This article is the second half in an inquiry into the debate between al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111) and Averroes

(1126-1198) on the metaphysical basis of modalities. The first article focused on Averroes' exposition of
the Arabic Aristotelian position on the eternity of the world and the modalities, as found in the ​Tahâfut
al-tahâfut,​ the "Incoherence of the Incoherence [of the Philosophers]" from ca. 1180.1 In this paper I
propose to sketch the outlines to a very different conception suggested by al-Ghazâlî in the T ​ ahâfut
al-falâsifa​ (1095) and quoted ​verbatim​ and commented upon by Averroes in the ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut.2 In
contrast to the naturalistic model of modalities propounded by

1
​Kukkonen, "Possible Worlds in the Tahâfut al-Tahâfut Averroes on Plenitude and Possibility," J​ ournal of the History of Philosophy
38 (2000) 329-348.
2
​I quote al-Ghazâlî primarily from the superlative new ​The Incoherence of the Philosophers. A parallel English-Arabic text
(henceforth abbreviated as ​T/I​), M. Marmura, ed., trans. (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1997). Any digressions from
Marmura's translation are noted. Because the debate in its entirety can be followed from the pages of Averroes' ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut,
references, where possible, are given also to that work: these are signalled by the abbreviation ​TT​ and are to the Arabic edition by
M. Bouyges, S.J. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930); Father Bouyges' Beirut edition of the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa​ from 1927 also
underlies Marmura's edition and translation. The English translation used—for quotations from Averroes, unless otherwise noted—is
Averroes' Tahâfut al-Tahâfut,​ S. Van Den Bergh, trans., 2 vols. (London: Luzac, 1954; abbr. ​II​). I also quote the Renaissance Latin
Juntine edition, ​Destructio Destructionum​ (henceforth ​DD)​ , in ​Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Cordubensis in eius Commentariis
(reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962), vol. 9. See the author's (2000), ibid., for a short introduction to the ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut
and for some references to the secondary literature.
Averroes, al-Ghazâlî develops an interpretation of possibility in which conceivability and co-assertability
are central. In several key respects al-Ghazâlî's approach mirrors that of John Duns Scotus in the
fourteenth century: it makes possible, for instance, a distinction between conceptual and natural
possibilities in a manner reminiscent of later Latin medieval theory, and, reflecting this, a distinction
between the (non-temporal) moments of conception and causation in the divine mind. The parallels
between al-Ghazâlî's and Augustine's basic conceptions, meanwhile, highlight the theological motives
lying at the heart of the new thinking.

As in the previous article, the dialectical form of Averroes' later​Tahâfut al-tahâfut​ is used for
critical insight. Averroes' criticism of al-Ghazâlî's modal theoretical innovations gives rise to an important
question about the lengths to which al-Ghazâlî's proposals could be taken. The issue is to an extent
unresolveable; one would do well to note why. Whereas Averroes' formulations in the ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut
are made readily understandable against the backdrop of his Aristotelian commentaries and wider
systematic teaching, it is less easy to determine how far al-Ghazâlî is willing to develop his own ideas.
The materials given in the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa​ leave the impression of being inconclusive and
3
open-ended—perhaps deliberately so—and the ambiguities are mirrored in al-Ghazâlî's other texts.
Taken as they stand, al-Ghazâlî's formulations retain a substantial Avicennian residue, for better or for
worse. This makes for a curious mixture of old and new in his overall scheme, a feature which Averroes
can exploit by criticizing al-Ghazâlî from a strict Aristotelian viewpoint (just as he criticized Avicenna),
while all the time maintaining that his adversary's proposals do not add up to a coherent and full-bodied
alternative to that venerable tradition. But Averroes' criticisms do not touch on the way al-Ghazâlî's
suggestions, vague as they may be, ​do​ represent a genuine breakthrough. Al-Ghazâlî's interpretation of
the modal terms bypasses the connection traditionally made between true possibility and temporal
instantiation. This allows for a freer handling of counterfactual possibilities, an important feature in any
refiguring of the limits of possibility.

2.
Al-Ghazâlî's innovations have their root in the idea of God freely choosing (arbitrating) between
alternatives equal to him. This simple kernel of an idea, seated in the ​kalâm​ conception of possibility,
allows for a recognition of the genuineness of synchronic alternatives: a seemingly small shift, but
all-important

3 On
​ al-Ghazâlî's non-committal and sometimes abtruse style see R. M. Frank, ​Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazâlî and Avicenna
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter-Universitätsverlag, 1992), 40-42.
 4
to the ensuing debate. Al-Ghazâlî has defended the notion of God's genuine choice earlier, but in
refuting "the third proof of the philosophers for the world's eternity," he begins to make systematic use of
the notion of possibility. A brief recapitulation of the philosophers' argument will serve to recall the
reasoning from which al-Ghazâlî takes his cue. The philosophers, in al-Ghazâlî's words, had argued that
even in the case that the world should have a temporal beginning,
The existence of the world is possible before its existence, since it is impossible for it to be impossible
and then to become possible. This possibility has no beginning; that is, it is ever established, the world's
possibility never ceasing since there is no temporal state whatsoever in which the world can be described
as impossible of existence. If, then, [this] possibility never ceases, the possible in conformity with
possibility also never ceases.5
Which is to say that the world or some objectified potentiality for its existence (which amounts to much the
6
same thing in al-Ghazâlî's and Averroes' minds) has existed and shall exist alongside God for all eternity.
This al-Ghazâlî cannot accept, not only because the concept of creation ​ex nihilo​ had by his time become
firmly embedded in Muslim theology but more importantly because a perpetual world by al-Ghazâlî's
7
estimation is shown in the last analysis to be unqualifiedly necessary and ultimately uncaused. The
principle of temporal creation must be defended against all possible affronts, and the opposite notion of
an eternalist universe must be shown to be an unviable one. Al-Ghazâlî duly proceeds to turn the
philosophers' proof upside down. Possibilities for God to initiate His creative act indeed stretch ​ad
8
infinitum​ into the past, this much al-Ghazâlî is willing to concede in the name of divine omnipotence. ​The
world's eternal possibility, however, does not equal its possible eternality, because "the principle of being
temporally created is specified: for it is the

4 ​See his discussion of the meaning of the term "will" and the relevance this bears on the cosmological question in the First Discussion, ​T/I,​ 21ff. (​TT,​ 34ff.; ​II,​ 18ff.; ​DD,​ f.
22Lff.).
5 ​T/I,​ 39.10-13, wit​h one minor alteration (I have rendered ​mumtanaʾ al-wujûd​ as "impossible of existence" in order to highlight the Avicennian connection). Cf. also ​TT,​ 97.5-8;
II,​ 57; ​DD,​ f. 33L.
6 ​For a more detailed study of the philosopher's clearly problematic argument and of Averroes' interpretation see the author's ​Possible Worlds in the Tahâfut al-tahâfut.
Averroes on Plenitude and Possibility​ in a previous issue of this journal (cf. n. 1).
7 ​Re-reading Avicenna's proof from contingency, al-Ghazâlî repeatedly insists that the only sensible meaning of the term "possible existent" is "caused" and that a "necessary
existent," in contradistinction, has no need for a cause. Cf., e.g., ​T/I,​ 81.20-82.5 (​TT,​ 277.16-278.6; ​II,​ 164-165; ​DD,​ f. 72C-D); ​T/I,​ 123 (​TT,​ 414; ​II,​ 250; ​DD,​ f. 103F-H). For
discussion see L. E. Goodman, "Ghazâlî's Proof from Creation," ​International Journal of Middle East Studies​ 2 (1971): 67-85; cf. also H. A. Davidson, ​Proofs for Eternity,
Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy​ (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 366-375.
8 ​T/I,​ 40.3-5, 40.7-8 (​TT,​ 97.11-13, 98.6-7; ​II,​ 57; ​DD,​ f. 33M-34A, f. 34B).
 9
possible, nothing else." This is to say that an eternal world is not a possibility, but is instead an
impossibility. It is something not even God could bring about, because such a world, infinite in past
extension, would constitute a violation of the rules of logic, as witnessed by the Aristotelian ban on an
10
actual infinite.
The world [is such] that it is eternally possible for it to be temporally originated. No doubt then that there is
no [single] moment of time but wherein its creation could not but be conceived, but if it is supposed to
exist eternally, then it would not be temporally originated. The factual then would not be in conformity with
11
possibility, but contrary to it.
God's eternal (as in timeless) possibility to realize the world does not translate into the world's possible
eternality, but into a single, limited actualization in time; this actualization, on the other hand, can be of
12
any given extension. The analogy here is with space, which like time can be of any other measure ​but
infinite.
This leads to an interesting observation. The world could have been created larger or smaller, "older" and
13
"younger" ​a parte ante​ than it was; and yet it wasn't. The case regarding the age of the world tells us
that world histories of different length are genuinely alternative lines of action for God and his creative
power. Clearly then the notion of possibility does not automatically imply a temporal instantiation the way
the philosophers would have it: it is not the case that everything that is possible must be realized sooner
14
or later. Rather, invoking the notion of possibility points to the presence of a genuine synchronic
alternative to how things ​de facto​ happen to be. The purported contingency of the world's spatial
dimensions confirms this observation. Contrary to the philosophers' beliefs about the necessity of
15
precisely this current world in all its aspects, al-Ghazâlî would have us contemplate the possibility

9 ​T/I,​ 40.14-15: the translation is mine, but differs little from Marmura's. (Cf. n. 27 for details.) Paralleled in ​TT,​ 98.13: alternative translations in ​II,​ 58; ​DD,​ f. 34C-D.
10 ​Al-Ghazâlî invokes the proof for creation from the impossibility of an actual infinite and an infinite regress in a passage parallel to the one at hand, which suggests he has it in
mind here. Cf. ​T/I,​ 47.11-48.4 (​TT,​ 119.1-7; ​II,​ 70; ​DD,​ f. 38D-E); and for a more full presentation, ​T/I,​ 18.10-19.15. In Goodman's (1971, 177) estimate, the proofs from infinity
are al-Ghazâlî's strongest counterarguments for the impossibility of the world's eternality; Averroes (e.g., ​TT,​ 223.1-2; ​II,​ 133; ​DD,​ f. 60H) seems to concur.
11 ​T/I,​ 40.7-9 (​TT,​ 98.6-8; ​II,​ 57; ​DD,​ f. 34B).
12 ​Al-Ghazâlî's exposition displays a remarkable sensitivity to the nature of the Aristotelian conception of the infinite. Even if the possibility for the world's coming to be is
extended ​ad infinitum,​ this never amounts to actual infinity. This is to say that all worldly extensions are extendable without limit, but still they remain one and all limited as
extensions ​per definitionem,​ as soon as we commit to them as being actual reality.
13 ​Cf. ​T/I,​ 40.9-14 (​TT,​ 98.8-12; ​II,​ 57-8; ​DD,​ f. 34B-C).
14 ​This common contention of the philosophers, known as "the principle of plenitude," is discussed in the first part of this article.
15 ​ Cf. al-Ghazâlî's own testimony on how the philosophers might be thought to object on behalf of the necessity of the current arrangement, ​T/I,​ 38.12-13 (cf. also Averroes'
addenda, TT,​ 90.10-91.12; ​II,​ 53; ​DD,​ f. 32F-I). Al-Ghazâlî responds in characteristic fashion: "if the world as it is cannot be greater or smaller," as the philosophers say, "then its
existence is necessary, not possible. But the necessary has no need for a cause." (​T/I,​ 38.19-21; ​TT,​ 91.14-15; ​II,​ 53; ​DD,​ f. 32K).
 that God could perfectly well have created the world another size. Possibilities are weighed as alternative
states of affairs, as indexes of might-have-beens: one world's coming to be at the expense of another is
exactly what is ​meant​ by its possibility (i.e., contingency). It is a show of God's superior activity as First
Cause and Arbitrator that exactly this world was brought into being where no other was.
Al-Ghazâlî wants to ground the usage of the term "possible" in what lies within God's power to realize.
Although his initial drive in his refutation of the "third proof" is only to cast doubt on the interpretation of
the modal terms on which the philosophers rely, the alternative conception hinted at here has some very
interesting possible implications, some of which are substantiated by al-Ghazâlî himself further on in the
Tahâfut.​ First, however, a note on what al-Ghazâlî is ​not​ prepared to say.

3.
The line of thinking sketched out above would, if followed through, presumably entail that there is an
infinity of unrealized ​possibilia,​ as for every actual state of affairs that God chooses to bring into existence
there are seemingly countless variants that might hold just as well but don't. About these al-Ghazâlî says
nothing further in the context of the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa,​ much to our disappointment.16 The omission may
be due to the fact that al-Ghazâlî still wants to hold on to the primacy of the actual and the necessitation
of the current world order, for what are evidently theological reasons. Al-Ghazâlî's ideas on the twofold
modal status of the created world can be described as follows.
Considered in themselves all states of affairs should be deemed radically contingent: everything could be
other than it is. In the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa​ al-Ghazâlî cites a number of examples from our actual reality,
some familiar, some unexpected and seemingly radical; and presumably the list could be expanded at
17
will. But this is only half the story. As chosen and executed by

16 ​For al-Ghazâlî's treatment of the question elsewhere see Frank 1992, 52-55. Frank surmises that al-Ghazâlî would, as a concomitant to his theory, accept the notion of an
infinity of unrealized particular states of affairs. These would be indexed as alternatives on a familiar scale of contraries and contradictories. He would not, however, postulate
there being any more ​kinds​ of possible beings than there are in actuality, as all essences are included in the pre-eternal "Throne," a Sufi refiguring on al-Ghazâlî's part of the
domain of intelligible reality in Avicenna.
17 ​In one instance, al-Ghazâlî takes up two examples that are deliberately trivial: the overall direction of the celestial movements (​T/I,​ 25.1-15; ​TT,​ 41; ​II,​ 24-25; [Averroes'
summary] ​DD,​ f. 23D-E) and the placing of the poles (​T/I,​ 26.18-20, 27.6-18; ​TT,​ 52; ​II,​ 30; ​DD,​ f. 24L-M). For some novel applications given in the context of a critique of the
causal principle, cf. e.g. ​T/I,​ 169.19-170.22 (​TT,​ 529.7-530.17; ​II,​ 323-324; ​DD,​ f. 131I-132C).
God, the actuality of the world's present state and its entire history are made necessary in the strictest
sense of the word. God's omnipotence and His unchanging Will are sufficient reason for the world to be
as it is; they are an indetermined determining factor which requires no further explanation and which no
18
other principles can add to, alter, or shake. Presuming that the Will of God is unchanging and eternal,
this means that on the plane of created actuality the whole of the world's history is in fact determined and
in that sense necessary. In general outline, al-Ghazâlî's conception corresponds to the one put forward
19
earlier by Augustine. For the notion of God's providential plan to make sense, He must be understood
as making a genuine decision and thus as having a genuine choice, and for this to happen counterfactual
possibilities have to be regarded as genuine. On the other hand, God's almightiness and immutability
dictate that the choice, once made, has to be final and unalterable.20 The twin theological notions carry
21
wide philosophical implications; they present interesting philosophical puzzles, too, as any study of
22
Augustine's or al-Ghazâlî's thought or of their influence shows.

18 ​Cf., e.g., ​T/I,​ 22.1-9 (​II,​ 19; not in the Bouyges edition of the ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut​ or in the ​DD​).
​ l-maqṣad al-asnâ fî sharḥ maʿ​ânî asmâ' Allâh al-ḥusnâ, F.A. Shehadi, ed. (Beirut: Dar
19 ​As parallels compare the explanation given by al-Ghazâlî to God's way of creating in A
el-Machreq Éditeurs, 1986), 79.18-81.11 with Augustine, ​In Iohannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV,​ E. Evans, ed. (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), I.17; ​De Genesi ad litteram,​ I. Zycha,
ed. (Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1894), II.8.16-17, VI.10.17 and ff.; ​Confessionum Libri XIII,​ P. Knöll, ed. (Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1896), XII.20-21.
20 ​Both the Neoplatonist and the Ashʿarite universes are thoroughly necessitated and determined: their difference according to al-Ghazâlî lies in the role played by the divine
attributes. In the theological conception, God's attributes are something additional to the essence and as such do not dictate His actions: the latter rise from the deliberation of a
free will and are executed through the separate attribute of power. (Cf. ​T/I,​ 52.22-53.1; ​TT,​ 141.6-8; ​II,​ 83; ​DD,​ f. 43E.) The Neoplatonic philosophers, by contrast, destroy God's
choice and deliberation by arguing that all of God's actions follow necessarily from his essence: cf. al-Ghazâlî's discussion of the theme in ​T/I,​ 55-59(​TT,​ 147ff.; ​II,​ 87ff.; ​DD,​ f.
44Kff.). (I thank Professor Marmura for bringing the point to my attention.)
21 ​A look at their prospective answers again betrays the close affinites between the two thinkers. To the "why not sooner?" argument, both reply that because time was created
together with the world and with movement there was no "before" before the first moment of creation (al-Ghazâlî, ​T/I,​ 31.13-20 [​TT,​ 65.11-66.5; ​II,​ 38; ​DD,​ f. 27F-G]; Augustine,
Confessionum,​ XI.13.15; Augustine, ​De civitate Dei,​ B. Dombart and A. Kalb, eds. [Turnhout: Brepols, 1955], XI.6). Willing a change, furthermore, does not necessarily involve a
change in the will (al-Gha​zâlî, ​T/I,​ 15.16-17​ [​TT,​ 7.6-9; ​II,​ 3; ​DD,​ f. 15L-M], 17.6-15 [​TT,​ 13.3-10; ​II,​ 6-7; ​DD,​ f. 17D-E]; Augustine, ​Confessionum,​ XI.10.12; ​De civitate Dei,​ XI.4,
XII.15, XII.18, XXII.2).
22 ​Augustine's ideas provided the incentive for new ways of thinking about the modalities in 12th century Latin Christendom. Al-Ghazâlî's treatment has the benefit of being
more fully articulated in terms of Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy; however twelfth century Christian philosophical theology managed to bring logical exactitude and a
rather more detached perspective to the discussion. For the Latin medieval history, see S. Knuuttila, ​Modalities in Medieval Philosophy​ (London: Routledge, 1993), 62-98.
Nothing that created being can do can alter the fact that history will come to be exactly as God has
ordained it.23 We can only marvel at the fact that evidently all sorts of other possibilities (other worlds)
24
never come to pass. Al-Ghazâlî puts the point succinctly when he explains in another work why we call
God ​al-Hakâm,​ "the Arbitrator," and why we need not worry about what tomorrow may bring:
The religious profit to be gained from beholding this attribute of God most high is to know that the matter
is settled and not to be appealed. For the pen is already dry . . . it is necessary that it [whatever comes to
be] exist: if it is not necessary in itself, it will be necessary by the eternal decree which is irresistible. So
man learns that what lies within [divine] power shall come to exist (​al-maqdûr kâ'in),​ and that anxiety is
superfluous.25
Al-Ghazâlî when he takes God to be (atemporally) choosing between worlds of different age leans back
on the ​kalâm​ notion of the world's particularization. This particularization is a choice made by God on the
basis of His status as the divine Arbitrator (​murajjiḥ). Inasmuch as the possible is defined as being an
26
object of power (​maqdûr​), al-Ghazâlî's approach is consistent with the standard practice and
terminology of Ashʿarite philosophical theology. But this conception leads to problems of its own
regarding the reality of unrealized

23 ​This rather fatalist notion was a popular theme in Islamic theology, no doubt partly due to its provocative nature in questions regarding, e.g., personal salvation. For
background to the question, cf. H. A. Wolfson, ​The Philosophy of the Kalam​ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 601ff.; E. M. Ormsby, ​Theodicy in Islamic
Thought​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 16-27.
24 ​In one instructive passage al-Ghazâlî hints that God's real possibilities are linked to our epistemic possibilities. We can see that both future eternity and future annihilation (of
the world) are possible for God: but "if it has become evident that we do not deem it rationally remote for the world's duration to be everlasting, but regard either rendering it
eternal in the future or annihilating it as [both] possible, then which of the two possibilities becomes fact is only known through the revealed law. Hence the examination of this
[question] is not connected with what is rationally apprehended." (​T/I,​ 48.4-6; ​TT,​ 119.7-9; ​II,​ 70; ​DD,​ f. 38F.) The matter is decided for us and the truth therefore strictly
necessary in that sense, but insight in the matter is gained not by philosophizing, but through revelation.
​ l-maqṣad al-asnâ, 103.1-6. Translation taken with slight alterations from A
25 ​Al-Ghazâlî, A ​ l-Ghazâlî on the Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God. Al-maqṣad al-asnâ fî sharḥ
ma​ʿâ
​ nî asmâ' Allâh al-ḥusnâ, D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, trans. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1992), 90.
26 ​Cf., e.g., ​T/I,​ 38.13 (​TT,​ 90.1; ​II,​ 52; ​DD,​ f. 32D); 178.10-11 (​TT,​ 535.17-18; ​II,​ 328; ​DD,​ f. 133I); 179.5-7 (​TT,​ 536.2-4; ​II,​ 329; ​DD,​ f. 133M). The term m
​ urajjiḥ is evoked in
the very opening of the ​Tahâfut​ debate: cf. ​T/I,​ 13.8-14 (​TT,​ 4.5-10; ​II,​ 1; ​DD,​ f. 15C-E); On God as ​murajjiḥ in the ​kalâm​, cf., e.g., W. L. Craig, ​The Cosmological Argument from
Plato to Leibniz​ (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1980), 55-57; and on particularization arguments in medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy, Davidson 1987, 174-203. The
​ urajjiḥ as ​inclinans​ in the medieval Latin translations (cf., e.g., ​DD,​ f. 15C-D) nicely preserves the senses of "weighing factor" or "tipper of scales" conventionally
rendition of m
associated with the arguments from particularization. Rendering ​maqdûr​ as ​attributum posse​ is likewise insightful.
possibilities. If "God decides for the existent that it will exist and for the non-existent that it will not exist,"
and if His will is eternal and unaltered, then what relevance does talking of unrealized possibilities have?
Apparently, God holds in his Will an infinite amount of both compatible and incompatible, indeed what are
mostly clearly contradictory propositions. The partitioning of these into the willed and unwilled, realized
and unrealized does not yet sufficiently explain the nature and status of pure ​possibilia.​ Their relatedness
to each other and their relationship to the proper modal notions must still be explicated. As it stands, the
ontological and possibly even logical status of the purported other possible worlds is left on some very
27
shaky grounds.
4.
In a sense the distinction runs between well nigh everything's being possible when considered in itself,
judging only from the formal aspect of its possibility (​formaliter​); and everything's being determined and
necessitated on the causal plane (​principiative​). When al-Ghazâlî remarks in the "third proof" that "the
principle of being temporally created is specified: for it is the possible, nothing else," he refers as much to
28
his conception of divine determination as he does to the necessity of creation in time. The twofold
approach is so clear-cut in its application as to recall the Latin distinction made by John Duns Scotus over
two centuries later. Although al-Ghazâlî never raises the issue in these exact terms, it is illuminating to
consider separately causal necessitation and formal contingency.
The idea of necessitation by determination is at once a ​kalâm​ notion and one reminiscent of Avicenna's
modal metaphysics. The term ​mutac​ ​ayyan,​ qualifying the world as "specified," may be seen to allude to
the ​kalâm​ conception of God as Arbitrator between ​per se​ equally possible alternatives. The notion is one
​ ahâfut al-falâsifa​ and one which Averroes expends
that al-Ghazâlî defends at some length in the T
considerable energy refuting. It was lent philosophical

27 ​In Latin scholasticism possible worlds were conceived of as residing in the infinite divine intellect, but in Islamic theology this would be more problematic because of the
controversial nature of the question concerning divine attributes. In Sufi mysticism and in mystical theology, an equivalent to the scholastic idea is figured as a question
concerning the Tablet or the pre-eternal Qur'ân, which discloses the whole of God's will for all eternity. The infinity of the possibles inscribed in the Tablet is a theme in, e.g., Ibn
Arabî's thought (for materials, cf. W. K. Chittick, ​The Self-Disclosure of God. Principles of Ibn Arabî's Cosmology​ [Albany: SUNY Press, 1997], 31ff. and esp. 66-72).
28 ​In fact the translation of the passage allows for two interpretations. The Arabic reads "wa-asl kawni-hi hâdith-an mutacayyan fa inna-hu al-mumkin la ghayr" (​T/I,​ 40.14-15;
TT,​ 98.13). Marmura has filled out the last clause to read "for [the temporally created world alone] is possible, no other"; however taken in itself the suffix ​-hu​ could just as well
refer to the determining principle (​aṣl) as to the originatedness (​âdith​) of the world. (​II,​ 58 and ​DD,​ f. 34D both incline towards this interpretation.) This being said, let the
judgment of each now be their own ​murajjiḥ.
credence by (again) Avicenna, who defined the "possible in itself" as something neither existing nor yet
not existing on its own. From its formally possible nature, Avicenna claims, anything possible (that is,
allowing) of existence needs some determining factor to either render it actual or to condemn it to
29
non-actuality. Nothing short of God Himself is assured of existence merely by virtue of its nature alone.
Al-Ghazâlî follows closely Avicenna's reasoning from God's necessary existence to "essential," pure
possibility and finally to God-necessitated contingent reality (now in explaining how God is Truth):
And that which is possible in its essence, necessary by something else is in a way reality and in a way
nullity. For it has no existence by virtue of its essence, and this is nullity: and it is given existence from
another . . . and in this way it is [has] a reality. And because of this the Exalted says: "Everything perishes
except His face." . . . And this also applies to assertions, as when someone speaks a truth or a falsity. As
concerns this, the truest of statements is your saying: "There is no God but God," for it is correct forever
and eternally, by virtue of its essence and not by virtue of another.30
Support for the idea of existentially indeterminate possibility can be found even in Aristotle, who in the
31
Metaphysics​ says of the possible that "it is that for which it is possible to exist or not to exist." Ironically,
the formulation is quoted in the ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut​ as well; not by al-Ghazâlî, however, but by Averroes,
32
who would have it to be nothing less than a definition of possibility. Averroes' use of the passage gives
an indication of just how distant his and al-Ghazâlî's conceptions of the construction of the domain of the
possible are from each other. Averroes chooses to understand by the "possible non-existent"

29 ​There is a wealth of presentations of Avicenna's modal metaphysics available: L. E. Goodman's, in ​Avicenna​ (London: Routledge, 1992, 49-122) offers a suitably dialectical
approach and a decent (perhaps more importantly, recent) documentation of the literature in the notes
30 ​Al-maqṣad al-asnâ, 137.9-13, 138.10-12. Richard Frank (1992, 62) notes how al-Ghazâlî plays on the double connotations of "truth" and "reality" of the term ​al-aqq​ (the
translation of the first part of the above quotation is based on Frank's). Consequently, it is difficult to determine what exactly al-Ghazâlî has in mind with his cryptic last remark.
Does he refer to the common notion of eternally true sentences being thereby necessary? Or does he believe in a stronger sense of God's very idea verifying itself, in a manner
reminiscent of Anselm? The matter cannot be pursued here, but al-Ghazâlî's remarks remain intriguing.
31 Met.​ IX.8, 1050b11. Cf. the Arabic in, e.g., Averroes' ​Long Commentary on the​ Metaphysics: ​Tafsîr mâ ba​ʿd
​ aṭ-ṭabîʿ​at,​ M. Bouyges, S.J., ed. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique,
1938-48), vol. 2, 1196.5-6; and for Averroes' comments, op.cit., 1199.
32 ​TT,​ 105.2 (​II,​ 61; ​DD,​ f. 35F). The quotation is none too exact, as Averroes would rather have the definition of the possible to be that of "the non-existence that is in readiness
to exist or not to exist" (​al-mumkin huwa al-ma​ʿ​dûm lladhî yatahayya'u an yawjuda wa-lâ yawjuda​). I have yet to find this particular formulation in any of Averroes' works or in the
Arabic Aristotle: cf. ​Met.​ XIV.2, 1089a28, where Aristotle states something to the effect that "generation is from the potential, which is said not to exist." The significance of the
formula in its ​Tahâfut​ context is to defend the idea of perpetual creation and to demonstrate the tacit acceptance of philosophical doctrine by the Muʿtazilites.
the potency of a thing that resides in matter, which sure enough is not actually existent nor totally
33
non-existent. But even though Averroes' interpretation fits in well with its purported context (Aristotle's
34
Metaphysics,​ book 9, whose main theme is the theory of potentiality and actuality), in the ​Tahâfut
al-tahâfut​ his explanation still carries a certain awkwardness. In Averroes' scheme, all possibilities are
reduced to natural capacities inhering in subjects, to properties with a subsistence all their own. The
Avicennian line of interpretation with its emphasis on the formal contingency of any thing considered in
itself would seem to hold a certain elegance over Averroes' naturalistic interpretation. Certainly it
highlights more the modal character of "formal" or logical possibility. It is al-Ghazâlî's formal definition of
possibility that we shall turn to next.

5.
In his refutation of "the philosophers' fourth proof" al-Ghazâlî develops his argumentation concerning the
correct interpretation of the modal terms. The philosophers had argued for the eternity of the world from
the interpretation of possibility as preceding potentiality: exactly the interpretation offered by Averroes in
​ ahâfut al-falâsifa,​ purports to
the last section. Al-Ghazâlî, who sets up the scene for the debate in the T
challenge the whole philosophical construction. In al-Ghazâlî's mind, a simpler and truer interpretation of
the modalities warrants no such conclusions as the philosophers would claim. The point around which
al-Ghazâlî's reasoning turns is that all modal judgments are in the last resort formed in the mind, by the
intellect. This can only mean that the determining of the modal status of a proposition or a thing can in the
final analysis only concern intellectual concepts in themselves and their relations to each other: no
reference to outside factors, such as real existence, is needed.
The possibility which they have mentioned reverts to a judgment of the mind. Anything whose existence
the mind supposes, [nothing] preventing its supposing it, we call "possible," and if prevented we call
"impossible"; and if it is unable to suppose its nonexistence, we name it "necessary." For these are
35
rational propositions that do not require an existent so as to be rendered a description thereof.
The idea is based on the definition of possibility in the ​Prior Analytics​ with its emphasis on the
36
compatibility of things when "presumed actualized." The novelty lies in al-Ghazâlî's last claim, which
shifts the locus of this presumption

33 ​TT,​ 105.2-106.10 (​II,​ 61-62; ​DD,​ f. 35F-H).

34 ​See also ​Met.​ VII.7, 1032a12-22; ​De gen. et corr.​ II.9, 335a33-34.
35 ​T/I,​ 42.2-5(​TT,​ 102.11-14; ​II,​ 60; ​DD,​ f. 34L-M).
36 ​Aristotle, ​An. Pr.​ I.13, 32a18-20. Apparently, Aristotle only wants to test the compatibility of the tentative possibility with the known facts of ​our​ world history (cf. ​De caelo et
mundo​ I.12); this of course is a gross error, and al-Ghazâlî's widening of the principle's application welcome.
from the plane of actualized reality onto the plane of mental conceivability. This single move shatters at
one stroke the basis for both the statistical and potency interpretations of modality. Given the high level of
existential commitment in most modal theories prior to al-Ghazâlî, this is certainly a novel development.
Although al-Ghazâlî does not wish to present just any imaginative representations as a viable basis for
the defining of possibilities (note the qualificatory "rational," ʿ​ aql​îy​), he does maintain that the domain of
37
possibility can be explored independently of what we take to actually exist in the world. What this
amounts to is a kind of differentiation between "conceptual" and "natural" possibilities (as noted, in the
natural world God has in fact determined all things to be exactly the way they are). The domain of
conceptual possibilities is in the process appreciably liberated from the naturalistic constraints that
threaten to overwhelm the Aristotelian scheme.
What kind of "obstacles to supposition" would count as genuine limitations to what it is rational to maintain
as possible? Contrary to what his choice of words might indicate, al-Ghazâlî does not wish to give any
subjectivist account of the possible. In the context of "the philosophers' second proof" we find one simple
modal definition based on the Law of Contradiction: "The impossible consists of conjoining negation and
38
affirmation. All impossibilities reduce to this." In the Seventeenth Discussion, or the first "About the
natural sciences" a more careful, one could say conventional, definition of possibility and impossibility is
given.
The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while
denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one [of them]. What does not reduce to
39
this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within [divine] power.
40
As Lenn Goodman has pointed out, the central claim here is the second one. It brings back into the
picture the whole Aristotelian scheme of genus and differentia, of essences and accidental properties, in
short: all the normative relations regarding what goes with what. This is certain to prove a weak point,

37 ​Cf. the exposition in ​T/I,​ 44.8-18 (​TT,​ 109.18-110.7; ​II,​ 64-65; ​DD,​ f. 36D-F), where al-Ghazâlî boldly claims that the objects of modal judgments, like all objects of knowledge
"have no existence in the concrete—so [much so] that the philosophers have declared that universals exist in the mind, not in the concrete." This, of course, is something
Averroes as a naturalistically inclined Aristotelian very much objects to—"what an ugly and crude sophism!" he is moved to exclaim at one point (​TT,​ 111.17-18; ​II,​ 66; ​DD,​ f.
36K-L). But Averroes' markedly immanentist explanation of the nature of the universals (​TT,​ 110.8-111.14; ​II,​ 65-66; ​DD,​ f. 36F-K) only serves to point to the very different and
ultimately Avicennian roots of al-Ghazâlî's conception. Cf. 7 below for details.
38 ​T/I,​ 38.17-18 (​TT,​ 90.7-8; ​II,​ 53; ​DD,​ f. 32F).
39 ​T/I,​ 175.5-7 (​TT,​ 536.2-4; ​II,​ 329; ​DD,​ f. 133M).
40 ​Goodman 1992, 186-187.
and Averroes will seize the opportunity to criticize al-Ghazâlî for conceding it (cf. below, §VIII). For now it
is enough to note that al-Ghazâlî wishes to keep the discussion concerning even absolute (or God's)
possibilities on respectable rational grounds. There are definite and objective limits to what can be
rationally maintained to exist at one time: and these limits of compatibility, either in the rational mind or in
actual reality, are at the same time the limits of genuine possibility.41 For al-Ghazâlî, then, if a thing is truly
possible, then it is compossible (with those other facts that are assumed to be true).
The compossibility relation envisioned here has two primary dimensions. We may consider independently
the compatibility of propositions (which in an Aristotelian setting means primarily the limits of possible
predication) and the compossibility of physical realities. The two facets are of course interconnected (as
could be surmised already on the basis of the quotation from al-Ghazâlî above, and as becomes
abundantly clear when one considers, e.g., the Aristotelian model of demonstrative science set forward in
the ​Posterior Analytics​). For purposes of exposition they are handled here separately. We shall begin by
considering the limits of possibility on the plane of physical reality and then move on to the more general
possibilities of predication and quiddity. While the former investigation highlights the more radical side to
al-Ghazâlî's thought, an inquiry into the latter reveals the self-imposed limits to that self-same radicalism.

6.
Once the minimal condition of compossibility is met, there seems to be very little that can be said to be
truly impossible on the plane of physical reality. Keeping in mind the criticism leveled by al-Ghazâlî at the
purported necessity of the causal nexus in the (justly famous) Seventeenth Discussion, it seems
especially and emphatically to be the case that from a logical point of view, it is possible for everything to
be different from one moment to the next. This provides an interesting application of the principle of
compossibility. "Possible worlds" for al-Ghazâlî can have the meaning of coherent world-descriptions
without temporal content, discrete time-slices of the universe, as it were. All successive possible worlds
created in sequence by Godfrom nothing in turn make up one larger "possible world," which retains
absolute formal contingency in spite of its having been necessitated by God's ordinance.
The combination of a seemingly thoroughgoing possibilism with what is a fairly standard description of an
Atomist ​kalâm​ universe accounts for much of

41 ​And even of divine power: al-Ghazâlî quite explicitly states that "the impossible is not within the power [of being enacted]" (​T/I,​ 179.5; Marmura rightly fills out the sentence in
its most general sense).
the more extraordinary description al-Ghazâlî wishes to present for our approval in the famous
42
"occasionalist" passages of the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa.​ There is no need to go into these materials in detail,
but al-Ghazâlî's motivations in presenting them are worth briefly considering. Al-Ghazâlî considers it vital
that man accept that from a logical point of view, there is no compulsion on God's part to conjoin events
and states of affairs in any given order. Man cannot with any certainty ascertain any fixed or single way
the so-called potentialities work, for instance; nor can he infer from a man's behavior the fate that will
43
befall that person in the afterlife. While there is certainly a conventional order of things, this might just as
well or indeed more probably be otherwise (after all, from a logical point of view it should in all probability
be considered wildly improbable that the conventional order is preserved so immaculately). Al-Ghazâlî's
metaphysics of contingency is meant as a propaedeutic to the proper understanding of a metaphysics of
44
grace, to borrow two of Lenn Goodman's appellations. As the world could have been constructed in a
way radically different from the way it was (most probably a lot worse), and as it might just as well be
utterly annihilated in the very next moment, or in the moment after that, it is only proper that we prostrate
before this vision of utter contingency. Because of this very contingency we should give praise for the fact
that from all possible worlds and world histories, God has chosen to put us in this one most blessed and
45
beneficial to us.
The conventional and seemingly law-like order of happenings in the world is put there solely for our
benefit: without the decisive factor of God's goodwill weighing in our favor, the world would be relegated
to the chaotic flux of mere happenstance. This is the context in which al-Ghazâlî sees the relevance for

42 ​The occasionalist debate is discussed in, e.g., M. Fakhry, ​Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas​ (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1958),
and B. S. Kogan, ​Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation​ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985). Cf. also n. 68 below.
43 ​The latter question was important in determining the extent of the community of Believers in this life: the so-called Khârijite controversy about predestination and knowledge
of it was the first known theological debate in Islam.
44 ​Both cited in Goodman 1992, 59. For the theological motives underlying al-Ghazâlî's twofold conception of the modal status of the world see E. M. Ormsby, "Creation in Time
with Special Reference to al-Ghazâlî," in D. B. Burrell and B. McGinn, eds., ​God and Creation​ (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1990), 246-264; cf. also Ormsby
1984, ​passim.
45 ​It is of some interest that an approach similar to al-Ghazâlî's can be found in current theistical interpretations of the inflationary expanding universe. Modern cosmology has
estimated that the present, life-permitting and highly ordered state of the universe required for its coming to be certain initial conditions that were in effect during the very first
moments of the history of the universe, initial conditions whose instantiation—among a seemingly bewilderingly wide variety of alternatives—should be deemed highly
improbable in itself. According to the theistic interpretation, this goes to show that a special providence was at work at that time and allowed for our inhabitable world to exist.
For discussion see, e.g., J. Leslie, ​Universes​ (London: Routledge, 1989), 1-65; P. Davies, ​The Mind of God​ (London: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 98-105.
 humanity of true possibility. It is also indicative of the dangers Averroes associates with al-Ghazâlî's
view. For Averroes, giving such a wide berth to possibilities as al-Ghazâlî does demotes humanity to an
irremediable state of ignorance and the world itself to bare chaos. No matter that al-Ghazâlî tries to
salvage some of the world's dignity by giving it stability based on convention: if everything that follows in a
time-sequence is in itself equally possible, then nothing has a true stable nature of its own but all things
mingle with everything. Such a world, always potentially fluctuating in chaos, is in Averroes' estimation
more non-existent than existent, and as such hardly worthy of a benevolent and almighty God's
46
attentions. Far less still could it be considered the prime manifestation of His wisdom and liberality.
In contrast to al-Ghazâlî's contingent universe, Averroes offers his traditional worldview in which the limits
of possibility are effectively secured and well-defined by a range of natural capacities and incapacities.
Here, the mind can come to recognize these by the same process by which it distills the correct nature of
47
the universals from the particularities of sense data. The benefits reaped from an unproblematized
isomorphism of the orders of reality, rationality and intelligibility so impress Averroes that he cannot
48
imagine any other arrangement that might secure the possibility of knowledge and order in the universe.
A vital part of this conception is that natural potentialities operate with a known regularity, in a larger
framework of statistical (that is, in the final analysis non-modal) accuracy. Naturally, this kind of conflation
of the possible with the real does not square well with a Theistic conception of divine choice.

46 ​For these points see ​TT,​ 411.13-413.15 (​II,​ 248-249; ​DD,​ f. 102M-103E); ​TT,​ 479.1-9 (​II,​ 291-292; ​DD,​ f. 118L-M); ​TT,​ 519.12-522.15 (​II,​ 318-319; ​DD,​ f. 129H-130D).
Averroes' approach, with its stark denial of arbitrariness as a component in any final explanation, shows affinity with another line of thought in modern modal cosmology:
so-called 'Selector' metaphysics. (Cp. Einstein's famous contention that "God does not play dice.") According to Derek Parfit, the argument in its simplest form goes
approximately as follows: if a feature in the world is found that would make it appreciably more orderly, beautiful, etc., than its alternatives, then that feature should in itself be
considered a viable 'Selector' for its coming about. This comes very close to the classical ideal of a rational and optimal creation, of which Averroes is but one proponent. (Cf. D.
Parfit, "The Puzzle of Reality," ​Times Literary Supplement,​ July 3rd, 1992; and cf. with John Leslie's "ethical requirement" in Leslie 1989, 165-173.) Some have found exactly the
traditional flavor of Parfit's reasoning to be less than promising: cf. S. Knuuttila, "Plenitude, Reason and Value: Old and New in the Metaphysics of Nature," in C.
Bengt-Pedersen and N. Thomassen, eds., ​Nature and Lifeworld. Theoretical and Practical Metaphysics​ (Odense: Odense University Press, 1998), 143-144.
47 ​See, e.g., ​TT,​ 110.8-111.8 (​II,​ 65; ​DD,​ f. 36G-L); compare with the sharp contrast set up by Averroes between the Ashʿarites and the philosophers in ​TT,​ 220.6-11 (​II,​ 131;
DD,​ f. 60C); and cf. also, e.g., ​TT,​ 520.9-522.15 (​II,​ 318-319; ​DD,​ f. 129K-130D); ​Tafsîr,​ vol. 2, 1132.7-11; ​Long Commentary on the Physics,​ in ​AOACC,​ vol. 4, II, comm. 78
(esp. f. 78A).
48 ​Knuuttila has contended that this sort of premodern conception "offers a romantic non-Kantian answer to the question of what comprehension of things is . . . attractive to
many people" even today. (Knuuttila 1998, 148.) For an excellent study on Averroes' views on the subject cf. Kogan 1985.
What we find in al-Ghazâlî's critique of philosophical necessitarianism, therefore, is a break from Greek
naturalism similar in motivation and execution to the one initiated in twelfth-century Christian thought; only
this one finds an instant critic in Averroes, a philosopher deeply steeped in the spirit of Greek thought and
unapologetic about bringing forth its concerns.
The clash is what makes the ​Tahâfut​ debate such invigorating reading: but it should not detract us from
noticing the subtleties in both thinkers' positions. Just as Averroes is willing to modify his Aristotelian
formulations to accommodate tenets of Monotheist faith, so also al-Ghazâlî is anxious to present his
theologically based worldview in respectable rational garb. The remainder of this article is devoted to
examining the concessions to philosophical parlance made by al-Ghazâlî, and the impact these have for
our view of his thought.

7.
When the possible is defined in terms of God's omnipotence, it becomes relevant to ask whether God's
actions define the domain of the possible or whether the realm of the (logically) possible is established
49
independently and itself forms the domain within which also God's power must operate. Al-Ghazâlî
never explicitly takes up the issue, and the indirect remarks he makes are not entirely consistent with
each other. Taken on face value, al-Ghazâlî maintains the ​kalâm​ approach, with its definition of possibility
as a correlate of divine power. Upon closer inspection, however, his scheme reveals itself to be much
closer to the philosophical world-view than he lets on.
We have already seen that al-Ghazâlî considers the formal rules of logic to be binding for the establishing
of possibilities. They have an objective validity even over God's power and His actions. In his initial
presentation of the "fourth proof" al-Ghazâlî furthermore cites the philosophers as saying that "[i]t is not
possible to say that the meaning of possibility reduces to its being [something] within the power [of
50
enactment] and to the Eternal's having the power [to enact it]." This is because a circular definition of the
kind "what

49 ​The idea of divine modal constructivism forms an important strand in Cartesian studies and in studies of early modern metaphysics: cf. H. G. Frankfurt, "Descartes on the
Creation of the Eternal Truths," ​Philosophical Review​ 86 (1977), reprinted in H. G. Frankfurt, ​Necessity, Volition, and Love​ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
24-41; L. Alanen, "Descartes, Conceivability and Logical Modality," in T. Horowitz and G. J. Massey, eds., ​Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy​ (Savage, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), 65-84; L. Alanen and S. Knuuttila, "The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and His Predecessors," in S. Knuuttila, ed.,
Modern Modalities. Studies in the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism​(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 1-69.
50 ​T/I,​ 41.13-14(​II,​ 59; not found in the Renaissance Latin or in the Bouyges Arabic of the ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut​). This is such an affront to established Ashʿarite teaching that one
would truly expect al-Ghazâlî to counter it right off the bat.
God can do is what it is possible for God to do" must be avoided. Averroes adds to our understanding of
the point by telling he had learned from al-Fârâbî that the definition quoted and discarded here had its
51
origins in John Philoponus. Averroes' testimony gives us both a pointer as to what al-Ghazâlî's sources
were and insight into his reasons for recalling this interpretation at this particular point.
Philoponus developed his interpretation in the course of refuting Aristotle's proof for the eternity of motion.
The refutation provided inspiration for several subsequent Theist theoreticians, who argued in a fashion
similar to Philoponus that God's initial creative activity operates according to rules different from those in
effect after the fact of creation. God requires no potentialities or matter as recipient to His actions: rather,
52
His and His alone should be the original power of true creation out of nothing. Now, from the point of
view of our study it is noteworthy that in spite of his defence in general of the possibility of a creation ​ex
nihilo,​ al-Ghazâlî here records the philosophers' repudiation of Philoponus' suggestions without objection.
Al-Ghazâlî, it seems, tacitly agrees with the philosophers that there must be other grounds for the defining
of possibilities than mere reference to the power of God. Al-Ghazâlî further admits in a number of other
passages that logical impossibilities are such that even God cannot bring them about. They are
impossible, not because God has chosen not to realize them, but because they are not "within the power
[of enactment]," to quote al-Ghazâlî and to borrow Marmura's filling out the phrase.
Presumably, what is within the power of enactment is defined primarily by the rules of consistency: God
must be consistent in His actions. But if the limits of the power of enactment ensue from the matrices that
come into sight when things are tested for their compatibility, then the limits of compossibility are a
transcendental transcending even God Himself. They form a sort of grid which determines the shape of
things that can come to be at a time. Surely, for al-Ghazâlî this conclusion is none too comfortable, yet it
is one he would be forced to admit, should he explicate in formal language what he cloaks here in the
traditional language of something's being or not being ​maqdûr.

8.
Al-Ghazâlî's presumed radicalism is further undermined when we examine the "occasionalist" examples
he employs with those of his Latin near contemporaries.

51 ​Averroes, ​Tafsîr​, vol. 3, 1498.5-7

52 ​Philoponus' views are quoted by Simplicius, ​In Aristotelis Physicorum quattuor posteriores libros,​ H. Diels, ed. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895), 1141.14-16, 1150.22-25. On the
subsequent history of this approach, see Davidson 1987, 30-39.
The latter were exceedingly interested in another form of counter-intuitive examples, namely those of ​per
impossibile​ predications, for reasons peculiarly their own. Their aim was roughly the same as
al-Ghazâlî's, that of determining the functioning of modal terms in extreme or counterfactual situations
and thus examining the outer limits of possibility. Popular examples included such notables as for
53
example "Socrates, who is a man, is a donkey." Now, we can see that al-Ghazâlî never goes quite this
far. Not once in his most radical occasionalist formulations does al-Ghazâlî propose that a thing might
have two natures; neither does he predicate something contrary or even unusual of anything at one and
the ​same​ time. No black thing ever has any quality contrary to its purported blackness, no horse ever ​is
anything contrary to its nature as a horse. At every point, at every Ashʿarite time-atom as it were,
al-Ghazâlî's universe is internally coherent as according to the most conventional rules of Aristotelian
predicate logic and its essentialist leanings. The conservative tenor of al-Ghazâlî's exposition is due to his
overwhelming reliance on Avicennian logic. The formal limitations imposed by the compossibility of
propositions may be thought to concern the syntactical aspects of possibility. The intentional features of
language, by contrast, impose what we might call semantical restrictions on the reach of compossibility. It
is in the atomic construction of the simple predicative sentence that we find al-Ghazâlî struggling in an
54
attempt to free himself from the conventions of Aristotelian modal theory.
Allan Bäck in a recent article has examined Avicenna's statements concerning the nature of necessary
predication. One of the lessons to be drawn from Bäck's presentation is that for Avicenna, quiddity has no
55
existential import, whereas in the determining of logical modality quiddity is all-important. Avicenna in his
metaphysics is quite ready to separate existence from essence;

53 ​For these predications, their use and context see S. Knuuttila, "Positio impossibilis and Medieval Discussions of the Trinity," in C. Marmo, ed., ​Vestigia, Imagines, Verba.
Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts​ (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 277-288. The medieval Latins explored the limits of logical language with an eye on determining
how far logic might be accomodating to theological formulations, what could and could not be done with it (compare the above predications with the formula "Christ incarnate
was both man and God," for example). They were not irrationalists, that is they did not wish to violate the Law of Contradiction; but they did probe the limits of Aristotelian
substance ontology by exploring the possibilities of predicating two natures of one being. And this, as we can see, is more than al-Ghazâlî is willing to attempt.
54 ​Another way of framing the situation is to distinguish between propositional logic, which proceeds hypothetically, and predicate logic, which from the outset displays a more
universal ambition in its truth-claims. Lenn Goodman (1992, 184-211) has suggested that the penchant of the ​mutakallimûn​ and Avicenna for propositional logic may reflect a
desire to confine the application of logic to hypothetical reasoning. For a related study see M. Maroth, ​Ibn Sînâ und die peripatetische "Aussagenlogik"​ (Leiden: Brill, 1989).
55 ​See A. Bäck, "Avicenna's Conception of the Modalities," ​Vivarium​ 30 (1992): 217-255.
in his logical writings he never seriously questions the necessity of quiddities ​qua​ quiddities. Indeed, all
questions of modalities are settled on the plane of quiddities, as those concerning the corresponding
propositions are resolved ​in intellectu.​ As Bäck points out, Avicenna's fully articulated conception strikes a
careful balance between logical possibilism and causal determinism. The domain of conceivable quiddity
may or may not follow the dictates of generic (Platonic) plenitude, while in the realm of corporeal,
temporal instantiation, the situation is more paradoxical and shows two sides: on the one hand, a strict
temporal plenitude regarding singular possibilities is firmly rejected (not all that can be deemed formally
possible will come to pass), on the other, the truly possible is that which is rendered actual and hence
necessary within the procession of emanation, and in this sense no genuine possibilities are after all left
unrealized. All this accords with what al-Ghazâlî has to say about the necessity of the actual. Necessary
truths are eternal, but not all eternal truths need from a formal point of view be necessary. (Presumably,
those concerning, e.g., God's essence are.) Further, logical possibilities need not be corporeally
actualized: but they do seem to be mind-dependent in a profound, and possibly problematic, way. And
finally, everything on the causal plane of existence is necessitated, unalterable and shows the only
possible way for things to be.
Al-Ghazâlî and Avicenna disagree when it comes to the nature of the ultimate determinant. For Avicenna
the emanation and projection of the intelligible plane onto the level of sensible existents makes the natural
world necessary in all its aspects, and this reflection proceeds with the force of necessity by virtue of
God's essential goodness. For al-Ghazâlî, it is ostensibly the free choice of God that determines the world
56
to be constructed as it is. But if Avicenna's philosophy and his logical treatises in particular were, as is
generally recognized, a profound influence on al-Ghazâlî, then Bäck's inquiry raises questions concerning
57
al-Ghazâlî as well. A common problem is the status of unrealized

56 ​Al-Ghazâlî's views on the nature of divine determination are anything but clear-cut and nothing if not subtle. Apparently he believed in the actual world's being the "best of all
possible worlds," as attested to by the highly controversial formula "there is not in possibility anything more wonderful than what is" (​laysa fî al-imkân abda​ʿ ​mimmâ kân​). A study
of the impact on Asharite theology of al-Ghazâlî's formulations is available in Eric Ormsby's ​Theodicy in Islamic Thought​ (1984). Ormsby offers a wealth of interesting material
and significant theological insights on the subject; the Appendix to the work (266-269) also provides several interesting examples showing how Avicennian formulations
concerning possibility were worked into theological manuals after al-Ghazâlî's example.
57 ​The following questions are taken over from Bäck (1992, 235). On al-Ghazâlî's love of logic and his proneness to treat syllogisms as the path to scientific knowledge see M.
E. Marmura, "Ghazâlî and Demonstrative Science," ​Journal of the History of Philosophy​ 3 (1965): 183-204; by the same author, "Ghazâlî's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and
Logic," in G. F. Hourani, ed., ​Essays on Islamic Science and Philosophy​ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1975), 100-111; cf. also Maroth 1989, 232-234.
 58
​possibilia,​ and more sharply of wholly imaginary possibilities. ​Both al-Ghazâlî and Avicenna struggle
with the apparent circularity of any definition of the possible based on a concept bearing the suffix "-able"
(as in "conceivable"), which again is reflected in the persistence of the question about psychologism in
their systems. Although we have seen that al-Ghazâlî wishes to establish the rationality and objectivity of
modal language, his statements concerning epistemological modalities are still most easily
understandable in subjectivist terms. This holds especially for his theory of impressed knowledge. An
examination of its critique in Averroes' ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut​ brings into spotlight the difficulties al-Ghazâlî
has in spanning the gap between strict Ashʿarite occasionalism and his own "cautious naturalism," as it is
59
dubbed by Lenn Goodman.

9.
Al-Ghazâlî at no point expresses a wish to abolish conventional philosophical terminology lock, stock, and
barrel. On the contrary, he claims adherence to it, provided that the terms are suitably interpreted. Matter
still functions as the recipient of the contrary forms, the principle of non-contradiction and the law of the
excluded middle are still very much in effect. Even the categorical divisions of substance from accident
and genus from genus remain firmly in place, contrary to what some theologians had claimed in their
60
exaggerated attempts at safeguarding God's omnipotence. When presenting his remarkable critique of
the causal principle in the course of defending the theological creed of God to effect miracles, al-Ghazâlî
is anxious to present the occasionalist revision as a totally justifiable, even if fairly extreme extension of
accepted Aristotelian theory. If change is explained in terms of forms interchanging in a common matter in
a duration of time, al-Ghazâlî urges us to consider, why could this not happen sometimes slower,
sometimes faster?

58 ​The problem, briefly put, is whether wholly phantasmagorical or synthesized images in the human intellect are to be regarded as possible or impossible, or whether the
question can in fact be determined at all. On Avicenna's treatment of the issue, see D. Black, "Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings," ​Documenti
e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale​ 8 (1997): 425-453 (cf. also Bäck 1992, 235). A presupposed plenitude in the divine mind might offer a solution as to the true modal
status of these images, but it hardly settles the question regarding our epistemological modalities.
59 ​Bäck considers a third perceived objection, whose roots are in the contention that all modal notions, including impossibilities, are supposed to have referents at least ​in
intellectu.​ The question is taken up by al-Ghazâlî in the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa​ and given short shrift by Averroes, who shrewdly replies that all the impossibilities most surely ​do
exist: in the actually existent world, they are present as the omnitemporal privations of impossible states of affairs. This, of course, only works in a naturalistic framework in
which all possibilities are capacities and all impossibilities incapacities. See ​T/I,​ 42.6-9 (​TT,​ 102.15-103.2; ​II,​ 60; ​DD,​ f. 34M-35A); and for Averroes' replies, ​TT,​ 103.7-104.2 (​II,
60-61; ​DD,​ f. 35B-C).
60 ​For these points see ​T/I,​ 175.8-176.13(​TT,​ 536.4-23; ​II,​ 329-330; ​DD,​ f. 133M-134E).
And if this is possible within a shorter time, there is no restriction to its being [yet] shorter. These powers
would thus accelerate in their actions, and through [this] there would come about what is a miracle for the
prophet.61
But are miracles of prophets the workings of natural potencies any longer? Consider: it is true, according
to the Aristotelian theory concerning starting and end-points of change, that there are no set limits to how
fast contrary qualities can succeed each other in a substrate; and this is true even in the case of
substantial change. As there is a first instant for some S's being P but no last, there is strictly speaking
still a period of time left for any S being P, no matter how quickly its change into not-P comes. Thus far
al-Ghazâlî seems to be correct. But this has nothing to do with the fact that potencies and actualities
generally require ​reasonable,​ not just any stretches of time in which they are to function and to be
operative. What is more, this feature of happening over time, in a reasonably law-like fashion, is
62
absolutely necessary if conceptual tools such as "potential" and "actual" are to have any value for​ us. Of
course, what al-Ghazâlî wishes to do here is merely to establish that possible states of affairs can in
principle succeed one another arbitrarily fast; and in this he is ​prima facie​ right. But this model has very
little to do anymore with the Aristotelian notion of possibility as potency, and it seems misleading on
al-Ghazâlî's part to argue otherwise.
In truth al-Ghazâlî probably subscribes to the k​ alâm​ atomist view of time. Here of course there is no
problem with postulating things as "changing" from one state to another or indeed one to another
63
"marvellously fast." In an atomist universe, things can by all accounts be radically different from one
instant to the next: but here, again, there is no need and possibly even no sense in talking about changes
taking place over time at all. Yet al-Ghazâlî seems intent on continuedly doing so in the context of the
Tahâfut​ discussions. What, however, is the sense of talking about a book changing into a horse, or a
dead man rising any longer? Referring to an enduring substrate (the spatial atoms of ​kalâm​ physical
theory) will not do, as there is no quiddity to render certain atoms recognizable as "this" or "that" anymore;
64
and at any rate, these atoms are themselves taken to be created anew at each time-instant as well.
Al-Ghazâlî seems caught between two worlds, unwilling to yield to Aristotelian

61 ​T/I,​ 172.9-10 (​TT,​ 534.8-9; ​II,​ 327; ​DD,​ f. 133B); see also ​T/I,​ 174.3-5(​TT,​ 535.11-14; ​II,​ 328; ​DD,​ f. 133H).
62 ​A point on which Averroes is particularly insistent: cf. e.g. ​TT,​ 113.6-9 (​II,​ 67; ​DD,​ f. 37C-D), and also ​TT,​ 416.16-417.4 (​II,​ 251; ​DD,​ f. 104A); ​TT,​ 478.16-479.6 (​II,​ 291; ​DD,​ f.
118L); ​Tafsîr,​ vol. 2, 1135.
63 ​On the point that al-Ghazâlî's revised Aristotelianism is probably adopted only for the sake of argument, cf. Marmura's comments in ​T/I,​ xxiv-xxv.
64 ​Cf. Averroes' criticisms at ​TT,​ 139-141 (​II,​ 82-83; ​DD,​ f. 43A-D).
essentialism yet unable to cut off all vestiges of conventional philosophical parlance.
In his ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut,​ Averroes is particularly scathing about al-Ghazâlî's suggestion that our
knowledge of the enduring properties of things and their behavior consists in God's habitually implanting
in us the appropriate correct beliefs. As an attempt at ​reductio​ Averroes compares al-Ghazâlî's viewpoint
with that of certain anonymous Muslims, who had held the preposterous view that God can in fact
combine two contrary opposites in one being. Their proof for this, Averroes maintains, was exactly that all
knowledge of what is and what is not possible is merely impressed belief of the kind to which al-Ghazâlî
has been alluding. Averroes coyly remarks that such a view would in fact be more consistent than the
quasi-logical one which al-Ghazâlî proposes:
For their opponents try to find out where the difference lies between what as a matter of fact the
theologians affirm on this point and what they deny, and it is very difficult for them to make this
65
out—indeed they do not find anything but vague words.
A thoroughly subjectivist account, in which all images that spring to mind (whether God-inspired or of their
own accord) are judged possible solely by virtue of this happening, is at least consistent: but it renders
true natural science and human wisdom impossible. Averroes reiterates the model he sees as the only
viable and sensible one, that the range of ​possibilia​ is first conclusively defined in the divine intellect and
then dispersed in the eternal world according to the range of natural compossibilities, which the human
intellect can again synthesize in a participatory act with the active intellect.
The general argument which solves these difficulties is that existents are divided into opposites and
correlates. And if the latter could be separated, the former might be conjoined: but the opposites are not
conjoined and so the correlates are not separated. And this is the wisdom of God most High for the
existents and His custom in regard to the produced [existents], and you will never find alteration in God's
custom. And it is through the perception of this wisdom that the intellect of man becomes intellect, and the
existence of such wisdom in the eternal intellect is the cause of its existence in existents. Because of this
the intellect is not something possible (​jâ'iz​) which it would have been possible to create with different
66
qualities.
A predetermined range of possible (and necessary, and impossible) predications is in Averroes' mind the
key to true knowledge. Consequently, the contents of the intellect also cannot be possible (i.e.,
contingent) but must instead be necessary. This holds equally for the knowledge of man and of God,
whose divine Wisdom Averroes is quick to cite in an effort to counter al-Ghazâlî's emphasis on the divine
Will. Averroes shrewdly appropriates a favorite

65 ​TT,​ 541.12-13 (​II,​ 333; ​DD,​ f. 135E).

66 ​TT,​ 542.2-9 (​II,​ 333; ​DD,​ f. 135F-G).
 67
Ashʿarite Qur'ân citation, that of there being no alteration in God's custom (​sunna​): in place of a
conventional voluntarist interpretation, Averroes wishes to establish with its aid the universal applicability
of predicate logic.
How far is this from what al-Ghazâlî would ultimately want to say? Richard Frank's contention is that
"given the established nature of the possible kinds of things and the way in which the realised instances
of these kinds causally interact with one another according to the fixed ordering of the higher and
universal causes, an essential component of the original sense of '​al-c​ ​âdah​' (God's customary ordering of
68
events) as employed in traditional Ashʿarite theology is effectively done away with." Now we have made
note of the fact that al-Ghazâlî accepts the traditional range of possible predications: so the crux of the
matter comes to lie in whether we can validly infer causal laws and actions from predicative statements.
69
Al-Ghazâlî's true views on the matter are still a matter of scholarly debate. But whatever way the verdict
may fall, this is where this introductory look into the modalities of the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa​ must necessarily
come to a halt. For questions about the possibilities of predication and about the relation of essence to act
are ones philosophers discuss even today, and without any greater sense of consensus or closure, or
70
indeed of clarity having been reached. We may end simply by acknowledging that al-Ghazâlî's and
Averroes' debate marks one of the first instances in which the matter was discussed in such detail and
that late medieval nominalism, a momentuous movement in this regard by anyone's account, evidently
counted both Avicennian logic and occasionalist theory among its influences. The parallels are hardly
coincidental and highly suggestive; the author, at least, is left to wonder about what might have been
achieved in the Arabic world, had someone but picked up the discussion from where it was left in the
Tahâfut al-tahâfut.​ Alas, that was not to happen.

67 ​The Glorious Qur'ân,​ 30:30, 33:62, 35:43, 48:23. Cp. also ​TT,​ 50.9 (​II,​ 29; not surprisingly not in the ​DD​), where Averroes additionally recalls the verse "there is no altering
the words of God" (​Q.​ 10:64).
68 F​rank 1992, 59.
69 ​In recent years, Richard M. Frank has presented a very unconventional picture regarding al-Ghazâlî's true convictions in the matter of secondary causation: cf. Frank 1992,
22-46, and by the same author, ​Al-Ghazâlî and the Ashʿarite School​ (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1994), 15-22. As against Frank, Michael Marmura has defended
the Ashʿarite interpretation of al-Ghazâlî: cf., e.g., ​T/I,​ xxv-xxvi, and also "Ghazali's Chapter on Divine Power in the ​Iqtisâd​," ​Arabic Sciences and Philosophy​ 4 (1994): 279-315;
"Ghazâlian Causes and Intermediaries," in ​Journal of the American Oriental Society​ 115 (1995): 89-100; cf. also the references in n. 56.
70 ​For introductory materials see M. J. Loux, ed., ​The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality​ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979); G. Forbes,
The Metaphysics of Modality​ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). For a recent attempt to make a viable theory out of Aristotelian syllogistics cf. the remarkable P. Thom, ​The Logic
of Essentialism​ (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996); on the possibility of a viable occasionalist metaphysics, André Gallois, ​Occasions of Identity. The Metaphysics of Persistence,
Change, and Sameness​ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
10.
Al-Ghazâlî's rethinking of the meaning and use of the modal terms is a bold and in many ways promising
departure from the customary theory of Arabic Aristotelianism, even as it raises problems of its own. In
some cases, al-Ghazâlî's difficulties seem to rise from his unwillingness to go too far with his radicalism.
A final historical comparison may perhaps cast light on both al-Ghazâlî's innovativeness and the limits to
his vision. The inevitable parallel with John Duns Scotus and his rethinking of the basis of modalities may
71
now be addressed.
The import of Duns Scotus' modal theoretical innovations lay in two main features: its incorporating
synchronic alternatives and its partitioning of all prospective propositions into domains of compossibility.72
Al-Ghazâlî's thoroughgoing reliance on Avicenna helps make understandable why his remarks in some
respects come so close to John Duns Scotus. Scotus too was an avid reader of Avicenna; it is probable
that he drew lessons of his own from what Avicenna said about formal and conditional possibility and
necessity in his ​Metaphysics.​ On no account did al-Ghazâlî himself influence Duns Scotus; but it is not
unnatural to assume that the same texts might have helped arouse the same kind of questions in two
attentive readers. Avicenna's remarks on modal logic will certainly have been well posited to do just that,
as they were part and parcel of an attempt all its own towards redefining the way modal notions and real
existents interrelate.
Scotus and al-Ghazâlî, then, both had Avicenna as a common source when they developed their
respective theories concerning the relation of possibility to reality. Neither accepted the whole of the
Avicennian edifice of modal metaphysics; both drew their own conclusions about what that model had to
say. Both helped bring down the earlier dominating extensional approach to modalities and thereby aided
the development towards a conception of possibilities as descriptions of internally coherent (compossible)
worlds. The crucial difference lies in al-Ghazâlî's stronger insistence on the primacy of the actual. This
may reflect the causally necessitated nature of the Avicennian universe or al-Ghazâlî's religious and
mystical Sufi outlook, or indeed both; whatever the reason, there seems to be in al-Ghazâlî no trace of the
kind of plenitudinal

71 ​This tentative and very cursory look is undertaken in the faith that it be recognized from the start how the two thinkers worked in very different historical settings and how,
even with the Aristotelian and Avicennian materials, they shared their works had a distinctly different theoretical orientation.
72 ​Cf., e.g., Knuuttila 1993, 139-149; S. Knuuttila, "Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities," in L. Honnefelder, R. Wood, and M. Dreyer, eds., ​John Duns
Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics​ (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 127-143; and the materials presented in ​John Duns Scotus. Contingency and Freedom. Lectura I 39,​ A. Vos Jaczn., H.
Veldhuis, A. H. Looman-Graaskamp, E. Dekker, and N. W. den Bok, intr., trans. and comm. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994).
model which ascribes to the plane of intellectual truths or to the numerically infinite worlds possible ​in
intellectu​ any firm status. Paradoxically, whereas in most instances adherence to a plenitudinal
metaphysics may be seen to have impeded the development of a modal theory capable of incorporating
genuine unrealized possibilities, it seems that here the acceptance of the principle of plenitude on the
plane of intelligibility could actually have helped al-Ghazâlî better recognize the nature of compossible
worlds and their independent logical status. Consider that Scotus did develop a theory of multiple, fully
defined possible worlds, partitioned on the basis of propositional co-assertability; and that this was done
in the context of Scotus's account of the "divine psychology," an often misunderstood notion that seems to
have had more theoretical significance than has often readily been acknowledged.
The study of medieval modal theory has taken great strides in the last decades. It is now generally
acknowledged that stimulating and original work was done by the medievals in this field, and that the
advances made here may even have been instrumental in ushering in the so-called modern era of
philosophy and science. In this context it is worth noting that this was perhaps never the achievement of
the Latins alone, but that it was built out of an ongoing discussion which incorporated every insight that it
managed to glean from the known "heretics" "Avicenna," "Algazel," and "Averroes." Indeed, the major
positions taken in later medieval discussions on the question of logical vs. nomic necessities are already
discernible in the Arabic debate on Aristotelian vs. divine possibilities. The cosmological and metaphysical
implications of the conflicting modal models were clearly seen by the Islamic philosophers and the
stances they took were thus often very clear-cut in this field, as were their stated reasons for doing so.
The dialogue which one finds between the ​Tahâfut al-falâsifa​ and the ​Tahâfut al-tahâfut​ presents this
sophisticated discussion in an engaging and enjoyable manner.