Engineering Failure Analysis 10 (2003) 667–674

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Fatigue failure of a fillet welded nozzle joint

C.R. Das, A.K. Bhaduri*, S.K. Ray
Materials Technology Division, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam 603102, India

Received 21 February 2003; accepted 12 March 2003

Abstract
A fillet welded joint in a nozzle of a storage tank, made of AISI 304L stainless steel (SS), had failed very close to the
weld fusion line during transportation. Visual examination of the weld showed deposition of excessive weld metal in
the joint. Scanning electron microscope observation of the fracture surface revealed beach and ratchet marks on the
fracture surfaces. The observation of in-situ metallography of the heat-affected zone (HAZ) anticipated sensitisation
of the HAZ. Bending of the nozzle to 15 anticipated the final failure, which occurred due to overloading during
transportation.
# 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Welds; Stainless steel; Tank failure; Sensitisation; Fatigue

1. Introduction

Austenitic SS are widely used in nuclear, chemical and petrochemical industries due to their excellent
corrosion resistance combined with adequate high temperature mechanical properties and ease of fabri-
cation. Although austenitic SS are easily weldable, two major problems can be encountered during weld-
ing, viz. hot cracking [1,2] and sensitisation [3,4]. Hot cracking in ASS can be avoided by choosing the
chemistry of the filler metal in such a way that the weld metal has a minimum amount of delta-ferrite [2]
along with minimum impurity elements like sulphur and phosphorus. The sensitisation of ASS occurs
when it is subjected to slow heating or cooling in the temperature range 723–1123 K during which chro-
mium gets depleted to less than 12% in regions adjacent to the grain boundaries due to the precipitation of
chromium-rich M23C6 carbides along the grain boundaries. Exposure of this sensitised material to corro-
sive media leads to inter-granular corrosion due to dissolution of the chromium-depleted regions [5]. The
sensitisation of the HAZ during welding depends on the time spent in the sensitisation temperature range,
which in turn depends on the heat input used during welding as these influence the heating and cooling
rates. Use of copper backing-plate, forced air-cooling, proper joint geometry and low heat input, all of
which ensure faster cooling rates through the sensitisation temperature regime, can help to avoid sensiti-
sation of the HAZ. Further, welding of materials of unequal thickness leads to solidification of the weld

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +91-4114-280232; fax: +91-4114-280081.

E-mail address: bhaduri@igcar.ernet.in (A.K. Bhaduri).

1350-6307/03/$ - see front matter # 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S1350-6307(03)00062-1
668 C.R. Das et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 10 (2003) 667–674

bead occurring preferentially in the direction of higher heat flow, namely to the thicker material. If, for a
given heat input, the inequality in thickness is too large, fusion may not even take place on the high heat-sink
side (thicker material), as the heat available is insufficient to melt the thicker material. However, increasing
the overall heat input may result in excessive melting on the low heat-sink side (thinner material). Though
many remedies are available for such welded joints, the most widely used one is to machine the thick
material so that the thickness across the weld joint is uniform. The failed welded joint of the nozzle was
between materials of different thickness, and the joint design was not proper. This failure investigation
examines the possible reasons for failure and suggests precautions that need to be adopted during repair
welding of this failed nozzle.

2. Background

A storage tank comprised of a number of nozzles running from the inside to the outside of the 304L SS
tank. As the nozzle joints were not designed for any fatigue or high-load applications, they were fillet-
welded to the tank using ER 308L austenitic SS filler metal by gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW). To avoid
damage during transportation from the fabrication shop to the plant site, all the nozzles were protected by
welding a 304L SS sheet (5 mm30 mm) along the periphery of the nozzle.
After transportation of the tank from the manufacturer’s site, it was found that one of the nozzles had
failed very close to the fusion line, with the failed process pipe being bent by about 15 . The failed nozzle, a
schedule 50 NB pipe, was a jacket pipe for the process pipe of schedule 15 NB. The annular space between
the jacket pipe and the process pipe was closed with the sealing plate using fillet joint. The outer diameter
(OD) of the process pipe was 22 mm, its wall thickness was 3 mm and its extended length was 270 mm from
the fillet joint. However, no information was available as to how the component was subjected to loading
except through vibration.

3. Investigations

3.1. Examination of fillet weld

On cutting the jacket pipe in the HAZ, at a location very close to the fillet weld joint, it was observed
that the 3 mm thick process pipe and jacket pipe were welded to a 7 mm thick sealing plate. Thus, during
fabrication, the sealing plate used was about 2.3 times thicker than the process pipe thickness. Measure-
ments of the fillet weld showed that the throat dimension, along the periphery of the pipe, varied between
6.5 and 7.5 mm. At some places, this fillet weld also had excess convexity. Further, the leg size was 4.2 mm
in one location and varied between 6 and 9 mm along the periphery, which was higher than the acceptable
limit [6]. These clearly showed that the fillet welding was carried out in an uncontrolled manner.

3.2. Visual examination of fracture surfaces

Macroscopic examination of the fracture surface of the failed nozzle (Fig. 1), carried out using a digital
camera, showed that excessive weld metal was deposited in one location, with the weld bead being depos-
ited preferentially towards the sealing plate. Grinding marks were observed on the weld metal at the weld/
pipe interface along with ratchet markings (Fig. 2), the latter indicating possible fatigue failure. Further,
uncontrolled weld deposition resulted in lack of overlapping of the weld bead at the end and start of the
fillet-weld. Closer observation of the fracture surface showed that the fracture initiated at the fillet weld/
pipe interface at the location where the fillet-weld end and start overlaps. The presence of grinding marks
 C.R. Das et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 10 (2003) 667–674 669

Fig. 1. Photograph of the failed surface.

Fig. 2. Close-up of fracture surface.

and/or improper weld-bead overlap could have resulted in high stress concentration and caused initiation
of multiple fatigue cracks. Further, burn-through was observed in the inner diameter (ID) side of the pro-
cess pipe very close to the fusion line (Fig. 3). This burn-through in the thin process pipe could have been
caused by the use of the high welding current necessary to melt the thick sealing plate side of the joint.
Thus, the fracture that occurred very close to the fillet weld fusion line in the HAZ could have been caused
by the high stress concentration due to the presence of machining notches as well as due to the improper
overlapping of weld metal during each weld pass.

3.3. Fractography

The scanning electron microscope (SEM) fractographs of the fracture surfaces of the failed nozzle (Figs. 4
and 5) show the presence of beach marks that are typical of a fatigue failure, and intergranular fracture
morphology with the features of the fracture surfaces being typical of an overload failure. The embrittle-
ment of the HAZ led to lowering of its toughness thereby further aggravating the intergranular failure.
670 C.R. Das et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 10 (2003) 667–674

Fig. 3. Burn through on the ID side of the process pipe.

Fig. 4. SEM fractograph of the failed nozzle showing fatigue crack initiation from a notch.

3.4. In-situ metallography

The microstructural features in the HAZ close to the fracture surface of the failed pipe, obtained by in-
situ metallography, shows presence of chromium rich M23C6 carbide precipitates, along the grain bound-
aries, with some grains showing a continuous network of grain boundary precipitates (Fig. 6). This
microstructure in the HAZ of the failed nozzle is typical of a sensitised structure. As sensitisation generally
occurs in SS in the high-carbon varieties [3,4], low-carbon varieties are generally used to avoid sensitisa-
tion. However, sensitisation in some low-carbon varieties of SS has also been reported [5]. As chemical
analysis of the material of the failed nozzle, by direct reading optical emission spectrometer, confirmed that
the material was indeed 304L SS (Table 1), the extensive carbide precipitation indicates that, during weld-
ing of this low-carbon SS, sufficiently high heat input was used to ensure melting of the high heat sink side
of this joint involving material of different thickness. The evidence of burn-through (Fig. 3) and sensitised
HAZ (Fig. 6a) confirmed the use of high heat input for welding the sealing plate to the process pipe, and
the resultant slow cooling rate through the sensitisation regime in the HAZ in the pipe.
 C.R. Das et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 10 (2003) 667–674 671

Fig. 5. SEM fractograph of the failed nozzle showing radial ridges.

Table 1
Chemical composition (wt.%) of the failed nozzle material

C Mn Si Cr Ni P S Mo Co Cu V Fe

0.018 1.1 0.4 18.5 9.7 0.03 0.012 0.24 0.075 0.16 0.08 Balance

4. Analysis of results

From the above investigations, the following possible causes of failure of the nozzle could be arrived at.

1. Welding of materials with different thickness resulted in deposition of excess weld metal and in the
weld bead solidifying preferentially in the direction of higher heat flow. Higher heat input had to be
used for melting the sealing plate, which was about 2.3 times thicker than the process pipe. This also
resulted in burn through in the ID side of the pipe very close to the weld fusion line, subsequent
machining of which resulted in notches at the weld metal/nozzle interface.
2. Improper overlapping of the weld metal bead at the end and start of the fillet-weld resulted in
multiple notches in the weld metal.
3. The presence of continuous network of grain boundary carbide precipitates in the HAZ caused the
embrittlement of this zone.
4. The presence of beach and ratchet marks on the fracture surface indicates that the failed nozzle was
subjected to fatigue.
5. Cracks initiated from the notches and propagated along the sensitised grain boundaries across the
thickness of the pipe.
6. The final rupture of the nozzle due to overloading cannot be ruled out as the nozzle had bent by
about 15 .
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Fig. 6. In-situ metallograph of HAZ of the 304L SS nozzle (etchant: 10% oxalic acid): (a) near the fracture surface of the failed
nozzle; and (b) after repair welding of the nozzle.

5. Repair welding of the failed nozzle

For repair welding of the failed nozzle, the following precautions/modifications were suggested.

1. The thickness of the sealing plate should be 3 mm instead of the higher thickness used earlier during
fabrication.
2. Controlled heat input should be used during fillet welding to avoid sensitisation of the HAZ.
3. Forced air cooing should also be used after welding to avoid sensitisation of the HAZ.
4. A modified joint configuration, as given in Fig. 7, should be used for repair welding of the broken
nozzle.
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Fig. 7. Joint configuration of the nozzle: (a) originally as used during fabrication; and (b) modified as for repair welding.
674 C.R. Das et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 10 (2003) 667–674

Based on the above suggestions, the failed nozzle was repair welded by cutting off the broken nozzle and
butt-welding it using the modified joint configuration (Fig. 7) and 2 mm diameter filler wires. A sealing
plate of thickness equal to that of the pipe was chosen. To minimise the heat input during welding, a
welding current of 62–65 A, voltage of 12–15 V and welding speed of 4 mm s 1 were used. Subsequent
microstructural examination by in-situ metallography of the repair weld confirmed the HAZ was not sen-
sitised (Fig. 6).

6. Conclusions

This failure analysis shows that welded joints between materials of different thickness need to be carried
out with extra precautions with respect to the following.

1. Choice of suitable joint design to ensure equitable distribution of heat across the joint.
2. Use of low heat input during welding, even if low-carbon stainless steels are used, for avoiding
sensitisation in the HAZ.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the support extended by Mr. P. Gopalakrishnan and Mr. S.
Jayaram (BARC Facilities, Kalpakkam) for carrying out this work. Suggestions made by colleagues Dr.
S.K. Albert and Shri Hasan Shaikh during the work are gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to
Mrs. M. Radhika, Mr. P. Sukumar and Mr. K.A. Gopal for their support during the experimental inves-
tigations.

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