1. People v.
Molina to their arrest should not be admissible
G.R. No. 133917
February 19, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the
Philippines
Accused-Appellants: Nasario Molina y
Manama “Bobong” and Gregorio Mula
y Malagura “Boboy”
Facts:
In June 1996, Police Officer
Marino Paguidopon was told by an
informant of the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao
City. When he went with the informant
to find this alleged drug pusher, the
informant pointed at accused Mula, a
motorcycle driver, as the pusher. On
August 8, 1996, upon receiving another
information, Paguidopon called for
assistance of PNP where other police
officers gathered at his house where
they waited for the appellant Mula to
pass by. When Mula and Molina
passed by, the police officers boarded
their vehicle and found dried mariuana
inside their bag. They were
subsequently arrested. When a case
was charged against the appellants
they contended that the marijuana
seized from them which was incident
has escaped while being transferred
as evidence because it violates their
right from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless
arrest, search and seizure fall within
the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
Held:
No, there was not valid
warrantless arrest and likewise no valid
warrantless search and seizure. Cases
where warrant is unnecessary is
indicated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court. These cases are: (a)
when, in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense, (b) when an offense has
just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it, and (c)
when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
from one confinement to another.
It does not fall under any of the
exceptions because there was no
commission or act that is considered as
illegal when the appellants were
arrested. For an in flagrante delicto
arrest to exist the following must exist:
(1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to c0mmit
a crime, and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence of within the view of
the arresting officer. They did not
indicate that they were about to
commit, were committing, or
committed a crime at the time they
were arrested. While reliable
information is enough to ground a
suspicion, it is not strong enough so as
to indicate probable cause much less
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
2. ****
3. People v. Villareal
G.R. No. 201363
March 18, 2013
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the
Philippines
Accused-Appellant: Nazareno Villareal
y Lualhati
Facts:
In the morning of December 25,
2006, Police officer Renato de Leon
was driving his motorcycle. From a
distance of 8 to 10 meters he saw the
appellant Villareal, holding a plastic
sachet of shabu. When Villareal saw
him, he immediately ran away. When
de Leon caught Villareal, he was
brought to the police station where he
was arrested and the alleged shabu
was turned over to be marked as
evidence. The substance was tested
and was proven to be a 0.03 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. The appellant was
charged with the violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. During
the trial de Leon claimed that the
appellant had previous criminal
charges for the same offense and that
he arrested the appellant because
when he saw that the appellant was
holding a powdery white substance, it
immediately gave him suspicion as to
the matter thereof.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid
warrantless arrest based on the police
officers personal knowledge of the
criminal record of the appellant.
Held:
No, there was no valid
warrantless arrest. A lawful
warrantless arrest exists when either
of the following circumstances are
present: (a) when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing or is attempting
to commit an offense, (b) when an
offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that he person to be
arrested has committed it, and (c)
when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
service final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Based on the distance and the amount
of the powdery substance it is
insufficient to conclude, even with
clear vision that such substance
constitutes as shabu. The act of the
appellant of examining the substance
is not tantamount to arouse suspicion
of a commission or possible
commission of a crime even if he has
previous criminal history on the same
offense.
Personal knowledge is not
defined as knowledge of a person’s
criminal record, but personal
knowledge as to the actual commission
of the crime. The act of running away
from authority also does not
automatically imply guilt on the
accused. There are various reasons to
run away from authority, and
commission of a crime is just one of
the possible reasons.
Because there is an absence of overt
act there is no justification for the
appellant’s warrantless arrest. Hence,
it cannot be presented as evidence in
court as it is a fruit of the poisonous
tree.
(#4 Picture)

5. Leviste v. Alameda, et. al.
G.R. No. 182677
Aug. 3, 2010
Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was
filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging
him with homicide for the death of Rafael
de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the
RTC of Makati. The private complainants-
heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion praying for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the
public prosecutor to re-examine the
evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper
offense. The RTC thereafter issued the
Order granting the motion by the
complainants, thus, allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation.
Later, the trial court issued the other order
that admitted the Amended Information
for murder and directed the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned
these two orders before the appellate
court.
            Upon arraignment, the petitioner
refused to plead. The trial court entered
the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to
this, the petitioner filed an Urgent
Application for Admission to Bail Ex
Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court
granted on the ground that the evidence
of guilt of the crime of murder is not
strong. The trial court went on to try the
petitioner under the Amended
Information. Then, the trial court found
the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the
trial court's decision, the petitioner filed
an appeal to the CA. The appellate court
confirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the amendment of
the Information from homicide to murder
is considered a substantial amendment,
which would make it not just a right but a
duty of the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation.
Held:
 Yes. A substantial amendment consists of
the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters
are merely of form. An amendment to an
information which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of
an opportunity to meet the new averment
had each been held to be one of form and
not of substance. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since
both are conducted in the same manner
and for the same objective of determining
whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.
6. People v. Malmstedt
G.R. No. 91107
June 19, 1991
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the
Philippines
Defendant-Appellant: Mikael
Malmstedt
Facts:
On May 11, 1989, the
appellant, Malmstedt, a Swedish
National, rode a bus stop in order to
catch a trip to Baguio City. On the
same day, the Commanding Officer of
the First Regional Command, Captain
Alen Vasco ordered to set up a
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province. This was
established to prevent the alleged
delivery of marijuana in the area and
also to catch a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, who based on information
received by Vasco that morning that an
alleged Caucasian was the one carrying
the drugs.
When the bus arrived at the
checkpoint, the NARCOM officers
inspected the same and made notice of
the appellant. An officer asked the
appellant to furnish them his
identification papers, but the appellant
failed to do so. Because the appellant
had a buldge near his waist, the officer
also asked that he show what the
bulge could be. When they saw that
such was a pouch, the officer the
noticed that he had 4 suspicious
looking objects wrapped in brown
packaging tape. When they were
unwrapped, they all contain hashish or
marijuana. The appellant was asked to
alight the bus, as he was doing this he
grabbed two travelling bags. Each
contained teddy bears. When they
brought the accused to their
headquarters they found that even the
teddy bears were filled with hashish.
Samples from his items were taken to
verify if such was marijuana and this
was proven to be true. Because of this
a case was filed against the appellant,
the appellant attested that the search
was an illegal search and that the
illegal items were merely planted by
the officers to arrest him. The court
found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless
search and seizure is made pursuant to
a lawful warrantless arrest.
Held:
Yes, the arrest constitutes a lawful
warrantless arrest. Pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5, arrests are deemed lawful
when: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
NARCOM received information regarding
the transportation of prohibited drugs the
same day that the items were about to be
transported. There was not enough time
on the part of NARCOM to obtain a search
warrant. When the accused was search he
was in the act of transporting illegal drugs,
such is an offense actually being
committed. The search emanates from the
information provided by the informant
coupled with the failure of the appellant
to present his passport when asked to do
so. He was caught in flagrante delicto, thus
when he was search such was incident to a
lawful warrantless arrest. The items
therefore, may be admissible in court.
7. RIZAL ALIH, et.al. vs MAJOR GENERAL
DELFIN C. CASTRO
G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
Nature of Action:
Petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary
injunction and restraining order which was
treated by the Supreme Court as an
injunction suit with a prayer for the return
of the articles alleged to have been illegally
seized,
Facts:
The military conducted a zona
wherein they raid the compound occupied
by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street,
Zamboanga City, in search of loose
firearms, ammunition and other
explosives. As a resistance against the
invasion, the petitioners burst a gunfire to
warn the intruders and deter them from
entering. The soldiers returned fire and a
bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a
number of casualties. The besieged
compound surrendered the following
morning, and sixteen male occupants were
arrested, later to be finger-printed,
paraffin-tested and photographed over
their objection. The military also
inventoried and confiscated nine M16
rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades,
and several rounds of ammunition found
in the premises. The petitioners demand
the return of the arms and ammunition on
the ground that they were taken without a
search warrant as required by the Bill of
Rights. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts done by the
respondents are violative of the Bill of
Rights and thus the evidence obtained
therein inadmissible in court.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the search of the
petitioners' premises on November 25,
1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all
the articles seized as a result thereof are
inadmissible in evidence against the
petitioners in any proceedings. However,
the said articles shall remain in custodia
legis pending the outcome of the criminal
cases that have been or may later be filed
against the petitioners.
Ratio:
The precarious state of lawlessness in
Zamboanga at the time in question did not
excuse the non-observance of the
constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. At
the time of the “zona” the petitioners
were merely suspected of the mayor’s
slaying and had not been in fact
investigated. Every person is entitled due
process. The respondents defied the
precept that “civilian authority is at all
times supreme over the military” so clearly
proclaimed in the Constitution. The
respondents simply by-passed civil courts
which had the authority to determine
whether or not there was probable cause
to search the petitioners’ premises. It
follows that as the search of the
petitioners’ premises was violative of the
Constitution, all the firearms and the
ammunitions taken form the raided
compound are inadmissible as evidence in
any of the proceedings against the
petitioners.
8. JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de
las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser
crime of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to
the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal,
he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of
any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
The Court of Appeals denied
petitioner’s application for bail. It
invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised
“with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioner’s theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is
more than six years but not more than
20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean
that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court?
Ruling:
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a
strict attitude towards the allowance of
bail pending appeal is anchored on the
principle that judicial discretion —
particularly with respect to extending
bail — should be exercised not with
laxity but with caution and only for
strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even
been pointed out that "grave caution
that must attend the exercise of
judicial discretion in granting bail to a
convicted accused is best illustrated
and exemplified in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114,
Section 5.
After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates
and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends. From then on, the
grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion. At the risk of being
repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons. Considering that
the accused was in fact convicted by
the trial court, allowance of bail
pending appeal should be guided by a
stringent-standards approach. This
judicial disposition finds strong support
in the history and evolution of the
rules on bail and the language of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. It is likewise consistent with the
trial court’s initial determination that
the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out
on bail despite his conviction may
destroy the deterrent effect of our
criminal laws. This is especially
germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate
sentencing in the trial court and
appellate review. In addition, at the
post-conviction stage, the accused
faces a certain prison sentence and
thus may be more likely to flee
regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting
bail too freely in spite of conviction
invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of
our criminal justice system and court
processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
9. *****
10. MA. LIZA M. JORDA vs. JUDGE
CRISOLOGO S. BITAS
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE
CRISOLOGO S. BITAS
2014-03-05 | A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 and A.M. No.
RTJ-14-2377
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
 Two administrative cases were
filed against Judge Bitas, a
Regional Trial Court Judge of
Tacloban City.
 The first case came about when
one Danilo Miralles was charged
with Qualified Trafficking and the
same filed with the sala of Judge
Bitas, in which the respondent
judge issued an order finding
 probable cause to indict Danilo,
but allowing him to post bail in the
three cases. Judge Bitas was
allegedly showed bias in favor of
the accused Miralles
o When he did not issue a
warrant of arrest even
when the Information
have been filed charging
Miralles with non-bailable
cases
o When he reduced bail
even without a motion to
fix bail without giving the
opposition an opportunity
to file its objections
 The second charge was filed by
Prosecutor Jorda involves the
hearing on the Petition for
Involuntary Commitment of minor
victim Margie Baldoza to the
DSWD, wherein the judge
allegedly propounded a series of
questions tending to mitigate
Danilo’s role in the case, which
according to the prosecution went
beyond judicial authority and
discretion.
 A motion for inhibition was filed
against the judge. During the
hearing, the judge allegedly
publicly humiliated Pros. Jorda and
berated her for filing of the
motion. He then told her he does
not want to see her in his court,
and prevented her from
conducting cross-examination.
Judge Bitas’ Defense:
 On the first charge: it was wrong
to arrest Danilo because he was
still in the process of determining
probable cause and when he did
found probable cause, he found
the evidence of the prosecution
not strong hence he allowed
Danilo to post bail. There was no
more need to file a petition for bail
as he already found the evidence
against Miralles weak during the
hearing on the determination of
probable cause.
 On the second charge: it was
complainant who lacked
knowledge of the law and was
lawyering for politicians. Indeed he
stopped her from conducting cross
examination because it was the
DSWD lawyers who should actively
prosecute the case.
Office of the Court Administrator’s
Recommendation:
 Found respondent judge GUILTY of
grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law, and
recommended that Judge Bitas be
fined P20,000.00 for each case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Bitas be
liable for grave abuse of authority,
irregularity in the performance of official
duties, bias and
partiality?
RULING:
On the first charge:
 In the instant case, Miralles was
charged with Qualified Trafficking,
which under Section 10 (C) of R.A.
No. 9208 is  punishable by life
imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than
Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00).  Thus, by reason
of the penalty prescribed by law,
the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion which can be exercised
only by respondent judge after the
evidence is submitted in a
hearing.  The hearing of the
application for bail in capital
offenses is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the
prosecution’s evidence is weak or
strong.
 As correctly found by the
Investigating Justice, with life
imprisonment as one of the
 penalties prescribed for the
offense charged against Miralles,
he cannot be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, in
accordance with Section 7, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
 Here, Judge Bitas granted bail to
Miralles without neither
conducting a hearing nor a motion
for application for bail.
Respondent judge's justification
that he granted bail, because he
found the evidence of the
prosecution weak, cannot be
sustained because the records
show that no such hearing for that
purpose transpired. What the
records show is a hearing to
determine the existence of
probable cause, not a hearing for a
petition for bail. The hearing for
bail is different from the
determination of the existence of
probable cause. It is only after this
proceeding that the court can
entertain a petition for bail where
a subsequent hearing is conducted
to determine if the evidence of
guilt is weak or not. Hence, in
granting bail and fixing it at
P20,000.00 motu proprio, without
allowing the prosecution to
present its evidence, respondent
judge denied the prosecution of
due process.
 Clearly, in the instant case,
respondent judge's act of fixing
the accused's bail and reducing
the same motu proprio is not
mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the
part of respondent judge, but a
patent disregard of well-known
rules. When an error is so gross
and patent, such error produces
an inference of bad faith, making
the judge liable for gross ignorance
of the law.
On the second charge:
 Judge’s actuations in the court
premises during the hearing of the
petition for commitment to the
DSWD constitute abuse of
authority and manifest partiality to
the accused. The Judge’s utterance
of “I don’t want to see your face!”;
“You better transfer to another
court!; You are being influenced by
politicians” was improper and
does not speak well his stature as
an officer of Court.
 The use of intemperate language is
included in the proscription
provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct
which stresses that as a dispenser
of justice, respondent should
exercise judicial temperament at
all times, avoiding vulgar and
insulting language. He must
maintain composure and
equanimity.
Canon 4: Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a
judge.
 This Court has long held that court
officials and employees are placed
with a heavy burden and
responsibility of keeping the faith
of the public. Any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of
official functions must be avoided.
This Court shall not countenance
any conduct, act or omission on
the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.
 Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge
which constitutes sanctions.
 The actuations of respondent judge
towards the complainants, as shown by his
use of abusive and insulting words against
complainants in open court, and his
correspondence with the Court, are evident
of his PARTIALITY to the accused.
WHEEFORE, JUDGE CRISOLOGO BITAS was
SUSPENDED from the service for three months and
one day without pay instead of a fine of P20,000 for
each case, as recommended by Investigating Justice.
He was WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.