MMDA vs.

Bel Air Village Association

GR No. 135962
March 27, 2000

Puno, J.

Facts:
On December 30, 1995, petitioner MMDA sent respondent Bel Air Village Association a notice
requesting the respondent to open a private road owned by the latter to public vehicles
supposedly by virtue of the state’s police power. On January 2, 1996, the respondent instituted
a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court Makati Branch which was later on denied
by the same court. The respondent questioned the lower court’s decision and raised the issue
before the Court of Appeals on January 23, 1996, and on January 27, 1997, the appellate court
granted the respondent’s petition. After which, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied. Hence, this recourse.

Issue:
Whether or not MMDA has the authority to order the opening of a private road

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The court
held that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. It does not have the power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. Therefore, it does not have the authority to order the opening of a private road to
public vehicles.

Binay vs. Domingo

1
GR No. 92389
September 11, 1991

Paras, J.

Facts:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its council, approved Resolution No. 60
also known as the “Burial Assistance Program.” The Metro Manila Commission approved the
said resolution and referred it to respondent Commission on Audit for its expected allowance on
audit. However, respondent disapproved the resolution. The petitioner, then, filed two letters for
reconsideration which were also denied by the respondent. The respondent believes that the
municipality failed to provide a perceptible connection between the objective sought to be
attained by the resolution and the alleged public safety or general welfare of the inhabitants of
Makati. Furthermore, the respondent believes that the fund allocated for the said program
should benefit the whole or the majority of the inhabitants of the municipality and not only a
limited few as pursuant to the police power of the state delegated to local government units by
legislature. Bent on pursuing the program, petitioner passed Resolution 243, re-affirming
Resolution 60. Nevertheless, the resolution was stopped by respondent’s Decision No. 1159.
This forced the petitioner to file a special civil action for certiorari praying that the respondent’s
decision be set aside as null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that “public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it
incidentally benefits a limited number of persons…The care for the poor is generally recognized
as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power
in the promotion of the common good.”

Beltran vs. Secretary of Health

GR No. 133640
2
November 25, 2005

Azcuna, J:

Facts

On April 2, 1994, Republic Act 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1997 was enacted. It
was approved by President Ramos on May 15, 1994, published in the Official Gazette on
August 18, 1994, and took effect on August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, respondent Secretary of Health promulgated its Implementing Rules and
Regulation Administrative Order No. 9 Series of 1995. Both Act and its implementing rules and
regulation contain a provision which phases out commercial blood banks in the country from the
time the act took effect.

On May 20, 1998, petitioner Rodolfo S. Beltran doing business under the name and style of Our
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank filed a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the validity of RA 7719 and its IRR. Two days after, petitioner Doctors Blood Center
filed a petition for mandamus with the prayer of issuance of temporary restraining order,
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The Court, then, issued a resolution directing
the Department of Health to file a consolidated comment, and a Temporary Restraining Order
for the respondent to cease and desist in implementing the act.

On August 26, 1998, the Secretary of Health filed a consolidated comment explaining the
reason and purpose behind the act.

On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for the Issuance of Extended Temporary Restraining
Order to prevent the respondent from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks,
compelling the public to source blood from voluntary blood donation and committing similar acts
detrimental to petitioners. In response, respondent filed a consolidated comment/opposition to
the motion on July 8, 1999. A few days after, petitioner filed a Petition to Show Why Public
Respondent Should Not Be Held in Contempt which the respondent answered again in a
consolidated comment.

On July 29, 1999, concerned citizen and taxpayers filed a Petition-In-Intervention interjecting the
same arguments and issues laid down by the petitioners which the court granted in a resolution
dated September 27, 1999. The respondent reiterated in his comment to the petition-in-
intervention the purpose of and the reason behind the act.

Issues

Whether or not Republic Act 7719 is a valid exercise of the State’s police power.

Ruling

3
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned
provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.[56] Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis therefore. Otherwise, the petition must fail.

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether
the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for
Congress to determine

ABS-CBN vs. PMSI

GR No. 175769-70

4
January 19, 2009

Ynares-Santiago, J:

Facts

On April 25, 2001, petitioner demanded for respondent to cease and desist from rebroadcasting
Channels 2 and 23. Two days after, respondent replied that the rebroadcasting was in
accordance with the “must carry” rule stated in NTC Memorandum Circular 4-8-88. Negotiations
ensued between the parties in an effort to settle the matter; however, it was terminated due to
respondent’s inability to ensure the prevention of the illegal transmission.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO against the
respondent for allegedly violating the Property Rights Law, and applied for a temporary
restraining order. IPO granted the application and ordered respondent to suspend the
transmission of said channels.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and a Manifestation,
reiterating its duty to comply with the “must-carry rule”, with the BLA. Respondent also
submitted a letter dated December 20, 2002 to then NTC Commissioner Borje requesting the
latter to provide regulating guidelines for application and coverage of Memorandum Circular 04-
8-88. On August 26, 2003, respondent filed another Manifestation with the BLA informing the
latter that it has received a letter from the NTC enjoining it to strictly and immediately comply
with the Memorandum.

On December 22, 2003, BLA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ABS-CBN.

Respondent filed an appeal with the Office of the Director-General of the IPO on February 6,
2004. On December 20, 2004, the Director-General of IPO rendered its decision in favor of
PMSI. Then, respondent filed with the CA a “Motion to Withdraw Petition; Alternatively,
Memorandum of the Petition for Certiorari” which was later granted in a resolution dated
February 17, 2005.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. On July, 18, 2005,
the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order. Afterwards, petitioner filed a Petition
for Contempt against PMSI for its continued transmission of the channels mentioned above. On
July 12, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions of ABS-CBN. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was still denied by the same court; hence, this petition.

Issue

5
Whether or not PSMI’s transmission of ABS-CBN’s channels is a violation of Section 9, Article 3
of the Constitution.

Ruling

After a careful review of the facts and records of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the
findings of the Director-General of the IPO and the Court of Appeals. The SC sees no merit in
ABS-CBN’s contention that PMSI violated its broadcaster’s rights under Section 211 of the IP
Code.

ABS-CBN and PSMI were granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 7966 and Republic
Act 8630 respectively, which requires both to “provide public service time to enable the
government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public
issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such
as in community programming; assist in the functions of public information and education…A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires.”

Chavez vs. Gonzalez

GR No. 168388
February 15, 2008

6
Puno, C.J:

Facts

On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye revealed the opposition’s plan of destabilizing
the government by releasing a recording between then President Arroyo and a commissioner of
the COMELEC. Two days after, he produced two versions of the taped conversation. However,
he later on retracted his statements.

On June 8, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned the media of a possible violation of the
Anti Wire-tapping Law if they were in found possession of copies of said recording and if they
continue to publish such. He even ordered the NBI to go after media organization that would
ignore his warning.

On June 11, 2005, NTC issued a press release giving the media fair warning to observe the Anti
Wire-tapping Law. In their press release, NTC clearly stated that those who disregard such
warning will be subject to suspension, or revocation/cancellation of their license.

On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with KBP, and, afterwards, issued a Joint Press
Statement emphasizing to media organizations the warning previously given.

Issue

Whether or not respondent’s action was a violation of the freedom of speech, of expression and
of the press.

Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petition.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom
of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them
provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s
private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but
their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free
press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed
in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the
injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the
preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger
test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means,
7
violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own
evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump
the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to
greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.

Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion

G.R.139465
October 17, 2000

Melo, J:

8
FACTS
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of the U.S.A” The Philippine Senate ratified the said treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S.
Note Verbale No.0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the United States.

On the same day, petitioner designates and authorized a panel of attorneys to take charge and
to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforesaid extradition documents, Mark Jimenez
through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. However, the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that
the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.

Issue:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the government’s ironclad
duties under a treaty.

Ruling:
The human rights of a person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government or another state.
This is so although we recognize treaties as source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the
land.

Petition DISMISSED.

US vs. Purganan
G.R. 148571
September 24, 2002

Panganiban, J.:

9
Facts:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly
authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs
(SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to
Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.The TRO prohibited the Department
of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO
was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465.
Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17,
2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented
by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter
alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code
Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18
US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US
Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest”
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the
procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In
his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he
be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000.

10
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the
court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001

Hence, this Petition

Issues:

Whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extradite before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in
allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty

Ruling:

It is significant to note that Sec.6 of PD1069 of our Extradition Law uses the word “immediate”
to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for
hearing the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Arrest subsequent to a hearing cannot be longer
considered immediate. What is needed only is to get first impression –a prima facie finding-
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest of the accused.

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. Extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses of which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the
courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE
insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private
respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of
our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law.

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

GR No. 122846
January 20, 2009

Tinga, J:

Facts:

11
This is a petition for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding this case.

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law an ordinance entitled “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila.”

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed that the
Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.
Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the
RTC. MTDC moved to withdrawn as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.

On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance.

On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.

The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals.

The city asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local
Government Code and the Revised Manila Charter.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.

Hence,this petition.

Issue:

Whether the Ordinance is constitutional

Ruling:

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not to eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of police power. Yet the desirability of these
ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.

However well-intentioned the Ordinance maybe, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical

intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly
12
restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance
No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

City of Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim v. Judge Laguio and MTDC

G.R. 118127
April 12, 2005

Facts

The petitioners seek to reverse the ruling of the RTC regarding the unconstitutionality of
Ordinance No.7783 which is entitled- AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDINGTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
13
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), contends that the City
Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels and that the Ordinance does not
constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business
has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected.
The petitioners on the other hand, argues that the City Council had the power to “prohibit certain
forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community” and
that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power.

Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the
Ordinance. He also granted the preliminary injunction prayed by the MDTC. Hence, the appeal
by the petitioners.

Issue

Whether or not the Ordinance No.7738 is constitutional and valid.

Ruling

There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so
desires to put an end to the prostitution, it can instead impose reasonable regulations. Local
legislative bodies ,in this case, cannot prohibit the operation of the aforesaid establishments
without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guise of due process and
equal protection of the laws of police power.

The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance
void is AFFIRMED.

Pilipinas Shell v Republic

G.R. 173918
April 8, 2008

Facts

Present controversy sprang from the cancellation of tax debit memos (TDMs) and the
corresponding tax credit certificates (TCCs) assigned to petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation by various entities. The assignment to Shell had the approval of the Board if
Investments and the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center
14
(Center). Some of these TCCs were subsequently accepted as payment by the Bureau of
Customs ( BoC) for petitioners taxes and import duties in 1997 and 1998.

On Nov. 3. 1999, then Secretary Edgardo B. Espiritu of the Department of Finance( DOF)
informed petitioner that its TDMs and TCCs were fraudulently issued and transferred, and had
to be cancelled. He asked petitioner to immediately pay the BoC and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue the value of the cancelled TCCs as well as the related penalties, surcharges and
interests. Petitioner immediately moved to dismiss the collection case. It contended that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint for collection was
prematurely filed in view of its pending petition for review in the CTA. On June 7, 2002, the
RTC denied petitioner’s motion and instead ordered to file an answer.

Issue

Whether or not filing of a collection case is a proper remedy.

Ruling

Yes, the filing of collection case was a proper remedy. Assessments informs taxpayers of their
tax liabilities. Under the TCCP, the assessment is the form of a liquidation made on the face of
the entry return and approved by the collector of Customs. A liquidation is considered to have
been made when the entry is officially stamped and liquidated. An assessment or liquidation by
the BoC contains finality and conclusiveness one year from the date of the final payment of
duties except when there was fraud, there is a pending protest or the liquidation of import entry
was merely tentative. None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case.

Petition denied. The RTC of Manila is ordered to proceed expeditiously with the pre-trial
conference and trial of the case.

Armando G. Yrasuegui vs. PAL

GR No. 168081
October 17, 2008

Reyes, J:

Facts:

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui filed for a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was
illegally dismissed for weighing beyond the ideal weight mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL. Petitioner was given almost five years to address his weight
15
concerns through vacation leaves and weight consultations with the corporate physician.
However, petitioner failed to lose the necessary weight and repeatedly refused to report for
weight check. On June 15, 1993, petitioner was informed by PAL that his services were
considered terminated due to his inability to attain the ideal weight. The Labor Arbiter ruled that
petitioner was illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Arbiter. Respondent
filed at the CA which reversed the NLRC in its decision dated August 31, 2004.

Issue/s:

1. Whether not the CA gravely erred in holding the petitioner’s obesity can be a ground for
dismissal under paragraph (e) of Artilce 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines;
2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that petitioner’s dismissal for obesity can be
predicated on the “bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense;
3. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that petitioner was not unduly discriminated
against when he was dismissed while other overweight cabin attendants were either given
flying duties or promoted;
4. Whether or not the CA gravely erred when it brushed aside petitioner’s claims for
reinstatement and wages allegedly for being moot and academic.

Rulings:

1. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code.
The standards violated in this case were not mere “orders” of the employer; they
were the “prescribed weights” that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and
keep his or her position in the company. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying
standards fall under Article 282(e), which states “other causes analogous to the
foregoing.”

2. The dismissal of the petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense.
The Court stated that BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.” Being in the business of air
transportation, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for
cabin crew is flight safety. Being overweight impedes mobility, a quality demanded in
emergency situations.

3. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
The petitioner failed to present substantial evidence to establish the alleged
discriminatory treatment by PAL. He merely provided the names of other supposedly
overweight cabin attendants whose obesity were tolerated by PAL.

4. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the option to exercise actual or payroll
reinstatement belongs to the employer. Despite a return to work notice received on
February 23, 2001, petitioner did not report for work nor did he was able to prove that he
rendered service from the moment he was dismissed to justify payment of back wages.
Petitioner’s request to be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight is
asking PAL to comply with the impossible.
16
 The appealed Decision of the CA is affirmed but modified in that the petitioner is entitled
to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of
service, which should include his regular allowances.

Biraogo vs. Truth Commission

GR No. 129935
December 7, 2010

Mendoza, J:

Facts:

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010
elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted
the good senator to the presidency.
17
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of
the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B.
Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and
question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Ruling:

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The Court finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of
all. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that
clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team

18
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by
the Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to
be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in
nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide
whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their
mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an
"adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

19
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent
initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is
the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of
violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for
it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a
hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out
the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

Sony Music vs. Judge Español

GR No. 156804
March 14, 2005

Garcia, J:

Facts:

Sony Music Entertainment filed a petition for certiorari with application for injunctive relief nullifying
the orders issued by respondent Judge Dolores Español on June 25, 2002 and January 2003.

The Videogram Regulatory Board filed a criminal complaint against private respondents and another
officer of Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) for violation of PD No. 1987 and RA No. 8293 (Intellectual
Property Code). The private respondents were charged of replication, reproduction and distribution
of videograms without license and authority from VRB and of infringing the petitioners’ copyrights.
Upon sworn statements by NBI Agent Lavin, witnesses, a private investigator, and unnamed

20
persons, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 220-00 for violation of PD No. 1987 and
Search Warrant No. 219-00 for violation of RA No. 8293.

On April 11, 2002, private respondents filed a “Motion to Quash Search Warrant (And To Release
Seized Properties) grounded on the following: lack of probable cause, that the warrant did not
sufficiently describe the items to be seized, and that the warrant was improperly enforced.

The respondent judge issued assailed orders quashing Search Warrant No. 219-00 because the
alleged seized items as evidence has been compromised, having been commingled with other
articles. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration were denied on the grounds that the SLC is still a
holder of a valid and existing VRB license, and that the search warrant was of no force and effect as
there was no probable cause to justify its issuance.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in ordering the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 219-00

Rulings:

The issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the requirements of probable cause.
The respondent judge did not accordingly err in quashing the same, let alone gravely abuse her
discretion. The applicants for the search warrants relied on most of the information on what alleged
unnamed sources told them. They testified under oath as to the truth of facts they had no personal
knowledge of. The more decisive consideration of whether or not a probable cause obtains to justify
the issuance of a search warrant is that the applicant and his witnesses had personal knowledge
that the discs were actually infringing, pirated or unauthorized copies. The heresay information were
not followed up personally nor validated by the applicants. Thus, the issuance of Search Warrant No.
219-00 was invalid. The instant petition is DISMISSED.

People vs. Marti

GR No. 81561
January 18, 1991

Bidin, J:

Facts:

On August14, 1987, appellant brought four gift wrapped packages to a courier company to be
sent to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. The packages were not inspected at the receiving
counter to the refusal of the appellant. However, before delivery to the Bureau of Customs, the
owner of the courier company, Mr. Job Reyes, opened the packages for final inspection as
standard procedure. Mr. Reyes brought samples of the suspicious contents to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which confirmed that the items were prohibited marijuana leaves.
Mr. Reyes accompanied the NBI agents to his office to surrender contents of the packages. On
August 27, 1987, the appellant was apprehended by authorities and was found guilty by the trial
court of violations against the Dangerous Drugs Act.
21
Issue/s:

Whether or not the appellant’s constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures were
violated

Ruling/s:

Appellant’s packages were inspected and searched by a private individual as a standard

procedure for courier companies. The protection against unreasonable search and seizure may
only be invoked against the State, thus it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals. Mr. Reyes, the owner of the courier company, volunteered the suspicious contents
of the packages to the NBI. The prohibited marijuana leaves came into the possession of
authorities without transgressing the appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and
seizure. Thus, the evidence procured through the private seizure may be used against the
appellant.

The SC AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court.

Republic vs. Eugenio

GR No. 174629
February 14, 2008

Tinga, J:

Facts:

The present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 assails the orders and
resolutions issued by the Makati and Manila RTCs.

On June 27, 2005, the AMLC issued a resolution founded on the findings of CIS that amounts
were transferred from a Hong Kong bank account owned by Jetstream Pacific Ltd. Account to
bank accounts in the Philippines maintained by Liongson and Cheng Yong. The resolution also
noted that Pantaleon Alvarez violated RA No. 3019 by awarding the contract to PIATCO despite
its lack of financial capacity.

22
On July 4 2005, the Makati RTC granted the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the
subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, supported by a probable
cause related to the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Another order was
granted to AMLC on January 12, 2006, granting it authority to inquire into 13 accounts and 2
related web of accounts the Republic alleged to have been used to facilitate corruption in the
NAIA 3 Project.

On January 25, 2006, Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order of January
12, 2006, arguing that nothing in RA No. 9160 authorized the AMLC to seek the authority to
inquire into bank accounts ex parte. The Manila RTC granted the motion.

On July 2006, Lilia Cheng, the wife of Cheng Yong and partly owned the bank accounts as part
of conjugal properties, filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. She imputed grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Makati and Manila RTCs in granting AMLC's ex parte applications for a bank
inquiry order which violated her constitutional right to due process. She further argued that the
AMLA cannot apply to bank accounts opened and transactions entered into prior to the
effectivity of the AMLA or to bank accounts located outside the Philippines.

On August 1, 2006, the CA acted on Lilia Cheng's petition by issuing a TRO on the said trial
courts and AMLC from implementing, enforcing or executing the respective bank inquity orders
previously issued. On September 22, 2006, the CA granted a writ of preliminary injunction in
favor of Lilia Cheng.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the subject bank inquiry orders are valid

Ruling:

Even from the cursory examination of the applications for inquiry order and the orders
themselves, it is evident that the orders were not in accordance with law. Even if the bank
inquiry order may be availed of without need of a pre-existing case under the AMLA, it does not
follow that such order may be availed of ex parte. It is evident that Section 11 does not
specifically authorize, as a general rule, the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order. The
necessary implication of this finding that Section 11 of the AMLA does not generally authorize
the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order would be that such orders cannot be issued
unless notice is given to the owners of the account, allowing them the opportunity to contest the
issuance of the order. The court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot simply take
the AMLC's word that probably cause exists that the deposits or investments are related to an
unlawful activity. It will have to exercise its own determinative function in order to be convinced
of such fact.

The Court’s construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy
considerations. A bank account inspected by the government following an ex parte proceeding
wherein the depositor would know nothing would have significant implications on the right to
privacy. There is a right to privacy governing bank accounts in the Philippines, and that such
right finds application to the case at bar. The petition is DISMISSED.

23
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 107383
February 20, 1996

Mendoza, J:

Facts

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner

24
had filed against her husband.

Issue

Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained through forcible intrusion and unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification
from medical practice.

Held

Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which
public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Gonzales v COMELEC
27 SCRA 835
G.R. L-27833
April 18, 1969

Facts

RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity, was challenged on
constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner
Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-
petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only

25
political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render
the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M.
Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed
be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine,
there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P.
Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the
act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue

Whether or not RA 4880 is unconstitutional.

Held

Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present
danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil'
sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It
is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the
clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions
were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate
response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and
substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of
late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent.

26
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews
for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.

137 SCRA 628
G.R. No. L-59329
July 9, 1985

Facts:

A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on
grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition.
Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to
establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates
freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue
raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition.
The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there
are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds
that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

27
Issue/s

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of
Expression.

Held

The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a
hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative
proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635).
The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The
Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not
simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various
issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it
gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation
of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected
against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation
of freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the
media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law
has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to
be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to
the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the
special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.

28
Ang Tibay v CIR
G.R. L-46496
69 Phil 635
February 27, 1940

Laurel, J:

Facts

Toribio claimed to have lain off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay
factory.

The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for reconsideration with the Supreme Court.

In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor union, the
respondent, averred:

1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis

2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation
with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
29
 5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldn’t be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

Issue

Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?

Held

Yes. Case remanded to the CIR

Rationale

There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity.

The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and quasi-judicial functions
for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and employees. It can
appeal to voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a locality by
order of the president.
There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes a departure from the
separation of powers.

The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary
for solving the dispute.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.

Some examples that it must follow are:

1. right to a hearing;
2. consideration of evidence by the court;
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached;
4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin
court so as to free them from technical rules;
5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court
may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies;
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustn’t merely
accept the views of a subordinate; and
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.

30
The record is barren and doesn’t satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of law.
Evidence was still inaccessible.

The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.

Prudente v Dayrit
G.R. 82870
180 SCRA 69
December 14, 1989

Padilla, J:

Facts

The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C.
Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several
days. We gathered information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and
explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition.
Further, the premise is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not
supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.

Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,

Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand
grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military
Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.

Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant claiming that

31
 1. Petitioners had no personal knowledge of the facts
2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and
answers
3. Search warrant was a general warrant
4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.

Issue

Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.

Ruling

Search Warrant annulled and set aside.

Rationale

Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and
that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific
offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.

“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.

This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

PARTICULARITY

For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree punishes
several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal
possession of firearms etc. - - Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the
search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the particular provision of PD1-
866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case.

32
20th Century Fox v CA

G.R. 76649-51

August 19, 1988

Gutierrez, J:

Facts

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the October 8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the
lower court, lifting its issued search warrants.

In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the NBI’s assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in
connection with the latter’s anti-film piracy campaign. It alleged that certain videotape outlets all
over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in
videotape form.

33
With NBI’s assistance, the petitioner was able to secure three (3) search warrants against 3
video outlets;

Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by private
respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search
warrants issued earlier against private respondents on the ground of misrepresentation
committed by the NBI and its witnesses, including its failure to present the master tapes from
which the alleged pirated taped were reproduced.

Issue

Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon the
application of the NBI

Ruling

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes
were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The application and search proceeding is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49,
in this case. Although what is required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of
probable cause, that probable cause must be satisfactory to the court, for it is time-honored
precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be
interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favour of the alleged
offender.

People v Claudio
G.R. 133694
February 29, 2000

Bellosillo, J:
34
Facts

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73
finding the accused Anita Claudio Y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4,
Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).

On or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, the above-named accused
without being lawfully authorized, wilfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried
leaves for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City.

Claudio was caught in flagrante delicto by Pat. Daniel Obinia, who was on board the same bus
coming from Baguio. Upon Pat. Obinia’s clear suspicion of the baggage that the accused was
carrying with her in the bus and finding that the same actually contained marijuana, he (Obania)
initiated a warrantless arrest against Claudio when they arrived in Olongapo City.

Issue

Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search, and seizure conducted by Pat. Obania was
justified.

Ruling

Under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:

..A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense

Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest – a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant

Since Claudio was caught in flagrante delicto, a warrant was no longer needed

People v Aminudin

G.R. 74869

July 6, 1988

35
Cruz, J:

Facts

On June 25, 1984, Idel Aminnudin was arrested and searched without warrant by PC officers
shortly after disembarking from M/V Wilcon 9; 3 kilos of marijuana was confiscated from him,
where he was charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. According to the
prosecution, the arrest and capture of Aminnudin was executed based on an earlier tip received
where Aminnudin was identified by name and that he was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City
and was carrying marijuana.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothings; that he was forced to admit that he was carrying the marijuana, when he did not even
know what marijuana look like.

Aminnudin claimed that the warrantless arrest and searched made by the PC officers makes the
marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill
of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General
dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it
came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests, making the
search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

During the trial, it was admitted by the arresting officer concerned that they had information of
Aminuddin’s arrival 2 days ahead but did not secure a warrant anymore because they were sure
that their operation will yield positive result.

Issue

Whether or not the arrest and search made against Aminudin was valid or that marijuana found
in his possession was admissible in evidence.

36
Ruling

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime, nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. The evidence,
therefore, cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally, owing to the fact that the warrantless arrest
and search was not justified or invalid.

People v Tangliben
184 SCRA 220
G.R. No.L-63630
April 6, 1990

Gutierrez, J:

Facts

Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they
found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue

Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.

Held

No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides that a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a
person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana
and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that
37
this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an
informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana.
The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

People v Malmstedt
G.R. 91107
198 SCRA 401
June 19, 1991

Padilla, J:

Facts

Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a
NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He
contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

Issue

Whether or not the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.

Held

NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon
information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and the Swedish national
failed to immediately present his passport.

A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
38
 c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

Duncan Assoc. of Employees v Glaxo Wellcome Phils, Inc.

GR No. 162994
April 12, 2006

Tinga, J:

Facts

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation
that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking
position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's
competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of
the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors
informed him of conflict of interest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that
either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo
transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request
against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and
while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that
Glaxo's policy was valid...

Issue

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid.

Held
39
On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and
other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against personal
or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot
be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to
the state or those acting under color of its authority. It has been held in a long array of US
Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely
privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply
with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed
manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

40
Pareno vs. CA
GR No. 162224
June 7, 2007

Carpio, J:

Facts

This case is a petition for certiorari assailing the 9 January 2003 Decision and 13 January 2004
Resolution of the Commission on Audit (COA).

Salvador Parreño (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years.
On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary. Petitioner availed, and
received pension.

Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. Subsequently the
AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended by PD 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses
his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the
Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.

Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension. The COA
denied the motion and ruled that petitioner’s entitlement to the retirement benefits he was
previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship in
accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence this petition.

Issue

Whether or not Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, curtails equal protection under the
Constitution.

Ruling

The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to
reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of
the class.
41
There is compliance with all these conditions. Petitioner’s loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes
a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino
citizenship. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the
state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service
when the need arises. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.

Petition Denied.
ROMUALDEZ VS. COMELEC
G.R. 167011
April 30 2008

Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts

On 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez,
applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen,
Leyte,respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section 10 11 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein
that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they
were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon
City, Precinct No. 4419-A,; and that petitioners, knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and
willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time
which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte.

The case was filed by private respondents and COMELEC with the RTC. Thus, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners.

Issue

Were Petitioners deprived of due process and that of Art. III, Sec. 14 of the 1987Constitution?

Held

No, the charges against them filed by Private respondents and the COMELEC with the RTC are
the same hence they cannot assail that they have been deprived of due process because they
were not given chance to submit counterevidence and refute the charges against them by
COMELEC..
Secondly, Section 45 41 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the
same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is
precise.

PETITION DENIED.
42
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell
GR no 173918
April 8, 2008

Villarama, Jr., J:

Facts

This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA.

On October 10, 1984, the Oil Price Stabilazation Fund (OPSF) was created under PD 1956 for
the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes of crude oil and imported petroleum products.
E.O. 137 amended PD 1956 in order to maintain stability in the domestic price of oils. The DOE
demanded the respondent to pay surcharges for late payment of P18.5M pursuant to the
Ministry of Finance Order no. 1-85. Respondent appealed to the Office of the President, the
latter affirmed the conclusion of DOE. Rspondents' Motion for Reconsideration was denied then
appealed before the CA. CA reversed the decision of the OP and ruled that MOF Cir 1-85, as
amended, is ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with the ONAR. Hence,
petition.

Issue

Whether or not MOF Cir 1-85 is ineffective for failure to comply the requirements of filing and
publication.

Ruling

SC held that MOF Cir 1-85 is one of those issuances which should be published before it
becomes effective since it is intended to enforce PD 1956. The said circular should also comply
with the requirement of filing under the Administrative Code. Petition denied, CA decision
affirmed.

43
Quinto v COMELEC
G.R. 189698
December 1, 2009

Nachura, J:

Facts

This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved
to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaringSection 4 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides
that, "Any person holding a public appointive office orposition including active members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." Be it noted that petitioners of the
above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010
elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution.

Issue

Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.

Ruling

The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution
unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it
does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does
not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The test used is reasonableness which requires that:

1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class.

In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective
officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas,
et al. vs Executive Secretary, et. Al.

44
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.

Farinas v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 147387
December 10, 2003
Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
(Public Officer, Difference between appointive officials and elective officials)

Callejo, Sr., J:

Facts

Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving
intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66.Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

Respondents contend that there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A
substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their
office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are
not elected by popular will. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Issue

Whether or not the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective
officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones.

Held

45
No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.

Moreover, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. Hence, equal protection is not infringed.

46
People vs Escano
G.R. 129756-58
January 28, 2000

Davide, Jr., C.J.:

Facts

During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused. As a result, other
passengers were searched and all firearms were seized.

Issue

Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal, and whether the evidence acquired
therein would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs.

Held

As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded as violative
of the right against unreasonable search.

47
Malacat v CA
GR 123595
December 12, 1997

Davide, Jr, J:

Facts

On August 30, 1990, a criminal case was filed against petitioner Sammy Malacat in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 5 for allegedly carrying a hand-grenade as it is a clear
violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. Petitioner was searched and apprehended
without a valid search warrant and warrant of arrest, and, although petitioner pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment, he had confessed to a police officer without the presence of a counsel
at the pre-trial.

After the trial, petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to seventeen years, four months and
one day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum penalty, and not more than thirty years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum penalty. The Court ruled that the warrantless arrest and
seizure of the petitioner is akin to a “stop and frisk”, and that seizure of the grenade was
incidental to a valid arrest. The court also states that petitioner’s admission to the crime is
sufficient to establish the latter’s guilt.

On February 18, 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court, but the record of
the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, even without jurisdiction
as an appeal on cases with penalty of reclusion perpetua is appealed in the Supreme Court,
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, petitioner filed an instant petition before the
Supreme Court.

Issue

1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of petitioner and seizure of the hand grenade are
valid.
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s confession is admissible as evidence in court.

Ruling

The SC set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision for lack of jurisdiction, and reversed the
decision of the lower court.

Rationale

1. At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ
in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope.
48
 In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.
[36]
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
be made -- the process cannot be reversed. [37] At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime,
or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.[38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just
been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
…
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk"
as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry,
thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual

conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment ***[39]

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk,"[40] it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.[41] Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
2. Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his
custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in
49
 evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution.

People v De Gracia
G.R. No. 102009-10
July 6, 1994
50
Regalado, J:

Facts

The case stemmed from the arrest of accused Rolando De Gracia with several others on
December 5, 1989 for violation of PD 1866, for unlawfully in possession, custody and control of
several cache of ammunitions and explosives on the occasion of a coup d’ etat staged by ultra-
rightist elements of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) against the government.

On December 1, 1989, on the strength of an intelligence report that the Eurocar Sales Office
located at Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City are believed to be holding a
group of rebel soldiers, elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion of the PA, led by Col. Delos
Santos, swoop down and eventually raided the said establishment. On the occasion of the raid,
accused Rolando De Gracia with two others were arrested and charged for violation of PD
1866. After due hearing, the trial court found the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms
in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to para 2 of Article 135 of the RPC and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with recommendation for executive clemency in favor of
the accused after he shall served a jail term of five (5) years in good behavior.

On appeal the appellant strongly challenge in his brief, that the court erred in convicting him of
the charged. He logically pressed his contention that he cannot be held guilty of the charge
because he did not have either physical or constructive possession of the ammunitions and
explosives found in his possession; neither was he the owner thereof nor the tenant of the
building when the same was found. He further claims that intent to possess, necessary before
one can be convicted under PD 1866, was not present in the case.

Issues

WON the intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable under PD 1866
and if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess said explosives and
ammunitions; and

WON there was a valid search and seizure, when the government operatives raided the
establishment, put restraint and eventually arrested herein appellant.

Ruling

On the first issue: The court ruled that when the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule,
intent to commit a crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the crime and that intent to perpetrate the crime must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and
that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime),
there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

51
In the present case, it was undisputed that there was animus possidendi or the intent to possess
an unlicensed firearm, on the part of the accused. It is in such presumption that possession
coupled with the fact sufficient to proved that the accused has no authority or license to possess
the firearm, even if such is in good faith and without criminal intent, may squarely held the court
to pronounce a conviction and sentence the accused guilty as charge.

On the second issue: There is no arguing that even if the elements of the government has no
search warrant to speak of, under the present case, their search and seizure of the prohibited
items, which was caught in possession, control and custody of the accused is valid. In the
considered opinion of the court, the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. The facts obtaining in this case, bears undeniable
proof that the elements of the government, had in fact reasonable ground to believe, based on
the verified and confirmed reports, that a crime was being committed, in the premises where the
appellant was arrested.

There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. In fact,
under the situation prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for or secure a
search warrant, much that the court was closed at that time as manifested by the trial court
judge himself, leaving no recourse after all under the premises, for the operatives to secure the
same. Hence, under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.

Judgment was affirmed and the portion of the trial court order recommending an executive
clemency was deleted.

People v Mengote
G.R. No. 87059
June 22, 1992

52
Cruz, J:

Facts

The accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted by the trial court of reclusion perpetua
for illegal possession of firearms on the strength of the pistol .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber found on his person at the moment of his
warrantless arrest by elements of Western Police District.

The incident transpired on August 8, 1987 shortly before noon, when elements of the Western
Police District, was informed by a telephone caller, that suspicious-looking persons were seen
at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. On the strength of the
report, police operatives dispatched at the scene effected the arrest of the accused on
suspicion, that he together with two (2) others were about to commit an offense as predicated
on their apparent behaviour that of “looking from side to side," with one even holding his
abdomen.

On appeal, the accused pleads that his arrest is illegal and the weapon allegedly taken in his
possession at the moment of his arrest cannot be used, much less admissible in evidence
against him. The firearm which was caught in his possession had been illegally seized and was
therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. Appellant further pleads that the evidence (revolver)
should not have been admitted, since its seizure is illegal there being no warrant therefore
having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful
arrest because the arrest of accused was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a
warrant.

However, the government disagrees and insists that the seizure was doubtlessly lawful even if
admittedly without warrant, having been effected on the basis of a tiff-off, which resultantly
made the basis by the police operatives to arrest the accused.

Issue

WON the arrest of the accused by the police operatives on the basis of warrantless search and
arrest is valid.

Ruling

Article III Section 3 para 2 of the Constitution explicitly provides that evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. On the
other hand, Rule 113 Section 5 of the Rules of Court, provides that the arrest without warrant
may be lawful only when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c)
the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Evidently, these requirements were not sufficiently proven and undoubtedly established by the
arresting officer, when they put restraint, arrest and eventually bring accused Mengote to the
53
police station and subsequently charged him for violation of PD 1866. It is undisputed that at the
time of the arrest, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen as testified bluntly by the arresting officers themselves during the trial. Neither there
was a violation that may be attributed that presumed a fact to warrant a suspicion from the
arresting officer that Mengote is about or attempting to commit an offense; nor validly assuming
a fact that the crime has just been committed or was actually being committed even at very least
attempted by accused in their presence. By no stretch of imagination could it be inferred or
otherwise, that such an act constitutes an offense that is punishable by law. Moreover, nobody
cannot simply put restraint upon any person and stopped and frisked them on mere suspicion.
The act of the accused exhibited at the time, may not validly dispensed the police operatives to
simply circumscribe the sacrosanct rights of everyone to be free from any restraint that
endangers their liberty.

Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

Ebralinag Vs. Division Superintendent Of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770
March 1, 1993

Grino-Aquino, J:

54
Facts

This instant case involves two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition
concerning petitions in G.R. No. 95770 and G.R. No. 95887, which were consolidated by the
court for essentially raising similar issue. Petitioners contends that the decision of public
respondents expelling 68 High School and Grade School students and members of religious
sect Jehovah’s Witnesses from various schools in Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan
and Asturias in Cebu is illegal. Their acts are apparently without legal basis and they have acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. The expulsion order
undertaken by the school authorities was based on the provision of R.A. 1265 as substantiated
by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Department of Education. The
students were expelled for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge required by RA1265. Under Jehovah’s Witnesses belief, saluting the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite a patriotic pledge are against their teachings because such
apparent acts are allegedly akin to idolatry. They are bound no less, by rules which controvert
their faith because giving such gestures to anyone or anything…except to God are sanctioned
by their teachings. They argued that imposing upon a duty that transcend constitutional limits
and invades the sphere of religious freedom is unconstitutional.

On the other hand, respondents relied their defense on the decisions already enunciated by the
court in Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. In Gerona case, the court ruled that everyone
must strictly abide by their bounden duty to the state. The gesture of respect we demonstrated
to our flag, being an emblem of national sovereignty, whenever it was hoisted and place in
highest esteem, exemplifies shared purpose, national unity and cohesion of the Filipino people.
It takes great pride that by doing so, it instill in us a deep sense of nationalism and patriotism.
The decision in this case distinctly marked a system of separation between the church and
state. Under the system of complete separation of church and state, the flag is devoid of any
religious significance. It does not involve any religious ceremony. The enforcement of non-
discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag, singing national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, are by no less legal and does not discriminate nor restricts the exercise of religious
freedom.

Issue

WON expulsion of the students based on their religious beliefs and in the exercise of their
religious freedom violates the constitution.

Ruling

The court ruled that religious freedom is a fundamental right which the state place with great
respect and highest priority. This rights to religious freedom expanding through individual
exercise of their faith and worships consists of two essential aspects, firstly; freedom to believe
which is an absolute act within the realm of thought and lastly; freedom to act on one’s belief
regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the
existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State
has right to prevent.

The long standing ruling of the Supreme Court in Gerona case, which ruled to expel and dismiss
students and teachers by refusing to abide by the rules, as mandated by RA1265, was
55
overturned. The court pronounced that the same violates the Constitution and transgress upon
the rights of every citizen to exercise their religious profession and worship including the
freedom of speech. The court ruled that Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from the
observance of flag ceremony. However, this does not give them the right to disturb such
ceremonies. In the present case, it was found that the students, who were expelled thereon,
were merely standing quietly, while their peers are performing the ceremonies. Such acts alone,
don’t constitutes disrespect or harm much less present any danger whatsoever, so evil and
imminent that would justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is simply to be exempt
from the flag ceremony and not to exclude them to enjoy the same right and privilege extended
to their contemporary to public education. Their expulsion by reason of their religious beliefs
also violates their rights to free education. In this light, the court ruled that non-observance of
the flag ceremony does, in no way constitute ignorance, lack of patriotic sense and civic
consciousness. Love of country, reverence to national heroes, nationalism, patriotic duty and
civic responsibility awareness are now integrated as part of the school’s curricula. Thus, the
expulsion due to one’s religious beliefs is unjustified.

Petition is granted and expulsion orders were annulled and set aside.

Newsounds Broadcasting vs Dy
GR 170270 & 79411,
April 2, 2009

Tinga, J:

Facts

56
Bombo Radyo Philippines (Bombo Radyo) operates several radio stations under the AM and
FM band throughout the Philippines and are operated by corporations organized and
incorporated by Bombo Radyo, particularly petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc
(Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting Systems (CBS). In 1996, Newsounds
commenced relocation of its broadcasting stations, management office and transmitters on
property owned by CBS Development Corporation (CDC).In the same year; CDC was issued a
building permit authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment on the property. The
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a Zoning Decision certifying the
property as commercial. The Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
(OMPDC) affirmed that the commercial structure conformed to local zoning regulations and “is
classified as a Commercial area”. Similar certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997
to 2001.

All the changed begging in 2002 when petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit
where they are required to submit either an approved land conversion papers from the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan
or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to
commercial land. Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before, and from
1996 to 2001, the OPMDC had consistently certified that the property had been classified as
commercial. Petitioners were unable to secure a mayor’s permit so they filed a petition for
mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City. When the RTC of Cauayan
denied petitioners, they filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but this
would be dismissed by appellate court due to the availability of other speedy remedies with the
trial court. The RTC dismissed the mandamus of action for being moot and academic.

Petitioners filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit for the year of 2003 and their
application was approved. However, respondent Felicismo Meer, Acting City Administrator of
Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR order was spurious and void and
supposedly reported that it did not have any order of the DAR order. Meer demanded
independent proof showing the authenticity of the Aydinan Order. The controversy continued in
2004 when petitioners filed their respective applications for their 2004 mayor’s permit. A zonal
clearance was issued in to favor petitioners however respondent Meer claimed that no record
existed of DAR Adm. Case No A-0200A-07B-002. As a result, petitioners were informed that
there was no basis for the issuance in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for
the issuance of the mayor’s permit.

The deadline of the mayor’s permit lapsed on February 15, 2004 and respondents Meer and
Racma Fernandez-Garcia arrived at the property and closed the radio stations. Petitioners
proceeded to file a petition with COMELEC seeking enforcement of the Omnibus Election Code,
which prohibited the closure of radio stations during the then-pendency of the election period.
COMELEC issued and order directing the parties to maintain the status and allowing the
operation of the radio stations, and petitioners proceeded to operate the stations the following
day. Through the intervention of the COMELEC, petitioners were able to resume operations of
the radio stations.
Petitioners were thus able to continue operations until June 10, 2004, the day when
respondents yet again closed the radio stations. This closure proved to be more permanent.
Due to the aforementioned closure of the radio stations, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion
for the Issuance of a Writ Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, praying that the said writ be issued
to allow petitioners to resume operations of the radio stations but the RTC rendered a decision
denying the petition for Mandamus. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, citing the trial
court’s failure to hear and act on the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction as a violation
57
of the right to due process, and disputing the RTC’s conclusions with respect to their right to
secure the mayor’s permit. The motion was denied in an Order dated December 1, 2004.

Petitioners initiated two separate actions with the Court of Appeals following the rulings of the
RTC. This petition imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for denying their
application for preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners also filed a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC, this time in connection with the denial of their petition for mandamus. Petitioners lost
both of their cases with the Court of Appeals and dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ruling that
the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in impliedly denying the application for
preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court of Appeals also denied the appeal by certiorari
affirming the right of the respondents to deny petitioners their mayor’s permit. On both
occasions, petitioners filed with these Court respective petitions for review.

Issue

Is the bare act of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior
restraint against the speech, expression of the press?

Held

We noted in Lim v. Ponce de Leon that “Public officials in the past have abused their powers on
the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties… the object of is
to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. It serve as a measure of pecuniary
recovery to mitigate the injury to constitutional rights, it likewise serves notice to public officers
and employees that any violation on their part of any person’s guarantees under the Bill of
Rights will meet with final reckoning.

The present prayer for temperate damages is premised on the existence of pecuniary injury to
petitioner due to the actions of respondents, the amount of which nevertheless being difficult to
prove. Temperate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The
existence of pecuniary injury at bar cannot be denied. Petitioners had no way of knowing it
when they filed their petition, but the actions of respondents led to the closure of their radio
stations from June 2004 until this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction in January
2006. The lost potential income during that one and a half year of closure can only be presumed
as substantial enough.

Public officers who violate the Constitution they are sworn to uphold embody “a poison of
wickedness that may not run through the body politic.” Respondents, by purposely denying the
commercial character of the property in order to deny petitioners’ the exercise of their
constitutional rights and their business, manifested bad faith in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
and malevolent manner.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to
immediately issue petitioners’ zoning clearances and mayor’s permits for 2004 to petitioners

SO ORDERED.
58
Pharmaceutical vs. Secretary of Health
GR No. 173034
October 9, 2007

Austria-Martinez, J:

In view of the enactment of the Milk Code does not contain a total ban on the advertising and
promotion of the breast milk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates and LAC which will
regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented
only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch
government, the legislature.

59
Facts

Executive Order (E.O) No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by former President Corazon Aquino to
give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS). In line with the implementation or enforcements of this law, the DOH issued the
Revised Implementing Rules and regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51. Part of the prohibitions
contained in the RIRR is the total ban on advertising and promotion of breast milk substitutes.

Petitioner Pharmaceutical and Health Care Associations of the Philippines challenged that said
order and contends that the provisions of the RIRR are unconstitutional and go beyond the law
it is supposed to implement. It further contends that respondent official of the DO acted in grave
abuse of discretion in using the said RIRR.

Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the RIRR seeks not only to implement the Milk Code
but also various international instruments are the ICMBS and Resolutions issued by the World
Health agencies.

Issue

Whether or not the RIRR issued by the DOH is constitutional.

Held

Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate”.
Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transforms into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into
domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has
the force and effect law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.

The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at
this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting
advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the
ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other
marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

60
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging
member states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.
Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the
provisions of into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, specifically
providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24
months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes,
have not been adopted as a domestic law.

As previously discussed for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be

established that such rule is being follower by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced
by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that any
compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law
of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by
the legislature.

In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising
and promotion of breast milk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates and IAC which will
regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented
only pursuant to a a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized
branch of the government, the legislature. Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of
subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject
RIRR.

Except Sections $(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR, are in consonance with
the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an
industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not
constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.

Bayan Muna v Ermita

G.R. 169659
March 21, 2006

En Banc

Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR. 21, 2006

G.R. No. 169659 (Bayan Muna, et al. v. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al.);

G.R. No. 169660 (Francisco I. Chavez v. Eduardo Ermita, et al.);
G.R. No. 169667 (Alternative Law Groups, Inc. [ALG] v. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al.);
G.R. No. 169777 (Senate of the Philippines, et al. v. Eduardo Ermita, et al.);
G.R. No. 169834 (PDP-Laban v. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita);
61
G.R. No. 171246 (Jose Anselmo I. strong>Cadiz, et al. v. Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita)

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
At the close of the Oral Arguments on these consolidated petitions held last February 21, 2006, this
Court ordered all parties to submit their memoranda within fifteen (15) days.

On March 8, 2006, the last day for filing the required memoranda, petitioners Bayan Muna, Courage,
and CODAL (petitioners), represented by the same counsel, filed an undated Motion for Extension of
Time to File Memorandum in which they asked for an extension of five (5) days within which to file
their memorandum. Said Motion was grounded on the alleged heavy workload with which counsel
was suddenly confronted when, after the issuance of Proclamation No. 1017, one of the party-list
representatives belonging to petitioner Bayan Muna was arrested and five others, belonging to the
same organization, were granted protective custody from warrantless arrest by the House of
Representatives.

This Court, in view of the reasons proffered by counsel and the assurance he gave to this Court that
the Motion was not intended for delay, granted the requested extension by Resolution dated March
14, 2006.

However, through a Manifestation dated 14 March 2006 filed on even date, the same petitioners, by
the same counsel, informed this Court that it will no longer file a memorandum "in the interest of
having the issues resolved soonest".

Implied in every motion for extension of time to file a pleading is a commitment by the moving party
and its counsel that it can and will indeed file the pleading within the time requested. To ask for
additional time from the Court, only to manifest later that the act for which the additional time was
requested will no longer be done, is to trifle with the Court and to make light of the proceedings
being conducted by it. The fault of petitioners and counsel is rendered all the more serious in view of
the gravity of the issues involved in the present cases.

WHEREFORE, petitioners Bayan Muna, Courage and CODAL and their counsel, Atty. Neri Javier
Colmenares, are REPRIMANDED. Their Manifestation dated 14 March 2006 is NOTED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
Islamic Da'wah Council Of The Philippines Vs. Executive Secretary
405 SCRA 497
GR 153888
July 9, 2003

Corona, J:

Facts

Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates
under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to
be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international
organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific

62
(RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue
halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to
conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified
products and manufacturers.

Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal
food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on
the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal
certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified
products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a
distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office.

On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine
Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation.
Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities.

Issue

Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Held

It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product
becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only
practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein
respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food
products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom
of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products
are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah
on halal food.

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on
the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for
human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on
the religious freedom of Muslims.

63
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
234 SCRA 630

Mendoza, J.:

Facts

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code

The Philippine Press Institute (PPI) is a nonprofit organization of newspaper publishers

established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other hand, the
Philippine Bible Society (PBS) is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and
64
distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their
rights under Sec. 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT
Law

Issue

Whether or not RA 7716 curtails the freedom of speech and of press, and free exercise of
religion.

Ruling

On the contention that the law violates freedom of speech and of press, SC held that the
argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media, the law discriminates is without merit
since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably
narrowed. The limitation does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. On the other hand,
neither the imposition of the RA violates the freedom of religion. The free exercise.of religion
clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sales of religious
materials by a religious organization. Additionally, the fee of P1, 000 is only to defray the cost of
registration to the VAT system. Petition is without merit.

Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582

Del Castillo, J.:

Facts

Ang Ladlad, incorporated in 2003, is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgendered individuals.

In 2006, Ang Ladlad applied for accreditation as a party-list organization under Republic Act
7941, otherwise known as the Party List System Act. COMELEC denied the application on the
ground that it had no substantial membership base. Then again, on August 17, 2009, Ang
Ladlad filed for a petition for registration. COMELEC, in its resolution dated November 11,
2009, dismissed the petition on moral grounds as it advocates sexual immorality which offends
religious beliefs. COMELEC used passages in the Bible and in Koran as basis. COMELEC
further stated that Ang Ladlad collides with the following provisions of the law:

• Art. 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which xxx (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality xxx.
65
 • Art. 1306 of the Civil Code which states that ‘The contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy
• Art. 1409 of the Civil Code which provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are
inexistent and void from the beginning
• Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows

Ang Ladlad sought for reconsideration but COMELEC upheld its resolution in another resolution
dated December 16, 2009, stating that Ladlad failed to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities are is beneficial to the nation. Moreover, LGBTs are also
protected by the same Bill of Rights like other males and females and upheld its earlier
resolution that Ang Ladlad falls under the legal provisions of Art. 695 of the Civil Code and Art.
201 of the Revised Penal Code.

Hence, Ang Ladlad filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the
resolutions of COMELEC. The Supreme Court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to file
its comment.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of its accreditation, in so far as it justified the same by using
religious dogma, violated the non-establishment clause. Ang Ladlad also contends that the
COMELEC resolutions violated its constitutional right to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws. COMELEC also violated the Philippines’ international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

On the other hand, COMELEC argued that Ang Ladlad has no concrete and genuine national
political agenda that would benefit the nation and that LGBT is not among the sectors
enumerated in RA 7941.

OSG, in its comment, concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and said that the COMELEC erred in
denying Ang Ladlad’s application because there was no basis for allegations of immorality.
However, OSG also said that COMELEC did not violate Ang Ladlad’s freedom of speech,
expression, and assembly.

Issue

Whether or not COMELEC violated the non-establishment clause by justifying its denial to
accredit Ang Ladlad by using religious dogma

Whether or not COMELEC violated the fundamental rights of Ang Ladlad

Ruling

On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that COMELEC committed grave violation of the non-
establishment clause by utilizing the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
The Supreme Court said that Art. III Section 5 which provided that "[n]o law shall be made
66
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" called for
government to be neutral in religious matters. Thus, governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.

The Supreme Court also found that COMELEC violated Ladlad’s fundamental rights, i.e.,
freedom of expression and freedom of association.

The Court held that freedom of expression not only applies to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC
is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one.

The Supreme Court also ruled that a political group should not be hindered solely because it
seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of
satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies
that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of
association guarantee.

Petition granted.

Chavez vs. PEA and AMARI

G.R. No. 133250

Carpio, J.:

Facts

In 1973, the government signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay and
construct Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. In return, CDCP would acquire
50% of the total reclaimed land.

In 1977, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created. PEA was tasked to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands. Lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were transferred to
PEA. Subsequently, all future works in MCCRRP were ordered to be funded and owned by
PEA.

In 1988, the reclaimed parcels of land under the MCCRRP were granted and transferred to PEA
which included the "Freedom Islands." These are reclaimed islands located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

67
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA was entered into through negotiation without public
bidding. The Board of Directors of PEA confirmed the JVA which was then approved by
President Fidel V. Ramos.

In 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA the "grandmother of all
scams” in a privilege speech, whereupon, the Senate committees on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations conducted a joint
investigation. The Committees reported that: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified
as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

In 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to study the legality of the JVA. The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA. In 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and
Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI
under an order issued by the President.

Subsequently, Antonio M. Zulueta filed a petition for prohibition seeking to nullify the JVA. The
Court dismissed the petition for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to
the refiling of the case before the proper court. On April 27, 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for mandamus.

Chavez prayed that PEA disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA pursuant to the right
of the people to information. PEA, on the other hand asserted that in cases of on-going
negotiations, the right to information is limited to definite propositions of the government. Also,
the right does not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the exploratory stage. AMARI also contended that the right cannot be
invoked at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. It maintained that
requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will
degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies as it will put its officials under all
kinds of pressure before deciding.

Issue

Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going

negotiations before a final agreement

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the twin provisions of the Constitution – right to information on
matters of public concern and policy of full transparency - seek to promote transparency in
policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are
essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its
official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed
without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also
essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people, for unless citizens
have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed
68
with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation
of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to
the existence and proper functioning of any democracy.

It also held that contrary to AMARI's contention, a consummated contract is not a requirement
for the exercise of the right to information. The commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction." Otherwise, the people can never exercise the
right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public
to expose its defects.

The Court also named the three categories of information which are "matters of public concern.”
These are (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions
and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category
refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies
or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data,
whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating
government policies.

Hence, the information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise
of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records
and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to
conduct the inspection and copying.

Petition granted.

69
Hilado, et.al. v Judge
G.R. No. 163155

Carpio-Morales, J.:

Facts

On May 25, 2000, Julita Campos Bendicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the
deceased Roberto Benedicto, filed for a petition for issuance of letters of administration over the
estate of her deceased husband. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Amor Reyes,
Branch 21, Manila RTC. The petition was granted on August 2, 2000, and Campos Benedicto
was appointed as Administratrix of the estate of Benedicto.

Petitioners Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin Limjap, Lopez Sugar
Corporation, had filed during the lifetime of Benedicto, two complaints for damages against
Benedicto. These claims were listed in the initial inventory of the estate as liabilities of the
estate.

From January 2002 until November 2003, petitioners were allowed by the Clerk of Court of
Branch 21, Manila RTC access to the records of the case. By December 2003, however, they
were denied access to the last folder-record of the case which, allegedly, could not be located
and was probably inside the chambers of the Judge for safekeeping. Afterwards, petitioner’s
counsel wrote Judge Reyes requesting that they be allowed to personally check the records to
which the Judge responded that only the parties or those with authority from the parties may be
allowed access.

70
Petitioners tried several times to secure copies of the records of the case, i.e., updated
inventory of the estate, copies of the order issued by the court in the February 13, 2004 hearing
and the stenographic noted taken thereon, but their efforts was met with futility, hence, this
petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to allow them to access, examine, and obtain
copies of any and all documents related to the case.

Issue

Whether or not records of a case are public records which the public has the right of access

Ruling

Sec. 7 of the Bill of Rights guarantees a general right – the right to information on matters of
"public concern" and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to "official records" and the
like. The right to information on "matters of public concern or of public interest" is both the
purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of access to public documents.

Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these
are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which
every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access
to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent,
suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v.
Judge Llamas, this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the
therein private complainants, the decision being "already part of the public record which the
citizen has a right to scrutinize."

In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory
and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the
request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of
such discretion, the following issues may be relevant: "whether parties have interest in privacy,
whether information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether
there is threat of particularly serious embarrassment to party, whether information is important
to public health and safety, whether sharing of information among litigants would promote
fairness and efficiency, whether party benefiting from confidentiality order is public entity or
official, and whether case involves issues important to the public." Petitioners' stated main
purpose for accessing the records — to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing
the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and
appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting —
appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto
Benedicto et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate.

Petition granted.

71
Attorney Ding So of the Bureau of Customs, petitioner vs. Erwin Tulfo, respondent
GR No. 161032

Velasco, J.:

Facts

1. In the column entitled “Direct Hit” published in the daily tabloid Remate, the said column
was accusing Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs of corruption. On the published
article Atty. So was portrayed as an extortionist and a smuggler.
2. Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed a libel suit in four (4) separate information
against Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay of
Remate.
3. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found Tulfo guilty of libel. The CA affirmed the
decision.

Issues

1. Whether or not Tulfo is guilty of false and malicious imputations in his column in Remate.
2. Whether or not the assailed articles are privileged.
3. Whether or not the assailed articles are fair commentaries.

Ruling

1. YES, For the ruling in Borjal case was not applied to this libel case:

a. The case was based on a criminal case.

72
 b. There was sufficient identification of the complainant.
c. The subject was not a private citizen; in this case, the subject is a public official.
d. In this case it is not in the scope of “fair commentaries on matters of public interest.”

2. NO. The columns were mere trivialized and editorialized; thecolumns don’t have
evidences to substantiate the claims and attacks to Atty. So. The articles cannot be
privileged simplybecause the target was a public official.

a. Tulfo made no effort to verify the information given byhis source or even to ascertain
the identity of the person he was accusing.
b. Tulfo abandoned the “consistent with good faith and reasonable care “when he wrote
the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a
journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his storyand instead misinforming the
public.
c. Tulfo had written and published the articles with reckless disregard of whether the
same were false or not.
d. Evidence of malice: The fact that Tulfo continuously published articles lambasting
Atty. So after thecommencement of an action. This is a clear indication of his intent to
malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.

3. NO. Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his storybefore publication.
Moreover he added facts based on hisstandards of veracity.
a. The absence of details of the acts committed by thesubject. These are plain and simple
and mere “gossip”accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamedsource.
b. Journalists do not rely on fictions instead on truth. Theremust be some foundation to
their reports; these reports must be warranted by facts.
c. The columns of Tulfo are not fair and true. Tulfo failed to do research before making his
allegations, and it has beenshown that these allegations were baseless.

Elements of fair commentary (to be considered privileged):

a. That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered insaid
proceedings, or of any other act performed by apublic officer in the exercise of his functions;
b. That it is made in good faith;
c. That it is without any comments or remarks.

73
KMU vs. Ermita
GR No. 167798
October 5, 2010

Carpio, J.:

Facts

In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all
government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline and harmonize their
Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide
convenience to the people served by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative
functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO420
infringes on the citizen’s rights to privacy.

Issue

In issuing EO 420, did the president make, alter or repeal any laws?

Ruling

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420,
the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and

74
user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under
existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR

347 SCRA 128

Per Curiam

Facts

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing
for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the
rights of private landowners.

Issue

Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

Ruling

The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s
petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
public domain – somehow against the Regalian doctrine.

75
Separate opinion of Justice Mendoza:

For Justice Mendoza, the IPRA should not be declared void on its face for “The only instance
where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of
expression.”

SWS vs. Comelec

GR No. 147571
Ponente: Mendoza, J.;

Facts:

Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the
period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:

Are the Comelec resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:

No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.”

76
Kuwait Airways Corporation v Philippines Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 156087
May 8, 2009

Tinga, J.:

Facts

On 21 October 1981 Kuwait Airlines and Philippine Airline entered into a Commercial
Agreement, annexed to which was a Joint Service Agreement between two airlines. Under this
agreement, Kuwait Airways obligated itself to "share with Philippine Airlines revenue earned
from the uplift of passenger between Kuwait and Mania and vice versa.

In 12 April of 1995 both Kuwait panel and Philippine Panel entered an agreement called
Confidential Memorandum of Understanding (CMU) . Present in the meeting from Philippine
panel were officials of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) and four official of the Philippine Relations, Legal Counsel and a Senior International
Relation Specialist . Dr. Victor S. Linlingan, the Head of the Delegation an Executive Director of
the CAB, signed the CMU in behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

On 15 May 1995, Ms. Socorro Gonzaga, Director for International Relation of Philippines
Airlines received a letter from Dauwould M. Al-Dawoud, the deputy Marketing and Sales
Director for the International Affairs of Kuwait Airways stating that effective 12 of April 1995 the
agreement concerning royalty for 3rd and 4th freedom traffic will be terminated.

Ms. Gonzaga replied to Kuwait Airways in behalf of Philippines Airlines stating that the
agreement may be terminated by either party by giving 90 days notice in writing to the other
party and must be on the last day of traffic period. Thus, the Philippines Airlines insisted that the
provision of the Commercial Agreement "shall continue to be enforced until such date" and
demanded Kuwait Airways to pay the principal sum of US$1, 092, 690.00 as revenue for the
uplift of passenger and cargo for the period of 13 April 1995 until 28 October 1995.

77
When Kuwait Airlines refused to pay, Philippine Airlines filed a complaint against the foreign
airlines with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

On 25 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Philippine Airlines.

Kuwait Airways filed to the Supreme Court Petition for Review.

Issue

Whether the execution of the CMU between the Philippines and Kuwait government could have
automatically terminated the Commercial Agreement, as well as the Joint Service Agreement
between Philippine Airlines and Kuwait Airways.

Held

We, as magistrates in a functioning democratic State with a fully fleshed Bill of Rights and a
Constitution that emphatically rejects "l’etat cest moi" as the governing philosophy, think not.
There is nothing to prevent the Philippine government from utilizing all the proper channels
under law to enforce such closure, but unless and until due process is observed, it does not
have legal effect in this jurisdiction. Even granting that the "agreement" between the two
governments or their representatives creates a binding obligation under international law, it
remains incumbent for each contracting party to adhere to its own internal law in the process of
complying with its obligations.

The promises made by a Philippine president or his alter egos to a foreign monarch are not
transubstantiated by divine right so as to ipso facto render legal rights of private persons
obviated. Had Philippine Airlines remained a government-owned or controlled corporation, it
would have been bound, as part of the executive branch, to comply with the dictates of the
President or his alter egos since the President has executive control and supervision over the
components of the executive branch. Yet Philippine Airlines has become, by this time, a private
corporation – one that may have labored under the conditions of its legislative franchise that
allowed it to conduct air services, but private in character nonetheless. The President or his alter
egos do not have the legal capacity to dictate insuperable commands to private persons. And
that undesirable trait would be refuted on the President had petitioner’s position prevailed, since
it is imbued with the presumption that the commitment made to a foreign government becomes
operative without complying with the internal processes for the divestiture of private rights.

78
REYES vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 146511
January 20, 2003

Puno, J.:

Facts

Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane
lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion
of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the
Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots
and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for
the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from
the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which
showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question
the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction
of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and
interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be
returned to herein petitioners.

Issue

Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent
NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract
for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the
concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now
been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public
convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself
allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and

79
resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for
the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

People vs. Zuela

GR No. 112177
January 28, 2000

Pardo, J.:

Facts

The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas
and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br. 24,
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

The accused-appellants interposed common defenses: denial and that they were tortured and
forced to make a confession. Moreover, Tito and Nelson claimed they were not assisted by
counsel when their confessions were taken.

Issue/s

Whether or not the trial court violated the constitutional rights of the accused-appellants in
relying on their extra-judicial confession.

Ruling

The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information on the crime from the suspected offender.

There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these
facts, the court was constrained to rule that Maximo’s extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in
evidence. An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
– that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel – is inadmissible in evidence. Contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their
signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa. Nevertheless, the infirmity of
accused-appellants’ sworn statements did not leave a void in the prosecution’s case. Accused-
appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who, in
turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is admissible in evidence
against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court
stating that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.” The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to Romualda’s
testimony.

Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,

not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.

80
The Court affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

People V Rufino Mirandilla Bermas

G.R. No. 120420
April 21, 1999

Vitug, J.:

Facts

Complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own father, appellant Rufino
Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their house in Parañaque, Metro
Manila. Armed with a knife and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will. After satisfying his lustful
desire, he threatened the victim with death if she reports the incident to anyone. Thereafter, the
complainant assisted by her mother, filed a complaint against Rufino Mirandilla Bermas of the
crime of Rape before the RTC of Parañaque. Accused, Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not
guilty. The accused vehemently denied the allegation and told the Court that he could not do
such a thing because he loves his daughter and his other children so much. In fact, he said that
he even performed both the role of a father and a mother to his children since his separation
from his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime of rape, the
complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous scolding
that she has received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night and that
he knew of no other reason as to why his daughter would ever charge him of such crime except
for retaliation. Despite the antecedent contentions of the accused, the trial court convicted the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer
the extreme penalty of death. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

Whether or not the accused was denied his constitutional right to equal protection of the law and
to effective and vigilant counsel.

Ruling

Yes, the accused was denied his constitutional right to equal protection of the law and to
effective and vigilant counsel. It is worthy of note that in convicting an accused, it is not enough
that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced; it is also essential that the accused has
been duly afforded his fundamental rights. At the inception, the RTC did not observe the correct
selection process in appointing the accused counsel de officio and did not scrutinize with
extreme caution the Prosecution’s Evidence, Misappreciated the Facts and therefore erred in
finding the accused guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt. The defense lawyers did not
protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused
Sevilleno, however guilty, he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must
advise said lawyers to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be
81
severely sanctioned. Likewise, the Second Assistant Prosecutor issued a certification to the
effect that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation. On the day of his
arraignment, the accused was brought before the trial court without counsel. The court
thereupon assigned a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office to be the counsel de oficio. The
prosecution placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. The counsel de oficio
testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by defense counsel who,
inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her
duty as counsel de officio. Furthermore, another lawyer was appointed the new counsel de
officio and asked for a ten-minute recess before he began his cross-examination which is far too
inadequate. On the day the defense will present their evidence, another lawyer, was appointed
as counsel de officio. Therefore, the accused has not properly and effectively been accorded
the right to counsel. Conjunctively, lawyers of the PAO are ADMONISHED for having fallen
much too short of their responsibility as officers of the Court and as members of the Bar and are
WARNED that any similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely. All told, the Supreme
Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal enough to warrant a
remand of the case for new trial.

82
People vs. Tulin
G.R.No.111709
August 30, 2001

Melo, J.:

Facts

On or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and
armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while
in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with
the complement and crew members, employing violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the
aforesaid law.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members
were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation and subsequently to the National
Bureau of Investigation. Accordingly, a series of arrests was thereafter effected.

The trial court finds the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio
Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine
Waters and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of
the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,
considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the
accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, ]r., and Cecilio Changco are each meted
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The
accused Cheong San Hiong is meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to
Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. After the accused
Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
In this regard, the matter was then elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether or not the accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?

2. Whether or not accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not
charged as such?
3. What are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented
accused-appellants during the trial?

Ruling

The Supreme Court uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in
83
every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the
trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to
achieve a common criminal design.

Upon the other hand, as regards the second issue, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
explicitly provides that:

SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway

robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or
protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information
about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner
derives any benefit there from; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as
an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete
evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal. Any doubt as
to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of
lesser responsibility.

It is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected
by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew
the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights
has been made. Saliently, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Teves v Sandiganbayan
GR.No.154182
84
December 17, 2004

Davide, Jr., CJ:

Facts

Edgar Y. Teves, former mayor of Valencia Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves was
convicted in violation of Sec.3 (h) of Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center. Petitioner filed a petition seeking to annul and set
aside this decision. They contend that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them were transgressed because Mayor Teves was initially charged for
alleged unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Anti-Graft Law
but they were convicted of having direct financial or pecuniary interest in the cockpit prohibited
under the Local Government Code of 1991 which is essentially different from which they are
charged.

Issue

Whether or not petitioners was denied of their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them

Ruling

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or forms part of those
constituting the offense charged. The first and second elements of the offense charged, as
alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is
necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged is necessarily includes the
offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the
conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

Estrada vs. People

G.R. No. 162371
August 25, 2005
85
Austria-Martinez, J.:

Facts

The petitioner, Mary Helen Estrada ask a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 28, 2003 and the CA Resolution
dated February 23, 2004 and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration with the letter of
the petitioner dated January 18, 2005 which was taking care by the Court as a petition for habeas
corpus alleging that the Decision dated July 2, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas, Branch
275, implemented upon the petitioner an erroneous and excessive penalty.

In a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus filed with the CA, petitioner assailed the decision of the
RTC, alleging the same to be null and void for having been rendered in violation of petitioner’s
constitutional rights.

Petitioner’s appeal was denied due course by the trial court in its Order dated April 5, 2000 for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period. She then filed the aforementioned petition
for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA, alleging that: the RTC judge violated petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process by depriving petitioner of the right to be assisted by counsel during
the proceedings and failing to notify petitioner of the scheduled presentation of defense evidence;
the RTC judge imposed upon petitioner a penalty which was not authorized under the law for which
petitioner had been charged; the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision and/or
motion for new trial; neither petitioner nor her counsel has officially received a copy of the RTC
decision, hence, the same has not yet become final and executory at the time petitioner filed her
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial; the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he denied due course to petitioner’s appeal
because petitioner filed her notice of appeal well within the fifteen-day period within which to appeal,
thus, it was the mandatory duty of the RTC judge to approve the notice of appeal.

On October 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision denying the petition for certiorari. The CA
held that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC judge as his actions were
anchored on Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which states that “after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable,” and on Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court
which provides that “[t]he absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he
had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat.” The CA further held that
“[t]he deprivation of her right to present evidence in her defense shall be deemed to include the non-
admission of the testimonies of the other witnesses other than the petitioner herself. This must be
so because the deprivation of her opportunity to present evidence due to unreasonable absences on
the scheduled hearings is primarily intended to safeguard the orderly administration of justice.” Thus,
the CA concluded that the trial court’s action was well within its jurisdiction.
In her motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioner called the CA’s attention to this fact,
and also pointed out that although petitioner, by failing to appear at several trial dates, may be
deemed to have waived her right to be present during the proceedings; such waiver does not include
a waiver of her right to present evidence. On February 23, 2004, the CA issued a resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

86
Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in deciding the case in a way not in accord with law or
jurisprudence and departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings. In support of said
allegations, petitioner reiterated her arguments that the trial court denied her the constitutional right
to be heard and to be assisted by counsel by failing to furnish her counsel copies of the order setting
the date for reception of defense evidence on May 14, 1997, and the order considering petitioner to
have waived her right to present evidence in her defense; that the decision of the trial court was null
and void for imposing a penalty not authorized by law; that inasmuch as the decision was null and
void, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial on the ground that the assailed decision had become final; and that
the CA utterly failed to resolve petitioner’s submission that the trial court’s decision was null and void
by virtue of the excessive penalty imposed.

Issue

Whether or not the Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.

Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is valid.

Held

The pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, trial
against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered against them
notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both accused have died and the fact of such death
is sufficiently established. In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial
court set a hearing on May 14, 1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was duly
sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and her counsel, respectively. When they failed to
appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing, they later alleged that they were not notified of said setting.
Petitioner’s counsel never notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner gave a
wrong address from the very beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly,
therefore, petitioner and her counsel were given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now
complain of alleged violation of petitioner’s right to due process when it was by their own fault that
they lost the opportunity to present evidence.

The Court likewise upholds the validity of the promulgation in absentia of the RTC judgment and the
RTC’s Order dated April 5, 2000, denying due course to petitioner’s notice of appeal for being filed
beyond the reglementary period. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
Rule applicable in this case since promulgation was held before the effectivity of The Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

The letter/petition for habeas corpus is DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY
GRANTED.

MARTI NEZ V. MENDOZA

G.R. No. 153795

Panganiban, CJ.:
87
Summary

A participant in the Nida Blanca murder case was allegedly abducted and was last seen by
Philip Medel at the CIDG in Camp Crame. As the alleged mastermind Martinez has
been missing, his family filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus against CIDG and PNP
officers. Court held that for the petition to be granted, the petitioner must establish
by competent and convincing evidence that the missing person, on whose behalf the
Petition was filed, is under the custody of the respondents. As the petitioners here merely relied
on the statements of Philip Medel, who the court found doubtful, the Court denied the
petition .When respondents deny custody of an allegedly detained person, petitioners have the
duty of establishing the fact of detention by competent and convincing evidence; otherwise, the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued. Nonetheless, when the disappearance of a person is
indubitable, the law enforcement authorities are duty-bound to investigate it with due diligence
and to locate the missing person .When the wrongdoing is attributable to the police agencies
and/or their agents, the aggrieved may secure the assistance of the People’s Law Enforcement
Board or the Commission on Human Rights.

Facts

-MICHAEL MARTINEZ, a resident of Sun Valley, Paranaque, was reported to be

abducted while on his way to his mother’s house nearby. The said abducting was
reported to the authorities-in the evening when MARTINEZ was abducted, the CIDG
presented before the media PHILIP MEDEL, JR. who allegedly named MARTINEZ
as the person who introduced him to ROD LAUREN STRUNK, the husband of Nida Blanca
who was also the alleged mastermind in her killing. PHILIP MEDEL narrated that he say
MARTINEZ at the CIDG at Camp Crame.-PHILIP MEDEL reiterated that he saw MARTINEZ to
the brother of MARTINEZ, even describing the clothes MARTINEZ was wearing when he was
abducted.-the Martinez family prayed for the release of MARTINEZ, or that they be allowed to
see him, but CIDG did not grant their request-so Martinez family filed a petition for habeas
corpus vs. PNP and CIDG officials to produce MARTINEZ or to justify the continued detention of
his liberty.-RTC set petition for hearing, directed respondents to show cause why writ should not
issue-

RETURN:* d e n i e d a n y p a r t i c i p a t i o n o r i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e a l l e g e d a b d u c t i o n
o r disappearance of Martinez* Martinez was never confined or detained by them or in their
custody-HEARING: same stand of respondents. Petitioners presented Philip Medel: said that
the even saw ESPINA (one of the defendants) boxed Martinez in the stomach RTC: granted the
petition CA: reversed RTC

1. Medel’s credibility was highly suspect: contradicted himself as to material facts

2. Espina’s positive testimony that he was at home at the time when he allegedly boxed
Martinez was never negated.
3. Presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties.
4. CIDG was equally concerned with the safety of MARTINEZ who is a vital witness to the case.

Issue

88
Was the denial of the Petition proper?

Ruling

Yes, the petitioner must present and established a competent and convincing evidence that the
missing person, on whose behalf if the petition is filed is under of the respondent. The evidence
is insufficient to convince the Court that Michael Martinez is in the respondents’ custody.
Therefore the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs in this instance.

In re Ilagan v Enrile
G.R. No.70748
October 21, 1985

Melencio-Herrera. J.:

89
Facts

A petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Free Legal
Assistance Group on behalf of Attorneys Laurente Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos
Risonar.

The three lawyers were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a
Mission Order signed by Gen. Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry of
National Defense. The petition was then filed on the ground that the arrests were illegal and
violative of the Constitution, because arrest cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders and
there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers who are involved in national security
cases.

The respondents contended that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree issued by
the President. Respondents further allege that the detained attorneys played active roles in
organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front.

The court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the
recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners, namely retired Chief Justice Concepcion
and retired Associate Justice J.B.L Reyes. However, despite the Order of the Court, the
detained attorneys were not released. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
stating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of
its jurisdiction to hear the case.

Furthermore, the respondents allege that information for Rebellion was filed against the
detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, and that they were
denied the constitutional right to due process.

Issue

Whether or not the subsequent filing of information is a bar to a petition for Habeas Corpus.

Ruling

Case was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners were detained by
virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to the
criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.

Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498
December 3, 2009

Brion, J.:

90
Parties

• PETITIONERS: GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief,
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO,
Regional Director of ARMM, PNP
• RESPONDENT: MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P.
ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Court of Appeals: Petition for the Writ of Amparo

Facts

Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with
Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of
October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following
day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.
Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary,
who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis’ return.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of

Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance
to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent,
May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition)
directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino
I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as “petitioners”),
with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of
Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was
an “enforced disappearance” under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed
the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person
case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ
to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts
to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of
their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the
finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

91
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES:
• Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e.
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights, is
indispensable in an amparo petition.
• Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her
allegations is sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.
• Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.

ANSWERS:
• No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances,
while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty
and security through State or private party action.
• Yes.
• No.

Reyes v CA
G.R. No. 96492
December 3, 2009

Nocon, J.:

92
Facts

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent
Court’s decision, which affirmed with modification the agrarian court’s decision, which ordered
them and the other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed
landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now
deceased Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the
subject lots; that Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter
Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and
working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had
refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore
prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between
plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots and asked
for the dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and
approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as
his defenses.

Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue

W/N the court erred in holding petitioners

Ruling

No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their
findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because
settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in
the instant case.

In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil
case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its
own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.

93
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
October 7, 2008

Puno, C.J.

Facts
94
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Raymond”) and
Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men
belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of
detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.

On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24
August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the
arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs.

While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24
October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion
to treat their existing petition under the Amparo Rule.

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a
petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and
remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the
petition.

On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. The
Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to
furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two
military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and
Reynaldo while under military custody.

Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal
with the Supreme Court.

Issue/s

1. Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for Amparo petition;

2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person
may be invoked.

Ruling

95
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim
during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will
come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their
credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or
landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.

The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of
the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion.
As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal
law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the
bodily integrity or security of a person.

The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In
the context of the Writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and
liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Sec. 2.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
“guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or
their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

In the Amparo context, the “right to security” is actually the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this
light, the “threatened with violation” clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a
form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article
9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the
right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right
to security of person to be invoked.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 26 December 2007.

96
BPI vs. CASA
GR No. 149454
May 28, 2004

Panganiban, J.:

Facts

The plaintiff bank, which has a current account with BPI, discovered that nine (9) of its checks had
been encashed by Leonardo T. Yabut under a fictitious name since 1990 in the total amount of
Php782,000.00. Yabut, who worked as an external auditor of CASA, voluntarily admitted that he
forged the signatures of CASA's President Ms. Ma. Carina C. Lebron. The RTC decided in favor of

97
CASA which filed a Complain for Collection with Damages against the defendant bank. The CA
modified the decision of the RTC holding BPI liable only for one-half of the value of the forged
checks in the amount of Php547,115.00 subject to reimbursements by Yabut who was ordered to
pay the other half to CASA. BPI filed two Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the CA.

Issue/s:

1. Was there forgery under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL)?

2. Were any of the parties negligent and therefore precluded from setting up forgery as defense?

3. Should moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and interest be awarded?

Ruling:

Forged Signature Wholly Inoperative

The Court held that there was forgery of the drawer's signature on the check. The lower courts found
that Yabut himself voluntarily admitted, through an affidavit that he forgery the draer's signature and
encashed the checks. Moreover, the lower courts ruled that the PNP Crime Laboratory's
examination of the checks concluded forgery.

Voluntary Admission Not Violative of Constitutional Rights

The mantle of protection under Article III Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution covers only the period
“from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime of from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime
although not yet in custody.”

There must be an arrest or a deprivation of freedom. The said constitutional provision does “not
apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner”. The Constitution prohibits
compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts. In the case at bar, Respondent Yabut was
not under custodial investigation. He made a voluntary admission, privately executed an affidavit
before private individuals. Moreover, the right to self-incrimination under Article III Section 17 of the
Constitution is not applicable to private investigations by private individuals.

Under these two Constitutional provisions, the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relations
between private individuals rather the relationship between the individual and the State. It is of
important note, however, that Yabut is not an accused in these Petitions.

Clear, Positive and Convincing Examination and Evidence

The examination by the PNP, though inconclusive, was nevertheless clear, positive and convincing.
Although the original checks have already been destroyed or cannot be used in court, a secondary
evidence may be produced. Through independent examination conducted by the lower courts, as
affirmed by PNP, found that the drawer's signatures on the microfilm copies and their the standard
signature were evidently different. Moreover, the drawer's testimony that she never signed the
checks were admitted as testimonial evidence. The preponderance of evidence required in this case
has been satisfied.

98
Negligence Attributable to BPI Alone

BPI, the drawee, erred in making payments by virtue of forgery of the drawer's signature. CASA
cannot be held liable since its drawer's signature did not appear on the checks. BPI failed to detect
the eight (8) instances of forgery despite its signature verification procedure. It cannot feign
ignorance since the Court has already ruled that a bank is “bound to know the signatures of its
customers”.

Neither Waiver nor Estoppel Results from Failure to Report Error in a Bank Statement

CASA never made any deed or representation that misled BPI. The former's omission, if any, may
only be deemed an innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences of periodic
audits. Since its conduct was due to such ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel will
not arise.

Loss Borne by Proximate Source of Negligence

For allowing payment on the checks to a wrongful and fictitious payee, BPI becomes liable to its
depositor-drawer. Due to the negligence of its officers or agents which were the proximate cause to
the fraud, BPI should be help primarily liable and must bear the loss.

CASA Not Negligent In Its Financial Affairs / Award of Monetary Claims

Since a forged signature is wholly inoperative, CASA is neither negligent in handling its financial
affairs nor it is precluded from setting up forgery as a real defense.

CASA's claim for moral damages is denied. In the absence of a wrongful act of omission, or of fraud
or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. CASA was unable to identify the particular instance
upon which its claim for moral damages is predicated. Having no right to moral damages, its claim
for exemplary damages is also denied. However, CASA is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.
When the act or omission of the defendant has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect
the latter's interest, or where the court deems it just and equitable, attorney's fees may be recovered.
Moreover, the payment of interest for the legal interest of 6% per annum is allowed for the failure of
BPI to pay CASA upon demand and for compelling the latter to resort to to the courts to obtain
payment.

The assailed Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with modifications.

People vs. Olvis

GR No. 71092

September 30, 1987

Sarmiento, J.:

Facts
99
On May 28, 1987, the three accused-appellants filed a statement stating their desire to continue
with the case as an appealed case.

On May 14, 1987, the Court issued a death penalty abolition resolution requiring the three (3)
accused-appellants to file a statement, personally signed by them with the assistance of
counsel, stating whether or not they wished to continue with the case as an appealed case.

On September 7, 1975, accused-appellants Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela executed the

conspiracy induced by former municipal mayor Olvis to kill by means of treachery and evident
premeditation Deosdedit Bagon. Bagon instantaneously died due to twelve (12) fatal stab and
hack wounds.

The trial court acquitted as principal by inducement due to lack of direct or indirect evidence.
However, the 3 other accused were found guilty beyond reasonable and to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH.

During the trial in open court, the 3 accused-appellants retracted their earlier statements
admitting to the murder due to alleged threats by the investigators They also alleged that they
were instructed by the police investigators to implicate Olvis in the case. They insisted their
innocence.

Issue/s

Whether or not the accused-appellants' statement, as extrajudicial confessions, can stand up in

court.

Ruling

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Based on the recorded evidence, the accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence. The accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel twice
including the forced re-enactment of the crime they were made to perform shortly after
apprehension. Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within
the ban against self-incrimination. An act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to
disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. All evidence
based on such re-enactment are in violation of the Constitution thus, incompetent evidence.

Villarojo's admission of inflicting the fatal wounds upon the deceased is binding on him. He
completely absolved his co-accused Sorela and Cademas from any liability. Thus, the Decision
is modified acquitting Sorela and Cademas on the ground of reasonable doubt and charging
Villarojo of homicide.

Disini vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 180564
June 22, 2010

Abad, J.:

Facts

This case is about the elementary rule of fair play and the dire effect on the Republic’s credibility
when it reneges on its undertaking to protect witnesses to whom it had given immunity from
prosecution.

In 1989 respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), wanted petitioner Jesus P. Disini to testify for his

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government in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) before the
United States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse
International Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T.
Disini (Herminio), as an executive in the latter’s companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic
believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,
brokered by one of Herminio’s companies, had been attended by anomalies.

On February 16, 1989 respondent Republic and petitioner Disini entered into an Immunity
Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for his government and provide its lawyers
with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed for prosecuting the two cases.
Acknowledging Disini’s concern that the Republic could become a party to yet other
proceedings relating to the matters subject of his testimony, the Republic guaranteed that, apart
from the two cases, it shall not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign
proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio.

Issue/s

1. Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement between respondent Republic and petitioner Disini;

2. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied
petitioner Disini’s motion to quash the subpoena addressed to him.

Ruling

Construing the above, the Court has ruled in a previous case that the scope of immunity offered
by the PCGG may vary. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity
depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-
gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by the witness
as sufficient to induce cooperation.

The language of Section 5, E.O. 14, said the Court, affords latitude to the PCGG in determining
the extent of that criminal immunity. In petitioner Disini’s case, respondent Republic, acting
through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil immunity but also immunity against
being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign proceeding, other than the civil and
arbitration cases identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify.
Trusting in the Government’s honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the
bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the
Republic on to its promise.

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The Republic of course points out that the immunity from criminal or civil prosecution that
Section 5 of E.O. 14 authorizes does not cover immunity from giving evidence in a case before
a court of law.

But in reality the guarantee given to petitioner Disini against being compelled to testify in other
cases against Herminio constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. If
Disini refuses to testify in those other cases he would face indirect contempt, which is
essentially a prosecution for willful disobedience of a valid court order, a subpoena. His refusal
to testify will warrant the imposition against him of the penalty of fine not exceeding P30,000.00
or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or both fine and imprisonment.

Here, petitioner Disini’s refusal to testify as ordered by the Sandiganbayan is certain to result in
prosecution for criminal contempt. It constitutes criminal contempt since guilt would draw a
penalty of fine or imprisonment or both. Said the Court in Montenegro v. Montenegro:

Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect
of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt is
the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is therefore an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated
order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature, but if to compensate,
then it is civil.

In criminal contempt, the proceedings are regarded as criminal and the rules of criminal
procedure apply. What is more, it is generally held that the State or respondent Republic is the
real prosecutor in such a case. The grant, therefore, of immunity to petitioner Disini against
being compelled to testify is ultimately a grant of immunity from being criminally prosecuted by
the State for refusal to testify, something that falls within the express coverage of the immunity
given him.

Respondent Republic claims that the grant of immunity to petitioner Disini against being
compelled to testify against Herminio contravenes the state’s public policy respecting the
recovery of illegally acquired wealth under the regime of former President Marcos.
But the same authority that adopted such policy, former President Corazon C. Aquino, is the
same authority that gave the PCGG the power to grant immunity to witnesses whom it might
use to recover illegally acquired wealth during that regime. In the case of Tanchanco v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court regarded as valid and binding on the government the immunity it
gave former National Food Authority Administrator, Jesus Tanchanco for all "culpable acts of his
during his service in the Marcos government," which would include possible prosecution for any
illegal wealth that he may himself have acquired during that service. The Court did not regard
such immunity in contravention of the state policy on recovery of ill-gotten wealth under the
auspices of the Marcos regime.

True, respondent Republic may have other cases in which it also needed petitioner Disini’s
testimony. But such circumstance does not necessarily invalidate the concession it gave him—

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the freedom from being compelled to give evidence in specific cases. It may be assumed that
the Republic regarded Disini’s testimony in the two cases covered by the agreement more
important and critical than those other cases. It is well known that the cases with Westinghouse
before the New Jersey District Court and the International Arbitration Tribunal concerning the
construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant had so huge a financial impact on the Republic
that it was willing to waive its power and right to compel petitioner Disini’s testimony in other
cases.
Two. Petitioner Disini argues that respondent Republic, through the PCGG, should not be
allowed to revoke the guarantee it gave him against being compelled to testify in other cases,
the Republic being in estoppel for making him believe that it had the authority to provide such
guarantee. The Republic rejects this argument, however, invoking Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution which provides: "The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall
not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel."

But, first, the estoppel that petitioner Disini invokes does not have the effect, if recognized, of
denying the state its right to recover whatever ill-gotten wealth Herminio may have acquired
under the Marcos regime. The action against Herminio can continue, hampered only by the
exclusion of Disini’s testimony. And there are other ways of proving the existence of ill-gotten
wealth. Second, although the government cannot be barred by estoppel based on unauthorized
acts of public officers, such principle cannot apply to this case since, as already pointed out,
respondent PCGG acted within its authority when it provided Disini with a guarantee against
having to testify in other cases.

A contract is the law between the parties. It cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual
consent. This applies with more reason in this case where petitioner Disini had already complied
with the terms and conditions of the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the
Agreement at this late stage will run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for
a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits.

The Republic also cites the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which
reads:
Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful information or
testimony.

The Republic interprets this as enjoining Disini, despite the immunity given him against being
compelled to testify in other cases, to "provide truthful information or testimony" in such other
cases.

But this reasoning does not sound right. The grant of immunity in paragraph 3 of the agreement
quoted above to petitioner Disini against being compelled to testify in "other cases" against
Herminio is quite clear and does not need any interpretation. Where a stipulation in an
agreement is clear, its literal meaning controls.

Besides, Disini undertook to testify for the Republic in its two foreign cases and provide its
lawyers all the information and testimony they needed to prosecute the same. The last sentence

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in the paragraph that enjoins Disini to "provide truthful information or testimony," despite the
guarantee not to be compelled to testify against Herminio, merely emphasizes the fact that such
concessions does not affect his obligation to "provide truthful information or testimony" in the
two cases mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

Social Justice Society vs. PDEA

GR No. 157870
November 3, 2008

Velasco, Jr., J.:

Facts

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.

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Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in
the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December
23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators
in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that
there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

Issue/s

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically,
do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of
legislative power?

Ruling

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students,
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluantarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of
the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.

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When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case,
do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Herrera vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 119660 – 61
February 13, 2009

Azcuna, J.:

Facts
Petitioners Pat. Edgardo Herrera y Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y Antonio, together
with the other accused, Pat. Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the
Parañaque Police Station, were charged with two (2) counts of murder, FOR THER KILLING OF
Shi Shu Yang and George Go y Tan, before public respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 16674 and 16675.

The original informations, both dated December 4, 1990, against the petitioners and two other
accused alleged:

That on or about the 28th day of December, 1989 in the Municipality of [Parañaque], Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused who were then public officers, being then members of the Parañaque Police Force,
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and armed with guns, and conspiring and confederating and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of their public positions as
members of the Parañaque Police Force, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot one SHI SHU YANG on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious and
mortal wounds upon said victim, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be awarded to them
under the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

That on or about the 28th day of December, 1989 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused who were then public officers, being then members of the Parañaque Police Force,
armed with guns, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of their public positions as
members of the Parañaque Police Force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot one GEORGE GO Y TAN on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious and
mortal wounds upon said victim, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be awarded to them
under the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue/s

1. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS FOR

MURDER UNDER THE AMENDED INFORMATIONS;
2. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE
PETITIONERS TO CONDUCT FURTHER CROSS EXAMINATION ON PROSECUTION
WITNESS WINTERHALTER;
3. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED EYEWITNESS WINTERHALTER WAS WANTING IN
CREDIBILITY;
4. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT PROSECUTION WITNESS NBI MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER AND HIS REAL EVIDENCE
SUPPORT THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE;
5. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT THERE WAS TOTAL ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONSPIRACY;
6. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL ACTS; AND
7. THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONERS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Ruling

First. Petitioners insist that respondent Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for the crime of
murder under the amended informations as they had earlier been arraigned under the original
informations for murder and their rearraignment under the amended informations placed them in
double jeopardy.

The rule on double jeopardy does not apply. Public respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the
amendment of the informations and made it of record that the evidence adduced during the pre-
trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed automatically
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reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the merits. Double jeopardy did not
attach by virtue of petitioner’s plea of not guilty under the amended information. For a claim of
double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea
to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed
or terminated without his express consent.
In the present case, petitioners and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the original
informations. Thereafter, at the instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the
informations that the crimes were committed "in relation to their office." On the same day,
respondent court ordered the amendment of the informations accordingly. Thus, the first
requirement for double jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations against the petitioners
were valid, has not been complied with.

Likewise, the fourth element was lacking. Petitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of
the original information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes
were committed "in relation to their office." Petitioners were thus not placed in danger of being
convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient information. Moreover,
there was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioners.

Furthermore, it was well-within the power of public respondent Sandiganbayan to order the
amendment of the information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
which states that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The
motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

Second. Petitioners make much of the fact the public respondent Sandiganbayan should have
allowed their counsel to conduct further cross-examination on prosecution witness Winterhalter.

Rule 132, Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that upon the termination of the
direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matter
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to
test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit
all important facts bearing upon the issue. The cross-examination of a witness is a right of a
party against whom he is called. Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution states that the
accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face. Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Indeed,
petitioners’ counsel has conducted an extensive cross-examination of witness Winterhalter on
the scheduled dates of hearing. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim there has been any
procedural infirmity in the proceedings.

Moreover, the trial court has the power to direct the course of the trial either to shorten or to
extend the direct or cross examination of a counsel. Under Rule 133, Section 6 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular
point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot
be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with
109
caution. Thus, it is within the prerogative of the trial court to determine when to terminate the
presentation of the evidence of the prosecution or the defense.

Third. Petitioners’ attempt to destroy the credibility of prosecution witness Winterhalter fails. The
trial court had the opportunity to observe first-hand the demeanor and deportment of the
witnesses, and, therefore, its findings that the witnesses for the prosecution are to be believed
over those of the defense are entitled to great weight. Winterhalter recognized the petitioners as
the ones who cooperated with Pat. Barrera in killing the victims. She saw the events unfolding
with the use of her binoculars 80-90 meters away. She established the identity of the petitioners
as the companions of Pat. Barrera when he effected the killing. It has been ruled that findings of
fact of the trial court on credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect. The
Court has refrained from interfering with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which as been misapprehended or
misinterpreted. None exists in this case.

After the incident, Winterhalter’s neighbor, who was also a foreigner, has been receiving death
threats. She herself has been getting death threats too, yet she voluntarily testified in order to
shed light on the commission of the crime. In fact, she did not even know the two victims.
Indeed, where there is nothing to indicate that a witness was moved by improper motives, his
positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand, made under solemn oath, should be
given full faith and credence. It has not been shown that Winterhalter has any reason to falsely
implicate petitioners.

Winterhalter narrated that Pat. Barrera and Pat. Alcalde, together with petitioners, were
responsible for the death of the victims. This was confirmed by the post mortem report prepared
by Dr. Roberto Garcia, medico legal officer of the NBI, showing the gunshot wounds on the
different parts of the victims’ body.

Fourth. Petitioners would persuade the Court that the testimony of the NBI-Medico Legal
Officer, a prosecution witness, supports the theory of the defense that they acted in self-
defense.

This argument cannot stand. By invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, petitioners
assume the onus of proving: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. Petitioners failed to discharge this burden.

To proceed with the argument that there was unlawful aggression by the two deceased who
tried to get the pistol tucked in the waist of one of the police officers, petitioners should prove
that they used reasonable means in repelling the aggression. Considering that both deceased
where handcuffed and unarmed and had restricted movements, it could only mean that the
perceived threat to petitioners’ lives were not sufficiently serious, in which case they were not
justified in shooting the hapless victims who were unarmed. Petitioners could have simply
subdued the two victims in a manner as to engage them in a fight without necessarily killing
them. Moreover, the autopsy reports showing the extent of the wounds sustained by George Go
and Shi Shu Yang tend to discredit the version of the defense.
Fifth. Petitioners assert that there was total absence of evidence to support the theory that
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

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Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence
of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. The familiar rule in conspiracy is that
when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible, when the
conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the conspiracy. In this
case, petitioner Herrera drove the vehicle along Timothy Street to a place which was less
conspicuous to passersby. There, Pat. Alcalde, Pat. Barrera, and petitioner Mariano brought out
the two victims from the back portion of the van in order to perpetuate the killing. Petitioner
Mariano alighted from the right front seat of the van and stood beside Pat. Alcalde and Pat.
Barrera who began shooting the victims. According to Winterhalter, petitioner Mariano even
appeared to be writing something on a sheet of paper immediately before the shooting, although
it cannot be determined with certainty as to whether he was making an inquiry or merely noting
the names of the victims. While it was Pat. Barrera who actually shot the two victims, the
evidence showed a common design on the part of both petitioners as they did not do anything to
prevent him from killing the victims, thus, indicative of the fact that they are in unison with the
criminal design of the Pat. Barrera. Petitioner Herrera alighted form the van without doing
anything to prevent the killing, and worse, after the killing took place along the street, petitioner
Herrera even helped carry the two victims into the van while petitioner Mariano, the driver,
remained in the vehicle during the incident. Consequently, applying the rule that the act of one
is the act of all, petitioners are thus as guilty as Pat. Barrera and Pat. Alcalde. In fact,
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances.

Sixth. Intertwined with their argument that they were acting in self-defense, petitioners want this
Court to appreciate the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official acts.

This contention has no merit. In order to consider the defense of fulfillment of a duty, it must be
shown that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. There was no showing
that petitioners should resort to inflicting injuries and even to the extent of killing the victims as
there was no resistance at all from them when they were apprehended. The two victims were
handcuffed and unarmed while the petitioners and the other police officers were armed with
pistols and a rifle. Aida Veloria Magsipoc, Supervising Forensic Chemist of the NBI, per
Chemistry Report No. C-89-1606, conducted the paraffin test on George Go and Shi Shu Yang
which yielded negative results, thus showing that the victims never fired a gun and were totally
defenseless in the face of the fully armed police officers.

Petitioners anchor their argument that they merely acted in self-defense. This contention has no
merit. The accused who invokes self-defense thereby admits having killed the victim, and the
burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the
confluence of the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.

Moreover, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and
unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense or defense
of stranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
oneself. The victims were repeatedly shot at close range and on vital parts of their bodies, thus
indicia that the police officers really intended to kill them. Clearly, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties on the part of the petitioners and the other police officers
does not apply.
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Seventh. Petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

On the contrary, the killing of the two victims was proved to have been committed with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden
attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape. Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself/herself or to retaliate.

The records are extant on the findings of respondent Sandiganbayan that when petitioner
Herrera drove the patrol car along Timothy Street to an practically deserted area and isolated
from traffic and pedestrians, Pat. Alcalde, Pat. Barrera, and petitioner Mariano brought out the
two victims from the back portion of the patrol car in order to eventually salvage them which
showed that all the police officers had a community of criminal design. Petitioner Mariano mad
the pretense of writing down something prior to the shooting incident. It would appear that he
was faking an alleged interrogation or trying to get the name of Shi Shu Yang, whose identity
was not immediately known, yet the fact remains that he did not do anything to prevent the
killing and even helped in loading the body of George Go inside the patrol car.

Clearly, the elements of murder have been proven: 1). that the two victims were killed; 2). that
petitioners and the two other accused killed the victims; 3). that the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery committed by the petitioners and the two other accused
who conspired together in killing the victims; and 4). that the killing was not parricide or
infanticide.

Eighth. Public respondent Sandiganbayan did not grant any award of damages in favor of the
heirs of Shi Shu Yang and George Go y Tan. When death occurs due to a crime, the following
damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 to the
heirs of the victims as civil indemnity is in order. In cases of murder and homicide, moral
damages may be awarded without need of allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the
heirs, other than the death of the victim, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of
the victims cannot be denied. Thus, the award of P50,000 is proper.

As to the award of actual damages, Edna Go testified that she incurred funeral expenses of
P11,500. Moreover, the award of exemplary damages of P25,000 is proper since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing of the victims. Article 2230 of the Civil Code
allows the award of exemplary damages as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating circumstance as
used therein should be construed in its generic sense since it did not specify otherwise.
The Court affirms the conviction

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People vs. Dumlao
GR No. 168918
March 2, 2009

Chico-Nazario, J.:

Facts

Office of the Ombudsman filed a case to Sandiganbayan against Hermenegildo Dumlao and
Four others as Members of the Board of Trustees of Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and Emilio La’o for Graft and Corruption. Allegedly, the Board of Trustees entered into a
contract with La’o approving the lease-purchase of a GSIS acquired property consisting of three
parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters together with a 5-storey building.

The prosecution and Accused Dumlao submitted on December 21, 2004 their Joint Stipulation
of Facts and Admission of Exhibits, terminating the pre-trial.

On February 21 2005, Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the grounds that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, of which the Sandiganbayan found to be meritorious as
told in their Resolution dated July 14, 2005.

The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman thru the Office of
the Special Prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the said resolution.

Issue/s

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Is the prosecution denied of the due process of law, when Sandiganbayan dismissed the case
against Dumlao?

Ruling

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the
prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its
case and to prove the accused’s culpability.

The petition was granted.

Valeroso vs. People

GR No. 164815
September 3, 2009

Nachura, J.:

Facts

A warrant of arrest was issued against Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso for kidnap for ransom. The
desk officer directed SPO2 Disuanco and three (3) other policemen to serve said warrant.

During the apprehension of Valeroso, a calibre 38 was found and seized from him, and thus
effecting another case, i.e., illegal possession of fire arm.

When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded “Not Guilty.” Trial proceeded.

During the course of the trial, both prosecution and defense have their own narration of how the
actual arrest happened.

The prosecution stated, on summary, that Valeroso was apprehended on July 10, 1996 near
INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City. They saw the accused about to board a
tricycle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed of
his rights, and bodily searched him. They found the subject firearm, tucked in his waist. He was
then brought to the police station for interrogation. Deriquito presented a certification that the
subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc Manila.

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On the defense’s hand, on summary, on July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in
the boarding house of his children at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was
awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and
pulled him out of the room. They tied his hands and put him outside the room then went back to
inside, searched and ransacked the room. On a locked drawer, they found the subject firearm.
Furthermore, a certain Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt dated
July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col.
Angelito Moreno.

On February 22, 2008, the trial court noted the version of the prosecution and rendered a
judgment convicting Valeroso of committing illegal possession of firearms which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals on their Resolution dated June 30, 2008
.
Valeroso petitioned twice for a reconsideration.

Issue/s

Is the obtained firearm resulted from a questionably unreasonable search and seizure
admissible in evidence against the defense party?

Ruling

The Supreme Court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to file a Comment and the
Motions for Reconsideration. Instead of a comment, on the 2nd M.R. the OSG filed a
manifestation changing its previous stand of convicting Valeroso, wherein the testimonies of the
defense were considered to be more credible.

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. It is the right and the duty of the apprehending officer to conduct a warrantless arrest
not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered.

During the apprehension as based on the defense testimony, the warrantless search and
seizure on Valeroso presented the fact that the arresting officers gravely erred. The firearm they
searched and seized was neither on the petitioner’s body nor within the area of his immediate
control – a clear picture of unreasonable search and seizure, an obvious violation of Article III
Section 2. More so, to forego the case is to strip Valeroso naked of his human rights for without
the illegally seized firearm, his conviction cannot stand.

In the light of the Manifestation filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and upon perusal of
the two Motions for Reconsideration filed by Valeroso, the subject firearm was found to be
obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search
and seizure, and thus excluded as evidence against him. Valeroso was ACQUITTED.

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People vs. Mojello
GR No. 145566
March 9, 2004

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts

On May 22, 1997, an Information for Rape with Homicide against accused, Dindo “Bebot”
Mojello was filed to Regional Trial Court Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu.

Accused was arraigned on July 24, 1997 and pleaded “Not Guilty.”

During the course of trial, Rogelio Rayco, a prosecution witness, stated that on December 15,
1996 at or around 9:00pm, the night the crime took place, he himself, and his friends were
having some drinks. An hour later, he left to go home and on his way, he saw Mojello walking
together with the victim, Lenlen Rayco, his niece, towards the direction of the seashore.

On December 16, 1996, the Rayco family was informed that the body of Lenlen Rayco was
found at the seashore, lifeless, bruised and naked.

On December 21, 1996, Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Region VII testified that the victim was positively raped and indicated that the cause
of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to the
head and the trunk.

The suspect was arrested at Bantayan on December 23, 1996. Thereafter, an investigation was
conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, wherein Mojello admitted that he is the perpetrator of the
dastardly deed. During the said custodial investigation, the accused was assisted by Atty. Isaias
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Guidoquio.

The said trial court rendered judgment on January 21, 1999 finding Mojello guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and sentencing him to the
supreme penalty of death.

Mojello filed a Notice of Appeal. Appellant avers that the confession he made during the
custodial investigation was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. More so, he was
not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights prior to the taking of his
confession. Hence, appellant alleges that his confession should be deemed inadmissible in
evidence, under the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree.

Issue/s

Whether the extrajudicial confession executed by Mojello is admissible in evidence against him
for two grounds, i.e., he did not exercise his right to have a competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice and Miranda doctrine was not explained to him prior to his
confession.

Ruling

Atty. Isaias Guidoquio, the lawyer who assisted Mojello during the said custodial investigation
was a competent and independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution. No
evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence. The phrase “preferably
of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will solely in the hands
of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer, who, for one reason or another, is not available in order to protect his
interest. The extrajudicial confession of the appellant complies with the strict constitutional
requirement on the right to counsel.

Moreover, the records of this case clearly reflect that appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently
entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda Doctrine. SPO2
Wilfredo Abello Giducos testified that prior to conducting his investigation he explained the
appellant’s constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect, notably Cebuano, a language known to
the appellant. RTC Br. 61 observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Thus, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.

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People vs. Taliman
GR No. 109143
October 11, 2000

Pardo, J.:

Facts

The accused-appellants, Pedro Taliman and the other 2 co-accused, were all found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and each of them was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused were also jointly and severally ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim for moral damages, funeral expenses and for the victim’s unrealized income.
The accused-appellants argued that the extra-judicial confessions on which the trial court relied
were inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in violation of their constitutional
rights.

Issue/s

Is the extrajudicial confession of the accused admissible in evidence even without the
assistance of counsel?

Ruling

No. The extrajudicial statements alone cannot be bases for conviction. As Article III, Section 12
(1) of the Constitution provides, any person under the custodial investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to be silent and have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights under the Constitution cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The mayor, a public official who assisted
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the accused –appellants, cannot be considered as an independent counsel for the accused
during their custodial investigation. Moreover, even assuming that the right to counsel was orally
waived during custodial investigation, still the defect was not cured. The Constitution clearly
provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel.

However, despite that the extrajudicial statements of the accused were inadmissible in
evidence, the Court found that there were still sufficient evidence to convict.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed with modification. The accused-appellants
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and were jointly and severally ordered
to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages and civil indemnity. The award of actual damages
for funeral expenses and unrealized income was deleted.

People vs. Tomaquin

GR No. 133188
July 23, 2004

Austria-Martinez, J.:

Facts

The petitioner, Elizar Tomaquin, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and was imposed with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and accessory penalties of the
law. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jacquelyn Tatoy. Petitioner avers that the trial
Court erred when it convicted him on the basis of his uncounselled confession. The Court is
confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession. This appeal
particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be
considered as an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

Issue/s

Is it legally possible to consider a barangay captain who is also a lawyer as competent and
independent counsel of the appellant?

Ruling

No. In this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a
peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing
competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his
jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant,
when the appellant executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the
presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his
client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest. Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as
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a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An "effective and vigilant counsel"
necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.

The lawyer should make sure that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.

The Court cannot conceive how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellant’s
rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that
appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having
committed it. Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and
competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed
by the appellant, even if it is true, is deemed uncounselled confession and therefore,
inadmissible in evidence.
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.
GR No. 109149
December 21, 1999

Quisumbing, J.:

Facts

Subject of the appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, convicting accused-appellant,
Leoncio Santocildes, Jr. of the crime of rape . The Court found Santocildes, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalty. One of the major points raised by the accused-appellant in his appeal is that
he was deprived, although not his fault, to be defended by a person authorized to practice law.
This deprivation was argued to be tantamount as denial of due process. Appellant therefore
argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime charged.

Issue/s

Is the conviction decided by the Court against the accused valid and acceptable even if the
accused was represented by a counsel who is not a member of the Philippine Bar?

Ruling

No. The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in Article III, Section 12 and 14 (2) of the
1987 Constitution. This mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the trial to be present in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of
judgment. An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the Bar in criminal
cases filed against him before the Regional Trial Court. Unless he is represented by a bonafide
lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be defective or
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inadequate in relation to the legal prerequisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. The
deprivation of a representation of a competent and a Bar-member lawyer would be a denial of
due process.

Jurisprudence has also held that “the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character
with special qualifications duly determined and certified. Under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court for assuming and acting to be a lawyer without authority.

Therefore, the judgment decided by the Regional Trial Court, with respect to the case of
Santocildes Jr., was set aside and remanded to the trial court for new trial.

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 152259
July 29, 2004

Panganiban, J.

Facts

On July 12, 1989, The People of the Philippines through PCGG filed information before the Anti-
Graft Court charging Alfredo T. Romualdez, with violation of Section 5, RA No. 3019 or Anti-
Graft Law. [It penalizes certain presidential relatives who “intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government.] The information read as:

‘”That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner], brother-in-law of
Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by
affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident
bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene
directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation
(NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.”

Alfredo Romualdez claimed that the phrase “to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business,
transaction, contract or application with the Government” is vague and violates his right to be
informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.

On February 9, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for lack of merit.

Issue

Whether or not that the Section 5 of RA No. 3019 is constitutional due to its vagueness.

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Held

The Section 5 of RA No. 3019 is constitutional. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines
have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes. [A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application.] It was stressed that ‘vagueness’ doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as
the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.

Also, term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to “to
come between.” Criminally liable covered in Section 5 of RA 3019, is impossible for the law to
provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the courts
may pass upon those details once trial is concluded.

In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague.

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David, et al v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
GR. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424
May 3, 2006

Sandoval – Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)

Facts

On February 24, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans
to overthrow the government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a
state of national emergency. The issuance was factually based on the following: (1) the escape
of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; (2) the defections in the
Philippine Marines; and (3) the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same
day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the
suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence.

In GR. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf David and Ronald Llamas, On February 24, 2006, were
arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20 th Anniversary of People
Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest. Also, Members of KMU and
NAFLU – KMU, et al. were turned away and dispersed (GR No. 171483).

In GR No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives “raided and ransacked without warrant their office.”

Issue

Whether or not, PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional for their insofar as it allegedly
violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against
warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably
assemble.

Ruling

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PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The implementing provisions in pursuant to G.O. No. 5,
the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the
Constitution making such acts as unconstitutional and illegal.

On the arrest without warrant of David, et al. upon the exercised of their right to peaceably
assemble, dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et al unwarranted as well as the
cancellation of all permits to rally disregard the principle of freedom of assembly when neither
showing of a clear and present danger. Also, the illegal search and seizure on the offices of
Daily Tribune violated the freedom of the press. The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is
unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the
“necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence.” Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo
alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism,
without restrictions.

Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.

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Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
GR No. 156273
October 15, 2003

Bellosillo, J.:

Facts

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the predecessor of herein respondent
sought to acquire Lot No. 916 and Lot No. 920 for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport.
The two parcels of land located in Lahug, Cebu City were owned by the spouses Timoteo
Moreno and Maria Rotea.

The spouses refused to sell their properties because the proposed price was unacceptably way
below the market value of the lands at that time. As an incentive for the other owners to cede
their lots adjoining the then existing Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their successors-in-
interest the right to repurchase their properties for the same price paid by the government in the
event that these properties were no longer used for purposes of the airport. Some landowners
executed deeds of conveyance while others who refused to cede their properties became
defendants in an action for expropriation filed by the Republic of the Philippines before the CFI
of Cebu. Lot Nos. 916 and 920 were among those included in the expropriation case.

The trial court declared Lot Nos. 916 and 920, along with the other adjoining lands, condemned
for public use after payment of just compensation. The subject lands were transferred in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently turned over to MCIAA under Republic
Act 6958 in 1990. Subsequently, when the Lahug Airport was abandoned and all its functions
and operations were transferred to the Mactan Airport, the heirs of Moreno wrote then President
Ramos and the MCIAA General Manager, requesting for the exercise of their right to repurchase
the lot. Written and verbal demands were ignored by the respondent. Petitioners filed a
complaint for reconveyance and damages with the RTC of Cebu City against the respondent
asserting their right to reacquire the subject properties. During the pendency of the case, one
Richard E. Unchuan filed a Motion for Transfer of Interest, alleging that some of the petitioners
had already assigned to him their respective rights, interests, participation, and ownership over
the subject properties.

On April 12, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, granting them the
right to repurchase the properties at the amount originally paid by the respondent in Civil Case
No. R-1881 including consequential damages.
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The CA reversed the trial court’s decision on the premise that the judgment affirming the state’s
right to exercise its power of eminent domain was unconditional. The SC reversed the decision
of the CA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Additionally, it also filed a Motion to
Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration by the Honorable Court En Banc dated November 11,
2003, alleging that the present case involves novel questions of law. The petitioners filed an
Opposition to the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration stating that no new arguments have
been proffered by the respondent to warrant the reversal of the Court’s decision.

Issue/s

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to reconveyance or repurchase of the lots in question
when the public purpose for which the eminent domain was exercised no longer subsists.

Ruling:

In the instant case of Fery Vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan which was cited in the recent case of
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, the supreme court declared that the government acquires only such
rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the
properties -

Further, If land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated. If land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon
condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons
its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision
to the contrary. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a
fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator,
whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have
the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

Hence in this particular issue the Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner and rule in favor of respondent herein. The Supreme Court reiterated what was
said in the former decision: It has been declared that the government acquires only such rights
in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties.

If land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is
ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the
purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.

126
Also, if land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition
that the city can only use it for a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is
some statutory provision to the contrary. And if, upon the contrary, however, the decree of
expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the
absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in
that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

It must be pointed out that nothing in this jurisprudence that bespeaks that there should
foremost be an express condition in the dispositive portion of the decision before the
condemned property can be returned to its former owner after the purpose for its taking has
been abandoned or ended.

The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a prior promise by the
predecessor of the respondent that the expropriated properties may be recovered by the former
owners once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu.
In fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed to their
previous owners. This belated news further bolsters the fact that the purpose for which the
properties were condemned has been abandoned. A more pressing discovery unearthed by
this Court is that a significant portion of the subject properties had been purchased by the Cebu
Property Ventures, Inc. for the development of a commercial complex. The respondent, in its
answer, did not deny this allegation in the petitioners’ complaint.

The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for public
purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of the land if the
condemning party continues to use the property for public purpose; however, if the condemning
authority ceases to use the property for a public purpose, property reverts to the owner in fee
simple. The government’s taking of private property, and then transferring it to private persons
under the guise of public use or purpose is the despotism found in the immense power of
eminent domain. Moreover, the direct and unconstitutional state’s power to oblige a landowner
to renounce his productive and invaluable possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for his own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

127
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Lozada
GR No. 176625
February 25, 2010

Nachura, J.:

Facts

Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was
Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by
Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings,
respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. The trial court ruled for
the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. However, the
projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued.

The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance
of ownership of the subject lot. On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate
dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances
to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed
for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property
notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-
respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the
petitioners argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional,
giving title in fee simple to the Republic.

Issue/s

Whether or not a constructive trust was constituted in this case, and as such, the respondents
herein are entitled to the restitution of the expropriated property which was not used for a public
purpose.

Ruling

It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent
domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose;
and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the

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nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated.

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the
expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property
owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s
right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition
that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if
this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise
of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification.

Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant case, on the question of whether
respondents were able to establish the existence of an oral compromise agreement that entitled
them to repurchase Lot No. 88 should the operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned, we
rule in the affirmative.

As provided for under Art. 1454 of the Civil Code provides: “If an absolute conveyance of
property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the
grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the Constructive trusts are
fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as
devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may not in good conscience
retain the beneficial interest.

In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustee’s sole duty
is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the
“wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must
himself do equity.” Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are
required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has
the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the
plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment of
the court, the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in
sustaining the property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his
services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit
from his acts.

The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and he beneficiary, in this case,
respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the
Civil Code, “When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to
give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they
have received. In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions
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which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the
party who is bound to return.

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. 110478
October 15, 2007

Nachura, J.:

Facts

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 110478
assails the May 27, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-
10212.

The parties herein has for its subject parcels of land forming part of what was originally known
as the Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan City and formerly owned by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) and/or the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

Sometime in the 1960’s, RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park
property on condition that they would vacate the premises if RCM to construct a school in the
area. The plan did not materialize but the occupants offered to purchase the portions they
occupied. RCAM’s proposed price was too high to afford by occupants, organizing themselves
as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the
Government through Land Tenure Administration (LTA) later succeeded by People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC), for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into
home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price. But because of the high
asking price of RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the Government, the latter’s effort to
purchase and/or to expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM then decided to effect, on
its own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the
public.

Petitioner Manapat, the defendant-landowner in C-6229, purchased the said individual

subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from RCAM and/or PRC.

The National Housing Authority (NHA), PHHC’s successor, then filed expropriation proceedings
with the Regional Trial Court over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of developing
Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for
distribution and resale at a low cost to the residents of the area.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the expropriation case and also denied the NHA’s motion for
reconsideration.

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NHA appealed to the CA the decisions on the issue of the necessity of the taking and the
amended ruling in some cases on the issue of just compensation.

On May 27, 1993, the appellate court rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212
reversing and setting aside the decisions of dismissal and in lieu thereof an order of
condemnation is entered declaring that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to take the lots
involved for the public use but annulling and setting aside the just compensation fixed by the
trial court at P180.00 per square meter in some other cases.

Petitioner Manapat elevated the case before the SC via a petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 110478. SC dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, but
reinstated it on motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ISSUANCE MADE IN THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, SPECIFYING THE LOTS TO BE EXPROPRIATED
AND THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY ARE INTENDED, REMOVES FROM THE
JUDICIARY THE DETERMINATION OF THE NECESSITY OF THE TAKING, THERE BEING
NO SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

SUPERVENING EVENT RENDERS IMPROPER THE DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS FOR AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION DECLARING THAT NHA HAS A LAWFUL
RIGHT TO TAKE THE LOT OF FERMIN MANAPAT FOR SUPPOSED PUBLIC USE AND FOR
REMAND OF HIS CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT FERMIN MANAPAT IS NOT
ONLY A BONA FIDE OCCUPANT IN THE GRACE PARK SUBDIVISION FOR PURPOSES OF
P.D. 1072 BUT LIKEWISE HAS A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 42370 OF THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CALOOCAN OVER THE SAME LOT SOUGHT TO
BE EXPROPRIATED WHICH SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK AS
DISPOSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THE EVENTUAL

BENEFICIARIES OF ITS BENEVOLENT EXPROPRIATION ARE SQUATTERS.

Ruling

The power of eminent domain or power of expropriation is an inherent and indispensable power
of the State, it is described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method "in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State." By virtue of its sovereign character, the exercise of the power
prevails over the non-impairment clause, and is clearly superior to the final and executory
judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case.

Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the
Constitution. Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, which mandates that "private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation," merely imposes a limit on the
131
government’s exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection to the individual’s
right to property. It may be delegated by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local
government units, and even to private enterprises performing public services.

The following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain: (1) the property
taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private property;
(3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of just compensation; and (5)
the taking must comply with due process of law.

It is incontrovertible that the parcels of land subject of these consolidated petitions are private
property. Thus, the first requisite is satisfied.

With respect to the second, the foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. As a rule, the determination of
whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question. However, when the
power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political
question. In the instant case, the authority to expropriate came from Presidential Decree No.
1072, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977. At that time, and as explicitly
recognized under the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos had legislative powers. Perforce, the
expropriation of the subject properties – identified with specificity in the P.D. --- was directed by
legislation. The issue of necessity then assumed the nature of a political question.

As to the third requisite of "public use," we examine the purpose for which the expropriation was
undertaken by NHA. As set forth in its petition, NHA justifies the taking of the subject property
for the purpose of improving and upgrading the area by constructing roads and installing
facilities thereon under the Government’s zonal improvement program and subdividing them
into much smaller lots for distribution and sale at a low cost to qualified beneficiaries, mostly
underprivileged long-time occupants of Grace Park. Around 510 families with approximately 5
members each will be benefited by the project.

The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being implemented for government by NHA, draws
breath from policy mandates found in the 1987 Constitution. It is an integral part of the
government’s "socialized housing" program as compliant with the "public use" requirement, it
being a program clearly devoted to a "public purpose."

"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower
class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and
other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1) and was later expanded to include among
others: (a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower
income groups of the society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and
other facilities; (b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers
as well as the provision of related facilities and services; (c) Slum improvement which consists
basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved, rearrangement
and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the construction and
provision of basic community facilities and services, where there are none, such as roads,
footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power system, schools, barangay centers, community
centers, clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities; (d) The
provision of economic opportunities, including the development of commercial and industrial
estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and (e) Such other
activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the
greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No. 757. (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)
132
Supreme Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". In
paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224, provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked
with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement
emphasize the public purpose of the project.

Petitioner Manapat insists that, being himself a beneficiary of the expropriation since he has
been a long-time resident of Grace Park, it would be incongruous for government to take his
land away from him only to give it back to him. This contention sadly fails to comprehend the
public purpose for the taking under the "socialized housing" program, and cannot assert any
right to be awarded the very same lots they currently occupy, nor be entitled to the same area of
the land they now have.

To satisfy the fourth requisite, SC affirms the appellate court’s disposition that the subject cases
be remanded to the trial court for the determination of the amount of just compensation. Under
case law, the said determination is a judicial prerogative.

As to the observance of the fifth requisite, the due process clause, in the expropriation
proceedings, all the parties have been given their day in court. That they are now before this
Court is attestation enough that they were not denied due process of law.

It is unmistakable that all the requirements for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
have been complied with. Thus, NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land. The
May 27, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 is AFFIRMED.

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Republic vs. Judge Gingoyon
G.R. No. 166429
December 19, 2005

Tinga, J:

Facts

The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the court’s decision in Agan v.
PIATCO, promulgated in 2003 (2003 decision). This decision nullified the “Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International
Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and
supplements thereto.

The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as
well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25
years. The contracts were nullified and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the
time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by
PIATCO and were near completion. HOWEVER, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status
of the NAIA 3 following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO
for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities.

After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the
possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal
into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of
negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.

In 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The
Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession
authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The
Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in
Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value
for taxation purposes. The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand,
PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply.

Issue
Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation
proceedings in this case?

Held

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The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the
Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just
compensation in accordance with the law and equity ruling in the present expropriation case
must be comfortable to the dictates of the court as pronounced in the Agan cases.

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the
national government expropriates property “for national government infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.

Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment
by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and
provides certain valuation standards of methods for the determination of just compensation.

Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the
Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3
billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4© of the law.

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National Power Corporation vs. Lucman G. Ibrahim, et.al.
GR No. 168732
June 29, 2007

Azcuna, J.:

Facts

Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, without respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took
possession of the sub-terrain area of several parcels of defendants’ lands and constructed
therein underground tunnels which were being used to siphon water from Lake Lanao and in the
operation of the Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects. The existence of the tunnels was discovered
by respondents in July 1992 and confirmed when Marawi City Water District denied the
application of one of the respondents for a permit to construct a motorized deep well on one of
the lots. Respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain
portion of their lands but the latter refused.

Thus, in November 1992, Ibrahim and co-heirs instituted an action for recovery of possession of
land and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur arguing that the
construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as Marawi
City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity and caused them sleepless nights,
serious anxiety and shock. In its answer, NAPOCOR denied the allegations of respondents and
argued mainly that respondents have no cause of action since respondents do not possess the
sub-terrain portion and the tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all private
lands are subject to such easement.

The RTC rendered its decision in August 1996: (1) denying Ibrahim, et.als. prayer for NPC to
dismantle said tunnels, (2) ordering NPC to pay Ibrahim, et.al. the fair market value of the said
lands at P1,000.00 per square meter, with 6% interest per annum from the filing of this case
until paid, (3) ordering NPC to pay reasonable monthly rental of P0.68 per square meter
effective from its occupancy of the foregoing area in 1978, and (4) awarding Php 200,000.00
moral damages and Php 200,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Ibrahim, et.al.

Ibrahim filed an urgent motion for execution pending appeal while NPC filed for a motion for
reconsideration. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and granted the motion for
execution. NPC filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC denied for having been filed out of time.
Meantime, the co-heirs of Ibrahim filed for motion for relief on judgement as they had belatedly
realized that the RTC judgement meant that NPC would be the owner of the subject parcels of
land which was never their intention. RTC granted their motion and modified its earlier
decision.

Both Ibrahim and NPC appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA set aside the
modified judgement of the RTC and restored with modification the original decision, ordering the
reduction of attorney’s fees and the removal of moral damages.

Issue/s
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1. Whether or not sub-terrain areas of a land belong to the owner of that particular land and
thus, its expropriation entitles them to just compensation.

2. Whether “taking” commences, for purposes of determining just compensation, at the time the
complaint for expropriation is filed or at the time the property was occupied by the government

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but
also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Art. 437 of
the Civil Code provides that, “The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special
laws and ordinances. xxx” Thus, Ibrahim, et. al. is entitled to just compensation.

On NPC’s contention that the underground tunnels constitute an easement upon the property of
respondents, the Supreme Court ruled that the manner in which the easement was created
violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them
and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. It further ruled that NPC could have at
any time validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire easement over the
respondent’s property. And in disregarding this procedure, petitioner took a risk and exposed
itself to greater liability with the passage of time.

As to how just compensation is computed, the Court held that that the time of taking is the
critical date in determining lawful or just compensation. Normally, the time of the taking
coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation, except where the owner would be
given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the
property expropriated. In this case, the Court determined that the parcels of land were taken
not in 1978 when the tunnels were constructed but in 1992 when respondents discovered the
construction of the huge underground tunnels beneath their lands and petitioner confirmed the
same and started negotiations for their purchase but no agreement could be reached, as its
entry in 1978 was made without color of legal authority.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA.

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Republic vs. Leodigario Sarabia, et.al.
GR No. 157847
August 25, 2005

Garcia, J.:

Facts

Sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of some
portions of Lot 6068, covering 4,901 square meters, belonging to Sarabia, et.al. The lot was
initially used as an airport parking area. In time, several structures were erected thereon,
including the control tower, the Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal and
the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group.

In 1995, stores and restaurants made of light materials were constructed on the area outside of
the ATO-occupied land. Sarabia, et.al. filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Damages before the Municipal Trial Court of Kalibo in 1997. ATO intervened in that case and
alleged that the occupants of the stores and restaurants are its lessees and assured private
respondents that they would be paid the fair market value of the subject land. However, the
parties did not agree on the amount of compensation. Thus, on June 5, 1998, the ATO filed for
expropriation of the entire Lot 6068. The trial court decided that only the portion of land
currently occupied by ATO (4,901 square meters) should be expropriated as the additional area
is not needed by ATO for public use or purpose. It also fixed just compensation based on the
current market value not at the time of the taking which was in 1956, but at the time of the
issuance of the writ of possession on November 11, 1999.

ATO appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

Issue/s

Whether “taking” commences, for purposes of determining just compensation, at the time of the
issuance of the writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings or the time of
actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that sufficient evidence exists to prove that the taking occurred
sometime in 1956, i.e., the time of actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity by
virtue of respondents’ admission.

The Supreme Court explained that the value of the property should be fixed as of the date when
it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead
of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated
its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from
the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The
owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
138
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only
the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.

However, where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property
subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

MIAA vs. Rodriguez

G.R. No. 161836
139
February 28, 2006

Tinga, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), a GOCC operating the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Complex, implemented expansion programs for its runway in the 70’s. So it
bought and occupied some of the properties surrounding the area through expropriation. In
1996, respondent lot owner proposed to sell to MIAA at P2,350.00 per square meter one of the
lots already occupied by the expanded runway. No deal was made. So respondent Rodriguez
bought the bigger lot, a portion of which was occupied by the runway, as well as all the rights to
claim reasonable rents and damages for the occupation, from its owner then, Buck Estate, Inc.,
for P4 million.

Rodriguez demanded from the MIAA full payment for the property and back rentals for 27 years,
amounting to P468.8 million. Failing to reach an agreement with MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case
for accion reinvindicatoria with damages. Finding that the MIAA had illegally taken possession of
the property, the trial court ruled respondent’s favor. The Court of Appeals modified the trial
court’s decision, holding that Rodriguez is entitled to back rentals only from the time he became
the registered owner of the property in 1996.

Issue/s

1.) Was Rodriguez a buyer in bad faith for having bought the subject lot in a highly speculative
and scheming manner, and in anticipation of a grossly disproportionate amount of profit at the
expense of the Government?

2.) Is Rodriguez entitled to exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

There is “taking” when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period
but for a more permanent duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in
such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In this
context, there was taking when the MIAA occupied a portion thereof for its expanded runway.
Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner
sought recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings,
the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling for purposes of compensation.

Thus, in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, wherein it took the owner of a parcel of
land thirty-five (35) years before she filed a case for recovery of possession taken by the local
government unit for a road-right-of-way purpose, this Court held:

140
…there being no other legal provision cited which would justify a departure from the rule that
just compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the
taking thereof in expropriation by the Government, not the increased value resulting from the
passage of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents
the true value to be paid as just compensation for the property taken.

The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that —

". . . (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff
upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural
increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses.

The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA starting in 1972. Thus, the value of the
lot in 1972 should serve as the basis for the award of compensation to the owner.

On actual damages for the occupation of the subject lot, undeniably, the MIAA’s illegal
occupation for more than 20 years has resulted in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his
predecessors-in-interest. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the
form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%)
on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA.
This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of
the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the
taking. Case laws ruled that the indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property owner’s
right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay the
compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment
of such compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property, and hence,
there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking.

On buyer in bad faith, the point is irrelevant. Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in
bad faith, all that he will be entitled to is the value of the property at the time of the taking, with
legal interest thereon from that point until full payment of the compensation by the MIAA. There
is nothing wrongful or dishonest in expecting to profit from one’s investment. However,
Rodriguez can fault but only himself for taking an obvious risk in purchasing property already
being used for a public purpose. To our mind, these are wanton and irresponsible acts which
should be suppressed and corrected.

Hence, the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order.

Manila Electric Company vs. Pineda

GR No. L-59791
February 13, 1992
141
Medialdea, J.:

Facts

Respondent , the honorable Gregorio G. Pineda adjudge in favor of Teofilo Arayon, Sr. Lucito
Santiago, Teresita Bautista and Atty. Gil de Guzman the fair market value of their property taken
by MERALCO plus consequential damages in terms of attorney’s fee.

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) strongly maintain that the respondent court’s
act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondent without
formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of property constituting a
flagrant violation of petitioner’s constitutional right.

Issue/s

Whether or not the respondent court can dispense in an expropriation proceeding and
determine for itself the just compensation.

Ruling

Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper
reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. In an expropriation case such as this
one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least
three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the
findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of
the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, thus, trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no
reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be
disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that
may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the
respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is
incompetent to determine just compensation.

In view of the above, Supreme Court is convinced respondent judge's act of determining and
ordering the payment of just compensation without the proper assistance of a Board of
Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a
gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

Estate of JBL Reyes vs. City of Manila

GR No. 132431
February 13, 2004

Corona, J.:

142
Facts

The case is a petition for review and certiorari filed by the heirs of J.B.L. Reyes against
respondent Court of Appeals and City of Manila et.al. The case esteemed from the decision of
the C.A. for the issuance of protective custody in favor of respondent on the contested 11
parcels of land owned by the petitioner situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila with a total land
area of 13, 940 square meters and covered by TCT no. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds,
Manila.

The land in question was initially occupied and leased by different tenants, among them are
respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakabitbahay,
Incorporated (SBMI). On May 9, 1994, petitioners obtained a favorable judgments against Abiog
pursuant to the decision rendered by the MTC Manila, Branch 3 in Civil Case No 142851-CV
and against Maglonso in Civil Case No. 144205-CV on May 4, 1995. While the case is under
adjudication, the respondents City of Manila intervenes and file a complaint for imminent domain
(expropriation) on April 25, 1995 based on its approved Ordinance No 7818 enacted on
November 29, 1993 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 9,930 square meters, more or less. It argued that the purpose of
expropriation is for a socialize housing project of the city which would otherwise benefit its
underprivileged and homeless citizens. However, petitioner turned down the offer on various
reasons among them, the failure of both to arrive at an amicable offer for the settlement of the
case.

Issue/s

1. Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue the protective order despite the finality of order
rendered by the trial court?

2. Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property without due process of law?

3. Whether the respondent City of Manila complied with the legal requirements for expropriation
provided under Section 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279?

Ruling

RA 7279 Sections 9 states the order of priority in the acquisition of property subject of any
expropriation intended for public purpose. Section 10 thereof, made a significant
pronouncement that “the expropriation may be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted: xxx underscoring supplied”. Before respondent City can exercise its
power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned and must not violate any law.
Reiterating the provision of R.A. 7279, it would bear stressing that private lands rank last in the
order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings
are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.

Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of
oftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when their
property is forcibly taken from them for public use. The state in its paramount interest of
promoting public good and general welfare cannot simply ignore the rights of its citizens and
143
such must take precedence over the interest of private property owners. Individual rights
affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the
exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law
to owners of the property to be expropriated. Due to the fatal infirmity in the City’s exercise of
the power of eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation was turned down by the court.
Petitions granted and decision of C.A. was reversed and set aside.

Lagcao vs. Judge Labra

GR No. 155746
October 13, 2004

Corona, J.:

Facts
144
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot
1029.

In 1965, petitioners purchased said Lot on installment basis. On the same year, all the 210 lots
was reverted to Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot
1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners, hence this case.

On July 9, 1986, the Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the
Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of the petitioners. Said decision was
affirmed by CA on June 11, 1992. As petitioners acquired the title for Lot 1029, they discovered
that there were squatters occupying the subject property. As a consequence, they filed for
Ejectment proceedings against the squatters. On April 1, 1998, The Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision ordering the squatters to vacate the
lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order
of demolition.

When Writ of Demolition about to be implemented, the Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two
letters, having deferment of said ejection as its contention on the ground that no relocation site
has yet been ready for the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two
orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days. However, during the pendency, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of
Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029.

Accordingly, the petitioners negated said Ordinance and filed a Notice of Appeal.

Issue/s

Did the City of Cebu violate the Constitution when they enacted Ordinance No. 1843 as it
sanctions the expropriation of petitioners’ property?

Ruling

Court nullified the subject ordinance for four grounds; these are:

1. The enactment of the said ordinance was in a manner hasty so as to evade the pending
ejection of squatters. The Execution of said ejection as it underwent due process is the rightful
proceeding to be enforced.

2. The fact that petitioners’ small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of
awarding it to no more than a few squatters – a clear picture of what is not “intended for public
use” but for only a few.

3. There was no reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the
objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it
employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the
circumstances.
4. The questioned ordinance is against pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA
7160.
145
More so, local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature.

Thus, the petition is granted.

Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc.,
GR No. 175983
April 16, 2009

Tinga, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is a government-owned and controlled corporation

and among its purposes are to acquire, install, improve, maintain and operate water supply and

146
distribution systems within the boundaries of the District. Petitioner wanted to acquire a five (5)-
square meter lot occupied by its production well. The lot is part of respondent’s property
covered by TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioner initiated negotiations
with respondent J. King and Sons Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale of the latter’s property.
Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioner’s proposal. After the negotiations had failed,
petitioner pursuant to its charter initiated expropriation proceedings which was duly approved
by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On 10 November 2004, petitioner filed a
complaint to expropriate the five (5)-square meter portion of respondent’s property.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner
wanted to tender the amount to respondent during a rescheduled hearing which petitioner’s
counsel had failed to attend. Petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of
P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the current zonal value of the property
which the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion and issued the writ of possession. Respondent
moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. It sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus,
petitioner was not able to gain entry to the lot.

On 26 July 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting respondent’s
petition. It ruled that the board resolution which authorized the filing of the expropriation
complaint lacked exactitude and particularity which made it invalid; that there was no genuine
necessity for the expropriation of the five (5)-square meter lot and; that the reliance on Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8974 in fixing the value of the property contravenes the judicial determination of
just compensation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was rejected.

Issue:

Whether the procedure in obtaining a writ of possession was properly observed.

Ruling:

The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to
take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes
of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment
of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated to entitle
the plaintiff to a writ of possession. In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages, first, is
the determination of the validity of the expropriation, and second is the determination of just
compensation.

Thus, the determination of the necessity of the expropriation is a justifiable question which can
only be resolved during the first stage of an expropriation proceeding. Respondent’s claim that
the expropriated property is too small to be considered for public use can only be resolved
during that stage. Further, the Court of Appeals ruled that Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 runs
counter to the express mandate of Section 2 of Rule 67. It held that the law undermined the
principle that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. R.A. No. 8974 does
not take away from the courts the power to judicially determine the amount of just
147
compensation. The law merely sets the minimum price of the property as the provisional value.
Thus, the amount of just compensation must still be determined by the courts according to the
standards set forth in Section 55 of R.A. No. 8974.

R.A. No. 8974 provides a different scheme for the obtention of a writ of possession. The law
does not require a deposit with a government bank; instead it requires the government to
immediately pay the property owner. The provisional character of this payment means that it is
not yet final, yet, sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over
the expropriated property. The provisional payment is a prerequisite and a trigger for the
issuance of the writ of possession. Petitioner was supposed to tender the provisional payment
directly to respondent during a hearing which it had failed to attend. Petitioner, then, deposited
the provisional payment with the court. The trial court did not commit an error in accepting the
deposit and in issuing the writ of possession.

The deposit of the provisional amount with the court is equivalent to payment. Indeed, Section 4
of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that “upon compliance with the guidelines…the court
shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property
and start the implementation of the project.”Under this statutory provision, when the
government, its agencies or government-owned and controlled corporations, make the required
provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. It is
mandatory on the trial court’s part to issue the writ of possession and on the sheriff’s part to
deliver possession of respondent’s property to petitioner pursuant to the writ.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 26 July 2006 and Resolution dated 28
September 2006 are REVERSED. The ORDERS of the Regional Trial Court dated 01 April
2005 and 9 May 2005 are hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is further DIRECTED
to immediately REMIT the amount of P17,500.00 to respondent and to REQUIRE the sheriff
to implement the writ of possession. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

Republic v Lim
G.R. 161656
June 29, 2005

Sandoval- Gutierrez, J.:

Facts

In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for certiorari of a land in Lahug, Cebu City
for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were
registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the

148
PNB then took position of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4, 062.10 as just compensation.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for
rentals for the two lots, bit it “denied knowledge of the matter”. On Sept. 6, 1961 Lt. Cabal
rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a
reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the Denzon’s successors-in-interest, Valdehueza
and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against
the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.

On July, 1962, the CFI promulgated its decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio but in view
of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the
Republic. Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim as
security for their loans which subsequently been foreclosed and the title was issued to his
name.

Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as
the owner of Lot 932.

Issue

Whether or not the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay the
respondent’s predecessor-in-interest the just compensation.

Ruling

While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private land-owner to recover possession of the expropriated lots” however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of the judgment in
the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession
of the property.

Therefore, the Republic cannot acquire ownership over Lot 932 because it has not paid its
owner the just compensation required by law for more than 50 years. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just.

LBP v Wycoco
G.R. 140160
January 13, 2004

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts

149
Feliciano Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare rice land. In the with the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell
the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. Afterwards, a
notice to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property to the amount of P2, 280,159.82 was sent to
Wycoco. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,(DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation
in a summary administration proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB Requested the LBP to open a
trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR and said
property was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries. Wycoco, however, forego in filing an
instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City.

Issue

Whether or not the fair market value alone could be the basis for evaluation of just
compensation.

Ruling

While market value may be one of the basis of determining just compensation, the same cannot
be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair
market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its
size, shape, location as well as the tax declaration thereon. Since these factors were not
considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary,

People vs. Tomaquin

GR No. 133188
July 23, 2004

Austria-Martinez, J.:

Facts

The accused-appelant was charged with murder. On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded

“not guilty” to the charge, and trial thereafter ensued. After trial, accused was found guilty. There
150
were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s
extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in
the presence of a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Appellant questions the admissibility of
the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Accused-appellant
contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent
counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue/s

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance of a
barangay captain, is admissible in evidence against him.

Ruling

No. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: (1) Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and
ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:

ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as
such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent
counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and
therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who
was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be
considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial
confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict
of interest.

151
People vs. Taliman
G.R. NO. 109143
October 11, 2000

Pardo, J.:

Facts

The accused-appellants Sgt. Pedro Taliman, C1C Basilio Baybayan were members of the
Constabulary/ Integrated National Police Command, and Amando Belano. The victim was
Renato Cuano. Prosecution witness Ernesto Lacson was the uncle and employer of Renato,
who was the caretaker of his gravel and sand truck. Lacson instructed Renato to take his
passenger jeep and to proceed in Nalisbitan to get his collectibles. That was the last time
Lacson saw the victim. Elizer, employee of Lason and a prosecution witness, was instructed by
152
Lacson to go to Nalisbitan were he saw the accused take Renato. A custodial investigation
was conducted on July 23, 1990. Atty. Nicolas V. Pardo, Mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte, went
to the Police station upon invitation of Police corporal Cereno to “assist” accused during their
investigation. The accused, executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the commission of
the crime. It was during this custodial investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin confessed to
prosecution witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he participated in the killing of Renato because
the latter did not give them the money they were demanding. This confession was given without
the assistance of counsel and was not reduced to writing. On February 26, 1991, the accused
were arraigned and pleaded “not guilty”.

The accused-appellants was found by the court guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder
as charged, and are hereby each sentence to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue/s

Whether or not Extra-Judicial confessions executed by the accused is a basis for conviction.

Ruling

On appeal, the accused-appellants submit that the extra-judicial confessions on which the trial
court relied were inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in violation of their
constitutional rights. The court agrees with accused –appellants on this point. The extra-judicial
statements alone cannot be a basis for conviction, as provided by Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution.

Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their
investigation. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense
of the accused without running into conflict of interest. Even assuming that the right to counsel
was orally waived during investigation, still the defect was not cured. The Constitution expressly
provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. This, accused-
appellants did not do.

However, while the court agree that the extra-judicial statements of the accused are
inadmissible in evidence, there is still sufficient evidence to convict. The Court affirmed the
decision with Modification. In the absence of proof as to how the killing was perpetrated, the
crime committed was homicide and are sentenced the accused to prision mayor, as minimum
and reclusion temporal, as maximum.

153
People vs. Purazo
GR No. 133189
May 5, 2003

Bellosillo, J.:

Facts

On November 24, 1997, Solomon Purazo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial
court of rape perpetrated against his own twelve (12) - year old daughter ROWENA. He was
sentenced to death, with the accessory penalty provided by law and ordered him to indemnify
his victim P100, 000.00 for moral damages. Hence, this automatic appeal in view of the death
penalty imposed by the court a quo.

Issue/s

154
Imposition of the death penalty as punishment for the crime of rape to the accused’ minor
daughter.

Ruling

The rape committed by the accused on his own 11-year old daughter is indisputably qualified by
minority and relationship. Accordingly, the penalty of death could thus be decreed in the instant
case. However, Sec. 2, Rep. Act No. 7659, amending article 47 of the Revised Penal Code,
recognizes that in death penalty cases, the high tribunal puts to a vote not only the issue of the
guilt of the accused, but also on the imposition of the death sentence itself. The law provides –

“when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme court, the required majority
vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.”

Hence, there may be circumstances to warrant such forbearance. Thus in People vs Roque,
where this court upheld the conviction of the accused for two counts of rape, the death penalty
imposed by the trial court was reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The court is convinced of the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for the crime with
which he has been charged but, considering that the case is on all fours with People vs Roque,
where the complaining sisters were raped several times over a period of two (2) years by their
father who was charged only with two (2) counts, the court have no choice but to follow case
law. Likewise, the court therefore vote to reduce the death penalty imposed by the trial court to
reclusion perpetua.

In Conformity with the prevailing Jurisprudence, the judgment of the Regional trial court of Cebu
City finding accused SOLOMON PURAZO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of incestuous rape is
AFFIRMED with the modification that accused is sentenced instead to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay Rowena Purazo the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Ivler v San Pedro
GR 172716
November 17, 2010

Carpio, J:

Facts:

Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trail Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with
two separate offenses: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injury for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline Ponce, and Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of Mrs. Ponce’s spouse and the damage to their vehicle,
after a vehicular accident which occurred in August 2004.

Petitioner posted bail.

155
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded guilty and was meted out for public censure. Petitioner,
then, filed a motion to quash the information for the second offense stating that proceeding with
the second criminal case was a violation of his constitutional right against Double Jeopardy.

The Metropolitan Trial court refused the quashal, finding the offenses filed against petitioner
distinct. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Pasig Regional Trial Court, and
continued to seek from the Metropolitan Trial Court suspension of the second criminal case
proceeding and the postponement of his arraignment until after his arrest. However, MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and cancelled petitioner’s bail and ordered his arrest. Seven
Days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. RTC
affirmed MeTC’s decision. Petitioner, then, filed a petition for review of the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
the second criminal case against him.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court and dismissed the
information on the second case filed against the petitioner on the ground of Double Jeopardy.

Rationale

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend
in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations(sic) with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed
the second case.

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible
substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
…

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
156
do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO, JAIME OCHOA, all of
the National Power Corporation, and RAUL GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas, Alias George
Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo (At large), Accused. JAIME OCHOA, Appellant.

Facts:

This is an appeal before the Supreme Court by the accused-appellant Jaime Ochoa
who found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of
Malversation thru falsification of Commercial Document and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is
P183,805,291.25 solidarily with co-accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., who is acquitted of
the same crime but is civilly liable for the damages suffered by the National Power

157
Corporation. An alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul
Nicolas, alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo who is at large.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant Jaime Ochoa has deprived of his constitutional
right?

Held:

No. The accused-appellant has accorded his constitutional right.

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED in all respects the May 28, 2002 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan.

The contention of the accused-appellant as regards to the custodial investigation

provided in the Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in this
case. Custodial Investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner. In the case at bar, the appellant’s statement was
taken during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team and not the law
enforcement authorities.

With the argument of disclaiming the authenticity of the sworn statement, appellant
insists that at the time he signed the documents he was confined in the hospital and
therefore not physically and mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This
pretext however collides with the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita Sadava,
who stated that appellant was confined for three days and, who, when queried whether
“ischemic heart disease” had any emotional or psychological effect, gave the
inconclusive reply that it "may or may not." Moreover, as aptly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the alleged
falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is supposedly astute in business
matters as he then occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of the NPC,
nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another affidavit retracting the same after his
recovery from illness. Verily, evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself – such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.

Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the transcript of
stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially. The record,
however, shows that the prosecution presented the team leader of the NBI investigators
who conducted the investigation, although his testimony was dispensed with as the
parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of the NBI Investigation report
albeit without admitting the truth of its contents. If at all, the admission of the report’s
existence is an acknowledgment that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit.
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Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA); Agusan Del Norte
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I); and
Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I), petitioners,
Vs.
The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, and the Secretary,
Department of Finance, respondents.

Facts:

This is a petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance
of temporary restraining order seeking to annul as unconstitutional sections 193 and 234 of R.A.
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

On May 23, 2000, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other
electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who are members of petitioner
PHILRECA. Accordingly, Section of P.D. No. 269 provides assistance to Cooperatives which
shall be exempt from the payment of all National Government, local government and municipal
taxes and fees and of all duties or imposts on foreign goods acquired for its operations. In
addition, Philippine Government entered into six (6) loan agreements with the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries to
finance the electrification project. The said loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions
on the tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the proceeds
of the loan. As per 6.5 of A.I.D. Loan, the loan provided for herein shall be free from and the
Principal and interest shall be paid to A.D. without deduction for and free from, any taxation or
fees imposed under any laws or decrees in effect within the Philippine Government.

Petitioners contend that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, as amended, and with the
provision in the loan agreements they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including

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payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they
allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground that the said provisions
discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they submit that
the said provisions are unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between
the Philippine Government and the U.S. Government.

On July 25, 2000, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code are
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause?
2. Whether or not the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sections 193 and
234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners are unconstitutional for
violating the non-impairment clause?

Held:

1. No, there is no violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause
under the Constitution means that “no person or class or persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable, must rest on substantial distinctions; be germane to the purposes of the law;
not be limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to all members of the same
class. In the instant case, there is reasonable classification under the Local Government
Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D.
No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.

First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at
least two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A.
No. 6938 and which characteristics are not present in the type or cooperative
associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.

Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is

germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power
by local government is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government
unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its
broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing powers of
local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy. Section 193 of the
Local Government Code is indicative of the legislative intent to vest broad taxing powers
upon local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities
specifically provided therein. As provided in Section 234, the Local Government Code
enumerates entities which are exempt therefrom and withdraws exemptions enjoyed by
all other entities with respect to real property taxes.

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, the Court held that the limited
and restrictive nature of the tax exemption privileges under the Local Government Code
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 is consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to enable local government units
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. The obvious intention of the law is to
broaden the tax base of local government units to assure them of substantial sources of
revenue.

Finally, Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code permit reasonable
classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply
equally to all members of the same class. Exemptions from local taxation, including real
property tax, are granted all cooperatives covered by Ra. No. 6938 and such exemptions
exist for as long as the Local Government Code and the provisions there in on local
taxation remain good law.

2. No, there is no violation of the non-impairment clause. The constitutional prohibition on

the impairment of the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing
laws. To fall within the prohibition, the impairment must be substantial. In Clemons v.
Nothing, “ a law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in
the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those
expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the
parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties.”

Section 6.5 provision shows that it does not grant any tax exemption in favor of the
borrower or the beneficiary either on the proceeds of the loan itself or the properties
acquired through the said loan. It simply states that the loan proceeds and the principal
and interest of the loan, upon repayment by the borrower, shall be without deduction of
any tax or fee that may be payable under Philippine law as such tax or fee will be
absorbed by the borrower with funds other than the loan proceeds. The import of the tax
provision does not purport to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the
contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift that tax burden,
if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary
of the loan. Thus the withdrawal by the Local Government code under Sections 193 and
234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the
obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as in
fact, no tax is granted therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining order issued is LIFTED.

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People v Rapezo
G.R. No. 169431
April 3, 2007
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 149891-92]

Facts

This is a case filed by the appellant Jerry Rapeza before the Supreme Court from the decision
dated 1 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals affirming the consolidated judgment dated 24 July
2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Palawan, Puerto Princesa city in Criminal Case Nos.
13064 and 13202. The appellant Rapeza found guilty of two (2) counts of murder and
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus a sum of money as
indemnity for the heirs of the two (2) victims.

In the afternoon of 21 October 1995, an unidentified woman went to the Culion Municipal
Station and reported a killing that had taken place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Barangay Osmeña,
Culion, Palawan. The officer-in-charge, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas, sent to the victims’ house which
was the scene of the crime an investigating team led by SPO2 Crisanto Cuizon, Jr. and PO2
Isidro Macatangay. There they saw two bloodied bodies, that of a woman lying on the floor of
the sala and that of a man inside the bedroom. The investigating team wrapped the bodies in
blankets and loaded them in a banca to be brought to the morgue. The victims were later
identified as Priscilla Libas and Cesar Ganzon. Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela
Cruz that appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look for
appellant. He found appellant fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning.

Issue

Whether or not the appellant (the accused) has accorded the due process of law during the
custodial investigation?

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Held

No, the accused has denied the due process of law during the custodial investigation.

The Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan, Puerto Princesa City in Criminal
Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.. No. 00642 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Rapeza is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence
leading to reasonable doubt. The SC has found the following insufficiencies committed by the
Police Officers during the custodial investigation:

1. Appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights in custodial investigation. A

person under custodial investigation essentially has the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the Constitution
requires that he be informed of such rights.

In the case at bar, the appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was
"invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in
the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his
extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been
informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to
the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached
when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in
the house of Atty. Reyes.

2. Confession was not made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel of
appellant’s choice.
Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the moment he was
arrested until before he was arraigned. On the other hand, the prosecution admits that
appellant was provided with counsel only when he was questioned at the house of Atty.
Reyes to which appellant was allegedly taken from the police station.

SPO2 Gapas testified that he "talked" to appellant when they got to the police station at
11 o’clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 and the result of their "talk" was that
appellant would give his confession in the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then held
in the police station overnight before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes.

The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that
the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not
make any such waiver.

Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to
his competence and independence as appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial
investigation. The meaning of "competent counsel" and the standards therefore were
explained in People v. Deniega as follows:
The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is important that he should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would be merely be giving a routine,
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 peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In People v.
Basay, this Court stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain
silent and to counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."

3. Confession is not voluntary. The confession contains facts and details which appear to
have been supplied by the investigators themselves.

The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its
face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details—which could only be supplied by the accused–
reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. The trial court
applied this rule but without basis.
On closer examination of the evidence, the key details in the alleged confession were
provided not by appellant but by the police officers themselves. The prosecution failed to
establish the actual date of the killings. SPO2 Gapas testified that he received a report of
the killing on 21 October 1995 and sent a team to investigate the incident. On direct
examination, he declared that two days after the commission of the crime, he received
information that appellant would give his confession in front of a lawyer. However, on
cross-examination, he stated that it was on the following day or on 22 October 1995
when he found appellant and invited him to the police station and that appellant’s
custodial investigation had taken place on 23 October 1995.

4. Confession was not sufficiently corroborated. As appellant is unschooled and was not
familiar with the Tagalog dialect, his confession which was in Tagalog necessarily had to
be read and translated to Waray allegedly by Abad. The SC has held that "such a
multiple process of reading and translating the questions and translating and typing the
answers and reading and translating again the said answers is naturally pregnant with
possibilities of human, if unintentional, inadequacies and incompleteness which render
the said confession unsafe as basis of conviction for a capital offense, unless sufficiently
corroborated." A confession may be admissible if it is shown to have been read and
translated to the accused by the person taking down the statement and that the accused
fully understood every part of it. SPO2 Gapas’ testimony cannot be accepted as regards
the contents of appellant’s alleged confession for being hearsay evidence thereon. Since
appellant allegedly made the confession to SPO2 Gapas through Abad, Abad’s
testimony is thus indispensable in order to make the confession admissible.

5. No motive could be ascribed to appellant. In People v. Aguilar, “the absence of apparent

motive to commit the offense charged would, upon principles of logic, create a
presumption of the innocence of the accused, since, in terms of logic, an action without a
motive would be an effect without a cause.” In the case at bar, the appellant’s conduct
after the killings was not that of a guilty person. He never attempted to flee even if he
knew that the police authorities were already investigating the incident as he was
summoned to help load the bodies in a banca. Being a transient in the place, he could
have easily disappeared and left the island but he remained there to continue looking for
work. These circumstances generate serious doubts that must be resolved in
appellant’s favor, congruently with the constitutional presumption of innocence.

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