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Pagan Dawn of A Christian Vision
Pagan Dawn of A Christian Vision
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Vertical Readings in Dante's Comedy
George Corbett
Each of the three opening cantos of the Comedy begins with an attempted
journey that ends in failure. In Inferno i, Dante gazes up at the sun’s rays
which light up the mountain he then attempts to climb; impeded by the
three beasts, he returns to the wood from whence he came, where the sun is
silent. In Purgatorio i, the predawn rise of the planet Venus (‘lo bel pianeto’)
inspires Dante who, leaving the cruel sea behind him, aims to climb the
mountain of Purgatory; interrogated by Cato, Dante is sent back to the
seashore where he is washed and girded with a rush by Virgil. In Paradiso i,
Dante attempts to fix his eyes on the sun; he has to give up, however, after
a short while. On an allegorical reading of the poem, the sun primarily
represents God and movement upwards represents movement towards
God.2 These three attempts and failures are, therefore, three attempts and
failures to journey towards God.
What is striking, then, is that on each of these three occasions when
Dante initially fails in his journey to God, he is helped not – as we might
expect in a Christian poem depicting the three realms of the Christian
afterlife – by an angel, a saint or a passage of Scripture but, rather, by a
pagan or by distinctively classical philosophy. The pagan poet-philosopher
Virgil comes to Dante’s rescue in the dark wood in Inferno i and undertakes
1 The video of this lecture is available at the Cambridge Vertical Readings in Dante’s
Comedy website, https://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1366614
2 The symbolic function of the sun to signify God was, of course, a commonplace of the
medieval imagination. In the Convivio (III. xii. 6-7), Dante highlights the distinction
between the corporeal sun and the spiritual sun (God) to illustrate the literal and spiritual
ways of reading his philosophical poems.
[While I was falling down into a low place, before my eyes one had
offered himself to me who through long silence seemed hoarse. When
I saw him in the great wilderness, ‘Miserere – on me’, I cried to him,
‘whatever you may be, whether shade or true man!’]
In the penultimate canto of the Comedy, Dante refers to King David, the
author of the Psalms, as ‘[il] cantor che per doglia / del fallo disse “Miserere
mei”’ [the singer who, grieving at his sin, said ‘Miserere mei’] (Par., xxxii.
11-12). Like King David, Dante is a sinner turned singer. And the first
words of Dante-character in the poem – in a strange conflation of vulgate
Latin (‘Miserere’) and vernacular Italian (‘di me’) – echo the opening of King
David’s penitential psalm. And yet, peculiarly, Dante-character’s addressee
is not God but, rather, he ‘who through long silence seemed hoarse’ (l. 63).
This circumlocution is puzzling because it does not seem possible that a
person, although silent, may appear hoarse. A traditional interpretation is
that the, as yet unidentified, interlocutor initially represents the voice of
3 See, for example, Michele Barbi, gloss to Inf., i. 63 ‘fioco’, in La Divina Commedia, ed. by
Michele Barbi (Milan: Ulrico Hoepli, 1946).
4 Inf., xi. 80: ‘la tua Etica’; xi. 101: ‘la tua Fisica’; xi. 97: ‘Filosofia’. Giovanni Busnelli argues
that the reference to philosophy must refer specifically to Aristotle’s Metaphysics and
not to Aristotelian philosophy in general (see Giovanni Busnelli, L’Etica Nicomachea e
l’ordinamento morale dell’Inferno di Dante (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1907), p. 128).
[He replied: ‘Not a man, I was formerly a man, and my parents were
Lombards, Mantuans both by birth. I was born sub Iulio, though it was
late, and I lived in Rome under the good Augustus in the time of the false
and lying gods. I was a poet, and I sang of that just son of Anchises who
came from Troy, when proud Ilion was destroyed by fire’.]
5 Virgil, Aen., I. 278-79: ‘His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono: / imperium sine fine
dedi’.
6 As Dante exclaims in the opening of his work of political theory, Monarchia, what would
be the point of attempting to describe the nature of human happiness when this has
already been done, and superlatively so, by Aristotle: ‘qui ab Aristotile felicitatem
ostensam reostendere conaretur’ (Mon., I. i. 4).
7 In the opening of Convivio IV, for example, Dante defends both the political authority of
the Holy Roman Emperor (Conv., IV. iv-v) and the ethical authority of the philosopher
(Conv., IV. vi).
8 For Augustine’s specific condemnation of Cato’s suicide see, for example, De civitate
Dei I. 22-24 (23). For a fuller discussion of the theological problem of Cato’s suicide,
see John A. Scott, ‘Cato, A Pagan Suicide in Purgatory’, in Dante’s Political Purgatory
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), pp. 69-84. For a more general
survey, see Alexander Murray, Suicide in the Middle Ages, 2 vols, II, The Curse on Self-
Murder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For Augustine’s critique of pagan virtue,
see, for example, Contra Iulianum, IV. 3. 21. For a fuller discussion, see Etienne Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. by L.E.M. Lynch (London: Victor Gollancz,
1961). Gilson comments that, for Augustine, human nature ‘is only the historical remains
of a divine order corrupted by sin’ (p. 239). Pagan virtues are contaminated and not ‘true
virtues’ since they are not correctly ordered towards God.
[‘Now may it please you to favour his coming: he seeks freedom, which
is so precious, as one knows who rejects life for her sake. You know it;
for to you, because of her, death was not bitter in Utica, when you left the
raiment that will be so bright on the great day’.]
Why does Dante adopt this apparently heretical position (‘quae videtur
sapere haeresim’)?10 Why this choice, and exaltation, of the pagan Roman
Cato?
Most straightforwardly, Dante’s representation of Cato of Utica follows
Roman classical sources with scant regard for, or reference to, subsequent
Christian critique. For Cicero and Seneca, Cato is the quintessential model
and pattern of virtue.11 Eulogised by Lucan, Cato serves as the custodian
of the Elysian fields in Virgil’s Aeneid.12 Despite scepticism in the Church
fathers, this view persists in the medieval reception of Cato. It is epitomised
by the pedagogical text mis-attributed during the medieval period to Cato
of Utica amongst others, the Disticha Catonis. Dante’s own eulogy of Cato
serves, however, an urgent ethical and political purpose. Cato comes to
9 See also Mon., II. v. 15: ‘illud inenarrabile sacrifitium severissimi libertatis tutoris Marci
Catonis’; and Lucan, Phars., II, 302-03: ‘tuumque / Nomen, Libertas, et inanem prosequar
umbram’.
10 See Benvenuto, gloss to Purg., i. 28-33, Dartmouth Dante Project (http://dante.dartmouth.
edu/): ‘Et quia hic videtur error satis enormis, rogo te, lector, ut vires animi parum
colligas ad considerandum quid poeta noster intendat sub ista mirabili nova fictione,
quae videtur sapere haeresim; nimis enim videtur absurdum quod ponat Catonem
custodem purgatorii, quem debuisset ponere in inferno, tum quia fuit paganus infidelis,
tum quia interfecit se ipsum; unde debebat melius reponi inter violentos contra se ipsos’.
11 See, for example, Cicero, De fin., IV. xvi. 44-45: ‘“Optime,” inquam: “quid enim mihi
potest esse optatius quam cum Catone, omnium virtutum auctore, de virtutibus
disputare?”’ See also Seneca, Epist., I. xi. 8-10: ‘Aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est ac
semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tanquam illo spectante vivamus et omnia tamquam
illo vidente faciamus. [...] Elige itaque Catonem’.
12 Lucan, Phars., II. 389-90: ‘Iustitiae cultor, rigidi servator honesti, / In comune bonus’; IX.
554-57: ‘Nam cui crediderim superos arcana daturos / Dicturosque magis quam sancto
vera Catoni? / Certe vita tibi semper directa supernas / Ad leges, sequerisque deum’.
See also Virgil, Aen., VIII. 666-70: ‘hinc procul addit / Tartareas etiam sedes, alta ostia
Ditis, / et scelerum poenas, et te, Catilina, minaci / pendentem scopulo Furiarumque ora
trementem, / secretosque pios, his dantem iura Catonem’.
signify the secular perfection of human nobility which Dante, in his dualistic
ethical theory, distinguishes from man’s eternal Christian beatitude.
Dante’s most extensive treatment of nobility is the fourth book of the
Convivio. Refuting a contemporary definition of nobility as residing in ancient
wealth and pleasing manners, Dante defines nobility philosophically as the
perfect fulfilment of a being’s nature. Following Aristotle, Dante argues that
each living thing, from a flower to a horse, has a certain natural perfection.
This, he affirms, is its nobility. Human nobility – virtus vera nobilitas – is the
perfection of man’s rational nature: virtue (practical activity in accordance
with reason) and knowledge (the contemplative use of reason) (Conv., I.
i. 1; IV. xvi. 5).13 Dante emphasises that the pagan Roman Cato of Utica
exemplifies this human nobility:14
‘Nel nome di cui [Cato] è bello terminare ciò che delli segni de la nobilitade
ragionare si convenia, però che in lui essa nobilitade tutti li dimostra per
tutte etadi.’ (Conv., IV. xxviii. 19).
[The mention of his name is a happy note on which to end the required
discussion of the signs of nobility, since in him nobility displays all these
throughout every stage of life.]
Just as Seneca advises the reader of his epistles to elect Cato as his ethical
model so, in Purgatorio i, Dante-character genuflects in deferential silence
before Cato, who is described as worthy of more reverence than ever a son
owed his father (ll. 31-33).15
13 See Kenelm Foster, The Two Dantes, and Other Studies (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 1977), p. 242: ‘the whole business of man’s achieving
“perfection” in this world, as a being endowed with reason and nevertheless mortal
(whose optimum state would be at once physical, moral and intellectual, in short a full
flowering of natural “virtue”) is presented as something to be carried out by means
entirely intrinsic to human nature itself’.
14 Speaking in the person of the elder Cato (Conv., IV. xxi. 9), Dante concludes that, were
the corporeal conditions ideally disposed to receive the incorruptible seed of human
nobility, another ‘incarnate God’ would be born (Conv., IV. xxi. 10). Cato of Utica, he
implies, most closely incarnates this ideal and is thereby most worthy to represent God:
‘E quale uomo terreno più degno fu di signficare Dio che Catone? Certo nullo’ (Conv.,
IV. xxviii, 15). The implication of Dante’s allegorical interpretation of Cato and Marzia
to represent God and the noble soul is that an individual soul which marries itself (in
imitation) to the figure of Cato brings to perfect fruition the divine seed of human
nobility implanted by God.
15 See Benvenuto, gloss to Purg., i. 28-33: ‘Dantes ingressurus viam virtutis moralis sequitur
consilium Senecae, et eligit Catonem rigidum’. Benvenuto endearingly adds: ‘sicut ego
elegi ipsum Dantem’.
Why specifically the pagan Cato? Because Cato embodies, for Dante,
human nobility. Why this emphasis at the beginning of Ante-Purgatory?
Because, I would argue, Cato’s presence at the shore of Mount Purgatory
differentiates the perfection of this secular ethical goal from the very
different goal – the recovery of Eden and the state of grace – represented by
the ascent of Mount Purgatory.16 The four stars reflected in Cato in Purgatorio
i (the perfection of the four cardinal virtues) are contradistinguished,
indeed, by the three stars (allegorically representing the three theological
virtues) which rise in their place, and are seen by Dante-character in the
last canto of Ante-Purgatory (Purg., viii. 85-93). The startling presence of
Cato thus throws into relief two distinct ethical goals: the first, a secular
nobility achievable in this life through reason and the natural virtues (a
goal attainable by pagans); the second, an eternal beatitude achievable only
through grace and the revealed truth of Christ (and, thereby, seemingly
unattainable by pagans).17
In the very first line of the Paradiso – ‘La gloria di colui che tutto
move’ – Dante re-affirms the power of man’s reason and, in this case, the
power of reason to know God. God is not directly named in the first canto
of Paradiso; rather, He is referred to by a series of philosophical definitions:
Par., i. 1: ‘colui che tutto move’ [he who moves all things]
16 This dualistic interpretation disputes two major, and still influential, strands in Dante
scholarship. The first argues that in the Comedy there is no trace of the dualistic doctrine
of two final ends developed in the Convivio and crystallised in the Monarchia (Mon.,
III. xvi. 7-9). This interpretative position became prominent in the second half of the
twentieth century, and was powerfully advocated by, amongst others, Bruno Nardi,
Étienne Gilson and Kenelm Foster. The second trend reads the Comedy as informed
by the dualism of the prose works, but identifies the secular goal as equivalent to the
Earthly Paradise in the Purgatorio. An influential development of this position is John. A.
Scott, Dante’s Political Purgatory. Like proponents of the second view, I strongly concur
that the Comedy is underpinned by Dante’s dualistic theory. Nonetheless, I argue that the
Limbo of the virtuous pagans rather than the summit of Mount Purgatory represents the
‘beatitudo huius vitae’ delineated in the Monarchia. I sustain that Dante uses the historical
figure of the virtuous pagan to represent figuratively secular human flourishing (man’s
earthly nobility) in a poem which nevertheless depicts literally the afterlife. For a full
presentation of, and series of arguments for, my own dualistic reading of the Comedy, see
George Corbett, Dante and Epicurus: A Dualistic Vision of Secular and Spiritual Fulfilment
(Oxford: Legenda and MHRA, 2013).
17 For John Marenbon, Dante’s treatment of Virgil in the Comedy epitomises what he calls
the ‘problem of Paganism’. See John Marenbon, Pagans and Philosophers: The Problem
of Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
Marenbon situates Dante’s particular approach to this problem (pp. 188-213) within an
analysis covering the period from c. 200 to c. 1700 (labelled, by Marenbon, the ‘Long
Middle Ages’).
Par., i. 106-07: ‘l’etterno valore, il qual è fine / al quale è fatta la toccata norma’
[the eternal Worth, the end to which is created the order [of the universe]
just touched upon]
Par., i. 111: ‘[il] principio loro’ [their [the different natures’] principle]
18 The authenticity of the epistle (or sections of the epistle) to Can Grande is, of course,
disputed. Cecchini argues that the evidence balances in favour of authenticity (see
Epistola a Cangrande, ed. by Enzo Cecchini (Florence: Giunti, 1995), pp. viii-xxv) as
does Robert Hollander in his important study, Dante’s Epistle to Cangrande (Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 1-101. My own view tends towards the
authenticity of the whole epistle.
19 For the argument from existence, see Epistola a Cangrande, xx. 54-57; for the argument
from essence, see Ibid., xxi. 58-59; for the argument from movement, see Ibid., xxvi.
71-72.
20 Dante’s apostrophe renders Boethius’ ‘O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas’, the
poem which opens the central book of the Consolatio Philosophiae. A brief, but useful,
gloss on the poem is found in Durling and Martinez, III, Paradiso, pp. 686-94.
[‘You should not wonder at your ascent, if I judge well, otherwise than at
a stream when from a high mountain it descends to the base. It would be
a marvel in you if, free from impediment, you had remained below, as if,
on earth, living fire should be motionless.’]
Dante emphasises thereby that the essential form of man naturally directs
him, when unimpeded by sin and ignorance, to God as to his principle
(origin) and end (goal). Dante-character’s first words of the canticle, like
their counterparts in Inferno i, conflate Italian and Latin: ‘Già contento,
requïevi’ [already contented, I rested] (Par., i. 97). Prefaced by the latinism ‘a
quïetarmi’ (l. 86), this language cannot but evoke the opening of Augustine’s
Confessions: ‘inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te’ [my soul is
restless until it rests in you]. Only on the enjoyment of the good of the
intellect, God, does the human will, reaching its goal, ultimately find peace.