1. GARCIA V.

COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with
the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to their power
of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said
resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a
letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event in February 1986.
The new Constitution became less trusting of public officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides
amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voter therein.
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.


2. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which
created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy
turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 199.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ
including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities
for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that
public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which
governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10.
2. Whether or not the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact;
whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an
INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the
Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The COMMISSION labeled the exercise as a
"Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called
"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And
yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills
and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and
referendum, the COMELEC exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.
The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an
approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people
reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it
has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented
thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the
proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality"
or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about
the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution
No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court
could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

3. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board

In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator
must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the qualifications of Senators.
HELD: Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The
provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test. Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require
a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

4. Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC GR 133495
September 3, 1998
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was
elected Mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected Mayor for
another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought
Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would already have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC ruled in favor of
Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of
office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.
Capco won in the elections against Borja.
Issue:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:
The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for which the official concerned was elected. If
he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds,
such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to
its expiration. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of
Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-
mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy.
In a real sense, therefore, such representative serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have served
the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third
time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they
wish to govern them. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that the term of office of elective local officials shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that no local elective
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not
serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.

5. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the
party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system
of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require
parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats
for concerned party


Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.


Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with
at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of
seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of
its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled
to, based on proportional representation.





6. BANAT V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National Board of
Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to
declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to
proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of
the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is constitutional
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

RULING:
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold
only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or
a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.


7. G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec


Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the
pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.


Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.


Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised
is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it
justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid
desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a
trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court
decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court
ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.



8. BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC
404 SCRA 719
FACTS: Bagong Bayani and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or over represented.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
HELD:
1. Yes. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA
7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. "Furthermore, under
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its
part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties."
. No. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any 2political party -- or
any organization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of
the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.

Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for
new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are
as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political
parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral
wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well -
defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were
drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to
include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty.
(In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and
that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies.
The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors
that by their nature areeconomically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined
political constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.


Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC
in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In
2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations. Until the
time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to
the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. That the Philippines cannot
ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said
religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms. COMELEC reiterated that petitioner
does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the
COMELEC to grant petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all
persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

BELLO V. COMELEC
Consolidated Case December 7, 2010
G.R. No. 191998, G.R. No. 192769, G.R. No. 192832

FACTS:
Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) on November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
its Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. In order not to be disqualified, they must prove that
the party-list group and the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent.
Mikey Arroyo was one of the partys nominees. Here arose several questions regarding his qualification for, he is not only
a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arroyo duly represents the marginalized sector he is representing; and

Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs nominee after his proclamation
and assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives.
HELD:

1. It held, among others, that a Filipino citizen, in order to qualify as a party-list nominee, only needs to be a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent, for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and must likewise be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. The COMELEC en banc
also held that Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807 is ultra vires, since the requirement that a nominee belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector he seeks to represent is not found in RA 7941.Thus, it concluded that Arroyo
possessed all the requirements mandated by Section 9 of RA 7941.

2. This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court. The consistent judicial holding is that the
HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity
directly voted upon was their party. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.
\
Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC
Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA
9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
first district ofMaguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting
the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201.
On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City prayed for the nullification of
Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that
Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 ofArt.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in
the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite
in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict
arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement
in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of Congress can create
provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the House of
Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than 250,000
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of
the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.Congress
exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative
bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and is
thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created
it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must
be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised
by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every
province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of the
Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only within its territorial
jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative
districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative
district whose representative is elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.


SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that
requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district
in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about
the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.


9. Layug vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Layug petitioned for the disqualification of Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and
Brother Mike from being its nominee for the following reasons:

1. Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is
disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution,

as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act.
2. Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El
Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as
required of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May
10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections

: Buhays contention was that Buhay Party-List is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the
qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the handicapped, as
well as the professionals, and Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group.
They likewise argued that nominees from a political party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from the
marginalized and underrepresented sector.

:COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers for Party-List, proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a
winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike
was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.

ISSUE: W/N the Court has jurisdiction to hear the case even if it was stated in Sec. 17, Art VI that HRET a shall be the
sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their members

HELD: Affirmative. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected from
legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.

In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that
went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng.

On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member
of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications.

Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law,
specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may
motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx.

Thus, it is the SC, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
has jurisdiction to hear the case.




Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in
St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together
in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor
of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of
the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the
First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her
father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and
concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean
the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the
constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to
the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the
residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos
after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their
marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations.
When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to
transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the
wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when
she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot,
Leyte.

(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election Code had
already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr.
De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the petitioners
qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.

Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former dictator, her domicile became subject
to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and
has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner vs Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and
JuanitoIcaro, Respondents
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any
challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so
vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates t hat all
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to
a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution
that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of
Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6,
Art.VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove
that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At
that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion,
Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does notengender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts. To successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
originshould be deemed to continue.

Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino
from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in
the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the
1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes ofelection law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated
by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not
just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in
which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered
voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that
Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile
of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the
area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac
and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is
not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next
highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the
May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to
the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite
its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the
Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary
to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of
Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the
petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a
loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage
of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as
a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.





RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]


NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The
Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act
No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity
by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a
similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67,
an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for
reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on
appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into
law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides
that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as
jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been
repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a
seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective
certificates of candidacy.


ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes
effective.


HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67
of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials
who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court
has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to
be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the
Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal
of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the
Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this
Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in
short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding
the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is
achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect immediately upon
its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid
down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period
shall be shortened or extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its
express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not
involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative
branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the
court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such
transgression has been shown in this case.