Bangladesh: Why It Happened

Author(s): G. W. Choudhury
Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 48, No. 2
(Apr., 1972), pp. 242-249
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2613440
Accessed: 11-03-2015 18:16 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and Royal Institute of International Affairs are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 BANGLADESH: WHY IT HAPPENED

T
| nHE immediate
G. W. Choudhury
causes of the disintegration
of Pakistanand the
emergenceof Bangladeshon December 16, 1971,were the military
atrocitiescommittedby the PakistanArmyagainstunarmedBen-
galis; the influxof millionsof refugeesfromEast Bengal into India
since March 1971; and finallythe directIndian militaryintervention in
East Bengal, backed by the diplomaticsupportof the Soviet Union.
The rise of Bengali sub-nationalism withinPakistan,however,had its
originin a numberof factors-political,economic,cultural,sociological,
etc.-that had been operatingsince Pakistan was created in 1947. Of
all the provinceswhichconstitutedPakistan,it was Bengal whichgave
the most solid supportto MohammedAli Jinnahin his struggleforthe
establishmentof a separate Muslim state in the sub-continent.Yet,
withina veryshortperiod,the Bengalis began to have second thoughts.
Althoughtheywere the majoritygroup in Pakistan,theysuffered from
a deep-rootedfear of dominationby the minoritygroup of West Pak-
istan. In a democracy,themajorityshouldnot have any fearof domina-
tion, nor should they have to ask for safeguards,such as regional
autonomy,reservationof places in the civil serviceand the armyand
guaranteesthatthe economicdevelopmentof theirregionwould not be
neglectednor theirculturethreatened.But fortwo decades the majority
Bengali groupdid feel obligedto seek theseguarantees;and when they
were not granted,Bengali sub-nationalismbegan to gathermomentum
until ultimatelyit became a national movementfor the creationof a
separatestate.
What were the factorsthatgave rise to Bengali nationalism? First,
the political factor: Pakistan began its political career under a par-
liamentarysystemmodelled on Westminster and under a federalcon-
stitution.But neitherthe parliamentary systemnor the federationwas
genuine. The constitutionalformsand trappingsof democracyonly
provideda cloak forruleby thefewwho wereable to concentrate power
in theirown hands. During eleven years (1947-58) of so-called parlia-
mentarydemocracy,therewas not a single general election,and the
provincialelectionswere describedas 'a farce,mockeryand a fraud
upon the electorate'.' Well-organisedpolitical parties did not exist.
With the decline of the Muslim League, therewas no national party;
the remainingpartieswere more narrowlybased than those in the new

I ReportoftheElectoralReformsCommission,Government
of Pakistan,Karachi,1956.
242

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 BANGLADESH: WHY IT HAPPENED 243

Asian democracies,not to speak of Westerncountries. The failureof

parliamentary democracyled to the developmentof an all-powerful and
irresponsible
executive,aided and supportedby a powerfulbureaucracy.
Pakistanwas dominatedby bureaucratsand soldiers.2
The emergenceof this all-powerfulrulingelite had a great impact
on the separatistmovementin East Bengal. The rulingelite was com-
posed of senior bureaucratsnone of whom was East Bengali. Up to
1958 they were supportedindirectlyby the army; after 1958, army
supportwas directand open. There was a cabinet and a parliament,
but the politicalorderin Pakistancould be called 'an oligarchyunder
a democraticconstitution'.It was a 'modernisingoligarchy'3 in which
Bengalis had no share. Except duringthe short intervalof thirteen
monthsof H. S. Suhrawardy'scabinet in 1956-57, the Bengalis had
hardly any role in national affairs.Every vital decision, whetherit
relatedto politicalor defenceor economicor diplomaticmatters,was in
the finalanalysismade by the rulingelite,composed of West Pakistani
civil and militaryofficers.
In provincialmatters,the situationwas no betterfor the Bengalis.
Even in their own province,all the key posts in the administration
wereheld by West Pakistaniswho had directaccess to the centralruling
clique. The countryhad, in theory,a federalconstitution, but in prac-
tice the provincialgovernment was entirelysubordinateto the centre,
particularlyin financialand administrativematters.The Bengalisfound
a new rulinggroupset over themin place of the formerBritishofficials.
The civil and militaryofficialsfromWest Pakistan stationedin East
Bengal neverbotheredto develop any real bonds withthe local popula-
tion who looked upon themas aliens. There were few social contacts;
the WestPakistaniofficialsconsideredthemselvesto be sociallysuperior
to theBengali Muslims,who were regardedas convertsfromlower-caste
Hindus. The resultwas bitterness and a wideninggap.
The Bengali intelligentsia,
particularlyat Dacca University,became
increasinglyconscious of their unsatisfactorysituation. It must be
pointedout, however,thatat the timeof Independencethe Indian civil
serviceleftbehindby the Britishraj containedonlyone Bengali officer.
Similarly,theBengaliswereverypoorlyrepresented in the armybecause
the Britishauthoritieshad consideredthem to be a non-martialrace.
There were thereforesome historicalreasons for the preponderanceof
West Pakistani civil and militaryofficersin East Bengal. But after
Independencenothingwas done to rectifythe situation,and, in the
absence of a genuinedemocracy,with the countryrun by an oligarchy

2 G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, The Politics of the DevelopingAreas (Princeton,

N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress), p. 572.
3 Almond and Coleman, op. cit.

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
244 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

of civil and militaryofficials,the Bengalis found themselvesin the

positionof a colonial people.

Region ratherthanreligion
When Ayub Khan came to power in 1958, there was complete
authoritarianrule in the countryfrom1958 to 1962; thencame a period
of controlledor guided democracy,underwhich the Presidentand the
same old rulingelite dominatedthe political scene. What had been
veiled before1958 now became more obvious. The resultwas a further
wideningof the gap betweenEast and West Pakistan. The political
orderas set up by Ayub in his 1962 constitution gave hardlyany scope
to the Bengalis for effective
and equal participationin national affairs.
They had no sharein the decision-making process. In any vital national
issue theycould onlyreact;theycould neveract.4
No self-respectinggroup could toleratethis state of affairs.Nation-
alism or patriotismcannotbe expectedto growor flourishin a vacuum.
It is only throughparticipationand sharingresponsibility that people
develop nationalfeelings.There was hardlyany scope forthe Bengalis
to develop common national feelingswith the West Pakistanis,apart
fromthe religiousbond of Islam. But, as in manyotherparts of Asia
and Africa, they became more and more conscious of region rather
than religion. The Islamic ideology,on which Jinnahhad based Pak-
istan, began to peter away, and regional feelingsgrew fast in East
Bengal. Regionalism was the raison d'etre for the emergence of
Bangladesh.
Henceforth, East Bengal became a hotbedforpoliticalagitationand
unrest.Hardly a yearpassed withoutBengalis revoltingagainstalleged
maltreatment by the centralgovernment;the resultwas shootingsand
killings,which gave furtherimpetusto the growthof Bengali nation-
alism. By the 1960s, most of the urban professionalBengali groups
werebeginningto considerseriouslywhethertheycould or would live to-
getherwiththeWesternpartof thecountry. People no longerconcealed
theirhatredof WestPakistan. But thegreatestblow to Pakistannation-
alism came as a resultof the Indo-Pakistanwar in September1965.
NeitherIndia nor Pakistancould claim victoryor be considereddefeated
in the 17-daywar. In fact,Pakistan,with a much smaller army,air
and naval force,did quite well in 1965 by comparisonwithwhat hap-
pened in December 1971. But the war of 1965 disastrouslyweakened
the nationalbond betweenEast and West Pakistan. Until thena com-
mon fear of externalaggressionhad, like the religiouslink, been an
important factorin helpingthe two partsof the countryto live together.

4 See the author's ConstitutionalDevelopmenzt

in Pakistan (2nd edition) (London:
Longman 1970), p. 247.

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 BANGLADESH: WHY IT HAPPENED 245

There was a deep-rootedmyththat if India attacked East Pakistan,

West Pakistani soldierswould move up to Delhi. The 1965 war shat-
teredthatmythforgood. Mr. Bhutto,Ayub's foreignminister,proudly
claimedin theNationalAssemblythatEast Pakistanhad been protected
by China. If thatwas so, the Bengalis began to argue,why do we not
settleour own diplomaticand externalrelations?Why depend on West
Pakistan,whichcould give no protectionto East Pakistan? Withinone
hourof thewar,East Pakistanwas cut off,not onlyfromWest Pakistan,
but fromthe restof the world. So the old argumentthatthe defenceof
East Pakistanlay in WestPakistanno longerheld water.
It was under these circumstancesthat Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
formulatedhis famous six-pointprogramme;but beforeexaminingit,
we should look at some economic and culturalfactorsin the Bengal
separatistmovement.The Bengalis' most serious complaintwas what
theycalled the 'economic exploitation'of East Pakistanby thePakistan
centralgovernment.It has been statedby many impartialeconomists,
particularlyAmericanand Britishexperts,that the economic develop-
mentof East Pakistanwas sadly neglectedand thatsomethingoughtto
be done about it. The presentauthor,who used to believe in one
Pakistan, has pointed out in previous writingsthat the most serious
challengeto Pakistan nationalismwas the economic disparitybetween
East and West Pakistan. Many moderateEast Pakistani leaders, like
Nural Amin and otherswho also wanted to live in a unitedPakistan,
stronglyurgedthe government to acceleratethe economicdevelopment
of East Pakistan and therebyremovethe most seriousgrievanceof the
Bengali separatists.But, unfortunately,this advice was not listenedto
carefullyor seriously.Nor was similaradvice fromthe Americansand
British. Instead the governmentaccused the Westernpowers,particu-
larly the Americans,of encouragingsecession in East Pakistan. Presi-
dent Bhutto in particularmade these wild accusations; so did the
controlledpress in West Pakistan. If the Pakistan governmenthad
listenedto the wise counsel of friendlycountries,the tragedyof 1971
mighthave been avoided.
But since politicalpower was exercisedby a narrowoligarchywho
looked at the whole situationentirelyfromthe colonial angle of main-
taining'law and order', it was futileto expect any imaginativeeco-
nomic programmeor plans. At the time of Independence,gigantic
effortsweremade to speed up economicgrowth.But, tragically, the rate
of economicgrowthin the developmentplans was much slowerin East
than in West Pakistan. Many figureshave been publishedto illustrate
this disparity.Some may have been exaggeratedforpoliticalpurposes
but even makingallowance for this,theyconvincingly demonstratethe
extentto which the East's interestswere neglected. The bulk of the
country'srevenue was spent in West Pakistan because the federal

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
246 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

capital was there. Moreover,a highpercentageof the budgetwas spent

on defence,which was all concentratedin West Pakistan. A much
largershare of developmentexpenditureas well as of foreignaid and
loans went to the West. East Pakistan earned most of the country's
foreignexchangeby exportingits jute; yetmostof the foreignexchange
was spent on the industrialisation of West Pakistan. Whetherit was
revenue or developmentexpenditure,foreignassistance and loans or
foreignexchange,East Pakistan did not get its fair share, thoughthe
majorityof the country'spopulationlived there.
A recentreportby a panel of expertsto the Pakistangovernment's
planning commission provides authoritativedocumentationof the
increasingeconomic disparitybetween the two regions. The most
strikingfact in this reportis the wideninggap betweenthe income of
the average West Pakistani and his Eastern counterpart.In 1959-60,
the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32 per cent. higherthan
in theEast. Over thenexttenyearstheannual rateof growthof income
in West Pakistan was 6-2 per cent. while it was only 4-2 per cent. in
East Pakistan. As a result,by 1969-70 the per capita income in the
West was 61 per cent. higherthan in the East. Thus in ten years the
income gap doubled in percentageterms; it increased even more in
absolute terms.5
No East Pakistani,whetherhe was a regionalistor a nationalist,
could watchthissituationwithequanimity.The economicdisparity,or
economic exploitation,as it was called by the regionalists,provided
them with powerfulweapons to win popular support. The situation
could be compared to that which prevailed in undividedIndia when
Jinnahconvincedthe Muslim intelligentsiaand the masses that their
rightsand interestswere not safe under Congress rule in India. He
catalogued the list of Muslim grievancesunder Congressrule; whether
these allegationswere all trueor not, the importantthingwas that the
Muslims believed in Jinnah'sversionof theirplight. Similarly,Sheikh
Mujib and his partywere highlysuccessfulin convincingthe emotional
Bengalis that their interestsand rightswere not safe with a govern-
mentcontrolledand directedfromWestPakistan. This led the younger
and more militantsectionsof the Awami League to starta movement
for secession. Sheikh Mujib himselfhas confessedin a recentinter-
view witha Britishjournalistthat he had been workingfor the estab-
lishmentof Bangladeshforsome time6; the flagof the new nationwas
already there; the slogan 'Jai Bangla' (Victoryto Bangladesh) was
heardlong beforethetragiceventsof March 1971.

5 Quoted fromEdward S. Mason, Robert Dorfmanand StephenA. Manglin,Conflict

in East Pakistan: Background and Prospects (London: Bangladesh Action Com-
mittee.1971),PartrIr,
p. 4.
6 Sheikh Mujib's televisioninterviewwith David Frost (London Weekend Television,
January16, 1972).

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 BANGLADESH: WHY IT HAPPENED 247

Now turning to cultural it shouldbe notedthatwhenJinnah

factors,
declaredthatby everydefinition and standardthe Muslimsof India
constituteda separatenationfromthe Hindus,7his two-nation theory
was probablymoreapplicableto Northern India thanto Bengal. The
BengaliMuslimsand Hindushad manydifferences; the Muslimsof
undivided Bengalhad manygrievances againsttheupper-classBengali
Hindus,or Bhadralokof Bengal,as theywerecalled. But themajority
of BengaliMuslimsand Hindusalso had manythingsin common:
theirway of life, social customs,behaviour-patterns. The Bengali
Muslims'support of Jinnah'sdemandfortheestablishment of Pakistan
was basedon a negativeattitude.The Bengalisarenotedfora negative
and destructiveattituderatherthanforhard workand constructive
programmes. Theyalso havea tremendous tendencyto puttheblame
on others.In pre-Independence days,theyblamedthe Britishand
thentheHindus,withwhomtheycouldnotcompetein anysphereof
demandfora stateappealedto theBengaliMuslims,not
life. Jinnah's
becauseof thetwo-nation theory, but becausetheylookedupon it as
a protective
wallagainstthewealthy andprivilegedHindus.

Languagean emotive issue

But when,withtheestablishment of Pakistan,theyfoundthatthe
privilegedpositionof theBritishand theupper-class Hindushad gone
to the West Pakistanis,theystartedstressing theirculturaland lin-
guisticaffinities
with the Bengalisof West Bengal. The Pakistan
authoritiesregardedthis as a seriousmenace to the existenceof
Pakistanand triedto imposea culturaluniformity based on Islam.
The Bengalisreactedsharply.Theyfelt-justas the Muslimsof un-
dividedIndia had felt-thattheircherishedcultureand way of life
werethreatened. The firsttusslewas overthe languagequestion.In
1948 the Bengalisreactedviolentlyto Jinnah'sproposalthatUrdu
shouldbe the onlynationallanguage.On February21, 1952,three
studentsofDacca University werekilledin a riotoverthisissue. Since
then,February21 has been observedas a day of mourning for the
cherishedlanguageof theBengalis.
The Pakistangovernment failedto appreciatethefactthatnations
are made up of humanbeingswhosedeep feelingsabout suchques-
tionsas theirlanguagecannotbe safelyignored.A federalunioncan
be strengthenedby givingculturalfreedomand autonomy.But Pak-
istan'sattemptto impose uniformity wherediversitywas desirable
had unfortunate consequences.Everyattemptmade by the Pakistan
government to encourageand fostera culturaluniformity based on
Islamicculturein East Pakistanproduceda sharpreaction;the Ben-

7 See M. A. Jinnah'sforewordin M.R.T.: Pakistan & Muslim India (Bombay. 1942).

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
248 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

galis began to look more and more to West Bengal forculturalaffinity

and bonds. The Indians,who also had not been happy about Jinnah's
two-nationtheory,gave encouragementand sympathyto the growing
separatistmovementin East Bengal. The Bengali Muslim intelligentsia
were more at home withthe Bengali Hindus in West Bengal thanwith
theirfellow-countrymen fromWest Pakistan. Culturally,and perhaps
psychologically, the countrywas dividedlong beforethe recentcrisisin
Pakistan.

SheikhMujib's six points

WhenSheikhMujiburRahmanformulated his six-pointprogramme
soon afterthewar of 1965,a largesectionof his followers seemedto
have optedfora separatestate. The six pointswereambiguousand
capableof morethanone interpretation. The firstsaid thatPakistan
shouldbe a trulyfederalstate,whichimplied,no doubt,a united
Pakistan.But it is verydoubtful whether theprogramme as a whole
couldbe described as a schemefora truefederalunion;it was morea
veiledschemeforsecession.The powersof thecentralgovernment, for
instance,werestrictly limitedto twoor three-defence, foreign affairs,
and,withmanyreservations, a common currency.
But themostimportant featureof SheikhMujib'sprogramme was
thatwhathe proposedto givethecentrewithone hand,he tookfrom
it withtheother.The centrewas givendefence, butno moneyto dis-
chargeits defenceobligations;it wouldhave to dependon the con-
tributions of the provinces.Similarly, foreignaffairswere givento
thecentre, butnotexternal economicrelations.It is difficult
to see how
to makea neatdistinction betweenthepoliticaland economicaspects
of external relations,
particularlyin a developingcountry likePakistan.
Whenthesix-point programme was formulated earlyin 1966,Mujib
mighthave beenwillingto makesomeadjustments and amendments,
but Ayub preferred to meet the challengewith 'the languageof
weapons' ratherthan by politicalnegotiations.8 That was a fatal
mistake.But the worstmistakewas to implicateMujib in a highly
controversialconspiracy case knownas the'AgartalaConspiracy Case'
whenhe was alreadyunderarrest.People asked,how could he be a
partyto theconspiracy sincehewas alreadyinprison?
Afterthefallof Ayub,GeneralYahiyamadea numberof gestures
to tryto wintheconfidence of theBengalis.He allowedfreeand fair
electionson the basis of 'one man,one vote', and Mujib won an
absolutemajority.Yahiyaalso acknowledged thefactthattheBengalis
had no sharein the decision-making processesand thatthisstateof
mustbe ended. But thesemeasuresweretoo late. Another
of affairs
8 Pakistan Times, February17, 1966.

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 BANGLADESH: WHY IT HAPPENED 249

analogy can be made with the period of Britishrule. In the 1940s,

the Congresstriedto make a numberof concessionsto Jinnahand the
Muslims. But by that time the Muslims had already decided to have
a separate state. Similarly,the scheme for a transferof power as
formulatedby Yahiya in 1969 was too late; the Bengalis had already
decided to have a state of theirown. Justas Jinnahused the election
of 1946 to establishhis credentialsas the sole spokesmanand leader
of Muslim India, so Mujib used Yahiya's electionon the basis of 'one
man, one vote' to establishhis credentialsas the spokesmanof the
Bengali nation.
It was most unfortunate and tragicthat the political dynamicsin
Pakistan in 1969-71 were not fullyappreciated. Once the electionwas
over,it was not only futilebut most unwiseto challengeSheikhMujib.
The resultwas a colossal loss of human lives and one of the greatest
human tragediesof modem history.India, no doubt,played a part in
the disintegration of Pakistan, but the real responsibilitylies in the
historyof the last two decades of Pakistan,when a majorityof the
country'spopulationwas treatedlike a colonial people. The civil and
militaryrulingeliteis solelyresponsibleforthetragedy.
Now that Bangladesh has been established,it is to be hoped that
its people's long suffering and miserywill come to an end. The big
questionis whetherthe Awami League leadership,whichwas fostered
on negativethinking, will be equal to the greatconstructive challenges
facingtheunfortunate Bengali nationof 75 millionpeople.

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:16:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions