1. Viola v.

Alunan

FACTS:

BRGY. Chairmane Viola filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of the Art III, Sec.1-2 of
the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice presidents and for auditors
for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.

He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493 which
mentions as elective positions only those of the president, VP, and 5 members of the BOD in each chapter
at any the political subdivision and national levels and thus the implementing rules expand the numbers in
the LGC in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from
the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.

ISSUE: W/N Sec 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid.

RULING:

Yes. The creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the LGC which in fact requires –
and not merely authorizes – the board of directors to “create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter”. The creation of these positions was actually made in the
Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay.

There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices in
the executive management.

While the BOD of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs of the chapter,
the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create additional
positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial
and metropolitan political subdivision levels.  Otherwise the National Liga would be no different from the
local chapters.  The fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the
local chapters but to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.
2. MACALINTAL V. COMELEC

FACTS:

Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity.
Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a
taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:

1. W/N sec. 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement of the Constitution?
2. W/N sec. 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution?
3. W/N Congress may exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

HELD:

1. No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for
the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal
of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is prevented
from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of the
Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage
(Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.

2. Yes. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and
Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps. Hence, the Congress should not have allowed
COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it.

3. No. Powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No.
9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
3. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

FACTS:

ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) that:
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions
have been satisfied.

ISSUES:
1. W/N there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. W/N there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the
Constitution.

3. W/N there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the Constitution.

HELD:
1. No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting
within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in
Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

2. No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in
our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In
this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

3. No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation
has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be
levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power
is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a
clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
4. Akbayan v. Aquino
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral
free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate
grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin,
customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and
final provisions.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information?
2. W/N the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of the negotiation
process?
3. W/N there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege?
4. W/N the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege on time?
Decision: Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:
1. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement
that it be a matter of public concern. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. From the
nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public
disclosure. Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only
whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive
privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party
demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for
the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social,
political, and economic decision-making.
2. The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order.
3. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing
of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. Each time the
deliberative process privilege is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the
competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the relevance of the evidence," "the availability
of other evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government," and the "possibility of
future timidity by government employees. In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong
and sufficient showing of need. There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of
public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of
any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade
agreement. Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this
Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making
unless the initial offers are also published.
4. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present
petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Respondents failure to claim the
privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by
the Executive branch. What respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman
Aguja were mere requests for information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier
resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request
to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. While it is a salutary and
noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials out of respect for their
office until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory
process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege.
5. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia
FACTS: 
The plaintiffs collective of environmental NGO and members of the civil society and scientist, challenged
the decision of granting a Biosafety permits and allowing field test of a new pest resistant
biotechnologically engineered aubergine.
They alleged that the field trials of the bioengineered aubergine were a violation of their constitutional
right to health and balanced ecology because the environmental compliance certificate No.1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation and because there is no scientific peer reviewed studies that
shows that the Bt gene used in the genetically modified organism is safe for human consumption and for
the environment. Consequently, the plaintiffs called for the application of the precautionary principle to
this case. In addition to that, the plaintiffs claimed that the field test project did not comply with the
required public consultation under Section 26 & 27 of the Local Government code.
In front of the court of first instance and the court of appeal, the plaintiffs prevailed and the judges
applied the principle of precaution and issued a writ of kalikasan against the defendants, namely the
authorities in charge of delivering the different permits such as the Environmental Management Bureau,
the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority, and the promoter of the bioengineered aubergines : the University
of the Philippines Los Baños, the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications.
The defendants appealed the decision arguing that they had respected all measures of environmental law
and that there was no evidence that the Bt gene of the aubergine could cause any environmental damage
or prejudice the life, health and property of the neighboring inhabitants.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the case should have been dismissed for mootness?
2. W/Nthe Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO 08-2002 as it was not raised as an issue

HELD:

1. The Court grants the motions for reconsideration on the ground of mootness. The Court may only
adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.62 The requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual
controversy" for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the comis of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In
other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
Also, On the paramount public interest exception, jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-
fast rule in determining whether a case involves paramount public interest in relation to the mootness
principle. However, a survey of cases would show that, as a common guidepost for application, there
should be some perceivable benefit to the public which demands the Court to proceed with the resolution
of otherwise moot questions.

Moreover, the case is not one capable of repetition vet evading review. The Court notes that the petition
for Writ of Kalikasan specifically raised issues only against the field testing of Bt talong under the
premises 'of DAO 08,..2002,that herein petitioners failed to: (a) fully inform the eople regarding the
health, environment, and other hazards involved;92 and (b) conduct any valid risk assessment before
conducting the field trial.93 As further pointed out by Justice Leonen, the reliefs sought did not extend far
enough to enjoin the use of the results of the field trials that have been completed. Hence, the petition's
specificity prevented it from falling under the above exception to the mootness rule

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the previous court and held that the risk of releasing
biotechnological plants in a biodiversity rich country like the Philippines was too high because the natural
and unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.
At the same time, the Supreme Court considered that there was a preponderance of evidence that GMO
could be a threat to both ecosystems and health. As a result, the Supreme Court supported the application
of the precautionary principle and upheld the previous court decisions and dismissed the appeal.
6. Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals

FACTS

The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed on August 8,
1991 on the ground that they had become moot and academic. On the other hand, the administrative cases
were dismissed for failure of the complainants to prosecute them.

Then, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of the judgment, particularly
the part ordering his reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries
and other benefits during the period of suspension.

The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Afterwards,
President Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of
the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five
nominees considered for the position.

Regional Trial Court, through respondent Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another order,
reiterating her earlier order for the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of PUP president. A writ of
execution, ordering the sheriff to implement the order of reinstatement, was issued.

The sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although
Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This
led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set. Petitioner also moved to cite DECS
Secretary Cariño in contempt of court. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.

Then, the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the two orders
and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a temporary restraining order.

The CA issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as
president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court, and enjoining further
proceedings in criminal cases.

The 7th Division of the CA rendered a decision. Said decision set aside the orders and writ of
reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing after
the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and benefits was limited to
those accruing from the time of petitioner's suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The
case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner.

ISSUE:
W/N the Court erred when it finds the accused not guilty of the violations charged in all these three cases
and hereby acquits him therefrom.
HELD:
No. The Court finds the accused, Isabelo T. Crisostomo, not guilty of the violations charged in all these
three cases and hereby acquits him therefrom, with costs de oficio. The bail bonds filed by said accused
for his provisional liberty are hereby cancelled and released.
The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are hereby cancelled and
released.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is
now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had
converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce.
What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life.
Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure
and organization.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not "one and the same institution" but
"two different entities" and that since petitioner Crisostomo's term was coterminous with the legal
existence of the PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the abolition of the PCC.
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being
"transferred" to the PUP but only that they "stand transferred" to it. "Stand transferred" simply means, for
example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new
name of the institution.
7. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

FACTS:  

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.    PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.    Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. 

ISSUE:  W/N E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions?

DECISION:  

No. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to
existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.  
8. Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Commissioner Fe Barin,
FACTS:
RA 9136, known as EPIRA (for electric Power Industry Reform Act) was enacted on June 8, 2009 and
took effect on June 26, 2009. Sec. 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB (Energy
Regulatory Board) and creation of ERC (Energy Regulatory Commission).
At the time of filing the petition, the ERC was composed of Commissioner Fe Barin and Dept.
Commissioners Carlos Alindada, Leticia Ibay, Oliver Butalid and Mary Anne Colayco
Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A portion of the
guidelines reflects the Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the ERC employees vis-à-vis
Civil Service rules.
Then, KERB sent a letter to the commissioners stating their objection to the commissioner’s stand that
Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application in the selection and placement of the
ERC employees.
KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the ERB’s character and they contended
it merely changed the ERB name to ERC and expanded functions and objectives.
Commissioner Barin replied to KERB, the creation of a placement committee is no longer necessary
because there is already a prescribed set of guidelines for recruitment of personnel.
KERB filed a petition to enjoin Termination of Petitioners ERB employees
ISSUES:
W/N Sec. 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional and ERC Commissioners were correct in
disregarding and considering merely suppletory in character the protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the
ERB employees.
HELD:
All laws enjoy the presumption of Constitutionality. To justify the nullification of law, there must be a
clear and convincing breach of the constitution. Power to create the office has been delegated by the
legislature. The power to create an office carries with it the power to abolish. Pres. Aquino, then
exercisingly her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing EO 172 on May 8, 1987. The question
whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. Sec. 38 of RA 9136 explicitly
abolished the ERB.
ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are
intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.
Impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an
office.
There is no occupant in an abolished office, where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak.
Petition is DISMISSED.
9. Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights,
FACTS:
Congress passed the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to
All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the
appropriations of the CHR. On the strength of these special provisions, CHR promulgated a Resolution
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed
to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV
position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade
15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. Thereafter,
CHR issued another Resolution providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of the several
positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same
resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under
Personnel Services. The CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of
funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four
Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one accounting Clerk II.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to DBM with a request for its
approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following grounds: (1) It
involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services. (2) In the absence of a specific
provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or
regional office, and the services to offices, such scheme should be denied. (3) Pursuant to General
Provisions of the General Appropriations Act of 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions
shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation. (4)
Moreover, as provided under the Compensation Standardization Law, the DBM is directed to establish
and administer a unified compensation and position classification system in the government. (5) Being a
member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade,
and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under the
Compensation Standardization Law.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office recommended to the CSC- Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected
owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR,
requested the CSC-Central office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA
stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to
evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals. CA affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the
upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within
the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
Petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court and successfully obtained the favorable action.
Respondent then filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N CHR is one of the constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy?
HELD:
NO. The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary,
the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. As already settled in the assailed
Decision of this Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the
strict sense, a constitutional commission. The creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated,
but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly
entitled “Constitutional Commissions,” identifies only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in
Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights. Thus, the respondent cannot invoke
provisions under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must
be able to present constitutional and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of
fiscal autonomy. The 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy
through the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly.
However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the
Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3.
Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal autonomy by the 1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A,
Section 5, a provision applied in common to all constitutional commissions. The Office of the
Ombudsman enjoys fiscal autonomy by virtue of Article XI, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution.
Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences stating that: (1) The government entity shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly
released. The respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article XIII,
Section 17, which provides that the approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
As compared to Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently does not
contain the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second
sentence on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations.
Fiscal autonomy means independence or freedom regarding financial matters from outside control and is
characterized by self-direction or self-determination.