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Module 12

POST-WAR ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATION FOR MINDANAO AND SULU

Geoffrey G. Salgado, Juvanni A. Caballero
& Phyllis Marie S. Teanco
History Department, CASS, MSU-IIT

I. Objectives

At the end of the module, the students should be able to answer the following
questions:

1. What was the Alonto Report and how did it lead to the integration programs of
the Philippine government in the post-war period?
2. What is the role of Mindanao State University in the national integration
program?
3. What is the Commission on National Integration and what became of it after
more than a decade of existence?
4. What was the Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) and what became of it
after several years of existence?

II. Introductory Activity

As an introduction, the instructor may recapitulate the following:

The Japanese occupation left a positive mood for Muslims and Christians in the
Mindanao region. Many were simply inspired by the extraordinary experience of fighting
a common invader. In fact, the post-war government was so pleased with Moro
participation in the resistance movement that it started appointing Muslim guerrilla
leaders to key government positions after the liberation. Moro leaders were also
inspired to run for both houses of Congress in the 1946 national elections under the
sponsorship of the Nacionalista and Liberal parties.

The active participation of Moro leaders in the national and provincial levels of
government was interpreted by many in the government as an indication that Moros
have no problem becoming Filipinos. This assumption would be put to test when the
Kamlon uprising broke out in 1951. (The Instructor may direct the students to reread
the story of Kamlon found in Module 1).

As a government response, a Senate committee was created to investigate the

cause and circumstances of the Kamlon Rebellion. This committee, which was
composed of Moro senators (namely, Sen. Domocao Alonto of Lanao, Cong. Luminog
Mangelen of Cotabato and Cong. Ombra Amilbangsa of Sulu), would accomplish and
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submit a very influential report that would popularly become known as “The Alonto
Report.”

III. Lesson Proper

1. What was the Alonto Report and how did it lead to the integration
programs of the Philippine government in the post-war period?

The Alonto Report refers to the document submitted by the special investigation
committee, which was created by the House Committee on National Minorities to
investigate the Kamlon Uprising. Among others, the report stated that the post-
independence “Moro Problem” had been a question of “inculcating into Muslim minds
that they are Filipinos and this government is their own and that they are part of it.” As
its principal recommendation, the Alonto Committee called for the integration of the
Muslim Filipinos into the Philippine body politic, in order to effect “in a more and
complete measure their social, moral and political advancement.”

The Alonto Report was so influential that it modified the thinking of the members
of the Philippine Congress from the 1950s until the Mindanao Crisis in 1971. It prodded
Congress to pass legislation to create agencies that would effect the integration of the
Muslims and develop the Mindanao region. Foremost of these agencies were Mindanao
State University (1955), the Commission on National Integration (1957) and the
Mindanao Development Authority.

2.)What is the role of Mindanao State University in the national integration

program?

Since the task of “inculcating” was largely educational, the government decided
to establish an academic institution that would carry the gigantic task of educating the
Muslims and other minoritized populations – Mindanao State University. This academic
institution was made possible through Republic Act 1387, which was signed into law by
President Magsaysay on June 19, 1955. Although MSU had already a Charter, its
implementation was delayed by many factors, “foremost of which was difficulty in
getting the right man to serve as the university’s first president.” 1 Finally, On
September 1, 1961, Antonio Isidro was sworn into office as MSU’s first president by
President Carlos P. Garcia.

1
Salgado
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The expected role of MSU in the history of Mindanao was vital. Aside from the
fact that it was supposed to provide the educational needs of the Moros and Lumads, in
order to give them equal opportunity with the majority of Christian Filipinos, it would
served also as a social laboratory for diverse students who would come from far-flung
and war-torn areas of Mindanao and Sulu. A general rule in the university’s dormitories
was that no two individuals could become roommates if they came from the same
province; meaning, one must have roommates who came from other religious, cultural
and ethno-linguistic backgrounds. According to a research, this social experiment had
been so successful that acceptance, solidarity and lifetime friendship had been
observed, while suspicion, ignorance and bias were minimized (if not eradicated)
among the Muslim, Christian and Lumad students after their dormitory experience. 2

The general mandate of Mindanao State University may be seen in the preamble
of its Charter, which reads:

1. The university is an instrument of the government policies in the southern

region of the Philippines;
2. The university must help promote the program of education to accelerate the
integration of national minorities into the Philippines’ body politic, particularly
the Muslims;
3. The university must provide extensive professional and technical training and
undertake research in native Filipino culture. 3

As pointed out in Module 1, the word “integration,” as used by the authors of the
MSU Charter, did not mean “assimilation” (or the extreme, “annihilation”) of the local
culture and religious belief of the Moros and other IPs of MinSuPala. Rather,
“integration” referred to the process of making the Moros and other IPs feel they are
Filipinos, too, by making them appreciate the government’s efforts of advancing their
heritage and cultures, counting them as part of the general Filipino heritage and
providing them with educational, economic and other opportunities so they would
become at par with the other groups of Filipinos.

3.)What was the Commission on National Integration and what became of it

after more than a decade of existence?

Aside from Mindanao State University, the government also created an

instrumentality whose task was to effect the integration of the Moros and Indigenous
Peoples. Known as the Commission on National Integration (CNI), it was created in
1955 by two Bills filed in the Lower House of the Philippine Congress. Both provided for

2
See Balacuit
3
See Salgado but better if we can see charter
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the creation of an agency that would focus on the integration effort. One of the Bills
was introduced by Congressman Luis Hora of the 3 rd District of Mountain Province and
the other by Congressmen Domocao Alonto, Ombra Amilbangsa and Luminog
Mangelen. The two Bills were consolidated and passed during its third reading on May
23, 1957. On June 22 of the same year, it was signed into law by President Garcia and
became known as Republic Act No. 1888.

The law creating the Commission on National Integration represented, for the
first time in the Republic, a social policy towards the Muslims and other indigenous
peoples. The most striking characteristics of the CNI Charter were the wide range of
functions and broad powers (never fully used) entrusted to it. A total of 17 powers,
functions and duties were vested on the Commission. From these functions, one could
infer that the CNI was tasked to attain two objectives: advancement and integration of
those who were then officially labeled as the “National Cultural Minorities.”

In 1964, amendments were introduced to the original CNI Charter through the
efforts of the Senate Committee on Cultural Minorities. Between October 15, 1962 and
January 15, 1963, the Committee, which was composed of Senator Manuel P. Manahan
as chairman and Senators Rogelio de la Rosa, Lorenzo Sumulong, Francisco Rodrigo,
Roseller Lim, Maria Kalaw Katigbak and Alejandro Almendras, as members, visited
several places including Mindanao, Sulu, Palawan, Mindoro and Northern Luzon. Their
objective was to survey the problems of the ethnic minorities, including those of the
Muslims. At that time, peace and order was observed to have deteriorated again in the
region of Mindanao and the situation precipitated the trip of the Senate Committee.

The Committee’s report, also known as the Manahan Report, showed statistically
the prevalent problems among the country’s indigenous peoples. It graphically
described these problems as perceived by themselves and by the CNI personnel. The
report also indicated that the indigenous peoples had not been neglected only; their
rights had been abused, too. Five broad classes of problems confronting the indigenous
peoples were identified by the committee. The consensus of the response and views
indicated the following in the order of their importance: (1) land problems; (2)
education; (3) livelihood; (4) health; and (5) transportation. The Committee also
underscored the fact that serious cases of land-grabbing occurred in various Mindanao
provinces and that “the provinces of Davao, Cotabato, Bukidnon and the island of
Basilan are the major trouble spots.” In this report, the Committee was emphatic in
pointing out the significance of agrarian problems and their crucial role in Muslim-
Christian relationship.
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The recommendations of the Manahan Report were later reflected in the

additional powers, functions and duties of the Commission on National Integration,
most especially in extending legal assistance for land settlement and in giving emphasis
to its scholarship program.

The CNI had several achievements, but it was beset also with problems. Part of
CNI’s achievement was that it helped out 3,000 students, mostly Muslims, to attain
college education. However, its attempt to assist the ethnic minorities in their land
cases, through its Legal Assistance Program, was not successful due to the ignorance of
the litigants or claimants and the slow turn of the wheel of justice, so to speak; and
also because of insufficient funds. The CNI was supposed to receive five million pesos
annually to finance its programs as provided for in its Charter. The amount was
supposed to come from any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
Only half of the five million pesos was assured of release.

The creation of the Office of the Presidential Assistant on National Minorities

(PANAMIN) in 1967, added another problem for the Commission on National
Integration. PANAMIN was established by President Ferdinand E. Marcos to advise him
on non-Muslims minorities, while CNI continued to discharge its function with respect to
the Muslims. However, though both agencies had separate areas of concern, PANAMIN
was seen as a rival of the Commission in getting attention and the much-needed
additional funding from the national government.

Finally, like any government agency that is not insulated from the whims of
partisan politics, CNI became a dumping ground for the protégés of politicians. Cesar A.
Majul assessed the Commission thus:

Setting aside some of the accomplishments of the Commission on National

Integration, the fact that the secessionist movement among the Muslims
began to germinate in the 1960s shows that it failed to integrate the bulk
of the Muslim population into the body politic.

4.)What was the Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) and what became
of it after several years of existence?

To complement MSU and CNI, the government also created the Mindanao Development
Authority as another instrumentality to effect the economic development of Mindanao.
Like R.A. 1888 that created the CNI, the legislation that established the Mindanao
Development Authority (MDA) also was based on two bills, which were separately filed
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in the Lower House of the Philippine Congress. The first bill was introduced on February
21, 1961 by Congressman Feliciano Ocampo of the 2 nd District of Nueva Ecija. The
second was co-authored by 11 congressmen from the MINSUPALA region and
introduced on April 6, 1961. Both were consolidated and signed into law as R.A. 3034
by President Carlos P. Garcia in the same year.

Because of the legal interagency implications, the Mindanao Development

Authority was formally organized as a public corporation on July 3, 1963, two years
since the enactment of the Authority’s enabling law. Its principal functions were:

1. To draw up comprehensive and short-term plans and programs for regional

development;
2. To coordinate and integrate the activities of both the public and private
sectors;
3. To extend or facilitate the extension of financial, management, and technical
support to industrial and commercial ventures in the region; and
4. To undertake, by itself or in joint venture with the private sector, agro-
industrial-commercial pioneering ventures.

MDA had a share of problems, which affected its ability to translate its plans and
programs into reality. First, there was a frequent turnover in the management
leadership of the agency. In a period of ten years (1963-1973), the Authority had five
chairman-general managers and three officers-in-charge. Second, it was not given
sufficient funding, so that in 1972, its paid-in capital was only P24 million out of the
P132 million appropriated. Thirdly, MDA’s Board of Directors had not been constituted
on a more permanent basis. During one third of the period of its corporate existence,
the Authority neither had a board nor even a working majority of the board on duty.

By the time of its replacement by the Southern Philippines Development

Authority in 1975, MDA was able to establish seven commercial operating projects, an
investment in shares of common stocks in three private ventures of the projects, and a
number of special projects. Perhaps its significant, if modest, breakthrough in regional
development was the pioneering preparation of a development plan two years prior to
its abolition in 1975. The plan envisioned to open the floodgates of foreign investment
for Mindanao and achieve the capitalist development of the region.

At the height of the Mindanao rebellion in 1973, the South was hastily identified
as a priority area to be subjected to massive development efforts. The government’s
plan—“Development Plan, FY 1974-1977”—conceptualized between 1973 and 1974, put
forth the “Mindanao Regional Development Project (MRDP)” along with the “Manila Bay
Ring Development Project” as the development priorities from the national point of
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view. Under the MRDP scheme, several “strategic leading growth points” would reach
out, extract and draw towards the centers the otherwise untapped resources of the
hinterlands and the countryside.

The MRDP was based on a study conducted between 1973 and 1974 under the
auspices of the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) with the cooperation of
the Mindanao Development Authority. In fact, the project director of the study was no
less than MDA’s last manager, Ernesto M. Aboitiz. UNDP was represented in the project
by D. H. Cohen, who prepared the seventy-seven page final report, being the project’s
industrial planner and adviser.

The project proposal called for the infusion of foreign capital for infrastructure
projects to attract foreign investors. These infrastructures included a network of
highways, ports, power generation and industrial estates. A number of these projects
required the massive transformation of the countryside, most often resulting in a host
of problems for communities that happened to occupy the lands identified as project
sites. Reports gathered from sources in areas on Mindanao, where major infrastructures
were implemented, revealed the same pattern of insensitivity to the social cost of
development as observed on Luzon.

The Mindanao Regional Development Project together with a host of “economic

and social reforms in Mindanao and Sulu” was precisely aimed at giving a socio-
economic dimension to the military activities against the Muslim secessionist movement.
Whether or not the “socio-economic uplift” of the people of Mindanao, particularly of
the indigenous peoples, was achieved through the combined programs in infrastructure
efforts in the South could probably be assessed in the incongruous scenes of huge
technological complexes in the midst of communities living a marginal existence. It may
have resulted in their displacement and further marginalization. To the inhabitants of
these communities, the dreamed promise that is Mindanao may have become a
nightmare.

IV.Lessons Learned and Peace Message

The major challenge of the post-war Republic was nation-building; i.e., how to
make the peoples of this archipelago (especially the Moros and Lumads) feel they are
part of the Filipino nation. The discussions above showed how the post-war
governments of Magsaysay, Garcia and Marcos tried to institute agencies that would
effect the integration program of the government. Yet, the same discussions showed
the problems and difficulties that seemed to hinder the achievement of these agencies’
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goals. The CNI, for instance, was virtually made “to swallow more than it could chew”
by its Charter. The first two4 of the seventeen functions and duties assigned to this
agency necessitated huge appropriations, as they were capital-intensive projects. CNI’s
annual budget of five million pesos (and only half of the amount was assured of
release) was not even enough for its other programs and projects. For lack of funds,
even the Commission’s task of establishing “public schools in the regions inhabited by
the National Cultural Minorities” (Section 4, (e), R.A. 1888 as amended by R.A. 382)
could not be effectively implemented. The statement of Antonio Isidro, MSU’s first
president, bears witness to this:

The situation seems paradoxical when it is considered that all along

the government has pledged interest in the education of the Muslims to
enable them to find national identification with their Christian brothers
from the North; and yet, when the Muslims eventually accepted the public
schools, the government failed to provide the funds to maintain the
schools effectively. The government must manifest greater interest in the
welfare of Muslims if they are to develop a feeling of oneness with the
rest of the people in the country.

Furthermore, the Commission was not spared from political maneuverings and
patronage. Four of its six commissioners came from the three dominant Moro groups.
There were reports that in granting scholarships, one’s membership in an ethno-
linguistic group was given priority over the grantee’s intellectual capacity. In 1962, CNI
was placed in bad light with an expose’ by one of its highest ranking officials of alleged
irregularities in the disbursement of scholarship funds. The expose’ prompted the
General Auditing Office (GAO) to examine the records of the Commission. The report of
the GAO examiners pointed out that certain CNI officials treated scholarship grants like
political pork barrel items, while some of them connived with certain private schools
that made a killing by receiving from the Commission tuition fee payments for non-
existent scholars.

Even the establishment of the Office of Presidential Assistant on National

Minorities (PANAMIN) in 1967 did not save the day for CNI. PANAMIN was actually one
side of the same coin, with the CNI as the other side. From the beginning, the
PANAMIN had certain inherent infirmities, especially in its organizational and
administrative set-up. The absence of sufficient control, check and balance mechanism
on the magnitude and utilization of its resources resulted in such anomalies as bloated

4
Settlement of Land problems and education of National Cultural Communities (especially Moros and
Lumads)
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payroll and rechanneling of funds for purposes other than those mandated for the
PANAMIN.

As pointed out already, the Mindanao Development Authority (MDA), which was
the agency assigned to spearhead the economic component of integration, was also
beset with organizational, financial and vision problems so that for years of its
existence, it was not able to bring genuine development. After all, the agency’s
development thrust was not anchored on self-reliance as it hoped to rely on the infusion
of foreign capital for infrastructure projects to attract foreign investors. That meant, “No
Foreign Investor, No Development”! Besides, MDA did not look at development through
the prism of the Moro and Lumad perspectives, so that often the massive
transformation of the landscape in the project sites collided with the cultural
sensitivities of the indigenous communities in the area. 5

Thus, to a large extent, the integration program of the government in the post-
war period appears to have been unsuccessful. In fact, with just one trigger (i.e., the
Jabidah Massacre), Moro secessionism would easily take shape and threaten the very
territorial integrity of the country in the 1970’s. For sure, there had been several factors
contributing to the failure of the integration program in the post-war period, but what
appeared to be most prominent was the unitary approach and assumption of the
government that the “Moro Question” was simply a problem of underdevelopment, poor
state of education, undelivered social services, etc. Peter Gowing notes:

The whole integration program of the Government seems to revolve

around the philosophy that if the Moros are provided with more roads,
schools, health facilities, civic centers, and industrial plants, and if they
are instructed in more modern methods of farming or are given more
scholarships for higher education in Manila or offered more jobs in
government, then in time they will be “integrated,” that is, they will
resemble the Christian Filipinos. Moros do in fact want many of these
things (hence, the cooperation of some with CNI), but they fear this
philosophy of assimilation, reflecting a basic contempt for the religious,
cultural, and historical factors upon which they anchor their psychological
and social identity.

V. References and Recommended Readings

5
There may be many examples of development efforts that had resulted in conflict instead of progress. Example:
Quarrying in mountains that happened to be burial grounds of Higaunon tribesmen; mining of gold in Subanen
Ancestral Domain; setting up a geothermal plant in Mt Apo, which is considered sacred by the Manobo; etc.
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Antonio Isidro. Muslim-Christian Integration at the Mindanao State University (Marawi:

MSU Research Center), 1968.

------------------. The Moro Problem: An Approach Through Education (Marawi: MSU

Research Center), 1979.

Carlos P. Romulo. “Muslim Problem: A Purely Domestic Affair,” Philippine Quarterly, Vol.
5 No. 3 (September), 1973.

Cesar Majul. “Towards a Social Policy for the Muslims in the Philippines” in Michael
Mastura (ed.) Islam and Development: A Collection of Essays by Cesar Adib Majul
(Manila: Office of the Commissioner for Islamic Affairs) 1980.

Eduardo Tadem. Mindanao Report: A preliminary Study on the Economic Origin of

Social Unrest (Davao City: Afrem Resource Center) 1980.

Eugenio Demigillo. “Mindanao Development and Marginalization” The Philippines in the

Third World Papers, Series No. 20 (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, UP
Diliman) 1979.

Filipinas Foundation Inc. An Anatomy of Muslim Affairs (Makati: Filipinas Foundation

Inc.), 1971.

Mindanao Regional Development Study. Final Report: Industrial Development of

Mindanao (Davao: MRDS), 1974.

Ministry of Muslim Affairs. An Overview on Muslim Development in the Philippines

(Manila: Plans and Policy Service, Ministry of Muslim Affairs), 1983.

Peter Gowing. Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: New Day
Publishers) 1979.

Rad Silva. Two Hills of the Same Land: Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem (Mindanao-
Sulu Critical Studies and Research Group), 1979.

Report of the First National Congress on Muslim Education (Marawi: Mindanao State
University), 1980

Salgado, Geoffrey G. Development Policies for Muslim Mindanao in the Pre-Martial Law
Period (1955-1971): Historical Notes on their Origin and Implementation, Vol 35, Nos 1-
2, 1990.
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Samuel Tan. The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggles: 1900-1972 (Makati: Filipinas
Foundation Inc.) 1977.

Senate Committee on National Minorities. Report on the Problems of Philippine Cultural

Minorities (Manila: Bureau of Printing),1963.