fCase Brief: Gerochi vs.

Department of Energy
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), petitioners
vs
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC),
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO), respondents.
FACTS:
On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001.
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law
for being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of
a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively
of the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government
debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy
and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross
subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge shall be collected by the
ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp.
through the creation of a special trust fund.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC
HELD:
No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the
regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental
to the regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue
and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru
regulation.
Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative
parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule
solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency
which is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before
execution must pass both the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. The court in
appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions
free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.
— POLITICAL LAW, TAXATION —
Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008 “Lawful Subjects”
and“Lawful Means”, Legal Standing, Police Power
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS: 
Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under
Philippinelaws, both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
agriculturalchemicals.Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital
recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate
capital was raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid
P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped
the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted,
however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and
an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI argues that Fertiphil has no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because itdoes not have a
“personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.” It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition
because“incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the
sellerfertilizer company.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.What
is the power of taxation?
RULING: 
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a
mereprocedural technicality which may be waived.The imposition of the levy was an exercise of
the taxation power of the state. While it is true that thepower to tax can be used as an implement
of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenuegeneration. If the purpose is
primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantialpurposes, then the
exaction is properly called a tax.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are
distinct andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact
legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The
main purpose of police power isthe regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue
generation. The “lawful subjects” and“lawful means” tests are used to determine the validity of a
law enacted under the police power. Thepower of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed
by inherent and constitutional limitations.

·!!! A! void! or! inexistent! contract! has! no! force! and! effect! from! the! very!
beginning,!as!if!it!had!never!been!entered!into.!!It!is!equivalent!to!nothing!and!is!
absolutely!wanting!in!civil!effects.!It!cannot!be!validated!either!by!ratification!or!
prescription.
Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 197743, March 12, 2018

Heirs of Mariano vs Naga City Facts: The officers of City Heights Subdivision wrote to the
mayor of the City of Naga (City), offering to construct the Naga City Hall within the premises of
the Subdivision. Their letter indicated that the City Hall would be built on an area of not less
than two hectares within the Subdivision, which would be designated as the open space reserved
for a public purpose. Upon the City's request, the Subdivision amended its offer and agreed to
donate five hectares to the City. The area is a portion of the land registered in the names of
Macario Mariano and Jose Gimenez under TCT No. 671 measuring a total of 22.9301 hectares.
The amended offer was signed by Mariano and Gimenez to indicate their "conforme," together
their respective spouses. Thereafter, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89 accepting
the Subdivision's offer of donation and its proposed contract. According to the City, the Mayor
Imperial and the registered landowners, Mariano and Gimenez, executed a Deed of Donation on
August 16, 1954, whereby the latter donated five hectares of land (subject property), two
hectares of which to be used as the City Hall site, another two hectares for the public plaza, and
the remaining hectare for the public market. By virtue thereof, the City entered the property and
began construction of the government center. It also declared the five-hectare property in its
name for tax purposes. Subsequently, other government agencies and instrumentalities entered
the same property and built their offices thereon. However, the heirs of Mariano (petitioners)
aver that the plan to donate five hectares to the City did not materialize as the contract to build
the City Hall was not awarded to the Subdivision but to a another contractor (Francisco Sabaria).
This caused Mariano and officers of the Subdivision to meet with Mayor Imperial to demand the
return of the five-hectare lot as the condition for the donation was not complied with. Mayor
Imperial purportedly assured them that the City would buy the property from them. On May 14,
1968, Mariano instructed the Subdivision's President to make a follow-up on the City's payment
for the subject lot. The purchase, however, did not materialize. In 1971, Mariano died without
receiving payment from the City. In 1976, a certain Tirso Mariano filed an action for partition of
Mariano's estate. The action was opposed by his widow, Irene, and their adopted children, Jose
and Erlinda. Irene died in 1988. Jose's heirs and Erlinda were declared as Irene's heirs. In 2003,
Danilo Mariano, as administrator of Irene's estate, demanded upon then City Mayor of Naga,
Jesse M. Robredo, to vacate and return the subject property. When the City did not comply,
petitioners, as heirs of Jose and Erlinda, filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against the City.
The MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that the
City's defense, which involved a claim of ownership, removed the issue from the case of
unlawful detainer. The RTC reversed the dismissal and ruled in favor of petitioners by ordering
the City of Naga and the other government agencies occupying the subject property to vacate
therefrom and pay back rentals to petitioners. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), in an
amended decision, overturned the RTC and upheld the dismissal of the MTC. The CA thus
concluded that the existence and due execution of the Deed of Donation had been duly
established, warranting the dismissal of the ejectment case. The CA also found that petitioners'
claim was barred by laches, noting that the City had been in open, public and adverse possession
of the subject property for 49 years at the time the ejectment case was filed.

Issue : Whether or not the Petitioners, as heirs of a registered owner of the subject property,
have the preferred or better right of possession

Held: Yes. The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners' superior right to possess the
property in unlawful detainer cases. A fundamental principle in land registration is that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the. person whose name appears therein. It is conclusive evidence as regards
ownership of the land therein described, and the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession Thus, the Court has time and again reiterated the
age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a parcel of land is entitled to possession
thereof. The title to the subject property remains registered in the names of Macario and
Gimenez. The alleged Deed of Donation does not appear to have been registered and TCT No.
671 does not bear any inscription of said Deed. It has likewise been constantly emphasized that
when the property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the
property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for
unlawful detainer. It has even been held that it does not even matter if the party's title to the
property is questionable. It has been held that a certificate of title has a superior probative value
as against that of an unregistered deed of conveyance in ejectment cases. As against the City's
unregistered claim, the Torrens title in the name of Mariano and Gimenez must prevail,
conferring upon the registered owners the better right of possession. This superior or preferred
right of possession applies to petitioners as Mariano's hereditary successors who have stepped
into said decedent's shoes by operation of law.

85 Phil. 663

TUASON, J.:
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 provides:
"Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction Pi-
nance Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or any other entity or person at a
rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent per annum for the purpose of purchasing or
exprfopriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling
them at cost to residents of the said cities and municipalities."
The court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but not to
expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the
present action, which seeks to condemn, for the purpose just stated, several parcels of
land having a combined area of 7270 square meters and situated on Legarda Street, City
of Manila.

In the cases of Guide vs. Rural Progress Administration, (G. R. No. L-2089), [1] and
Commonwealth of the Philippines vs. Borja, (G. R. No. L-1496),[2] we discussed at great
length the extent of the Philippine Government's power to condemn private property for
resale. Among other things, we said:
"It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take
the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when
the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one
inconsistent with every just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (29
G.J.S. 820.)
"In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that
embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation, to the
public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited,
and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the
expropriation with public interest and. public use. The expropriation in such cases tends
to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, endless conflicts between landlords
and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and
public peace and order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be
applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction
of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit,
public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent
domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests involved are
of considerable magnitude. (29 C.J.S. 823, 82; see also People of Puerto Rico vs. Eastern
Sugar Associates et al, 156 Fed. [2d] 316.) In some instances, slumsites have been,
acquired by condemnation. The highest court of New York State has ruled that slum
clearance and erection of houses for low-income families were public purposes for which
New York City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. And this
decision was followed by similar ones in other states. The underlying reasons for these
decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and insanitary dwellings
diminishes the potentialities of epidemics; crime and waste, prevents the spread of
crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the
surrounding communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general.
(Murray fit al. vs. La Guardia, 52 N.E. [2d] 884; General Development Coop. vs. City of
Detroit, 33 N.W. [2d] 919; Weizner vs. Stichman, 64 N. Y. S. [2d] 50.) But it will be
noted that in all these "cases and others of similar nature extensive areas were involved
and numerous people and the general public benefited by the action taken.
"The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their
families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use
public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the
economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public
peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take
plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her
and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the
stipulated rent or leave the premises.
"No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can
be made; each case has to be judged according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices
to say for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in
those elements which make? for public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon
an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and
embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open
the gates to .more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we
see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and
subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy
closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by
condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for
subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon.
We are inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to
purchase lands for homesites. The word "expropriating", taken singly or the text, is
susceptible of only one meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to
the limitations and conditions noted in the decisions above cited. The National
Government nay not confer upon its instrumentalities authority which it itself may not
exercise. A stream can not run higher than its source.
Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is we alter for the condemnor. In the first
place, the land that is the subject of the present expropriation is only one-third of the
land sought to be taken in the Guido case, and about two-thirds of that involved in the
Borja condemnation proceeding. In the second place, the Arellano Colleges' land is
situated in a highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons who are
not bona fide, tenants. Lastly, this land was bought by the defendant for a university site
to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for schools of higher learning.
To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of
eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and
purposes. (29 C. J. S. 884-885.) In City of Manila vs. Manila Chinese Community, (40
Phil., 349), this court, citing American decisions, laid down this rule:
"The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and
that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs.
Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R.
R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)"
And this passage in Blackstone's Commentaries on the English Law is cited in that
decisions "80 great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize
the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great
necessity thereof."
Perhaps modern decisions are not so exigent. Necessity within the rule that the
particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an. absolute
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit
to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and
property owner consistent with such benefit, (29 C. T. S. 386.) But. measured even by
this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private character of the intended use,
necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. The land in question has cost, the
owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken
are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the
money with a view to disposing of the property later for a profit. Cheaper lands not
dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants' needs
and means, if really they only want to own their own homes, are aplenty elsewhere. On
the other hand, the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its
property but had the plans for construction ready and would have completed the project
a long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities. And again, while a
handful of people stand to profit by the expropriation, the development of a university
that has a present enrollment of 9j000 students would be sacrificed. Any good that
would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into
insignificance in comparison with the preparation of young men and young women for
useful citizenship and for service to the government and the community, a task which
the government alone is not in a position to undertake. As the Rural Progress
Administration, the national agency created by the Government to purchase or
expropriate lands for resale as homesites, and to which the petition to purchase the land
in question on behalf of the occupants was referred by the President, turned down the
occupants' request after proper investigation, commenting that "the necessity of the
Arellano Law College to acquire a permanent site of its own is imperative not only
because denial of the same would hamper the objectives of that educational institution,
but it would likewise be taking a property intended already for public benefit." The
Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to
keep this land.
The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed without costs.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ.,
concur.

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Elements of
Taking)
FACTS:  After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken
when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4)
devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.
G.R. No. 165828 NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY 656 SCRA 60
NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
656 SCRA 60
G.R. No. 165828
August 24, 2011

TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric

Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of
several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River
to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer
for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to
safer grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly
entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable
to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled
that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an
actual physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable
taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownersh We found 459 full-text results for the search "Umil v. Ramos,". ip or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening
or destroying its value

CASE DIGEST: Republic vs. PLDT

(1969) 

FACTS: 

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications Inc., an American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming
from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred
to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa. 

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own
Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and
by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint
overseas telephone service. 

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving
no reply, disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the
plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to execute
a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone system, and
for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to restrain the severance of the
existing trunk lines and restore those severed. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the
plaintiff. 
HELD: 

“ x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the
Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and
that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.”

Republic v. PLDT
GR No. L-1884;  January 27, 1969
FACTS:
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System
by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT to enable government officers to call private parties. One of the rules of PLDT,
however, is the prohibition on the Bureau’s public use of the service furnished only
for the private use of said Bureau. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public since its inception (also using the lines of PLDT). PLDT contends that
said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange
is inter-connected with the PLDT’s facilities and, after giving an ultimatum, PLDT
disconnected the trunk lines rented by the Bureau, effectively isolating the
Philippines from the rest of the world (except the United States). Petitioner thus
filed for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PLDT may be forced to execute a contract with petitioner
HELD:
The parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them. While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract
with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT subject to just compensation.
The use of PLDT’s lines and services are subjected to a burden to the respondent
for the public use and benefit, thus, they constitute properties over which the
power of eminent domain may be exercised.

REPUBLIC vs PLDT G.R. No. L-18841

FACTS: PLDT, is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise to install, operate

and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry electrical transmission
of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of
other countries.
             The RCA Communications, Inc., is an American corporation authorized to transact
business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate
a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages and to
operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services.
             Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered
into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by
RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa.
The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and
Asiatic countries.
             Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own
Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting
trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. However, its
application for these trunk lines contained a statement whereby it states that it would abide by the
rules and regulations of PLDT.
             The Director of Telecommunications entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications whereby the Bureau would convey overseas calls from RCA to local residents.
Defendant PLDT then complained to the Bureau that they had used the trunk lines not for
government offices only but also to serve the general public; which is in direct competition of
PLDT. The Bureau did not respond, thus PLDT severed the lines.
             After failure to negotiate terms, the Bureau filed a suit against defendant in the CFI of
Manila praying that PLDT be commanded to execute a contract with plaintiff for the use of the
latter’s telephone system under such terms as the court would deem just and a preliminary
injunction to prevent further severance or to restore those that had already been severed.
             The lower court ruled that it could not force PLDT to enter into a contract, nor is the
Bureau not allowed to service the general public with telephone connections. Thus, this appeal
ISSUE: w/n the trunk lines of PLDT can be validly expropriated
HELD:                 Yes. The court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may
not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of
the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court.
Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title
to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT’s lines
and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If,
under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no
reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest,
provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting
service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for
public use.
REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY [395 SCRA 494; GR NO.
147511; 20 JAN 2003]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the

expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated
public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas
Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated
from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment
ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just
compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the
stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement
Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area,
as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which
showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied.
Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA
when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units,
which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has
forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and
the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the

light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for
the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly,

petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low
cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled
doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional
purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with
"public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."
Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold
to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution
itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services
to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement
areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized
housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

G.R. No. 156946 - Secretary of Finance v. Oro Maura Shipping Lines

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 156946 : July 15, 2009]

SECRETARY OF FINANCE, Petitioner, v. ORO MAURA SHIPPING

LINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition1 filed by the Secretary of Finance (petitioner),
assailing the Decision dated August 26, 2002, 2 and Resolution dated January
20, 20033 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64644. The CA
affirmed the decision4 dated March 29, 2001 of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) holding that the assessment made by the Customs Collector of the
Port of Manila on respondent Oro Maura Shipping Lines' (respondent) vessel
M/V "HARUNA" had become final and conclusive upon all parties, and could
no longer be subject to re-assessment.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On November 24, 1992, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)

authorized the importation of one (1) unit vessel M/V "HARUNA"; ex: Shin
Shu Maru No. 8, under a Bareboat Charter, for a period of five (5) years
from its actual delivery to the charterer. The original parties to the bareboat
charter agreement were Haruna Maritime S.A., represented by Mr. Yoji
Morinaga of Panama, and Mr. Guerrero G. Dajao, proprietor and manager of
Glory Shipping Lines, the charterer.

On December 29, 1992, the Department of Finance (DOF), in its 1st

Indorsement, allowed the temporary registration of the M/V "HARUNA" and
its tax and duty-free release to Glory Shipping Lines, subject to the
conditions imposed by MARINA. The Bureau of Customs (BOC) also required
Glory Shipping Lines to post a bond in the amount equal to 150% of the
duties, taxes and other charges due on the importation, conditioned on the
re-exportation of the vessel upon termination of the charter period, but in no
case to extend beyond the year 1999.

On March 16, 1993, Glory Shipping Lines posted Ordinary Re-Export Bond
No. C(9) 121818 for P1,952,000.00, conditioned on the re-export of the
vessel within a period of one (1) year from March 22, 1993, or, in case of
default, to pay customs duty, tax and other charges on the importation of
the vessel in the amount of P1,296,710.00.

On March 22, 1993, the M/V "HARUNA" arrived at the Port of Mactan. Its
Import Entry No. 120-93 indicated the vessel's dutiable value to
be P6,171,092.00 and its estimated customs duty to be P1,296,710.00.

On March 22, 1994, Glory Shipping Lines' re-export bond expired. Almost
two (2) months after, or on May 10, 1994, Glory Shipping Lines sent a Letter
of Guarantee to the Collector guaranteeing to renew the Re-Export Bond on
vessel M/V "HARUNA" on or before May 20, 1994; otherwise, it would pay
the duties and taxes on said vessel. Glory Shipping Lines never complied
with its Letter of Guarantee; neither did it pay the duties and taxes and
other charges due on the vessel despite repeated demands made by the
Collector of the Port of Mactan.

Since the re-export bond was not renewed, the Collector of the Port of
Mactan assessed it customs duties and other charges amounting
to P1,952,000.00; thereafter, it sent Glory Shipping Lines several demand
letters dated April 22, 1996, June 21, 1996, and March 10, 1997,
respectively. Glory Shipping Lines failed to pay the assessed duties despite
receipt of these demand letters.

Unknown to the Collector of the Port of Mactan, Glory Shipping Lines had
already offered to sell the vessel M/V "HARUNA" to the respondent in
October 1994. In fact, the respondent already applied for an Authority to
Import the vessel with MARINA on October 21, 1994, pegging the proposed
acquisition cost of the vessel at P1,100,000.00. MARINA granted this request
through a letter dated December 5, 1994, after finding that the proposed
acquisition cost of the vessel reasonable, taking into consideration the
vessel's depreciation due to wear and tear.

On December 2, 1994, Haruna Maritime S.A. and Glory Shipping Lines sold
the M/V "HARUNA" to the respondent without informing or notifying the
Collector of the Port of Mactan.

On December 13, 1994, Kariton and Company (Kariton), representing the

respondent, inquired with the DOF if it could pay the duties and taxes due on
the vessel, with the information that the vessel was acquired by Glory
Shipping Lines through a bareboat charter and was previously authorized by
the DOF to be released under a re-export bond. The DOF referred Kariton's
letter to the Commissioner of Customs for appropriate action, per a 1st
Indorsement dated December 13, 1994. In turn, the Commissioner of
Customs, in a 2nd Indorsement dated December 14, 1994, referred the
DOF's 1st Indorsement to the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila.

On the basis of these indorsements and the MARINA appraisal, Kariton filed
Import Entry No. 179260 at the Port of Manila on behalf of the respondent.
The Collector of the Port of Manila accepted the declared value of the vessel
at P1,100,000.00 and assessed duties and taxes amounting to P149,989.00,
which the respondent duly paid on January 4, 1995, as evidenced by Bureau
of Customs Official Receipt No. 50245666.

On November 5, 1997, after discovering that the vessel M/V "HARUNA" had
been sold to the respondent, the Collector of the Port of Mactan sent the
respondent a demand letter for the unpaid customs duties and charges of
Glory Shipping Lines. When the respondent failed to pay, the Collector of the
Port of Mactan instituted seizure proceedings against the vessel M/V
"HARUNA" for violation of Section 2530, par. 1, subpar. (1) to (5) of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP).

In his September 1998 Decision, 5 the Collector of the Port of Mactan ordered
the forfeiture of the vessel in favor of the Government, after finding that
both Glory Shipping Lines and the respondent acted fraudulently in the
transaction.

The Cebu District Collector, acting on the respondent's appeal, reversed the
decision of the Collector of the Port of Mactan in his December 1, 1998
decision, concluding that while there appeared to be fraud in the sale of the
vessel M/V "HARUNA" by Haruna Maritime S.A. and Glory Shipping Lines to
the respondent, there was no proof that the respondent was a party to the
fraud.6 Moreover, the Cebu District Collector gave weight to MARINA's
appraisal of the dutiable value of the vessel. The decision also held that in
light of this appraisal that the Collector of Custom of the Port of Manila used
as basis for his assessment, the customs duty the Collector of the Port of
Manila imposed was unquestionably proper.

On December 14, 1998, the Commissioner of Customs, in a 3rd

Indorsement,7 affirmed the decision of the Cebu District Collector and
recommended his approval to the petitioner.

In a 4th Indorsement dated January 8, 1999, 8 the petitioner affirmed the

Commissioner's recommendation, but ordered a re-assessment of the vessel
based on the entered value, without allowance for depreciation. The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the petitioner denied.

On May 15, 2000, the respondent filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA,9 assailing the petitioner's January 8, 1999 decision. In a decision dated
March 29, 2001, the CTA granted the respondent's petition and set aside the
petitioner's 4th Indorsement, thus affirming the previous decision of the
Commissioner of Customs.10

Dissatisfied with this outcome, the petitioner sought its review through a
petition filed with the CA; he claimed that the CTA erred when it held that
the petitioner no longer had authority to order the re-assessment of the
vessel.11

The CA affirmed the findings of the CTA in its decision dated August 26,
2002.12 The appellate court concluded that the assessment made by the
Collector of the Port of Manila had already become final and conclusive on all
parties, pursuant to Sections 1407 and 1603 of the TCCP; the respondent
paid the assessed duties on January 4, 1995, while the Collector of the Port
of Mactan demanded payment of additional duties and taxes only on
November 5, 1997, or more than one year from the time the respondent
paid. The CA also upheld the findings of the Cebu District Collector, of the
Commissioner of Customs, and of the CTA that the fraud in this case could
not be imputed to the respondent since it was not shown that the
respondent knew about Glory Shipping Lines' infractions.

The CA subsequently denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its

resolution of January 20, 2003.13 Hence, this petition.

THE PETITION

The petitioner submits three issues for our resolution:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ASSESSMENT MADE BY THE MANILA CUSTOMS COLLECTOR ON THE
SUBJECT VESSEL HAD BECOME FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE UPON ALL
PARTIES.

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT

WAS AN "INNOCENT PURCHASER."

III

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT A LIEN

IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT AND AGAINST THE VESSEL EXISTS.

The petitioner mainly argues that the CA committed a reversible error when
it held that the assessment of the Customs Collector of the Port of Manila
had become final and conclusive on all parties pursuant to Sections 1407
and 1603 of the TCCP. According to the petitioner, these provisions cannot
limit the authority of the Secretary of Finance or the Commissioner of
Customs to assess or collect deficiency duties; in the exercise of their
supervisory powers, the Commissioner and the Secretary may at any time
direct the re-assessment of dutiable articles and order the collection of
deficiency duties. Even assuming that Sections 1407 and 1603 of the TCCP
apply to the present case, the petitioner posits that the one-year
limitation14 set forth in these provisions presupposes that the return and all
entries, as passed upon and approved by the Collector, reflect the accurate
description and value of the imported article. Where the article was
misdeclared or undervalued, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until a deficiency assessment has been issued and settled in full. Lastly, the
petitioner claims that the respondent, being a direct and actual party to the
importation, should have ensured that the imported article was properly
declared and assessed the correct duties.

The respondent, on the other hand, claims that the appraisal of the Collector
can only be altered or modified within a year from payment of duties, per
Sections 1407 and 1603 of the TCCP; it is only when there is fraud or
protest or when the import entry was merely tentative that settlement of
duties will not attain finality. The petitioner's allegation that there was
misdeclaration or undervaluation of the vessel is not supported by the
evidence and is contrary to the findings of the District Collector of the Port of
Cebu, which the petitioner himself affirmed in his 4th Indorsement dated
January 8, 1999. Moreover, the records show that the value of the vessel
was properly declared by the respondent at P1,100,000.00, pursuant to the
appraisal of the MARINA.

The core legal issue for our resolution is whether the Secretary of Finance
can order a re-assessment of the vessel M/V "HARUNA."

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition meritorious and rule that the petitioner can order the re-
assessment of the vessel M/V "HARUNA."

Procedural Issue

The Collector of the Port of Mactan found that the respondent defrauded the
BOC of the proper customs duty, but the District Collector of Cebu held
otherwise on appeal and absolved the respondent from any participation in
the fraud committed by Glory Shipping Lines. These factual findings and
conclusion were affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs, by the CTA and,
ultimately, by the CA. Although in agreement with the conclusion, the
petitioner, however, ordered a reassessment of the dutiable value of the
vessel based on the original entered value, without allowance for
depreciation.

Factual findings of the lower courts, when affirmed by the CA, are generally
conclusive on the Court.15 For this reason, the Rules of Court provide that
only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review on certiorari. We
delve into factual issues and act on the lower courts' factual findings only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when these findings contain palpable
errors or are attended by arbitrariness.16

After a review of the records of the present case, we find that the CTA and
the CA overlooked and misinterpreted factual circumstances that, had they
been brought to light and properly considered, would have changed the
outcome of this case. In particular, a closer scrutiny of the surrounding
circumstances of the case and the respondent's actions reveal the existence
of fraud that deprived the State of the customs duties properly due to it.

A Critical Look at the Facts

Our examination of the facts tells us that there are four significant phases
that should be considered in appreciating the present case.

The first phase is the original tax and duty-free entry of the MV Haruna
when Glory Shipping Lines filed Import Entry No. 120-93 with the Collector
of the Port of Mactan on March 22, 1993. The vessel then had a declared
dutiable value of P6,171,092.00 and the estimated customs duty
was P1,296,710.00. It was allowed conditional entry on the basis of a one-
year re-export bond that lapsed and was not renewed. Despite a letter of
guarantee subsequently issued by Glory Shipping Lines and repeated
demand letters, no customs duties and charges were paid. The vessel
remained in the Philippines.

The second significant phase occurred when Glory Shipping Lines offered to
sell the vessel to the respondent in October 1994. At that point, the
respondent applied for an Authority to Import the vessel, based on the
proposed acquisition cost of P1,100,000.00. MARINA granted the request
based on the proposed acquisition cost, taking depreciation into account.

From the first to the second phase, bad faith already intervened as Glory
Shipping Lines, instead of paying in accordance with its commitment, simply
turned around, disregarded the demand letters of the Collector of the Port of
Mactan, and offered the vessel for sale to the respondent.

The respondent, for its part, already knew of the status of the vessel (as it in
fact subsequently manifested before the DOF); in fact, what it asked for was
an authority to import, although the vessel was already in the Philippines.
The respondent likewise was the party which secured an appraisal from
MARINA knowing fully well of the vessel's value based on its previous
history. It also joined Glory Shipping Lines in the latter's attempt to evade
the payment of the customs duties and charges demanded by the Collector
of the Port of Mactan by pushing through with the purchase of the vessel
without any notification to the Collector of the Port of Mactan - the Port that
first administratively enforced the rules on the vessel's importation resulting
in its tax-free entry and conditional release.

The third phase came when the respondent's representative asked the DOF
if it could pay the duties and taxes due on the vessel, knowing fully well the
vessel's history of entry into the country. The respondent's declared value in
the request was P1.1 Million based on the lower appraisal that it secured
from MARINA. The DOF referred the matter to the Commissioner of Customs
who in turn made his own referral to the Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila. It was the Collector of the Port of Manila who accepted the declared
value of P1.1 Million and assessed duties and taxes amounting
to P149,989.00. The respondent thus paid the customs duties as approved
by the Collector of the Port of Manila. As in the second phase, no notice was
given in this third phase to the Port of Mactan as the Port that allowed the
entry of the vessel into the country and which had existing demand letters
for the customs duties and charges due on the vessel.

The fourth phase started on November 5, 1997 when the Collector of the
Port of Mactan acted after learning of the sale of the vessel to the
respondent. The Collector eventually instituted seizure proceedings that led
to the petition currently with us.

Evidence of Fraud

The tie-up between Glory Shipping Lines and the respondent in the four
phases identified above can better be appreciated if the surrounding facts
are considered.

An undisputed given in the narration of the four phases is the valuation

of P6,171,092.00 that Glory Shipping Lines gave when the vessel first
entered the country under Import Permit No. 120-93 on March 22, 1993.
When the respondent made its request with the MARINA for authorization to
import the same vessel after a span of only 19 months, the respondent
proposed an acquisition cost of only P1,100,000.00. Consistent with this
proposal, the respondent, through Kariton, gave the vessel the same
declared value in its own Import Entry No. 179260 filed with the Collector of
the Port of Manila. Thus, in a little over a year and a half, the declared value
of the vessel decreased by P5,000,000.00, or an astonishing 80% of its
original price. We find this drop in value within a short period of 19 months
to be too fantastic to be accepted without question, even allowing for
depreciation. Equally fantastic is the change in the customs duties, taxes and
other charges due which fell from P1,296,710.00 in March 1993
to P149,989.00 in January 1995, all because of the sale, the new application
by the vendee, and the change in the Port where the assessment and
collection were made.

The drop alone from the undisputed original entry valuation

of P6,171,092.00 to the respondent's new valuation of P1,100,000.00 (or a
decrease of 80% from the original valuation) is already a prima
facie evidence of fraud that the rulings below did not properly appreciate
simply because they disregarded the records of the original entry of the
vessel through the Port of Mactan. Section 2503 of the TCCP provides in this
regard that:

Section 2503. Undervaluation, Misclassification and Misdeclaration of Entry. -

When the dutiable value of the imported articles shall be so declared and
entered that the duties, based on the declaration of the importer on the face
of the entry, would be less by ten percent (10%) than should be legally
collected, or when the imported articles shall be so described and entered
that the duties based on the importer's description on the face of the entry
would be less by ten percent (10%) than should be legally collected based
on the tariff classification, or when the dutiable weight, measurement or
quantity of imported articles is found upon examination to exceed by ten
percent (10%) or more than the entered weight, measurement or quantity,
a surcharge shall be collected from the importer in an amount of not less
than the difference between the full duty and the estimated duty based upon
the declaration of the importer, nor more than twice of such difference:
Provided, That an undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or
quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight,
measurement, or quantity declared in the entry, and the actual value,
weight, quantity, or measurement shall constitute a prima facie evidence of
fraud penalized under Section 2530 of this Code: Provided, further, That any
misdeclared or underdeclared imported articles/items found upon
examination shall ipso facto be forfeited in favor of the Government to be
disposed of pursuant to the provision of this Code.

When the undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration

in the import entry is intentional, the importer shall be subject to the penal
provision under Section 3602 of this Code. [Emphasis supplied.]

The 80% drop in valuation existing in this case renders the consideration
and application of Section 2503 unavoidable.

Significantly, the respondent never explained the considerable disparity

between the dutiable value declared by Glory Shipping Lines and the
dutiable value it declared - difference of P5,000,000.00 - so as to overturn
or contradict this prima facie finding of fraud. We note that the exercise of
due diligence alone would have alerted it to Glory Shipping Lines' acquisition
cost and the vessel's declared value at its first entry. The respondent, being
in the shipping business, should have known the standard prices of vessels
and that the value it proposed to MARINA, as described in the second phase
above, is extraordinarily low compared to the vessel's originally declared
valuation. All these strengthen, rather than weaken, the prima
facie evidence of fraud that the law dictates when an unconscionable
disparity of valuations exists.

Depreciation not factor in determining dutiable value

Neither can the respondent hide behind the excuse that the vessel's dutiable
value at P1,100,000.00 was approved by MARINA via the Authority to
Import, taking into consideration the vessel's depreciation brought about by
its ordinary wear and tear. In the first place, we observe that nowhere in the
TCCP does it state that the depreciated value of an imported item can be
used as the basis to determine an imported item's dutiable value. Section
201 of P.D. No. 1464 (the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978) 17 in this regard
provides:

Sec. 201. - Basis of Dutiable Value. - The dutiable value of an imported

article subject to an ad valorem rate of duty shall be based on the cost (fair
market value) of same, like or similar articles, as bought and sold or offered
for sale freely in the usual wholesale quantities in the ordinary course of
trade in the principal markets of the exporting country on the date of
exportation to the Philippines (excluding internal excise taxes to be remitted
or rebated) or where there is none on such date, then on the cost (fair
market value) nearest to the date of exportation, including the value of all
container, covering and/or packings of any kind and all other expenses,
costs and charges incident to placing the article in a condition ready for
shipment to the Philippines, and freight as well as insurance premium
covering the transportation of such articles to the port of entry in the
Philippines.

Where the fair market value or price of the article cannot be ascertained
thereat or where there exists a reasonable doubt as to the fairness of such
value or price, then the fair market value or price in the principal market in
the country of manufacture or origin, if it is not the country of exportation,
or in a third country with the same stage of economic development as the
country of exportation shall be used.

When the dutiable value of the article cannot be ascertained in accordance

with the preceding paragraphs or where there exists a reasonable doubt as
to the cost (fair market value) of the imported article declared in the entry,
the correct dutiable value of the article shall be ascertained by the
Commissioner Of Customs from the reports of the Revenue or Commercial
Attache (Foreign Trade Promotion Attache), pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Fifty-four Hundred and Sixty-six or other Philippine diplomatic
officers or Customs Attaches and from such other information that may be
available to the Bureau of Customs. Such values shall be published by the
Commissioner of Customs from time to time.

When the dutiable value cannot be ascertained as provided in the preceding

paragraphs, or where there exists a reasonable doubt as to the dutiable
value of the imported article declared in the entry, it shall be domestic
wholesale selling price of such or similar article in Manila or other principal
markets in the Philippines or on the date the duty become payable on the
article under appraisement, on the usual wholesale quantities and in the
ordinary course of trade, minus:

(a) not more than twenty-five (25) per cent thereof for expenses and
profits; andcralawlibrary

(b) duties and taxes paid thereon. (as amended by E.O. 156) [Emphasis

supplied.]

Even assuming that the depreciated value of the vessel can be considered in
determining the vessel's dutiable value, still, we find that the decrease of
80% from the original price after the passage of only 19 months cannot be
believed and thus should not be accepted.

Assuming further that MARINA merely committed a mistake in approving the

vessel's proposed acquisition cost at P1,100,000.00, and that the Collector
of the Port of Manila similarly erred, we reiterate the legal principle that
estoppel generally finds no application against the State when it acts to
rectify mistakes, errors,18 irregularities, or illegal acts, 19 of its officials and
agents, irrespective of rank. This ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of
the State without any hindrance on the part of the government from
implementing laws and regulations, despite prior mistakes or even illegal
acts of its agents shackling government operations and allowing others,
some by malice, to profit from official error or misbehavior. The rule holds
true even if the rectification prejudices parties who had meanwhile received
benefits.20

This principle is particularly true when it comes to the collection of taxes. As

we stated in Intra-Strata Assurance Corporation v. Republic of the
Philippines:21
It has long been a settled rule that the government is not bound by the
errors committed by its agents. Estoppel does not also lie against the
government or any of its agencies arising from unauthorized or illegal acts of
public officers.22 This is particularly true in the collection of legitimate taxes
due where the collection has to be made whether or not there is error,
complicity, or plain neglect on the part of the collecting agents. 23 In CIR v.
CTA, we pointedly said:

It is axiomatic that the government cannot and must not be estopped

particularly in matters involving taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation
through which the government agencies continue to operate and with which
the State effects its functions for the welfare of its constituents. Thus, it
should be collected without unnecessary hindrance or delay. [Emphasis
supplied.]

The Respondent's Complicity

That the respondent fully participated in moves to defraud the BOC, as

shown by the recital of the four phases above, is further supported by
another factual circumstance - the respondent's acknowledgment to the DOF
that the vessel M/V "HARUNA" conditionally entered the country under a re-
export bond filed with the BOC. This is plain from the 1st Indorsement of the
DOF dated December 13, 1994, which states:

1st Indorsement
December 13, 1994

Respectfully forwarded to the Commissioner of Customs, Manila, for

appropriate action, the herein letter of even date of Kariton & Company,
requesting in behalf of their client, ORO MAURA SHIPPING LINE to pay the
corresponding duties and taxes due on the vessel MV "HARUNA" (ex. Shinsu
Maru No. 8) which was acquired by Glory Shipping Lines thru bareboat
charter under P.D. No. 760, as amended and previously authorized by this
Department to be released under a re-export bond pursuant to Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1711 amending P.D. No. 760 under our 1st Indorsement dated
December 29, 1992, copy attached, subject to pertinent import laws, rules
and regulations.

With the knowledge that the vessel was released under a re-export bond,
the respondent should have known that this original entry was subject to
specific conditions, among them, the obligation to guarantee the re-export of
the vessel within a given period, or otherwise to pay the customs duties on
the vessel. It should have known, too, of the conditions of the vessel's
release under the re-export bond and of the state of Glory Shipping Lines'
status of compliance.

There was an original but incomplete importation by Glory Shipping Lines

that the respondent could not have simply disregarded proceeds from
knowledge of the vessel's history and the application of the relevant law. In
this respect, Section 1202 of the TCCP provides:

Importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the

jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unlade therein. Importation
is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes and other
charges due upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at a port of
entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted, or
in case said articles are free of duties, taxes and other charges, until they
have legally left the jurisdiction of the customs.

In order for an importation to be deemed terminated, the payment of the

duties, taxes, fees and other charges of the item brought into the country
must be in full. For as long as the importation has not been completed, the
imported item remains under the jurisdiction of the BOC. 24 From the
perspective of process, the importation that originally started with Glory
Shipping Lines was therefore never completed and terminated, so that the
respondent's present importation is merely a continuation of that original
process.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Saddled with knowledge of the underlying facts that preceded its purchase,
the conclusion that the respondent fully cooperated with Glory Shipping
Lines in avoiding the original charges and duties due is unavoidable; the
respondent provided the medium (1) to disregard the original duties due on
the vessel's first entry; and (2) to avoid the Port of Mactan where demands
for payment of overdue custom duties already existed. In the process, it of
course acted for its own interest by securing for itself lower dutiable values
and lesser duties due. The fact that the respondent did all these confirms
that it participated in the moves to defraud the BOC of the legitimate taxes
due as originally assessed.

Finality of the Port of Manila Assessment

Our finding of fraud leads us to conclude that the assessment of the

Collector of the Port of Manila cannot become final and conclusive pursuant
to Section 1603 of the TCCP, which states:

Section 1603. Finality of Liquidation. - When articles have been entered and

passed free of duty or final adjustments of duties made, with subsequent
delivery, such entry and passage free of duty or settlements of duties will,
after the expiration of one (1) year, from the date of the final payment of
duties, in the absence of fraud or protest or compliance audit pursuant to
the provisions of this Code, be final and conclusive upon all parties, unless
the liquidation of the import entry was merely tentative.

Nature of a tax lien

An important factual circumstance that the CTA and the CA appear to have
completely overlooked is that the vessel first entered the Philippines through
the Port of Mactan and it was the Collector of the Port of Mactan who first
acquired jurisdiction over the vessel when he approved the vessel's
temporary release from the custody of the BOC, after Glory Shipping Lines
filed Ordinary Re-Export Bond No. C(9) 121818.

When this re-export bond expired on March 22, 1994, Glory Shipping Lines
filed a letter dated May 10, 1994 guaranteeing the renewal of the re-export
bond on or before May 20, 1994, otherwise the duties, taxes and other
charges on the vessel would be paid. Therefore, when May 20, 1994 came
and went without the renewal of the vessel's re-export bond, the obligation
to pay customs duties, taxes and other charges on the importation in the
amount of P1,296,710.00 arose and attached to the vessel. Undoubtedly,
this lien was never paid by Glory Shipping Lines, thus it continued to exist
even after the vessel was sold to the respondent. Section 1204 of the TCCP
in this regard states:

Section 1204. Liability of Importer for Duties. - Unless relieved by laws or

regulations, the liability for duties, taxes, fees and other charges attaching
on importation constitutes a personal debt due from the importer to the
government which can be discharged only by payment in full of all duties,
taxes, fees and other charges legally accruing. It also constitutes a lien upon
the articles imported which may be enforced while such articles are in
custody or subject to the control of the government.

As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, a lien is a claim or charge on property

for payment of some debt, obligation or duty. 25 In this particular instance,
the obligation is a tax lien that attaches to imported goods, regardless of
ownership.26

Consequently, when the respondent bought the vessel from Glory Shipping
Lines on December 2, 1994, the obligation to pay the BOC P1,296,710.00 as
customs duties had already attached to the vessel and the non-renewal of
the re-export bond made this liability due and demandable. The subsequent
transfer of ownership of the vessel from Glory Shipping Lines to the
respondent did not extinguish this liability.

Therefore, while it is true that the respondent had already paid the customs
duties assessed by the Collector of the Port of Manila, this payment did not
have the effect of extinguishing the lien given the tax lien that had attached
to the vessel and the fact that what had been paid was different from what
was owed. From the point of amount alone, the customs duties paid to the
Collector at the Port of Manila only amounted to P149,989.00, while the lien
which had attached to the vessel based on the unpaid assessment by the
Collector of the Port of Mactan amounted to P1,296,710.00.

Finally, we deem it necessary to reiterate our pronouncement in Chevron

Philippines v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 27 where we discussed
the importance of tariff and customs duties in the following manner:

Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. Tariff and customs duties are taxes
constituting a significant portion of the public revenue which enables the
government to carry out the functions it has been ordained to perform for
the welfare of its constituents. 28 Hence, their prompt and certain availability
is an imperative need29 and they must be collected without unnecessary
hindrance.30 [Emphasis supplied.]

In keeping with this and other cited rulings, we find in favor of the petitioner
and uphold his order for the re-assessment of the value of the vessel based
on the entered value, which in this case should follow the unpaid assessment
made by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Mactan.

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated

August 26, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64644, and REINSTATE WITH
MODIFICATION the ruling under former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu's
4th Indorsement dated January 8, 1999. The re-assessment shall be based
on the unpaid assessment by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Mactan
against respondent Oro Maura Shipping Lines dated November 5, 1997,
made on the basis of M/V HARUNA's entered value, without allowance for
depreciation, but including other taxes and charges due. Seizure proceedings
shall proceed in due course unless the unpaid customs duties, other taxes
and charges are duly paid. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
National Development Company v. CIR, G.R. No. L-53961, June 30, 1987

National Development Co. vs. Commissioner GR L-53961, 30 June 1987 En Banc, Cruz (J): 14
concur
Facts:
The National Development Co. (NDC) entered into contracts in Tokyo with several Japanese
shipbuilding companies for the construction of 12 ocean-going vessels. Initial payments were
made in cash and through irrevocable letters of credit. When the vessels were completed and
delivered to the NDC in Tokyo, the latter remitted to the shipbilders the amount of US$
4,066,580.70 as interest on the balance of the purchase price. No tax was withheld. The
Commissioner then held NDC liable on such tax in the total amount of P5,115,234.74. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue served upon the NDC a warrant of distraint and levy after
negotiations failed.

Issue:
Whether the NDC is liable for deficiency tax.

Held:
The Japanese shipbuilders were liable on the interest remitted to them under Section 37 of the
Tax Code. The NDC is not the one taxed. The imposition of the deficiency taxes on the NDS is a
penalty for its failure to withhold the same from the Japanese shipbuilders. Such liability is
imposed by Section 53(c) of the Tax Code. NDC was remiss in the discharge of its obligation of
its obligation as the withholding agent of the government and so should be liable for its
omission.

Planters Products. Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp., G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under
Philippine laws, both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
agricultural chemicals. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital
recovery component of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate
capital was raised to make PPI financially viable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA), which was then remitted the depository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144
to FPA from 1985 to 1986. After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the
imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted,
however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages, questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and
an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process. PPI argues that Fertiphil has no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a
"personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition because
"incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller
fertilizer company.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No.
1465. What is the power of taxation?

RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a
mere procedural technicality which may be waived. The imposition of the levy was an exercise
of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that the power to tax can be used as an
implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenue generation. If the
purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes,
then the exaction is properly called a tax. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent
powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power
is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to
be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or
conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are
used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on
the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

AIR CANADA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent. (G.R. No. 169507; January 11, 2016)

FACTS: Air Canada is an offline air carrier selling passage tickets in the Philippines,

through a general sales agent, Aerotel. As an off-line carrier, [Air Canada] does not have
flights originating from or coming to the Philippines [and does not] operate any airplane
[in] the Philippines[.]

Air Canada filed a claim for refund for more than 5 million pesos. It claims that there
was overpayment, saying that the applicable tax rate against it is 2.5% under the law on
tax on Resident Foreign Corporations (RFCs) for international carriers. It argues that, as
an international carrier doing business in the Philippines, it is not subject to tax at the
regular rate of 32%.

Air Canada also claims that it is not taxable because its income is taxable only in Canada
because of the Philippines-Canada Treaty (treaty). According to it, even if taxable, the
rate should not exceed 1.5% as stated in said treaty.

However, the CTA ruled that Air Canada was engaged in business in the Philippines
through a local agent that sells airline tickets on its behalf. As such, it should be taxed as
a resident foreign corporation at the regular rate of 32%.

The CTA also said that Air Canada cannot avail of the lower tax rate under the treaty
because it has a "permanent establishment" in the Philippines. Hence, Air Canada
cannot avail of the tax exemption under the treaty.

ISSUES:
[1] Is Air Canada, an offline international carrier selling passage documents through
Aerotel, a RFC?
[2] As an offline international carrier selling passage documents, is Air Canada subject
to 2.5% tax on Gross Philippine Billings or to the regular 32% tax?
[3] Can Air Canada benefit from the treaty's elimination of double taxation in favor of
Canada or the preferential rate of 1.5%?
[4] Can Air Canada validly refuse to pay its tax deficiency on the ground that there is a
pending tax credit proceeding it has filed?
[5] Is Air Canada entitled to the tax refund claimed at more than 5 million pesos?
HELD:
[1] Yes, Air Canada is a resident foreign corporation. Although there is no one rule in
determining what "doing business in the Philippines" means, the appointment of an
agent or an employee is a good indicator. This is especially true when there is effective
control, similar to that of employer-employee relationship. This is true between Air
Canada and Aerotel. Hence, Air Canada is a RFC.

[2] No, because the 2.5% tax on Gross Philippine Billings applies only to carriers
maintaining flights to and from the Philippines. Air Canada's appointment of a general
sales agent, Aerotel, here is only for the purpose of selling passage documents. However,
this is not the complete answer since the treaty is the latter law that prevails in this case.

[3] Air Canada cannot avail of the elimination of double taxation in favor of Canada
since the treaty expressly excludes Canadian carriers with "permanent
establishment." Through the appointment of Aerotel as its local sales agent, petitioner is
deemed to have created a "permanent establishment" in the Philippines as defined
under the Republic of the Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty.

This is especially true since Aerotel has no "independent status" beacuse Air Canada
exercises comprehensive control and detailed instructions over the means and results of
the activities of the former.

[4] No, it cannot. Even if Air Canada succeeds in claiming tax refund, the general rule
prevails that there can be not setting off of taxes since the Government and the taxpayer
are not creditors and debtors of each other.

[5] No, Air Canada is not entitled to refund. The P5,185,676.77 Gross Philippine Billings
tax paid by petitioner was computed at the rate of 1 ½% of its gross revenues amounting
to P345,711,806.08149 from the third quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2002. It
is quite apparent that the tax imposable under Section 28(A)(l) of the 1997 National
Internal Revenue Code [32% of taxable income, that is, gross income less deductions]
will exceed the maximum ceiling of 1 ½% of gross revenues as decreed in Article VIII of
the Republic of the Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty. Hence, no refund is forthcoming.

MARC DONNELLY AND ASSOCIATES VS. MANUEL AGREGADO

G.R. No. L-4510 May 31, 1954

FACTS:  Petition for review of the decision of the Auditor General to reject the
petition of the applicant to the Sugar Quota Office in respect of the export fees
charged by the applicant to the Sugar Quota Office in the amount of P54,862.84.

July 2, 1946 – enacted Commonwealth Act No. 728: 'unlawful for any individual,
company or organization to export agricultural or industrial products,
commodities, articles, materials and supplies without authorisation from the
President of the Philippines. Appoints the President with the power to oversee,
monitor and ban the sale of products abroad.

July 10, 1946 – President, promulgated Executive Order No. 3 banning the
exportation of such products mentioned therein, and permits the exportation of
other items.

April 24, 1947 – The Chief Executive Officer sent a communication to the
Philippine Sugar Administration approving the sale of scrap metals on payment
by the applicants of a charge of P10 per ton of the metals to be shipped.

Over the time from December 1947 to September 1948, the petitioner exported
substantial quantities of scrap iron, brass, copper and aluminum, for which the
total amount of P54,862,84 was compensated by way of royalties. Amount was
obtained by the Sugar Quota Office under the authority provided by the Chief
Executive Officer and the above-mentioned Cabinet resolution. The matter is
currently before us by way of appeal from the decision of the Auditor General,
who rejected the offer for repayment of those royalties.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO is valid?

 
HELD: Yeah, according to Art. 6 sec. 22(2) of the Constitution, the Congress may,
by statute, permit the President, subject to certain restrictions, to set, under the
limits laid down, tariffs, import or export quotas and tonnage. The Congress
enacted the Commonwealth Act No. 728, which confers on the President the
power to govern, ban, monitor and prevent the sale of scrap metals and to set
down such rules and regulations as may be appropriate for the enforcement of its
provisions. The resolution is perfectly legal because it was done by authority of
Commonwealth Act No. 728 and in pursuance of an express provision of our
Constitution. The fact that the resolution was enacted by the Cabinet and the
recovery of revenues was not decreed on the grounds of an order given by the
President himself does not, in our view, invalidate the resolution because it
cannot be denied that the act of the Cabinet is, and is ultimately, the act of the
President.

And this is so because, as this Court aptly said, the secretaries of departments
are mere assistants of the Chief Executive and “the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v Marcos (1996)

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v Marcos GR No 120082, September 11, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner was created by virtue of RA 6958. Section 1 thereof states that the authority shall be exempt
from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. However, the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes from petitioner.
Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court dismissed the petitioner
ruling that the Local Government Code withdrew the tax exemption granted to Government owned and
controlled corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether the city of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner

RULING:
Yes. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the
pleasure of the taxing authority. As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by
natural or juridical persons, including government- owned and controlled corporations, section 193 of the
LGC prescribes the general rule, viz, they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those
granted to local water districts, cooperatives, duly registered under RA 6938, non stock and nonprofit
hospitals and educational institutions and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. 

CASE DIGEST: MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,

petitioner, vs. HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, THE
CITY OF CEBU, represented by its Mayor, HON. TOMAS R. OSMEA, and
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, respondents. (G.R. No. 120082; September 11, 1996)

FACTS:
Under its charter, the MCIAA shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National
Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. In 1994,
the Local Government Unit (LGU) of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on
several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA.

MCIAA objected to the same as baseless and unjustified, claiming its exemption under
its charter. Also, it cites the LGC stating that LGUs taxing power does not extend to
taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.

Cebu City countered, however, citing Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC which withdraw
tax exemptions of GOCCs and realty tax exemptions previously granted to ore presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs.

MCIAA paid tax under protest. It insisted that the taxing powers of LGUs do not extend
to the levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government.
It also insisted that while it is indeed a GOCC, it nonetheless stands on the same footing
as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its
powers and functions.
ISSUES:
[1] Is MCIAA a taxable person?
[2] Is MCIAA exempt from realty taxation?

HELD: 
[1] Yes, although it previously enjoyed exemption from realty tax under its charter
(which has already been withdrawn by the LGC), this exemption extended only to said
tax, not to other taxes. Hence, MCIAA is still a taxable person.

[2] No, MCIAA is not exempt from realty tax by the City of Cebu. First, its tax exemption
under its charter has already been withdrawn. Second, while it is true that LGUs cannot
levy tax on property of the Republic of the Philippines or the National Government
(outside Metro Manila), the beneficial use of property should not be given to a taxable
person.

Here, MCIAA is already the owner of the parcels of land in question. Hence, even the
exemption under the LGC cannot apply.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

LawPhil’s Full text

link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_81561_1991.html

FACTS:

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the
booth of the “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped
packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the
packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts,
Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves
contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained
inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting
in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

 

RATIONALE:

Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a

defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in
Mercado vs People’s Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government
without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents

conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the
NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused / appellant.

CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof
 

BILL OF RIGHTS

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy,

protection against whom, protection against the STATE.
Facts: Andre Marti and his common-law wife sent 4 gift wrapped packages
via Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. When Anita Reyes asked if she
can examine the packages, Marti refused and assured her that it only
contains books and cigars. Before delivery to Bureau of Customs it is SOP to
open  the boxes for inspection and found dried leaves with peculiar odor
from the said box. They asked NBI to test the dried leaves. The NBI made
inventory and took charge of the box. Dried leaves are found to be
marijuana. When Marti was claiming his mail at post office he has invited for
questioning by the NBI. Marti contends that the evidence subject of the
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.
Issue: Whether or not Marti’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated?
Decision: Judgment affirmed. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character
since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. The search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

People vs Andre Marti

G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to
Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could inspect the packages.
Shirley assured Anita that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. Anita Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages. 

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau

of Posts, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier
company, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. He took samples of the contents thereof. He reported this to the
NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence
of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found
dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in
violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the trial court. Andre filed an
appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy
was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Were the evidence obtained in violation of Marti's constitutional rights

against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec.
2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore inadmissible in evidence?

Held:

The SC hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference,

the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State.

The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the

state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare
some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures

therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals.

It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the
presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of
the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes
into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely
to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. The
judgment of conviction finding Marti guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged was AFFIRMED.

Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Caption: 
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin 
(253 SCRA 699) 
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts: 
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo
Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the
157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and
photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by
means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for
the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial
court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as
nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice. 

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. 
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from
a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save
for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing
to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Silahis International Hotel vs Soluta, et al.

G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006

Facts:

The petitioners suspected that the respondents who are officers of the
Silahis International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside
the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution.
They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance.

In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was
opening the Union Office, petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for
Finance of Silahis International Hotel, Inc., with his personal secretary, a
Bulletin reporter, and a security guard entered the union office despite
objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. Once inside  the union
office they started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of a
plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the dangerous drugs
act was filed against the respondents before the RTC of Manila which
acquitted them on the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it
was warrantless and without consent by the respondents.
After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution
against the petitioner for violation of Art. 32 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result
of an illegal search. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals

Issue:

Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private

individual and corporation) on the union office of the private respondents is
valid.

Held:

The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil
Code. The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the
petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. For respondents, being
the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of
validity of the search and seizure. 

Petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of
illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego
conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, petitioners and their
companions barged into and searched the union office without a search
warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the
objection of Babay.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling
under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed
by law. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right
against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners cite People v. Marti to support their thesis that the determinants
in the validity of the constitutional right against searches and seizure cannot
be invoked against private individuals.
But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of
whether "an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of [one’s]
constitutional rights, [may] be invoked against the State." In other words,
the issue in that case was whether the evidence obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity without the participation of the State, is
admissible.

The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent

individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. Article
32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

City of Manila vs. Laguio

 on 10:06 PM  in Case Digests, Political Law 
 3
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

o Due Process
o Equal Protection
o Requisites of a Valid Exercise of Police Power by LGU

FACTS:

The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation

engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided
that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar
as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power
and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power

W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law

HELD:

The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police
power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded
social ills fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in
Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of
the community.

Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places.... Every
house, building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the
prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral
man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of
men.

The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires.
The Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
unde the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.

CARLOS R. SAUNAR v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, GR No.

186502, 2017-12-13
Facts:
Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which he
joined as an agent in 1988. Through the years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the
Chief of the Anti-Graft Division. During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar conducted
an official investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and
involving then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada (President
Estrada), and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada. President Estrada's assailed involvement in the
tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate crimes included in his indictment for
plunder
27 August 2004, Saunar was reassigned as regional director for Western Mindanao based in
Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he received a subpoena ad testificandum from the
Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case against President Estrada
Saunar appeared before the Sandiganbayan on several hearing dates, the last being on 27 October
2004.[6]
On 29 October 2004,... Saunar... then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special
Order No. 005033[7] informing Saunar that he was relieved from his duties as regional director
for Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further instructions.
Bautista informed Saunar that an investigation was being conducted over his testimony before
the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for the developments in the investigation. In the
meantime, Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be available at any time
whenever he would be needed. He made himself accessible by staying in establishments near the
NBI. In addition, he also attended court hearings whenever required.
6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
requiring him to answer the allegations against him in the PAGC Formal Charge dated 3 October
2006. The charge was based on a letter, dated 19 August 2005, from Wycoco recommending an
immediate appropriate action against Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24 March
2005, without approved leave of absence for four (4) months
Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29 January 2007, he
received a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service.
the OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and dismissed him from service. It pointed out that Saunar failed to report
for work for more than a year which he himself admitted when he explained that he did not
report for work because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility. The OP
highlighted that he was clearly instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so. It added
that it would have been more prudent for Saunar to have reported for work even if no duty was
specifically assigned to him, for the precise reason that he may at any time be tasked with
responsibilities. The OP, however, absolved Saunar from allegedly keeping government property
during the time he did not report for work, noting that he was able to account for all the items
attributed to him
Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the OP in its 12 June 2007 resolution.[11]
Undeterred, he appealed before the CA.
CA affirmed in toto the OP decision
The appellate court ruled that Saunar was not deprived of due process because he was informed
of the charges against him and was given the opportunity to defend himself. It expounded that
the absence of formal hearings in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due process.
Issues:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT
VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS GUARANTEED IN THE
CONSTITUTION
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious
Saunar bewails that he was deprived of due process, pointing out that no real hearing was ever
conducted considering that the clarificatory conference conducted by the PAGC was a sham. In
addition, he asserts that he was not notified of the charges against him because he was only made
aware of the allegations after the PAGC had formally charged him. Further, Saunar highlights
the delay between the time PAGC received Wycoco's letter-complaint and when he received the
formal charge from the PAGC.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution is similar with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of
the American Constitution in that it guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law
In American jurisprudence, the due process requirement entails the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.[15] Likewise, it was characterized with fluidity in
that it negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation.[16]
In our jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact
definition.[22] It is flexible in that it depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject
matter and the necessities of the situation.[23]
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations,[24] the Court eruditely
expounded on the concept of due process in administrative proceedings,... here are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) The first of
these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion... but the evidence
must be "substantial."
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for
that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it... the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for
administrative bodies to exhaust all possible means to ensure that the decision rendered be based
on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court reminded that administrative bodies have the
active duty to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. As such, it would be more in keeping with
administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the general rule rather than the
exception.
Thus, administrative bodies should not simply brush aside the conduct of formal hearings and
claim that due process was observed by merely relying on position papers and/or affidavits.
Besides, the Court in Joson recognized the inherent limitations of relying on position papers
alone as the veracity of its contents cannot be readily ascertained. Through the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, administrative bodies would be in a better position to ferret out
the truth and in turn, render a more accurate decision
Under the PAGC rules of procedure, it is crystal clear that the conduct of clarificatory hearings is
discretionary. Nevertheless, in the event that it finds the necessity to conduct one, there are rules
to be followed. One, the parties are to be notified of the clarificatory hearings. Two, the parties
shall be afforded the opportunity to be present in the hearings without the right to examine
witnesses. They, however, may ask questions and elicit answers from the opposing party coursed
through the PAGC.
To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process
requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it
suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, such
"reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere submission of position papers
and/or affidavits and the parties must be given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against
them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be invoked by the parties to thresh out
substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the rules itself of the
administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily
result in the deprivation of due process, it should be acceptable only when the party does not
invoke the said right or waives the same.
The Court finds that Saunar was not treated fairly in the proceedings before the PAGC. He was
deprived of the opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings since he was not notified of the
clarificatory hearing attended by an NBI official. Saunar was thus denied the chance to propound
questions through the PAGC against the opposing parties, when the rules of the PAGC itself
granted Saunar the right to be present during clarificatory hearings and the chance to ask
questions against the opposing party.

CARLOS SAUNAR vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 186502, THIRD DIVISION,
December 13, 2017, MARTIRES, J. In administrative cases, the lack of a formal hearing does
not necessarily transgress the requirement of due process. This does not mean, however, that
formal hearings should be regarded as mere superfluities. While a formal hearing is not
obligatory as the due process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard through pleadings, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable should not be hastily
thrown around. In this case, petitioner was not treated fairly in the proceedings as he was
deprived of the opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings and he was not notified of the
clarificatory hearing where a witness was presented thereby denying him the chance to propound
questions.

FACTS:
Petitioner was a former Regional Director of the NBI. He was the one who conducted an
investigation regarding the alleged corruption concerning tobacco excise taxes against Governor
Singson, Senator Jinggoy Estrada, and President Estrada. He was required by the Sandiganbayan
to testify in the plunder case against President Estrada and he dutifully appeared during the
hearing dates. Thereafter, the NBI Director Wycoco informed petitioner that he was relieved
from his duties and was asked to report to the Deputy Director for Regional Operation Services
for further instructions. He reported thereto and was informed that an investigation as being
conducted over his testimony. He was not assigned any duty and was instead told to make
himself available. Petitioner made himself accessible by staying near NBI and he also attended
court hearings whenever required. Petitioner thereafter received a letter from the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission requiring him to answer a charge from Wycoco recommending action
against petitioner for failure to report to duty. A witness presented in one of the hearings in the
charge against him. However, he was absent in that hearing has he received no notice thereof. He
was subsequently reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. Petitioner then
received a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service. The OP held that petitioner
failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself admitted when he explained that
he did not do so because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility. It further
held that he should have reported to work even without any duty specifically assigned to him.
The CA affirmed the OP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was validly dismissed form service. (NO)

RULING:
The due process requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial
tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heart. Such
reasonable opportunity should not be confined to the mere submission of position papers and the
parties must given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. In administrative
cases, the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the requirement of due
process. This does not mean, however, that formal hearings should be regarded as mere
superfluities. While a formal hearing is not obligatory as the due process requirement is satisfied
if the parties are given the opportunity to be heard through pleadings, the idea that a formal
hearing is not indispensable should not be hastily thrown around.

In this case, petitioner was not treated fairly in the proceedings as he was deprived of the
opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings and he was not notified of the clarificatory
hearing where a witness was presented thereby denying him the chance to propound questions.
Gross neglect of duty, as an administrative offense, refers to negligence characterized by the
glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to
consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected. In this case, petitioner
remained compliant with the lawful orders given to him. He would attend court hearings
pursuant to special orders and he also stayed near NBI establishments awaiting possible
assignments. He also complied when he was reassigned to the Bicol Office. Petitioner’s actions
was not tantamount to inexcusable or gross negligence as there was no intention to abandon his
duty as an NBI officer.

Banco Español vs. Palanca, 37 Phil 921

Facts:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng secured a debt with various parcels of real property in
Manila. The debt 　 amounted to P218,294.10 at 8% per annum, payable quarterly.
Property's estimated value was about 　 P292,558. After the instrument's execution,
mortgagor returned to Amoy, China and died on January 29, 　 1810. 　 The foreclosure
proceeding needed publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Publication was made in a newspaper of Manila and an order of the court deposited in the
post office in　a stamped envelope of the summons and complaint directed to defendant.
The clerk, however, failed to comply with the mail publication requirement.
The bank was able to foreclose the property without the defendant.

After seven years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested
the court 　 to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered
upon July 3, 1908, and to　vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application, as set forth in the motion 　 itself, was that the order of default and the
judgment rendered thereon were void because the court　had never acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant or over the subject of the action.　His appeal was denied by the lower
court, hence the appeal.
His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.

Issue: 　 Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been
prejudiced.

Held:
1. There must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the　matter before it;
2. JURISDICTION must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property　which is the subject of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given the OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful HEARING.
The essentials of procedural fairness inn judicial proceedings are:

Conclusions stated by the court indicated that the judgment appealed from is without
error, and the　same is accordingly affirmed.

BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA

37 Phil. 921

FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to
his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe.
Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died.
Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by
means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to
furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El
Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of
Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that
there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process
had been met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
G.R. No. 46496 February 27, 1940

FACTS: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who
were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials.
The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging
therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers’ Brotherhood (NWB) of
Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated against the NLU and
unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of
Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU’s
allegation that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89
workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU
filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations.

ISSUE: Whether the CIR’s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe
special requirements of due process in administrative cases.

HELD: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same
is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with
instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222

SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious
physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean
Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee
which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit
their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent
students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Investigating Committee found a
prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge.
Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students.
The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members
of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the
University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean
del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. The Dean
of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled
out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic

institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students
mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to
do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their
statements . Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20,
1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law
School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters
dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before
the Joint Administration Faculty- Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog
and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners'
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were
denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due
process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING conducted to investigate students'
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the
investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no righ t to
examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz
. Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their
evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was
reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by
a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory
questions.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE

IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27
MAY 1993]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University,

died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation
rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries
inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia
del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours
on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of
the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed
on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and
hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written
answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to
hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent
students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of
the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since
they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining
petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and
Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued
that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original
petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement
of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural

due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the
instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the
Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this
case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

G.R. No. 148560 , November 19, 2001

Joeseph Ejercito Estrada, Petitioner 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and  People of the Republic of the Philippines,
Respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner, Former President Joseph Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),
assailed the constitutionality of the said law based on the following grounds: (1) the law
suffers from vagueness; (2) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
prosecutions; and (3) it abolishes the element of mens rea or criminal intent in the
crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The foregoing, according to
Estrada, violated his fundamental rights to due process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?

Ruling: 
No. The plunder law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.  Republic Act
7080 also known as Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7569, provides for
comprehensive guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties. A statute or act may be said to be vague when
it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess as its meaning and differ in application. However, the questioned law is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein or because
of the employment of terms without defining them. The petitioner’s reliance on “void-for-
vagueness” doctrine is clearly misplaced. It can only be invoked against the specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction. Being one of the senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the senate
and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and due observance to the constitution

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., et al., Petitioners, -versus-

ANTITERRORISM COUNCIL, et al., Respondents G.R. No. 178552, EN BANC, October 05,
2010, J. Carpio-Morales A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid. Statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only
'as applied' to a particular defendant. Thus, absent an actual or imminent charge against the
petitioner, a vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible. In this case, since
the petitioners have not been charged with violation of the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is
not applicable.

FACTS:
Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007. They
assailed the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the
crime of terrorism under the said law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free
speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
ISSUE: Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a penal statute.
RULING: Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
because it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid. In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated only “as applied” to a particular defendant. This means that
in determining the constitutionality of a statute, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged. Absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited vagueness analysis
of the assailed statute is legally impermissible. Therefore, in this case, since the petitioners have
not been charged with violation of the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE

LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS
REYES, AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR HERSELF AND AS
REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, v. QUEZON
CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS CITY, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, Respondents. G.R. No. 225442, EN
BANC, August 08, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application

FACTS:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew
for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila, in this case, Navotas City and Quezon
City, started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody.Petitioners,spearheaded by theSamahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan(SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that aims to
forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth
and minors- filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
Their arguments were the following:(a) it result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and
thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.More specifically,
petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

RULING: The petition is partly granted. Petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as
void for vagueness is denied."A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:
(1)it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."In this case,
petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do
not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly. The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due
process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE

BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts: 
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged
abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc.,
called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the
laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech
and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. 

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up
with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed
through with the rally. 

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not
absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were
eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement. 

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late. 

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

Held: 

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they
"need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation
and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or
"when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed.”

Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano G.R. No. L-59524 Feb. 18, 1985 Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

FACTS:
Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion
Act after he wasimplicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series
of bombings in Metro Manila. Hewas tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons ? (1)because his house was used as a
contact point ; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los 
Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines
if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salonga;s alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of
speech.

HELD
Yes. The petition is dismissed.RATIOThe petitioner s opinion is nothing
but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought andexpression. Protection is especially
mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential tothe ascertainment
of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The
constitutionalguaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminentlawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. In the case at bar, there is no threat againstthe government.In PD 885, political
discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in asubversive
organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or other members of
suchassociation or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the
case, there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow
the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission
was not against the government, but directedagainst a particular family. Such a
statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment.
OBITER DICTUM:To withhold the right to preliminary investigation, it would be to
transgress constitutional dueprocess. However, it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted to satisfy the dueprocess clause. There must be sufficient
evidence to sustain a prima facie case or that probable causeexists to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused.

VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION

Topic: Right to self organization
Extent and Scope of Right

FACTS:
1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious
sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. 

2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union

(hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining
agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: 
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement. 

3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the
following day, March 4, 1964. 

4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement
with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961,
however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to —
paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization". 

5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with
any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962,
and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3,
1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the
Union as a member. 

6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that
unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted
Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing
Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective
bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No.
875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 

CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the
plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action 
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law. 

ISSUE/S:
WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4
of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization" is unconstitutional

WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it
"prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such
sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said
members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6)
of the 1935 Constitution

RULING:

1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free
exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict,
the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects
cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their
jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. 

If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to
sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious
faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor
union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association. 

DISPOSITIVE: Benjamin Victoriano Won (Plaintiff)

Appeal is dismissed.

DOCTRINE: The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract

rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.
If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so;
the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining,
and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.

Case Digest #2-1 | GR No. 148208 | Central Bank Employees (Banko Sentral ng

Pilipinas) Association vs Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary | Dec

15, 2004

FACTS:

The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against

BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from

further implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground

that it is unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND:

July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central

Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.

Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and

wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of

the Bank Sentrals human resource development program. Provided that the Monetary Board

shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under

RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that compensation and wage

structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in

accordance with the rates prescribed under RA No 6758.

7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of Government

Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997)
– SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No

8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the

constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:

The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

RULING:

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial

institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No

7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko

Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its

classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because

there were substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.

The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that

considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c),

Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-

and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but

must also apply equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and

impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically

to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.

The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests on

the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support the

inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot
justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who

are similarly situated.

The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress

inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The

challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on

the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly

situated.

In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection

of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination,

directly or indirectly.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons

shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred

and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is

that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not

identical are analogous.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST

& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioners,-versus-CITY OF MANILA, represented by
DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,Respondent. G.R. No. 122846, EN BANC, January
20, 2009, TINGA, J. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two
related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before
it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. If
due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of
arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due
process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the
government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. In this
case, an ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder: SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as
"An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy,
short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby
prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila. SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. Short-time admission shall mean admittance
and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of
rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of
said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. SEC. 5. Penalty
Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment
for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the
persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of
subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
automatically be cancelled. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC),
Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila. The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila. The City filed an Answer dated January 22,
1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. The RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution."
Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally,
from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to
the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where the legitimate purpose of
preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-
province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. First, it held that the
Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes
the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb
immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate.
Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila,
liberty is regulated by law.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid. (NO)

RULING:
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied
actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations
and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied. The
apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. The
purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural
due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person
of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples
range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. If due process were
confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the
government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. The
question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected
dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more
rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due
process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a
liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the
State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated
methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application. In
this case, an ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for
the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, -versus- GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,

Respondent. G.R. No. 167614, EN BANC, March 24, 2009, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. In
Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, the constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), a government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file
employees under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees
of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that the
disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the Court
deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the constitutionality
of said provision. Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the
Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in
the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.

FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of
his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However,
respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner
refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May. Petitioner's
employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19,
1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine(9) months and
twentythree(23)days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the
dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the
NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the
sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled
to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC
on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs
are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the
subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. The last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section10, Republic Act (R.A.)No.8042, to wit: Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In
case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF
CIVIL LAW 208 plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Applying the subject
clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months
and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00. Impugning the
constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00
awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his
employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00 ISSUE: Whether or not the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to decide
questions of substance not theretofore determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly,
the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which
unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas
workers to three (3) months?

RULING: When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its
co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2)
that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and (3)
that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case otherwise the Court will dismiss
the case or decide the same on some other ground. Without a doubt, there exists in this case an
actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor
tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months
only as provided under the subject clause. The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should
be borne in mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest
opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such
that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be
considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not
in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with said
labor tribunal, and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Nonetheless, the issue is
deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to
resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-
judicial function - its function in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to
which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself; thus, its foremost function is to
administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The
CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power to declare
unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019
– UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 209 Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue
before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up
the issue in its decision. The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the
resolution of the case likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum
salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a
period of three months, strikes at the very core of the subject clause. Thus, the stage is all set for
the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause. There are three levels of scrutiny
at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the
deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown
to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate
scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny
is triggered by suspect classifications based on race or gender but not when the classification is
drawn along income categories. It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the
constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a
government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file
employees under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees
of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that the
disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the Court
deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the constitutionality
of said provision. More significantly, it was in this case that the Court revealed the broad outlines
of its judicial philosophy, to wit: Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or
English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se
controlling in this jurisdiction. Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the
use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention. Our present Constitution has
gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate
the interests of the working class on the humane DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF
CIVIL LAW 210 justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And
the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls
for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Under
most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial
of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. In the case at bar,
the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officeremployee status. It is
akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a
benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Considering that majority, if not all, the
rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited,
especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the
Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a
decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs
counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass
muster. Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the
present case also employs the standard of strict ju

Stonehill v. Diokno G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Fact: Upon application of the officers Respondents-Prosecutors, Respondents-Judges
issued, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations
of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as “the subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the
applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

Petitioners that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening
the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe
with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — said petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof,
in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same
null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to
return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court,
the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

Issue: Whether the documents, papers, and things seized in the residences of

petitioners may be used in evidence against the petitioners, corporation.

Held: No, documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners is not
covered with the search warrant and are inadmissible evidence against petitioners
herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized. The court were not satisfied that the
allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by
the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a
certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of
marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory
Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the
informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “aling Rosa”
about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They
found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence

alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her
testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre
where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross the road an old
woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on
arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old
woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant
was presented.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of
1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs
from the accused.

Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section

12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a

warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely

crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to
conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect
a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no probable cause and
the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did
not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An

application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall
only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if

refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained
therein.

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge
shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the
person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no
return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain
whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require
that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by
the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the
date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

People vs. Aruta

G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998

Facts: An informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from
Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant
pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police
apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The
bag contained marijuana leaves.

Held: Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about
to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when
the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant.
This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any
compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that
the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor
of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-
appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to
Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
By ResIpsaLoquitor - August 03, 2013
Romer Sy Tan vs Sy Tiong Gue, et al.

G.R. No. 174570                                                                December 15, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner (Romer Sy Tan) filed a criminal case against respondents (Tiong Gue, et al.).
The Respondents moved for the withdrawal of the information which was subsequently
granted by the RTC on the ground that the information for robbery did not contain the
essential elements of robbery as decided upon by the Court of Appeals on an prior
complaint. Hence the case was dismissed. Now the petitioner, seeking shelter from the
Supreme Court contended that he filed information for qualified theft based on the same
subject matter of the dismissed robbery and would like to use the item seized in the
previously conducted search for the new information of qualified theft.

Issue:
Whether or not the items seized in the previously conducted search warrant issued by
the court for robbery be included and used for the filing of for an information for qualified
theft.

Ruling:
No, petitioner cannot iclude the seized items as part of the evidence in the new
information. Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Thus, as search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection
with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant's
personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Therefore, petitioner cannot utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search warrant issued in connection with the case of
robbery in a separate case of qualified theft, even if both cases emanated form the
same incident. Also, the withdrawal of the information was justifiable, since there was
no probable cause as to indict respondents of the crime of robbery since unlawful taking
which is an essential element for Robbery and likewise for Qualified Theft is not
present.

CASE DIGEST: JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF

Leave a reply
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged
to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus
seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items
seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
 Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
 Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by
the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The
purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of
the two warrant.
As to the issue that the  items seized were real properties, the court applied the
principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of
the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

 Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.

 The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did
not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses
having been mere generalizations.

 Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general

warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the
warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification
the subversive nature of the said items.

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234, August
23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department
of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie
Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro
Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant

Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They
criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to
clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants
of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.

REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In
arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon
filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges
should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of
arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and
for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and
beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of
this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of
Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court
believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended
their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that
the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these
are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

Prudente vs Dayrit Case Digest

By maechmedina

NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT

G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989

LawPhil’s Full Text

link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/dec1989/gr_82870_1989.html

FACTS:

The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness
(P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our continuous
surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources
that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed
to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the
holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms,
explosives and ammunitions.

Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the

Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of
Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.

Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:

1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts

2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and
answers
3. Search warrant was a general warrant
4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed
to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday,
urgent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?

HELD:

Search Warrant annulled and set aside.

RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the
complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in
connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and
under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.

“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.

–          This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

PARTICULARITY

For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
illegal possession of firearms etc. – – Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other
words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.
Case Digest Prudente vs Dayrit

NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT

G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
LawPhil’s Full Text link: 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/dec1989/gr_82870_1989.html

FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of
 witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our continuous
surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources
that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed
to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the
holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms,
explosives and ammunitions.

Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the

Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office
of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.

Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:

1.     Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
2.     The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and
answers
3.     Search warrant was a general warrant
4.     Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?

HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.

RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the
complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in
connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search
Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing
and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with
any affidavits submitted.

“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
-          This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant
and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
illegal possession of firearms etc. - - Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other
words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.

G.R. No. L-32409 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32409, February 27, 1971
Bache & Co., etc
vs Hon. Judge Vivencio Ruiz, etc.
Ponente: Villamor

Facts:
Petitioner prays to declare null and void the search warrant
issued by the respondent judge against the petitioner
corporation.

Allegedly, Judge Ruiz issued a search warrant against petitioners

for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code by authorized
Revenue Examiner de Leon to mail and file the application for
search warrant. 3 days later, BIR agents served the warrant at
the petitioner’s offices. Petitioner's lawyers protested the
search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search and yielded 6 boxes of documents.

Later, petitioners filed a petition with the CFI praying that the
search warrant be quashed and declared null and void, with
damages and attorney's fees. In the meantime, the BIR made a tax
assessment on petitioner based on the documents seized, with the
following reasons: (1) Judge Ruiz failed to personally examine
the complaint and his witness. (2) The search warrant was issued
for more than one specific offense. (3) The search warrant did
not describe the things to be seized.

Ruling:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search

Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null
and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the
said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized
there under are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and
respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their
representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the
assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as
well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and
effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and
from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other
proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE [246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL 1995]
Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant
alleging that he received information that Petitioner had in his possession at
his house “M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite
sticks and subversive documents”, which were “used or intended to be used”
for illegal purposes. The application was granted.

In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized

“2 envelopes containing P14000, handset with antennae, transceiver with
antennae, regulator supply, academy notebook and assorted papers and
handset battery pack”. In October, petitioner moved that the search and
seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In
December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money
seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure should be limited to the specified
items covered thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of
the order of MTCC citing that pending the determination of legality of seizure
of the articles, they should remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the
petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned
in the search warrant was legal.

Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search

warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The police acts
beyond the parameters of their authority if they seize articles not described
in the search warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is
to limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion; that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that
abuses may not be committed.

Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money

seized.
ARIEL C. VALLEJO vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 156413 April 14,
2004 ISSUE: Whether or not Vallejo is liable FACTS: Ariel Vallejo is a lawyer in the
Register of Deeds of the province of Isabela. Franklin M. Javier, a National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) agent, filed a sworn application for search warrant before the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan which briefly requests that a Search Warrant be issued on
the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the purpose of
seizing the following documents: 01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND TITLES,
Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Our Primary
Entry Book under no. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith; 02. Blank
Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry
of Deeds; 03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer transactions without the
corresponding payment of Documentary Stamps and Capital Gains Tax. That all of the
said documents are being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony
that is FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under Article 171 RPC, Article 213 RPC and
R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft) and are hidden or being kept in the said office. HELD: NO. The
charged imputed upon Vallejo should be dismissed and the seized items be returned.
The questioned warrant in this case is a scattershot warrant for having been issued for
more than one offense - Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171 and Article 213 of
the RPC, and violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant must be issued upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense. In fact, a careful perusal of the application for the warrant
shows that the applicant did not allege any specific act performed by the petitioner

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST constituting a violation of any of the

aforementioned offenses. Thus, the questioned warrant must be struck down for having
been issued in contravention of the 1987 Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and existing jurisprudence consequently the charged against Vallejo must be
dismissed. 

People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992] Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on
leave Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC
Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to
Bontoc. They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m.,
they flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion
and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and had no
passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which
Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag
which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side
of the vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng
consented to. When they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of
different sizes containing pulverized substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader,
who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter boarded
the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC
Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic
Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the
substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for
hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the MTC
Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits
despite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had waived his
right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against Omaweng, ordered the
elevation of the case to the proper court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of
Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After
his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of
not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution
presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint
Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph
Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment
convicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA
6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Omaweng was
subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a
violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly
gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and
travelling bag. The testimony of the PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-
examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng
waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a
search or consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is precluded from later
complaining thereof right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived
and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid
search 41 packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant
was necessary for such seizure.

Espano vs. Court of Appeals [GR 120431, 1 April 1998] Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers,
namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police
District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana .
When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana.
Espano was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of
prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order of
release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting
Espano of the crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Espano filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the search of
Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate against his right against unreasonable search and
seizure.

Held: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana found at
Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from Espano
during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the
said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the
ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and
Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

People v. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 (1999) G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999
Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
CID began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the
coastal area he intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed,
the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID
and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon
seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by
holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the
man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his
bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but
still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he motioned with
his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and
acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. which was later found out that it was Shabu.
CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed
to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to
comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted
the latter to the police headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession
of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of
the judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause
impelling the police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the
telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of
courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver
the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist —
accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. The
term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer
or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts
or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.

The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a

contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous
weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which
search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain
possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the
search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996
HIZON, et. al.
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
The accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First Fishermen
Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon were apprehended by SPO3
Romulo Enriquez, and the members of the Task Force BantayDagat for allegedly fishing
in the shoreline of coastal waters of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of
assorted live fishes. Such acts constitute an offense of Illegal Fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under PD No. 704, the Fisheries Decree
of 1975. A day following the arrest, random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B
Robinson were gathered for laboratory examination. The specimens were brought to the
NBI sub-office to determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary
purposes. The NBI Forensic Chemist conducted two tests on the fish samples and
found that they contained sodium cyanide.
The trial court convicted the petitioners of the offense charged and CA affirmed the
decision, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the fish specimen, which yielded a positive result to the test of the presence of
sodium cyanide, are admissible being illegally seized on the occasion of warrantless
search and arrest.
Whether the statutory presumption of guilt under Sec. 33 of PD 704 prevails over the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

RULING:
On the first issue,  the court sustained the warrantless arrest and therefore the evidence
obtained was admissible.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a
judicial warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain
exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation
of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor
vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not
required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can
be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching
our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable
them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other
government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat
suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the
course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners
failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and
seizure.
On the second issue. Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the
Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is
generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain
facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the
burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the
inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable.  In fine,
the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of the crime when
committed.
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on
facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of
obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish
caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or
electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the
owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in
catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or
the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise
from the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the
fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact
proved.
The statutory presumption is merely prima facie.It cannot, under the guise of regulating
the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from presenting his
defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance can the accused be denied the
right to rebut the presumption. thus:
The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But
the experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be
explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put
witnesses on the stand or go on the witness stand himself to explain his possession,
and any reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his guilty
connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt
which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen
goods.
In the case at bar, the petitioner was able to overcome the presumption when they
requested another sampling of the fishes captured for laboratory examination where the
result yielded  negative presence of sodium cyanide . The prosecution was not able to
explain the contradictory findings of the laboratory examinations.
The petitioners were acquitted of the crime charged.
Hizon vs. Court of Appeals [GR 119619, 13 December 1996] Second Division, Puno (J): 4
concur Facts: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters
of the city. In response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to
assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing. On 30
September 1992 at about 2:00 p.m., the Task Force Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 64 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several
small crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto
Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force Bantay
Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found several men
fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-
kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the
acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police
saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports and found
them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu
and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the
license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez
brought the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.
At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez to guard
the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP
Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the
boat, its crew and fishermen were charged with the following violations: (1) Conducting fishing
operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayor's permit; (2) Employing excess
fishermen on board (Authorized — 26; On board — 36); and (3) Two (2) Hongkong nationals on
board without original passports." The following day, 1 October 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed
the boat captain to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory
examination. On 7 October 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on
the fish samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide. In light of these findings, the
PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint against the owner and
operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by
Richard Hizon, the boat captain Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer Ernesto Andaya, two other
crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat for the offense of
illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under Presidential
Decree (PD) 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. In an Information dated 15 October 1992, Hizon,
et. al. were charged with a violation of PD 704. Hizon, et. al. were arraigned and they pled not
guilty to the charge. On 23 November 1992, however, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of
the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found the fish negative for the
presence of sodium cyanide. On 9 July 1993, the trial court found Hizon, et. al. guilty and
sentenced them to imprisonment for a minimum of 8 years and 1 day to a maximum of 9 years
and 4 months. The court also ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28
sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes as instruments and proceeds of the offense. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hizon, et. al. filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the search and seizure conducted in Hizon’s
boat is valid. Held: Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons
without a judicial warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain
exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is
rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured.
Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception
ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels
are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the
Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
The warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in
illegal fishing, thus is valid. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were
properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, Hizon failed to raise the issue during trial and
hence, waived their right Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 65 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) to
question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure. However, Hizon et.
al. are not guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. The
prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission
raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide. The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports Hizon, et.
al.'s claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes
by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on board their sampans. This claim is
buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The authorities found nothing on the boat that
would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the
fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious
circumstances, that Hizon, et. al. were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances. Hence, Hizon, et. al. are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances defined under Section 33 of Republic Act 704, the Fisheries Decree of
1975.
Dela Cruz v. People, GR 209387, 11 January 2016

FACTS:
·         Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently
traveled, coming back and forth taking a vessel.

·         While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter.

·         Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on
the x-ray scanning machine for inspection.
·         The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.
·         Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable
by law and was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of
firearms.
·         Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to
unreasonable search and seizure, thus warranting his conviction.
·         The firearms were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a
common seaport security procedure.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although
done without warrant, is valid. 
 
RULING:
Yes. The Court finds the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable and,
therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of
the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to
have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and
ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as
evidence against the accused.
The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from a customs search.

Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are

allowed when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect
search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs laws." The Tariff and Customs
Code provides the authority for such warrantless search, as this court ruled in Papa, et
al. v. Mago, et al.:
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board,
or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.

The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People, in that the state’s policy to
combat smuggling must not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on whether the
state has the duty to accord constitutional protection to dutiable articles on which duty
has not been paid, as with a person’s papers and/or effects.
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting
the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was
for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place
or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port security
measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It
was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code or other
customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is
important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.

 The Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012 and
the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. 
 

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without

search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions
protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable
safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

Dela Cruz, an OJT of an interim-vessel, was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go
home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter.
When his bag was placed in the x-ray machine, the operator saw firearms inside his
bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, the operator called the attention of port
personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then. Dela Cruz claimed
ownership for the bag and consented to manual inspection. Dela Cruz was charged with
violation of RA. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms. The trial court held that the
search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid. The Court
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881.

Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and
whether the search was valid

HELD:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be
first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Hence, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private
persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule.

However, Court held this doctrine is not applicable in this case since port security
personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed agents of
government. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in
domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining
here, we find the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore,
not violative of his constitutional rights.

The search rendered was not unreasonable when the baggage inspector opened
petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the police. The port personnel's actions
proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles
within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's right to
travel if weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
events must be weighed in its entirety. When his bag went through the x-ray machine
and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the
port authorities. It was after the port personnel's inspection that Officer Abregana's
attention was called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner's consent. Also,
there was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search
of his personal effects.
With the foregoing reasons, the search conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815

Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court Ruling

G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009

Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner

vs.

Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:

On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of
kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily
searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist.
The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to
the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched
(without a search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their
guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went
back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the
room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner
was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.

Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the
necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to
be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit
and valid

HELD/DECISION:

1. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A
person who was arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may
remove any weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is
to protect the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will
happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by
the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any
weapons either on the person or within the area of his immediate control.
Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist
arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was found;
therefore the room where the gun was found could not be “in his
immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that
officers are permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently
found during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the
firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore
not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained
is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997

Facts: Four police officers were conducting a patrol in Quiapo due to bomb threats that been
occurring in the area for the last seven days. They found two groups of Muslim-looking men
standing on opposite sides of the Quezon Boulevard corner who were acting suspiciously and
their eyes were moving very fast. After thirty minutes of observing the two groups, they decided
to approach one of the groups. Upon seeing the policemen, the groups fled in all directions.
Fortunately, one of the men later identified as Malacat, was apprehended. Without a warrant, the
police officer searched him and found a grenade tucked inside his front waist line. Malacat was
arrested and charged with illegal possession of explosives. 

Held: There could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the
search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an
overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was
being committed or was going to be committed. Since the arrest of petitioner is invalid, the
search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

There was also no justifiable reason to apply the “stop-and-frisk” rule. While probable cause is
not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.

There are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a
genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the
credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise,
i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were
"immediately collared."

Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which
leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at
the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.

A Case of a Warrantless Arrest: MALACAT vs. Court of Appeals

MALACAT vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched
by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging
around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men.
When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered in all directions which
prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a search was
made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition
wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made
on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his
arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible
because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.

Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.

Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued
warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.  36 In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made —
the process cannot be reversed.  37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer
may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a
"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.

Valmonte vs. Gen. De Villa G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990

Facts: In the Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition for
prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their
dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners have filed the instant motion
and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. Before submission of the
incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his comment, to
which petitioners filed a reply. The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants
as a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether installment and operation of checkpoints is unconstitutional and

constitutes warrantless search.

Held: No, it is the basic right of the State to defend itself from its enemies and, while in
power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the
pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power,
to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is
evidently one of such means it has selected. it the basic right to defend itself from its
enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public
welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right,
under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving
them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.

Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the
potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways
are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear
to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in
which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding
motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The
location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited
enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a
checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field
officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover,
a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is
unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.
Valmonte vs. de Villa [GR 83988, 24 May 1990] En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 85 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling
and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in
the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people. They aver that, because of
the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to
regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July
1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself
to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he
was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
They further contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. In the Supreme Court's decision
dated 29 September 1989, Valmonte’s and ULAP’s petition for prohibition, seeking the
declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was
dismissed. Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of
said decision. Issue: Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for government officials
for warrantless search and seizure and, thus, are violative of the Constitution. Held: Nowhere in
the Supreme Court's decision of 24 May 1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all
times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal
per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is
on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation
clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints
manned by either military or police forces. Although no one can be compelled, under our
libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or
commend its political, social and economic policies or performance; one must concede to it the
basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of
government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government
has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best
achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the
routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage
without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two.
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded
as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. These routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are generally allowed to pass
these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of
the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle
are or have been instruments of some offense. By the same token, a warrantless search of
incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport,
is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety,
and necessity. Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor
condone Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 86 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) abuses committed by the
military manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether
the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that
power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be
resolved in the constitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a
checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And
the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints,
who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable
criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.
Guanzon vs De Villa
Posted on March 2, 2017 by thecasedigester in Criminal Procedure
181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; January 30, 1990
Facts:
The 41 petitioners alleged that the “saturation drive” or “aerial target zoning” that were
conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there
is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of
arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates
or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on
the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered
guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police
to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they’re homes were
ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their
money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported
incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also
suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations.
The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that
the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined
the operation to witness and record such event.
Issue:
Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
Held:
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure
used or the methods which “offend even hardened sensibilities” .Based on the facts
stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused
from sleep were arrested.
There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the “aerial zoning”
could not be achieved even as the rights of the squatters and low income families are
fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not
one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged.
In the circumstances of this taxpayers’ suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief
can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court
temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is
remanded to the RTC of Manila.
Case Brief: Luz vs. Philippines
MAY 8, 2017 JEFF REY
G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet
and so he flagged him down. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is
assigned as a traffic enforcer. The accused violated a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. While the officers were
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that the accused
was uneasy and kept on reaching something from his jacket. He was alerted and told the accused
to take out the contents of his jacket’s pocket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The
accused obliged, slowly put out the contents of his jacket’s pocket which included two plastic
sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are
positive of methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful
arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of
the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented
to the search conducted upon him.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.
Held:
Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing
with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license
of the latter. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner
could not be said to have been under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during
which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

P E O P L E V. D E G R A C I A ( 1 9 9 4 ) | S E A R C H E S A N D   S E I Z U R E S
February 8, 2017

G.R. No. 102009, 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994

Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was
being committed, and had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts, the same constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches.
Facts:
1. Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
staged coup d’état in December 1989 against the Government.
2. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team,
conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning
of December 1, 1989, which surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at
around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
that the said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as
communication command post.
3. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo when a group of 5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards
their surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area.
However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their guns and fired at them, which
resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for
they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire.
4. Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar
Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4
dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.
5. Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping though door.
6. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there
was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped
up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the
Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
Issue:
 Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Held:
 YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
 It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant at that time. It
was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on
the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so,
thereby compelling the former to break into the office.
 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory
or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably
or even colorably explained.
 In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous
and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
  Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place,
the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or 

 
SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES
 
G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005

Facts:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing

fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some
photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB
then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of
search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a
search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB,
particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead,
sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and
200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the
sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for
examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash
the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to
be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding,
which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized
under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin
syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

Held:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view
doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain
view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine
to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a
prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he
can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on
plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents.
However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was
enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that
such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be
stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the
sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately
apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the
sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to
prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

Consti2Digest – 074 Abenes Vs Court of Appeals, 515 SCRA 690, GR 156320 (Feb 14, 2007)

Rodolfo Abenes Vs Court of Appeals and People of the Phils, 515 SCRA 690, GR 156320 (Feb.
14, 2007)

Facts:
Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high powered
firearm and its ammunitions during the election period. Two Informations were filed for (1)
illegal possession of firearms and its ammunitions; and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a checkpoint wherein his vehicle was
stopped and he was asked to alight the same for routine inspection. The police saw the firearm
tucked in his waist, and asked him to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not produce
one, the police confiscated the firearm. It was then found that Abenes was not a registered nor
a licensed firearm holder. The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges.

Abenes appealed to the CA alleging that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set
up, and thathis constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure was violated. The CA
affirmed the trial court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the checkpoint was legally set up.

2. Whether Abenes’ constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure had been violated.

Held:
YES. The production of a mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint
was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the circumstances under
which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant (plainview).
NO. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement
of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In
the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating Abenes where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in
plain view and discovered inadvertently when Abenes alighted from the vehicle. However,
there is insufficient evidence that the firearm Abenes carried had no license. Thus, for failure of
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm without
prior authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal liability under the
illegal possession of firearms law. However, Abenes is still convicted for violation of the
Comelec Gun Ban.

In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also Roque vs. de Villa [GR 84581-82],
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 90 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) In RE: Anonuevo. Anonuevo vs.
Ramos [GR 84583-84], In RE: Ocaya. Ocaya vs. Aguirre [GR 83162], In RE: Espiritu. Espiritu
vs. Lim [GR 85727], and In RE: Nazareno. Nazareno vs. Station Commander of Muntinlupa
Police Station [GR 86332] En Banc, Per Curiam: 11 concur Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February
1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad)
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records
as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in
Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the
gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2
CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
"Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case C-30112;
no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the
Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court
issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de
Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ
on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February
1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they
were accordingly released.

Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of
rebellion.
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2
CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest
came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes
or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the
rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts
but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by
the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and
duly constituted authorities.

CASE DIGEST: DOMINGO V. DELA ROSA

Published by paul on July 22, 2013 | Leave a response

Board of Commissioners (Commission on Immigration and Deportation),

Board of Special Inquiry, Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo, Associate
Commissioner Jorge V. Sarmiento, Acting Associate Commissioner Regino
R. Santiago, Members of the Board of Special Inquiry, Estanislao Canta, Leo
Magahom and Benjamin Kalaw, petitioners, versus Hon. Joselito dela Rosa,
Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, William T. Gatchalian,
respondents.
G. R. Nos. 95122.23         May 31, 1991

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was

recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of his natural born mother, Marciana Gatchalian.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila
from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco and Johnson Gatchalian. They had with
them Certificate of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. After
investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 5, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens and was issued
Identification Certificates.

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting

aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The
same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those
cases was that of William and others.On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners,
reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of,
among others, respondent Gatchalian.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6,
1961 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportation case against them was assigned.

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6,
1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian
as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him.
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the
Secretary of Justice recommending that the respondent Gatchalian along with the other
applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion be charged with violation against the
Immigration Act of 1940.

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to
the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William
Gatchalian. The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and
was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided by respondent Judge
dela Rosa. On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging
that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the
Board of Special Inquiry.

On September 6, 1990, respondent’s wife and minor children filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. That
petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation
proceedings against William. Respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary
restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.

Issue:

Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen.

Held:

The very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing
the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens.

In matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation

of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest
only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground
for deportation as charged against the alien. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for the purpose of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.

Philippine law, following lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage
formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Having declared the assailed
marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his
father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is
likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who is admittedly a
Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens

contemplated under Section 1, Article IV of the Consititution.
Harvey vs. Santiago
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW
HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988

The Immigration Law empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for
the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the
deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country.

Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, are both American, while Adriaan Van
Elshout is a Dutch citizen.

Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents. Two (2) days after
apprehension seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-
deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another
was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa.
Thus, of the original twenty-two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face
deportation.
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid.

HELD: Yes, the warrant of arrest is valid. The Supreme Court decided in the case of
Vivo vs. Montesa that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of
Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation
is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring
to the 1935 Constitution) is not inviolable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant
of Arrest issued did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not
be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that,
deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens and
the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.

Also, the requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend
to deportation proceedings."  There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not
deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board reiterated in Vivo vs.
Montesa, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is
therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a
probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated,
probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were
issued.

VIVO v MONTESA G.R. No. L-24576 July 29, 1968 Facts: The private respondents Juan,
Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito, all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the
Philippines from Hongkong, the first four on 18 November 1959, and the last three on 6
December 1959. Upon their arrival they sought admission as Filipino citizens. After
investigation, a board of special inquiry, in its decisions of 7 and 11 December 1959, found them
to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into
this country. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of them an identification certificate
as a Filipino citizen. Sometime in February, 1963, however, Isaac Calacday confessed before an
immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons. He retracted his confession in
March, 1963, in an investigation in the Department of Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit
of anger, he disclaimed, under oath, paternity of the respondents because they refused to give
him money (Annex "I" to Answer). On 9 May 1963, Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano
Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents, stating in said warrants
their deportability under Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, for having entered the Philippines "by
means of false and
misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being
properly documented for admission." The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of
the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there
be, why they should not be deported. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others
remained at large. On 26 April 1965, the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition,
docketed as Civil Case No. 60906, praying for three principal reliefs, namely: to restrain the
arrest of those petitioners who have not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday who had been
arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners, all upon the claim that they are
Filipino citizens. RTC granted the petition. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to
restrain the deportation proceedings Held: We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the
court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of respondents
Calacdays. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under
Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613). That jurisdiction is not
tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have
reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the
issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of
administrative decisions.
in Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531, 533, this Court said: While the jurisdiction of
the Deportation Board as an instrument of the Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists
only when the person arrested is an alien, however, the mere plea of citizenship does not divest
the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make "a showing that his claim is
frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho vs. White, 259 U.S., 275), and must prove by sufficient evidence that
they are Filipino citizens. [Kessler vs. Strecker (1939) 307 U.S., 21, 35-36.] If such is the
primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation Board has the necessary power to pass
upon the evidence that may be presented and determine in the first instance if petitioners are
Filipino citizens or not. This is inherent-in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of
the Deportation Board (Laurencio vs.Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37). It is well to note here
that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition (the respondent judge considered it as such)
was filed, deportation proceedings had been started against the respondents (petitioners below)
but had not been completed. In view of the non-completion of the proceedings, the Board of
Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. The respondents Calacdays, therefore, are
not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the
main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so
far for the courts to review. It is clear from the order complained of that the court below
misapprehended the import of the warrants issued by the Commissioner herein. Said warrants
required the respondents to be brought to the immigration authorities, not to be deported, but "to
show cause, if any
there be, why he should not be deported from the Philippines", as expressly recited therein.
There was no case of "summarily arresting and deporting" the respondents Calacdays, as
unwarrantedly assumed by the court below. The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain
documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship. The proper procedure is for said
respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as
evidence on their part to show cause why they should not be deported. IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the writ prayed for is hereby granted, the order issued in Civil Case No. 60906 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila is set aside, and the proceedings ordered discontinued. But
the warrants of arrest heretofore issued by the petitioner, Immigration Commissioner, against
herein respondents Calacdays are declared null and void, without prejudice to said respondents
being required to furnish bonds in such reasonable sums as the Immigration Commissioners may
fix, in order to guarantee their appearance at the hearings and other proceedings in their case,
until final determination of their right to stay in the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA,
G.R. No. 71092
September 30, 1987
Forced re
-
enactments, like uncounselled
and coerced confessions come
within the ban against self
-
incrimination.
Evidence based on such
re
-
enactment
is
a
violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.
Here,
accused is
not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics;
by and large, he is
likewise made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police
procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession
.
The lack of counsel makes statement in contemplation of law, 'involuntary'
even if it were
otherwise voluntary.
FACTS:
On September 9, 1975,
authorities from the
Integrated National Police
station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga de
l Norte, received a report that a
certain Deosdedit Bagon is
missing.
Bagon had been in fact missing since two day
s before. He was last seen by his
wife in the afternoon of September 7, 1975, on his way home to S
itio Sebaca
where they resided.
A
search party
was conducted by the authorities
to mount an inquiry. As a matter
of police procedure, the team headed off to S
itio Sebaca to question possible
witnesses. There,
they
chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed them
that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the
accused herein.
The authorities then thereafter picked up Sorela for
interrogation.
Sorela bore
several scratches on his face, neck and arms when the police found him.
According to him, he sustained those wounds while clearing his ric
efield.
Apparently unconvinced, the police
had Sorela take them to the ricefield where
he s
ustained his injuries. But half way there, Sorela illegally broke down, and, in
what would apparently crack the case for the police, admitted having participated
in the killing of the missing Bagon. Sorela allegedly confessed having been with
Deosdedit Bag
on, a friend of his, in the evening of September 7, 1976 in S
itio
Sebaca
. They were met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co
-
accused herein and likewise friends of the deceased, who led them to a secluded
place in the ricefields.
Accordin
g to their confessions Villarojo
attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him
at several parts of the body until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled,
running into thick cogon grasses where he suffered facial and bodily scratches.
The police soon pi
cked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were
turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo
the Polanco Station Commander
.
The police thereafter made the three re
-
enact the cr
ime.
Sorela
was directed
to
lead them to the grounds where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been
buried. But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the
ricefields, where the sack
-
covered, decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a
shallow grave.
The necr
opsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the
deceased suffered twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to
be fatal.
In the re
-
enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how
the victim was
boloed to death.
A
photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in
the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike another, while Solero and Cademas
look on.
A
nother photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of concealing the
murder weapon behind a banana tree,
apparently after having done the victim in.
Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solero, Villarojo,
and Cademas executed Discredit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco
municipal mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00 eac
h.
While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The
first confessions were taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine
Constabulary headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police. On
September 18, 1975,
the three accused reiterated the same confessions before
the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub
-
office. On September 21,
1975 and September 25, 1975, they executed two confessions more, again before
the Philippine Constabulary and the polic
e of Polanco.
In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21,
1975, and September 25, 1975, the said accused again pointed to the then
accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement, who allegedly promised them
a reward of
P3,000.00 each.
In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in
the knowing. We note that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI
sub
-
office following a request on September 10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda O. Adaro
daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of harassment against her father by
his supposed political enemies.
T
he court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three accused
on the one
hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other.
However
Olvis was acquitted, while the
three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder.
In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's
earlier confessions
pointing to him as the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as
far as he was concerned. It rejected claims of witnesses that the three accused
-
appellants would carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill Bagon upon an of
fer of a
reward when in fact no money changed hands.
With the acquittal of Olvis,
however t
he
remaining
accused
-
appellants
subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court
despite prior
confessions
, and now were
alleging
that there were
thr
eats by the Polanco
investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the
case. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police
investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted on the
ir
innocence.
The a
c
cused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that it was the deceased who
had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self
-
defense.
For the defense, the
accused Romulo Villarojo admitted hacking the victim to death with a bolo. He
s
tressed, however, that he did so in self
-
defense. He completely absolved his co
-
accused Dominador
Sorela and Leonardo Cademas from any liability.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of
Polanco had but the three accus
ed
-
appellants' statements to support its claiming.
Issue
s
:
(1.)
W
hether
these statements, as any
of the
extrajudicial confession
can
stand up in court.
(2.)
Whether Villarojo’s claim of self
-
defense tenable?
Ruling:
(1.)
No. T
he three accused
-
appellants' extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he
has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation,
he
must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the
right to
remain silent.
For those
unaware of the privilege, the warning is
needed simply to make them aware of
the threshold requirement for an
intelligent decision as to its
exercise.
More important, such a warning is
an absolute pre
-
requisite in overcoming
the inherent pressures of the
i
nterrogation atmosphere
.
The
confessions in the case at bar suffer from a
Constitutional infirmity
In their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975
, the
accused
-
appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived"
their rights to
coun
sel. T
h
e lack of counsel makes statement
in
con
templation of law, 'involuntary
' even if it were otherwise voluntary,
technically.”
Forced re
-
enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come
within the ban
against self
-
incrimination. The 1973 Co
nstitution, the
Charter prevailing at the time of the
proceedings below, says:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the
accused is made to
execute not meant to une
arth undisclosed facts but
to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. This
includes requiring the accused to submit to a test
to extract virus from
his body,
or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his
mouth
,
or
making her
submit to a pregnancy test
,
or a foot
printing test
or
requiring him
to take part in a police lineup in certain cases." In each
case, the accused does not speak
his guilt. It is not a prerequisite
therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand
of
counsel.
But a
forced re
-
enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not
merely required
to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large,
he is made to admit criminal
responsibility against his will. It is a police
procedure just as co
ndemnable as an
uncounselled confession.
It should
be furthermore observed that the three accused
-
appellants were in
police custody
when they took part in the re
-
enactment in question. It is
under such circumstances that the
Constitut
ion holds a strict
app
lication.
Any statement he might have made
thereafter is therefore subject to
the Constitutional guaranty.
I
n such a case, he should have been
provided with counsel
.
(2.)
The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted
wounds caused by a
sh
arp instrument. The assault severed his right
hand and left his head almost separated
from his body. This indicates a
serious intent to kill, rather than self
-
defense.
In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, superior strength
or
nocturnity is unfound. In the absence of any other proof, the severity
and number of wounds sustained by the deceased are not, by
themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic
aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength
. Hence, Villarojo
should be liable for plain homicide
, and
accused
-
appellants Leonardo
Cademas and Dominador Sorela are acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

Dela Cruz vs. People, GR 200748, 23 July 2014

FACTS:

 Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic
Act No.(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
  The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido that
Ariel, the live-in partner of Corazon and Charito was picked up by unknown male
persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs.
 An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the
number a ring,they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office
located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City.
 In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them P100,000,
later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
 A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation.
 Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing to which a positive
result for presence of dangerous drugs was found.
 Petitioner claimed that when he was in the NBI Office, he was required to extract
urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI and such
request was denied.
 He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine
sample, to no avail.
 
ISSUE:
Whether the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.

RULING:
Yes. The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The
constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak of his guilt, hence
the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right
against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred
when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was
merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.
In the present case, though, the petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having
his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence
that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
Law enforcement agents, must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits
of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its
lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected
rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write
a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The
petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination
would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should
have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him
furnish evidence against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the

petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist
and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take
down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter
for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because
it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at
bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe
the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in
one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that
if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that
the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for
the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting
to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some
cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases
are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), Petitioner,-versus- DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Respondents. G.R. No. 157870, EN
BANC, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J. Congress may not amend or enlarge the
qualification requirements for senatorial candidates as enumerated in Section 3, Article VI of the
Constitution. Hence, neither Congress nor the COMELEC mayrequire a senatorial candidate to
be certified illegal-drug clean. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 53
FACTS: Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office. Pursuant to the said legal
provision, COMELEC issued a Resolution which required “all candidates for public office, both
national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections” to undergo
mandatory drug tests. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a candidate for re-election, claims that the
mandatory drug tests are unconstitutional since these impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether
mandatory drug tests may be validly imposed as an additional qualification for senatorial
candidates. (NO) RULING: Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain substantive and constitutional limitations, which circumscribe both the exercise
of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. One such limitation is found in
Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In this case, neither Congress nor the COMELEC may enlarge the qualification requirements
enumerated in the aforesaid constitutional provision. To require a senatorial candidate to be
certified illegal-drug clean would add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution,
at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Hence, the mandatory drug test
requirement for senatorial candidates is unconstitutional.

BLAS F. OPLE, Petitioners, – versus - RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,

HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE
NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
Respondents. G.R. No. 127685, EN BANC, July 23, 1998, PUNO, J. The Court prescind from
the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence,
it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the
identification of the individual through his PRN. It does not provide who shall control and access
the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard
the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F.
Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of
Computerized Identification Reference System” - providing for a national computerized
identification system with the goal of providing convenient way to transact business with the
government. Among the grounds raised is that the A.O. impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s
constitutional right of privacy. ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the
constitutional right to privacy. (YES) RULING: If we extend our judicial gaze, we will find that
the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. The
Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by
some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies
in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise
our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited
to biological information alone for identification purposes In fact, the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 –
UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 576 Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of
A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No.
308 cannot be underplayed. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his
PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His
transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of
the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence
of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. We can even grant,
arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic
personal infomation about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O.
No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical
terms how theseinformation gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and
access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. It is plain and we hold that
A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our
people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it
may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded.

SABIO VS GORDON
Posted by kaye lee on 9:17 PM
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al. 
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006, 
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)

[Congress Power of Inquiry]

FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners  to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees.  Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and
it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal.  The Court’s high  regard  to  such power is rendered more evident in Senate
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that  “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch.”  Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault   that  “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation,  is
a proper subject for investigation” and  that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the
power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of
inquiry.  This cannot be countenanced.  Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting
such exemption.   The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad,  encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec.
21), the principle of  public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II,
Sec. 28), and the right of  access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis. 
Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, February
11, 2014
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of R.A. No. 10175
(The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners
claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CYBERCRIME PREVENTION
ACT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS THEY REGARD CERTAIN ACTS AS
CRIMES AND IMPOSE PENALTIES FOR THEIR COMMISSION AS WELL AS
WOULD ENABLE GOVERNMENT TO TRACK DOWN AND PENALIZE VIOLATORS
 
RULING:
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is NOT unconstitutional.
 Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus
be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional
construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class
of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden
is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the
strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal protection.
Strict Scrutiny Standard not applicable in Illegal Access provision.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing
what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
Engagement of ethical hackers requires an agreement, therefore, insulating him from
the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Petitioners fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers,
professionals who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would
neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the
target system’s security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it
and give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent
of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping
records.
Besides, the client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between
them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested.
This is referred to as the “get out of jail free card.” Since the ethical hacker does his job
with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the
coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference is NOT unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally
subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its
subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3)
does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form
of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to
others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to
destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.
Petitioners fail to discharge the burden of proving that the provision is invalid under the
Overbreadth Doctrine.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in
terrorem effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens
who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the
State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the
state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling
effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the
evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of
one’s constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving
that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden.
No Equal Protection violation under Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire,
parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well-known
billionaire-philanthropist named “Julio Gandolfo,” the law would punish for cyber-
squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his
pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real
name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two,
the law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his
real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the
name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the
domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who
are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to
the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is
baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft is NOT unconstitutional
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process
and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in
Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself deserving of constitutional protection.
Zones of Privacy
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form
of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued
by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy” and “every has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and
(b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the
challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and,
if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well
as the right to due process of the law.
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship,
his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his
spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or
use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners
simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft
violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of the
law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not
hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed
freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions, the
acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.
Section does not violate freedom of the press
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person
in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the
essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring
and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a
form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through
the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on
the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or
social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate
intent to gain which is required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex does NOT violate freedom of expression
Petitioners claim that the section violates freedom of expression. They express fear that
private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting
adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded
as crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace. In common usage, the term “favor”
includes “gracious kindness,” “a special privilege or right granted or conceded,” or “a
token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously.” This meaning given to the term
“favor” embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law
enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of
“engaging in a business” necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually
seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography committed through a computer system is NOT
unconstitutional
The section merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the
government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system.
The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a
legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty. The potential
for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded
in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications or SPAM is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating freedom of expression
The section penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also
known as “spam.” The term “spam” surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive
fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a
“spam.” The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which actors
would keep saying “Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam” when reading options from a menu.
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and
network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and
technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out
spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads
reduce the “efficiency of computers.” Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never
been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is
that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true
with spams. Their recipient always have the option to delete or not to read them.
Commercial speech still entitled to protection
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally  guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.
Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous statement or
article is NOT unconstitutional
Petitioner lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel
provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice”
even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of
“actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed
malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal
code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken
down as unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “actual malice”
could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People even where the
offended parties happened to be public figures.
Elements of libel: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
(b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice.
There is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory
statement with knowledge that is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published.
Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.
Prosecution bears the burden of proving actual malice in instances where such element
is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official
or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the
Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal
code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the
Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s
interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs.
Where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the
presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show
that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
Cybercrime Prevention Act does not violate the Philippines’ obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
General Comment 34 of ICCPR does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement
should constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes
truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in
making the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall
not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against government
employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall
be acquitted.
Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting the Commission of Cybercrime should be permitted to
apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section
4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-Squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related
Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex.  
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerate as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression.
Aiding and abetting certain cybercrimes must be distinguished between the actors
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed
statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like
PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the computer
used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog;
and f)the person who posts a link to the blog site.
The question is: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory statement,
“Commenting” on it, or “Sharing” it with others, to be regarded as “aiding or abetting?”
In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster
that says, “Armand is a thief!,” he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing
the poster, writes on it, “I like this!,” that could not be libel since he did not author the
poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, “Correct!,” would that
be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He
still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical
world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, “Armand is a thief!” on a social networking site.
Would a reader and his Friends or Followers, availing themselves of the “Like,”
“Comment,” and “Share” reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the
complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding
or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed
Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may
think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable
for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds
of thousands of responding “Friends” or “Followers” in the criminal charge to be filed in
court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the
challenged posting?
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” cyber-libel, unsolicited
commercial communications and child pornography is a nullity for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his
relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental
purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology
to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will
unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute
broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime
law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
When void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. Generally, the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrine is inapplicable in ‘facial” challenges to penal statutes not
involving free speech. In an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation
of his constitutional right must assert his own right, not that of third persons. This rule
is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial”
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own
right under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on the grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech
that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his
speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the
actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out,
formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in
other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography,
cannot stand scrutiny.
Section 6, which imposes a higher penalty on crimes penalized under the Revised Penal
Code if committed through information and communication technologies, is NOT
unconstitutional.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of information and communications
technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in
question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims
or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.
Section 7, which allows prosecution both under the Cybercrime Law and the Revised Penal
Code, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as cyber-libel and cyber child pornography is
concerned.
There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous,
is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims
that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished
under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another
means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely
expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As
previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the
use of “electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.” Thus,
charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 which imposes penalties for cybercrimes is NOT unconstitutional
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it
regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear appropriate to the evil sought to be
punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly
wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of
another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise
their range as determined by the legislative department.
Section 12, authorizing law enforcement to collect real-time traffic data, is TOO
SWEEPING AND LACKS RESTRAINT
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record
traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for
official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what
kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every
individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into messages or
information that they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since
a law may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only
upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law,
that there is compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is
narrowly drawn. In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance
the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for
there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good.
To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to
monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is
part, aims to provide the law enforcement authorities with the power they need for
spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting
is a state business.
Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without right,
transmitting viruses, lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration, and producing child pornography could easily evade detection and
prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from
day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually
anywhere: from internet cafes, from kindred places that provide free internet services,
and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under
pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses
and can neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can
quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays of
computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations.
Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent
recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them
out.
Two categories of right to privacy
In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy in two categories:
decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers
to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right – the right
to informational privacy – that those who oppose government collection or recording of
traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy and its two aspects
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining
whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a
two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an
actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to
accept as objectively reasonable.
Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact
Computer data – messages of all kinds – travel across the internet in packets and in a
way that may be likened to parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts.
When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and
around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic
data: information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is
in the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing
data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the packet fits together with other
packets. The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at times across the
ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the
sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets
travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back
together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another
over cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit
certain traffic data that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The
conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation of
privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
“Due Cause” under Section 12 has no precedent in law or jurisprudence
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, “with due cause,” to collect or record
by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. But the cybercrime law,
dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase “due
cause.” Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable
commission of a particular crime. It just says, “with due cause,” thus justifying a general
gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution
prohibits.
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or
content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law
enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of
their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the
citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in
these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated with
specified communications.” But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities
to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication they
want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred
institutions to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have
previously been impractical or even impossible. “All the forces of technological age x x x
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms,
the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and totalitarian society.” The Court must ensure that laws seeking
to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to
ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Section 13 on preservation of computer data and Section 17 on destruction of computer
data do not constitute undue deprivation of right to property
The contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors
or recipients and are to be considered private communications. The data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible
to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not
unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
It is unclear that the user has demandable right to require the service provider to have
that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them
preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or
received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
Section 14 on disclosure of computer data does not violate privacy of communications and
correspondence
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of subpoena.
Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory
powers. Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued
court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to
carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not
constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.
Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data does not supersede existing
search and seizure rules
On its face, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that
would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data
that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties does not
pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does
not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well
as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into
a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that
computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal
property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in
one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the
Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for
judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19
operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all
forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare
certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged
to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the
opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury,
and executioner all rolled into one.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three
tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and
present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be
found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6
into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision.
It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
Section 20, punishing non-compliance with any order issued by law enforcement agencies
under Chapter IV, is NOT unconstitutional
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is
that mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to
situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of P.D. 1829, Section 20
necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. Thus, there
must still be judicial determination of guilt, during which, defense and justifications for
non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the
provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26, which provides the creation and powers of the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordination Center, are VALID
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a
national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to
follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court
has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate
and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the
petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a
definition of cybersecurity.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law
to “prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation.” This policy is
clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard.
Hing vs. Choachuy
FACTS:
 Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s)
filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a
fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The
court denied the application for lack of evidence.  So in order to get evidences for the
case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing
the Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the
fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to
privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a order granting the application of the Hing’s
for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video surveillance cameras
they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and  the
RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s
violated the Hing’s right to privacy.
HELD:
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1)
prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business
office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access.

Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College GR No 202666 29 September 2014

11TUESDAYOCT 2016

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City;
wherein, the students involved posted pictures on their Facebook account of
them wearing wearing no shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said
photos were taken while they were changing into their swimsuits for a beach
party. The said photos were reported to the STC’s computer teacher, named
Mylene Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked several of her students to show her
other photos of Julia and Julianne, above-mentioned graduating students,
they saw photos of: them along the streets of Cebu wearing clothing which
shows their black brassieres (duh, Sinulog? Hello?); them drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar (Private property OUTSIDE school
premises); and that their Facebook accounts were accessible to any
Facebook user.
Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school
authorities. The poor students involved were investigated and were barred to
attend their highschool graduation rites which is experienced by a person
once in their lifetime. Heartless.
A case was filed against the STC and its officials for Injunction and
Damages. Injunction as to the order of the school not to allow the poor
children to attend their graduation rites. A petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data was also filed. Petitioners (Parents of the students
involved) assert that the privacy of the children were unlawfully invaded.
Since the Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”; That
the photos were owned by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Old hag, however, violated this by saving digital
copies and subsequently showed them to the STC’s officials.
RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their verified written
return within 5 working days from service of the writ.
Respondent denied the petitioners allegation, among others, because there
can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy on Facebook.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.
Issue: Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy?
Decision: No.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
PURPOSE:
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY CONFINED TO CASES OF
EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ
of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the
immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ
only to extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2, a variance of habeas data situations,
would not have been made.
It is designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age.
RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT IT IS NOT AN ENTITY ENGAGED IN THE
GATHERING, COLLETING OR STORING OF DATA OR INFORMATION
REGARDING THE PERSON, FAMILY, HOME AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
AGGRIEVED PARTY. -THIS IS ERRONEOUS.
Such individual need not be in the business of such.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor.
To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily
mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business.  What matters
is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data
or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Regularity is
immaterial.
THREE STRANDS OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
1. Locational/Situational
2. Informational (case at bar)
3. Decisional
RIGHT TO PRIVACY WAS NOT VIOLATED because:
 1. Facebook has privacy safeguard tools.
2. Utilization of this tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of
the user’s invocation of his right to informational privacy.
That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolsters
the petitioners’ contention. It is well emphasize at this point that setting a
post’s or profile detail’s to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter
is Facebook friends or not with the former.

Ramirez vs. CA G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and void, and
holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of
the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,”
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity
of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Constitutional Law – Right to Free Speech, Public Figure) 
FACTS: Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the
production and filming of the projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution”, which
relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at EDSA, for its
unlawful intrusion upon the former’s right to privacy.
Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of
speech and expression; and the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public
interest and concern and not on the individual private life of respondent senator.
ISSUE: WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.
HELD: Yes. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one
of public interest. Private respondent is a public figure due to his participation in the
culmination of the change of government. The right of privacy of the a “public figure” is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
 
Case 2A. AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. vs. CAPULONG GR No. L-82380, April 29,
1988 GR No. L-82398, April 29, 1988 DOCTRINE: The production and filming by
petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's
"right of privacy." CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE – that words are used in
such a circumstance and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantial evils that a lawmaker has a right to prevent.

BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST- the courts should balance the public interest
served by legislation on one hand and the freedom of speech (or any other
constitutional right) on the other. The courts will then decide where the greater weight
should be placed. FACTS: Petitioner McElroy, an Australian Film maker, and AYER
PRODUCTIONS, his movie production company envisioned, for commercial viewing
and for Philippine and International Release, the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed Motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the MTRCB and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also
signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a
six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have
developed a script. Private Respondent Ponce Enrile declared that he will not approve
the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium
for advertising or commercial exploitation. Petitioners acceded to this demand and the
name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy is unlawfully intruded. Petitioner contended that:

a. the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression;
and b. the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and concern and
not on the individual private life of respondent Senator. RTC Judge Ignacio Capulong
ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence
the appeal. ISSUES: a. Whether or not the Freedom of Speech/ Expression includes
freedom to film and produce motion pictures. b. Whether or not the Right to Privacy of
Respondent Enrile is violated by the Motion Picture of “Four Day Revolution”. RULING:
a. Yes. Freedom of Speech includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures
and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
Along with press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of
mass communication for information, education and entertainment. This freedom of
Speech is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion
picture companies. b. No. The projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does
not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent’s right of privacy. In the
case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and
the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner taking into account the interplay
of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and
considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by
petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the
limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern." Whether the “balancing of interest test” or the “clear and
present danger test” be applied in respect of

the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be
reached. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no “clear and
present danger” of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could
lawfully assert. The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-
bloody change of government which took place at EDSA. Clearly such subject matter is
one of public interest and concern or even international interest. The subject matter
relates to a highly critical state in the history of this country and thus passed into the
public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage
by any form of mass media. The synopsis provided by petitioner does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not the private life of respondent Ponce Enrile. The “Four
Day Revolution” is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce
Enrile. Moreso, Private respondent Enrile is a public figure (which gives the public a
legitimate interest of his doings, his affairs, his character and has become a public
“personage”), in other words he is a celebrity. To be included in this category are those
who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public. This
includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary
soldiers, an infant prodigy, in short anyone who has arrived at a position where public is
focused upon him as a person. Private respondent Enrile is a public figure because of
his participation as principal action in the culminating events of the change of
government. The right of privacy of a public figure is necessarily narrower than that of
an ordinary citizen. But it must be noted that the proposed motion picture is required to
be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. This serves as a line of
equilibrium in this case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression
and the right of privacy. There must be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling
private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal
facts. Portrayal of the participation of private respondent in the EDSA

Revolution should be related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution.

F. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, Petitioner, – versus - RAUL M.

GONZALES, Respondent. G.R. No. 168338, EN BANC, February 15, 2008, PUNO, C.J. A
governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the
strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to
satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of
free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping
law clearly endangers the national security of the State. FACTS: On June 5, 2005, Press
Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the
administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the
President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through
wiretapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales
warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in
their presence. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a press release giving fair warning to radio and
television owners/operators to observe anti-wiretapping law and pertinent circulars on
programstandards. The acts of respondents are alleged to be violations of the freedom on
expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Respondents denied that the acts transgress the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the
official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the
alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities constitute
unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. (YES)
RULING: The Supreme Court applied the Content-based restriction test and ruled that
respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. With respect to
content-based restrictions, the government must show the type of harm the speech sought to be
restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm
otherwise the prior restraint will DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
583 be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality
already on ground. As formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press
based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule
applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. This outlines the procedural
map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the
presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum
of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the
burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle
the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The
records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls
short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the
taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one
supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially
considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its
commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy
the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free
speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.

Soriano vs. La Guardia G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009 Freedom of Speech
JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB,
separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse
and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect
of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in
Ang Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment
of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from
the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of
a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that
indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of
serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of
less offensive language.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M.
ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R.
CANLAS, Petitioners, v. SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE
ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 174105, EN BANC, April 2, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J The same directors and officers
contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution
or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose
inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to
gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a
need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not
result in any potential legislation. FACTS: Petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II
Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation, signed by the Legislative Committee
Secretary, the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development chaired
by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd day of
August 2006 at The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review
and possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act"
and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter petitioner Romero II
requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled
hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. 537 and
543 his request, being unmeritorious, was denied Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the
Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum on petitioner Romero II directing
him to appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006 relative to
the aforesaid Senate resolutions. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and
to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued.
Observing that the Senate's motives in calling for an investigation in aid of legislation were a
political question. The respondents averred that the subject matter of the investigation focused on
the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate
determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of
1995 and enacting laws to protect OWWA funds in the future. ISSUES: Whether or not the
subject matter of the Committee's inquiry is subjudice? (NO) RULING: DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019
– UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 77 The same directors and officers contend that the Senate
is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative action
should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information
and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve
existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any
potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid
of legislation. [T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation. All
pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the
Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time when the Committee issued
invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of
the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at
the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons
to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to
respond to subpoena, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify
fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. There is no more
investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more investigation the
constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge.

EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. 132231,EN BANC, March 31, 1998, MENDOZA, J. Here, x
x x there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given
the fact that print space and airtime can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the
disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest
justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the
Constitution. x x x The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only
prohibit the sale or donation of print space and airtime to candidates but require the COMELEC
instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the
candidates. In effect, during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page
of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the
candidates. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 593 FACTS: This is a
petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission
on Elections. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections. Petitioner
Emilio M. R. Osmeña is candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P.
Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend that events after the
ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections" have called into question the validity
of the very premises of that [decision]." NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of §11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the press. In urging a
reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since the
decision in that case has shown the "undesirable effects" of the law because "the ban on political
advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, [but] actually worked to the grave
disadvantage of the poor candidate[s]" by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to
pay while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching voters like
airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. No empirical data have been presented by
petitioners to back up their claim, however. Argumentation is made at the theoretical and not the
practical level. Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the
operation of the law. They do not complain that they have in any way been disadvantaged as a
result of the ban on media advertising. Their contention that, contrary to the holding in NPC,
§11(b) works to the disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources to wage a
campaign outside of mass media can hardly apply to them. Their financial ability to sustain a
long drawn-out campaign, using means other than the mass media to communicate with voters,
cannot be doubted. If at all, it is candidates like intervenor Roger Panotes, who is running for
mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, who can complain against §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. But
Panotes is for the law which, he says, has "to some extent, reduced the advantages of moneyed
politicians and parties over their rivals who are similarly situated as ROGER PANOTES." He
claims that "the elimination of this substantial advantage is one reason why ROGER PANOTES
and others similarly situated have dared to seek an elective position this coming elections." What
petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the holding of an academic exercise.
And since a majority of the present Court is unpersuaded that its decision in NPC is founded in
error, it will suffice for present purposes simply to reaffirm the ruling in that case. Stare decisis
et non quieta movere. ISSUE: Whether or not the case of NPC v. COMELEC, which upheld the
validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the
press, is founded in error. (NO) RULING: [W]e have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC
v. COMELEC in order to clarify our own understanding of its reach and set forth a theory of
freedom of speech. I. No Ad Ban, Only a Substitution of COMELEC Space and COMELEC
Time for the Advertising Page and Commercials in Mass Media DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 594 The term political "ad ban," when used to describe §11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as §11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and
air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the
candidates space and time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a
regulation of the time and manner of advertising. x x x Here, x x x there is no total ban on
political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space
and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor
candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the
regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution. x x x The
provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or
donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure
space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect,
during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the
commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates. x x x … [T]he
State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as well as campaigning within a certain
place. For unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the mass media skews the political
process and subverts democratic self-government. What is bad is if the law prohibits
campaigning by certain candidates because of the views expressed in the ad. Content regulation
cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason. II. Law Narrowly Drawn to Fit
Regulatory Purpose The main purpose of §11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only
incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of
opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as
pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope. x x x The premise of this
argument is that §11(b) imposes a ban on media political advertising. What petitioners seem to
miss is that the prohibition against paid or sponsored political advertising is only half of the
regulatory framework, the other half being the mandate of the COMELEC to procure print space
and air time so that these can be allocated free of charge to the candidates.

Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager
of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to
compel the
latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947.
The
petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the respondent
refused
to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe,
basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.”
Respondent
based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public
peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec.
1119, Free
use of Public Place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating
freedom of
assembly.

HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and
to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights
of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute.
They can
be regulated under the state’s police power – that they should not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society.
The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of
Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of
a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila;
and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or
public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of
the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the
risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to
authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases
of national
emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for
the
assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of
serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free
men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that
the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence
or in
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority
Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-1800
January 27, 1948

FACTS:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent Mayor
Fugoso to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for
redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the Mayor Fugoso
in his defense for refusing the permit is, “that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially
on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches
of the peace and a disruption of public order.”
Mayor Fugoso also invoked the delegated police power to local government. The
Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila. The Municipal Board is also granted the
following legislative powers, to wit: “(p) to provide for the prohibition and
suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate
the use of streets, avenues, . . . parks, cemeteries and other public places” and “for
the abatement of nuisances in the same,” and “(ee) to enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity
and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.”
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against
public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a
misdemeanor, “any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd
for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly.” Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

HELD:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated
discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or
meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine
or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion
by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others,
and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The
court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to
authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic
system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There
must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Petitioner –versus- ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG GEN.
ARTHUR ANG, CAMP AGUINALDO CAMP COMMANDER, and LT. COL. HAROLD
CABUNOC, AFP PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF, Respondents G.R. No. 214986,
SECOND DIVISION, February 15, 2017, LEONEN, J. This Court will not freely infringe on the
constitutional right to freedom of expression. It may interfere, on occasion, for the proper
administration of justice. However, the power of contempt should be balanced with the right to
freedom of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public
matters. Freedom of expression must always be protected to the fullest extent possible. FACTS:
Jeffrey Laude was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US Marine Private
Joseph Scott Pemberton. Police had not been able to obtain Pemberton' s latent fingerprints and
oral swabs, because he was confined by his superiors on a ship and placed under their custody.
Pemberton was eventually transferred from his ship to a facility in the headquarters of the AFP.
However, Philippine authorities maintained that until a case was filed against Pemberton,
custody over him remained with the United States of America. News broke out that Pemberton
had been flown into Camp Aguinaldo. Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced
their way inside the premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board and
gained entry despite having been instructed by Military Police personnel not to enter the
compound, and even though the gates were closed. As narrated by respondents, petitioner
fomented disorder by inciting his clients to scale the perimeter fence, to see Pemberton.
Respondents allege that the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having been subject of
various national television, radio, internet, and print media publications. Respondents filed a
disbarment complaint against petitioner, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On the
same day, respondent Cabunoc called a conference at Camp Aguinaldo, and publicly announced
that a disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner. Respondent Cabunoc also
distributed a press statement, which reads: Press Statement: AFP files disbarment complaint
against Atty. Harry Roque; Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and
generously quoted from, by media. Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious
violations of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Further, petitioner claims that
respondents' acts put to question his professional and personal reputation. Respondents argue that
the press statements are not among the contumacious acts prescribed under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. The subject of the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL
LAW 779 disbarment case pertains to a serious breach of security of a military zone. The
statements were official statements made in the performance of a public function to address a
public concern. The circumstances, which led to the filing of the disbarment complaint and the
acts alleged therein were witnessed by the public and duly reported by the media. The filing of
the disbarment case was not meant to malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to
the events that transpired at Camp Aguinaldo. Respondents also claim the issue is a matter of
public interest, which is a defense in contempt proceedings such as this. With the Laude Murder
case being of public concern, petitioner has attained the status of a public figure, susceptible of
public comment in connection with his actions on the case. In any case, respondents instituted
the disbarment complaint against petitioner in good faith. They are laymen, and are not familiar
with the confidentiality rule. ISSUE: Whether or not there is contempt of court. (NO) RULING:
The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or promote the proper
administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious
alleged violations of the confidentiality rule, we apply a restrictive interpretation. Petitioner
assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed public threats of
filing a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public statement that they had
filed a disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is
nothing to keep private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4,
2014, and there was no proceeding to keep private. As for the Press Statement made on
November 4, 2014, a close examination reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits
punishment for contempt. The Press Statement declared only three (3) things: first, respondent
AFP filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus,
must conduct himself according to the standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's
"unlawful conduct" is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. As regards the
disbarment, the Press Statement only said: At about 2 p.m. today, the AFP has filed a verified
disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Harry
Roque for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Press Statement' s coverage
of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report that a complaint had been filed.
Such an announcement does not, in and of itself, violate the confidentiality rule, particularly
considering that it did not discuss the disbarment complaint itself. In any case, the Press
Statement does not divulge any acts or character traits on the part of petitioner that would
damage his personal and professional reputation. Although the Press Statement mentioned that a
disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner, no particulars DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 –
UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 780 were given about the content of the complaint or the
actual charges filed. Furthermore, prior to the filing of the complaint, petitioner even made his
own public statement regarding respondents' possible filing of a disbarment complaint. Even
before any case against him had been filed, media reported that petitioner tweeted publicly that
he looked forward to answering the complaint before the APP. In the articles cited by petitioner
as evidence of respondents' violation of the confidentiality rule, he, too, is quoted, saying "the
case is a chance for him to 'clarify a lawyer's role in pushing victims' rights and sovereignty."' It
is unlikely that petitioner's reputation could be further damaged by a factual report that a
complaint had actually been filed. Petitioner has made it even more public by filing the instant
case against the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines, instead of targeting only the individuals
who participated in the disclosure. Even the events that led to the filing of the disbarment case
transpired in front of media. As alleged by petitioner, the question of custody over Pemberton
was the subject of public discussion. In relation to that issue, petitioner accompanied his clients
when they demanded to see Pemberton, when they were refused, and when they forced
themselves into Pemberton's detention facility, in a serious breach of security of a military zone.
Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a
subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against petitioner. The
statements were official statements made in the performance of respondents' official functions to
address a matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to
a serious breach of security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be
punished for responding publicly to such public actions. This Court will not freely infringe on
the constitutional right to freedom of expression. It may interfere, on occasion, for the proper
administration of justice. However, the power of contempt should be balanced with the right to
freedom of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public
matters. Freedom of expression must always be protected to the fullest extent possible. The
question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree (Schenck vs. U.S., supra). The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been
adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of
expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a
remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech
and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the
constitution, are not absolute. They are DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL
LAW 781 subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts
against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325.) This rule may be epitomized as follows:
If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence,
or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is
it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
(Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.)

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING

CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza,J. Under the O’Brien test, even if a law
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Applying the
O’Brien Test in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4 is invalid, because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
FACTS: Comelec sought to enforce Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
“Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.”
Petitioners brought an action for prohibition to enjoin Comelec from enforcing such provision,
claiming that it constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any
clear and present danger to justify such restraints.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression and the press. (YES)

RULING: The Court applied the O’Brien Test under, under which even if a law furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the
restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question. Applying the O’Brien Test in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4 is
invalid, because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than the suppression of freedom of expression. Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the
prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited
period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of
the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a
category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days
immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election.

Sps. Romualdez v. COMELEC

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 167011 AFpril 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:
                Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of
the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information
as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
                The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
                Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since
1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the
house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.

Issue: WON due process was violated.

Held: No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched
in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for
violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from
those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges
as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC,
notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be
covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by
the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were
based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint
or Information.

Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due
process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based
on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations
filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such
that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary
evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were
afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to
the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss
with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before
the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the
circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor
General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the
charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting
evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated. 

diong Vs Comelec
ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and
7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. â€” The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted
areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the
COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile”
places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No.
2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null
and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly,
the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they
include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of
his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree
of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on
the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not
met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated
that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early
nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More
precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner
Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in
the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11,
1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a
registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-
petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a
candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of
political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate
or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these
political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and
present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of
petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was
asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and
press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however
under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil
of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and
degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government
but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union,
the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to
give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the
police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may
supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of
speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment
or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule
in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the
words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated.
It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the
practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the
actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has
invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this
country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the

part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the

holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for
public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution
of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether
directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a
constitutional command.

SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner, -versus- CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING

SYSTEM, INC. and PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE, INC., Respondents. G.R. No.
162272, SECOND DIVISION, April 7, 2009, TINGA, J. The special civil action of quo warranto
is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what
warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that "[t]he
determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of
quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or
otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private
injury." FACTS: Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and Peoples
Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are
involved in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the
grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of two laws, RA No. 7477 and RA No. 7582. RA No.
7477, granted PBS a legislative franchise to construct, install, maintain and operate radio and
television stations within the Philippines for a period of 25 years. RA No. 7582 extended CBSs
previous legislative franchise to operate radio stations for another 25 years. The CBS and PBS
radio networks are two of the three networks that comprise the wellknown Bombo Radyo
Philippines. Section 9 of RA No. 7477 and Section 3 of RA No. 7582 contain a common
provision predicated on the constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of public utilities.
The NTC issued 4 Provisional Authorities to PBS and 6 Provisional Authorities to CBS,
allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various
locations throughout the nation. These Provisional Authorities were issued between 1993 to
1998, or after the enactment of RA No. 7477 and RA No. 7582. Petitioner Santiago C.
Divinagracia filed two complaints both dated 1 March 1999 with the NTC, respectively lodged
against PBS and CBS. He alleged that he was "the actual and beneficial owner of 12% of the
shares of stock" of PBS and CBS separately, and that despite the provisions in RA No. 7477 and
RA No. 7582 mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of PBS and
CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering. Thus, Divinagracia commonly argued in his
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 709 complaints that the failure on
the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the mandate of their legislative franchise is a misuse of
the franchise conferred upon it by law and it continues to exercise its franchise in contravention
of the law to the detriment of the general public and of complainant who are unable to enjoy the
benefits being offered by a publicly listed company." On 1 August 2000, the NTC issued a
consolidated decision dismissing both complaints. The NTC ruled that it was not competent to
render a ruling on that issue, the same being more properly the subject of an action for quo
warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. After the NTC had denied Divinagracia’s
motion for reconsideration, he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals. On 18 February 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
upholding the NTC. The appellate court agreed with the earlier conclusion that the complaints
were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of CBS and PBS and that a quo
warranto action was the proper mode to thresh out the issues raised in the complaints. Hence, this
petition. ISSUE: Whether quo warranto exists as an available and appropriate remedy against the
wrong imputed on private respondents. (YES) RULING: Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action
for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises public office, position or franchise." Even while the action is maintained in the name of
the Republic, the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such action
upon complaint, and upon good reason to believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule
66 can be established by proof. The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by
which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public
office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to the
exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-
user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert
which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the
abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury." A forfeiture of a franchise will
have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a
franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government. Quo
warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a government corporation has
offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise. If the courts conclude that private
respondents have violated the terms of their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo warranto
against them, then the NTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since these
permits draw strength from the possession of a valid franchise. If the point has not already been
made clear, then licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and provisional authorities are junior
to the legislative franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing authority of the DEAN’S
CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 710 NTC is not on equal footing with the
franchising authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTC
implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner that the
executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its own laws. And similar
to the inability of the executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by Congress, the
NTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a
legislative franchise by withholding or cancelling the licenses of the franchisee.

Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans [GR L-59329, 19 July 1985] Resolution En Banc,
Gutierrez Jr. (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs and submits brief statement, 1 concurs in separate opinion,
1 concurs in dispositive portion, 1 took no part, 2 voted for dismissal. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 45 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: Radio Station DYRE was closed on the ground
that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. A petition was filed by Eastern
Broadcasting to compel the Minister of Transportation and Communications, Ceferino S.
Carreon (Commissioner, National Telecommunications Commission), et. al. to allow the
reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national
security; alleging denial of due process and violation of its right of freedom of speech. On 25
March 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues
raised, Eastern Broadcasting through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion
to withdraw or dismiss the petition. Eastern Broadcasting alleged that (1) it has already sold its
radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the
radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment; (2) the National
Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to the said new owner
Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio station and to
approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE; (3) in view of the foregoing,
Eastern Broadcasting has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B.
Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further. Issue: Whether radio
broadcasting enjoys a more limited form Held: The case has become moot and academic.
However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines: (1) The cardinal primary
requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by the Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed
or its operations curtailed; (2) it is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and
precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government
action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate
case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20
SCRA 849); (3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule - that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent; (4) the clear and present
danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies
have to be allocated among qualified users; (5) The clear and present danger test must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations —
whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful,
intelligent and sophisticated handling; (6) the freedom to comment on public affairs is essential
to the vitality of a representative democracy; and (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without
regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.All forms of communication are
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspaper and print media. Radio broadcasting, more than other forms of
communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause, because:
First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens.
Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy
of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion
picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the
same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
tuning in and out. Similar considerations apply in the area of national security. The broadcast
media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income
masses who find Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 46 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the cost of
books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter
perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The
television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a
national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach
every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different
I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech
would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and
immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to
cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance. Still, the government has a right to be protected
against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may
not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time,
the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for
existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances.
Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public
issues, they also deserve special protection.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR. [137 SCRA 628; L-
59329; 19 JUL 1985]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was
“summarily closed” on grounds of national security. The radio station
was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends
that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual
evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station
violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a
decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were
sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because
there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the
Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the
guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this
case.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional

Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null
and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights.
The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang
Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be
closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to
support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law
and facts and not simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can
know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of
Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional

right of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that
all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow
it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and
present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such
nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has
the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to
organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public
affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the
people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast
stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et al. G.R. NO. 173034, October 09,
2007, J. Austria-Martinez The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls
within the ambit of the term commercial speech. The absolute ban on advertising is unduly
restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting
the health of infants and young children. It ought to be self-evident, for instance, that the
advertisement of such products which are strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech. The
laudable concern of the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and young children
cannot justify the absolute, overarching ban. FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was
issued by President Corazon Aquino. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From
1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The DOH issued the assailed RIRR which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006. Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of
breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. ISSUE:
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 625 Whether or not the absolute
ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11
of A.O. No. 2006-0012 (RIRR) should be struck down. (YES) RULING: The advertising and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the ambit of the term commercial
speech-that is, speech that proposes an economic transaction. This is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. An American
jurisprudence provided a four-part analysis for evaluating the validity of regulations of
commercial speech: (1) The commercial speech must concern lawful acitivity and not be
misleading; (2) The asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If both of these
requirements are met, it must next be determined whether the state regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest. Applying the test in the case at bar, first, it is not claimed that the
advertisement at issue is an unlawful activity or is inaccurate. In fact, both the International Code
and the Milk Code recognize and concede that there are instances when breastmilk substitutes
may be necessary. Second, there is no doubt that the government interest in providing safe and
adequate nutrition to infants and young children is substantial. This interest is expressed as a
national policy in no less than the fundamental law of our land and is also embodied in various
international agreements where we are a party. Third, there is an undeniable causal relationship
between the interest of government and the advertising ban. Unquestionably, breastfeeding is the
tested and proven method of providing optimal nutrition to infants and young children. The
rationale of the absolute ban is to prevent mothers from succumbing to suggestive and
misleading marketing and propaganda which may be contained in advertisements of breastmilk
substitutes.Fourth, prescinding from these predicates, the critical inquiry is: whether the
complete suppression of the advertisement and promotion of breastmilk substitutes is no more
than necessary to further the interest of the state in the protection and promotion of the right to
health of infants and young children. The absolute ban on advertising is unduly restrictive and is
more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of
infants and young children. It ought to be self-evident, for instance, that the advertisement of
such products which are strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech. The laudable concern
of the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify the
absolute, overarching ban.

Gonzales vs Katigbak
FEBRUARY 24, 2015 | KAAARINA
Gonzales vs Katigbak
G.R. No. 69500, July 22, 1985
Facts: The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim, was classified “For Adults Only.”
The main objection was the classification of the film as “For Adults Only.” For petitioners, such
classification “is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of
artistic expression.  The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which
the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film.  Viewed as a
whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its
classification.”
Issue: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion in classifying said film as “For Adults Only.”
Held: No. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari solely on the ground that there are
not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification
of Kapit sa Patalim as “For Adults Only.”
Principles found:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas
and the expression of the artistic impulse.  Their effects on the perception by our
people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing
cultural traits is considerable. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court,
“may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern without censorship or punishment.”[12]This is not to say that such
freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute.  It can be limited if “there be a
‘clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to
prevent.
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free
press.  If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated.  It is, however, except
in exceptional circumstances a sine qua nonfor the meaningful exercise of such
right.  This is not to deny that equally basic is the other important aspect of
freedom from liability.  Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation, the
emphasis should rightly be on freedom from censorship.  It is, beyond question, a
well-settled principle in our jurisdiction.
3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent.  Such danger must not only be clear but also present.  There
should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of.  The causal connection must be evident.  Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence.  The time element cannot be
 ignored.  Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable.  There is the
requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable.
4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity — and rightly so.
5. There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is obscene.  There is
persuasiveness to the approach followed in Roth:  “The early leading standard of
obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated
excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons.
6. The above excerpt which imposes on the judiciary the duty to be ever on guard
against any impermissible infringement on the freedom of artistic expression calls
to mind the landmark ponencia of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Bustos,
[22]
decided in 1918.  While recognizing the principle that libel is beyond the pale
of constitutional protection, it left no doubt that in determining what constitutes
such an offense, a court should ever be mindful that no violation of the right to
freedom of expression is allowable.
7. It is quite understandable then why in the Roth opinion, Justice Brennan took
pains to emphasize that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous.”[24]Further: 
“Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest.  The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works,
is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press.
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876, reference was made to
respondent Board “applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard,”[26]words which can be construed in an analogous manner.  Moreover, as
far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed
strongly that the arts and letters “shall be under the patronage of the
State.”[27] That is a constitutional mandate.
9. This being a certioraripetition, the question before the Court is whether or not
there was a grave abuse of discretion.  That there was an abuse of discretion by
respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by
petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as “For Adults Only,” without
any deletion or cut.  Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity
appears to be unduly restrictive.  This Court concludes then that there was an
abuse of discretion.  Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that
such an abuse can be considered grave.  Accordingly, certiorari does not lie.
10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of
obscenity applicable to motion pictures.  It is the consensus of this Court that
where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for
observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to
pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.  Children then
will likely  will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown.  As
was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. [34] It
cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to
manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
Case Digest: Daez vs Court of Appeals   G.R. No. 133507,          Feb 17, 2000,325
SCRA 856 (2000)
7/8/2020

0 COMMENTS
 
Issue:
Whether or not  land owner can still exercise their right of retention over subject 4.1685
hectares rice land despite the fact that a previous decision denying petition for
exemption under Presidential Decree 27 had long been executory.

Facts:
Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Soriente, Macatulad,  Mediana and 
Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation
Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended by Letter of
Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by the respondents,
stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers,  Daez applied for the
exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as
for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the
petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27
having been finally denied her, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
rice land, this time under R.A. No. 6657.

On March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed  Daez to
retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain
three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct
management thereof as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.

DAR Secretary affirmed the decision of the regional director. They appealed to the
Office of the President (OP).

Office of the President ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment
authorizing the retention of the 4.1685 hectares of land. The application of the children
was still denied. Hence the appeal in CA.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President.

Held:
YES. Petitioner heirs of  Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject
4.1685 riceland.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform 23 , we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their
retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No.
6657 24 . We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if
a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had
previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still
entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. 25 Otherwise, he
is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, 
SECTION 6. Retention Limits — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person
may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size
of which shall Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management
contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in
violation of this Act shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior
to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period
of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall
inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in
excess of five (5) hectares" .
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even
the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must be
protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to
be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar
or comparable features.

Borjal v. CA Case Digest ( GR No. 126466)

Posted byPingJune 1, 2019Posted inUncategorizedTags:Law Notes
Borjal v. CA
GR No. 126466
January 14, 1999
Facts:
Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven was the publisher
and chairman of its editorial board. Borjal was among the regular writers of The Philippien
Star who runs the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles written in Jaywalker,
which called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed hero.
Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was
organized. Its objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land
transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated to cost around
Php1,815,000, which would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors. Private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such, he
wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to support the conference.
The Jaywalkercontained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other
defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the organizer nor the conference
referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article, filed a case of libel
against Borjal, Soliven, and others. The trial court as well as the appellate court found the
accused guilty of libel.
Issue:
Were the courts a quo correct in convicting the accused of libel?
Ruling:
No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as
the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify
him as the object of the libelous publication. In the case at bar, these requisites were not
complied with.
Even Wenceslao admitted that he had doubts whether he was really the organizer referred to in
the articles. In fact, he admitted that there were several organizers and that he spoke to Borjal to
inquire if he was the one talked about in the articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when
even the victim is unsure that he was the object of the attack.
The other errors revolve around the issue of whether the articles constitute privileged
communications. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Article 354 of the RPC
provides the cases of privileged communication, to wit:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1)  A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and,
2)  A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.
The Supreme Court agrees that the articles are not within the exceptions of Article 354, but this
does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumeration under Article 354 is not
exclusive. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The
conference is one imbued with public interest, and Wenceslao is a public figure. The rule is that
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, but it must be a false allegation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition. Honest criticisms on the conduct of public
officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments.

Aglipay v. Ruiz (Case Digest)

 MissIdea  Uncategorized  August 10, 2014 1 Minute
Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized
by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the
purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance,
thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and
State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the
aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

A.M. No. P-02-1651, EN BANC, June 22, 2006, PUNO, J. Be that as it may, the free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to
contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to
religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in
preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise
would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself. Thus, it is not the
State’s broad interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage and the family," or even "in the
sound administration of justice" that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the State’s
narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith
finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do. FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge RTC - Las
Piñas City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for
living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement.
Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court,
thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and
immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her
husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio
have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten
years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness."
xxx DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 606 By invoking the religious
beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal
arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held
administratively liable, the Court had to determine the contours of religious freedom under
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz: Sec. 5. No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
In the Court’s decision for the same case dated August 4, 2003 it held that it is the compelling
state interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied. Notwithstanding the above rulings, the
Court could not, at that time, rule definitively on the ultimate issue of whether respondent was to
be held administratively liable for there was need to give the State the opportunity to adduce
evidence that it has a more "compelling interest" to defeat the claim of the respondent to
religious freedom. Thus, in the decision dated August 4, 2003, we remanded the complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to intervene in the case so it can determine whether the 3 steps of the “compelling state interest
test” are satisfied. ISSUE: Whether respondent should be found guilty of the administrative
charge of "disgraceful and immoral conduct. (NO) RULING: The OSG failed to satisfy the
“compelling state interest” test which involves 3 processes: (a) examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice; (b) present evidence on the
state’s "compelling interest" to override respondent’s religious belief and practice; and (c) show
that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s
religious freedom. There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting
the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice. Indeed,
the provisions by which respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I,
Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334 and 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and
Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the State’s need to protect these secular interests. Be that as
it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in
our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it
is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself
holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state
interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To
rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 607 Thus, it is not the State’s broad
interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage and the family," or even "in the sound
administration of justice" that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the State’s
narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith
finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do. As previously
discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing
that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she had was "illegal
per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad,
improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the Solicitor General failed to appreciate
that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Finally, even assuming that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end
that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed
to prove this element of the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited above which
established the sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact that the agreement was an
internal arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact,
the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the
means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious freedom. Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made
out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious
freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however,
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will
also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR

Published by paul on August 12, 2013 | Leave a response
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651      August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.
They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Everson v. Board of Education

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Everson (Petitioner), in his status as a taxpayer,

filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent, Board of Education (Respondent), to
reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their
children to and from school.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that, while no law
respecting an establishment of religion will stand under the United States Constitution
(Constitution), neutral laws, which afford benefits to children will be upheld.
acts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the
Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the
transportation of their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging
that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by
allowing the parents of parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement
scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the
Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted
certiorari to consider the issue.

Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit
from the same services afforded to the parents of public school children.

Held. Affirmed.
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the statute
was not unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of
all school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged.

Dissent. The dissents of Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) and Justice Wiley
Rutledge (J. Rutledge) stand for strict adherence to the establishment clause.

Discussion. It is important to understand, in striking down the Establishment Clause

challenge, the Supreme Court highlights the fact that funds cannot be commingled
when they are reimbursed only for transportation costs already expended. Thus,
because there is no possibility of funding parochial activities in themselves, the statute
is allowed to stand.

Lemon v. Kurtzman

Brief Fact Summary. The state reimburses parochial schools for certain expenses
associated with the education of its children.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. To be valid, a statute must have a secular legislative

purpose, must not advance or inhibit religion, and must not excessively entangle church
and state.
Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher
salaries, textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute
that allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement.

Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools
for the cost of teaching secular subjects?

Held. No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and
religion. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the
institution benefited, the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship between
the government and church.
Discussion. The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully
prohibited the establishment of a state church because of the inherent problems. The
Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state “sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”

Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Facts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools,
which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic
pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS

and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing
District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational
institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees,
and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do
not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their
religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions
made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their
conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of
Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the
list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to
Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however,
given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the
latter did not answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without
prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to
free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’
issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring
them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to
admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their
respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions
defending the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen
who believe in expressing their love of country through observance of the flag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools
violates right receive free education.

Held:

The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art
XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give
them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during
flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right
and duty to prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when

every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the
Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had
lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting
the Phil. Flag.

The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby
annulled and set aside.

Ebralinag v. Division Superintended G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Facts: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955,
and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions. Jehovah’s Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are
“acts of worship” or “religious devotion” which they “cannot conscientiously give to
anyone or anything except God”. They feel bound by the Bible’s command to “guard
ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21”. They consider the flag as an image or idol
representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State’s power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against
official control.
CASE DIGEST : Manotoc Vs Ca
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986  RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE,
JR., as Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION, HON.
EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM), respondents.

 FACTS : There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc
which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints
against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged
with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial
court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to
his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and
was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul
the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel

 ISSUE : WON the Court Acted with grave abuse of discretion

 HELD : A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before
any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
right to travel If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts As petitioner has failed to
satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration
thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible
error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the
country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail
bond.

EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G. SEE, Petitioners vs HON.

LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, and RICARDO V. PARAS III, in
his capacity as Chief State Counsel, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents G.R. No. 197930, EN BANC, APRIL 17, 2018, REYES, JR., J.:
The right to travel is a guarantee of the constitution under the Bill of rights. There are allowable
restrictions in the exercise of this right which are for the interest of national security, public
safety or public health as may be provided by law. FACTS: The case is a consolidated case of
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ Secretary Delima for her issuance of
DOJ circular no. 41. Series of 2010, known as the “Consolidated Rules and Regulations
Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold DepartureOrders (HDO), Watch list Orders
(WLO) and Allow Departure Orders (ADO)” . The Petitioners questions the constitutionality of
this DOJ circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. The petitioners
in these consolidated cases are former Presiden tArroyo and her husband, and Efraim and Erwin
Genuino. Former DOJ Secretary De lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners on the
ground that criminal charges of plunder, qualified theft and violation of the Omnibus Election
Code were filed against them. Petitioners, particularly Spouses Arroyo, file temporary restraining
order against the issued HDO and WLO of DOJ seeking relief and grant from court to allow
them to travel so that former president Arroyo may seek medical treatment abroad. The court
granted relief sought on a condition that petition will file a bond of PhP2M, an undertaking that
petitioners shall report to Philippine consulate in the countries they are to visit (Germany,
Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and Austria) and shall appoint a representative to receive on their
behalf subpoena, orders and other DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
641 legal processes. Petitioners complied all the conditions instead of following the order of the
court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process the petitioners travel documents. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issued DOJ circular 41 infringes the constitutional rights of the
petitioners to travel and thus an ultra vires to the constitution. RULING: The constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation; it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. If a law or administrative rule violates any norm of the constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. In this case, the right to travel is a guarantee of the constitution under
the Bill of rights. There are allowable restrictions in the exercise of this right which are for the
interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. The
ground of the respondent in the issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the petitioners to be present
during the preliminary investigation of their cases which is outside the allowable restrictions
provided by the constitution, hence, it is ultra vires and has no effect.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 99-9-141-MTCC November 25, 1999

HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE FELIPE M. ABALOS, MTCC -

BRANCH 1, DIPOLOG CITY IN CRIMINAL CASES Nos. 15521 & 15522, petitioner,
vs.
ME, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Felipe M. Abalos, who was the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in
the Cities (MTCC) of Dapitan and Dipolog issued an order dated November 20, 1998
directing the Bureau of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List a certain Fe
Cagatan, accused in a bouncing checks case pending before his court. The Hold
Departure Order (HDO) was referred to the Court Administrator by the Justice Secretary
citing a court circular which provides that an HDO may be issued only by a Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction. Required to
Comment, Judge Abalos stated that it was an "honest inadvertence" since he was busy
with his cases in both cities "which may have caused a little confusion." The Court
Administrator recommended that Judge Abalos be reprimanded and be advised to keep
abreast of court issuances.

The Court finds the recommendation to be well-taken. SC Circular 39-97 dated June 19,
1997, as correctly cited by the Justice Secretary "limits the authority to issue hold
departure orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive
jurisdiction" (Hold Departure Order issued by Judge Eusebio Barot, MCTC, Branch 2,
Aparri, Calayan, Cagayan, A.M. 99-8-108-MCTC, August 25, 1999 — en
banc Resolution per J. Mendoza). Considering that only the RTC is mentioned in said
Circular and by applying the rule on legal hermeneutics of express mention implied
exclusion, courts lower than the RTC — such as the MeTC, MTC, MTCC and MCTC —
has no authority to issue hold departure orders in criminal cases.

The excuse proffered by the judge herein contradicts the norm enshrined in the Code of
judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence (Canon 3, Rule 3.01). Judges should be diligent in keeping abreast with
developments in law and jurisprudence, and regard the study of law as never ending
and ceaseless process (Re: Hold departure order Dated April 13, 1998 issued by Judge
Juan C. Nartatez, MTCC-Branch 3, Davao City, A.M. No. 98-10-141-MTCC, November
18, 1998).

WHEREFORE, Judge Felipe M. Abalos is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that

a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and DeLeon, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-72119 Case Digest
G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987
Valentin Legaspi, petitioner
vs Civil Service Commission, respondent
Ponente: Cortes

Facts:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of
public concern is invoked in this special civil action for
mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the
Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of

Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Commission to disclose said information.

They supply the rules by means of which the right to information

may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating
the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right there in recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for
any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may
be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have
become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the
New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a
mandamus proceeding such as this one.

Solicitor General's challenges: (1) petitioner's standing to sue

(2) there is no ministerial duty on the part of the commission to
furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Held:
(1) The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved
party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be
enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be
performed. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied
by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

(2) In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the

1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty
of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data used
as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced
in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full
public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject

to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on
the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise,
the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered
nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may
be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. In the case
before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant
duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee.

(3) The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of

access to information of public concern is a recognition of the
essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy. But the constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access
to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as
may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The
law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.

In every case, the availability of access to a particular public

record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question
is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to
the government agency having custody of the desired information.
However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of
denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing
that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if
it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law
from the operation of the guarantee.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of

public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public.

But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of

public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the
information must not be among the species exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims
of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision
in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right
to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the
civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.

Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request

for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of
Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and

Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for
the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent CSC to disclose said information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring

the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of
Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and
Agas.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit
Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very
nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera,
136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation
the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the

assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied
by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to

seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

CASE DIGEST : VALMONTE vs BELMONTE

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL,
DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ,
REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO
and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for
failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of
public interest."

 ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon
GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political
parties.

 HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke
their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the
loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny
The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent
of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable
to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of
the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.

Issue: Whether the expulsion of the Students in refusing to participate in the Flag
Ceremony in compliance with the teaching of the “Jehovah’s Witnesses” inviolates their
Right to Freedom of Religion.

Held: Yes, the court held that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah’s
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their
religious beliefs, however “bizarre” those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless,
their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to
disrupt such patriotic exercises. While the highest regard must be afforded their
right to the free exercise of their religion, “this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are powerless to discipline them” if they should commit
breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace,
or pose “a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right and duty
to prevent.

Case Brief: Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

JANUARY 23, 2018 JEFF REY
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA
7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The
motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and
pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.
RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode
of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice
and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and
its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon
City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a
date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for
TRO until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in
question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a
motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death
penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other
countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice .
Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an undue
delegation of legislative power
HELD:
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177
IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.”
(what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and
one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of
lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of
the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
– and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable –
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out
the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, ET AL. G.R. No. 130716, FIRST DIVISION,
DECEMBER 9, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J. The state policy of full public disclosure extends only
to transactions involving public interest and may also be subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law. The following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information. FACTS: Francisco Chavez, in invoking his
constitutional right to information, demanded that the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claimed that any compromise on
the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest since it has
a debilitating effect on the country’s economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. The PCGG, while admitting that a compromise is in the works,
claimed that Chavez’s action is premature, since the proposed terms and conditions of the
agreements have not become effective and binding. ISSUE: May the PCGG be required to reveal
the proposed terms of compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-
gotten wealth? RULING: Yes.The recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter
of public concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes
a public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. Thus, there is
no question that Chavez has a right to PCGG's disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived
at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. The question that remains is whether the
constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations
or proposals prior to the final agreement. Reviewing the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, the Court held that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.

 
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court
officials and employees aswitnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012
and the various letters for the Impeachment ProsecutionPanel dated January 19
and 25, 2012
Facts:1. During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the
prosecution Panel manifested in aCOMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses
which included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Courtofficials and employees who will testify
on matters internal to the Court and almost a thousand documents2. Letters (from letters of
Hon. Abaya, Congressman and Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, in behalf of theHouse
Impeachment Panel) were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records, and the issuance
of certifiedtrue copies of the
rollos
and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations of various cases decided by the SC forpurposes
of the -Impeachment Complaint.
Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces TecumAnd Subpoena AdTestificandum were also issued
against Clerks of Court of the SC.
 3. In light of the
subpoenas
served, the urgent need for a court ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws
and of the Court’s rules and policies, we shall now determine how the Court will com
ply with the
subpoenas
and theletters of the Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
DISCUSSION:Judicial Privilege

 
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence prohibiting the revelation of
confidential or “secret”
information that causes damage to public interest even in judicial and other proceedings such as
the
sui generis
impeachment trial. As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved in all
proceedings are duty-bound to observe the privileged communication and confidentiality rules if
the integrity of the administration of justicewere to be preserved
 –
 
i.e.,
not even Members of the Court, on their own and without the consent of the SupremeCourt, can
testify on matters covered by the prohibitions and exclusions, particularly with respect to matters
pendingresolution before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the letters and subpoenas issued by Prosecution Impeachment Panel should
 
be favored.

IT DEPENDS. The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution’s own terms,
is not absolute.
Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court grants access to court records to
any person
, subject to payment offees and compliance with rules
;
 it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This islimited by the
need to preserve and
 
protect the integrity of main adjudicative function
of the Court and theJudiciary.

Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 (1986) G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
Fact: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required
by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case
on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect. The petitioners are now before us again, this time
to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision.  Specifically, they ask the What
is meant by “law of public nature” or “general applicability”? Must a distinction be made
between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? What is meant by
“publication”? Where is the publication to be made? When is the publication to be
made?  the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette

Issue: Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and
Newspaper of General Circulation is a mandatory requirement of the Constitution?
Held: Yes, Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is
not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but
simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of
penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect
before they can begin to operate. The conclusive presumption that every person knows
the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember
that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
STA CLARA HOA VS GASTON JAN. 23, 2002 (CASE DIGEST)
June 13, 2012

Facts:

Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia Gaston, the private respondents, filed a complaint for

damages with preliminary  injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order

before the Regional Trial Court against petitioners Sta Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA). 

The complaint alleged that the private respondents purchased their lots in Sta. Clara Subdivision

and at the time of the purchase, there was no mention or requirement of membership in any homeowners’

association.    From that time on, they have remained non-members of the SCHA.   They also stated  that

an arrangement was made wherein homeowners who  were non-members of the association were issued

non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards manning the
subdivision’s entrances and exits.  This arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime  in the middle of

March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only its members in good

standing were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles. 

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case as

it involved an intra-corporate dispute between SCHA and its members.  The proper forum must be the

Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC).   They  stated that that the Articles of Incorporation of

SCHA, which was duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission , provides that the

association shall be a non-tock corporation with all the homeowners of Sta. Clara constituting its

membership.  Its by-laws also contains a provision that all real estate owners automatically become

members of the association.    Moreover, the private respondents allegedly enjoyed the privileges of

membership and abided by the rules of the association, and even attended the general special meeting of

the association members. 

Issue:

 Whether or not the private respondents are members of SCHA

Ruling:

        

      The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate.  The right

to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of the partnership.   It

should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association.  It does not compel others to

form or join one.

           Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of SCHA by the simple expedient of

including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws without their express or implied consent.   True, it

may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision  to band themselves together to promote

their common welfare.  But that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to

become members of the association.  True also, membership in homeowners’ association may be acquired

in various ways – often through deeds of sale, Torrens  certificates or other forms of evidence of property

ownership.   However, when private respondents purchased their property and obtained Transfer

Certificates of Title, there was no annotation showing automatic membership in the SCHA.   Thus, no privity

of contract arising from the title certificate exists between petitioners and private respondents. 

 
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON,
RAMONMODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY,
SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDOAGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF
APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
 
G.R. No. 85279July 28, 1989
 
Facts:
 On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employeesfrom reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to thePublic Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;
that the strikers refused toreturn to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to
work; that thedefendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It
appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included:implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on
check-off of uniondues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractualemployees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees
and their entitlement to thesame salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children'sallowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedlycommitted acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. 
Issue:
 Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. 
Held:
 The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee
therights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities,including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the
framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of theseprovisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution wouldshow that in recognizing
the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the rightto the formation of
unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O.
No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as"government employees"] and that the SSS is
one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and
are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibitingstrikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

December 20, 2017

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion
A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

Facts:
    The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions of
Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of
the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

    Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status
as a lawyer in good standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
Issue:
    Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.

Held:
    The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of
a distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.

    The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A)
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.

    The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys of the Court.

Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996

Fact: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig.
Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters.
When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. The resolution was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture
and Sports At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The
motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing
the provisional market and assessed values of the property and authorizing the Republic
to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of the
Constitution.  Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation
of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. On 15 February 1990, following the
filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners’ motion seeking the dismissal of
the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. 6 Five (5) days later, or
on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and
academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August
1989 with the rejection of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in
its 16th April 1991 order. Petitioners then lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals
which the appellate court dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the
reconsideration of the decision was denied subsequently by appellate court.

Issue: Whether  the expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the
act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: No, Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking
property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which
confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by
public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by
one or many members of public, a “public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues
sufficient to constitute a public use. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear
cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.
G.R. No. 168770 : February 9, 2011

ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO

ARNAIZ, and CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ,Petitioners, v. THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU,
Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency, pursued
a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators,
NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport.

The landowners claim the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them
that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion
project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.

On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga
who originally owned six [6] of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and
seven others, successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of
the condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a
complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The RT
rendered a decision directing MCIAA to reconvey the lands.

Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the
Ouanos.

Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the
Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to
repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand.

The RTC dismissed the Ouanos’ complaint for reconveyance. The CA denied their
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving

the promises, assurances and representations by the airport officials and
lawyers are inadmissbale under the Statute of Frauds.
HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: Condominium and Subdivision

Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a
contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the
same or some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged.
Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or secondary evidence of its contents.

MCIAA’s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute
applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated
contracts.

Petition is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC v. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, GR No. 185124, 2012-01-25

Facts:
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao
Irrigation Project.
it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of
three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91... square meters.
NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes
as registered owners of Lot No. 3039.
NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties... after
depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of ?19,246.58 representing the
provisional value thereof.
respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim.[6]
They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because
it was not a sovereign political entity;... that NIA's valuation of their expropriated... properties
was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have placed its value at ?5
million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their properties for the
project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties... valued at ?250,000.
the lower court issued an Order stating it would issue a writ of possession in favor of  NIA upon
the determination of the fair market value of the properties, subject of the expropriation
proceedings.
The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated should be ?65
per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
As regards the improvement on the properties, the report recommended the following
compensation:... a. P200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4) years old... b. P150 for
each gmelina tree that are more than one (1) year old... c. P164 for each coco tree... d. P270 for
each banana clump[1
NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the Decision of the RTC to the
CA,... the CA... affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that the committee
tasked to determine the fair market value of the properties and... improvements for the purpose of
arriving at the just compensation, properly performed its function.
Aggrieved by the appellate court's Decision, NIA now comes to this Court via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING OF JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS
THEREON BASED ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS.
Ruling:
the Petition is not meritorious.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the
owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property
to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[32] The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the... market value of the property,
broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and
one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the... actual taking by the government.
In the instant case, we affirm the appellate court's ruling that the commissioners properly
determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were
expropriated by petitioner.
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just
compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee members made an...
ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact
areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on the properties.[34] When
the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land... and the improvements thereon,
the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of
determining the value of the land and the improvements.
The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas.
They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated
properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as
distance... from the highway and the nearby town center.[35] Further, the committee members
also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of
Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the value of the properties and the...
improvements for taxation purposes.
We can readily deduce from these established facts that the committee members endeavored a
rigorous process to determine the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the
expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to, oversimplify the process...
undertaken by the committee in arriving at its recommendations, because these were not based
on mere conjectures and unreliable data.
In the instant case, the committee members based their recommendations on reliable data and, as
aptly noted by the appellate court, considered various factors that affected the value of the land
and the improvements.[3
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001
Fact: Respondent initiated before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three
(3) parcels of land in Rosario, Cavite. More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court
upheld the right of respondent to expropriate the land of the petitioner.
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot
would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence
would not be utilized for a public purpose. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the said expropriation is for public purpose.

Held: Yes, the “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as the court has ruled
that the taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The term “public use” has
acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying
strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. the Court has also held that what ultimately emerged is a
concept of public use which is just as abroad as “public welfare.”
Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone [GR 137285, 16 January 2001]
Second Division, De Leon Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing
Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of irrigated riceland in
Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
with an approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez
(TCT T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later, the said trial court
in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the right of PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406
(A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by the Estate of Salud Jimenez
contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl
Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated 25 October 1991,
the trial court reconsidered the Order dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order
unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Estate and
PEZA entered into a compromise agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The compromise agreement
provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court
dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the
other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for
damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by plaintiff
from 1981 up to the present. (2) That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez
shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot
registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff
and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which
lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement
recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant
Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the
Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said
defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree that
they will abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be
rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory." The Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise
agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with
the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court approved the
compromise agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate
inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT T-14772 but Progressive Realty
Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March 1997, the Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order
dated August 23, 1993." In the Order dated 4 August 1997, the trial court annulled the said
compromise agreement entered into between the parties and directed PEZA to peacefully turn
over Lot 1406- A to the Estate. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent
PEZA moved for its reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated 3 November 1997. On
4 December 1997, the trial court, at the instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4
August 1997 and 3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that
should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27 November 1997, PEZA interposed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders
dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 of the trial court. Acting on the petition, the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated 25 March 1998, partially granted the petition by setting aside the
order of the trial court regarding "the peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot
1406- B" and instead ordered the trial judge to "proceed with the hearing of the expropriation
proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation over Lot 1406-B." The Estate
sought reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998. However, the appellate court in a
Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied the Estate's motion for reconsideration. The Estate
filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the purpose of
the expropriation by PEZA is of “public use.” Held: This is an expropriation case which involves
two (2) orders: an expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the first order
becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use
cannot anymore be questioned. Contrary to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the
expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject said order to rescission but
instead constituted an admission by the Estate of PEZA's authority to expropriate the subject
parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was expropriated. This is evident from
paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which states that the "swap arrangement
recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud
Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the Order of the
Honorable Court dated 11 July 1991." It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that
the parties limited the compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to the Estate.
Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to
pay by PEZA will also nullify the right of PEZA to expropriate. No statement to this effect was
mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was
subject to payment. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by
swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only
the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded. PEZA has
the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public
purpose. PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated 30
May 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent
domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential Decree 66. Accordingly,
subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated "for the construction of terminal facilities, structures and
approaches thereto." The authority is broad enough to give PEZA substantial leeway in deciding
for what public use the expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority,
PEZA leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation
terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law amending
PEZA's original charter. As reiterated in various case, the "public use" requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. What ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as
broad as "public welfare."

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila [GR14355, 31 October 1919] First Division,
Johnson (J): 4 concur Facts: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands (extension of Rizal Avenue
within Block 3 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila]
alleged in its answer that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the
Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the
land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or
expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads
furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed
expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public
necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the City's purposes, at much less
expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the
lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the Chinese Community for
cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said
expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require
the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other
place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing
monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss
and injury to the Chinese Community and to all those persons owning and interested in the
graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the City was without right or
authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that
the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. Ildefonso Tambunting,
answering the petition, denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said
expropriation was not a public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband,
Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and
Ildefonso Tambunting. Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the
expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants (Chinese
Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado, et. al.) from all liability under the complaint,
without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed. Issue: Whether
portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be expropriated for the construction of
a public improvement. Held: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila)
provides that the city (Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The Charter of the
city of Manila, however, contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into
effect. Act 190 provides for how right of eminent domain may be exercised. Section 241 of said
Act provides that the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department
thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law,
the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner
prescribed by Section 242 to 246. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that
a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right
or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery in question is
public (a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church) and seems to
have been established under governmental authority, as the Spanish Governor-General, in an
order creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of
the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. To disturb the mortal
remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except
in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of
our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for
that object. While Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) cemeteries and
sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are still within the memory and command of
the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is
difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such
places, under such circumstances, should be violated.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as
such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the
same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner)
has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court
in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the
court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts
are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the
value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in
favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE:  W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD:  Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt.,
281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with
the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon
municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general
authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in
particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right
in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question
which the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise
of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in
the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of
eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it in a particular case.
(Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of
eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)

Summary:
The appellant questions the exercise of eminent domain by the City of Manila over
a real property used as cemetery arguing, among others, that it is not necessary for
the plaintiff (City of Manila) to expropriate the said property. The Supreme Court
explained that the exercise of eminent domain is political, and not judicial. As such,
the appellant and Courts cannot inquire, much less substitute, into the wisdom and
prerogative of the State in choosing which and what property to expropriate.

Doctrine:
1) In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,
the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are
questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination
of those questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign
power; the legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no
power to review it (the necessity and the expediency) * * *. It (the legislature) may
designate the particular property to be condemned, and its determination in this
respect cannot be reviewed by the courts.
2) The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency
of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute
their own views for those of the representatives of the people.
3) The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation,
and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon
it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that
a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also
that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the
present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law.

Facts:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly
described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila],
answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it denied that it was either
necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street
purposes; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a
public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's
purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the
dead.
 

Issues Ratio:
Whether or not, the argument of lack of necessity to expropriate is a valid reason to
dismiss the expropriation proceeding.
In ruling in the negative, the Supreme Court cited several cases and explained
that: In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,
the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are
questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination
of those questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign
power; the legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no
power to review it (the necessity and the expediency) * * *. It (the legislature) may
designate the particular property to be condemned, and its determination in this
respect cannot be reviewed by the courts.

Dispositive:
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court
should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005
Fact: On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a
special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu,
involving Lots of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. After depositing ₱9,500.00
with the Philippine National Bank, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter,
the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
₱4,062.10 as just compensation. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons,
filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
“denied knowledge of the matter.” Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to
the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim.
in 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding
that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939
because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. In view of “the differences in money value from 1940 up to
the present,” the court adjusted the market value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6%
interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings,
until full payment.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim for failure to pay. in 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the (RTC) seeking an absolute and exclusive possession of the property. in 2001,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CA but the Ruling of the RTC was upheld and affirmed.

Issue: Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his
property when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been
assessed or agreed upon?

Held: Yes, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from
private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation which
the court defined as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC RESOURCES INT'L. PTY. LTD., GR
NO. 162331, 2006-11-20
Facts:
the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of WMC
Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio
FTAA... for... the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration
of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the
provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance
with Executive
Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio FTAA,
and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner Lepanto over its
entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies'...
exercise of their right of first refusal to purchase the subject shares
In an Agreement dated 6 October 2000, however, the Tampakan Companies sought to exercise
its right of first refusal. Thus, in a letter dated 13 October 2000, petitioner assailed the Tampakan
Companies' exercise of its right of first refusal,... on 10 January 2001,... WMC Resources and the
Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and Purchase
Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which
would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities.
After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of Sagittarius
Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC
Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., petitioner
filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the President
Issues:
the propriety of the application to the Columbio FTAA of Republic Act No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of the
President of the assignment or transfer of... financial or technical assistance agreements
Ruling:
Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22
March 1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on 14 April
1995.
it... is undisputed that said FTAA was granted in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and
Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991, which does not contain any similar
condition on the transfer or assignment of financial or technical assistance agreements.
what petitioner would want this Court to espouse is the retroactive application of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 to the Columbio FTAA, a valid agreement concluded prior to the naissance
of said piece of legislation.
This posture of petitioner would clearly contradict the established legal doctrine that statutes are
to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or
necessarily implied from the language used in the law.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein
otherwise provided."
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply
retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively,... Be
that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that We are to apply the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 retrospectively to the Columbio FTAA, the lack of presidential approval will not be fatal
as to render the transfer illegal, especially since, as in the instant case, the... alleged lack of
presidential approval has been remedied when petitioner appealed the matter to the Office of the
President which approved the Order of the DENR Secretary... in the La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos[15] case, involving the same FTAA subject of the instant case:...
when the transferee of an FTAA is another foreign corporation, there is a logical application of
the requirement of prior approval by the President of the Republic and notification to Congress
in the event of assignment or transfer of an FTAA
On the other hand, when the transferee of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino corporation, the
need for such safeguard is not critical
It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws... and to fall within the
prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of... the existing contract, but the
impairment must be substantial
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President with
respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio
FTAA, would be tantamount to an... impairment of the obligations under said contract as it
would effectively restrict the right of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the
said FTAA.
imposing a new condition apart from those already contained in the agreement, before the parties
to the Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest in the said agreement,
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, if made to apply to the Columbio
FTAA,... will effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus impair the
obligations of the parties
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
Principles:
It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws... and to fall within the
prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of... the existing contract, but the
impairment must be substantial... a... law which changes the terms of a legal contract between
parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with
those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms, is law which impairs... the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.
PHILRECA v. Secretary of Interior
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Interior and
Local Government
G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003
Puno, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to annul as
unconstitutional sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code. A class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and
in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269
who are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association,
Inc. (PHILRECA). Petitioners contend that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269,
as amended, and the provision in the loan agreements of the government of the
Philippines with the government of the United State of America, they are exempt
from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the
passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax
exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail Sections
193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground that the said provisions
discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they
submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional because they impair the
obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United States
Government.
ISSUE:
Did Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code violate the equal
protection clause?
HELD:
NO. The pertinent parts of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code
provide:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock
and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.
HILRECA vs. DILG G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003

Fact: a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other
electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Accordingly, petitioners
enjoys Assistance; Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties, Fees; Assistance from the
National Power Corporation. Petitioners contend that they are exempt from payment of
local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local
Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly
withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code on the ground that the said provisions discriminate against them, in
violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they submit that the said provisions are
unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine
Government and the United States Government.

Issue: Whether the assailed provisions of the Local Government Code violates the rights
of the Petitioners to the Equal Protection clause by unreasonable classifying them and
withdrawing their Tax exemption

Held: There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection clause
under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. The court hold that
there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the
different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.

First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at
least two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A.
No. 6938 and which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative
associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.
1. Capital Contributions by Members
2. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives

Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is

germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power
by local governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government
unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its
broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing powers of
local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy.
Taxation Case Digest: PRECA vs Secretary of DILG

PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

GR. No. 143076

June 10, 2003

_______________________________________________________________
TAX EXEMPTION;WITHDRAWAL OF TAX PRIVILEGES OF ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES BY THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
_______________________________________________________________

Facts:

On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of
other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of
petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1
(ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD
269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all
National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise,
fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in
any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now
National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements
with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions
have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234
of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to
all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938,
while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
Issue:

(1) Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal protection
clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of
the Philippines?
 
(2) Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between
the Philippine and the US Governments?

Held:

(1) No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on
substantial classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to the
existing conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that
there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under
RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA
6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric
cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of
funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require cooperatives to
make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a
member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership
fee is required which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in
getting electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of
cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds
of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers
showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least
25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be
less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government control over
electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a
primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred
loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of these electric
cooperatives. Consequently, amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of
NEA over the electric cooperatives o ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to
the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient
and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to
the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that “every local government unit shall
enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local
governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the
legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit
exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions are
not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.

(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment
of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within
the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but
the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-
parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption
in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions
simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to
the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local
Government Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by
petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary
under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein.
ORTIGAS VS. FEATI BANK [94 SCRA 533; NO.L-24670; 14 DEC 1979]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots

to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On
March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad
Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962,
the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots
in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase
price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of
Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds
of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:

1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and
she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or
any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and
properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary
installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic
tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its
boundary lines.

Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez

and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same
restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification of the
subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of
EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff
demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was later
dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the
appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated.

Held: No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main

traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the
Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for
this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts
is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.

Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision
at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter
transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed
was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be
exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez
and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a
building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential
use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending
that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in
Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a
commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of
Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial

and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer
Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the
Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied
power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more
power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and
material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the
said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g.
the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of
police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of
the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the
amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and
commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

RE: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, EN BANC, August 19, 2009, BERSAMIN, J.
Only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate
and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to
acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal
actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person,
therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent
litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged
people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause
on a person's poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. In view of the foregoing,
the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from legal and filing fees
despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.

FACTS:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote: xxx The Hon. Court Administrator
Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141
that reserves this "privilege" to indigent persons. While judges are appointed to interpret the law,
this type of law seems to be extremely detailed with requirements that do not leave much room
for interpretations. In addition, this law deals mainly with "individual indigent" and it does not
include Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As seen in
our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-out to the
poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the
smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for "common
prescriptions", to broken families who returned to a normal life. In other words, we have been
working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach to,
or have rejected or abandoned them. Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for
indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people? xxx

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Courts can grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the
same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations
are working for indigent and underprivileged people. (NO)

RULING:
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent
litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis
for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The importance
of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance
cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the
ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to
give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor. In implementation of the right
of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21,
Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court, which respectively state thus: Sec.
21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one
who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and
other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted
from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless
the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any
time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing
that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the
proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. Sec. 19. Indigent
litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.' Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that
of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current
tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from
payment of legal fees. The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the
exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate
family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with
the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the
litigant's affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient
cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. The clear intent and precise
language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party
litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its
members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of
all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the
laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded
the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly,
the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person's poverty, a condition
that only a natural person can suffer. There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the
request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a
juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be
prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by
corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the
scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and
wasteful for the courts. In view of the foregoing, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be
extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and
underprivileged people.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

 
G.R. No. 103499 December 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REY DENIEGA y MACOY, and HOYLE DIAZ y URNILLO, defendants-appellants.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of garbage in an ill-frequented
back corner on the left side of the Mt. Carmel Church in New Manila, Quezon City. Her
hands were tied behind her back by a shoestring and pieces of her own clothing. The
body bore thirty nine (39) stab wounds. There was evidence that she had been brutally
assaulted, physically and sexually, before she was murdered.

Police authorities investigating the gruesome crime on August 31, 1989, arrested Rey
Daniega y Macoy on information that the victim was last seen with Daniega,1 a waiter at
the Gathering Disco where Canoy used to work. Friends of Canoy volunteered the
information that the former had just broken off from a stormy relationship with
Daniega.2 The latter, it was bruited,3 desperately tried to patch up the relationship.

Following the latter's arrest, and on the basis of a confession obtained by police
authorities from him during custodial investigation (where he allegedly admitted raping
and killing Canoy),4 appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was invited by the investigators for
questioning. A second sworn statement, substantially similar and corroborating many of
the details of Daniega's sworn affidavit, was later extracted from Diaz. In the said
statement, Diaz admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied that he had
something to do with the victim's death.5

Armed with the said extra-judicial confessions, an Information was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,6 charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with
Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1989, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, with lewd designs, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and/or
intimidation have sexual intercourse with MARLYN CANOY BENDO,
without her consent and against her will; and by reason of and on the
occasion thereof, said accused, pursuant to their conspiracy, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and without any
justifiable cause, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of said victim, by then and there stabbing her with an icepick
several times, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of her death, to the damage and
 prejudice of the heirs of said Marlyn Canoy Bendo, in such amount as may
be awarded to them under the provisions of the New Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

At trial, the confessions obtained by law enforcement authorities during their (separate)
custodial investigations formed the centerpiece of the prosecution's case for Rape with
Homicide against both accused.7 These confessions allegedly disclosed details of the
killing, summarized by the trial court in its Decision dated August 23, 1991, thus:

Rey Deniega's confession essentially stated:

On August 28, 1989, he and Marlyn were at her house at Onyx Street,
Sta. Ana Manila. There they had an altercation because she wanted to
break up with her already. He accompanied Marlyn afterwards to
Rolando's Disco Pub where Marlyn works. They agreed however, to meet
again after she gets (sic) out of the Disco Pub to have a final talk about
their relationship. They agreed to see each other at 3:00 in the morning of
August 29, 1989 at a waiting shed along Aurora Boulevard near San Juan.
He arrived there earlier than Marlyn. While waiting, Rey saw Hoyle Diaz
(a.k.a. Boyet) pass by. Rey told Hoyle that he is going to take Marlyn to
the Mt. Carmel Church compound and if Boyet wants to take revenge on
Marlyn (makaganti) Boyet can hold-up her there.

When Marlyn and Rey were already at the Mt. Carmel Church compound,
Boyet arrived with two companions. Boyet berated Marlyn for choosing
Rey as her boyfriend instead of Boyet despite the fact that he has already
spent large sums for her. Then, suddenly the two companions of Boyet by
the name of Tony and Carlos pulled with a jerk the apparel of Marlyn and
undressed her. The two tied Marlyn's hands and got her necklace and
wristwatch. Boyet then took off his T-shirt and pulled down his pants and
raped Marlyn. After the rape, Tony and Carlos stabbed Marlyn. Then
Boyet gave Rey an icepick and ordered him to stab Marlyn whom he
stabbed once in the stomach. Rey left leaving the three men behind.

Hoyle Diaz confession essentially stated:

He came to know of both Rey Deniega and Marlyn Canoy at Gathering

House where Hoyle used to take drinks. He was courting Marlyn there and
used to take her as a table partner.

He saw Rey Deniega on a bridge near Broadway Avenue and Aurora

Boulevard, Quezon City on August 29, 1989 at around 2:00 in the
morning. There Rey told Hoyle that he will teach Marlyn a lesson and will
hold her up. He asked Hoyle to accompany him. At between 3:00 and 4:00
that morning Marlyn arrived at the waiting shed where she and Rey were
 supposed to meet and Rey took Marlyn to Mt. Carmel Church compound
with Hoyle Diaz following behind.

The two talked for about 20 minutes. Then they had an altercation, hurling
and hollering bad words at each other. Rey tried to undress Marlyn who
resisted. Rey boxed Marlyn and was finally able to take off her clothes.
Then Rey raped Marlyn. After Rey was through, Hoyle raped Marlyn.

Afterwards, Rey told Hoyle that so that there will be no more trouble
(aberia) they better finish off Marlyn. Rey took out an icepick and stabbed
Marlyn. Then he handed the icepick to Hoyle and Hoyle stabbed Marlyn
too. Then Rey faced Hoyle (hinarap) and so Hoyle ran away as Rey
chased him. As Hoyle ran he threw away the icepick. He does not know if
Rey returned to get the necklace, bag and wristwatch of Marlyn. Hoyle
also stated that he saw that Rey was heavily influenced by drugs (sabog
sa gamot). Hoyle also recalled that on the way to Mt. Carmel a man
followed them but the man was no longer in the vicinity when they reached
the Mt. Carmel Church Compound.

When Rey ran after Hoyle, Rey was holding no weapon. Marlyn was
raped right where she was found dead.8

In their defense, appellants, during the course of the trial, vehemently denied the claim
that they had voluntarily executed the said confessions.9 Appellants Daniega and Diaz
went to the extent of seeking the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, and
there executed a sworn statement to the effect that their respective confessions were
coerced and obtained through
10
torture.  Both testified that they were subjected to electrocution and water treatment.
They contended that they were arrested without warrants of arrest and that the
confessions obtained from them immediately thereafter were made without the
assistance of counsel.

After the prosecution rested its case on December 14, 1990, the accused-appellants
moved for leave to file Demurrer to Evidence, which the trial court granted. 11 In a
demurrer submitted to the trial court on December 28, 1990, appellants moved for the
dismissal of the information for Rape with Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, stressing that: 1) the confessions obtained by police authorities were acquired
without the assistance of counsel in violation of their constitutional rights and were
hence, inadmissible in evidence; 2) the same (confessions) "were obtained through
torture, force, threat and other means which vitiat[ed] (their) free will;" and 3) except for
the testimonies of the medico-legal officer and two IBP lawyers who alleged that they
assisted the accused during their custodial investigation, the prosecution presented no
other evidence to warrant a conviction.12

In an Order dated January 30, 1991, the Regional Trial Court denied the motion for
Demurrer to Evidence.13 Consequently, after hearing the appellants' testimonies, the
lower court, on August 31, 1991 rendered its Decision convicting the accused-
appellants of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing each of them to a penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua. 14 They were likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Marlyn Canoy
the amount of P50,000.00 in solidum.15

In dismissing appellant's principal defense that their confessions were obtained in

violation of their constitutional rights, the trial court held that:

The court finds it hard to believe that (Atty. Sansano and Atty. Rous), both
of whom are officers of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP and are
prominent practitioners of great integrity, would act as the accused said
they did. Over and beyond this it appears that the confessions were
executed during daytime and the accused themselves brought to the
Quezon City IBP office at noontime during office hours when several
employees of that chapter were working, there are usually other lawyers
there, and therefore, the accused, if their confession were really
prevaricated beforehand, had ample atmosphere to tell Atty. Sansano and
Atty. Rous, respectively, that their confession were coerced and untrue.
The two counsels testified that they precisely segregated the accused
from their police escorts to cull out the truth and the accused volunteered
to confess to the crime at bar;

Rey Deniega was arrested at around 6:30 in the morning and Hoyle Diaz
at around 9:30 in the morning. Rey was brought to the IBP at around
11:00 in the morning and Hoyle at around 2:00 p.m. of the same day of
their arrest on August 31, 1990. Their confession were quite lengthily (4
page each) and filled with details. There is nothing in the record to show
that the apprehending officers are clever and articulate enough to be able
to fabricate in a short a time the kind of confessions submitted here . . . .16

Considering that no eyewitnesses to the actual commission of the crime were presented
before the court, the issue of the voluntariness and due execution of the extrajudicial
confessions of the appellants upon which their conviction was based, is pivotal in the
resolution of the instant appeal. Analyzing the appropriate provisions of law in relation to
the facts of the case at bench, we find for appellants.

It is a settled rule that this Court will not normally overturn factual conclusions of the trial
court, unless factual evidence has either been deliberately ignored or misapprehended.
The confessions which form part of the record of the case at bench are an eloquent
example of facts deliberately ignored: the legal insufficiencies and inconsistencies in the
documents in question are so glaring, even from a cursory examination of the
confessions, that they should not escape even the untrained eye.

The statements evidencing the interrogation, including those portions in which the
appellants purportedly were informed of their constitutional rights, were in typewritten
form. However, within the body of these documents, blank spaces were conspicuously
left at strategic areas (spaces) where the accused were supposed to sign and
acknowledge that they were appraised of their rights and that they gave their
statements voluntarily. These were spaces obviously provided for the accused to fill in
the blank with the word "yes" ("opo") followed by another blank space for their
respective signatures. In addition to these, the header of the disputed documents
indicates that the investigations were conducted at the police headquarters,
contradicting the prosecution witnesses' declarations that the confessions were
obtained in the Quezon City IBP office.

Apart from the defects evident on the face of the documents, there exists evidence
indicating that the actual custodial investigation was conducted at the police
headquarters in the absence of counsel, as contended by appellants. While we have no
dispute with the trial court's observation that the appellants were brought to the Quezon
City IBP office during daytime when other individuals were holding office in the IBP floor
(who may have witnessed the presence of the appellants in the area), 17 it is one thing
for appellants to be brought to the IBP office only for the purpose of signing the
confessions in plain view of the other employees of the office, while compliance with the
constitutional mandate requiring the presence of counsel during the actual custodial
investigation is quite another.

There is convincing proof18 that, while Attys. Sansano and Rous may have been present
at the signing of the documents, they were not present at all during the actual custodial
investigation of the accused in the police headquarters.

For instance, Atty. Sansano placed the time of arrival of appellant Deniega at the IBP
Quezon City chapter office at "around 11:30 in the morning" of August 31,
1989.19 However, Deniega's extrajudicial confession taken by Pat. Maniquis gives the
time of its execution as 11:20 A.M. also on August 31, 1989 or earlier than the time they
allegedly arrived at the IBP office.

Moreover, even assuming the possibility of error in recording the actual time of the
investigation,20 there is conflict as to the place where the custodial investigation was
actually conducted. Atty. Sansano for instance, testified that Daniega's extrajudicial
confession was taken at the QC-IBP office.21 An examination of the document's heading
however reveals that the confessions were given to the investigator (Maniquis) at the
police headquarters of the SID, QCPS (sa himpilan ng homicide ng SID, QCPS) not in
the IBP office of Atty. Sansano.

With respect to the extrajudicial confession of appellant Diaz, Atty. Rous' declaration
that "the custodial investigation was conducted by the policeman in the (IBP chapter)
office," 22 conflicts with the statement in the actual document (sinumpaang salaysay)
that he (appellant) executed his confession at the police headquarters of the SID, QCPS
(himpilan ng homicide, SID, QCPS) and not the IBP office.
Lastly, the probity of Pat. Maniquis, who testified in rebuttal was certainly not enhanced
by the information given the trial court by prosecution witness P/Sgt. Rogelio Barcelona
that he (Maniquis) had been dismissed from the service for unspecified reasons.23

A thorough reading of the transcripts of the testimonies of the two lawyers, Atty.
Sansano and Atty. Rous, indicates that they appeared less as agents of the accused
during the alleged investigation than they were agents of the police authorities. In the
case before us, it was the police authorities who brought the accused, handcuffed, to
the IBP headquarters where the services of the lawyers were supposedly "engaged."
No details of the actual assistance rendered during the interrogation process were
furnished or alleged during the entire testimony of the lawyers in open court. The bulk of
the lawyers' oral testimonies merely gave the trial court assurance that they supposedly
explained to the appellants their constitutional rights, that the signatures present were
their signatures and those of the accused, and that the accused agreed to having the
lawyers assist them during the process of custodial investigation.24

Clearly, the standards utilized by police authorities (and the lawyers) to assure the
constitutional rights of the accused in the case at bench fall short of the standards
demanded by our case law and the Constitution itself.

In Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,25 the Court defined the procedure which law enforcement

officers must observe in custodial investigations as follows:

At the time, a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter of
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.26

The rules laid down in Morales were reiterated in 1985 case of People vs. Galit.27

The 1987 Constitution provided a stricter rule by mandating that waiver of the right to
counsel must be made not only in the presence of counsel but also in writing. Article III,
Section 12 provides:
 1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.

Section 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires, moreover, that a confession, to be
admissible, must be express.

Finally, Republic Act 7438 mandates that the entire confession must be in writing.28

In all, under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the
confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the
confession must be in writing.

It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all
organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of
1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice,
under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the
accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed
judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.

Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People vs. Basay, this
Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."29

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the
latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon
proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such
petition."30 Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of
their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial investigation. What may
satisfy constitutional requirements of voluntariness at the investigation's onset may not
be sufficient as the investigation goes on. There would be denial of the right to the
assistance of competent and independent counsel if the investigation or, as in the case
before us, during the process of signing. The competent or independent lawyer so
engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview,
counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and
stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered

meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so
cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyer's role is reduced to
being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating
therein compliance with the accused's constitutional rights, the constitutional standard
guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 (1) is not met. The process above-described fulfills
the prophylactic purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding "the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense"31 and ensuring that
the accused's waiver of his right to self incrimination during the investigation is an
informed one in all aspects.

The process of assisting appellants in the case at bench as described by the lawyers in
their testimony therefore hardly meets the standard of effective and meaningful
communication required by the 1987 Constitution, when its framers decided to add the
modifiers competent and independent to the requirement for counsel during the process
of custodial investigations.

The failure to meet the constitutional requirement for competent and independent
counsel and the glaring inconsistencies in documents purportedly executed under the
trained and watchful eyes of the lawyers who allegedly were of assistance to the
accused during the process of custodial investigation - taken together with the manner
in which the signatures of the accused were affixed into the confessions — cast a
serious doubt on their due execution, and support the contention that the sworn
statements executed by the appellants were already prepared and signed at the police
headquarters before the statements were brought to the QC-IBP office for signing.
During the trial, Daniega testified to the following:

Q Was Atty. Sansano present when this alleged sinumpaang

salaysay was taken from you by questions and answers
which consist of 31 questions and 32 answers?

A No, because this statement was signed by me at the

police station and then we brought it to the IBP office.32

In his cross-examination, the other accused, Diaz likewise testified as follows:

Q Who told you to sign this document?

A That paper, we made that at the headquarters.

Q Do you know who prepared this at the headquarters?

A It was Pat. Maniquis.

Q And Pat. Maniquis was typing this while he was asking

you this question?

A. I did not see that paper while he was investigating me, it

was later, he showed that to me, maam.

Q For how long a time more or less (did) Pat. Maniquis

investigate(d) you?

A About one hour maam.

Q And after that one hour, how long a time elapse(d) before
you were brought to the IBP Bldg.

A Two or three in the afternoon.

Q And when you were told to sign this document, at the IBP
Bldg., Pat. Maniquis, who were the person(s) present aside
from you and Pat. Maniquis?

Atty. Gojar:

He did not sign that in the IBP, your Honor. It was at the
headquarters.

A I signed that document(s) at the police headquarters.

Q What time more or less was that, when you signed that
document?

A About lunch time.

Q Was that after Pat. Maniquis investigated you?

A Yes maam.

Q Who were present at the time Pat. Maniquis told you to

sign this?

A I don't know them, I only remember Pat. Maniquis.

 Q Did you have any occasion to read this before you
sign(ed) this?

A No maam, he just asked me to sign it.

Q But can you read tagalog?

A Yes maam.

Q And you did not take any opportunity to read this before
you sign(ed) it?

A Everything went fast, sir.

Q After you signed this how long a time elapse(d) before you
went to Quezon City IBP?

Atty. Gojar:

It was already answered, your honor.

Q What time did you sign this?

A I signed it about ten to eleven in the morning ad we went

to IBP about two or three in the afternoon.33 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Together with all the legal deficiencies pointed out so far, it would not be difficult for us
to give credence to appellants' testimonies to the effect that the investigation was
actually conducted in the absence of counsel in one place (the QC SID headquarters)
and signed in the presence of counsel in another (the QC IBP office). Appellants, who
were not trained in the law, would not have understood the constitutional nuances of the
fact that the confessions and the signing of the documents evidencing the confessions
were obtained in different places. Assuming they were couched, appellants were quite
vehement as they were consistent in their separate oral testimonies, and one or both of
them would have withered, in any case, on intense cross examination.

These facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the confessions of both defendants
were obtained in the absence of independent and competent counsel as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution and that the same may have been acquired under conditions
negating voluntariness, as alleged by the accused.34

In fine, the likelihood for compulsion is forcefully apparent in every custodial

investigation. A person compelled under the circumstances obtaining in every custodial
investigation is surrounded by psychologically hostile forces and the threat of physical
violence so that the information extracted is hardly voluntary. In the oftentimes highly
intimidating setting of a police investigation, the potential for suggestion is strong.

Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the
sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the
sole basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their
brutality and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally
tempts these agencies to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal
safeguards intended to bring about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are
punished. Our courts, in the process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play
a central role in bringing about this assurance by determining whether or not the
evidence gathered by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards
fixed by the Constitution. If the standards are not met, the Constitution provides the
corresponding remedy by providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny confession
or admission obtained in violation of (Article III, Section 12[1]) . . . hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence."35

There is a distinct possibility that the confessions given by the appellants in the case at
bench might speak the truth. Judges face unimaginable pressures from all areas,
including the pressure of their heavy dockets. They are on the forefront of the
government's battle against crime. Were it not for the defects inherent in the
confessions, and the contradictions and inconsistencies here noted, the trial court's
well-written opinion in the case at bench — an eloquent example of the earnest
attempts judges make to battle crime, would have been readily sustained by this Court.
Yet again, there remains the possibility that the real assailants lurk free somewhere,
thanking their luck. What can only be said, in relation to the unfortunate circumstances
of the case at bench has already been said, ad nauseam, in a number of cases before
this. In People v. Javar, 36 for instance, we emphasized, conformably with Art. III, Sec.
12 of the Constitution that:

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, or in

part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession speaks the
truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if
it had been voluntarily given.

We stress, once again, that the exclusionary rules adopted by the framers of the 1987
Constitution were designed, not to vindicate the constitutional rights of lawbreakers but
to protect the rights of all citizens, especially the innocent, in the only conceivable way
those rights could be effectively protected, by removing the incentive of law
enforcement and other officials to obtain confessions by the easy route, either by
psychological and physical torture, or by methods which fall short of the standard
provided by the fundamental law. Allowing any profit gained through such methods
furnishes an incentive for law enforcement officials to engage in constitutionally
proscribed methods of law enforcement, and renders nugatory the only effective
constitutional protections available to citizens.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, appellants Rey Daniega y Macoy and
Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Their
immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless they are being held on other
legal grounds.

SO ORDERED.
People v Deniega 251 SCRA 626 (637)
Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution
was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers
without the presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that
the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and
the basis of the lower court’s conviction to the accused was based on their
alleged extrajudicial confessions.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on
their extrajudicial confession.

Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental
requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the
confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing.
The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was
inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial
investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial
investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in
violation of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. “Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.” Thus, because of
these defects in observing the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on
custodial investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. MACAM [238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24 NOV 1994]
Tuesday, February 10, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Prosecution’s version:

On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr.,

Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle
of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the
accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid
Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a
tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the
house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had
taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam
and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife
(Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought
them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom
and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo
and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items
taken was P536, 700.00.

Defense’s version:

Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to
Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given
a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day.
Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch.
Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan
pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some
things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside
the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan patayin
ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such phrase
he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his
brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can
be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his
brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father
of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother
was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police
headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things.

After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and

bore contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during
investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving
victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also
charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case.

Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the
arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.

Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of

prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a “critical” stage
of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a
police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present
evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses
identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to
the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.

The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are
estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not
moved to quash the said information and therefore
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while

remaining outside the house served as a looked out.

Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque

and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-
conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.

Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes,
betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA
Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.

PETER PAUL ABALLE Y MENDOZA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE HONORABLE JUDGE BERNARDO V. SALUDARESG.R. No. L-64086, 15
March 1990
FACTS:
Jennie, a minor, was found dead in their sala and there were no eyewitnesses to the biza
rre killing. On the following day, a police team sought the accused Aballe for questioning
. They found him just as he was coming out of the communal bathroom in Saypon and w
earing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon seeing them, the accused witho
ut anyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed Jennie. He made thereafter an extra
judicial confession that he killed Jennie but without counsel. He later on disavowed his e
xtrajudicial confession on the ground that it in the absence of counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of Aballe was established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes. Even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession since it was not shown that t
he youthful offender was ever represented by counsel, the guilt of the accused has been e
stablished beyond reasonable doubt. It is well to note that even before the taking of the e
xtrajudicial confession, the accused, upon being picked up as he was coming out of the c
ommunal bathroom and wearing a T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to co
ver with his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt before the police and confessed that 
he killed Jennie. The testimony of police on Aballe’s oral confession is competent eviden
ce to positively link the accused to the aforesaid killing.
People vs. Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Albino Bagas (accused- appellant) and
Diascoro Vinas – GR 104383, July 12, 2001

FACTS This is an appeal from the decision of the Caloocan RTC Branch 131 convicting the
accused of the complex crime of robbery with a bad and double rape. On February 1991, a group
of 8 men entered the house of Perlita Lacsamana and stole valuables amounting to Php728K. In
the course of the robbery, 2 gang members raped Lacsamana's niece and employee. Four days
after the incident, the police, together with Federico Ampatin, went to a handicrafts factory in
NIA Road, Pasay City to look for a certain “Mario”. The police ordered the factory workers to
lie down and, after some threats and hitting him on the neck with the butt of a pistol, told
Ampatin to point at anyone (“magturo ka ng kahit sino”). Ampatin, out of fear, pointed at the
first person that he saw, who was the accused-appellant. The police thereafter brought the
accused to the police station to be presented to the complainants. At the station, Lacsamana
asked the accused-appellant if he knew Vinas and Amestuzo, but he answered in the negative.
Then the police told the complainants that the accused-appellant was a suspect in the robbery so
the complainants started hitting and kicking the accused-appellant. They only stopped when the
police intervened.

ISSUES
(1) Whether the accused was deprived of the right to counsel from the time he was arrested to the
time he was presented to the witnesses for identification.
(2) Whether the manner of out-of-court identification was irregular and, therefore, inadmissible
in court.

HELD
(1) NO. The guarantees of sec. 12 (1) of the Bill of Rights or the so-called Miranda rights of the
accused may only be invoked while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
begins from the time when the police no longer ask general questions about the crime, but start
focusing on the suspect and attempt to elicit incriminating questions in the course of the
investigation. The object of the Miranda rights is to ensure that the accused is protected from
possible intimidation or coercion from law enforcement officers who may force him to admit to a
crime that he did not commit. The police line-up is not yet included in the custodial investigation
as it is the witnesses who are asked questions during the line-up. In this regard, the inquiry has
not yet shifted from investigatory to accusatory. Moreover, during the line-up, there was no
evidence that the accused was interrogated by the police, nor were there any incriminating
statements elicited from him.
(2) YES. There is no law prescribing a specific manner of identification in criminal cases. A
police line-up is, therefore, an acceptable way for the complainants to identify the suspect in a
crime. However, the court also applies the circumstances test enunciated in the case of People vs.
Teehankee, which had the following factors:
1. the witness's opportunity to view criminal at the time of the crime
2. the witness's degree of attention at that time
3. the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness
4. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the identification
5. the length of time between the crime and the identification
6. the suggestiveness of the identification process The Court found that the out-of-court
identification in this case failed the last criterion because of the police's announcement to the
complainants that the accused-appellant was a suspect in the crime. This was considered
improperly suggestive because it was not the complainants themselves who pointed to or
identified the accused-appellant. There was, therefore, no spontaneity nor objectivity in the
identification.

People vs. Anthony Escordial – GR 138934-35, January 16, 2002

FACTS

Escordial was convicted for robbery with rape and sentenced to death by the Bacolod RTC.
Michelle Darunday, the rape victim, did not know what the suspect looked like because she was
blindfolded at the time the crime was committed. She would only recognize him if she heard his
voice and felt the rough bumps on skin, as he was talking to her while he was raping her.
However, her roommate claimed that she saw the suspect, even though she was blindfolded,
because of the light that filtered in from a lamp post outside their room; that's why she gave a
physical description to the police officers. In the course of their investigation, the police found
that the suspect's description fit that of a worker in the Coffee Break Corner, where the accused
was employed. When the police officers arrived at the cafe, they asked the owner for the
accused's whereabouts. They went to the location stated by the owner and found the accused in a
basketball court. He was then invited for questioning. The rape victim was already at the station
when the accused arrived. According to her testimony, the accused blushed when he saw her. He
also tried talking to her, asking her if she really knew him, but she did not respond. He was asked
to take off his shirt and she confirmed that he was indeed her assailant because of a keloid at the
back of his neck and his voice.

ISSUES
(1) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused was lawful.
(2) Whether the accused's Miranda rights were violated.

HELD
(1) NO. He was arrested while he was watching a basketball game. He was not caught in
flagrante delicto. Neither was he arrested immediately after the consummation of the crime
because he was only “invited” for questioning a week after the incident. However, the defect was
cured when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
(2) YES, insofar as he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.
Nevertheless, the Court noted that the accused did not, at any time, admit to committing the
crime, even when he claimed that he was being tortured by the police. Therefore, there was no
uncounselled confession obtained from him. The Court also found that, although the out-of-court
identification of the accused was inadmissible as evidence since he was not assisted by counsel
at that time, the in-court identification was definitely a valid ground for his conviction. In fact, it
was actually the in-court identification that formed the basis for the RTC's decision, not the out-
of-court identification.

Mejia vs. Pamaran (G.R. No. L-56741-42)

Facts:
6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against
Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose
Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All cases were decided by the City Court of Manila against
Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by the Honorable Jose
P. Alejandro. 

On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered into a
compromise agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al. individually received from
Lu the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the
premises in question and remove their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of
the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the authority to
demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. The
compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did not join her co-
defendants in entering into the compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the cases.

In July 1979, Meimban went to Court where she met Atty. Mejia who told her that the case
has not yet been decided because there was still one party who has not signed the
compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was
surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu, a brother of
Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her she would
help them provided they give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge

They were able to give partial amount of the money being asked. Atty. Mejia also
attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through
intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C," which the
investigator returned through an employee. Corall-Paterno investigated the complaints of
Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, Mejia was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and
sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as
minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office
and to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing the
money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise
sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as
minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office
and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money
given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court. 

Mejia contended that the proceedings taken by respondent Sandiganbayan in the case at
bar is void ab initio. She argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner
under PD No. 1606 which effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse to the Court
of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court, only issues of law may be raised and worse
still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. Petitioner
contends this is a denial of the equal protection of the law.

Issue:
WON the accused is denied of due process and the equal protection of the law.

Held:
There is no denial of equal protection of the law. The classification satisfies the test
announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that it must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

There is no violation of due process. What is required for compliance with the due process
mandate in criminal proceedings? This Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly
Identified it with a "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the
preparation of defense. In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused
is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he hall to meet, with his
conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full
opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being implied in accordance with a valid
law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent
jurisdiction. Thus: This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of
due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said
that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded
against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.

264. In Re: BERNAS G.R. Nos. 133583-85 FACTS: For automatic review are decisions
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur finding appellant
Roberto Bernas y Nacario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape of her two
minor daughters. When first arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel, pleaded not guilty. When the case was submitted for decision, the prosecution moved to
reopen the case to present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as the Marriage contract of
the parents. This motion was granted over the objection of the defense counsel. Before the
prosecution presented its evidence, appellant, through his counsel, moved for the change of his
former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted. Appellant was thus
rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the charges. The defense waived its right to present evidence
and submitted them for decision based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. The RTC
then rendered the assailed decisions. ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was
proper. RULING: NO. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This right
finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court.
Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an Information. The facts stated in the
body of the Information determine the crime that the accused stands charged and for which he
must be tried. This recital of the essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of
accusation against an accused. Other than the allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element
of rape as defined by law is alleged in the Information. Since the Information fails to allege the
essential elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have been convicted of that crime.
Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him would be violated
179 Phil. 351

DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and/or Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Crispin Flores
on October 24, 1972 after he has been allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Order
of the respondent Judge, dated June 20, 1972, finding him guilty of indirect
contempt.  (Annex A, Petition, p. 11, Rollo).
From the records of this case, it appears that petitioner was actually arrested on August
28, 1972 and has since been detained in the Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his release
by virtue of a bond of P500.00 which he was allowed to file by this Court in its
Resolution dated October 31, 1972 (p. 33, Rollo), which he must have filed as he had
precisely asked to be bailed, pending his appeal from the Order of the respondent judge
dated August 10, 1972.  (Annex E to Petition, p. 24, Rollo).  The reason for the delayed
arrest is that petitioner was given a period up to August 1, 1972 "to inform the court
whether or not he relinquishes his possession over the land in question."
The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution on November 28, 1978 to
satisfy the award of damages in favor of Leonardo Mandac, plaintiff in Civil Case No.
1616 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against petitioner and his
father, Doroteo Flores, as defendants and the losing parties in said case.  They failed to
redeem the property sold to the heirs of Leonardo Mandac in the auction sale.  Hence,
the respondent court ordered petitioner to place in possession the heirs of
Leonardo Mandac who had in the meantime died.  For his refusal to vacate the land in
favor of the heirs of Mandac, contempt proceedings were instituted against petitioner on
motion of Atty. Antonio N. Laggui, as counsel of the aforementioned heirs.  As
previously stated, these contempt proceedings led to his arrest and detention.
Petitioner, however, questions the legality of the proceedings for not having been
assisted by counsel during the hearing of the motion for contempt, and for not having
been duly informed of the contempt charge by being furnished a copy of the motion, or
properly "arraigned" before trial.  Thus, petitioner claims to have been deprived due
process of law which voided the proceedings against him as for lack of jurisdiction of the
court to inflict the penalty imposed on him, citing Santiago vs. Alikpala, L-25133,
September 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 356.
Further, petitioner contends that his act of not surrendering possession of his levied
property does not constitute contempt, citing the case of Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP
of Camiling, et al., L-14345, July 20, 1961, 2 SCRA 793, and Chinese Commercial
Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al., L-18565, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 851.
1. On the issue of whether petitioner was denied due process as he claims, both
respondent judge and private respondents deny the claim of petitioner, of having been
so denied, private respondents even quoting from the transcript of the stenographic
notes the following:
"COURT:  Is the defendant Crispin Flores in Court?
(Interpreter calls out the name of Crispin Flores, and answered that he is present.)
(The Court addresses Crispin Flores).
Q.   Who is going to represent you in this case?
A.    I have a lawyer but he was not able to come.
Q.   Did you notify him?
A.    Yes, sir, but he was not able to come today.
Q.   Are you willing to go into trial in this case even in the absence of your lawyer?
A.    Yes, sir.
Q.   Do you need the assistance of any lawyer?
A.    No more, anyway I can answer."
(pp. 1 and 2, tsn Barias, June 19, 1972).
The veracity of the alleged proceedings as indicated above is denied by petitioner,
alleging that no such proceedings took place, and that, in any event, the transcript was
not signed by the stenographer.  What happened according to him, is that "when
respondent judge had learned that he was without counsel, he told him (petitioner) to
deliver possession of the premises to the private respondents, and for this purpose gave
him ten (10) days to carry out that mandate.  In spite of the plan of petitioner that the
hearing on that date be postponed so that his counsel of record could appear for him or
that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his behalf, the respondent judge,
however, demurred, and with the assistance of a certain Atty. Joshua Pastores, peti-
tioner was made to sign an understanding to deliver up the premises within the period
indicated by the judge on pain of being imprisoned." (Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 79-
80, Rollo.)
The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has never been considered
subject to waiver.  The practice has always been for the trial court to provide the accused
with a counsel de oficio, if he has no counsel of his own choice, or cannot afford
one.  This is because -
"The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard
by counsel.  Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence and this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.  It is for this reason that his right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
our rules of procedure it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and
he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." (People
vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752; See also Aguador vs. Enerio, 37 SCRA 140.)
On the basis of the aforequoted ruling, it cannot be disputed that the respondent court
failed in its duty designed to satisfy the constitutional right of an accused to
counsel.  Petitioner, as the respondent in the contempt charge, a proceedings that
partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution, was thus denied due process.  This is
more so as petitioner does not appear to have been duly notified of the contempt charge,
nor was properly "arraigned," since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing
(Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra).  Admittedly with a counsel of record, petitioner could not
have willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear.  It is certainly
much easier to believe, that, as petitioner alleges, he asked for postponement, because of
the absence of his counsel, but that the respondent judge denied the plea, a fact not
expressly traversed in the respondent judge's comment.  (p. 56, Rollo).  Neither has he
denied the allegation in the petition that there was a denial of petitioner's right to due
process for not having been duly informed of the contempt-charge, nor was his counsel
furnished a copy thereof, as he is entitled to one as a matter of right and as a matter of
duty of the court.  All that respondent judge said in his comment is that "defendant
Flores has been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges presented
by reason of his contumacious acts." (p. 56, Rollo.)
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the proceedings on the contempt charge has
been vitiated by lack of due process, entitling petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus he
seeks.
"Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.  It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when
the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.  Such defects results in the absence
or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction
of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.  That void judgment of conviction
may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus.  This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be
availed of by the defendant.  In Harden vs. The Director of Prisons (81:741 /1948/),
Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly announced that' deprivation of any
fundamental or constitutional rights' justify a proceeding for habeas corpus, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.  Abriol vs. Homeres (84 Phil. 525) is even more
categorical.  In that case, the action of a lower court, denying the accused the
opportunity to present proof for his defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held
by this Court as a deprivation of his right to due process.  As was made clear by the
opinion of Justice Ozaeta: 'No court of justice under our system of government has the
power to deprive him of that right.  If the accused does not waive his right to be heard
but on the contrary invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer
has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him
in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally
attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding." (Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra.)
2.  We also find as not clearly established by the pleadings and annexes, the legal basis
for the pronouncement of guilt for contempt against petitioner.  What would constitute
contempt is the re-entry of the defeated party into the premises after possession thereof
has been delivered to the prevailing party by the sheriff in enforcement of the writ of
execution (Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758, 763; Chinese
Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et. al., L-18565, November 30, 1962,
6 SCRA 848; Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling, et. al., L-14345, July 20, 1961,
2 SCRA 793).  Thus, in the order of the respondent judge, dated September 28, 1972,
(Annex G to Petition, pp. 30-31, Rollo), it was stated that:
"By virtue of the writ of execution of the decision in this case the plaintiffs were placed
in possession over the parcel described in paragraph 3 of the complaint.  Sometime in
March, 1969, defendants invaded the land and since then, they refused to vacate
same.  Plaintiffs, on July 2, 1969, filed the first motion for contempt against the
defendants.
The other properties of defendants were levied, foreclosed and sold to defendants on
November 28, 1968 in a public auction to satisfy the damages awarded in the same
judgment.  The defendants failed to redeem the bidded properties within the one year
from the registration of the certificate of sale of the land, and yet defendants refused to
vacate same land for which plaintiffs filed the second motion for contempt on December
17, 1971.
The Court did not pass upon the first motion for contempt but gave due course to the
second motion for contempt."
It is altogether clear that with respect to the parcel described in paragraph 3 of the
complaint, the Mandacs were placed in possession thereof but subsequently, the
petitioner herein invaded the land and had since refused to leave it.  With respect,
however, to the land in question, petitioner never vacated the same; there was,
therefore, no re-entry to speak of.  According to petitioner, the sheriff who tried to
enforce the writ of possession never succeeded in locating the specific land to be
delivered to the Mandacs to be able to claim having placed the latter in possession of the
land.  (pp. 77-78, Rollo).  Where the defeated party asked to vacate the premises by the
judgment of the court, refuses to vacate the same on being ordered by the sheriff
enforcing a writ of execution or possession, no contempt is committed, as held
in Goyena de Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., G. R. No. L-2851, January 31,
1950, cited in Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al., supra.  In the case
of Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758, Justice Teehankee,
speaking for the court said:
"The order of execution issued by the lower Court is addressed solely and exclusively to
the sheriff, who under the above-cited rules is called upon to oust the defeated party
from the property and make the delivery or restitution by placing the prevailing party in
possession of the property, and mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the defeated
party to relinquish the property, would not constitute contempt."
3.  There is, likewise, an allegation in the petition that the Motion for Contempt was filed
by the counsel of Leonardo Mandac after the latter's death, and therefore, the motion
was unauthorized and without legal standing.  From what has been said above that
petitioner is not guilty of contempt, the challenge against the legality of the motion for
contempt need not be inquired into.  In fairness, however, to private respondent from
his allegation in his Answer that -
"7. Atty. Pedro N. Laggui had authority to file the motion for contempt against the
Petitioner on June 30, 1969; at that time, Leonardo Mandac was still alive.  Atty.
Antonio N. Laggui likewise had authority to file the motion for contempt against the
Petitioner on December 17, 1971 no longer as counsel for the deceased
Leonardo Mandac - for at that time he was already dead - but as counsel for his wife and
children in whose favor the corresponding deed of sale of the parcels of land sold at
auction on November 28, 1968, was executed by the Sheriff on February 12, 1970,
pursuant to the Order dated January 21, 1970." (Answer, p. 69, Rollo).
We have no hesitation to say that the Motion for Contempt has been filed with proper
authority.
For all the foregoing, the present petition should be, as it is, hereby granted, thereby
setting aside the order of the respondent judge finding petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt.  No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.

.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979

FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASRO, J!
DOCRINE! "# $%&"' 'o (o)*s#+ )$%*& '$%a+ CANNO # a%v#.
FACS!Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested
and detained illegally by Order
of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of
%*%$#(' (o*'#/'
. Flores was actually arrested on August 2! "#$2 and has since
been detained in the %ro&incial Jail of Cagayan until his release by &irtue of a bond of %'((.
((. )he reason for the delayed
arrest is that Flores was gi&en a period *to inform the court whether or not he relin+uishes his
possession o&er the land in
+uestion.*
)he land in +uestion was le&ied upon and sold on e,ecution to satisfy the award of damages
against Flores in a
ci&il case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence! Judge Ruiz
ordered Flores to place in
possession the heirs of -andac plaintiff in the ci&il case/. For the refusal of Flores to &acate
the disputed land! contempt
proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores +uestions the legality of the proceedings for not ha&ing been assisted by counsel during
the hearing of the
motion for contempt! and for not ha&ing been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
furnished a copy of the
motion! or properly *arraigned* before trial. Flores claims to ha&e been depri&ed due process
of law which &oided the
proceedings against him as for lac0 of 1urisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him.
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has wai&ed his right to counsel as e&idenced by the transcript
of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings too0 place! and that! in any e&ent! the transcript
was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores! when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel! Ruiz
told Flores to deli&er
possession of the premises within "( days. n spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on
that date be postponed so that
his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his
behalf! Judge Ruiz!
howe&er! demurred! and with the assistance of a certain Atty. %astores! Flores was made to
sign an understanding to
deli&er up the premises within the period indicated by the 1udge on pain of being imprisoned.
ISSUE!
3O4 Flores was denied due process of law
ELD!
567. )he right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne&er been considered
sub1ect to wai&er. )he
practice has always been for the trial court to pro&ide the accused with a counsel de officio! if
he has no counsel of his own
choice! or cannot afford one. )his is because 8e&en the most intelligent or educated man may
ha&e no s0ill in the science of
the law! particularly in the rules of procedure! and! without counsel! he may be con&icted not
because he is guilty but
because he does not 0now how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.9
Here! it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the
constitutional right
of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to ha&e been duly notified of the contempt
charge! nor was properly
*arraigned!* since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel
of record! Flores could not
ha&e willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. t is certainly much
easier to belie&e that Flores
as0ed for postponement! because of the absence of his counsel! but that Judge Ruiz denied the
plea. 4either has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly
informed of the contempt
charge! nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof! as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of
right and as a matter:of duty
of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that *defendant Flores has been granted
his day in court to defend
himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.*
)herefore! the proceedings on the contempt charge has been &itiated by lac0 of due process!
entitling petitioner to
the writ of habeas corpus he see0s.
a#as (o$)sis a high prerogati&e writ considered as an e,ceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is
illegally restrained. 7uch defects results in the absence or loss of ;1urisdiction and therefore
in&alidates the trial and the
conse+uent con&iction of the accused whose fundamental right was &iolated. )hat &oid
1udgment of con&iction may be
challenged by collateral attac0! which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. )his writ may
issue e&en if another
remedy which is less effecti&e may be a&ailed of by the defendant. ;4o court of 1ustice under
our system of go&ernment has
the power to depri&e him of that right. f the accused does not wai&e his right to be heard but
on the contrary in&o0es the
right! and the court denies it to him! that court no longer has 1urisdiction to proceed< it has no
power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense< and the sentence thus pronounced is &oid and may
be conaterany attac0ed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
Note: In Flores v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L‐ 35707, May 31, 1979, the Supreme Court held that the right
to counsel during the trial cannot be waived, because ―even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence‖.

179 Phil. 351

DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and/or Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Crispin Flores
on October 24, 1972 after he has been allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Order
of the respondent Judge, dated June 20, 1972, finding him guilty of indirect
contempt.  (Annex A, Petition, p. 11, Rollo).
From the records of this case, it appears that petitioner was actually arrested on August
28, 1972 and has since been detained in the Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his release
by virtue of a bond of P500.00 which he was allowed to file by this Court in its
Resolution dated October 31, 1972 (p. 33, Rollo), which he must have filed as he had
precisely asked to be bailed, pending his appeal from the Order of the respondent judge
dated August 10, 1972.  (Annex E to Petition, p. 24, Rollo).  The reason for the delayed
arrest is that petitioner was given a period up to August 1, 1972 "to inform the court
whether or not he relinquishes his possession over the land in question."
The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution on November 28, 1978 to
satisfy the award of damages in favor of Leonardo Mandac, plaintiff in Civil Case No.
1616 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against petitioner and his
father, Doroteo Flores, as defendants and the losing parties in said case.  They failed to
redeem the property sold to the heirs of Leonardo Mandac in the auction sale.  Hence,
the respondent court ordered petitioner to place in possession the heirs of
Leonardo Mandac who had in the meantime died.  For his refusal to vacate the land in
favor of the heirs of Mandac, contempt proceedings were instituted against petitioner on
motion of Atty. Antonio N. Laggui, as counsel of the aforementioned heirs.  As
previously stated, these contempt proceedings led to his arrest and detention.
Petitioner, however, questions the legality of the proceedings for not having been
assisted by counsel during the hearing of the motion for contempt, and for not having
been duly informed of the contempt charge by being furnished a copy of the motion, or
properly "arraigned" before trial.  Thus, petitioner claims to have been deprived due
process of law which voided the proceedings against him as for lack of jurisdiction of the
court to inflict the penalty imposed on him, citing Santiago vs. Alikpala, L-25133,
September 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 356.
Further, petitioner contends that his act of not surrendering possession of his levied
property does not constitute contempt, citing the case of Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP
of Camiling, et al., L-14345, July 20, 1961, 2 SCRA 793, and Chinese Commercial
Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al., L-18565, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 851.
1. On the issue of whether petitioner was denied due process as he claims, both
respondent judge and private respondents deny the claim of petitioner, of having been
so denied, private respondents even quoting from the transcript of the stenographic
notes the following:
"COURT:  Is the defendant Crispin Flores in Court?
(Interpreter calls out the name of Crispin Flores, and answered that he is present.)
(The Court addresses Crispin Flores).
Q.   Who is going to represent you in this case?
A.    I have a lawyer but he was not able to come.
Q.   Did you notify him?
A.    Yes, sir, but he was not able to come today.
Q.   Are you willing to go into trial in this case even in the absence of your lawyer?
A.    Yes, sir.
Q.   Do you need the assistance of any lawyer?
A.    No more, anyway I can answer."
(pp. 1 and 2, tsn Barias, June 19, 1972).
The veracity of the alleged proceedings as indicated above is denied by petitioner,
alleging that no such proceedings took place, and that, in any event, the transcript was
not signed by the stenographer.  What happened according to him, is that "when
respondent judge had learned that he was without counsel, he told him (petitioner) to
deliver possession of the premises to the private respondents, and for this purpose gave
him ten (10) days to carry out that mandate.  In spite of the plan of petitioner that the
hearing on that date be postponed so that his counsel of record could appear for him or
that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his behalf, the respondent judge,
however, demurred, and with the assistance of a certain Atty. Joshua Pastores, peti-
tioner was made to sign an understanding to deliver up the premises within the period
indicated by the judge on pain of being imprisoned." (Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 79-
80, Rollo.)
The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has never been considered
subject to waiver.  The practice has always been for the trial court to provide the accused
with a counsel de oficio, if he has no counsel of his own choice, or cannot afford
one.  This is because -
"The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard
by counsel.  Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence and this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated.  It is for this reason that his right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
our rules of procedure it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and
he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." (People
vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752; See also Aguador vs. Enerio, 37 SCRA 140.)
On the basis of the aforequoted ruling, it cannot be disputed that the respondent court
failed in its duty designed to satisfy the constitutional right of an accused to
counsel.  Petitioner, as the respondent in the contempt charge, a proceedings that
partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution, was thus denied due process.  This is
more so as petitioner does not appear to have been duly notified of the contempt charge,
nor was properly "arraigned," since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing
(Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra).  Admittedly with a counsel of record, petitioner could not
have willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear.  It is certainly
much easier to believe, that, as petitioner alleges, he asked for postponement, because of
the absence of his counsel, but that the respondent judge denied the plea, a fact not
expressly traversed in the respondent judge's comment.  (p. 56, Rollo).  Neither has he
denied the allegation in the petition that there was a denial of petitioner's right to due
process for not having been duly informed of the contempt-charge, nor was his counsel
furnished a copy thereof, as he is entitled to one as a matter of right and as a matter of
duty of the court.  All that respondent judge said in his comment is that "defendant
Flores has been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges presented
by reason of his contumacious acts." (p. 56, Rollo.)
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the proceedings on the contempt charge has
been vitiated by lack of due process, entitling petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus he
seeks.
"Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.  It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when
the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.  Such defects results in the absence
or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction
of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.  That void judgment of conviction
may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus.  This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be
availed of by the defendant.  In Harden vs. The Director of Prisons (81:741 /1948/),
Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly announced that' deprivation of any
fundamental or constitutional rights' justify a proceeding for habeas corpus, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.  Abriol vs. Homeres (84 Phil. 525) is even more
categorical.  In that case, the action of a lower court, denying the accused the
opportunity to present proof for his defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held
by this Court as a deprivation of his right to due process.  As was made clear by the
opinion of Justice Ozaeta: 'No court of justice under our system of government has the
power to deprive him of that right.  If the accused does not waive his right to be heard
but on the contrary invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer
has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him
in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally
attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding." (Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra.)
2.  We also find as not clearly established by the pleadings and annexes, the legal basis
for the pronouncement of guilt for contempt against petitioner.  What would constitute
contempt is the re-entry of the defeated party into the premises after possession thereof
has been delivered to the prevailing party by the sheriff in enforcement of the writ of
execution (Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758, 763; Chinese
Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et. al., L-18565, November 30, 1962,
6 SCRA 848; Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling, et. al., L-14345, July 20, 1961,
2 SCRA 793).  Thus, in the order of the respondent judge, dated September 28, 1972,
(Annex G to Petition, pp. 30-31, Rollo), it was stated that:
"By virtue of the writ of execution of the decision in this case the plaintiffs were placed
in possession over the parcel described in paragraph 3 of the complaint.  Sometime in
March, 1969, defendants invaded the land and since then, they refused to vacate
same.  Plaintiffs, on July 2, 1969, filed the first motion for contempt against the
defendants.
The other properties of defendants were levied, foreclosed and sold to defendants on
November 28, 1968 in a public auction to satisfy the damages awarded in the same
judgment.  The defendants failed to redeem the bidded properties within the one year
from the registration of the certificate of sale of the land, and yet defendants refused to
vacate same land for which plaintiffs filed the second motion for contempt on December
17, 1971.
The Court did not pass upon the first motion for contempt but gave due course to the
second motion for contempt."
It is altogether clear that with respect to the parcel described in paragraph 3 of the
complaint, the Mandacs were placed in possession thereof but subsequently, the
petitioner herein invaded the land and had since refused to leave it.  With respect,
however, to the land in question, petitioner never vacated the same; there was,
therefore, no re-entry to speak of.  According to petitioner, the sheriff who tried to
enforce the writ of possession never succeeded in locating the specific land to be
delivered to the Mandacs to be able to claim having placed the latter in possession of the
land.  (pp. 77-78, Rollo).  Where the defeated party asked to vacate the premises by the
judgment of the court, refuses to vacate the same on being ordered by the sheriff
enforcing a writ of execution or possession, no contempt is committed, as held
in Goyena de Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., G. R. No. L-2851, January 31,
1950, cited in Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al., supra.  In the case
of Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758, Justice Teehankee,
speaking for the court said:
"The order of execution issued by the lower Court is addressed solely and exclusively to
the sheriff, who under the above-cited rules is called upon to oust the defeated party
from the property and make the delivery or restitution by placing the prevailing party in
possession of the property, and mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the defeated
party to relinquish the property, would not constitute contempt."
3.  There is, likewise, an allegation in the petition that the Motion for Contempt was filed
by the counsel of Leonardo Mandac after the latter's death, and therefore, the motion
was unauthorized and without legal standing.  From what has been said above that
petitioner is not guilty of contempt, the challenge against the legality of the motion for
contempt need not be inquired into.  In fairness, however, to private respondent from
his allegation in his Answer that -
"7. Atty. Pedro N. Laggui had authority to file the motion for contempt against the
Petitioner on June 30, 1969; at that time, Leonardo Mandac was still alive.  Atty.
Antonio N. Laggui likewise had authority to file the motion for contempt against the
Petitioner on December 17, 1971 no longer as counsel for the deceased
Leonardo Mandac - for at that time he was already dead - but as counsel for his wife and
children in whose favor the corresponding deed of sale of the parcels of land sold at
auction on November 28, 1968, was executed by the Sheriff on February 12, 1970,
pursuant to the Order dated January 21, 1970." (Answer, p. 69, Rollo).
We have no hesitation to say that the Motion for Contempt has been filed with proper
authority.
For all the foregoing, the present petition should be, as it is, hereby granted, thereby
setting aside the order of the respondent judge finding petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt.  No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (ART. 336) PEOPLE V MONTERON (GR. NO. 130709)

FACTS: On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking
home fromWangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was walking on a
secluded portionof the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see
where the stonecame from; she was hit again on the mouth. She fell down unconscious. When
Mary Ann cameto, she found herself lying on the grass naked. Accused-appellant was lying on
top of her, alsonaked. She struggled but accused-appellant, who was stronger, restrained her. He
placed hispenis on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She frantically grabbed his
erect penis and pushed it away from her. ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of consummated
rape.

HELD:
Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the n e g
ativeavermentsoftheaccused,theformerundisputedlydeservesm
o r e c r e d e n c e a n dentitled to greater evidentiary weight. In the case at bar, Mary Ann
Martenez positively identifiedaccused-appellant as her molester. Mary Ann’s testimony pointing
to accusedappellant as theauthor of th crime is corroborated by her cousin Arnel Arat. Accused-
appellant has commencedthe commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of
undressing himself and the victimand lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of
execution which should producethe felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. © case at bar, it was Mary Ann’s violent resistance which
prevented the insertion of accused-appellant’s penis in her vagina. The foregoing conclusion is
supported by the medical findings of Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma that Mary Ann’s hymen was intact
and had no laceration.

People vs. Quitlong G.R. No. 121562 July 10, 1998 FACTS On October 1994, the victim
Jonathan Calpito Y Castro, along with his friends and Gosil and Adjaro were caught in
an argument with a fishball vendor when they claimed to shortchanged by the vendor.
The accused were seen to have rushed to them and cornered Calpito which lead to his
being stabbed. He was rushed to the hospital but he was not able to survive. The
defense gave no alibi and admitted the presence of accused-appellants at the vicinity of
the crime scene but interposed denial by appellants of any participation in the
commission of the crime. Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia Cultura, both sidewalk
vendors, corroborated the story of the Quitlong brothers. According to Nonita and Lydia,
it was a certain Mendoza who stabbed Calpito. On 21 April 1995, the trial court,
following his evaluation of the respective submissions of the prosecution and the
defense, including their rebuttal and sub-rebuttal evidence, rendered its decision:
“RONNIE QUITLONG Y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS and EMILIO
SENOTO, JR. Y PASCUA were adjudged by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased Jonathan Calpito y Castro in the sums of
P50,000.00 for the latter's death; P35,700.00 as consequential damages; and
P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus their proportionate shares in the costs. There
being no indication that the remaining accused, Jesus Mendoza, whom they claim to be
the one who stabbed the victim, and several John Does could be arrested/identified and
arrested shortly, let the case against them be, as it is hereby, archived without prejudice
to its prosecution upon their apprehension.” Ronnie Quitlong appealed with the
Supreme Court averring that the RTC erred in its judgement. Senoto averred that the
trial court has erred in finding conspiracy among the accused and argues that the crime
committed is homicide, not murder, given the circumstances. ISSUE

Whether or not the herein three accused may be held guilty as co-principals by reason
of conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there being no dispute that the
latter died due to the solitary stab inflicted on him. DECISION The Supreme Court
established, through witnesses, that it was Ronnie Quitlong who stabbed Calpito. And
that the rest were just mere accomplices since the act of holding the victim while Ronnie
Quitlong was about to stab him does not demonstrate the concurrence of will or the
unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective responsibility of two or
more individuals. It occurred at the spur of moment. The two accomplices, appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were subject to the imposition of the penalty
next lower in degree than reclusion temporal maximum to death or, accordingly, prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may be held to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, as the minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of reclusion
temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty. The trial court correctly imposed the
payment of a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim. The
consequential (actual) damages in the amount of P35,700.00 not having been
substantiated, except for the amount P12,000.00 paid to the memorial chapel, is
disallowed. The award of moral damages recoverable under Article 2219 (1), in relation
to Article 2206, of the Civil Code is reduced from P100,000.00 to P20,000.00. Appellant
Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to reimburse them the
actual damages of P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of P50,000.00. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as accomplices in the
commission of the crime, and each shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of nine (9)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor minimum period, as minimum penalty, to
thirteen (13) years and nine (9) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal
minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto,
Jr., are also hereby held solidarily liable with appellant Ronnie Quitlong in the payment
of the damages hereinabove mentioned.

Acebedo vs. Sarmiento [GR L-28025, 16 December 1970] First Division, Fernando (J): 7
concur. 3 on official leave Facts: It was shown that on 3 August 1959, the Provincial Fiscal filed
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a criminal information for damage to property
through reckless imprudence against David Acebedo y Dalman and a certain Chi Chan Tan. As
there were no further proceedings in the meantime, Acebedo on 19 May 1965 moved to dismiss
the criminal charge. Judge Malcolm G. Sarmient was not in agreement as shown by his order of
denial of 10 July 1965. Then, after two more years, came the trial with the complainant having
testified on direct examination but not having as yet been fully cross-examined. At the
continuation of the trial set for 7 June 1967 such witness did not show up. The provincial fiscal
moved for postponement. Counsel for Acebedo, however, not only objected but sought the
dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Judge this time
acceded, but would likewise base his order of dismissal, orally given, on the cross-examination
of complainant not having started as yet. Later that same day, the Judge did reconsider the order
and reinstated the case, his action being due to its being shown that the cross-examination of the
complainant had already started. Acebedo filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether Acebedo
is entitled to have the case dismissed based on the right ofteh accused to speedy trial. Held: The
right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest
possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense
he may interpose. The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus
if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the
final dismissal of the case. The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without
good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without having his
case tried. An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be
oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. It is not to be
supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove from the prosecution every
reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary
efforts required on the part of the prosecutor or the court. The Constitution does not say that the
right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and
undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.
More specifically, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the
denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at
continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an
accused being twice put in jeopardy. Herein, Acebedo not once but twice did seek to have the
prosecution for damage to property against him terminated as the matter was pending for at least
6 years, the first time he sought to put an end to it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the
complaining witness testified on direct examination but made no appearance when his cross-
examination was to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a speedy trial was thus
made out. There was an order of dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No reconsideration
could therefore be had without offending the provision on double jeopardy.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-62810 July 25, 1983

EULALIA MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. FABIAN VER, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and GEN.
HAMILTON DIMAYA, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, respondents.

Arturo V. Romero for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

PLANA, J.:

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin on behalf of her husband, Pvt. Francisco
Martin.

Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about April 14, 1981, when he was still
in the service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio Cruz at P50.00 each, one of which
exploded during a picnic in Laoag City on April 17, 1981 causing the death of three persons,
including Rogelio Cruz, and injuries to three others.

According to respondents, Pvt. Martin has admitted to Cpl. Lucio Tuppal, Philippine Army, having
sold the grenades to Rogelio Cruz in Laoag City, although this is denied by Pvt. Martin.

After an initial investigation conducted by the Laoag City PC and INP authorities, a report was
submitted to the Ministry of National Defense which referred the matter to the Chief of Staff, AFP,
who in turn directed the Inspector General to conduct another investigation.

On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to barracks) at Fort Bonifacio
pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra. The following year, he was discharged from the
service effective as of May 5, 1982. On November 17, 1982 the instant petition was filed. The
following month, i.e., December 3, 1982, Pvt. Martin was charged for violation of the 85th and 97th
Articles of War, which read:

ART. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers.—

Any soldier who sells or wrongfully disposes of or willfully or through neglect injures
or losses any horse, arms, ammunition, accouterments, equipment, clothing, or other
property issued for use in the military service, shall be punished as a court-martial
may direct.
 ART. 97. General Article.—Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline and all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the military service shall be taken cognizance of by a
general or special or summary court-martial according to the nature and degree of
the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.

The charge sheet stipulates the following charges:

CHARGE I: Violation of the 85th Article of War.

Specification: In that Private Martin assigned with the Headquarters and

Headquarters Service Battalion, First Infantry Division, Philippine Army on or about
14 April 1981 at Laoag City wrongly disposed of by sale to Rogelio Cruz two (2)
grenades.

CHARGE II: Violation of the 97th Article of War.

Specification: In that Private Francisco Martin, ... on or about the month of April 1981
at Laoag City, unlawfully and without authority had in his possession two (2) hand
grenades thus committing an act prejudicial to good order and military discipline and
of a nature that will bring discredit to the military establishment.

The petitioner contends that having been discharged from the military service, he is no longer
subject to court-martial even if the offenses of which he is charged were committed while he was still
subject to military law. He therefore, concludes that his continued detention pursuant to Article 70 of
the Articles of War (which authorizes the arrest/confinement of any person subject to military law
who is charged with an offense under the Articles of War) is illegal and he, accordingly, should be
released. This posture has no merit.

Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the Philippines ceases
upon discharge or other separation from such service. This however, is but a general rule. The
Articles of War in terms prescribe some exceptions designed to enhance discipline and good order
within the military organization. Thus, court-martial jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and
misappropriation of military hardware and other government property is not extinguished by
discharge or dismissal pursuant to the 95th Article of War.

ART. 95. Frauds Against the Government.—Any person subject to military law ...

Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willingly misappropriates, applies to his own
use or benefit or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms,
equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores, money, or other property of
the Government furnished or intended for the military service thereof ...

Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other

punishment as a court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties. And
if any person, being guilty of any of the offenses aforesaid while in the service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary receives his
discharge or is dismissed from the service, he shall continue to be liable to be
arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-martial in the same manner and to
the same extent as if he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It was on the basis of the foregoing legal provision, among others, that this Court sustained the
court-martial of the petitioner in De la Cruz vs. Alcaraz, et al. after his reversion to inactive status, for
misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active military service. The Court,
thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, said:

There is no question that although appellant had been reverted to inactive (civilian)
status in the reserve force of the Philippine Army, he is still amenable to investigation
and court-martial under the Artitles of War by the Philippine Navy for alleged acts of
misappropriation of government funds committed while he was still in the active
military service. As correctly held by the Court below, appellant's case falls within the
provisions of Article 95 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended), which provides as follows: ...

The lower Court did not, therefore, err in refusing to enjoin appellant's investigation
by the naval authorities on charges that he had misappropriated public property while
he was still in the service of the Philippine Navy, specially since petitioner admits that
he is still a member of the Reserve Force." (99 Phil. 130 at 131-132.).

We conclude that despite his discharge from the military service, the petitioner is still subject to
military law for the purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military property, and his
preventive detention thereunder — pending trial and punishment for the said offense committed
when he was in the military service — is lawful.

Alternatively, petitioner maintains that even assuming that the jurisdiction of the military authorities to
try and punish him was not abated by his discharge from military service, the denial to him of his
constitutional right to speedy trial (he having been confined from the date of his arrest on May 5,
1981 up to December 3, 1982 when he was formally charged — a period of I year and 7 months)
entitles him to be released on habeas corpus.

The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution apply to all persons, including those subject to
military law, (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546; Cayaga vs. Tangonan, 66 SCRA
216; Go vs. Olivas, 74 SCRA 230; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429.) To quote Ex Parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2:

The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances.

It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are called upon in times of the gravest national
crises to lay down their lives in defense of peace and freedom would be the very people to be
singled out for denial of the fundamental rights for which they risk their lives.

For denial of a constitutional right to the accused, the hearing tribunal may lose its jurisdiction to
conduct further proceedings. In such a case, habeas corpus would lie to obtain the release of the
accused. (Gumabon vs. Director, 37 SCRA 420; Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Flores vs. People, 61 SCRA 331; Dacuyan vs. Ramos, 85 SCRA 487,
Ventura vs. People, 86 SCRA 188; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429; Aquino vs. Ponce
Enrile, supra; Go vs. Olivas, supra.)

In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that he has been denied his constitutional right of speedy
trial because the charges against him were filed only about 1 year and 7 months after his arrest.
There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision: "x... the test of violation
of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information
is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has
not been without reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether
there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial." (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at 236.)

At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise
quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable
delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. As expressed in Barker vs. Wingo, 33 L.
Ed 2d 101:

... the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than
other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be quantified
into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise
time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived ...

... a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a
balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of the delay, reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether defendant's right to a
speedy trial has been denied ...

Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner unfortunately resulted in the
death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly bought the handgrenades from the
petitioner) and very serious injuries to three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment of
charges and prosecution of the petitioner. It is therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of
respondents that the delay complained of was occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a claim
which has not at all been challenged or denied by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed, without prejudice to the petitioner
seeking his provisional release on bail from the military authorities or the Ministry of National
Defense. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-
Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

People vs Opida G.R. No. L-46272, July 13, 1986
FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial
District, imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of
murder.
On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and hit
him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The actual knife-wielder was
identified as Mario del Mundo. 3 Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged
with murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death. 4
The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution witnesses,
neither of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the crime, their
extrajudicial confessions, which were secured without the assistance of counsel, and
corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of interlocking confession.
What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two
accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from
judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the
impression that the judge had allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the
credibility of the witnesses for the defense.
ISSUE:  
 1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession that was used as a basis for conviction was
admissible as evidence.
2.  Whether or not the evident hostility and bias of the judge in the case at bar is proper.
DECISION:
1. We have consistently held that, aside from the required assistance of counsel,  the rights
guaranteed during a custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the
suspect, especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so he can
understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of any sort will vitiate any
extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and renders it inadmissible in evidence
against him.
2. Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.  we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. This guaranty was not observed in this case. Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward
the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be,
as they in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy enough to
employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused.
The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused,
who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want
me to dictate the decision now?" 23, he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and
obviously waiting only to be formalized.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is reversed and they are
hereby ordered released immediately. No costs.

PEREZ V. ESTRADA                                                    AM No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001

FACTS:

On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly
franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the
Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of
full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by
Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano
and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the
petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.
HELD:

NO. In Estes v. Texas, US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an
inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect
their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive
public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera
is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of
the public."

The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This
right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at
stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information.
The accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life
and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.

IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a fair trial...could
allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not
subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."

Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the life and liberty of
any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the
concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

Republic vs. Agbulos Case Digest

 0

● Trial in absentia is valid provided that: a)  the accused has been arraigned; b) he has been
duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.

● Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

***********

Facts: 

Agbulos was charged with forcible abduction with rape. He pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Trial
ensued and the prosecution rested its case.
Agbulos failed to appear during the subsequent hearings. The bonding company failed to surrender
the accused and the court issued an order stating that upon motion of fiscal, judgment will issue
against the full amount of the bond. In 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding Agbulos
guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The counsel for the accused filed a notice of appeal.

Issues:

1. Was the trial in absentia valid?

2. May Agbulos file an appeal?

Held:

1. The trial in absentia was perfectly valid, having been held in accordance with Article IV, Section
19, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, which has been reproduced verbatim in Article III,
Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution, providing in part as follows:

However, after arraignment, trial may proceed not withstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the
past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's
escape.

Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly
eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the
trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.

Under the old doctrine, trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be
duly notified thereof. Under the present rule, the fugitive is deemed to have waived such notice
precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his
trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the
prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant's escape will
be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due
notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by
escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

2. No. The record shows that after arraignment and during the trial, Agbulos jumped bail and has
not been apprehended to date. The last time he appeared in court was on April 25, 1984, when the
prosecution rested its case. The rest of the trial was held in absentia, resulting in the judgment of
conviction.

Rule 124, Section 8, of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may, "upon
motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." We have held that once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to its
jurisdiction is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. (Republic vs. Agbulos,
G.R. No. 73875 May 18, 1993)
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No.
213847, 18 August 2015.
17MAY
En Banc
[BERSAMIN, J.]
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder
in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile
filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that
before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and
burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and
cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile,
if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with
proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight
risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to
determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail
considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?
HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of
the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit
a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful
of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was
granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment
of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
N.B.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Case Brief: Government of Hongkong
vs Olalia
APRIL 2, 2019 JEFF REY
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ,
Respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting
the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge
subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and
will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be
forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its
own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding;
and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real
and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that
the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent
judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of
America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to
the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from
the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

eople vs. Dela PEÑA (2018)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO DELA PEÑA ET. AL
G.R. No. 219581, January 31, 2018

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: Appellant was charged, with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 532 allegedly committed as follows that on or about the 24th day of
September 2005, along the river bank of Barangay San Roque, Province of Samar, the
accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to gain, by
means of force and intimidation, feloniously take and carry away valuable items (13
sacks of dried coconuts valued at P7,537.00; 2 pieces automatic watch valued at
P6,796.00; 1 piece ([S]audi gold) valued at P4,731.00; 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued
at P3,615.00[;] 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at
P26,000.00[;] cash money worth [P]1,000.00, all amounting to P49,679.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner.

Appellant interposed an alibi and claimed that the Information did not state that the
vessel in question was in Philippine waters.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of piracy.

Ruling: Yes, the elements of piracy under PD 532 are all present.

Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows: Any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof,
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed
by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters shall be considered as piracy.

Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is defined as follows: [A]ll bodies of
water, .x x x and all other waters belonging to the Philippines x x x and other submarine
areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.

It is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters. The Information also clearly
alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the passengers
were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. The appellant was able to
seize these items when he, along with armed companions, boarded the victims' pump
boat and seized control of the same.

Ratio Decidendi: Positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be
fabricated and is inherently unreliable.

Gist: This is an appeal assailing the Decision of the CA which affirmed with modification
the decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
piracy.

CAGANG v. SANDIGANBAYAN   G.R.

Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018
Inordinate Delay, Right to speedy
disposition of Cases
MARCH 25, 2019
FACTS:

Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan’s denial to quash the Informations and Order of
Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman’s alleged inordinate delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation.

In February 10, 2003, Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging the
graft and corruption at the Vice Governor’s Office, Sarangani Province by diverting public funds
given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as “dummies.” The complaint
was referred to the Commission on Audit for audit investigation.

On November 17, 2011, the OMB filed Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents
against Cagang, Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest.

Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v. Ombudsman,  he argued that the
delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.  The
OMB, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that there was no showing that
delay in the filing was intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.

The Sandiganbayan denied the Motions to Quash/Dismiss.

It also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information, considering
that 40 different individuals were involved with direct participation in more or less 81 different
transactions.
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated his constitutional
rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not inordinate delay exists in this case.

RULING:

What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by “mere
mathematical reckoning.” It requires consideration of a number of factors, including the time
required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to conduct an arraignment, the
application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for decision.
Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be
taken into account.

Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed to have
commenced.

In Dansal v. Fernandez, this Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases does
not only include the period from which a case is submitted for resolution.

Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the right may be
invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest.

To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation

violates the accused’s right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in
the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether
delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to
have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove
that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the
circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a
competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given
case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for
such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation
of the accused’s constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay
in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the
case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. 

Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The
failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.

Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights during this
period, choosing instead to wait until the information was filed against him with the
Sandiganbayan.

The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division that factfinding investigations are

included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is ABANDONED.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED.

US vs Tan Teng Case Digest

 0

Facts:

The sister of Oliva Pacomio (7-year old girl) discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal
disease known as gonorrhea. Oliva related to her sister that in the morning of the 15th of September
1910, after she took a bath, Chinaman Tan Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some
face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he
threw her upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some
little time. 

The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were
collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. Tan Teng was not
present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to
violate her.

Upon this information Tan Teng was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his
clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his body bore every
sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman
took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the
Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the
examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial, the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the
Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such
evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. 

The trial court found Tan Teng guilty of the crime of rape.

Issue:

Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has gonorrhea, cannot be used
as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against
self-incrimination.

Held:

The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of
the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial,
for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the
commission of a crime.

The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant
even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under
discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or
by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call
upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility.
The evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself.

The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact
that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than
would the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief. (US vs Tan Teng, G.R.
No. 7081, September 7, 1912) 
US VS. TAN TENG [23 PHIL 145; G.R. NO. 7081; 7 SEP
1912]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old

girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that
he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private
parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called
gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to
the police.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him.
He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was
found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion
of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to
the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering
from gonorrhea.

The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had
acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the
unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the
said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his
right against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of

the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination.

Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a
violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or
to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his
objection and was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and
not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be
the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by
him may be used as evidence against him.

58 Phil. 851

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Against the appellee, Elisea Ylagan, a complaint for physical injuries was
filed in the justice of the peace court of Batangas, Province of Batangas.
After preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First
Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with
serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment, the defendant pleaded not
guilty to the information; whereupon the private prosecutor, with the
concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the
case, which motion was granted by the court. The attorney for the
defendant said nothing about the dismissal of the case.
Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in
the same justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the
same offense of serious physical injuries. After another preliminary
investigation, the case was again forwarded to the Court of First Instance,
where the information filed in the justice of the peace court was
reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of double
jeopardy, based on section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After a
hearing, the court sustained the plea and dismissed the case. From this
order of dismissal, an appeal was taken by the Government.
Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
"A person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, for which he has been previously brought to
trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined, when the case is dismissed
or otherwise terminated before judgment without the consent of the
accused."
It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, a defendant in a
criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the
following conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a
valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4)
after he has pleaded to the complaint or information. Tested by this
standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has been once in jeopardy
for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. It is true that in United
States vs. Ballentine (4 Phil., 672; 1 Philippine Decisions 575, and in other
subsequent cases, including People vs. Belisario (G. R. No. 33416),[1] this
court has held that there is no jeopardy until the investigation of the
charges has actually been commenced by the calling of a witness; but we are
now convinced that such a view should be abandoned. There is no provision
or principle of law requiring such a condition for the existence of legal
jeopardy. All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to
trial "in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our system of
criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a
plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to
the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going
through the process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary
investigation, arraigned, and required to plead and stand trial.
The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril
of second punishment, but against being again tried for the same offense.
This is the principle underlying both section 23 and section 28 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Commenting on said section 23, this court, in
Julia vs. Sotto (2 Phil, 247, 252, 253), said: "Without the safeguard this
article establishes in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety, and peace of
mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness, who might
repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he
might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will
and pleasure. The accused would never be free from the cruel and constant
menace of a never-ending charge, which the malice of the complaining
witness might hold indefinitely suspended" over his head, were it not that
the judiciary is exclusively empowered to authorize, by an express order to
that effect, the repetition of a complaint or information once dismissed in
the cases in which the law requires that this be done. Such is, in our
opinion, the fundamental reason of the article of the law to which we refer.
Thanks to this article, the accused, after being notified of the order
dismissing the complaint may, as the case may be, either rest assured that
he will not be further molested, or prepare himself for the presentation of a
new complaint. In either case, the order gives him full information as to
what he may hope or fear, and prevents his reasonable hopes from being
dissipated as the result of an equivocal and indefinite legal situation. To
this much, at least, one who has been molested, possibly unjustly, by a
prosecution on a criminal charge, is entitled."
Counsel for the government, however, contends that the previous case
brought against the appellee was dismissed with her consent, on the theory
that the phrase "without the consent of the accused", used in section 28 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be construed to mean "over the
objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused". We can not
accept such a theory. We believe it a sound rule to lay down, that the mere
silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case
does not constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for
the same offense is as important as the other constitutional rights of the
accused in a criminal case. Its waiver can not, and should not, be predicated
on mere silence.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Vickers, and Butte , JJ., concur.

PSB v. Bermoy
PSB v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005
 
FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (“petitioner”), respondents
Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (“respondent spouses”) were charged with estafa thru falsification of a
public document in the Regional Trial Court.
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded “not guilty” to the charge and the case was set for
trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence
on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused. The trial
court dismissed the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that
the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on
account of lack of proper identification of the accused.  But even assuming that the trial court erred,
the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari
for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court’s dismissal of Criminal Case No.
96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this
case.
 
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?
 
HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first
criminal case:
 
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction;
 
(b)   The court had jurisdiction;
 
(c)    The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
 
(d)   He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]
 
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the
accused does not result in double jeopardy.  However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely,
if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] 
A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception.  Since such dismissal is based
on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
 
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in
Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public
document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. 
The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses.  Respondent
spouses were arraigned during which they entered “not guilty” pleas.  Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.
 
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment
or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.”
 
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193
for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the
Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an
inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

PSBank v. Bermoy G.R. No. 151912,

September 26, 2005

Facts: That on or about May 11, 1994, the said accused, defraud the
Philippine Savings Bank thru falsification of a public document. Upon
arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The trial court set the pre-trial and After the hearing on that day, the
trial court issued the following Order. When the case was called for
hearing, private prosecutor and defense counsel, appeared and upon
their stipulation, they admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the
identities of the accused. Upon motion of private prosecutor, joined by
public prosecutor without objection let the initial hearing for the
reception of the evidence for the prosecution be set on June 18, 1997
at 8:30 a.m., as previously scheduled. The minutes of the hearing,
which respondent spouses signed, bore the following handwritten
notation under the heading remarks: Postponed. Upon joint
agreement of counsels. This was the only notation made under
remarks. Nowhere in the one-page minutes of the hearing did it state
that any of the accused made any stipulation or admission. During the
hearings the prosecution presented the testimonies of the manager of
petitioners and an employee of petitioner. After presenting the
testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of
court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution
failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused in Criminal Case.
The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, opposed the motion
claiming that Crisostomo and Calang had identified respondent
spouses. The prosecution also pointed out that as borne by the 11
June 1997 Order, respondent spouses stipulated on their identity
during the pre-trial. The Ruling of the Trial Court granted respondent
spouses motion, dismissed Criminal Case, and acquitted respondent
spouses. The basic issues to resolve here boils down on (sic) the
determination of whether the accused were identified by the
prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the act complained of
during the trial of the case and whether they admitted their identities
as the accused named in the information.

Issue: Whether the reviewed either on appeal or on petition for

certiorari would violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy

Held: Yes, the court are more than convinced that the trial court was
correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of
evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused.
But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the
accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for
certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. It is clear that this petition seeks to review the judgment of
the trial court, which already had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and of the persons of this case. The trial court had jurisdiction to
resolve the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, either by
denying it or by dismissing the case for lack of sufficient evidence. If
the demurrer is granted, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case
and the acquittal of the accused, this can no longer be reviewed unless
it can be shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In this case,
assuming the trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not
shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The error, if any, is merely an error of
judgment.
In RE Habeas Corpus. Aclaraction vs. Gatmaitan [GR L-39115, 26 May 1975] En Banc, Aquino
(J): 7 concur, 1 concur in result, 3 filed separate concurring opinions Facts: Segifredo L.
Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija from 1 October 1969 to 21 November 1971. His appointment
expired on 21 November 1972 while he was working as a temporary stenographer in the CFI of
Manila. Thereafter, he was employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and Claims
Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission, where he is now working. After Aclaracion
had ceased to be a court stenographer, the Court of Appeals required him to transcribe his
stenographic notes in two cases decided by the Gapan court which had been appealed (Muncal
vs. Eugenio, CA-GR 49711-R and Paderes vs. Domingo, CA-GR 52367-R). He failed to comply
with the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He was declared in contempt of court. On May 29
and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N. Leuterio, Chairmen of the
Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, ordered the Chief of Police of
Makati, Rizal (Colonel Ruperto B. Acle), to arrest Aclaracion, a resident of that municipality,
and to confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript of his notes in the said cases.
Aclaracion was arrested on 21 June 1974 and incarcerated in the municipal jail. In a petition
dated 12 July 1974 he asked the Court of Appeals that he be not required to transcribe his notes
in all the cases tried in the Gapan court. He suggested that the testimonies in the said cases be
retaken. The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 7 August 1974 ordered
the release of Aclaracion. Later, he transcribed his notes in the Muncal case. However, the
warden did not release him because of the order of arrest issued by the Seventh Division. On 9
August 1974 Aclaracion filed in the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus. He advanced
the novel contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he ceased to be
a stenographer, would be a transgression of the rule that "no involuntary servitude in any form
shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted"
(Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution). Issue: Whether the fact that a former court
stenographer was compelled to transcribe his stenographic notes is a transgression of the right
against involuntary servitude. Held: An Appellate Court may compel a former court
stenographer to transcribe his stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its
appellate jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and
efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due administration of justice. The
provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that "upon the approval of the record on
appeal the clerk shall direct the stenographer or stenographers concerned to attach to the record
of the case 5 copies of the transcript of the oral evidence referred to in the record on appeal"
includes stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary. The traditional made of exercising the
court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if
he does not comply with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he
obeys the order. Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer,
promotion, resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes the transcription of his
notes. This is provided for in Circular 63 of the Secretary of Justice. Aclaracion's contention that
to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute involuntary servitude is not
tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and
against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not. That situation does not obtain in
this case.

US VS POMPEYA
G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

FACTS:

This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo,
charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully,
illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty,
required under said municipal ordinance.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the
complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for
being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said
law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their
rights therein guaranteed

HELD:
The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific
purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the
ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in
the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as
well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment
contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to
render the same.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls
within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in
conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the
provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights
of the persons affected thereby.

Is there a cause of action?

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality;
(b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55;
nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon
him for the services mentioned in the law.

"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with
costs. So ordered."

U.S. Supreme Court

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897)

Robertson v. Baldwin

No. 334

Argued December 15, 1896

Decided January 25, 1897

165 U.S. 275

Syllabus
Section 4598 of the Revised Statutes is not unconstitutional by reason of its
authorizing justices of the peace to issue warrants to apprehend deserting seamen
and deliver them up to the master of their vessel.

The judicial power of the United States is defined by the Constitution, and does not
prevent Congress from authorizing state officers to take affidavits, to arrest and
commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens,
and to perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial
power, rather than a part of it.

Section 4598 and 4599, insofar as they require seamen to carry out the contracts
contained in their shipping articles, are not in conflict with the Thirteenth
Amendment forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, and it cannot be open to
doubt that the provision against involuntary servitude was never intended to apply
to such contracts.

The contract of a sailor has always been treated as an exceptional one, and
involving to a certain extent the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of
the contract.

This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District
of California, rendered August 5, 1895, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued
upon the petition of Robert Robertson, H. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris
Hanson.

The petition set forth in substance that the petitioners were unlawfully restrained
of their liberty by Barry Baldwin, Marshal for the Northern District of California, in
the county jail of Alameda County, by virtue of an order of commitment, made by a
United States commissioner, committing them for trial upon a charge of
disobedience of the lawful orders of the master of the American
barkentine Arago; that such commitment

Page 165 U. S. 276

was made without reasonable or probable cause, in this, that at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, petitioners were held on board
the Arago against their will and by force, having been theretofore placed on board
said vessel by the Marshal for the District of Oregon, under the provisions of Rev.St.
§ 4596, subdivision 1, and §§ 4598, 4599, the master claiming the right to hold
petitioners by virtue of these acts; that §§ 4598 and 4599 are unconstitutional and
in violation of Section 1 of Article III of, and of the Fifth Amendment to, the
Constitution; that § 4598 was also repealed by Congress on June 7, 1872, 17 Stat.
262, and that the first subdivision of § 4596 is in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment in that it compels involuntary servitude.

The record was somewhat meager, but it sufficiently appeared that the petitioners
had shipped on board the Arago at San Francisco for a voyage to Knappton, in the
State of Washington, thence to Valparaiso, and thence to such other foreign ports
as the master might direct, and return to a port of discharge in the United States;
that they had each signed shipping articles to perform the duties of seamen during
the course of the voyage, but, becoming dissatisfied with their employment, they
left the vessel at Astoria, in the State of Oregon, and were subsequently arrested,
under the provisions of Rev.Stat. §§ 4596 to 4599, taken before a justice of the
peace, and by him committed to jail until the Arago was ready for sea (some sixteen
days), when they were taken from the jail by the marshal, and placed on board
the Arago against their will; that they refused to "turn to" in obedience to the orders
of the master, were arrested at San Francisco, charged with refusing to work in
violation of Rev.Stat. § 4596, were subsequently examined before a commissioner
of the circuit court, and by him held to answer such charge before the District Court
for the Northern District of California.

Shortly thereafter they sued out this writ of habeas corpus, which, upon a hearing
before the district court, was dismissed, and an order made remanding the
prisoners to the custody of the marshal.

Page 165 U. S. 277

Facts: The Kaisahan ng Manggagawa ng Kahoy sa Pilipinas declared a strike against
Gotamco Saw Mill because thelatter did not accede to the former¶s request of a salary
increase. While the case was being heard by the Court of Industrial Relations, the
parties reached a temporary wage arrangement and the workers were ordered to go
back to work while the saw mill was ordered to increase the salaries of the workers by
P2.00, let them take home small piecesof lumber to be utilized as firewood, and was
enjoined from laying-off, suspending, or dismissing any laboreraffiliated with the
petitioning union. Conversely, the workers were enjoined from staging walkouts or
strikes duringthe pendency of the hearing.Gotamco Saw Mill subsequently filed an
urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held in contemptof court for having
staged a strike during the pendency of the main case, for picketing on the premises of
the saw mill,and for grave threats which prevented the remaining laborers from working.
The union alleged that one of itsrepresentatives conferred with the management of the
saw mill, but instead of entertaining their grievances, the saw mill ordered the stoppage
of the work and employed four new Chinese laborers without express authority of the
courtand in violation of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The CIR ruled that
there was a violation of the previousorder of the CIR by the union, which warranted the
commencement of contempt proceedings and that the saw milldid not violate Section 19
of CA 103. Issue: W/N Section 19 of CA 103 is unconstitutional for being in violation of
the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Ruling: NO. Section 19 of CA 103 does
not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude. The
provisions of CA 103 were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the concern
of the Stateto promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people. In order to attain this object,Section 19 was promulgated which grants to
labor what it grants to capital and denies to labor what it denies tocapital. Among other
things, Section 19 lays down the ³implied condition that when any dispute between
theemployer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the
CIR for settlement or arbitration,pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and pending
award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall notstrike or walk out of his
employment when so joined by the court after hearing and when public

interest so requires,and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it,
upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so
requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided orsettled.´
Thus, the voluntariness of the employee¶s entering into such a contract of
employment²he has a free choice between entering into it or not²with such an implied
condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitudeensuing. Issue: W/N the
previous order of the CIR, which ordered the union laborers to go back to work, is
unconstitutionalfor being in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude.
Ruling: NO. The order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their work.
That order was made afterhearing, and Section 19 of CA 103 authorizes such order
when the dispute cannot in its opinion be promptly decidedor settled. The very
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the CIR the
power toissue the order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing
undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry.  Several laws promulgated
which apparently infringe the human rights of individuals were ³subjected toregulation
by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.´  From Justice
Perfecto¶s concurring and dissenting opinion: If the laborers should feel that they
arecompelled against their will to perform something which is repugnant to their
conscience or dignity, they need not resort to any court action to seek judicial settlement
of the controversy, as they can resign fromtheir work and there is no power that can
compel them to continue therein.

SERENO, C.J.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated
30 June 2011 and Resolution[2] dated 18 April 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No.
107626.
The CA upheld the Order of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources—Pollution Adjudication Board (DENR-PAB) in DENR-PAB Case
No. NCR-00760-06 to fine N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc. (Dela Merced &
Sons), for violation of Section 28 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9275 (The
Clean Water Act of 2004). The appellate court, however, reduced the fine
from P3.98 million to P2.63 million.
The Facts
The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and
operated by Dela Merced & Sons.[3] Situated alongside the Pasig River, the
complex operates a wet market and houses eateries or kitchenettes in the
same building.[4]
On 13 July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-National Capital
Region (EMB-NCR) of the DENR inspected the Guadalupe Commercial
Complex. The inspection team found that Dela Merced & Sons had violated
the following: 1) Section 1 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2004-26 for
operating air pollution source installations (generator set) without a permit
to operate; and 2) Section 27(i) of R.A. 9275 for operating a facility that
discharged regulated water pollutants without a discharge permit.
Thus, the EMB-NCR served a notice of violation (NOV)[5] dated 28 August
2006 upon Dela Merced & Sons, stating the charges and ordering the latter
to comply with the requirements.[6] Dela Merced & Sons requested and was
granted an extension of time to comply with the NOV requirements. [7]
On 11 October 2006, however, the EMB-NCR conducted another inspection
of the Guadalupe Commercial Complex to monitor Dela Merced & Sons'
compliance with R.A. 8749 (The Clean Air Act of 1999) and R.A. 9275, as
well as their respective Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs). The
inspection team collected effluent[8] sample from the facility, and the results
of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected failed to conform to
the DENR Effluent Standards.[9]
Consequently, on 6 February 2007, the DENR Secretary, upon the
recommendation of the EMB-NCR, issued a cease and desist order (CDO)
to Dela Merced & Sons for violation of R.A. 9275 and the IRR thereof. [10] In
the same Order, the company was informed that no temporary lifting order
(TLO)[11] shall be issued in its favor, unless it would submit the documents
required under the law.[12]
On 30 March 2007, the EMB-NCR went ahead to partially execute the CDO
by sealing the kitchen sinks of the locators identified as sources of
wastewater at the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. On the other hand, the
wet market and the kitchenettes or turo-turo on the ground floor of the
building were only given warnings.[13]
On 3 April 2007, Dela Merced & Sons filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR) of the imposition of the CDO and submitted the required documents
for the issuance of a TLO.[14] The DENR-PAB issued the TLO on 3 July
2007.[15]
Meanwhile, on 9 August 2007, the EMB-DENR issued a Certificate of Non-
Coverage (CNC) to Dela Merced & Sons pursuant to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1586 (Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System).[16]
By 14 November 2007, another effluent sampling was conducted.
Subsequently, the results were submitted to the EMB laboratory for
analysis and verification. The findings showed that the effluent conformed
to the DENR Effluent Standards.[17] Thus, the DENR-PAB issued a Notice of
Technical Conference to Dela Merced & Sons for a discussion of the
imposition of fines during the period of violation of R.A. 9275.[18]
Attached to the notice was an initial computation of the fine in the total
amount of P3.98 million. The notice also directed Dela Merced & Sons to
submit its position paper regarding the fine.
The fine covered the alleged 398 days that Dela Merced & Sons had violated
R.A. 9275. The rate was P10,000 per day of violation in accordance with
Sec. 28 of the law. The period covered was from 12 October 2006—when
the collected effluent from the facility failed the DENR Effluent Standards—
to 13 November 2007, which marked the end of the period when, by the
next day, the sampling gathered by the EMB-NCR had already passed the
DENR Standards.[19]
In its Position Paper,[20] Dela Merced & Sons prayed that the fine be
discarded for being imposed without due process of law. It argued that the
fine was violative of Sections 1 and 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. It
also contended that the period from the issuance of the TLO (3 July 2007)
up to the date it had complied with the requirements (13 November 2007)
should not be included in the computation.[21]
Following the recommendation of the PAB Committee on Fines, the DENR-
PAB issued an Order[22] dated 13 November 2008 imposing a fine of P3.98
million on Dela Merced & Sons. The latter moved for reconsideration, but
its motion was denied in an Order dated 30 January 2009. [23]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, Dela Merced & Sons filed with the CA a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, with a prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction[24].
In its Resolution[25] dated 1 March 20 10, the CA denied the prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or Injunction when it found that Dela Merced &
Sons had not been deprived of its constitutional right to due process. The
CA also found that the company had failed to show any grave and
irreparable damage or injury that would have been caused, had the DENR-
PAB's Orders been executed.[26]
As to the main petition, Dela Merced & Sons assailed the DENR-PAB
Orders imposing the fine amounting to P3.98 million and denying the
former's MR. Dela Merced & Sons claimed that it was exempt from the
requirements of R.A. 9275 by virtue of the CNC.[27] It also argued that the
imposition of the fine was unconstitutional for being excessive.[28]
On 30 June 2011, the CA rendered a Decision [29] affirming the assailed
Orders of the DENR-PAB, except as to the imposable fine which was
reduced to P2.63 million. According to the appellate court, the fine should
be reduced in view of the EMB-NCR's unreasonable delay in complying
with the order to conduct an effluent sampling of Dela Merced & Sons'
Wastewater Treatment Facility.[30]
Both parties filed their respective MRs which were both denied in a
Resolution[31] dated 18 April 2012. Hence, they both came to this Court with
their respective petitions.
Petition Before This Court
The DENR-PAB filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court on
5 June 2012, docketed as G.R. No. 201501. The petition is contesting the
downgraded fine imposed by the CA on Dela Merced & Sons.[32] In turn, the
latter party filed its own Petition for Review on Certiorari on 8 June 2012,
docketed as G.R. No. 201658. The petition is questioning the fine imposed
upon it and is contesting the constitutionality of the provision on the
imposition of the fine.[33] The two petitions have been consolidated.[34]
Issues
The issues raised by both parties are summarized as follows:

1. Whether Dela Merced & Sons was denied due process.

2. Whether the issuance of a CNC means exemption from compliance

with R.A. 9275.

3. Whether Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 on the imposition of fines is

unconstitutional under Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution
for being excessive.

4. Whether the amount of the fine imposed was correct, assuming that
its imposition was proper.
Our Ruling
We deny Dela Merced & Sons' petition, but grant that of the DENR-PAB.
Dela Merced & Sons was Not
Denied Due Process
Dela Merced & Sons argues that the fine was imposed without due process
of law because the company was "never given an opportunity to present its
evidence to dispute the alleged violation of the law."[35] It also claims that
the DENR-PAB simply entered the former's premises and unilaterally
conducted an inspection and thereafter assessed excessive fines without
first conducting conferences or a trial.[36]
We are not persuaded.
As for the inspection, the EMB-NCR was only performing its mandated
duty under R.A. 9275[37] and the IRR[38] thereof when it inspected the
premises of the Guadalupe Commercial Complex.[39] Clearly, the EMB had
legal authority when it conducted the inspection.
The specific claims of denial of due process are belied by the records of the
case. We quote with approval the findings of the CA on this matter:
[The opportunity to be heard] was made completely available to petitioner
[Dela Merced & Sons] who participated in all stages of the
administrative proceeding before the DENR-PAB. x x x, [T]he respondent
[PAB] after issuing the notice of violation and possible imposition of
fines to the petitioner, gave it time to comply with the requirements of the
environmental laws. The petitioner even requested for extension of
time to comply with the requirements which the respondent granted. But
a subsequent inspection of the facility showed that the petitioner still
failed to comply with the DENR effluent standards despite the extension
given by respondent. Thus, the respondent was compelled to issue a cease
and desist order.
xxxx
Upon full compliance of the petitioner with all the requirements, the
respondent issued a TLO in its favor. x x x EMB-NCR
conducted another inspection of the facility and found that the effluents
x x x conformed to the DENR Effluent Standards. Thereafter, the
respondent invited the petitioner to a technical conference wherein the
latter was instructed to submit a position paper on the amount of fines to
be imposed and gave it a copy of the respondent's initial
computation of fines. The petitioner, in its Position Paper, pleaded
that the computation be discarded x x x. After due deliberation of
petitioner's arguments, the respondent DENR-PAB imposed x x x fines
x x x. The petitioner moved for its reconsideration which was denied.
[40]
 (Emphases supplied)
The above findings overwhelmingly show that Dela Merced & Sons was not
denied due process. In a real sense, it was able to take advantage of the
available opportunities to explain its side and to question the acts and
orders of the DENR-PAB. In administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process.[41]
It is wrong for Dela Merced & Sons to insist that a trial-type proceeding is
necessary. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. In the former, a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not
strictly applied.[42]
It is not legally objectionable for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as is the case here.[43]
In any event, whatever procedural defect there may have been in the
subject proceedings was cured when Dela Merced & Sons moved for
reconsideration.[44]
No Exemption from Compliance
with Environmental Laws,
Even if Issued a CNC
Dela Merced & Sons contends that it was exempt from complying with the
environmental requirements of R.A. 9275 because it was issued a CNC. [45]
This argument deserves scant consideration.
As explained in Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,[46] the CNC is a
certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by
the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System and that the project
proponent is not required to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate. The EIS System was established pursuant to P.D. No. 1151,
which required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that would have a
significant effect on the environment.[47]
In 1981, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued, enumerating the areas and
types of projects that are environmentally critical and within the scope of
the EIS System. The areas and projects not included in the enumeration
were considered non-critical to the environment and thus, were entitled to
a CNC.[48]
This Court notes that the Guadalupe Commercial Complex is not included
in the list of environmentally critical projects or areas under Proclamation
No. 2146. As an environmentally non-critical project, it is not covered by
the EIS System and, consequently, a CNC was rightly issued in its favor.
Nevertheless, the CNC only exempts Dela Merced & Sons from securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate. It does not exempt it from
complying with other environmental laws. Section 5 of P.D. 1586 is clear on
this matter:
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. — All other projects,
undertakings and areas not declared by the President as environmentally
critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to
submit an environmental impact statement. The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human
Settlements may however require non-critical projects and
undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as
it may deem necessary. (Emphases supplied)
Based on the law, environmentally non-critical projects such as the
Guadalupe Commercial Complex are still expected to provide additional
environmental safeguards as deemed necessary. Hence, Dela Merced &
Sons is still bound to abide by environmental laws such as the Clean Water
Act, even if it possesses a CNC. As held in Leynes v. People,[49] an entity is
not exempted from compliance with applicable environmental laws, rules,
and regulations despite the issuance of a CNC in its name.
The Constitutionality of Section
28 of R.A. 9275 Was Not
Properly Questioned
Another main contention of Dela Merced & Sons is that Section 28[50] of
R.A. 9275 violates Section 19 (1), Article III of the Constitution, because the
former section provides for the imposition of excessive fines.
We note at the outset that Dela Merced & Sons' attempt to assail the
constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 constitutes a collateral attack. This
is contrary to the rule that issues of constitutionality must be pleaded
directly.[51] Unless a law is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal
presumption of the law's validity remains.[52]
Nevertheless, even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented,
Dela Merced & Sons still failed to satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court
to undertake a judicial review.[53] Specifically, the issue of constitutionality
of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this case.
The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the
constitutionality of a law must show that the case cannot be resolved unless
the disposition of the constitutional question is unavoidable.
[54]
 Consequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course should be adopted and
the question of constitutionality avoided.[55]
In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be
legally resolved unless the constitutional issue it has raised is resolved.
Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 stands.
The Fine Imposed Is Not
Excessive Under the
Constitution
Even if We were to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275
despite the procedural lapses, Dela Merced & Sons' petition would still be
denied.
At the outset, Dela Merced & Sons' invocation of Article III, Section 9(1) of
the Constitution is erroneous. The constitutional prohibition on the
imposition of excessive fines applies only to criminal prosecutions. [56] In
contrast, this case involves an administrative proceeding and, contrary to
the supposition of Dela Merced & Sons,[57] the fine imposed is not a criminal
penalty. Hence, the proscription under Article III, Section 19 is inapplicable
to this case.
Besides, even if the Bill of Rights were applicable, the fines under R.A. 9275
still cannot be classified as excessive.
For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, it needs to be
more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe.[58] To
come under the prohibition, the penalty must be flagrantly and plainly
oppressive[59] or so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock
the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper
under the circumstances.[60] Dela Merced & Sons failed to satisfy these
jurisprudential standards.
In questioning the constitutionality of the fine, Dela Merced & Sons merely
alleges that the amount is "exorbitant,"[61] "arbitrary,
unconscionable,"[62] and "too excessive as to cause grave impact on the
business operations, nay [the] very survival of petitioner as a business
entity [and] its employees as a whole."[63] These unsubstantiated allegations
are not enough to strike down the fine as unconstitutional for being
excessive.
Moreover, Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 cannot be declared unconstitutional simply
because the fine imposed may cause grave impact on Dela Merced & Sons'
business operations. Indeed, the possibility that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional.[64]
Also, it should be noted that the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the
PAB and the CA (i.e. P10,000 per day of violation) is the minimum
imposable amount under the law. Since penalties are prescribed by statute,
their formulation is essentially and exclusively legislative. Having no
authority to modify the penalties already prescribed, the courts can only
interpret and apply them.[65] As held in U.S. v. Borromeo, "[t]he fixing of
penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative function, and
the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far
excessive as to shock the sense of mankind."[66]
During the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2115 (which was the origin of
R.A. 9275), one of the senators made the following statement:
The lack of usable, clean water resources is a problem that confronts us
today. This is the reason, Mr. President, this committee thought of
submitting this measure as our humble contribution in finding alternative
solutions. x x x
xxxx
This bill is not lacking in incentives and rewards and it has muscle to
penalize acts that further pollute all our water sources as well.
We increased the fines so that with strict implementation, we
can curb the damage we continue to inflict, ironically, to our life
source. x x x
xxxx
[T]he quality of the nation's water resources is of great interest because it is
so integrally linked to a long-term availability of water that is clean and safe
for drinking, recreation and that is suitable for industry, irrigation and
habitat for fish and wildlife.[67] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the legislature saw the need to protect and conserve our water
resources. To this end, it formulated rules with concomitant penalties to
ensure compliance with the law. We will not interfere with its wisdom in
drafting the law, especially since the presumption of its constitutionality
has not been overturned.
The Fine imposed by the DENR-
PAB was Erroneously Reduced
by the CA
The DENR-PAB contests the reduction by the CA of the amount of fine the
former could impose on Dela Merced & Sons, an issue that involves a
question of fact. Since there is a conflict between the finding of the CA and
that of PAB,[68] we are constrained to delve into this factual issue.
At the rate of P10,000 per day of violation, [69] the fine was computed by the
PAB in the amount of P3.98 million, which covered the period of 12
October 2006 (when the collected effluent from the facility failed the
DENR standards) to 13 November 2007 (the day before the effluent
sampling was gathered, which eventually passed the DENR standards)—a
total of 398 days.
On the other hand, the CA reduced the fine to P2.63 million, because the
period of violation it considered covered only 263 days—from 12 October
2006 to 3 July 2007 (the date of issuance of the TLO). The CA reduced
the fine in view of EMB-NCR's "unreasonable delay" in complying with the
order in the TLO to conduct the effluent sampling of the company's
Wastewater Treatment Facility.[70]
The PAB pointed out that the eft1uent samples were collected on 14
November 2007, which was still within the 150-day time
frame[71] prescribed in the TLO.[72] It claimed that the period of effectivity of
the TLO was based on the Construction Timetable of the Water Treatment
Facility attached to Dela Merced & Sons' MR filed with the PAB. The
timetable provided a period of 150 to 180 days before completion.[73]
Furthermore, it was only through a letter dated 26 November 2007 that
PAB was informed by Dela Merced & Sons that the latter's Permanent
Wastewater Treatment Facility had been completed on 9 November 2007
and a trial run conducted on 12 November 2007.[74]
Based on the foregoing, it was improper for the CA to indicate the date of
issuance of the TLO as the end of the period of violation. As pointed out by
the PAB, Dela Merced & Sons merely submitted documentary evidence to
convince the former of the company's sincere intention to comply with the
DENR standards. Hence, the grant of the request for the issuance of a TLO
cannot be equated with compliance or proof that the company's effluent has
already passed the standards.[75]
Any delay in conducting the influent and effluent sampling of the Water
Treatment Facility cannot be characterized as unreasonable, especially
since the period of sampling was well within the 150-day period provided in
the TLO. Consequently, the amount of fine imposed by DENR-PAB must be
upheld.
A Final Note
The importance of water resources for our existence cannot be overstated.
These resources are vital not only for our individual well-being, but also for
the survival of society as a whole. Yet, we have continued to abuse them, as
if they were inexhaustible.
Pollution has been a perennial problem affecting our water resources. In his
sponsorship speech for the Clean Water Bill, one senator cited the Pasig
River to illustrate this point. He said, "[i]f we were to present a body of
water that typifies the chronic water pollution problem in the country,
nothing leads us closer than the notoriously polluted Pasig River. x x x
Pasig River is considered biologically dead x x x. [It] is just one of the
bodies of water that has been severely prostituted."[76] This is the same river
to which the Guadalupe Commercial Complex has discharged its
wastewater.[77]
Our legislators saw the need for a concerted effort of the government and
society to abate, control, and prevent the pollution of our country's water
resources.[78] Hence, the Clean Water Act was enacted in the hope that "this
vital measure will offer the future generation an abundant supply of potable
water, clean rivers to swim [in], and a better access to safe water for their
daily use."[79]
All of us benefit from clean water, and we are all responsible for its
preservation. Dela Merced & Sons is no exception. Thus, we should all do
our part in the protection and conservation of our water resources. As the
authors of the Clean Water Act have reminded us, we must use our water
wisely, for it is the selfsame prosperity we ought to hand down to our
children.[80]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No.
201501 is GRANTED, while that in G.R. No. 201658 is DENIED. The
Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 107626 dated 30 June
2011 and its Resolution on 18 April 2012, are hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the amount of fine imposed.
Following the DENR-PAB's Order dated 13 November 2008 in DENR-PAB
Case No. NCR-00760-06, N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. is
hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of P3,980,000 (three
million nine hundred eighty thousand pesos).
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,[*] Leonardo De-Castro, Peralta,[**] and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.

ozano v. Martinez
G.R .No. L-63419; December 18, 1986

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22
punishes a person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless which causes injury to the public interest. Contentions on the law are that: 1)
it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs
freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly
delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed because the
Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the Third Reading
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)

HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a
worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large since putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation can pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not in
conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of
contract since contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does
not deny the equal protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check
and not the payee. Additonally, BP 22 does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislative powers. Contrary to the contention, the power to define the offense and to
prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On the last contention, the
Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause in question was
an authorized amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the
constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.
Lozano vs Martinez Case Digest
 0

Facts: 

Petitioners were charged with violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to
quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in
one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The
parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to

debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

Held: 

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by
BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is
an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the
bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in
trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient
substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such
perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to
destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold,
can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful”
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind
that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this
modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking
system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws
or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended
that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the
indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime.
This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both
the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who
may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez,  G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)

LOZANO v MARTINEZ            G.R. NO. L-63419Dec. 18, 1986

YAP, J.

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for
decision.

Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between
the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the
statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated
only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute
is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the
check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce
payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.

ISSUE: 

WON enactment of BP 22 repugnant of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt and
therefore is an invalid exercise of police power.

RULING:

NO. police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times.
There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For
example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of
contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge
has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The SC finds that the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

ORLANDO L. SALVADOR v. PLACIDO L. MAPA, GR No. 135080, 2007-11-28

Facts:
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,... Several loan accounts were
referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan transactions between Metals
Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the Committee
determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order
No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President
Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the
loan was granted.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and
representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents... the Ombudsman
handed down the assailed Resolution,[6] dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that
there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it
dismissed... the complaint holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed,... It bears
mention that the acts complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2,
1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the (sic)
Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978 and 1981
transpired at the time when there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or
categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.
the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under
Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992,
was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining... behest loans.
Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged
offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS
ALREADY PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS COMPLAINT.
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO.
61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S]
Ruling:
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[13] thus:
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A.
No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the... loans." Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-
0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from
the day of such commission.
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, and
since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee
was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not... yet prescribed
when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be
declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond... reasonable doubt. The
presumption is always in favor of constitutionality.
In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex
post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which... changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order... to convict the defendant.
[22] This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights
and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful; or (f) that which... deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation
of amnesty
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of
penal laws.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this
definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act
of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for
determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no
basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post
facto.
CUMMINGS V. MISSOURI

CUMMINGS V. MISSOURI, 4 Wallace 277 (1866). Acting

against the interests of congressional Republicans, the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated a provision in the Missouri
constitution of 1865 that required public and corporation
officers, attorneys, teachers, and clergymen, as a qualification
of entering the duties of their office, to take an oath that they
had never given aid to the rebellious Confederate states or
expressed sympathy with the secessionist cause. The
requirement, ruled the Court, violated the federal constitutional
prohibition of bills of attainder—legislative acts that allow an
individual or group to be singled out and punished without a
trial.
United States Supreme Court

CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI(1866)

No. 45
Argued: Decided: December 1, 1866

[71 U.S. 277, 279]   IN

January, 1865, a convention of representatives of the people of Missouri
assembled at St. Louis, for the purpose of amending the constitution of the State. The
representatives had been elected in November, 1864. In April, 1865, the present constitution-
amended and revised from the previous one-was adopted by the convention; and in June, 1865,
by a vote of the people. The following are the third, sixth, seventh, ninth, and fourteenth sections
of the second article of the constitution:

SEC. 3. At any election held by the people under this Constitution, or in pursuance of any law of
this State, or under any ordinance or by-law of any municipal corporation, no person shall be
deemed a qualified voter, who has ever been in armed hostility to the United States, or to the
lawful authorities thereof, or to the government of this State; or has ever given aid, comfort,
countenance, or support to persons engaged in any such hostility; or has ever, in any manner,
adhered to the enemies, foreign or domestic, of the United States, either by contributing to them,
or by unlawfully sending within their lines, money, goods, letters, or information; or has ever
disloyally held communication with such enemies; or has ever advised or aided any person to
enter the service of such enemies; or has ever, by act or word, manifested his adherence to the
cause of such enemies, or his desire for their triumph over the arms of the United States, or his
sympathy with those engaged in exciting or carrying on rebellion against the United States; or
has ever, except under overpowering compulsion, submitted to the authority, or been in the
service, of the so-called 'Confederate States of America;' or has ever left this State, and gone
within the lines of the armies of the so-called 'Confederate States of America,' with the purpose
of adhering to said States or armies; or has ever been a member of, or connected with, any order,
society, or organization, inimical to the government of the United States, or to the government of
this State; or has ever been engaged in guerilla warfare against loyal inhabitants of the United
States, or in that description of marauding commonly known as 'bush-whacking;' or has ever
knowingly and willingly harbored, aided, or countenanced any person so engaged; or has ever
come into or left this State, for the purpose of avoiding enrolment for or draft [71 U.S. 277,
280]   into the military service of the United States; or has ever, with a view to avoid enrolment in
the militia of this State, or to escape the performance of duty therein, or for any other purpose,
enrolled himself, or authorized himself to be enrolled, by or before any officer, as disloyal, or as
a southern sympathizer, or in any other terms indicating his disaffection to the Government of
the United States in its contest with rebellion, or his sympathy with those engaged in such
rebellion; or, having ever voted at any election by the people in this State, or in any other of the
United States, or in any of their Territories, or held office in this State, or in any other of the
United States, or in any of their Territories, or under the United States, shall thereafter have
sought or received, under claim of alienage, the protection of any foreign government, through
any consul or other officer thereof, in order to secure exemption from military duty in the militia
of this State, or in the army of the United States: nor shall any such person be capable of holding
in this State any office of honor, trust, or profit, under its authority; or of being an officer,
councilman, director, trustee, or other manager of any corporation, public or private, now
existing or hereafter established by its authority; or of acting as a professor or teacher in any
educational institution, or in any common or other school; or of holding any real estate or other
property in trust for the use of any church, religious society, or congregation. But the foregoing
provisions, in relation to acts done against the United States, shall not apply to any person not a
citizen thereof, who shall have committed such acts while in the service of some foreign country
at war with the United States, and who has, since such acts, been naturalized, or may hereafter be
naturalized, under the laws of the United States and the oath of loyalty hereinafter prescribed,
when taken by any such person, shall be considered as taken in such sense.

SEC. 6. The oath to be taken as aforesaid shall be known as the Oath of Loyalty, and shall be in
the following terms:
'I, A. B., do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with the terms of the third section
of the second article of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, adopted in the year
eighteen hundred and sixty-five, and have carefully considered the same; that I have
never, directly or indirectly, done any of the acts in said section specified; that I have
always been truly and loyally on the side of the United States against all enemies thereof,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States, and
will support the Constitution and laws thereof as the supreme [71 U.S. 277, 281]   law of the
land, any law or ordinance of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that I will, to the
best of my ability, protect and defend the Union of the United States, and not allow the
same to be broken up and dissolved, or the government thereof to be destroyed or
overthrown, under any circumstances, if in my power to prevent it; that I will support the
Constitution of the State of Missouri; and that I make this oath without any mental
reservation or evasion, and hold it to be binding on me.'

Ex post facto law, law that retroactively makes criminal conduct that was
not criminal when performed, increases the punishment for crimes already
committed, or changes the rules of procedure in force at the time
an alleged crime was committed in a way substantially disadvantageous to the
accused.

The Constitution of the United States forbids Congress and the states to pass

any ex post facto law. In 1798 it was determined that this prohibition applies
only to criminal laws and is not a general restriction on retroactive
legislation. Implicit in the prohibition is the notion that individuals can be
punished only in accordance with standards of conduct that they might
have ascertained before acting. The clause also serves, in conjunction with the
prohibition of bills of attainder, as a safeguard against the historic practice of
passing laws to punish particular individuals because of their political beliefs.
In 1867, in Cummings v. Missouri and Ex parte Garland, the United States
Supreme Court condemned as both bills of attainder and ex post facto laws the
passage of post-American Civil War loyalty-test oaths, which were designed to
keep Confederate sympathizers from practicing certain professions.
The policies underlying ex post facto laws are recognized in most developed
legal systems, reflected in the civil law maxim nulla poena sine lege (“no
punishment without law”), a principle whose roots are embedded in Roman
law. In England Parliament is not prohibited from passing ex post facto laws.
However, following the common-law tradition, judges have refused to
interpret legislation retroactively unless Parliament has clearly expressed such
an intention.
CITATION

71 US 277 (1867)

ARGUED

Mar 17, 1866; Mar 16, 1866; Mar 19, 1866; Mar 20, 1866

DECIDED

Jan 14, 1867

Facts of the case

Following the Civil War, Congress and Missouri adopted provisions that required persons in
specified professional occupations to take an oath that they have never given aid to the rebellion
and secession. Missouri convicted a priest who refused to take the oath. A former Confederate
congressman asked the Supreme Court for permission to practice without taking the federal oath.

Question
Do the state and national oaths violate prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder of the Constitution?

Conclusion
Field, writing for a divided Court, held that both state and national oath laws were
unconstitutional. The oath laws transformed acts that had not been forbidden into crimes and
increased the punishment of acts that were known to be crimes. The oath laws were also bills of
attainder since they were legislative acts that inflicted punishment without the benefit of a trial
by a judge.
BOCEA vs. Teves Case Digest
 0

Facts:

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335
which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from
the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate
personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for
performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations
and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner
contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular
group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law
confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not
meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal
from service is immediately executory.

Issue:

Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

Held:
No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a
particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the
lack of judicial trial. 

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or
BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are
still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. (BOCEA
vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589)

Caunca v Salazar (Constitutional Law)

Caunca v Salazar
GR. No. L-2690
January I, 1949

Liberty of abode and travel

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores, an
orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. 

An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a
maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment
agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by
Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?

Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation
of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to
choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause
harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of
choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as
much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

Ratio:

On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for respondents to
obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied by
thousands or millions but would not in any way subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have
a free choice of abode. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of
avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right.
The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom.
Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains.
Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.

Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who, in order to
require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will,
as household servant or farm laborer."

Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is prevented from
leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.

Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954, February 15,

2000; 525 SCRA 525_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings –Habeas Corpus)
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was lost or destroyed,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the
Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila,
praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is
illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the
judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be
reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid  judgment as required by
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of
Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal
ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the
right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering,
as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is
violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court,
there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis
for his detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its
face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter
that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful
public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the
burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or
decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

AVA v. GATMAITAN G.R. No. L-4855|11 October 1951 FACTS: On 22 October 1950,
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was decreed by virtue of the
following Proclamation No. 210 issued by President Elpidio Quirino. The immediate
cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210, was the apprehension and detention of
lawless elements in whose possession strong and convincing evidence was allegedly
found showing that they are engaged in rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive
acts. ISSUE: Whether or not, a person covered by Proclamation No. 210 which has
been formally charged with rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies, may be
entitled to bail. RULING: Yes. Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Areticle II of the 1935
Constitution, “all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.” The crime
of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a capital offense, because it is penalized only
by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed Php20,000.00. The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and
co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to
bail, they would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. The right to bail; along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself
and counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to
have a speedy and public trial; to meet the witnesses face to face; and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, tends to aid the
accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the
distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the
suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to be tried by a court) that may win for
him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted
upon for being patently untenable.
RODRIGUEZ vs ARROYO
AUGUST 28, 2018  GRACEZYL BLANCO LEAVE A COMMENT

Noriel H. Rodriguez vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS
AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA,
P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE
VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC
under the name HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN
G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state,
making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos
in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car where
more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol).
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a
member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a
military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army.
Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other
NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and
tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a
surenderree.
On September 17, 2009,  Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by
members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home
with them to Manila.
Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went inside
their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are
following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed  a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen.
Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col.
De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her
immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president).
Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the abduction
and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals
to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De
Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture.  As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was
dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her
immunity from suits.
ISSUE:
1. WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her
presidential immunity from suit
2. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and
habeas data cases.
HELD:
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only
applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”
“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the
latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office
as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may
be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. The intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during their
tenure (and not term).
“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield
herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents
are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or
administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the
respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other
hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and
allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property.
He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of
respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with respect to
respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and
P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent
Callagan for lack of merit.

Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

G.R. No.191805; November 15, 2011
DOCTRINE:
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or
administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility on the theory that this doctrine now constitutes a principle of International law or
contemporary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution 
FACTS:
Petitioner, Noel Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under
the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. 
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan
onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him
and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom
was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of them
carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle. 
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and
started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved
around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to
being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered
a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a
banner with the word “Bravo” written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to
the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was interrogated and repeatedly tortured just to forced him to confess to being a
member of the NPA. There was also a time when he was again subjected to tactical interrogation
about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant
mauling every time he failed to answer.
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had
surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he
became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document, he received another
beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he
was merely coerced.
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When
they stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA
camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath
and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center,
where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him. 14 When the doctor asked him why he had
bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed
a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four
hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum.
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to
supposedly prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached
Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that
they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing
the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and
guarded until they reached home.
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan
and two soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The
soldiers explained that the photos and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez
and his family were able to arrive home safely. Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the
soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only left thirty minutes later. 23
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International
Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate
stating that the latter had been a victim of torture. 24
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles,
noticed that several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in
the streets and on a jeepney. 25
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. 26 The petition was
filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major
General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed
for the following reliefs:
  a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating  
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.

  b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching

Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.

  c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry
Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.

  d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on

Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division,
the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and
subsequent to 6 September 2009.

  e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.

The court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had
been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army. The court likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the
writs and to comment on the petition.
In their Return, respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28
May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified as “Ka Pepito” by former
rebels. 33 According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius
P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan Valley. 34
Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the
military in exchange for his protection. 
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty
and an Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a
military asset. Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information.
However, he feared that his NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.
Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase
any suspicion about him being a double agent.  Hence, the abduction subject of the instant
petition was conducted.
On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision. 51 Subsequently, on 28
April 2010, respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration. Before the Court of
Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for
Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the assignment of errors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not  the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.
HELD:
 Yes.
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that
the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v.
Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict.”  Although originally used for ascertaining
criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil
cases for human rights abuses. In the United States, for example, command responsibility was
used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia — civil actions filed under the Alien Tort
Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act. This development in the use of command
responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally
extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility
may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we
held in Rubrico: 
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now
constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at

most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the
duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to
fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to

determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect
his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of Justice
Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or
administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper
context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to
Amparo cases.

Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its
contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It
further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in
amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities
that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at

most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the
duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to
fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever
processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to
protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the
appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii)
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there
is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within
these foregoing definitions. 
EDGARDO NAVIA v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, GR No. 184467, 2012-06-19
Facts:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that
the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required
quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried... out by, "or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, [the government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
[the same or] give information on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons."... his petition
for review on certiorari
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation[8] (Asian
Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale
Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The... arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita's son,
Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When
Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle.
One of them immediately asked Lolita where... they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could
answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office
of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in
the subdivision.[9]
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land
also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.[10] The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner
Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties' respective versions diverge.
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but
only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before.
In the course of the investigation on Ben's disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took
advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they
already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual... release. The last time
she saw Ben was when she left him in petitioners' custody at the security office.[27]
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparo[28] before the RTC of Malolos City.
Issues:
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.
4.1.1.  WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS
HAVE COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBAND'S
RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.
4.1.2.  WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.
4.1.3.  WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS.[39]
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it proper and
appropriate, as follows:
(a)  To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct a deep and
thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in
connection with the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico,... utilizing in
the process, as part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;
(b)  To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the witnesses who
testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their safety and security; and
(c)  To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the
circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners] in this
case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the pertinent... documents and admissions
forming part of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.
Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director Nestor
Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby
DISMISSED.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS

DISCRETIONARY UPON THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE.
Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager
of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to
compel the
latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947.
The
petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the respondent
refused
to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe,
basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.”
Respondent
based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public
peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec.
1119, Free
use of Public Place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating
freedom of
assembly.

HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and
to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights
of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute.
They can
be regulated under the state’s police power – that they should not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society.
The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of
Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of
a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila;
and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or
public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of
the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the
risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to
authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases
of national
emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for
the
assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of
serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free
men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that
the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence
or in