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Psychological Warfare: A Critical Study of Tactics and conceptualization in

Indian perspective

Conference Paper · October 2019

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• Sub-Theme: Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and Psychological Warfare

• Title Of The Paper: Psychological Warfare: A Critical Study of Tactics

and conceptualization in Indian perspective

• NAME: Mohammad Sameen

• Designation: Student

• NAME OF THE INSTITUTE: Aligarh Muslim University

• E-Mail: rishisameen10@gmail.com

• Postal-Address: Room. No. 27, Dr B.R. Ambedkar Hall, Qila Road, Near
Faculty Of Law AMU, Aligarh- 202001

• Contact. No.: 7017759476/9682614651

 Psychological Warfare: A Critical Study of Tactics and conceptualization in Indian
perspective

Mohammad Sameen

(3rd year BALLB, Faculty of Law, Aligarh Muslim University)

ABSTRACT

Psychological warfare has been a non-violent weapon used to attain military objectives since
biblical times. The psychological dimension of a dispute is as crucial as its physical dimension,
and in this era of modern warfare, psychological operations have become even more relevant,
particularly for a nation-state where the socio-psychological danger is more pronounced. While
fighting the threat of terrorism, the psychological dimension assumes great importance as terrorists
use violence as a psychological weapon by terrorizing the multitude, rather than affecting a few
physically, and in this sense they also fight a psychological war. Psychological operations '
significance is much higher than tactical operations ' effective behavior. This paper is an effort in
the Indian context to conceptualize the psychological operations (PSYOPs). The changing
dynamics of international relations after the end of the Cold War and post-9/11 changes in the
strategic South Asian environment have made the region more important. It is also essential to
understand that distinctions between different associated ideas such as Propaganda, Information
Warfare, and Perception Management are wafer-thin and can lead to controversial opinions among
different organizations operating within the general domestic safety environment, if not regarded
from the present view. Clarity of the idea will therefore set the stage for efficient policy execution
and assist to establish a policy framework in India for the coordination of PSYOPs at domestic
level. In addition to the need for a disciplined, educated and well-equipped workforce to address
national security problems, extensive and efficient psychological operations equipment is also
crucial. Then such a machine must cover the whole spectrum of socio-psychological risk in all its
diverse forms without losing sight of the evolving worldwide trends.

KEYWORDS

Psychological Warfare, Tactical Operations, Information Warfare, Policy execution

INTRODUCTION
The very idea of going to war or political end of imposing one's will on an adversary is born in the
mind the will to fight is born out of the victory perceived in one's mind. This is a strategic thinking
process in the human mind and takes place at all levels, from the ruler to the subject and from the
general to the soldier. The psychological warfare seeks to influence human thinking in order to
make it beneficial to its practitioner. The practice has been as ancient as the war and its significance
and use have been continuously increasing all the time, but its presence has been recognized to
level more claims against the victorious enemy than to appreciate it as a contributor to the win.
The last 200 years saw its tremendous development as war after its excellent usefulness at such
low price. This research seeks to understand the strategic and tactical elements of psychological
warfare in the context of modem warfare while tracing its growth and refinement, increasing
significance and how indispensable it is now to the national security of any nation, especially India.
[1]

The British analyst and historian, J.F.C Fuller, was the first to coincide with the term "PsyWar" in
1920 when he analyzed the strategies used in the First World War. In his treatise on tanks, he
prophesied that the traditional battlefield, characterized by the use of machines and weapons and
used to destroy the possessions of the other country in order to weaken it, was replaced by the
modern PsyWar. In the event of Japan in World War I, where it was decided to perform PsyOps
at such moments and identify such trends, the earliest use of this method was seen to be done so
that PsyWar's plan to make Japan surrender was carried out with complete efficacy. Until the early
1980s, PsyWar was not regarded a priority in wartime practice. A remarkable military historian,
Fred Walker notes that on the last page of training textbooks, until 1980, the PsyOps were
something that existed. Holistically, armies around the globe have failed to comprehend the
magnitude of effects created by PsyWar activities. Also, the intangible nature of the PsyWar
weapons and their difficulty in quantifying them resulted to their war training being ignored. Since
they are not given a definite direction except in times of conflict, services are unwilling to cope
with them. A distinctive characteristic of the modern strategic setting continues the psychological-
political penetration and subversion of foreign nations and international organizations and
movements. Although such activity takes place in peacetime, it is nevertheless closely related to
violence.[2]

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT

The first use of Psychological Warfare occurred when a human bare his or her teeth for the first
time and threateningly gesticulated to an adversary in order to scare the latter. A wag would say
the guy had lost his first Psychological Warfare fight when a barking dog made a person decide
not to hit the former. Psychological warfare instances are discovered in almost every culture and
at all times, as far as mythologies, folklore and recorded history go, prehistoric, ancient, medieval
or contemporary. Sometime its military usefulness was doubted and its practice was restricted to
the day's technology. Psychological warfare and propaganda are as ancient as human history itself.
The weak have always tried to depict themselves more powerfully than they really are. The
Byzantine Empire has resorted to such acts in its attempts to prolong its life. The emperor on his
throne used to be raised, as if by divine intervention, and reduced again, while the stuffed lions
that served as his throne's arm-rests belched out fire and smoke and shouted terrifying roars as the
foreign land ambassadors lay down before him.[3]

The Sanskrit epics, Ramayana and Mahabharata have examples of strategic and tactical
psychological warfare. Hanuman enables himself to be apprehended by the troops of the demon
king after destroying favorite Ashok Vatika (garden) of Ravana, so that he can get a opportunity
to meet Ravana. He lengthily narrates Rama's military prowess to impress upon him how pointless
it was to go to battle with such a strong opponent and even advises him to be his friend rather than
foe and be demolished.[4]

The psychological warfare is not a new concept in Islam, the Battle of Ohad, three miles north of
Madina when a native tribe Kuraish that once ruled Madina attacked the neo-Muslims, led by
Prophet Muhammad, with the support of other non-Muslims. Hazrat Naeem Bin Masood, whose
conversion to Islam was not known to the non-Muslims, spread the word among the Kuraish that
the Meccans were not loyal to them in their fight against the Muslims. On the other hand, he
propagated among the Meccans that the Medinite Kuraish could betray them any time. The trick
worked and the Meccans and Madinite Kuraish did not join hands against the Muslims. The Battle
of Ohad, however, witnessed the Kuraish resorting to psychological warfare against the Muslims
far more successfully. They conveyed to their Muslim enemies, during their decisive counter-
attack, that Prophet Muhammad was killed. The false story demoralized many Muslims who left
the battle in grief and the impact was one of the causes of the Muslims' defeat. The Prophet was
only wounded and not dead. The Muslims lost the Battle of Ohad.[5]
The Romans used to unleash a propaganda-campaign by the word of mouth about the superiority
of their legions, their bravery and iron-hard resolve to win. For instance, when news reached Rome
that Etruscan king was preparing to attack Romans, they sent a patrician, Mucins Scaevola to the
Etruscans. The emissary tried to impress upon them not to attack Rome and promised some
benefits in return. But the Etruscan king would not budge and kept on repeating, "Rome must fall!"
finally, Scaevola extended his arm over the bonfire and allowed it to burn without even a sigh. The
king was flabbergasted by the strong will of the Nositor and that shook his own resolve to attack
Rome.[6]

The earliest recorded use in an American publication of the word ' Psychological Warfare'
happened in January 1940, when an essay entitled' Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It'
appeared in a famous American newspaper.4 The term ' Psychological Operations' was also used
in early 1945, when Captain (later Rear Admiral) Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy, employed the
word in an operation plan designated as' Operation Plan. Without any description or explanation,
the word proposed, "All psychological activities will be coordinated in terms of moments and
trends to prevent reducing the efficacy of this major procedure." This term was again used in 1951,
when the Truman Administration Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview
179 renamed an inter-agency strategy committee, calling it the Psychological Operations
Coordination Committee. This development was due to the reality that Americans were becoming
progressively worried about the ongoing use of a term that contains the word ' warfare' to describe
an activity aimed at friends and neutrals (see the debate on definitions later in the article) as much
or more than at hostile or possibly hostile individuals. This was reflected in the 1958 Lebanon
crisis and the 1965 intervention by the Dominican Republic.[7]

Historically, the use of psychological operations in one form or another has proved almost as
crucial to the effective conduct of war as the use of manpower and arms. Despite its lengthy history
of effective use, however, "the ability to use the authority of persuasion as a force multiplier
through psychological operations to attain domestic goals with minimal destruction has been
recognized by very few even among the most perceptive army officials and statesmen.

ANCIENT INDIAN CONTEXT

Famous examples of the Ramayana and Mahabharata Psychological Warfare can be classified as
literary or mythical and their historical validity can be questioned along with comparable cases
observed in Indian folklore and their literary reflection. Even a cursory look indicates that not only
the ancient history of India but also the non-literary treatises of that moment describe and prescribe
methods that can readily be categorized as Psychological Warfare as it is recognized today. The
Arthashashtra, by Kautilya also known as Chanakya or Vishnugupta, a good thinker and statecraft
master of the fourth century BC, is the most prominent of such works. An significant element of
The Arthashashtra is that this science is not created by Kautilya. He mentions a number of previous
officials and their opinions at 112 locations (such as Vishalaksha and Bharadwaja) and relates to
six distinct schools of thought — Brihaspati, Ushanas, Prachetasa, Manu, Parasara and Ambhi —
to dismiss the views. Kautilya calls it a compendium of almost all ancient teachers ' comparable
treatises.' Thus the research of government and foreign policy and science growth in India is very
ancient, may have began around 650 BC. '' This gives excellent scope to a belief that the PsyWar
knowledge and practice could also be similarly old, if not more. Since the king's happiness Ues in
that of his subjects, "* the ruler had three main responsibilities toward the state and the individuals:
raksha (protection), palaana (maintenance and care) and yogakfhema (people's welfare)." Kautilya
suggests that Arthashashtra is the science of obtaining the wealth and welfare of a nation.[8]

The PsyWar is the intelligence domain— clandestine agents— and it's a covert operation,
according to The Arthashastra. In most nations, including India, and in most of the scenario, it is
the practice even today. For a long time even after the end of hostilities, even a white leaflet is a
classified document today. The US made its latest Taliban war leaflets public, but that was because
it was a one-sided affair, and neither Taliban nor Al-Qaeda were in a position to launch any counter
campaign or contest.

Chanakya is for a very elaborate secret Service for the state, operating directly under the king. Of
four main tasks of clandestine agents of all types described in The Arthashastra include:

• Neutralization of principal officers who, though living by service under the king, work for the
enemy;

• Keeping under surveillance people of the country who are likely to fall prey to the incitement of
the enemy;
• Waging of psychological warfare against the enemy; and

• Weakening of the enemy

For the upajaapa, the four-point formula of Sama, Dana, Bheda and Danda tackling the current or
potential scenario of dispute has much use. Kautilya strongly recommends the use of the doctrine
throughout the continuum of operation and suggests many methods for each of them and most of
them can be followed with Psywar's weapon. These techniques could also be used in different
combinations and order of steps, which further improves the Psywar's strategic usefulness. The
Arthashastra lists four methods to use one technique, six methods to use two at a moment, four
ways to use three at a moment, and one way to use all four at the same moment.[9]

POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

After the Independence, Indian interest in the Psychological Warfare was more spasmodic than
episodic. It was used to shoot wars; counter-insurgency and proxy wars and peacekeeping
activities without their professionals getting much advantage from institutionalized doctrinal,
organizational, policy and back-up planning. But it has yielded encouraging outcomes whenever
and wherever the Psychological Warfare has been resorted to. For greater appreciation, the military
operations of our moment can be categorized into three categories, namely, Wars, the Proxy War
and counter-insurgency operations. There was not much of any kind of Psywar in the fust three
wars India battled after partition-independence, including the Kashmir War of 1948, the 1962
Sino-Indian Border War, and the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The attitudes and psychological effect
associated with war and safety developed before, during and aft; hostilities and perhaps the media
coverage of those wars played a part in shaping attitudes. But the Psywar can't be called that. It
was just happening.[10]

It's hard to get any formal confirmation, but during a visit to the Tawang-Sela-Bomdila industry
in April 1999 it was learned that in 1962 the Chinese had dropped flyers with pictures of an Indian
soldier, a Chinese soldier and a local tribal juxtaposition to strengthen their theme question to the
individuals of NEFA at that time,' who looks more like you? An Indian or Chinese.' No sample of
the pan-Mongolian attraction could either be discovered, but in some context it seemed plausible.
This was a Psychological Warfare example, of course. But his creator's poor attempt hadn't
performed a lot of homework. The fact is that the local people who speak excellent Hindi besides
their tribal dialect, are traditionally lukewarm to the Chinese and even 'Tibetans for whatever
reason. Radio Pakistan has never been tired of its anti-India propaganda making all kinds of
appeals and accusations, and the retaliation of All India Radio in some form or another does not
fit much in the Psywar's art and science, at most such exchanges can fall into the category of what
is called tond sukh in Marathi, which means the enjoyment of calling names. Such activity is
aimless and does not produce a tactical or strategic outcome. In the Bangladesh War, India
attempted its hand in the Psywar for the first time in many decades, though using a technique of'
trial and mistake.'[11]

BANGLADESH LIBERATION WAR

The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War (Operation Cactus and Lily) can be defined as the first war
in both strategic and tactical fields in which India practiced the Psychological Warfare. This brief
14-day conflict culinated in an unprecedented surrender of more than 90,000 Pakistani troops,
approximately an army force, well-armed, equipped and provided but unnerved when All India
Radio repeatedly broadcast the surrender appeal of the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. (later, Field
Marshal) S.M.F.E. Maneckshaw, telling them that ports were grounded with their air force. [12]

After the surrender, the Psychological Warfare persisted in the POW camps. A camp journal was
introduced to teach the Pakistani officers and soldiers in the camps in order to better explain the
Indian political system and the ethos of apolitical armed forces. Earlier, the Indian Air Force
dropped leaflets in the name of the Army Chief's surrender appeal, but these efforts were late in
the day, almost as the Indian troops reached the outskirts of Dhaka. The Indian Psychological
Warfare is therefore unable to take complete credit for it because it did not play a part in generating
the strategic-tactical situation that forced the Pakistanis to surrender.[13]

INDIAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE SRI LANKA

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was established in Sri Lanka under the Indo-Sri Lankan
Accord to promote weapons laying by the LTTE (Tamil Elam Liberation Tigers) and other
insurgents to a third party and to preserve overall law and order. But quickly this lightly armed
force finally fought a full-fledged counter-insurgency war in which its opponent, the LTTE, had a
head start. The Psywar was one of the LTTE's periodic operations as a guerrilla warfare
organization and was already dominating the press spectrum. The LTTE Psywar planners so that
due to its numerous humanitarian service initiatives, the Tamils did not create any smooth comer
for the IPKF.[14]
A small Psyops Cell (POC) was formed at the Headquarters of the 54 Infantry Division, under its
Deputy GOC (General Officer Commanding), comprising the Commanding Officer of the Signal
Regiment, Officer-in-Charge of the Civil Affairs Cell, Intelligence Officer and Public Relations
officer." The POC targets were the LTTE cadres, Tamil population in Jaffna peninsula, detenus in
rehabilitation centres, people of Tamil Nadu and own troops. The objectives included projection
of friendly image of the Indian troops and the IPKF, justification of the presence of the IPKF in
Sri Lanka, imperatives of the Tamil participation in the democratic process, utility of the Indo-Sri
Lanka accord in meeting the Tamil aspirations, counter-Psywar, boosting morale of the Indian
troops and futility of the LTTE operations against the IPKF.[15]
The LTTE themes were: atrocities of the IPKF, calling Rajiv Gandhi ‘'butcher of Lankan Tamils,'
impossibility of co-existence of the Tamils and Singhala, IPKF would go home leaving the Tamils
to the mercy of the Sri Lankan army, inexperienced Indian prime minister was duped into sending
in the IPKF to fight the Tamils while the Lankan troops played volley ball.
Both the sides used usual methods and means like leaflets, books, posters, newspapers, radio and
TV broadcasts. But the IPKF tried even ineetings of the citizens committee and organised
distribution of leaflets, booklets, posters and pro-lPKF local and Indian newspapers. The IPKF
Psyops paid off well. They denied free run to the LTTE and succeeded in facilitating holding of
provincial council elections despite the LTTE boycott, got fulfilled the Tainil aspirations of
recognition of Tamil as a national language of Sri Lanka and merger of North and Eastern
provinces.[16]

PRESENT INDIAN SCENARIO

The experience demonstrates that in India the Psychological Warfare worked as much as
elsewhere. It has succeeded even when waged in counter-insurgency scenario by not so
strategically-savvy district police force. Innovative weapons were used by the British to wage it,
first to deny education and then to doctorate education to maintain their colonial rule in obviously
hostile India. In both world wars, they used it to strengthen the faith of the colonists in their
invincibility, to prevent any opportunistic upsurge during the war, and to raise a big colonial
military and logistical help to sustain their war efforts. Their early Psychological Operations were,
of course, secret and subtle too and therefore escaped the attention of the Indians, very few of
whom were learned.[17]

When asked about the level of awareness about the Psychological Warfare in the country, noted
strategist K. Subrahmanyam said, "Zero. It is a big zero. The leaders belonging to all political
parties, without an exception, believe that when the time comes their word would be taken as a
vedvaya. These leaders are supposed to be communicating to the people, taking media and
academia into confidence on security issues but they do not do that. This is a part of the crisis of
leadership in the country. The latest example is Operation Parakram. Nobody has said why the
troops were deployed for such a long time and why they were withdrawn—though these were the
right steps—and this has given Musharraf a chance to say that the Indians withdrew because they
were scared. "The Bhagwatgeeta, the undoubted essence of the Indian philosophy and culture, is
the result of a war; more precisely a Psychological Warfare, and the Geeta itself is an excellent
piece of its practice. But its military significance was lost in high philosophical and devotional
values. The book is being studied and commented upon over and over again in India for
millenniums from religious, social, philosophical and every other angle except the military. The
present Indian society, even after hundreds of years of foreign rule, continues to embody the
mythical Arjuna and stand where he did before Krishna in Kurukshetra when it comes to the
question of security. It is prone to a pacifist thought to the fault.[18]
The poor state of strategic culture India has got calls for more concerted efforts to bring about
general awareness about the national security and impressing upon its past, present and potential
challengers. But such efforts are not seen to have been made during the post-independence period.
The need to communicate not only with own people but also the population of the adversary is
never felt so earnestly in this country. The spectrum of public information has no room for vacuurn.
If the right information is not placed on it in time, someone else will fill the gap with wrong
information or what is right for him/her. It is difficult to regain the initiative in the Psychological
Warfare if lost once. The situation becomes unenviable since it is perceived that India is the most
threatened country.'" Even today the country is simultaneously fighting a proxy war in Kashmir.
Valley, a very low intensity conflict in Siachen Glacier and along the Line of Control, cross-border
terrorism like attack on Parliament and hijacking of and airliner, externally supported insurgency
in the North East, internal disturbance like the Naxal attacks. The scenario is overshadowed by
unsettled geo-political situation around the country, Indo-Pakistan tension and even threats of
nuclear weapons. The forces that hold out these threats also unleash a planned Psychological
Warfare.[19]
India is particularly vulnerable to the hostile action because it is free, open, pluralistic and
democratic society, which is not militarised but by nature it is pacifist and that to in the near
absence of security awareness. Two examples are interesting in this context. After the Pokharan
11 tests, most of the Pakistani cities witnessed street demonstrations, not against the weapons, but
exhorting their Government to carry out same number of tests. No such demonstrations were held
in India when the Chinese tested their bomb in early sixties. The whole of the US and most of the
West expressed its shock and anger against the attack of 9/11 but the Indian society as a whole has
never responded so to the terrorist attacks and the cross-border terrorism.[20]

CONCLUSION
An effort was produced in this document to comprehend the conceptual structure of the latest
evolution of Psychological Operations, where the danger to a nation-state exists in the socio-
psychological realm and the psychological aspect of a dispute is as crucial as the physical one.
When used in combination with other operations, PSYOPs can play an significant role in attaining
the general domestic goals by affecting the attitudes and behaviors of the conflicting sides, both in
moments of war and peace. The requirement for a comprehensive domestic response on a
psychological plane cannot be overlooked, along with the need for disciplined, qualified, and well-
equipped workforce to address national safety problems. This reaction must cover the whole range
of socio-psychological risk in all its different forms without losing sight of the evolving worldwide
trends. There is no denying that in order to control the same thing, we must first develop a domestic
philosophy of PSYOPs, including its thrust and a centralized framework. This will then pave the
way for the various safety organizations to adopt this philosophy in the form of PSYOP operational
doctrines. India urgently needs to develop all-round Psychological Warfare capability. It has
tremendous potential of being a war-winning factor as the world experience shows. India
experience of the modern period is so encouraging. Besides, it is an important component of the
soft-kill strategy, which is expected to dominate the future wars, especially since the nuclear
weapons stand self-neutralised. The Indian model has not yet shaped. It is still at a nascent stage.'
The Indian Armed Forces are practising the Psychological Warfare in an ‘irregular’ fashion only
with individual initiative and comprehension of the subject. It is a non-standard approach lacking
doctrines, training, vital wherewithal and above all policy support. The civilian superstructure of
the high command is not involved, unlike in the US. The Americans have fully evolved model for
the Psychological Warfare and therefore it is necessary to understand its features.

REFERNCES

[1] J.F.C.Fuller. (1920). Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918. Harvard University

[2] JOHN W. RILEY, J. A. (1957). Research for Psychological Warfare. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 21, No.
1 , 147-158.

[3] Roetter, Charles, Preface. In Psychological Warfare. 1974. B.T. Batsford Ltd;
London.

[4] Valniiki. Shrivalnukn mamayane, Geeui Press.. Gorakhpur, Saiga (Chapter) No LI Verses No 4 to
45

[5] Malik, Brigadier S.K.. Pakistani Army, TheOmamc Concept ofWcti, Wajid Alis Ltd, Lahore and
Himalayan Books, New Dellu, p 84 The Battle of Ohad has attracted tiie Dmne Critique in the
Quraiuc Chapter Al-1-Imran. which is reproduced in the Appendix JV of the book.

[6] Volkogonov, Prof. Dimitn, ThePsvchological War, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986 p 62-63—
citing writings of Plutarch a Greek historian and writer ot 46 AD.

[7] Zacharias, Ellis M., Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer. 1946.
G. P. Putnam’s Sons; New York. p. 345.

[8] Farquhar, J.N., Modern Religious Movements in India, fust published in England in 1914,
published in India by Munshiram Mauohailal, Delhi, 1967.

[9] Kautilya, The Arthashashtra, ti and ed L N Rangarajan, IFS. Penguin Books, New Delhi 1992
p 16 and 99 This Manu should nol lo be conlused with Manu of Manmtnnn fame—ed.

[10] Raina, 4soka, Inside ILiWthe story ojIndia's Secret Service, Vikas Publishing House, New
Delhi, 1981, p 45.

[11] Shashi, Dr., S. S., Defendeis ojIndia, Publication Division, Indian School Supply Depot, p 130
 [12] Chandoi kar, Lt Gen., the tlien Director of Military Intelligence, Amiy Headquarters, in a
persona] interview with (his rebcarcher in eaily 2001 But in the General'^ views this was not a
psychological warfaie But it had an impact The Pakistani authorities decided against lem ducting
many of these POWs after they letumed home and underwent a special screening

[13] Maneckshaw, Field MarshaJ, S.H.F.J., in foreword to 1971 The Sappeii,' Wc7f, compiled by
Col R.B Khanna, Published by Engineer-m-Chief, Army Headquaiters. Nev\'Delhi, 1995

[14] Rao Capt N Sailendia "Psvchologicil Opeiations During Counter-Insurgency Operations-Sri Lank.i,'
Coiiibal Journal Vol 17 No 3 Novembei 1990 p 43

[15] Singh, Maj. C.K., Public Relations, OfTicei, 36 Inf Div. IPKF, in an mlerview with this
researcher m Miimbai on 20 January 2003 The Indian Information Service oflicer is serving PRO,
MOD in Mumbai.

[16] Rao, Ramamohan I , Inlormjtion Consultant to Defence Minister, Mimstry of Defence, in an interview to
this leseaicher in his office on 19 December 2002 Rao lefiised to give details of die nature of the top poup
that conducted the Pshewar

[17] SubrahmanvHin, K., in an interview at his New Delhi residence on 20 December 2002 with
this research student

[18] Khanna, Lt. Gen. (Rtd) H.M., in an inier^iew with ihis researcher on 19 June 2002. Gen.
Khanna was the GOC-in-C, Northern Command during the Kargil War and is now Chhatrapati
Shivaji Chair Professor, Depaitment of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Pune.

[19] Thorat, Lt. Gen. S.P.P., From Reveille To Retreat, Allied Pubhshers Pvt Ltd. Mumbai. 1986, p
130

[20] .Singh, Jaswant, Defending India, Macmillan India Ltd, Bangalore. 1999. Mr. Singh, the former
foreign and defence minister, argues in the book that India has a poor strategic culture and the
Indian elite had been divorced from strategic thinking and formulating policies for centuries of the
alien rule

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