Imperial formations in crisis:

Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire

in a global context of the 11th century

Symposium: Medieval Empires and their

Networks
17 November 2019
Tachikawa Memorial Hall, Ikebukuro Campus,
Rikkyo University
Johannes Preiser-Kapeller (Austrian Academy
of Sciences)
Outline of the presentation
• 1) Ideal and realities of imperial rule in 10th-11th
century “Christendom”: emperors and the
“dominant coalition”
• 2) The crisis of the 11th century in the (Holy)
Roman Empire and Byzantium: The „usual“ fragility
of power arrangements or new socio-economic
dynamics?
• 3) Geopolitical, environmental and socio-economic
change across Afro-Eurasia: societies in trouble?

2
 Ideal and realities of imperial rule
in 10th-11th century “Christendom”
(cf. Borgolte 2002, pp. 29-31)
In your hands, God has laid the power and
appointed you as autocrat and ruler.
From heaven came the mighty leader of the
heavenly armies
and opened before you the gates to rule.
That is why the world fondly reveres the
scepter of your right hand,
full of gratitude to the Lord who granted it;
for to have you was their longing, the pious
emperor,
Ruler and shepherd, autocrator.

Konstantinos VII Porphyrogennetos,

acclamations to the emperor, Jesus Christ crowns Emperor
Book of Ceremonies (10th cent) Konstantin VII. Porphyrogennetos
3
(945, ivory)
 Ideal and realities of imperial
rule in 10th-11th century
“Christendom” (cf. Borgolte
2002, pp. 31-34; Hehl 2007)
But you have conquered savage
and exceedingly terrible nations,
you have forced rude, ruthless and
spirits deprived of humanity under
your rule. The lands, castles,
fortified places and realms with
their petty kings (reguli), long lost,
Roma now recognizes as her
possession through your victorious
right arm.
Christ crowns Emperor Henry III and
Anselm of Besate, his wife Agnes, Inscription: Per me regnantes,
“Rhetorimachia”, on Emperor vivant Heinricus et Agnes (Codex Caesareus,
Monastery Echternach, ca. 1045 CE)
Henry III (1049 CE) 4
Empires and imperial spheres in Europe
and the Mediterranean, 1025 CE

5
Aspects of crisis in 11th century
Byzantium
1025

1081

6
Aspects of crisis in the 11th century
(Holy) Roman Empire

Canossa, 1077 7
 “Decline” from the “apex” of empire or the “poisoned heritage” of
“autocratic” rulers?: Emperor Basil II, the “Bulgar-Slayer” (976-1025)
• After this Basil proceeded to question him, as a man
accustomed to command, about his Empire, how it could
be preserved free from dissension. Sclerus had an answer
to this, although it was not the sort of advice one would
expect from a general; in fact, it sounded more like a
diabolical plot. 'Cut down,' he said, 'the governors who
become overproud. Let no generals on campaign have too
many resources. Exhaust them with unjust exactions, to
keep them busied with their own affairs. Admit no woman
to the imperial councils. Be accessible to no one. Share
with few your most intimate plans.‘ (Michael Psellos I, 28)
• But he was different from before; he became haughty and
insidious in his character, distrusting everyone, and
relentless in his wrath. (…) For through his age and his
victories over all, he looked down on all, did not desire
that the subjects should be well-disposed to him, but
feared him, and would not lead the army and people
according to the prevailing custom, which had given the
legislators the force of law, but according to his own
judgment and will. (Zonaras XVII, 7-8)
• “For 35 years, Basil II had concentrated power into his
own hands. During that time he did not face challenges
from rival politicians, other elements of the court, the
people of the City, or the clergy, and faced only one Basil II triumphant, Psalter, 11th cent.,
mutiny in the army (quickly over). Perhaps this was the Cod. Marc. gr. 17, fol. 3r.
deviant development in the history of the empire, whose
political sphere was normally defined by contestation and
imperial vulnerability.” (Kaldellis 2017, pp. 224-225)
8
 “Decline” from the “apex” of empire or the “poisoned heritage”
of “autocratic” rulers?: Emperor Henry III (1039-1056)
(Weinfurter 2007, pp. 30-45) as servus dei or rex iniquus

At that time, both the great and the

lesser ones grumbled more and
more against the Emperor,
complaining that he had long since
fallen from his initial attitude of
justice, peace, gentleness, and the
fear of God (...) in favor of greed
and a certain carelessness. And it
will soon be much worse than at the
beginning.
Hermann von Reichenau, 1053 CE,
on Henry III
Henry III with the symbols of rulership attending the
consecration of the Stavelot monastery church on 5 June 9
1040, Perikopenbuch Heinrichs III., Echternach
 Elected by and consulting „with those persons and groups
of people without whom it was impossible to rule”
• “The functioning of a political system and
the condition of a polity are particularly
evident in the history of change of
government. This means not only how a
new rule was established, but also how an
old rule was replaced or eliminated. (…) In
both empires one can speak (...) of
electoral monarchies. However, there
were no fixed electoral bodies, no counting
of votes and no majority rule. However, it
was important to achieve unity among all
eligible voters and to demonstrate this
unity to the outside, because according to
the beliefs of those involved, God himself
made the decision and endowed the
chosen one with his grace. From a
pragmatic point of view, the (future)
emperor was dependent on obtaining or
maintaining the consent of those persons
and groups of people without whom it
was impossible to rule.” (Borgolte 2002, p.
39; cf. Cheynet 2006, pp. 68-72) 10
The „natural state“ and the „dominant coalition“
“The natural state reduces the problem of
endemic violence through the formation of a
dominant coalition whose members possess
special privileges. The logic of the natural state
follows from how it solves the problem of
violence. Elites – members of the dominant
coalition – agree to respect each other’s
privileges, including property rights and access to
resources and activities. By limiting access to
these privileges to members of the dominant
coalition, elites create credible incentives to
cooperate rather than fight among themselves.
Because elites know that violence will reduce
their own rents, they have incentives not to fight.
Furthermore, each elite understands that other
elites face similar incentives. In this way, the
political system of a natural state manipulates the
economic system to produce rents that then
11
secure political order.” (p. 18)
Emperor by election and dynasty-
building efforts
• Justin I – Maurikios (by co-
optation, 518-602)
• Herakleios – Justinian II
(610-711)
• Leon III – Eirene (717-802)
• Michael II – Michael III
(820-867)
• Basil I – Theodora (by co-
optation, 867-1056)
• Constantine X – Michael
VII (by co-optation, 1059-
1078)
• Alexios I – Andronikos I
(1081-1185)
12
Dynasty by co-optation of military brass
and civil elites: the „Macedonian“
13
emperors, 867-1056 CE
Underage rulers and queen regents: „Woe to you, O land, when your
king is a child” (Ecclesiastes 10:16) – Basil II (*958), Constantine VIII
(*960) – Nikephoros II Phokas, John I Tzimiskes, Basil Lakapenos
Parakoimomenos – Bardas Skleros, Bardas Phokas, 963-989
From that time onward, Basil's
carefree existence was forgotten
and he wholeheartedly applied
himself to serious objects. (…) The
complete change in the emperor's
Nomisma (gold coin) of Nikephoros II Phokas character dates from that time.
and Basil II (963-969) While he rejoiced at the death of
his enemy, he was no less grieved
by the sad condition of his own
affairs, with the result that he
became suspicious of everyone, a
haughty and secretive man, ill-
tempered, and irate with those
Clash between the armies of Bardas Skleros
and Bardas Phokas (Chronicle of John who failed to carry out his wishes.
Skylitzes, cod. Vitr. 26-2, fol.164b; Madrid) (Michael Psellos I, 4 and 18) 14
Christos Pantokrator with Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos (r. 1042-1055)
and Empress Zoë (d. 1050) (Mosaic in Hagia Sophia) 15
 Emperor by election and dynasty-building
efforts
• Henry I – Henry II (919-1024)
Henry III
• Conrad II – Henry V (1024-1125)
(1039-1056)

“For centuries, the group of voters

Henry IV
(1056-1105)
and the forms of voting remained
unregulated. Lawfulness resulted
from success. Only indistinctly can
contemporary patterns of order be
identified. Sons of kings from
Conrad II legitimate marriage had the best
Henry V
(1024-1039) chance.”
(1106-1125)
(Schneidmüller/Weinfurter 2003, pp.
Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz,
20-21) 16
Cod. lat. 295, fol. 81v (ca. 1130 CE)
The reach and central/peripheric regions of
imperial power (Ehlers 2007; Zeilinger 2007):
itinerant rulership in the Western Empire

17
„Forte quia Graecus est…“: Otto III (b. 980), Henry „the Quarrelsome“
and Byzantine law (Nov. Iustiniani 116, ch. 5) as argument for the
regency of Theophano (d. 991) and Adelheid, 983/984-994

Prayer book of Otto III (984-991 CE,

Signatur Clm 30111, Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek in Munich)
Henry II of Bavaria,
Niedermünster Abbey Book
18
of Rules, c. 990
 The minority of and competing regents for Henry IV (* 1050),
1056-1066: Empress Agnes of Poitou, Archbishop Anno II of
Cologne, Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen
• For a long time the king [Henry IV] began
to despise all the powerful, to raise the
lesser with wealth and aid, and after the
latter´s council he administered what was
to be administered. Of the noblemen,
however, he rarely admitted one to his
secret affairs. And because many things
happened in a disorderly manner, the
bishops, the dukes, and other great men
of the empire withdrew from the affairs
of the king.
• Annales Altahenses, a. 1072, p. 84; cited
after Althoff 2013, p. 84; see also Althoff
2007
The kidnapping of Henry IV at the order of Archbishop Anno II of Cologne at
Kaiserswerth (near Düsseldorf), April 1062 CE (Bernhard Rode, 1781) 19
Contest for the royal crown:
counter-kings in the (Holy) Roman
Empire, late 10th-11th century
(Schneidmüller/Weinfurter 2003)
• Henry, Duke of Bavaria (984-
985, surrender)
• Rudolf von Rheinfelden, Duke of
Swabia (1077-1080, active in
Saxony, death)
• Hermann, Count of Salm (1081-
1088, active in Saxony, death)
• Conrad, son of Henry IV (1093-
1098, in Italy, deposition and
death 1101)
• Henry V, son of Henry IV (1104-
1105, accession to the throne) Hermann, Count of Salm (Counter-King,
1081-1088, called the “Garlic King”;
depiction at the town hall in
Eisleben, 16th century)
20
The City of Constantinople and strategies of
mobile/immobile rulership in Byzantium

https://www.byzantium1200.com/
21
 The City of Constantinople and strategies of
mobile/immobile rulership in Byzantium
• No-one has ever dared to create an uprising against the Emperor, trying as well to destroy the
peace of Romania, who has not been destroyed himself. So, for this reason, I advise you, my
beloved children, whom God has given me, to be on the side of the Emperor, and in his service.
For the Emperor who sits in Constantinople always wins.
• I know, mightiest, that the nature of men desires rest. But an unprofitable, or rather harmful,
rule has prevailed, that the Emperor does not go out to the lands under him - of the East, I
mean, and of the West – but is in Constantinople as if in a prison. Certainly, if someone had
confined you in one city, you would be pained and distressed at such treatment; but, since you
have done this to yourself, what is there even to say? So go out into the lands which are under
you, and into the themes, and see the injustices which the poor suffer, and what the agents
sent by you have done, and whether the lower classes have been unjustly treated, and set
everything right. The themes of the Romans, and the lands of the peoples under you will know
that they have an emperor and a master watching over them, and you will know the strength
of each theme and fortress and land, and how it is inclined, and in what it is injured, and in
what it is helped, and no revolt will take place, nor will they rise up against the administrators,
but the (lands) under you will be <in> a peaceful condition. I know that the people who serve
you, in order not (to have) to labour, will advise you that it is not good but that you will
oppress the lands and the themes, going through them with troops and an imperial
bodyguard. They will say this, too: ‘If you, Emperor, go out from Byzantium, another will
become emperor in your place’. But when I considered this, I laughed. For the man who has
been left behind by you in the palace, taking care of those who are there under his hand, both
foreigners and Romans, will certainly be active and competent, and should stay alert and do
what is suitable.
• Kekaumenos, Consilia et Narrationes; English translation by Charlotte Roueché (online:
http://www.ancientwisdoms.ac.uk/mss/viewer.html?viewColumns=greekLit:tlg3017.Syno298.sawsEng01)
22
 Contest for the imperial crown: counter-emperors in
Byzantium, late 10th-11th century (Cheynet 1990)
• 1) Nikephoros Phokas (963, East > co-optation)
• 2) Bardas Phokas (969, East > defeat) 19 rebellions with proclamation of
• 3) Bardas Skleros (976-979, East > defeat) a counter-emperor
• 4) Bardas Phokas (987-989, East > death) 3 accession to the throne
• 5) Bardas Skleros (987-989, East > surrender) 3 co-optation (actually 2.5)
• 6) Georgios Maniakes (1042-1043, West > death) 13 failure
• 7) Leon Tornikios (1047, West > defeat)
• 8) Isaak Komnenos (1057, East > accession to the throne) 11 from the armies of the East
• 9) Nikoulitzas Delphinas (1066, West > exile) 8 from the armies of the West
• 10) Romanos Diogenes (1067, West > co-optation)
• 11) Romanos Diogenes (1071, East > defeat)
• 12) Ioannes Dukas – Roussel de Bailleul (1073, East > defeat)
• 13) Nikephoros Bryennios (1077-1078, West > defeat)
• 14) Nikephoros Botaneiates (1077-1078, East > accession to
the throne)
• 15) Nikephoros Basilakios (1077, West > defeat)
• 16) Konstantios Dukas (1079, East > exile)
• 17) Nikephoros Melissenos (1080-1081, East > negotiation, Clash between the armies of Bardas Skleros
co-optation) and Bardas Phokas, 979 CE (Chronicle of John
• 18) Alexios I Komnenos (1081, West > accession to the throne) Skylitzes, cod. Vitr. 26-2, fol.164b; Madrid)
23
• 19) Nikephoros Diogenes (1094, West > surrender)
The „usual“ fragility of power arrangements or
new socio-economic dynamics?
“The dynamics of natural states are the dynamics
of the dominant coalition, frequently
renegotiating and shifting in response to
changing conditions. If adjustments lead to more
power and rents based on personal identity,
institutions become simpler and organizations
less sophisticated, and the society moves toward
the fragile end of the progression of natural
states. If adjustments lead to more power based
on durable agreements, institutions become more
complex and organizations become more
sophisticated, and societies move toward the
mature end of the progression. No compelling
logic moves states in either direction. As
governments becomes more sophisticated and
institutionalized across the natural state
progression, they also become more resilient to
shocks.” (p. 73)
24
The „usual“ fragility of power arrangements or
new socio-economic dynamics?
“But more importantly, beyond the actions of specific
individuals, I came to question a particular model of
socioeconomic transformation that some historians
sought to impose on this period. According to this
model, the imperial “state” ruled by the Macedonian
dynasty was challenged by the landowning “magnates”
of Asia Minor, who were powerful “families” that were
eating up peasant lands and angling to run the empire
in a way that benefited their own class. As far as I can
tell, this picture is fictitious. It leads to tendentious
interpretations of events and individuals that serve a
modern agenda, specifically to show how and when
Byzantium became “feudalized.” When we view those
events and individuals against the narrative patterns of
Byzantine imperial history, a different picture emerges,
one of emperors systemically vulnerable to potential
enemies and rivals, including most prominently their
own courtiers and generals. In sum, political-military
history will here point to a different understanding of
the socioeconomic history of this period.” (Kaldellis
2017, pp. xxx-xxxi) 25
Demographic and agricultural
growth in 10th-11th century
Germany during the „Medieval
Climate Optimum“

Izdebski/Koloch/Słoczyński/Tycner 2016 26
 The state, the elites and the surplus:
frameworks and rules of the socio-economic game
• “Land is the primary asset in agrarian societies. Access, use, and the ability to
derive income from land therefore provide a rich set of tools with which to
structure a dominant coalition and its relationship to the wider economy.”
(North, Wallis, Weingast 2009, p. 77)
• “What most profoundly threatened the existing structure of power was the
dynamics of social and economic change: increasing population and wealth
and the multiplication of people with the means and will to coerce others. In
the old passing world nobles had ruled, and nobles were few. In the
burgeoning new world of the First Crusade more and more castellans and
knights were pretending to noble powers and, inevitably, status.
Characteristically, their ambitions exceeded their resources, thus predisposing
them to the use of coercive force not only against their own peasants so as to
secure a sufficient patrimony for their militant ease they craved, but also
against the land and peasants of others so as to entice fighting men to the
rewards of their service and fidelity. Men fought for lordship, or for shares in
it, and they learned to despise the peasants the felt compelled to exploit.
Incipient nobility could be pitiless – and precarious. Were lord-princes to resist
such vicious men? – or to co-opt them?” (Bisson 2009, p. 7) 27
Demographic growth, inland colonisation (clearing of
forests, drainage of swamps) and the expansion and
intensification of secular and ecclesiastical lordship
• Bishop Benno II of Osnabrück
and the exclusion of the
farmers near Iburg from the
northern Teutoburg forest,
1070 (Rösener 1991, pp. 51-
52)
• Bishop Meinwerk of
Paderborn (1009-1036):
expansion of landed property
of the bishopric, strict
supervision of peasants, but
also provision with food
during periods of corvee and
acquisition of two shiploads
The clearing of the forest and founding of a of grain for starving
new village, scenes from the Heidelberg population of Veluwe and
Sachsenspiegel, ca. 1300 CE Teisterbant (Rösener 1991,
pp. 56-57) 28
 The servientes/ministeriales as newly emerging „elite
of function“ and „social climbers“ of the high middle
ages (Zotz 1991; Borgolte 2002, pp. 60-61)
• Unfree members of the „familia“
of a king, bishop or prince
• Service as milites (equites
loricati) and administrators
• Perceived as competition by old-
established „free-born“ elites

The genealogical tree of the ministeriales family of the Kuenringer

29
(from the so-called “Bärenhaut” in Stift Zwettl of 1311 CE)
 The growth of cities: the example of Cologne (Stehkämper
1991; Borgolte 2002, pp. 68-70) and the rebellion of the vulgus
and populus against Archbishop Anno in 1074 CE
98.6 ha Roman town
125 ha Rheinvorstadt
200 ha 1106

The secret passage for Anno´s escape in 1074

30
The Pfalz of Goslar

Goslar, the
Harz, silver
mines and the
expansion of
royal power in
Saxony under
Henry III and
Henry IV
(Zeilinger 2007)

31
New castles and ministeriales of King Henry IV and
the rebellion of the Saxon princes and „rustici“ in
defence of traditional rights, 1073-1075
Because not against the pagans who
devastated our border area, these
castles were built, but in the middle of
our country (...). From you who live
nearby, they (the king's officials) forcibly
took your possessions and carried them
into these castles. Your wives and
daughters they abused at will. Your
servants and your cattle they forced to
Remains and service. Even yourselves, they force to
reconstruction of carry every burden - no matter how
the Harzburg, built shameful - on your shoulders. (Speech of
on the order of Otto von Northeim, deposed Duke of
Henry IV, 1065-1068 Bavaria, in July 1073; Brunonis de bello
Saxonico liber)
32
 Concita plebs and accensum vulgus: „revolution“ of
the rustici for the restoration of their rights, and the
„desecration“ of the Harzburg (1074)
• The enraged people (concita plebs) flared in the greed for new, all peasants broke
their farm equipment and made weapons; they made double-edged swords with bent
sickles on heavy hoes, and spears on poles. One part hung light shields on the left, one
made of iron a kind of riding helmet, the others of triple felt; they prepared thousands
of sticks of wood for the fight and strengthened them with lead and iron. In a
thousand ways, the peasants armed themselves to war. The fields lay desolate, bared
by peasants. The shepherds, the guardians of the houses, devoted themselves to the
dangers of the war rather than their tasks. (...) Thus and in other ways the agitated
and unruly people (accensum pectora vulgus) prepared themselves for the war that
was to be waged, with sticks they learned to guard against blows, and it delighted in
the clatter of weapons and the sound of the horns. So the people rushed there and did
not consider the future outcome. (Carmen de bello Saxonico III, 100-126)
• Meanwhile, when the peasants (rustici) had seized control of the place from which
they had endured much evil for a long time, they no longer cared about the orders,
but did what was long desired, and continued the destruction. until they saw no stone
on the other. In a short time, they destroyed the royal buildings, which had been
erected at royal expense over many years, and did not even leave the foundations of
the mighty walls in the earth. The messengers of the king dared not say a word, as the
peasants threatened them with death if they tried to protest. As a result, they also
tore the collegiate church, which had been laboriously completed, down to its
foundations, plundered all the treasure gathered there, whether it belonged to the
king or the church, shattered the light-sounding bells, dug the son and brother of King,
whom he had buried there, and scattered their bones like common filth and left
nothing at all from the castle. (Brunonis de bello Saxonico liber 33) 33
The defeated Saxons, the „merciless“ King Henry IV, the alienated
German princes, the excommunication by Pope Gregory VII,
Canossa 1077, the election of Anti-Kings and civil wars until 1122

Otto von Freising, Chronicle, Jena, Thüringer Universitäts-

Schwarzmeier 1976 und Landesbibliothek, Ms. Bos. q. 6, fol. 91v.
 The „crisis“ and transformation of the (Holy, since
1157) Roman Empire in the 11th-12th cent.
• But if the Emperor does not obey this consilium, the
princes will maintain the loyalty they have promised each
other. (Proclamation of the German princes vis-à-vis Henry
V in 1121)
• „The aspiration for universal rule and consensual political
practice went hand in hand here. The High Middle Ages
tied the king to the will of his princes and at the same time
made the empire sacred.” (Schneidmüller/Weinfurter
2003, p. 13)
• "The territorial integrity of the empire in the west was not
endangered by the changes of rulers and even by the
elevation of anti-kings. (...) The leading princes
increasingly felt themselves to be the pillars of the empire
and the guardians of its unity."(Borgolte 2002, p. 45)

35
 The Holy Roman Empire – a weakly
coordinated, but cohesive political body
• “The (…) coordinating state,
in which each social
structure can decide
whether to mobilize its
resources for the state, is
weak. Its ability to act is
limited, because a social
structure will contribute only
to tasks that do not alter the
capacity of others to use
their coercive power ex post
to expropriate the resulting
gains or gain additional
powers and resources,
thereby leaving the relevant „The Holy Roman Empire with its limbs“,
social structure or its leaders woodcaving of von Hans Burgkmair d. Ä.
worse off.” (1473-1531 CE, Staatsarchiv Nürnberg)
• Greif: Institutions and the Path to
the Modern Economy, 2006, 219. 36
 Territorial, economic and demographic growth in the Byzantine
Empire, 10th-11th cent. – a geopolitical „window of
opportunity“ after the fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate
On the military side, the empire
expanded dramatically after 955
and quickly lost ground between
1064 and 1078. But the period
overall witnessed economic and
demographic growth. More land
was probably brought under
cultivation and trade increased,
resulting in more production and
revenues for the state. There were
occasional downturns within this
picture of otherwise steady growth,
such as droughts and famine
(localized in time and space), and
the loss of Asia Minor caused
extraordinary hardship in the 1070s.
It might one day be possible to write
a history of this period in which the
political and the economic are more
closely and horizontally integrated.
37
(Kaldellis 2017, p. 13)
 Re-expansion of agricultural
activity in Asia Minor in the
9th-11th cent. CE

Izdebski/Koloch/Słoczyński 2015
38
 Continued growth in
Central Greece,
900-1300 CE

A. IZDEBSKI –
Halos G. KOLOCH –
L. Voulkaria T. SŁOCZYŃSKI, Exploring
Bauron Byzantine and Ottoman
Lerna economic history with the
use of palynological data:
a quantitative approach.
JÖB 65 (2015) 67–110.

39
 Indicators for growth
in 11th-12th century Greece

40
The expansion of urban commerce and the rise of
new elites of wealth and of function in Byzantium
“(…) vertical mobility is a very important and prominent characteristic of social change in
the eleventh century. This is certainly also related to the prosperous economic conditions
of the time. An increasing number of people gained access to lucrative positions in the
bureaucracy. More than before or afterwards, non-aristocratic people were able to
accumulate wealth and influence. New distributions of power and wealth emerged. The
official hierarchy of state functions eroded and gave way to more informal dependence
relationships. The court, loosely defined, was the place where people forged alliances,
competed with each other for promotions, and sought to have access to the emperor, or,
failing that, to people who in turn exercised influence on him. Networking and intercession
became ever more decisive for the advancement of careers.” (Bernard 2014, pp. 11-12)

• In old days, it seemed that the sources of prosperity and misery were regulated
according to heritage, and children received from their fathers disparate
streams of fortune which they then passed on to their own children. But you
are the first to overturn this ignoble discrimination, and you redress the
balance of fortune on the basis of merit rather than descent, thus reallocating
rights and entitlements to us. Michael Psellos, Panegyric oration for Emperor
Constantine IX Monomachos (transl. Bernard 2014, p. 165) 42
 Intellectuals vs. nouveau riche: distinctions within the
new elites in the words of Michael Psellos (1018-1078)
• Unfortunately, Constantine's (IX Monomachos) idea was to
exhaust the treasury of its money, so that not a single obol
was to be left there, and as for the honours, they were
conferred indiscriminately on a multitude of persons who had
no right to them, especially on the more vulgar sort who
pestered the man, and on those who amused him by their
witticisms. It is well-known, of course, that there is in the
political world a proper scale of honours, with an invariable
rule governing promotion to a higher office, but Constantine
reduced this cursus honorum to mere confusion and abolished
all rules of advancement. The doors of the senate were
thrown open to nearly all the rascally vagabonds of the
market, and the honour was conferred not on two or three,
nor on a mere handful, but the whole gang was elevated to
the highest offices of state by a single decree, immediately
after he became emperor. Inevitably, this provided occasion
for rites and solemn ceremonies, with all the city overjoyed at
the thought that their new sovereign was a person of such
generosity. The new state of affairs seemed incomparably Depiction of Michael
better than that to which they had been accustomed, for the Psellos in Codex 234, f.
truth is, folk who live in the luxury of a city have little 245a, Mount Athos,
conception of government, and those who do understand such Pantokrator Monastery
matters neglect their duties, so long as their desires are 43
satisfied. (Michael Psellos, History VI, 29)
Michael Attaleiates,
intellectual and nouveau
riche (ca. 1020-ca. 1085)
Attaleiates: assets of 150 pounds of gold (10,800 Ring belonging to Michael Attaleiates.
nomismata), annual revenues of more than 260 Byzantine Collection, Dumbarton Oaks,
nomismata (Krallis 2012, p. 41) Washington DC. 4719.

44
 The phoundax in Rhaidestos established by the logothetes tou
dromou Nikephoros under Emperor Michael VII Doukas (1071-
1078), the people of Rhaidestos and Michael Attaleiates
He thereby established a monopoly over this most essential of
trade, that of grain, as no one was able to purchase it except
from the phoundax. (…) now the harvest was brought in to the
phoundax, as if to a prison. (…) The purchase of grain went from
eighteen modioi per gold coin to only one. For from that
moment on they monopolized not only the grain carts (…) but
also all other goods the circulated in the vicinity. (…) He, then,
farmed out the phoundax for sixty pounds of gold, and enjoyed
the proceeds, while everyone else was hard-pressed by a
shortage not only of grain but of every other good. For the
dearth of grain causes dearth in everything else, as it is grain
that allows the purchase or preparation of other goods, while
those who work for wages demand higher pay to compensate
for the scarcity of food. (…) As a result of the emperor´s
planning or, rather, of Nikephoros´s evil designs, grain was in
short supply and abundance turned into dearth. The people´s
discontent increased. Mich. Att. 25, 4-6 (transl. Kaldellis –
Krallis, pp. 367-373)

And for Rhaidestos, (…) they first deed of the locals was
to destroy and pull to the ground that universal insult
and injustice, the horrible invention of the logothetes,
that threat to the common good. I am referring to the
phoundax recently constructed outside the city, which,
indeed, was torn down to the very ground. Mich. Att. 31,
8 (transl. Kaldellis – Krallis, pp. 452-455) 45
 „Revolution“ for the restoration of the Macedonian dynasty:
Michael V, Zoë and the „people from the streets“ (to agoraion genos)
of Constantinople, 1042

Miniature from the so-called Skylitzes Matritensis (12th century).

This image depicts the people of Constantinople attacking the
imperial palace during the uprising against Michael V in 1042. 46
 „Revolution“ for the restoration of the Macedonian dynasty:
Michael V, Zoë and the „people from the streets“ (to agoraion genos)
of Constantinople, 1042
As for the people from the street (to agoraion genos), they were already on the move, greatly
stirred at the prospect of exercising tyranny over him who had himself played the tyrant. And
the women -- but how can I explain this to people who do not know them? I myself saw some of
them, whom nobody till then had seen outside the women's quarters, appearing in public and
shouting and beating their breasts and lamenting terribly at the empress's misfortune, but the
rest were borne along like Maenads, and they formed no small band to oppose the offender. (…)
As there was no longer anything to stop them, for all men had already rebelled against the
tyrant, they took up their positions ready for battle, at first in small groups, as if they were
divided by companies. Later, with all the army of the City, they marched in one body to the
attack. Every man was armed; one clasped in his hands an axe, another brandished a heavy iron
broadsword, another handled a bow, and another a spear, but the bulk of the mob, with some
of the biggest stones in the folds of their clothing and holding others ready in their hands, ran in
general disorder. I myself was standing at the time in front of the palace entrance. (…) going
through the midst of the city I saw with my own eyes the sight which now I can hardly believe. It
was as if the whole multitude were sharing in some superhuman inspiration. They seemed
different from their former selves. There was more madness in their running, more strength in
their hands, the flash in their eyes was fiery and inspired, the muscles of their bodies more
powerful. As for prevailing on them to behave in a more dignified manner or dissuading them
from their intentions, nobody whatever was willing to try such a thing. Anyone who gave
advice of that sort was powerless. (Michael Psellos V, 26-28; cf. Krallis 2012, pp. 112-113)
47
 Constantinople vs. the army:
to politikon vs. to stratiotikon?
• Apparently, the last few emperors were convinced that they were firmly
established once the civil element (to politikon genos) acclaimed them. Indeed,
their close relations with these persons were such that the emperors believed the
throne was safely ensured beyond all dispute if the civilians were well-disposed.
Naturally, therefore, as soon as they took up the sceptre it was to the civil party
that they granted the right to speak in their presence before all others. If they
evinced pleasure, if they uttered flattering speeches and gave vent to a little
nonsensical clap-trap, then the emperors needed no further assistance. It was as if
they had the sanction of God. Really, of course, their power rests on three factors:
the people, the Senate, and the army. Yet while they minimized the influence of
the military, imperial favours were granted to the other two as soon as a new
sovereign acceded. (…) Even before this time it had been the ambition of the
military (to stratiotikon) to subjugate the whole of the Roman Empire, to serve a
soldier-emperor and break down the civil succession (politike diadoche) to the
Principate, but hitherto these designs were kept secret. Their fond designs were
cherished only in private -- for the simple reason that nobody seemed competent
to rule. Not even in their wildest dreams had they expected Isaac to entertain
ambitions for sovereignty, because of the difficulties attendant on such an
enterprise. Now the position was altogether changed. They saw Isaac [Komnenos]
at the head of a revolutionary party: they saw him personally taking the decisions
necessary to its success. The time for compromise was now over. Without more
ado adherents rallied to his side, strongly equipped and provided for the exigencies
of war. (Michael Psellos VII, 1 and 6) 48
 The military clans and great
landowners of Asia Minor?
“There were definitely wars between the emperors in Constantinople and their rivals
in the provinces, but there is no warrant for calling the latter “landed magnates”; nor
were the “emperors threatened on many occasions by powerful Anatolian
landowners.” The emperors were threatened not by landowners but by army
officers. Some were no doubt landowners, but there is no evidence that they were
dangerous because of their property— in other words, that they were so rich that
they could challenge the imperial state by means of personal resources, something
that was possible in the West. Instead, they were dangerous because they could
subvert the loyalty of the armies through the military prestige that they had
acquired through service. In the revolts that we know the most about (963, 1043,
1047, 1057), we see nothing but officers canvassing support among the army. These
officers did not have private armies, as is often implied. They had retinues, but this
was expected of generals, to be maintained from their salaries. Their household staff
could never threaten a regular army unit. Nor did they have private forts, only army
installations in the territories that they controlled as generals or rebels. To seize
power, they had to act subversively from within the imperial system, not leverage it
from the outside. And we need to be completely honest about this: apart from a
dubious anecdote, we have no idea of the scale of the properties of the officers or
“families” in question. They may have owned most of Asia Minor, or had more
modest holdings, “wealthy” only in relation to poorer neighbors. Recent studies
have even suggested that the wealth of the officer class may have derived from
their salaries, not their lands.” (Kaldellis 2017, p. 15) 49
 Offices, titles, salaries, influence and landed
property: the case of Philokales, 996 CE
• „For we came upon Philokales, who was originally one of the poor and the villagers, but
afterwards one of the illustrious and wealthy, and who as long as he was among the
lowly paid his taxes with his fellow villagers and did not interfere with them; but when
God raised him to the title of hebdomadarios, then koitonites, and thereafer
protobestiarios, in short order he took possession of the entire village community and
made it into his own estate; he even changed the name of the village. Accordingly, since
he was raised to prominence in this way, and this was the state of affairs that pertained
to him, is it possible that we should grant him the statute of limitations in support and
leave him free to keep what he wrongfully took? It is not right. For which reason, when
our Majesty was passing through this region and learned of the matter in a complaint
brought forward by the poor, he demolished his lavish dwellings down to the
foundations, gave back to the poor what was theirs, left him with the fiscal property
which he had at the beginning, and made him one of the villagers once more. To be
counted as dynatoi are not only such individuals, but also all those enumerated in
succession in the list of our great grandfather the emperor Romanos the elder. He names
even the scholarioi [soldiers enrolled in the tagmata] as dynatoi; we also name them
dynatoi, but we also add protokentarchoi [senior centurions] since we have observed
them a dynatoi in practice (pragmatikos).“
• Novel of Emperor Basil II, 996 CE (transl. McGeer 2000, 119; Dölger-Müller-Beihammer
50
2003, reg. nr. 783).
The „magnates“ of Asia Minor (Cheynet
2006, pp. 184-192; Andriollo 2017)
How will the statute of limitations take effect simply and in
an ordinary manner, when by virtue of being a dynatos (a
„powerful“) the person who exploited a poor man will spend
a long time in a position of influence (dynasteia) and
prosperity (euemeria), and in the event that this person is a
patrikios, will pass on his influence and prosperity to his
successors, while those of his line, such as his children and
grandchildren, are likewise dynatoi on familiar terms with
the emperors and have flourished over seventy or a hundred
years? (…) This is plain to see from the family of the
Maleïnoi and in turn of the Phokades. For the patrikios
Constantine Maleïnos and the magistros Eustathios, his
son, for one hundred or even one hundred and twenty
years, enjoyed a period of prosperity (euemeria)
Hendy 1985 coextensive with their lifetimes, the Phokades far beyond
them. For their great grandfather, and in turn their
grandfather, then their father, and subsequently his sons,
held perpetual dominance (dynasteia), I daresay, until we
came on the scene. How will such people have the support
of the statute of limitations?
Novel of Emperor Basil II, 996 CE (transl. McGeer 2000,51117)
Ethno-geographic origins of 85 families of the “military aristocracy” (left) and of 51
families of the “civil aristocracy” of the Byzantine Empire (right), 11th-12th cent., red:
regions within the empire, yellow: regions outside of the empire (data: A. Kazhdan and S.
Ronchey 1999; graphs and maps: J. Preiser-Kapeller, 2019)
 Confining the expansion of the large-scale
landowners at the disadvantage of penetes:
rights to hold a market
• „Since there is much unscrupulous behaviour among the
the dynatoi to wrest away the fairs from the rightful claims
of the weak, we ordain (…) that the transfer of the fair from
the weak to the dynatoi must in no way be allowed to
happen, unless the whole fair withdraws of one accord and
voluntarily and transfers to a place where it had previously
been held in times past, such that two conditions coincide in
the matter: the right of longstanding custom, and the
mutual agreement and consent of the whole group. (…) We
are extending a helping hand to the poor in every way and
checking the excessive power of the dynatoi, a matter best
treated long ago by our blessed great grandfather, the lord
emperor Romanos the elder, in the alienation of the
immovable properties of the weak to the dynatoi.“
• Novel of Emperor Basil II, 996 CE (transl. McGeer 2000, 132;
see also Laiou 2002a, pp. 731-732) 53
 Confining the expansion of the large scale
landowners at the disadvantage of the state
• „For the activities of [the dynatoi] has increased the great
hardship of the poor, bringing upheavals, persecution, coercion,
and other concomitant afflictions and difficulties through the
multitude of their servants, hirelings or other attendants and
followers, and (…) will cause no little harm to the
commonwealth unless the present legislation puts an end to it
first. For the settlement of the population demonstrates the
great benefit of its function – the contribution of taxes and
the fulfillment of military obligations (strateia) – which will be
completely lost should the common people disappear. Those
concerned with the stability of the state must eliminate the
cause of disturbance, expel what is harmful, and support the
common good.“
• Novel of Emperor Romanos I Lakapenos against the intrusion of
the dynatoi in the village communities, Sept. 934 CE (transl.
McGeer 2000, 55).
54
 The „winter of famine “ 927/928 CE and
the increasing power of the „dynatoi“
„The same month an intolerable
winter suddenly set in; the earth
was frozen for one hundred and
twenty days. A cruel famine
followed the winter, worse than any
previous famine, and so many
people died from the famine that
the living were insufficient to bury Therefore from the previous first indiction
the dead. This happened in spite of onwards (that is, since the outbreak of famine)
the fact that the emperor
[Romanos I Lakapenos] did his very all particularly honoured people [the dynatoi]
best to relieve the situation, who have come to control over hamlets and
assuaging the ravages of the winter villages and there have acquired more
and the famine with good works possessions, are expelled from there for future
and other aid of every kind.“ time, whereby they will receive back the
(Io. Skyl. 10, 18 and 22; transl. purchase price, either by the original owners or
Wortley, p. 215 and 218; cf. also their heirs and relatives (...) or by the village
Telelis 2004, nr 372 and 373) community.
(Law of Emperor Romanos I Lakapenos, 934;55ed.
Svoronos, 1994, p. 86, lns. 88-95)
 Dynamics „from below“:
free peasants into paroikoi
“The decision of peasants to sell their land
and become paroikoi is seen as a rational
one since the landlords could protect them
better from both the risks of bad crops or
famine, and the exactions of the tax-
collector, a serious risk in the eleventh
century, when extraordinary taxes and
corvées kept increasing. At the same time,
many estate owners were acquiring
privileges and immunities (exkousseia)
which freed them from the obligation to
pay the land tax; and their tenant farmers
benefited from this exemption. As a result,
it has been argued, the estate owners could
essentially share with their paroikoi the
benefits of tax exemption, and offer
landowning peasants economic incentives
to sell their lands and become tenant
farmers”
Laiou, Angeliki; Morrisson, Cécile: The Byzantine
Economy. Cambridge 2007, p. 106. 56
Ecclesiastical dynatoi: the growth of monastic
property, 10th-12th century (Athos, Patmos)

Smyrlis 2006
57
“For one hundred or even one hundred and twenty
years”? The fragility of elite status in Byzantium
• “Families became powerful only when they succeeded in court politics and
managed to retain imperial favor. Thus, even though some benefited from
inherited connections, prestige, and wealth, there was also considerable
political mobility and turnover. (…) It is probably better to speak of a ruling
elite who were powerful because they held offices at the court, in the army,
and in the Church, and whose membership changed over time, often due to
shifts in imperial favor.” (Kaldellis 2017, pp. 2-3)
• „Being a member of (…) elite was never (…) a fixed or determinate quantity –
on the contrast, it was to occupy a position in a complex set of social and
cultural relationships, in which position, status, and income remained both
negotiable and fragile. Members of elites generally attempt to achieve
economic and social security for themselves and their immediate kin by
investing wealth in land on the one hand, and in the court or palatine or
administrative apparatus of their state on the other, the first as means of
securing a regular revenue to fund their activities and promote their interests,
the second in order to maintain their access to power and resources.“ J.
Haldon, Social elites, wealth and power, in: idem, A Social History of Byzantium.
Malden – Oxford 2009, 174 and 182.

58
The „turnover“ of elite families in Byzantium,
976-1204 CE (data: Kazhdan/Ronchey 1999;
calculations Preiser-Kapeller 2018)

59
 Offices, titles, salaries, influence
and landed property
• Now two things in particular contribute to the hegemony of the Romans, namely,
our system of honours and our wealth, to which one might add a third: the wise
control of the other two, and prudence in their distribution. (Michael Psellos VI, 29)
• “It is probably better to speak of a ruling elite who were powerful because they
held offices at the court, in the army, and in the Church, and whose membership
changed over time, often due to shifts in imperial favor. It was an aristocracy of
service, not blood, despite the occasional rhetoric, and it “organized power
through title and office rather than through family.” (Kaldellis 2017, pp. 2-3)
• “These officers did not have private armies, as is often implied. They had retinues,
but this was expected of generals, to be maintained from their salaries. Their
household staff could never threaten a regular army unit. Nor did they have private
forts, only army installations in the territories that they controlled as generals or
rebels. To seize power, they had to act subversively from within the imperial system,
not leverage it from the outside. And we need to be completely honest about this:
apart from a dubious anecdote, we have no idea of the scale of the properties of
the officers or “families” in question. They may have owned most of Asia Minor, or
had more modest holdings, “wealthy” only in relation to poorer neighbors. Recent
studies have even suggested that the wealth of the officer class may have derived
from their salaries, not their lands.” (Kaldellis 2017, p. 15)
60
 The enhanced central position of the imperial honours and
salaries in the shrunken empire since the 7th century and the
increased competition for the imperial throne

“The old senatorial establishment, with much of the literary cultural

baggage associated with it, faded away during the seventh century, to
be replaced by a service élite of heterogeneous ethnic, social, and
cultural origins. The new élite incorporated many elements of the
older establishment, especially in the metropolitan region and in the
senior church hierarchy, but élite culture underwent radical change.
The major shifts in urban culture meant that wealthy provincials
turned to Constantinople, the seat of empire and source of wealth,
status, and power, and there they invested their social capital in
order to become part of that system, although that might just as
easily mean a post in their native territory. Only the church provided
an alternative and equivalent career structure, but that also was
centered in Constantinople. The emperor and the court became,
more than ever before, the source of social advancement.”
J. Haldon, Social elites, wealth and power, in: idem, A Social Histoy of
Byzantium. Malden – Oxford 2009, p. 177.
61
 Demographic and economic growth and material
(In)dependence (from) on the imperial system of
Constantinople
If you own fortresses, or perhaps villages, on your own land, and are a toparch, and hold
power in them, don’t let wealth or titles or big promises from the Emperors lead you astray,
and give your land to an emperor, and get money and possessions in exchange for it, even if
you are going to get four times as much, but own your land, even if it is small and
insignificant; for it is better for you to be an independent friend than a slave, and a
dependant. You are likely to be noble, valued and praised and honoured by the Emperor, and by
everyone, just as long as you are on your land, and in your position of power - both you, and
your children, and their descendants. But, when you abandon your land, and fall from your
office, for the moment you will befriended by the Emperor, (but), after a little time, you will be
despised by the Emperor, and considered by him (to be) worth nothing, and you will know that
you are a slave, and not a friend. Then even your subject will be frightening to you; for, if you
annoy him, he will go off to the Emperor, and accuse you of plotting evil things against him, or
wanting to escape, and go off to the land, that was formerly yours - and you have probably not
even contemplated the thing of which he has accused you. Then a frightening tribunal will sit (in
judgement) on you, and they will cross-examine you like an evil and treacherous slave. And you,
when you are speaking the truth, will not be believed; but your sometime subject, and slave,
when he lies, will appear to be saying convincing things, and will receive honours from the
Emperor, but you will be silenced, and will not even be able to answer, and either a sentence of
blinding will be pronounced on you, by the ruler, or (he will say): ‘My Majesty forgives you’, but
you <will be deprived> of your possessions, and exiled, or shut in prison by him. And then you
will remember that little land of yours, and your power, and how, from among free men, you
voluntarily became a slave; and you, who once used to judge and punish others justly, will
then be unjustly condemned and punished. Perhaps the Emperor, even if he knew that you were
accused falsely, yet, in order to get back again what he gave you, and what he promised, will
overlook justice. It is better for you to be in your land.
Strategikon of Kekaumenos, c. 218:
http://www.ancientwisdoms.ac.uk/folioscope/greekLit%3Atlg3017.Syno298.sawsEng01%3Adiv4
&viewOffsets=-2749
Martial ethos, status-consciousness and independence
in Byzantine Asia Minor: Digenis Akritas
Receiving this he sent back a reply [to the
Emperor]:
'I am the lowest servant of your power,
Even though I have no share of benefits; (…)
Inasmuch as you wish to see your servant,
In a few days be by Euphrates river;
There, holy master, you shall see me when
you will.
Think not that I refuse to come before you;
But that you have some inexperienced
soldiers,
And if some chanced to say what they ought
not,
I should for certain make you miss such men;
For with the young, master, such things occur.‘
Digenis Akritas 2067-2079; tr. Mavrogordato
Warrior saints, wallpainting from Cappadocia
 The „(usual) systemic political crisis“ and
mainly exogenous causes of imperial collapse?
“In the end, the main cause of the imperial collapse was likely exogenous. In the
late tenth century, the Romans were waging offensive warfare, enjoyed crushing
advantages, and succeeded in conquering territories lost to the empire for more
than three centuries. By 1081, they were fighting for their survival and had lost the
east. One way to understand this comparison is by realizing that in 955 Byzantium
had to deal with only one active front, that in southeast Asia Minor, and was fighting
weaker enemies than itself (the Cilician towns and the emirate of Aleppo). After
1050, however, there were three active fronts (the west, north, and east) and new
enemies: the Normans, Pechenegs, and Seljuk Turks, some of whom were backed by
substantial resources. Even without postulating internal decline, we can
automatically understand why Byzantium would not fare as well in the eleventh
century. No Roman empire— ancient or Byzantine, with themata or tagmata—
could cope with three new enemies simultaneously. It did not adapt to them fast
enough, and was distracted by its systemic political crisis. It lost Italy, then the
lower Danube, then Asia Minor. One might argue that even Asia Minor was a lost
cause from the start, regardless of the outcome of any one battle. The Turks were
raiding deeply into it before Mantzikert, even during Diogenes’ campaigns. This
underscores how little we know about the imbalance of power between Romans
and Turks.” (Kaldellis 2017, pp. 277-278)
64
 The interplay between endogenous socio-
political dynamics and the „loss“ of Asia Minor

65
 The interplay between endogenous socio-
political dynamics and the „loss“ of Asia Minor
• The notion of a conglomerate of competing forces evolving around a network of coalitions
in the imperial palace of Constantinople and in various provincial centers not only
accurately reflects the reality of political competition among autonomously operating elite
members. It also helps explain many of the development observable during the period of
the Turkish invasions, such as the striking absence of specific forms of central control, the
high degree of liberty of action among local military units and mercenary groups, and the
frequent outbreak of local seditious movements. (…) The political situation of Byzantine
Asia Minor from 1056 onwards was marked by serious tensions between centralizing
tendencies and the gradual strengthening of regional powers backed by military forces.
These consisted of seditious Byzantine aristocrats, foreign mercenary troops, Armenian
noblemen, Arab and Kurdish emirs and many others. This process resulted in a
fragmentation of state authority and the emergence of numerous, mostly short-lived,
semi-independent local lordships of limited size. Political power, to a large extent, was
regionalized. This is to say, that we are dealing not necessarily with a conflict between the
Byzantine central government and Turkish invaders but with struggles and contentions
within a complicated patchwork of local powers, in which the Turks intruded and
eventually managed to prevail. (…) They were able to insert them smoothly into existing
social networks and power relations, to exploit administrative tools and local resources, and
thus to gain the acceptance of local elites and their subjects. (…) Unlike the Muslim
conquest in the seventh century, the Turkish expansion of the eleventh century was the
result of an intricate long-term development that spanned almost a century. (…) there was
a gradual decay of centralizing imperial structures, which gave way to the emergence of
small-size regional powers of Byzantine, Frankish, [Armenian] and Turkish origin
66
(Beihammer 2017, pp. 9, 15, 388 and 390)
 Byzantine civil wars, Turkish, Armenian and Norman political
formations after the battle of Manzikert 1071 (Roussel of
Bailleul, 1071-1075; Philaretos Brachamios, 1072-1085)

Lead seal of Ursel/Roussel of

Bailleul

Lead seal of Philaretos

Brachamios
From: Beihammer 2017
67
The remains of Empire, the new „dominant coalition“ of
Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118) and re-distribution of
offices and revenues at an unprecedented scale
Besides, he did not behave with its
institutions as common and as with public
ones, and did not consider himself their
steward but their owner; he considered and
named the palace his own house. (…) he
offered the relatives and some servants
public funds in whole wagonloads, and gave
them ample annual allowances, so that they
embraced themselves with great wealth.
(Zonaras XVIII, 29, on Alexios I Komnenos)
Empires and imperial spheres in Europe
and the Mediterranean, 1060 CE

Pechenegs

Normans
Seljuks

69
Southern Italy as problematic „central periphery“ for both (or all three)
empires: Meles of Bari, the Byzantine victory of Cannae 1018 and the
Siege of Troia by Emperor Henry II, 1021 CE

Star coat of Emperor Henry II,

Gift of Prince Meles of Bari
(Diözesanmuseum Bamberg)

70
The emerging Norman princedoms in Aversa (1030, Rainulf
Drengot) and in Melfi (1042, Wilhelm and Drogo Hauteville)
within the fragmented political landscape of Southern Italy

Melfi

71
Robert Guiscard, Roger I., the Norman conquests of Bari
1071 and Palermo 1072 and the attack on Byzantium, 1081

The coronation of Robert Guiscard as

72
Duke by Pope Nicolaus II in 1059
The Pechenegs between the Rus (1036), the Oghuz,
the Cumans (1054) and Byzantium

Depiction of Cuman nomads

73
in a Russian Chronicle
„Patzinakia“ as semi-independent entity on the
Balkans and the cooperation with rebels and
emperors, 1048-1091
῾Ο ἅγιος ᾿Ιωάννης ὁ Πρόδρομος. / Κύριε
βοήθει ᾿Ιωάννῃ μαγίστρῳ καὶ ἄρχοντι
Πατζινακίας τῷ Κεγένῃ
Legend of the lead seal of Ioannes Kegen,
Magistros and Archon of Patzinakia, 1050/1051

Skeleton and
Patzinakia? findings from the
burial ground of
Odărci (Bulgaria)

74
The Oghuz, the Seljuks and the conquests in Iran and Iraq
from 1040 onwards (Toghrul Beg in Baghdad 1055)

Oghuz

Qarakhanids

Ghaznavids

Buyids

75
„The Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean. Climate
Change and the Decline of the East, 950-1072“
(Ronnie Ellenblum, 2012)

“This provocative study argues that

many well-documented but apparently
disparate events - such as recurrent
drought and famine in Egypt, mass
migrations in the steppes of central Asia,
and the decline in population in urban
centres such as Baghdad and
Constantinople - are connected and
should be understood within the broad
context of climate change.”
 Integrating written and archaeological evidence with
proxy data (Climate Change and History Research
Initiative, Princeton)
J. Preiser-Kapeller, A
Collapse of the
Eastern
Mediterranean?
New results and
theories on the
interplay between
climate and societies
in Byzantium and
the Near East, ca.
1000–1200 AD.
Jahrbuch der
Österreichischen
Byzantinistik 65
(2015) 195-242.
Empires and imperial spheres in Europe
and the Mediterranean, 1025 CE

78
The shipwreck of Serçe Limanı in
SW Asia minor, 11th cent. CE:
a freight of glass from Egypt
Maghreb – Egypt as main axis of trade of the Geniza Merchants in the 11th century
(J. L. Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean. The Geniza
Merchants and their Business World. Cambridge 2012)

80
The Nile Flood and socio-political stability in Egypt

From: Ellenblum 2012

 The “Great Calamity”: Unrest, civil war and
devastation in Cairo, 1062/1065-1074 CE
Under the reign of Mustansir, this famine
broke out, the consequences of which were
abominable and whose memory remains
horrible. It lasted seven years: the causes
were the weakness of the government,
the disorder of the state affairs, the
constant fights between the Bedouins, the
bad flood of the Nile, and the fact that
the lands covered by the flood was not
seeded. This calamity began in the year
457 (1065 CE): prices were rising and the
shortage was felt, followed by an epidemic,
so that most of the land was not cultivated
(...) men ate each other. (…) The Nile
swelled, rose, and fell at the usual times,
but no one was found to cultivate the soil
and to maintain the dams. Al-Maqrizi p.
37-38; Telelis nr. 480
 The takeover of by Badr al-Jamālī and the „Muslim-
Armenian“ Vezirs in Fatimid Egypt, 1073-1140
• Badr al-Jamālī (1074-1094)
• Al-Afdal Shahanshah b. Badr al-
Jamālī (1094-1121)
• Ahmad Kutayfat al-Akmal b. al-
Afdal (1131)
• Yanis al-Rumi al-Armani (1132)
• Bahram al-Armani (1135-1137)
• Faris al-Muslimin Tala´i b. Ruzzik
(1154-1161)

Bab Zuweila, Cairo

83
 Calamities, famines, unrest and civil war in Baghdad
under Buyid rule, 945-1055 CE (data: Busse 2004)
Frequency of weather extremes and plagues of locusts
And in the year 1026 AD, there was
intense cold in Baghdad during the
winter, and the banks of the Euphrates
and Tigris were covered with ice, and the
palm-trees were destroyed. And in
Baghdad men used to cross over the
small canals on the frozen water, and the
farmers were unable to sow seed.
(Bar Hebraeus p. 191; Telelis, nr. 439)

Frequency of famines and dearth

The „Big Chill“ in 10th-11th cent. Central Asia and
nomadic mobility
Proxy data used by Bulliet 2009
 The scenario of Bulliet and Ellenblum and its
critics
• J. Paul, Nomads and Bukhara. A Study in Nomad Migrations, Pasture, and Climate Change
(11th century CE), Der Islam 93/2 (2016) pp. 495-531: “Paleoclimatic evidence is adduced,
showing that there was climate change in the 10th-11th centuries, notably a cooling of the
summer temperature and a marked desiccation. But winter temperatures remained more
or less constant – no marked chilling of the winters took place. In all, the article rejects
Bulliet’s causation chain and proposes that the Ghuzz-Seljuq migration into Transoxiana
was due to political reasons rather than induced by climate change.”
• D. Tor, The Eclipse of Khurāsān in the Twelfth Century, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 81/2 (2018) pp. 251-276: “The purpose of this article, therefore, is to re-
examine what the primary sources reveal about the catastrophic cultural and political
eclipse of Khurāsān in the mid-twelfth century, in order to demonstrate that this
catastrophe was not due to “climate, cotton and camels” – in fact, Khurāsān was doing
very well until the 1150s – but to concrete human agency and action: namely, the
province's destruction by the rampaging Oghuz Turkmens after Sultan Sanjar had been
taken captive by them in 1153, thus leading directly to the downfall of the Great Seljuq
Sultanate.”
• Y. Frenkel, The Coming of the Barbarians: Can Climate Explain the Saljūqs’ Advance?, in
Liang Emlyn Yang, Hans-Rudolf Bork, Xiuqi Fang, Steffen Mischke (eds.), Socio-
Environmental Dynamics along the Historical Silk Road, Cham 2019, pp. 261-274: „Again, I
am arguing that the sources do not provide decisive evidence to support a meteorological
interpretation as the prime explanation of the massive human movement across the
Steppes/Iranian frontier during the eleventh century. The impression created by these
accounts, briefly mentioned above, is that nomadic pressure and lawlessness combined
with the governors’ strong hand are the prime cause of disability and social unrest (…).” 87
Climatic anomalies in the Khitan/Liao-Empire
in the 10th-12th centuries

88
Socio-economic growth, political change and
environmental calamities in the Empire of the
(Northern) Song, 10th-12th century

von Glahn 2016 89

 Environmental crisis
and factionalism
(Wang Anshi) at the
Song Court, 1048-1128

90
 Demograpic and economic growth, socio-political change
and power competition (shōen land) in 11th century Japan
and the emergence of the Insei rule (Totman 2014)

Takeshi Nakatsuka, Multi-decadal climate variability as

triggers of societal regime shifts in Japan. PAGES Magazine
24/1 (August 2016) pp. 18-19. Shirakawa-tennō
(1073-1087/1129)
91
 Strange parallels (Lieberman 2009), environmental
teleconnections and particularities of the respective
configurations of power

92
 Affluent societies in troubles –
a crisis of growth (Bisson 2009)?
„Violence, disorder, stress: the
problems of traditional powers in
western medieval lands arose
chiefly from societal growth and
change. They might indeed be
called „growing pains“ were it not
for the inadequacy of the
developmental metaphor. There
was a confused old head on this
Model of Cluny III young body, addled with conflicting
(in reality 187 m length), 1088-1130 venerable views of world order (…).“
(Bisson 2009, p. 9)
93
Echoes of imperial ambitions: Manuel I Komnenos
(1143-1180) – Frederick I Barbarossa/Henry VI
(1152-1190/1190-1197)

94
 Succession crises and civil war in the Holy Roman
Empire (1197-1218) and Byzantium (1180-1204)

Pfalzgraf Otto von Wittelsbach murders King Philipp von The Conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth
Schwaben, 1208 (Sächsische Weltchronik, 14th cent., Crusade, April 1204 (fragment of mosaic floor,
Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. Church of San Giovanni Evangelista, Ravenna,
germ. fol. 129, fol. 117v) Emilia-Romagna. Italy, 13th century) 95
http://rapp.univie.ac.at/

http://www.dasanderemittelalter.net/

http://oeaw.academia.edu/JohannesPreiserKapeller/Talks
Thank you very much for your attention!
96