1

THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. NO. 5712, June 29, 2005 ]

FRANCISCO LORENZANA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with
violation of the Civil Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law profession.

In a verified complaint dated May 27, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent, while
employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his
retirement on May 15, 2002, was a member of the People's Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB) of Quezon City, receiving a monthly honorarium of P4,000.00.[1] He was also a
member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, also receiving a
monthly allowance/ honorarium.[2]

Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law,
receiving acceptance fees ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.  He lives in a house
and lot owned by complainant's family without paying any rental and refuses to leave
the place despite the latter's demands.

Asked to comment on the complaint, respondent countered that his membership in the
PLEB of Quezon City, representing the NGO, was without fixed compensation.  He
reported only once a week in the afternoon for which he received only per diems allowed
under Section 43 par. (c) of Republic Act No. 6975.[3] As regards his designation as a
member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized under Section 406 of
the Local Government Code of 1991; and his monthly allowance/honorarium is allowed
under Section 393.

While he received allowances, honoraria and other emoluments as member of the PLEB
and of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, even as he is in the government service, the same is
authorized by law.  Hence, there was no double compensation.  He admitted having
appeared as private counsel in several cases.  However, his clients were his relatives and
friends, among them were complainant's father and brother Ricardo.  He emphasized
that his services were pro bono.

Respondent denied that the lot on which his house is built belongs to complainant's
family.  In fact, it is now the subject of an "Accion Publiciana" filed against him by one
Dionisio delos Reyes before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100.

In a Resolution dated January 20, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila, who conducted the investigation, found that
respondent's appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Town Proper, Novaliches, Quezon City, while concurrently employed as a legal officer of
the Manila Urban Settlements Office is not unlawful.  Such appointment is in
accordance with the Local Government Code of 1991.  Nor could respondent be found
liable for receiving honoraria as a Lupon member, since the Local Government Code of
1991 authorizes Lupon members to receive honoraria, allowances, and other
emoluments. With respect to respondent's appointment as PLEB member, IBP
Commissioner Aguila stated that the same is not an exception to the prohibition against
dual appointments or employment of government officials or employees.

IBP Commissioner Aguila found that respondent's court appearances as counsel for
litigants do not constitute private practice of law since complainant failed to show that
he received compensation.  However, respondent should still be held liable for violation
of Civil Service Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by
his Office to appear as counsel for his clients.

On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-93
quoted as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and in view of respondent's accepting appointment as Board Member of the
People's Law Enforcement Board of Quezon City while he was still employed as Legal
Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month and hereby REPRIMANDED
with stern WARNING for failing to obtain written permission from his superiors to
appear as counsel to certain relatives and friends as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules.
The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or
appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is
contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides:

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or 2employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."[4]
In trying to justify his appointment as PLEB member, respondent invoked Section 43 (c)
of R.A. No. 6975[5] quoted below which, according to him, is the law allowing him to be
appointed as such member of the Quezon City PLEB.

"Section 43.  People's Law Enforcement Board

x x x                                         x x x                               x x x

(c) Compensation, Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty.  However, PLEB members
may be paid per diem as may be determined by the city or municipal council from city or
municipal funds."
It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members.  It
cannot be construed as an exception to the Constitutional and statutory prohibition
against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees.

Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the
Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception
to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes.  Indeed,
respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local Government Code of 1991.   Being contra
leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Attorney's Oath.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
These duties are further enshrined in the Attorney's Oath, which every lawyer in this
jurisdiction has to take before he is allowed to practice law.  The Attorney's Oath states
in part that every lawyer "shall support the Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities…"

The lawyer's paramount duty to society is to obey the law.  For of all classes
and professions, it is the lawyer who is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he is
their sworn servant.[6] Sadly, respondent failed to fulfill this exacting duty.

On respondent's appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay

Novaliches Proper, while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements
Office, we agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order,
being allowed by law.

"Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members

x x x                x x x                 x x x
(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except as
provided for in Section 393 and without prejudice to incentives as provided for in this
Section and in Book IV of this Code.  The Department of Interior and Local Government
shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to the lupon or
pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and
expeditiously resolve cases referred to them.  While in the performance of their
duties, the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private
employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer
from any diminution in compensation or allowance from said employment
by reason thereof."
The above provision allows government officials and employees to sit
as lupon or pangkat members.  The phrase "whether in public or private employment"
sustains respondent's posture.

We now determine whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed
as Legal Officer V in the Manila Urban Settlement Office.  Private practice of law
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer. [7] Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind.  The
practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition
of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. [8]

In the case at bar, respondent's appearance as counsel is not merely isolated.  Evidence
presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law.  While
employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained
a law office.  The pleadings he signed as "counsel" for his clients filed with the courts
indicate his office address as "Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches,
Quezon City."  Following is the letter head appearing on the letters and envelopes[9] sent
to his clients:

"Cesar G. Fajardo
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law
Room 201 7 J & A Building
244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches
Quezon City."
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila
Urban Resettlement) is "not really strict when it comes to appearing in some private
cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to render service even on holidays
without additional compensation."  At most, he should have asked written permission
from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
that "(n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department."
As to respondent's alleged unlawful stay on complainant's property affecting his
conduct as a member of the Bar, suffice it to state that any discussion on this issue is
premature since the case is still pending in the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City.

Anent the penalty to be imposed, as mentioned earlier, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month for accepting a
prohibited appointment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City and be reprimanded
for failing to obtain a written permission from his "superiors" to appear as counsel "for
certain friends and relatives."  We believe that a heavier penalty should be imposed
upon him for he transgressed not only the statutes but the very fundamental law itself,
in violation of his Attorney's Oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which is he is required to take
before admission to practice, for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.  The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice (Stress
supplied).
WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City
while concurrently employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office,
in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorney's
Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of
law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months effective from notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be spread
upon the records of Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo; the Office of the Court Administrator to be
furnished to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
2

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 4539, May 14, 1997 ]

ROMANA R. MALIGSA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARSENIO FER

CABANTING, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a
verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming a
lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May
1992[1] over a piece of property subject of a pending civil case before the
Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case
No. U-5434.[2]

On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint.

He failed to comply despite service upon him of our Resolution together
with copy of the complaint.

On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio

Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to do so and
directed the case submitted for decision.

On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court
finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for
making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Quitclaim in
question that the affiant therein signed the document and acknowledged
the contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in
truth and in fact the affiant did not and could not have done so.

The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was
purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V. Abaoag
over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.[3] The
subject document was notarized by respondent on the same date. The
document was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a
pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with
prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order plus damages.

The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been
executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene Maligsa
died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.[4] Moreover, Irene Maligsa
could not have signed the document because she "never knew how to write
as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered." [5]

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [6] provides

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer

duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his
free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he
is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned document
specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared IRENE MALIGSA
x x x x" [7] Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally appear before
the Notary Public or any other person authorized to take such
acknowledgment of instruments or documents.

In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible
for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim
on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and
validity before respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having
died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to
require the personal appearance of the person executing a document to
enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.

Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been
involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the
Canons of Professional Ethics.

In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting, [8] the

Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months
from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his client's
property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding
contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and
Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the circumstances, a
recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in the practice of
law is apropos.

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as
well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession. [9]

Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public

interest in a substantial degree and protection of the interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries
public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the
administrative offices generally.[10] Notarization of a private document
converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to

subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his
effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a
mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his

professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. [11] Considering the serious nature of the instant
offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for
which he was penalized with a six (6) month suspension from the practice
of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the
instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants
the imposition of a much graver penalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER

CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his
continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well
as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,

Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima Jr., Panganiban, and
Torres Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., is on leave.

3
4
5

6Nakpil vs Valdes [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

16OCT

Ponente: PUNO, J.

FACTS:

Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer residence in
Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property
for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter
could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he
used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name.

The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil
died. Respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the
Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and the complainant.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.

RATIO:

[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same
time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest
of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.

[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be
doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these
two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were
valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether
there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict
of interest.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good
faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.

7
EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 3637, January 24, 2001 ]

RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ERNESTO H.

PILLA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:
Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this Court the instant
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent)
alleging deceit and gross misconduct on the part of the latter. The
complaint alleges as follows:

1. That on July 23, 1975 the respondent executed a Real Estate

Mortgage in favor of the complainant over a parcel of land located in
the Municipality of Sagay, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of
the registered owners thereof, Pedro N. Torres and Oscar D. Granada.
A copy of this Real Estate Mortgage is herewith attached as Annex
"A".

2. That together with the aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage the respondent
submitted a Special Power of Attorney by virtue of which he was
purportedly authorized and empowered by the registered owners
 Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel
of land in favor of the complainant. A copy of this Special Power of
Attorney is herewith attached as Annex "B".

3. That on the security of, among others, the aforesaid parcel of land
over which the respondent represented that he is authorized to
mortgage, complainant extended and released a loan to the
respondent in the amount of P91,427.00.

4. That complainant subsequently and much later learned that the

respondent was not at all authorized and empowered by the
registered owner Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel
of land when it was joined as a defendant in a complaint filed by the
aforesaid Oscar D. Grananda for removal of cloud on title with
preliminary injunction and damages. A copy of this complaint is
herewith attached as Annex "C".

5. That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in the hearing conducted in

connection therewith Oscar D. Granada specifically and categorically
denied having executed and signed the Special Power of Attorney,
Annex B, submitted by the respondent to the complainant in support
of his application for a loan.

6. That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, was subsequently decided
against the respondent wherein the aforesaid Court found that the
Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, was indeed forged and falsified
because the spouses Oscar D. Grananda and Lolita L. Granada have
not signed the same and wherein the Court also made the finding that
the defendant, considering that he has benefited from the said
falsified document, is presumed to have a hand in the preparation of
the same. A copy of this Decision is herewith attached as Annex "D".

7. That the respondent has not appealed from the aforesaid Decision
thereby making the findings of fact made therein final as against him.

8. That the foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the

complainant Bank a forged and falsified Power of Attorney for the
purpose of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do
falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right
to continue further in the practice of law.[1]
Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the
charges of deceit and gross misconduct against him. Respondent denied
employing any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from
complainant rural bank. According to respondent, he did not know that the
signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of attorney appointing
him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of
attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of
land in Sagay, Negros Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank.
Respondent also claimed that if indeed said document was forged, he was
not a party to the forgery. He cited the findings of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 1-C, thus:

Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually

falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet
considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he
is presumed to have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-annex "D".) [2]
Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from complainant rural
bank without depriving it of the opportunity to investigate his financial
capacity as well as to ascertain the genuineness of the special power of
attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor. Thus, respondent is of the
view that, under the circumstances, it cannot be said that he employed
deceit and gross misconduct against complainant rural bank.

After receipt of respondent's comment, the Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties
adduced their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP. Upon agreement of the parties, the matter was resolved on the
basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached thereto. From
these pleadings, the IBP, through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo,
established the following uncontroverted facts:

Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a certain Pedro Torres and Oscar

D. Granada, by virtue of a special power of attorney, respondent applied for
a loan and concomitantly executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the
complainant bank covering the property of Pedro Torres and Oscar D.
Granada. With such security, complainant extended to the respondent his
loan in the amount of P91,427.00. In view of the failure of the respondent
to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was foreclosed by the complainant
bank. Later, Oscar Granada, the real registered owner of the mortgaged
property filed a complaint against the respondent and the complainant for
the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney.
After the trial, the court declared null and void the said Special Power of
Attorney as well as the Real Estate Mortgage for being products of forgery.
This decision was not appealed by the defendants.

There is no showing that respondent, despite the adverse decision, returned

or offered to return the money he took from the complainant bank. The
bank then instituted this disbarment proceeding against the respondent. [3]
The IBP found from the above facts that respondent violated his oath as a
lawyer to do no falsehood, thus:

This office believes that the actuation of the respondent constitutes a

betrayal of his oath as a lawyer. The findings of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental has persuasive effect in this proceeding.

As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in its decision in

Civil Case No. 1-C, entitled "Spouses Oscar D. Granada and Lolita L.
Granada vs. Ernesto H. Pilla, et al", the plaintiffs Granada spouses have not
signed the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent
and the said spouses' signatures as appearing in the Special Power of
Attorney are not their true and genuine signatures for actually they have
not executed nor granted a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein
respondent authorizing him to mortgage the one-third (1/3) share of the
said spouses in the mortgaged property. The trial court stressed that:

"...Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually

falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet
considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he
is presumed to have a hand on the same.

Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in fact he admitted that he notarized

the said documents, Exhibit "A" and "B", with the assurance of Atty. Pilla
that the signatures appearing in the said documents were the signatures of
Atty. Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro Torres, registered owners of the
property in question."
Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the questioned Special
Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent, testified in said Civil Case as
follows:

Now, compañero, will you please relate to this Honorable Court the
"Q circumstances under which you notarized this Special Power of
Attorney now marked as Exh. "A" on April 21, 1975?
Yes, sir. I remember that on the same day, April 21, 1975, defendant
Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla personally appeared before me and he
brought along with him this Special Power of Attorney executed in
his favor. He told me to notarize it. I asked him about the signature
of Atty. Oscar D. Granada if this is his signature and he said "Yes". I
"A
also asked him about the signature of the other principal and he
said also "Yes". With that assurance and being a brother lawyer I
accommodated him. Knowing that he will not do anything that is
illegal and I have confidence in him considering that he is a lawyer
and he knows what he was doing, I accommodated him."
(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil Case No. 1, RTC, Branch
LX, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental)

If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the falsification of the Special

Power of Attorney, why did he not explain before the trial court or before
this office the circumstances on how he obtained the same. He did not even
bother to identify his alleged client who provided him the forged Special
Power of Attorney. Instead, respondent is banking on his defense that the
complainant bank has not introduced any evidence to prove that he forged
the Special Power of Attorney. He relied on the argument that his
transaction with the complainant bank was purely commercial business
and did not involve his capacity as a lawyer. Further, if it is true that the
respondent maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity as he
asserted, why did he represent before the notary public that the signatures
appearing in the Special Power of Attorney were the signatures of the real
owners if he was not actually aware that the signatures were that of the real
owners.
The office is convinced that the actuation of the respondent is
misrepresentation constituting gross misconduct at the very least. This is a
violation of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man.[4]
In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five (5) years. The IBP, through
Resolution No. XIV-00-175, dated 7 April 2000, of its Board of Governors,
substantially adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Elamparo but modified the penalty. The IBP RESOLVED as
follows:

...to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as annex
"A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, said recommendation is with
modification that Respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for THREE (3) years for misrepresentation.[5]
We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, since
respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed
to have a hand in the falsification of the same. Respondent miserably failed
to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he had no
knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give credence to respondent's
negative assertion that he did not know that the special power of attorney
issued in his favor was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to
know that parties to a public document must personally appear before the
notary public to attest that the same is their own free act and deed. In utter
disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special power of
attorney to be notarized without the parties appearing before the notary
public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural
bank in order to obtain a loan therefrom. It is thus apparent that
respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document especially
considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, "the settled
rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore
guilty of falsification."[6] Further, "if a person had in his possession a
falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it
and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material
author of the falsification."[7]

Respondent's acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." The fact that the conduct pertained to respondent's
private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A lawyer
may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.[8] Possession of good moral
character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members of the bar.[9]

Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent

be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years is
approved.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla

guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt
with.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and
spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

8
FACTS:
Mrs. Dantes alleged that his husband is a philanderer. Atty. Dantes purportedly engaged 
in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children 
with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular sup
port to his wife and their children, thus  forcing her to work abroad to provide for their c
hildren’s needs.

Atty. Dantes admitted the fact of marriage with her and the birth of their children, but al
leged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen years before after his wife had 
abandoned him in their residence. He further asserted that Mrs. Dantes filed the case ju
st to force him to remit 70% of his monthly salary to her.

Mrs. Dantes then presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of 
Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave, all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of his 
husband and his paramour to prove the fact that he sired three illegitimate children out 
of his illicit affairs with two different women.

ISSUE:

whether or not having an illicit relationship during the the subsistence of marriahe warr
ants the disbarment of a lawyer.

RULING:

Yes.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dish
onest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct 
which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good 
and respectable members of the community.To be the basis of disciplinary action, the la
wyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so cor
rupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high de
gree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the co
mmon sense of decency.

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different wo
men during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immo
ral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, t
aken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent
s commission of marital infidelity and immorality.

Atty. Crispin G. Dantes has been DISBARRED.