® Academy of Management Journal

1999, Vol. 42, No. 4, 420-428.

RESEARCH NOTES

GETTING MORE THAN YOU PAY FOR:

ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR AND
PAY-FOR-PEJIFORMANCE PLANS
JOHN R. DECKOP
ROBERT MANGEL
Temple University

CAROL C. CIRKA
Neumann College

Economic control frameworks such as agency theory start with the assumption that
employee and employer interests naturally diverge, whereas alternative control frame-
works imply that employee and employer interests are often aligned. Integrating these
literatures, we hypothesized that value alignment moderates the impact of pay for
performance on extrarole behaviors. Our study of employees in the utility industry
supported this hypothesis. Pay for performance had a negative impact on extrarole
hehaviors for employees low in value alignment but not for employees high in value
alignment.

A paradox of social organization is that human
variability must be reduced to ensure predictable
role performance, yet spontaneous and innovative
activity that goes beyond role requirements must
still be encouraged (Katz, 1964). There has been
extensive research on how to design organizational
control systems to accomplish the objective of en-
suring predictable and reliable role performance
(e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Govindarajan & Fisher,
1990; Johnson & Gill, 1993). There has also been
significant research on the construct of extrarole
behavior and its importance to the effective func-
tioning of organizations (e.g., Podsakoff & MacKen-
zie, 1997). There has been a lack of research, how-
ever, on the intersection of control systems and
extrarole behavior, the point at which the critical
paradox identified by Katz occurs.
A pay-for-performance plan, in which compen-
sation is linked to employee performance, is one
form of organizational control, as it motivates em-
ployees to devote effort to in-role performance by
controlling their behaviors, outputs, or both (Oliver
& Anderson, 1995). However, a potential downside
of pay for performance is that it may also discour-
age employees from engaging in behaviors not
linked to monetary rewards, including extrarole
behaviors (George & Jones, 1997; Morrison, 1996;
Wright, George, Farnsworth, & McMahan, 1993).
One critical form of extrarole behavior is organi-
zational citizenship behavior (OGB). OGB is em-
ployee behavior that goes above and beyond the
call of duty, that is discretionary and not explicitly
recognized by the employing organization's formal
reward system, and that contributes to organiza-
tional effectiveness (Organ, 1988; Smith, Organ, &
Near, 1983). OGB is desirable from an organiza-
tional point of view because such behavior is
thought to increase available resources and de-
crease the need for more formal and costly mecha-
nisms of control (Organ, 1988; Podsakoff & Mac-
Kenzie, 1997). If an organization's control system
reduces OGB, the ironic and unfortunate effect is
that the organization may have to invest in other
forms of control in order to encourage spontaneous
and innovative activity.
We suggest that the degree to which the interests
of employees and their organizations are aligned is
a key factor in understanding the impact of control
systems on OGB. In this research note, we draw on
multiple theoretical frameworks to explain why the
degree of interest alignment moderates the impact
of pay for performance on OGB.

CONTROL THEORY AND PERFORMANCE PAY

We wish to thank Gary Blau, Alison Konrad, and John
McClendon for their helpful comments on drafts of this Economics-based control theories offer frame-
work. works for understanding the exchange between em-
420
1999 Deckop, Mangel, and Cirka
ployees and organizations. Agency theory, for ex-
ample, addresses the issues that arise in ah agency
relationship, in which one party (the principal)
delegates work to another (the agent). Most agency
theory models rest on the assumption that the prin-
cipal and the agent have diverging goals and that it
is often expensive for the principal to monitor the
behavior of the agent, given the information asym-
metries between the two (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989;
Fama, 1980). In an agency situation, the principal
basically can choose to provide some form of out-
put-based contingent reward to align the agent's
interests with its own or to invest in mechanisms to
monitor the behavior of the agent (Eisenhardt,
1989). The relative efficiency of each control option
is dependent upon levels of outcome uncertainty,
risk aversion, the costs of monitoring behavior, and
other related variables.
Most agency theory research has focused on the
GEOs of organizations as agents (Barkema & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998), though more recently, strategic com-
pensation research has examined the principle-
agent relation for employees below the GEO level
(e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin,
1992; Milkovich, Gerhart, & Hannon, 1991; Stroh,
Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996). Lower-level em-
ployees, unlike GEOs, have little opportunity to
affect key firm performance indicators. As a result,
many firms base pay increments, awarded as merit
pay, on subjective assessments of employee behav-
ior (Eisenhardt, 1988).
Whether pay-for-performance systems are based
on behavioral monitoring or output control, the
goal of these plans is to encourage employees to .
maximize their individual performance, or in-role
effort. A possible by-product, however, may be a
reduction in the effort devoted to OGB. By clearly
specifying behaviors and outputs that will be re-
warded, organizations risk discouraging behaviors
that will not be explicitly rewarded (Morrison,
1996). This argument has been supported in an
experimental context. Wright and colleagues (1993)
found that subjects given difficult goals and incen-
tives for task completion exhibited relatively low
levels of spontaneous helping behavior.
This tension between rewarding individual per-
formance and maintaining OGB is assumed to re-
sult from divergence in the interests of principal
and agent. Agency theorists and proponents of re-
lated theories, such as transactional cost economics
(Williamson, 1981), have usually assumed that the
interests of the parties involved in employment
transactions are not aligned (Davis, Schoorman, &
Donaldson, 1997). Hence, a formal control sys-
tem—such as pay for performance—is needed to
mediate transactions between the parties; other-
421
wise, natural inclination will result in noncooper-
ative behavior and unfavorable transactions.
Other research on control theory, however, has
not been based on the assumption that the goals of
employer and employee diverge. Ouchi (1980)
drew on the transactional cost economics frame-
work but relaxed the assumption of goal incongru-
ence. He argued that the degree of goal incongru-
ence varied from cases of total divergence to cases
of little or no deviation between the goals of an
organization and an employee. Ouchi's perspective
suggests that firms can proactively manage their
selection and socialization practices so that em-
ployee interests are aligned with the firms'. These
so-called clan forms of organization thus have little
need for formal mechanisms to mediate the ex-
change between individual and organization, be-
cause the employee's natural (or socialized) incli-
nation is to behave in ways that are consistent with
the organization's objectives.
Other theoretical perspectives are consistent
with and extend the clan control perspective. Blau
(1964) distinguished social from economic ex-
change relationships in organizations. Economic
exchange relationships involve tangible, often
short-term, contractual relations with a clear quid
pro quo component, much akin to an output con-
trol system. Social exchange is based on trust be-
tween the parties and does not require an immedi-
ate quid pro quo. In a social exchange relationship,
trust allows for temporary or perceived asymme-
tries between inducements and contributions, and
the relationship itself has value. This valuing of the
relationship allows one party to put the interests of
the other party ahead of his or her own.
The notion that the relationship between em-
ployer and employee can be far more than a tradi-
tional economic exchange has been developed fur-
ther in related lines of research. Van Dyne, Graham,
and Dienesch suggested that when the relationship
between an employee and an organization is char-
acterized by a system of shared values, organiza-
tional identification, and trust, it may become a
covenantal relationship that lies outside the ex-
change framework and involves "intrinsically mo-
tivated effort rather than earning something or get-
ting somewhere" (1994: 768). Similarly, Fox and
Hamilton (1994), Davis and coauthors (1997), and
others have conceptualized managers as stewards,
as opposed to agents. Stewardship theory, devel-
oped in part as a counterpoint to agency theory,
defines situations in which managers are inotivated
by organizational rather than individual goals be-
cause their interests are aligned with those of the
owners (principals) of the organization (Davis et al.,
1997).
422 Academy of Management Journal
In summary, several theoretical perspectives de-
scribe a type of control system that is premised on
the alignment of values between employer and em-
ployee. In such a value-based control system, OGB
would not necessarily represent a cost to employ-
ees. To the extent that goals are aligned, employees
may feel that they'are helping themselves as they
engage in OGB, even though they do not expect
direct, organizational rewards for this behavior. To
the extent that these perspectives apply, we would
not expect support for an agency/transactional cost
economics prediction that the stronger the link be-
tween pay and performance, the less an employee
is likely to engage in OGB.
Control Interaction
The preceding discussion suggests that the effect
of pay for performance on OGB depends on the
broader employment relationship and, more specif-
ically, on the extent of interest alignment. Gonsis-
tent with agency theory predictions, our argument
is that when interests are not aligned, a strong
performance-pay link is the main employment ex-
change between employer and employee. Pay for
performance will likely motivate employees to fo-
cus on their in-role behavior and to avoid behaviors
such as OGB that are not rewarded.
However, when the values of individuals are
tightly aligned with those of the organization, the
employment exchange is social rather than eco-
nomic, and OGB may not be perceived as a cost. For
such value-aligned employees, we predict that pay
for performance will not exert a significantly neg-
ative effect on OGB.
To assess the validity of these cirguments using
individual-level data, it is necessary to translate the
construct of a value-based control system to the
level of employee attitude. The construct of value
commitment is useful in this regard. Mayer and
Schoorman (1992), building on previous research
(Angle & Perry, 1981; Porter, Steers, Mowday, &
Boulian, 1974) defined value commitment as "a
belief in and acceptance of organizational goals and
values and a willingness to exert considerable ef-
fort on behalf of the organization" (Mayer & Schoor-
man, 1992: 673). Thus, value commitment repre-
sents the degree to which employee and employer
values are aligned, and it is equivalent to the ob-
jective of a value-based control system. It has also
been linked conceptually to OGB in previous re-
search (Davis et al., 1997; Mayer & Schoorman,
1992).
In summary, we suggest that the level of em-
ployee value commitment will moderate the rela-
August
tionship between the performance-pay link and
OGB as follows:
Hypothesis la. At low levels of value commit-
ment, there will be a negative relationship
between the strength of the performance-pay
link and organizational citizenship behavior
(OCB).
Hypothesis lb. At high levels of value commit-
ment, there will be no relationship between the
strength of the performance-pay link and OCB.
METHODS
Design of the Study
Eight large, investor-owned gas and electric pub-
lic utilities from across the United States partici-
pated in our survey. The utility industry was a
particularly attractive context for this study, in that
many utilities are modifying their control systems
to incorporate more transactional forms of control,
including pay-for-performance plans.
The survey was administered in 1992 to workers
in similar jobs in the eight participating companies.
The utility companies identified an average of 13
benchmark jobs per company that would be com-
parable to each other in the outside labor market.
The jobs ranged from craft and clerical positions to
supervisory and lower-level managerial work. Al-
though the johs were not necessarily unique to
utilities, it was possible that the industry context
might exert some effect on the results of this study,
potentially limiting the generalizability of results.
Utilities tend to be larger and more hierarchical
than other organizations and, as quasi-public enti-
ties, they may be subject to different political forces
than private sector organizations. Employees in the
majority of jobs in the survey were covered by
union contracts.
Respondents included workers and their imme-
diate supervisors. One supervisor was chosen at
random from each company for each benchmark
job. The supervisors were asked to select, at ran-
dom, up to 10 subordinates (most supervised
fewer) and to report on OGB for each employee.
Supervisors with more than 10 subordinates were
asked to list their employees alphabetically, then
select every other one until 10 were chosen. We
then surveyed the employees selected by the super-
visors (N = 660) about job attitudes, work organi-
zation, and other variables. A total of 512 usable
employee responses were obtained. We were able
to match 340 of these "listwise" with the responses
of the supervisors; not all of these employees were
covered by pay-for-performance plans. Our final
1999 Deckop, Mangel, and Cirka
primary subsample consisted of 146 employees
working under some form of pay-for-performance
plan (individual-, group-, facility-, or company-
based). Gomparisons of this primary subsample of
146 to all survey respondents on demographic vari-
ables indicated that the subsample was representa-
tive in terms of age (42.38 versus 42.06 years),
tenure with the company (15.39 versus 15.20
years), and gender (75 percent versus 76 percent
men), though subsample members were more
highly educated (x = 4.23 vs. 3.70, p < .05).^ This
difference in education is probably due to the fact
that employees covered by pay-for-performance
plans are generally likely to be in higher-level jobs,
which require more education.
Measures
Organizational citizenship behavior. For each
of the employees, supervisors filled out a 9-item
version of the Podsakoff and MacKenzie (1989) Or-
ganizational Gitizenship Behavior Scale. The ques-
tions included 3 from each of the scale's three
dimensions, altruism, sportsmanship, and consci-
entiousness. Practical constraints made it impossi-
ble to use the entire OGB scale. This study reports
results from data collected as part of a larger survey
on human resource practices in the utility industry.
In its full form, the Podsakoff and MacKenzie scale
would have required up to 240 responses (24 items
times ten subordinates) from each supervisor, who
also had several other scales to complete. Re-
sponses on this and all other scales in the study
were on a five-point Likert-type format with an-
chors from 1, "strongly disagree," to 5, "strongly
agree." (Please contact the first author for a list of
the items used in this study.) The OGB scale was
completed by the employees' supervisors; the fol-
lowing scales were completed by employees.
Performance-pay link. We developed a three-
item- scale for this survey to measure the degree to
which employees perceived a strong link between
their performance and pay. The scale items were
"Increased productivity means higher pay for em-
ployees," "My individual performance actually has
little impact on any incentive pay award" (reverse-
coded), and "My performance actually has little
impact on my salary" (reverse-coded). The per-
ceived link between pay and performance is more
relevant to this study than the actual link in that
organizations and units within organizations may
vary in their ability to effectively communicate the
^ For the coding of education level, see "Control vari-
ables," below.
423
existence and scope of a pay-for-performance plan
(Lawler, 1980). Also, employees' attentiveness to
such communication is likely to vary. Hence, some
employees may misperceive the strength of the per-
formance-pay link in their organizations and may
act on their perceptions rather than on reality. Gon-
sistent with this idea, research on employee own-
ership has found that employees' perceived influ-
ence is a more important explanatory variable than
actual ownership (Buchko, 1993) and that an organ-
ization's ability to accurately communicate about
an ownership plan is a significant factor in its suc-
cess (Klein, 1987).
Value alignment. A six-item scale from the Por-
ter et al. (1974) Organizational Gommitment Ques-
tionnaire (OGQ) was used to measure value com-
mitment. We identified these items through a
principal factor analysis using "varimax" rotation
of a 12-item version of the OGQ, which was in-
cluded in the survey. The factor analysis produced
two factors with eigenvalues greater than one. We
labeled these factors "value commitment" and
"continuance commitment." Six of the items
loaded more heavily on the value commitment fac-
tor, and these items constituted our scale. Angle
and Perry (1981) and Mayer and Schoorman (1992)
also factor-analyzed the OGQ, obtained two factor
solutions, and applied similar labels to the factors.
It should be noted that although we applied the
label "value commitment" to this factor, other re-
searchers (e.g., Dunham, Grube, & Gastefieda, 1994)
have argued that the OGQ more closely measures
affective commitment, defined as employees' emo-
tional attachment to, identification with, and in-
volvement in their employing organization (Allen
& Meyer, 1990). Mayer and Schoorman (1998) also
stated that Angle and Perry's (1981) value commit-
ment dimension reflected "a positive, affective ori-
entation to the organization" (Mayer & Schoorman,
1998: 16). A difference between value and affective
commitment is that the latter implies emotional
attachment. Since it seems reasonable to assume
that value alignment will produce emotional at-
tachment, the degree to which our measure of value
commitment reflected an affective orientation
should not have significantly affected our results or
conclusions.
Control variables. Four control variables were
included: a measure of procedural justice, and de-
mographic information related to employee gender,
age, and education. Previous research has asserted
the role of procedural justice as a necessary condi-
tion for a social exchange relationship, and hence
OGB, to occur (Moorman, 1991; Organ, 1988). Pro-
cedural justice has also been shown to be positively
related to value commitment (Organ & Ryan, 1995).
424 Academy of Management Journal August

Though procedural justice does not directly relate
to our theorizing about control systems' relation to
value commitment and its consequences for behav-
ior in the context of a pay-for-performance system,
procedural justice was a necessary control variable.
Employees low in value commitment may be more
likely to possess negative perceptions of the fair-
ness of organizational procedures, particularly a
pay-for-performance system. If we had not con-
trolled for procedural justice in our analyses, our
estimates of the effect of value commitment could
have reflected procedural justice effects as well. To
measure procedural justice, we followed the
method used by Moorman (1991) and developed a
seven-item scale that reflected the rules of proce-
dural justice developed by Leventhal (1980) and
Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry (1980).
Employee gender, age, and education were in-
cluded because all could be related to employee
attitudes (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997) such
as value commitment, as well as to OCB. Education
was coded on a six-point scale ranging from "some
high school" (1) to "graduate training" (6).
The subsample of nonunion employees was too
small to warrant separate analyses; no significant
differences were found in OCB, value commitment,
and the performance-pay link between unionized
and nonunionized employees.
RESULTS
Table 1 contains means, standard deviations, cor-
relations, and reliability levels of the study vari-
ables. Scale reliabilities all exceeded the cutoff of
.70 suggested by Nunnally (1978).
We tested our study's hypotheses using moder-
ated regression analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). The
specification of the interaction term enabled us to
assess whether the effect of the performance-pay
link on OCB varied with the level of employee
value commitment, as predicted. With the effects of
the performance-pay link and value commitment
entered, along with the control variables, we added
the interaction of the performance-pay link and
value commitment. The significance level of that
coefficient represented a test of whether the addi-
tion of the interaction term contributed a statisti-
cally significant increment to R^ (Aiken & West,
1991).
The results shown in Table 2 are consistent with
the moderation effect implied by our hypotheses.
The first column reports results without the mod-
erator specified; the second column includes the
moderator. Results show a statistically significant
(p < .01) interaction between the performance-pay
link and value commitment. Comparisons between
columns indicate that the addition of the interac-
tion term resulted in a significant increase in fl^
[p < .01). These results imply that the effect of the
performance-pay link on OCB is influenced by the
value commitment of employees.
To further explore the interaction, we calcu-
lated regression coefficients for the performance-
pay link effect at several levels of value commit-
ment (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen,
1983). Calculations were made at one standard
deviation below the mean of value commitment,
^vhich represents low^ value conunitment; one
standard deviation above the mean, which repre-
sents high value commitment; and at the mean of
value commitment.
At low value commitment, the slope estimate of
the performance-pay link is -1.07 + .25 (3.48) =
-.20 [t = -2.28, p < .05). At high value commit-
ment, the slope is -1.07 + .25 (4.76) = .12 [t =
1.46, p > .10), and at the mean, the slope is -1.07 +

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics, Pearson Correlations, and Reliabilities
Variable Mean s.d.

1, OCB 3.86 0.67 (.88)

2, Performance-pay link 3.26 0.92 .08 (.71)
3. Value commitment 4.12 0.64 .28** .30** (.82)
4 Value commitment X 13.59 4.84 .21* .91** .65**
performance-pay link
5, Procedural justice 3.23 0.80 .23** .27** .29** .33** (.90)
6, Age 42.38 8.80 -.09 .02 .11 .06 .13
7, Education 4.23 1.45 .08 -.10 -.05 -.09 -.06 -.12
8. Gender'' 1.24 0.43 .01 .12 .13 .15 .09 -.14 -.30*

° N = 146; coefficient alphas appear on the diagonal.

'' Coding: 1 = man, 2 = woman.
* p < .05
** p < .01
1999 Deckop, Mangel, and Cirka 425

TABLE 2
Results of Regression Analysis for
Without With
Independent Variable Interaction Interaction Sample of 340

Intercept 2.67** (.52) 5.99** (.51) 3.23** (.50)

Value commitment 0.27** (.09) -0.52^ (.31) -0.00 (.12)
Performance-pay link -0.02 (.06) -1.07** (.39) -0.31** (.18)
Value commitment X performance-pay link 0.25** (.09) 0.08* (.04)
Procedural justice 0.15* (.07) 0.15* (.07) 0.13** (.04)
Age -0.01^ (.00) -O.Ol'^ (.00) -0.00 (.00)
Education 0.04 (.04) 0.03 (.04) 0.06* (.02)
Gender -0.05 (.13) -0.07 (.13) 0.03 (.08)

.13 .17 .13

Adjusted R^ .09 .13 .12
F. 3.52** 4.17** 7.30**
N 146 146 340

' Values are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

"^p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01

.25 (4.12) = -.04. The results show a significant, DISCUSSION

negative effect of pay for performance on OCB for
low value commitment, a marginally significant,
positive effect of pay for performance on OCB for
high value commitment, and no effect of pay for
performance on OCB at the mean.
In summary, the results presented in Tahle 2 and
the supplemental tests described ahove support our
hypotheses. As predicted hy Hypothesis la, for em-
ployees low in value commitment, the stronger the
performance-pay link, the less they will engage in
OCB. For individuals high in value commitment,
we obtained a statistically insignificant coefficient
estimate, a finding supporting Hypothesis Ih.
We also conducted, for comparison purposes, an
analysis that utilized the full sample of 340. This
sample included individuals who reported on the
survey that they were not covered hy a pay-for-
performance plan. Results from the sample of 340,
shown in Tahle 2, are similar to those for the sam-
ple of 146. Though effect sizes are somewhat
smaller, the interaction hetween the performance-
pay link and value commitment is positive and
statistically significant [p < .05), which again sup-
ports the argument that the effect of the perfor-
mance-pay link on OCB depends on the value com-
mitment of employees.
Consistent with previous research (Organ &
Ryan, 1995), procedural justice was a significant
predictor of OCB. The age of an employee had a
negative and marginally significant effect on OCB.
The gender and education of the employee failed to
exert a statistically significant effect.
The results of this study provide hoth negative
and positive evidence regarding the effects of he-
havioral and output control systems in organiza-
tions. On the negative side, for employees low in
value commitment a pay-for-performance system
appears to he a disincentive for engaging in OCB.
The stronger they perceive the performance-pay
link to be, the less likely they are to engage in
organizational citizenship behavior. This result,
which is consistent with agency and transactional
cost economics predictions, represents a downside
to the use of behavioral and output control systems
not previously identified in field research.
The positive evidence is that pay-for-perfor-
mance plans do not appear to discourage OCB for
value-committed employees. This result is consis-
tent with previous research on control systems in
which a conflict of interests between employer and
employee has not heen assumed, and it further sug-
gests that most agency/transactional cost economics
models are limited in their applicability and may
need to be modified to account for convergent inter-
ests. In fact, agency models can be constructed to
reflect convergent interests, though in practice most
are not (Albanese, Dacin, & Harris, 1997).
Interestingly, we obtained a fairly sizable, posi-
tive estimate for the performance-pay link for val-
ue-aligned employees that was marginally statisti-
cally significant in a one-tailed test. A positive
effect of pay-for-performance on OCB is potentially
compatible with what Tsui and her colleagues
(1997) termed a "mutual investment" approach to
426 Academy of Management Journal
the employee-organization relationship. Mutual in-
vestment in their study was indicated, in part, by
the existence of a unit-based pay-for-performance
plan. Tsui and coauthors found that organizations
that adopted a mutual investment approach expe-
rienced more employee OCB. This finding suggests
that value-aligned employees may view pay for per-
formance less as a short-term quid pro quo and
more as an element of a broad, long-term social
exchange relationship. These employees may view
pay for performance as an investment on the part of
the organization, and they respond with OCB.
Results of this study also present interesting
implications for research into antecedents of OCB.
The lack of a negative relationship between the
performance-pay link and OCB for value-aligned
employees suggests that OCB is not necessarily a
cost to employees. If this is true, exchange-based
theories may be limited in their ability to explain
OCB. Though there is persuasive evidence that
OCB is an outcome consistent with a social ex-
change relationship, results of this study are also
consistent with previous research that has identi-
fied nonexchange explanations of OCB. For exam-
ple, Pearce and Cregerson (1991) found that altru-
ism in the form of felt responsihility predicted
extrarole behaviors, and Van Dyne and colleagues
(1994) found that extrarole behaviors resulted from
a covenantal relationship between employee and
employer, a relationship that, like altruism, tran-
scended exchange. In these studies, altruism and
intrinsic motivation were suggested as probable an-
tecedents of OCB. In future studies, researchers
should consider further theoretical and empirical
assessment of the place of motivational antecedents
in the nomological net of OCB. A focus at the level
of motivation may help explain the conditions un-
der which employees transcend an exchange rela-
tionship with their employers.
A limitation of any study involving OCB is
whether the measure used is valid. As has heen
argued (e.g., Morrison, 1994; Robinson & Morrison,
1995), individual differences and contextual fac-
tors may determine whether a behavior measured
hy an OCB scale is in fact an extrarole behavior. For
example, as Eastman (1994) pointed out, what for
some employees may be citizenship behavior for
others may be an attempt to ingratiate themselves
to employers or supervisors. Civen this limitation,
our results may represent a conservative test of
Hypothesis la. To the extent that the hehaviors we
measured in our OCB scale were in fact in-role
behaviors, the less we would expect to find a neg-
ative relationship between the strength of the pay-
for-performance link and our measurement of OCB.
Yet we did find a negative effect for the strength of
August
the pay-for-perfofmance link when value commit-
ment was low. If we were able to obtain a more
accurate measure of OCB, we would expect to ob-
serve an even stronger negative relation between
pay for performance and OCB for those employees
who are less value-committed.
Future research that addresses the interaction of
different control systems within and across organi-
zations would he valuable, as organizations con-
tinue to alter the nature of their relationships with
employees. The utility industry presents an espe-
cially good context for exploring the issues of in-
teracting control systems. Utilities have historically
been heavily regulated, very paternalistic, and
heavily unionized (as was our sample). Now, they
are moving toward more transactional forms of con-
trol, in which the focus is on enhancing individual
and organizational performance in order to adapt to
deregulation and increased competition.
With respect to the unionized part of the work-
force in particular, this movement toward transac-
tional control manifests itself in a move to various
forms of pay for performance. From an agency per-
spective, pay for performance attempts to align em-
ployer and employee interests. Many group incen-
tive systems also entail increased employee
participation in decision making (Lawler & Jenkins,
1992). These evolving forms of workforce gover-
nance challenge the notion that union and manage-
ment necessarily have conflicting interests in all
areas of the employment relationship. The assump-
tion of conflicting interests has historically under-
lain industrial relations theory (Kaufmann, 1993;
Kochan, 1980). In the same way, it provides an
underpinning for economic theories of control sys-
tems, such as the agency/transactional cost eco-
nomics perspective. As industrial relations theory
evolves, newer models that incorporate elements
such as trust (Fox, 1974) and social exchange (Ma-
honey & Watson, 1993) reflect convergent interests,
as do perspectives such as input-, clan-, and value-
based control in the control theory literature.
The utility industry exemplifies a more general
trend in the United States. In recent decades, the
employment relationship has heen moving away
from long-term, bureaucratic forms in which em-
ployees are tightly tied to organizations. In con-
trast, we observe more flexible arrangements, in
which employees are less firmly attached to given
organizations and there is more emphasis placed
on immediate, short-term employee performance
(Kanter, 1989; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988; Useem, 1993).
Organizations with histories of long-term employ-
ment relationships, in which social or value-hased
control was an important component of the overall
control systems, are increasingly implementing
1999 Deckop, Mangel, and Cirka
performance-based incentive systems. To the ex-
tent that value-based control systems are eroding
in such organizations, other methods of fostering
organizational citizenship hehavior may need to be
identified as the shift to transactional forms of con-
trol discourages good citizenship.
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John R. Deckop is an associate professor of human re-
source administration at the Fox School of Business and
Management, Temple University. He received his Ph.D.
in industrial relations from the University of Minnesota.
His research interests include the effects of pay systems
on employee motivation and behavior, especially extra-
role behavior.
Robert Mangel is an assistant professor of human re-
source administration at the Fox School of Business and
Management, Temple University. He received his Ph.D.
from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsyl-
vania. His current research interests include individual
and group incentive systems, employee participation,
work-family initiatives, and work-technology interfaces.
Carol G. Cirka is a doctoral candidate in the Fox School
of Business and Management at Temple University and
an assistant professor of management at Neumann Gol-
lege. She received her M.B.A. from the University of
Pittsburgh. Her doctoral work examines the effects of
management controls on psychological empowerment
and proactive employee behaviors.