Supreme Court of the Philippines CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted
THIRD DIVISION to us.
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, PETITIONER, VS.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND SCANMAR
MARITIME SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision[1] of the
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC
Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P.
Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc.], declaring that petitioner is not a
beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code
of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.[2]
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as
electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board
the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such,
he was enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP).[3] Unfortunately, on June 2,
2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby
steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the
[4]
following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John's biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social
Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union.
However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June
[5]
10, 2009 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim,
stating:
We regret to inform you that we cannot give due course to
your claim because you are no longer considered as the
parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
The denial was appealed to the Employees' Compensation
Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS
La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and
the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and
the ECC ruled against petitioner's entitlement to the death
benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can
no longer be considered John's primary beneficiary. As
culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were
adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner's grandfather,
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision[7] in
Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in
Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of
adoption attained finality.[8] Consequently, as argued by the
agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John's primary
beneficiary, not petitioner.
Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as
John's secondary beneficiary even if it were proven that
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC
ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides
(sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents
and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided;
that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision
relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as
provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation. This Commission
believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate
parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for
adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the
adoption divested her of the status as the legitimate
parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the
biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the
adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent
referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary,
who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of
[9]
the deceased and not herein appellant. (Emphasis
supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[10]
which was likewise denied by the ECC. Hence, the
instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC's
Decision is contrary to
evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC
committed grave abuse in
denying the just, due and
lawful claims of the
petitioner as a lawful
beneficiary of her deceased
biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC
committed grave abuse of
discretion in not giving due
course / denying petitioner's
otherwise meritorious motion
[11]
for reconsideration.
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the
biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted,
employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus,
entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under
the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC's factual findings
are not consistent with the
evidence on record 
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied
petitioner's claim for death benefits is that even though she
is John's biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that
his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As
intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to
whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead,
which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner]
for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of
death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume
him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to
claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a
qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view
of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the
benefit legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary,
in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this
point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
said administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.[12] However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the
petitioner- Cornelio's death certificate. [13]
Based on Cornelio's death certificate, it appears that John's
[14]
adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less
than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on
[15]
February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was
error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven
that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits
claims to the legitimate
parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John's work-
related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which
reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - As used in this Title
unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children,
the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who
are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered
as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent
children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c)
supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations
governing the processing of claims and the settlement of
disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the
ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as
follows:
RULE XV - BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition, (a) Beneficiaries shall be either
primary or secondary, and determined at the time of
employee's death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
primary:
(1)  The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the
time of the employee's death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate,  legitimated,  legally  adopted  or
acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not
gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21
years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable
of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further,
that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no
other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are
two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be
counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
secondary:
(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the
employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children
who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over
21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical
or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during
minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner's claim on
the ground that she is no longer the deceased's legitimate
parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by
the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between
John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status
of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a
secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. l(c)(l) of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation
deviates from the clear language of
Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code,
as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is
at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized
administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into
Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by
the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point is
Article 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal
[16]
Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must
be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or
expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations
must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two
will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation is patently a
wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from
Article  167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the
phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory
construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[17] in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be
construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof.
Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code,
is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons
of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a
general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.
That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from
making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguera
debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in
Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and
intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation.
Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use
the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of
the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when
used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives
but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless
the context indicates that it was used in a more
restrictive or limited sense — which as already
discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase
"dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of
the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general
sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents"
as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents"
should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When
the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish.
Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need
of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly
shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase
"dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk
of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are secondary
beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it
would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate
descendants." The manner by which the provision in
question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
"dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents -
legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section l(c)(l) of the
Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation is in contravention
of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code
provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of
equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded,
prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from
claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code,
as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation
cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner.[18] In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
[19]
legitimate governmental objective.
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require
the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."[20]
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis
to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the
above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the
claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed
the test of reasonableness since the classification is not
germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing
government concern or interest that requires protection so
as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on
one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On
the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the
policy of PD 626 - that employees and their dependents
may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of
work-connected disability or death -will be better served if
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly
interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent
beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other
course of action to take other than to strike down as
unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in
Rule XV, Section l(c)(l) of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John's
dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of
the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an
opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefits by
equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of
parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its
assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for
adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under
the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it
say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise
parental authority over the employee enrolled under the
ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision wherein such
qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo
that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased's legitimate
parents, and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify
as John's secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about
two (2) years old, petitioner's parental authority over John
was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail
the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio's death, was that
when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age.
John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral
[21]
relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care
for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal
custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel
concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552[22] (RA
8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. - If the petition [for
rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority
of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the
legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to
each other shall be extinguished, (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy
insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned. The
manner herein of terminating the adopter's parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,[23] justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration
of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a
minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy,
especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio's
death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which
provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the
factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are
guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind
RA 8552[24] wherein the paramount consideration is the best
interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this
disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child
that someone will remain charged for his welfare and
upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered
incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the
adoptee is still in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in
the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one
else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a
parent other than the adoptee's biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even
though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption,
the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are
not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological
parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the
adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the
adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by
the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted
survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol's death, which was
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing
provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving
no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits
arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not
form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals
the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those
by adoption vis-a-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of
the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the
event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring's
adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of
a minor child whose second chance at a better life under the
care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by
death's cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child's quality
of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if
he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We
hold that Cornelio's death at the time of John's minority
resulted in the restoration of petitioner's parental authority
over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of
petitioner's dependence on John can be established from the
documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears
in the records, petitioner, prior to John's adoption, was a
housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable
to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a
housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio's adoption of John
and Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio's death in 1987, so records reveal, both
petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan,
Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this very
address was used in John's Death Certificate[25] executed in
Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life
accomplished by the; master of the vessel boarded by John.
[26]
Likewise, this is John's known address as per the ECC's
assailed Decision.[27] Similarly, this same address was used
by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union
branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence,
it can be assumed that aside from having been restored
parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually
execised the same, and that they lived together under one
roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,[28] named petitioner
as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282,
otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA
8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths
or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member
unlike in PD 626, John's deliberate act of indicating
petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a
way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently,
the confluence of circumstances - from Cornelio's death
during John's minority, the restoration of petitioner's
parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and John's clear intention to designate petitioner as
a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind,
entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary
under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is
bereft of legal basis. Cornelio's adoption of John, without
more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from John's death as a dependent parent
given Cornelio's untimely demise during John's minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall
accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining
beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby
directed to release the benefits due to a secondary
beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol
to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
*
Villarama, Jr., Reyes, Perlas Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
November 25, 2014
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___November 12, 2014___ a
Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of
which was received by this Office on November 24, 2014
at 2:47 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
[22]
An act establishing the rules and policies on the
domestic adoption of Filipino children and for other
purposes
[24]
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - (a) It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure that every child
remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and
be provided with love, care, understanding and security
towards the full and harmonious development of his/her
personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and
no appropriate placement or adoption within the child's
extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated
person be considered.
(b)  In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption
of a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount
consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the
United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the
Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles
Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with
Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention
on the  Protection  of Children and Cooperation in  Respect
of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall
provide alternative protection and assistance through foster
care or adoption for every child who is neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned.
(c)  It shall also be a State policy to:
xxx
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from
his/her biological parent(s);
 Supreme Court of the Philippines
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138823, September 17, 2008
CARIDAD MAGKALAS, PETITIONER, VS.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner seeks to set aside
and annul the Decision[1] dated March 10, 1999 as well as
the Order[2] dated May 14, 1999 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124, in Civil
Case No. C-16464.

The RTC decision dismissed the complaint for damages

with prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner against the
National Housing Authority (NHA). The RTC also ordered
the NHA to proceed with the demolition of petitioner's
structure.

The undisputed facts, as found by the RTC, are quoted

hereunder:
x x x plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been
occupying a lot designated as TAG-77-0063, Block 1,
Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen.
Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City, for the past 39 years.

On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued

expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
was named Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Uban Bliss
Project with the former to take possession, contol (sic) and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of
demolition. During the Census survey of the area, the
structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063.
After conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined
that the area where plaintiff's structure is located should be
classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center
was determined in compliance with the requirement to
reserve 30% open space in all types of residential
development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr. & Mrs. Josefino Valenton and
Mr. & Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through counsel, filed an
appeal from the decision to designate the area where the
plaintiff and the two other spouses have erected structures,
as an Area Center. On January 25, 1985, the NHA, through
its General Manager, sent a letter to the counsel of the
plaintiff and the two other previously named spouses
explaining why the area where their structures were erected
was designated as the area center (open space). The said
appeal was denied by the NHA. In a letter, dated August 6,
1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff
recognizing the latter as a Censused Owner of a structure
with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation.
In the same Notice, the NHA informed plaintiff that per
Development Program of Bagong Barrio, she was being
assigned to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132.
On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for
Damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. C-12102. The civil case was
filed after the NHA, through Henry Camayo, sent a letter to
the plaintiff earlier in the month of August, 1985 directing
said plaintiff to vacate the premises and dismantle her
structure. In an Order, dated July 23, 1981, this civil case
docketed as C-12102 was dismissed with the instruction
that the parties exhaust the administrative remedies
available to the plaintiff.
Sometime in March, 1994, plaintiff received a letter, dated
March 8, 1994 from Ines Gonzales, the Office-in-charge of
District II-NCR. In said letter, plaintiff was advised that her
previous request to stay put in her house which is located
within the area designated as Area Center, was previously
denied per resolution of the NHA which was signed as
early as February 21, 1990 by the former manager of the
NHA, Monico Jacob. The plaintiff was told to remove the
structure she erected on the area within 30 days and to
transfer her residence to Lot 77, Block 2. It was stressed in
said letter that no Judicial Order was required to remove the
plaintiff's structure pursuant to P.D. No. 1472.
Plaintiff prays that, aside from the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, defendants
be enjoined from transferring plaintiff's residential house
from its present location to another lot and/or demolishing
the same without judicial order; payment of moral
damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, for the malicious
and illegal acts of defendants; and payment of P50,000.00
as attorney's fees.
At this juncture, it may not be remiss to state that the two
other homeowners, Mr. & Mrs. Josefino Valenton, and Mr.
& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan had already transferred to their
allocated lots at Lot 2, Block 1, and Lot 78, Block 2,
respectively.
On March 25, 1994, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) against defendants. After hearing
and submission of memoranda, plaintiff's prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied in
an Order dated April 14, 1994.
The Order denying plaintiff's prayer for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction was appealed, by way of Petition
for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as
CA-G.R. No. 33833). On May 31, 1994, the Court of
Appeals, Seventeenth Division, promulgated a Decision
denying the Petition. Plaintiff's (petitioner herein) motion
for reconsideration having been denied in a Resolution
dated July 29, 1994, she appealed to the Supreme Court by
way of Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Supreme
Court, through the First Division, issued a Resolution dated
October 5, 1994, denying the Petition. An Entry of
Judgment on the aforesaid Resolution was made on
December 22, 1994.
Thereafter, pre-trial conference was scheduled on January
9, January 23, February 16, March 22 and finally on April
25, all in 1996 (an Order dated May 16, 1996 was issued
declaring the pre-trial terminated). During the pre-trial,
counsel for plaintiff proposed that the case be decided
based on the memoranda to be submitted by the parties, to
which counsel for defendants agreed. Hence, a Motion for
Leave of Court to allow parties to submit memoranda in
lieu of trial was filed by the defendants. Plaintiff filed her
comment thereto. After submission of NHA's Reply and
plaintiff's rejoinder, reiterating their respective stands, the
Court resolved to grant the Motion for Leave. In the same
Order, the parties were directed to submit their respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from receipt, on the sole
issue of whether or not the NHA can lawfully relocate the
[3]
plaintiff and demolish plaintiff's structure.
On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed
decision dismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner's
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence,
this petition for review of the said decision and order of the
RTC.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner raises the
following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEMOLITION OR
RELOCATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S
STRUCTURE WILL
VIOLATE THE VESTED
RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONER OVER THE
ACQUIRED PROPERTY
UNDER THE SOCIAL
JUSTICE CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
B. WHETHER OR NOT R.A.
7279 IMPLIEDLY
REPEALED P.D. 1472 AND
[4]
P.D. 1315.
As to the first issue, petitioner maintains that she had
acquired a vested right over the property subject of this
case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for
forty (40) years already. Thus, to order her relocation and
the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice
clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
Petitioner's contentions must necessarily fail. The NHA's
authority to order the relocation of petitioner and the
demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.[5] Under this Decree, the entire
Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a
blighted area and was thereby declared expropriated. The
properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included
petitioner's property. The NHA, as the decree's designated
administrator for the national government, was empowered
to take possession, control and disposition of the
expropriated properties with the power of demolition of
their improvements.[6] Section 2 of P.D. No. 1315 further
states:
Section 2. The comprehensive development plan shall
consider the upgrading of existing dwelling units, the
relocation of qualified squatter families to a resettlement
area nearby; and the re-blocking, re-arrangement and re-
alignment of existing dwelling and other structures to allow
for the introduction of basic facilities and services, all in
accordance with the provision of national SIR [Slum
Improvement Resettlement] and Metro Manila ZIP [Zonal
Improvement Program] Programs. The Authority [NHA]
shall maximize the land use of the area and shall provide
for a controlled, orderly and structured growth of dwellings
in an environment provided with adequate sanitary and
other physical facilities. (Words in bracket ours)
Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1315, the NHA identified
Area 1 where petitioner's property was located as part of
the Area Center reserved for open space, after studies have
shown that the development of the area will affect only
three (3) structures compared to six (6) or more structures
in the other areas. A stage and recreation center was
expected to be constructed at the Area Center. As a result,
petitioner was informed by the NHA that she would be
relocated to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132. However,
petitioner adamantly refused to vacate the property
claiming she had acquired a vested right over the same. Her
refusal to vacate and relocate to her assigned lot had
hampered the development of the entire area. It should be
noted that to date, only petitioner had refused to comply
with the NHA directive as the other occupants in Area 1
had already vacated the premises.

To stress, P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the
power to immediately take possession, control and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of
demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by force of law, has the
authority to order the relocation of petitioner, and the
demolition of her structure in case of her refusal as this is
the only way through which the NHA can effectively carry
out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315.
The NHA's authority to demolish squatters and illegal
[7]
occupants was further reinforced by P.D. No. 1472 which
specifically provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The National Housing Authority shall have the
power to summarily eject, without the necessity of
judicial order, any and all squatters' colonies on
government resettlement projects, as well as any illegal
occupants in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit
owned or administered by it. In the exercise of such power,
the National Housing Authority shall have the right and
authority to request the help of the Barangay Chairman and
any peace officer in the locality. xxx.(Emphasis ours)
Inasmuch as petitioner's property was located in the area
identified as an open space by the NHA, her continued
refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat.
Thus, in accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could
lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had
already acquired a vested right over the subject property
when the NHA recognized her as the censused owner by
assigning to her a tag number (TAG No. 77-0063). We
quote with approval the trial court's pertinent findings on
the matter:
Plaintiff's structure was one of those found existing during
the census/survey of the area, and her structure was
assigned TAG No. 77-0063. While it is true that NHA
recognizes plaintiff as the censused owner of the structure
built on the lot, the issuance of the tag number is not a
guarantee for lot allocation. Plaintiff had petitioned the
NHA for the award to her of the lot she is occupying.
However, the census, tagging, and plaintiff's petition, did
not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she was occupying,
but a mere expectancy that the lot will be awarded to her.
The expectancy did not ripen into a legal title when the
NHA, through Ms. Ines Gonzales, sent a letter dated March
8, 1994 informing her that her petition for the award of the
lot was denied. Moreover, the NHA, after the conduct of
studies and consultation with residents, had designated
Area 1, where the lot petitioned by plaintiff is located, as an
Area Center.[8]
A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and
unconditional and no obstacle exists to its exercise. It is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any
contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a title
-- legal or equitable -- to the present or future enjoyment of
property.[9]
Contrary to petitioner's position, the issuance of a tag
number in her favor did not grant her irrefutable rights to
the subject property. The "tagging of structures" in the
Bagong Barrio area was conducted merely to determine the
qualified beneficiaries and bona fide residents within the
area. It did not necessarily signify an assurance that the
tagged structure would be awarded to its occupant as there
were locational and physical considerations that must be
taken into account, as in fact, the area where petitioner's
property was located had been classified as Area Center
(open space). The assignment of a tag number was a mere
expectant or contingent right and could not have ripened
into a vested right in favor of petitioner. Her possession and
occupancy of the said property could not be characterized
as fixed and absolute. As such, petitioner cannot claim that
she was deprived of her vested right when the NHA
ordered her relocation to another area.
Petitioner invokes the Social Justice Clause of the
Constitution, asserting that a poor and unlettered urban
dweller like her has a right to her property and to a decent
living. Thus, her relocation and the demolition of her house
would be violative of her right embodied under Article XIII
of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good,
undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing
which will make available at affordable cost decent housing
and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens
in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also
promote adequate employment opportunities to such
citizens. In the implementation of such program the State
shall respect the rights of small property owners.
(Underscoring supplied)
Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with
law and in a just and humane manner. (Underscoring
supplied)
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be
undertaken without adequate consultation with them and
the communities where they are to be relocated.
Petitioner cannot find solace in the aforequoted
Constitutional provisions. Social Justice, as the term
suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. As the
eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must
be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the State of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."[10]
Moreover, jurisprudence stresses the need to dispense
justice with an even hand in every case:
This Court has stressed more than once that social justice -
or any justice for that matter - is for the deserving, whether
he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel.
It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called
upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion.
But never is it justified to give preference to the poor
simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice must always be served for
[11]
poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
(Underscoring supplied)
Hence, there is a need to weigh and balance the rights and
welfare of both contending parties in every case in
accordance with the applicable law, regardless of their
situation in life.
In the instant case, the relocation of petitioner and the
demolition of her structure were in accordance with the
mandate of P.D. No. 1315 which was enacted primarily to
address the housing problems of the country and to adopt
an effective strategy for dealing with slums, squatter areas
and other blighted communities in urban areas.
Significantly, the "whereas clause" of P.D. No. 1315 states:
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines mandates
that the "State shall establish, maintain and ensure adequate
social services in the field of housing, to guarantee the
enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of living" and
directs that "The State shall promote social justice to ensure
the dignity, welfare and security of all the people" xxx.
For sure, the NHA's order of relocating petitioner to her
assigned lot and demolishing her property on account of
her refusal to vacate was consistent with the law's
fundamental objective of promoting social justice in the
manner the will inure to the common good. The petitioner
cannot disregard the lawful action of the NHA which was
merely implementing P.D. No. 1315. It is also worth noting
that petitioner's continued refusal to leave the subject
property has hindered the development of the entire area.
Indeed, petitioner cannot invoke the social justice clause at
the expense of the common welfare.
Anent the second issue, petitioner avers that P.D. No. 1315
and P.D. No. 1472 were impliedly repealed by R.A. No.
7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992.[12] She contends that while P.D. No.
1315 and P.D. No. 1472 authorized the NHA to eject
without the necessity of a judicial order all squatter
colonies in government resettlement projects, R.A. No.
7279 discouraged such eviction and demolition without a
court order. According to petitioner, R.A. No. 7279, being
the later law, impliedly repealed the former laws, i.e. P.D.
No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472, following the legal axiom that
when a later law is passed with provisions contrary to the
former law, an implied repeal of the former law takes
effect. In particular, petitioner cites Section 28 of R.A. No.
7279 which provides:
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition - Eviction or demolition
as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition,
however, may be allowed under the following situations:
(a)When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds;
(b)When government infrastructure projects with available
funding are about to be implemented; or
(c)When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
Petitioner asserts that the afore-quoted provision of R.A.
No. 7279 is inconsistent with Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315
and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472, which state as follows:
Sec. 1 (P.D. No. 1315) - xxx. The National Housing
Authority hereinafter referred to as the "Authority" is
designated administrator for the national government and is
authorized to immediately take possession, control and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of
demolition of their improvements. xxx.
Sec. 2 (P.D. No. 1472) - The National Housing Authority
shall have the power to summarily eject, without the
necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters' colonies
on government resettlement projects, as well as any illegal
occupants in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit
owned or administered by it. xxx.
From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions, we hold
that R.A. No. 7279 does not necessarily repeal P.D. No.
1315 and P.D. No. 1472 as it does not contain any
provision which categorically and expressly repeals the
provisions of P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472. Neither
could there be an implied repeal. It is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. The rationale behind the rule is explained as
follows:
Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. Such repeals
are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed unless
it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the
terms of the new and old laws.[13]
Likewise, in another case, it was held:
Well-settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication
are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their
congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The
rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be
so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is
that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved
against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted
in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject.[14]
We find, as the trial court has found, no irreconcilable
conflict or repugnancy between Section 28 of R.A. No.
7279 and P.D. No. 1315 and No. 1472, rather, they can be
read together and harmonized to give effect to their
provisions. It should be stressed that Section 28 of R.A. No.
7279 does not totally and absolutely prohibit eviction and
demolition without a judicial order as in fact it provides for
exceptions. Pursuant to established doctrine, the three (3)
statutes should be construed in light of the objective to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed by the
said laws, and they should be given such construction as
will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure
the benefits intended.[15] It is worthy to note that the three
laws (P.D. No. 1315, P.D. No. 1472 and R.A. No. 7279)
have a common objective ─ to address the housing
problems of the country by establishing a comprehensive
urban development and housing program for the homeless.
For this reason, the need to harmonize these laws all the
more becomes imperative. Hence, in construing the three
laws together, we arrive at a conclusion that demolition and
eviction may be validly carried out even without a judicial
order in certain instances, to wit:
(1)when the property involved is an expropriated property
in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City pursuant to Section 1
of P.D. No. 1315,
(2)when there are squatters on government resettlement
projects and illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment
or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA
pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472,
(3)when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to
Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279;
(4)when government infrastructure projects with available
funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section
28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.

It readily appears that R.A. No. 7279 does not foreclose the
NHA's authority to dismantle the house of petitioner.
Besides, under Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279, demolition
may be carried out when government infrastructure projects
with available funding are about to be implemented. Under
P.D. No. 1315, the government has set aside the amount of
P40 million for the establishment and upgrading of housing
facilities and services in Bagong Barrio.[16] Thus, on the
ground of a much-delayed government infrastructure
project about to be implemented, the NHA has the authority
to carry out the summary eviction and demolition of
petitioner's structure on the subject lot.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

DENIED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. C-16464 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Corona, Carpio Morales*, and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[5]
Entitled, "Providing for the Expropriation of a Landed
Estate Registered under TCT No. 70298, 78960, Portion of
71357, 2017 and 2018 and All Transfer Certificates of Title
Derived Therefrom, in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City for
the Upgrading and the Disposal of Lots Therein to their
Present Bonafide Occupants and Other Qualified Squatter
Families and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds for
the Purpose." Approved on March 26, 1978.

[7]
Entitled, "Amending Republic Act Nos. 4852 and 6026
by Providing Additional Guidelines in the Utilization,
Disposition and Administration of All Government
Housing and Resettlement Projects." Approved on June 11,
1978.
 Supreme Court of the Philippines
EN BANC
G.R. NO. 165835, June 22, 2005
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA,
PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public
[1]
respondent Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October
2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment[2] dated 2
November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents
Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further
proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of
the assailed issuances.
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas,
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field
Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after
due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with
public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation
of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713,[3] violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil
Service Law.  Based on this complaint, a case for
[4]
Violations of R.A. No. 1379, Art. 183 of the Revised
Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in  relation  to Sec. 11 of R.A. No.
6713, docketed as Case
[5]
No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner.   unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379,
Petitioner’s wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three
sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed
Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of
R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators,
conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving,
accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the
Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition
with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment[6] against petitioner, his
wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as
amended.  The petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
0193, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen.
Carlos F. Garcia, et al.”  It was alleged that the Office of
the Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined
that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and
the other respondents therein who hold such properties for,
with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his
incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired
huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other
lawful income, if any.[7]
Acting on the Republic’s prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the
questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for.  The
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was
subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of
a bond by the Republic.  On 17 November 2004, petitioner
(as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] in Civil
Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No.
1379.  On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition,
raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is
without jurisdiction over the “civil action” for forfeiture of
maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the
Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 2[9] of the law,
and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil
actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his
family, and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,[10] as amended, and
Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 14[11] and 14-A.[12]
Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or
the law creating it, was intended principally as a criminal
court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions,
petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquino’s
issuances after the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No.
1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and
cronies,  (2) E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606
and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction over civil actions filed against President
Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the
Civil Code and other existing laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A
whch further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and
R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A.
No. 1379 which may be filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies, may proceed independently of the
criminal action.
Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the
Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over the
separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil actions
were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under
R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or
indemnification for consequential damages or other civil
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws.  Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and jurisdiction
According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to
P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the
Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction over separate
civil actions other than those filed against President
[13]
Marcos, his family and cronies.   Hence, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any separate civil
action against him, even if such separate civil action is for
recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No.
1379.
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for
forfeiture filed against him is fatally defective for failing to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2,
[14]
R.A. No. 1379, namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecution arm
of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor
General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there
has been violation of the said law and that respondent is
guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. [15]  He
argues that only informations for perjury were filed and
there has been no information filed against him for
violation of R.A. No. 1379.  Consequently, he maintains, it
is impossible for the Office of the Ombudsman to certify
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of
the said law had been committed and that he is guilty
thereof.  The petition is also supposedly bereft of the
required certification which should be made by the
investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to
the Solicitor General.  Furthermore, he opines that it should
have been the Office of the Solicitor General which filed
the petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman as in this
case.  The petition being fatally defective, the same should
have been dismissed, petitioner concludes.
In their Comment,[16] respondents submit the contrary,
noting that the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as
these have been settled in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan[17]
which categorically ruled that “there is no issue that
jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379
now rests with the Sandiganbayan.”[18]  Respondents argue
that under the Constitution[19] and prevailing statutes, the
over the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed
against petitioner.  Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of
P.D. 1606, as amended, as the prevailing law on the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 4.  Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
….
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher ranks;
….
As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public
positions covered by the aforestated law, the petition for
forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioner’s
argument that the petition for forfeiture is “civil” in nature
and the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction
over civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the
petition, since the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all
cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of
whether these cases are civil or criminal in nature.  The
petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the cases
initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O.
Nos. 14 and 14-A, as these are dealt with under a separate
subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in particular
[20]
Sec. 4.c thereof.   Further, respondents stress that E.O.
Nos. 14 and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery
of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos,
his family, and cronies.  It would also not be accurate to
refer to a petition for forfeiture as a “civil case,” since it has
been held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal
or penal and that it is only the proceeding for its
[21]
prosecution which is civil in nature.
[22]
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,
likewise relying on Republic v. Sandiganbayan to argue
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture filed against petitioner.  The Ombudsman
explains that the grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction
over violations of R.A. No. 1379  did not change even
under the amendments of
R.A. No. 7975[23] and R.A. No. 8294[24], although it came to
be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials
as enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of
higher rank, to which petitioner belongs.[25]
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate
forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the Office of the
Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution[26] and R.A. No.
6770.[27]  The constitutional power of investigation of the
Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its
power to investigate any act of a public official or
employee which appears to be “illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient” covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by
public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379. 
Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11)[28] of R.A. No. 6770 expressly
empowers the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth.  This
authority of the Ombudsman has been affirmed also in
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan.[29]
The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioner’s
allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed against him
failed to comply with the procedural and formal
requirements under the law.  It asserts that all the
requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly complied
with.  An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was
conducted by a Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman.  The participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General, claimed by petitioner to be necessary, is
actually no longer required since the Office of the
Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to investigate
and prosecute the case as discussed above.[30]
In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the
present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-
shopping.  Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss
as regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case
No. 0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of the
Sandiganbayan’s alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the
instant Petition raising exactly the same issue, even though
the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still
pending resolution.  Worse, it appears that the Motion to
Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the same day,
17 November 2004.
Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply[31] and
enunciates that the Sandiganbayan’s criminal jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been
removed without subsequent amendments expressly
restoring such civil jurisdiction.  His thesis is that R.A. No.
1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial
in nature, the clear intent of which is to separate the prima
facie determination in forfeiture proceedings from the
litigation of the civil action.  This intent is further
demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the
authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary
investigation being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal,
and the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the
Solicitor General.
[32]
Petitioner also points out in his Reply to the Comment of
the Office of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase
“violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379” in P.D. No.
1606, as amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are
principally criminal or penal in nature because the concept
of “violation” of certain laws necessarily carries with it the
concept of imposition of penalties for such violation.  Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture
Hence, when reference was made to “violations of [R.A.]
Nos. 3019 and 1379,” the only jurisdiction that can
supposedly be implied is criminal jurisdiction, not civil
jurisdiction, thereby  highlighting respondent
Sandiganbayan’s lack of jurisdiction over the “civil case”
for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth.  Of course, petitioner
does not rule out cases where the crime carries with it the
corresponding civil liability such that when the criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for enforcement of the
civil liability is impliedly instituted with it, and the court
having jurisdiction over the criminal action also acquires
jurisdiction over the ancillary civil action.  However,
petitioner argues that the action for forfeiture subject of this
case is not the ancillary civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal action.  Rather, the petition for forfeiture
is an independent civil action over which the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.  Petitioner points to
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of independent
civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the
civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action
had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein
has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and
joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.
Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the
charge of forum-shopping.
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the
under R.A. No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the
Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and
prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether
petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.
The petition is patently without merit.  It should be
dismissed.
The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan[33]
squarely rules on the issues raised by petitioner concerning
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of
the Office of the Ombudsman.  After reviewing the
legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of
the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of
jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A.
No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379.  Originally, it was the
Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture
proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the
city or province where the public officer or employee
resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379.
Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D.
[34]
No. 1486, original and exclusive jurisdiction over such
violations was vested in the said court.[35]  P.D. No. 1606[36]
was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well
as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in
connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
[37]
said court.   Such civil actions removed from the
jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for
restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of
instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under
Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture
[38]
proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379.
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[39] abolished the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
regular courts and expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such
offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty.  Since this
change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases
before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is
punishable by a penalty not higher than prision
correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a
serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D.
[40] [41]
No. 1860 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.
On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of
R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan.
[42]
  It could not have taken into consideration R.A. No.
7975[43] and R.A. No. 8249[44] since both statutes which also
amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet
enacted at the time. The subsequent enactments only serve
to buttress the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan indeed
has jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379.
Under R.A. No.  8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758),
specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of
the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the
Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors
and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2)        Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the
judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.[45]
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present
state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s argument—that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture it being “civil” in nature and the Sandiganbayan
allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actions—
collapses completely.

The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first
recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus:  “[T]he
rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem  the nature of
[46]
and,  therefore,  civil in nature.”   Then, Almeda, Sr. v.
Perez,[47] followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A.
No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty
but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally
acquired  in  favor of the State.  It noted that the procedure
outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for
in a civil action.[48]
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture
of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a
penalty.  In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,[49] the Court cited
voluminous authorities in support of its declaration of the
criminal or penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, viz:
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of
property without compensation, in consequence of a default
or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this
article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of
punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but
by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of
conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature
to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the
prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a
forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from
the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be
'the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money
as the consequence of violating the provisions of some
statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law.'
It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or
breach of duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
….
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of
goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment
against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in
rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent
that where the person using the res illegally is the owner of
rightful possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the
nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in
criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several
counts in an information is upheld if one count is good.
According to the authorities such proceedings, where the
owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from
being a witness against himself and to prevent the
compulsory production of his books and papers. . . ." (23
Am. Jur. 612)
….
“Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be
civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute
providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil
causes shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want
of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however,
suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal
nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all
the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the
goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be
proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought
to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368)[50]
Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda,
Sr.  v. Perez.[51]  The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine
laid down in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect
of the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the
substantial rights of respondents, particularly their
constitutional right against self-incrimination. [52]  This  was 
reaffirmed  and  reiterated  in Republic v. Agoncillo[53] and
Katigbak v. Solicitor General.[54]
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over
violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled “An Act Declaring
Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to
Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.”    Sandiganbayan.[59]
What acts would constitute a violation of such a law?  A
reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not
enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which
would necessitate the imposition of a penalty.  Instead, it
provides the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case
a public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and to his lawful income and income from legitimately
[55] [56]
acquired property.   Section 12 of the law provides a
penalty but it is only imposed upon the public officer or
employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired
property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for
making the unlawful acquisition.  In effect, as observed in
Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of
the properties unlawfully acquired upon the respondent
public officer or employee.[57]
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A.
No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in
nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property
amounts to a penalty.  The soundness of this reasoning
becomes even more obvious when we consider that the
respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer
or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was
committed during the respondent officer or employee’s
incumbency and in relation to his office.  This is in line
with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan
as an anti-graft court—to address the urgent problem of
[58]
dishonesty in public service.
Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore
abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies.
We come then to the question of authority of        the  in existing and prior laws.[64]
Office  of  the Ombudsman  to  investigate,  file   and
prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.  refers to the jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding and
This was the main issue resolved in Republic v.
Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General
who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before
the then Courts of First Instance.  P.D. No. Decree No.
1486 was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379
forfeiture proceedings.  Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the
Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute
forfeiture cases.  This may be taken as an implied repeal by
P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former Courts of
First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to
file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379
by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor,
respectively.[60]  An implied repeal is one which takes place
when a new law contains some provisions which are
contrary to, but do not expressly repeal those of a former
law.[61]  As a rule, repeals by implication are not favored
and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
legislature so intended.  Before such repeal is deemed to
exist, it must be shown that the statutes or statutory
provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the
latter be inconsistent with the former.  The language used
in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted.  An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
suffice.  What is needed is a manifest indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal.[62]
P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides
that “[A]ny provision of law, order, rule or regulation
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.”[63]  This is not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed.
Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379
the authority to file the petition for forfeiture.  As P.D. No.
1486 grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, the then
Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot
exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such
cases.  Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are
inconsistent with each other and the former should be
deemed to have repealed the latter.
On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was
enacted, P.D. No. 1487[65] creating the Office of the
Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed.  power to conduct the necessary investigation and to file and
The Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction
being vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier
mentioned.
On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted
expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486.  Issued on the same date
[66]
was P.D. No. 1607 which amended the powers of the
Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints[67] and
created the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. [68]  P.D.
No. 1607 provided said Office of the Chief Special
Prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
file informations therefor, and direct and control the
[69]
prosecution of said cases.   P.D. No. 1607 also removed
from the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file
actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.[70]
The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior
law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
thereby revived unless expressly so provided.  From this it
may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force
where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by
implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the
repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the
language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. [71]  Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606
necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor General to
file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not
the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case
nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now
Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation
therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.[72]
The Tanodbayan’s authority was further expanded by P.D.
No. 1630[73] issued on 18 July 1990.  Among other things,
the Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to
direct and control the prosecution of said cases. [74]  The
prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative
cases before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or
administrative agency against any public personnel who
has acted in a manner warranting criminal and disciplinary
action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief
Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.[75]
Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860
and 1861[76] which granted the Tanodbayan the same
authority. The present Constitution was subsequently
ratified and then the Tanodbayan became known as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to
exercise its powers except those conferred on the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the Constitution.[77]  The
Office of the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A.
No. 6770.[78]
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by
R.A. No. 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the
Constitution, include the authority, among others, to:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases;[79]
… institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
[80]
involved therein.
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the
petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.  However, the
Ombudsman’s exercise of the correlative powers to
investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-
gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases
for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.[81]  As regards such wealth
accumulated on or before said date,  the Ombudsman is
without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan
such forfeiture action—since the authority to file forfeiture
proceedings  on or before 25 February 1986 belongs to the
Solicitor General—although he has the authority to
investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25
February 1986, pursuant to the Ombudsman’s general
[82]
investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the
Ombudsman acted well within its authority in conducting
the investigation of petitioner’s illegally acquired assets
and in filing the petition for forfeiture against him.  The
contention that the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of
R.A. No. 1379 were not complied with no longer deserve
consideration in view of the foregoing discussion.
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-
shopping.  Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party
“repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely by, some other court.”[83]  It has also
been defined as “an act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition.”[84]  Considered a
pernicious evil, it adversely affects the efficient
administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets,
unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the
judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes. [85] 
Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the complaint or initiatory pleading
with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of court, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions, which may
both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the
forum-shopping is found.[86]
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of
forum-shopping.  The present petition was filed
accompanied by the requisite Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping[87] in which petitioner made the
following representation:
….
3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any
other action or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, involving the
same issues as that in the above-captioned case.
4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been
commenced or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I
undertake to report that fact to this Honorable Court within
five (5) days from knowledge thereof.
However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had
filed a Motion to Dismiss[88] in relation to the petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan.  The existence of this
motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by
respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment.  A
scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner
raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the same
reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition.  In fact, the
Arguments and Discussion[89] in the Petition of petitioner’s
thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to
Dismiss.  The only difference between the two is that in the
Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the
petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural
requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the
annulment of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29
October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2
November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only
superficial.  Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the
same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed
against petitioner, his wife and their sons.  It is undeniable
that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking.  This is
incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to
dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel and party
[90]
concerned.   The brazenness of this attempt at forum-
shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both the
Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day,
17 November 2004.  Petitioner should have waited for the
resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the
petition at hand.
Petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De
Jesus, needs to be reminded that his primary duty is to
assist the courts in the administration of justice.  As an
officer of the court, his duties to the court are more
significant and important than his obligations to his clients.  officer under E.O. No. 292, perjury under Art. 183 of the
Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
[91]
administration thereof contravenes his oath of office.   on this complaint, Case No. OMB-P-C-04-1230-J for
Atty. De Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he must, the
tenets of the legal profession and the mission of our courts
of justice.  For this, he should be penalized.  Penalties
imposed upon lawyers who engaged in forum-shopping
range from severe censure to suspension from the practice
[92]
of law.   In the instant case, we deem the imposition of a
fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to be sufficient to make
Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of his naked abuse of
the judicial process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is
DECLARED in CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a
fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid
within ten (10) days from the finality of this Decision.  
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1]
Approved by Associate Justices Greory S. Ong, Jose R.
Hernandez, and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Fourth
Division.  Rollo, pp. 35-39.
[4]
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor; 18 June 1955.
[5]
Based on the same Complaint, Case No. OMB-P-A-04-
093501 for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service was also filed
against petitioner.  Petitioner further avers that on 21
October 2004, Atty. Roxas filed another complaint against
him with the same respondent Office of the Ombudsman,
charging dishonesty, conduct unbecoming of a public
Revised Penal Code and violation of R.A. No. 3019.  Based
Violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code and
Violation of R.A. No. 3019 was filed against petitioner, his
wife, and three sons.  Case No. OMB-P-A-04-1030-J was
filed against petitioner alone for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Officer
under E.O. 292.  In addition, four Informations for perjury
were also filed with public respondent Sandiganbayan
against petitioner.  Rollo, pp. 9-12.
[8]
Id. at 915-938. At the time of filing of respondent Office
of the Ombudsman’s Comment on 7 December 2004, the
Motion to Dismiss was still pending.  Id. at 581.  At the
time of the promulgation of this decision, it could not be
determined from the records if the Motion to Dismiss had
already been resolved.
[9]
Sec. 2. Filing of petition.—Whenever any public officer
or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor
General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or
provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry
similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and
shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable
ground to believe that there has been committed a violation
of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or
province where said public officer or employee resides or
holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer
or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or
any part thereof, should not be declared property of the
State: Provided, That no such petition shall be filed within
one year before any general election or within three months
before any special election.
[11]
Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-
gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of the Immediate Family,
Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees; 7 May 1986.
[19]
Art. XI, Sec. 4: “The present anti-graft court known as
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.”
The 1973 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 5, provided for the
creation of a special court known as the Sandiganbayan and
defined the jurisdiction thereof.  It states: “The National
Assembly shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law."
[23]
An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended; 30
March 1995.
[24]
An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes; 5 February 1997.
[28]
“Sec. 15.  Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties: …(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action
for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the
prosecution of the parties involved therein.”
[35]
Id., Sec. 4, which reads:
“SECTION 4.    Jurisdiction.—Except as herein provided,
the Sandiganbayan shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to try and decide:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt  Practices
Act and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers
or employees including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations in relation to their office;
Provided, that, in case private individuals are accused as
principals, accomplices or accessories in the commission of
the crimes hereinabove mentioned, they shall be tried
jointly with the public officers or employees concerned.
Where the accused is charged of an offense in relation to
his office and the evidence is insufficient to establish the
offense so charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and
sentenced for the offense included in that which is charged.
(d) Civil suits brought in connection with the
aforementioned crimes for restitution or reparation of
damages, recovery of the instruments and effects of the
crimes, or forfeiture proceedings provided for under
Republic Act No. 1379;
(e) Civil actions brought under Articles 32 and 34 of the
Civil Code.
Exception from the foregoing provisions during the period
of material law are criminal cases against officers and
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all
others who fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
military tribunals.”
[37]
Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
“SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall
have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and
exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty
higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as
herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent
with the regular courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and
the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged,
he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the
offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it
the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided,
however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had theretofore
been filed separately with a regular court but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise,
the criminal action may no longer be filed with the
Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same
notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in
the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided,
further, that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the
criminal or civil action is first filed with the regular courts,
the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may
be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent
jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial
law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the
armed forces in the active service.
[39]
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980; 14 August
1981.  Sec. 20 thereof provides: “Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in
criminal cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.”
[40]
Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Relative to
the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for Other
Purposes; 14 January 1983.  Sec. 1 thereof reads:
“SECTION 1.    Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:
"(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
"(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; and
"(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
"The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and
exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty
higher than prision correccional or its equivalent. In all
other offenses, original and exclusive jurisdiction shall vest
in the appropriate court in accordance with the provisions
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories together with the public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees.
"Where an accused is tried of any of the above offenses and
the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged,
he may nevertheless be convicted of and sentenced for the
offense proved, included in that which is charged.
"Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court.
The filing of the criminal action shall be deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be recognized; PROVIDED,
however, That, in cases within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action
had been filed separately with a regular court but judgment
therein has not been rendered and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise,
the criminal action may no longer be filed with the
Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same
notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in
the regular courts of competent jurisdiction."
[41]
Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Relative to
the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for Other
Purposes; 23 March 1983.  Section 1 thereof states:
SECTION 1.     Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 4.  Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
"(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1)  Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2)   Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses
or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall
be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.
"(b)        Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1)   On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally
decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2)   By petition for review, from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their
respective jurisdiction.
"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
well as the implementing rules the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereinafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Intermediate Appellate
Court shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed
with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall
represent the People of the Philippines.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees.
"Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts,
the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be recognized: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that where the civil action had heretofore
been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, as the case maybe, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be considered abandoned."
[56]
“SECTION 12. Penalties.—Any public officer or
employee who shall, after the effective date of this Act,
transfer or convey any unlawfully acquired property shall
be repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding
five years, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or
both such imprisonment and fine.  The same repression
shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly
accept such transfer or conveyance.”
[67]
“Sec. 10. Powers. –The Tanodbayan shall have the
following powers:
(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on
his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether
amounting to any criminal offense or not of any
administrative agency including any government-owned or
controlled corporation;
(b) He shall prescribe the methods by which complaints are
to be made, received, and acted upon; he may determine the
scope and manner of investigations to be made; and,
subject to the requirements of this Decree, he may
determine the form, frequency, and distribution of his
conclusions and recommendations;
(c) He may request and shall be given by each
administrative agency the assistance and information he
deems necessary to the discharge of his responsibilities; he
may examine the records and documents of all
administrative agencies; and he may enter and inspect
premises within any administrative agency's control,
provided, however, that where the President in writing
certifies that such information, examination or inspection
might prejudice the national interest, the Tanodbayan shall
desist. All information so obtained shall be confidential,
unless the President, in the interest of public service,
decides otherwise;
(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to
appear, give sworn to testimony, or produce documentary
or other evidence the Tanodbayan deems relevant to a
matter under his inquiry;
(e) He may undertake, participate in, cooperate with
general studies or inquiries, whether or not related to any
particular administrative agency or any particular
administrative act; if he believes that they may enhance
knowledge about or lead to improvements in the
functioning of administrative agencies.”
[68]
“Sec. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. –There
is hereby created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office
of the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief
Special Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor,
and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same
qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and who shall
be appointed by the President; ….
The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special
Prosecutor, and the Special Prosecutors shall have the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of
all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file
informations thereof and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein; ….
…
The Chief Special Prosecutor, Assistant State Prosecutor,
Special Prosecutor and those designated to assist them as
herein provided for shall be under the control and
supervision of the Tanodbayan and their resolutions and
actions shall not be subject to review by any administrative
agency.”
….
Sec. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other person.
—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public
official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner
warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings,
he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the
Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal or administrative case before the
Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper
administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the
Sandiganbayan shall make the appropriate
recommendations to the administrative agency concerned.”
[74]
P.D. No. 1630, Sec. 17:  “Sec. 17. Investigation and
Prosecution of Cases. –The Office of the Tanodbayan shall
have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan;
to file information therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases. The Tanodbayan may utilize the
personnel of his office and/or with the approval of the
President, designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor
or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist him in the investigation
and prosecution of said cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under
his supervision and control….
[75]
“Sec. 18. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or
Person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper
public official, employee, or other person has acted in a court or before the proper administrative agency.”
manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or
proceedings, he shall conduct the necessary investigation
 Supreme Court of the Philippines
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec.
1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085,
otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of
Alliases."[1]
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan,
Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of
Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila
to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery,
dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was
initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato
through a resolution advising the Governor to report the
involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of
mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.
[2]
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for
petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao
City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint
against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client
Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar
Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before
proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner
talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to
personally ask for the document since he was one of the
respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez
advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez)
name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt
of the complaint.[3]
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in
Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to
register in the visitors’ logbook. Instead of writing down
his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after
which he was told to proceed to the Administrative
Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He
handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the
Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then
gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he
acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." [4]
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted
by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in
the same office. They conversed for a while then he left.
When Loida learned that the person who introduced
himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario
Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station,
Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who
recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed
the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of
court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure
of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was
different from his registered name in the local civil registry
was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document
from the local civil registry was presented to show the
registered name of accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him
guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.
A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of
one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional
minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of
P4,000.00 plus costs.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by
imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as
minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of
P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as.
he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not
violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085 as he
never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his
alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes
the habitual use of another name by which a person is also
known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar
Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion
and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself.
It is his position that an essential requirement for a
conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No.
6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution
failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from
his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further
argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering
the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong
law.[5]
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a
statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose.[6] The court may consider the
spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. [7]
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as
amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and
the surrounding circumstances under which the law was
enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments
and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which
was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its
amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no
person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was christened or by which he has been known
since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases
shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and
each new petition shall set forth the original name and the
alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has
been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on
which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for
the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No.
6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No.
142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary,
cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes
and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth
in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which
he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry;
or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have
not been registered in any local civil registry and who have
not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this
act within which to register their names in the civil registry
of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name
and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias
shall set forth the person’s baptismal and family name and
the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant’s name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has
such names other than his original or real name, specifying
the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the christian name and the
alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or
names other than his original or real name unless the same
is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their
origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the
Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True
Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the
Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement,
Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other
purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and
amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November
1934.[8] The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as
amended follow -
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign,
on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or
business or any written or printed contract not verified by a
notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any
agreement or business transactions, any name used in
connection with his business other than his true name, or
keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the
place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a
business, any sign announcing a firm name or business
name or style without first registering such other name, or
such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of
Commerce together with his true name and that of any
other person having a joint or common interest with him in
such contract agreement, business transaction, or business x
x x.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as
amended was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names
and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field
of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of
using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not
be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly
or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias
name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. [9]
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic[10] the Court had occasion to
explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an
alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled -
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner’s use of alias
‘Kheng Chiau Young’ in addition to his real name ‘Yu
Cheng Chiau’ would add to more confusion. That he is
known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc.,
by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its
use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his
associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad,
Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real
name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered
certain difficulties in his transactions with government
offices which required him to explain why he bore two
names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could
easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking
only to his real name ‘Yu Cheng Chiau.’
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the
Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for
naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court,
argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if
naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no
necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using
only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions.
And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes
(after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to
write his name following the Occidental method, ‘he can
easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of
the name ‘Yu Kheng Chian,’ he can, abandoning the same,
ask for authority to adopt the name ‘Kheng Chiau Young.’
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold,
that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and
reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to
warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias
name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a
person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his
real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the
first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by
which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known
by several different names and these are known as aliases.
[11]
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without
any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by
this name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No.
142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the
Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the
name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have
brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of
petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his
lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner
was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar
Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no
evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use
that name as his second name in addition to his real name.
The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner
in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally
required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had
identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of
the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint
was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense
within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under
which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its
related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure
and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.[12] Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and
in favor of the accused.[13] The reason for this principle is
the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and
the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
court limited.[14] Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the
proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law
that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.
 Supreme Court of the Philippines
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119987-88, October 12, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PETITIONER, VS. HON. LORENZO B.
VENERACION, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 47, MANILA, HENRY
LAGARTO Y PETILLA AND ERNESTO CORDERO,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of
law.  After finding that an accused individual in a criminal
case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is
the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?
The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as
narrated by petitioner,[1] involve the perpetration of acts so
bizarre and devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the
senses of all civilized men:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later
identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and yellow
table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left
hand protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St.
near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.
When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body
of the victim was seen clad only in a light colored duster,
without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of
the face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia,
and with her head bashed in.
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking
sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim,
Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address,
and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola
Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the
crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated
August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, National Capital Judicial Region.  Said
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071,
reads:
That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with one alias 'LANDO' and other persons whose
true names, identifies and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking
advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity, and
ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by
taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse,
covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head
with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y
LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the
latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said
ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. 'LANDO' and others,
caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her
death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a.
`Booster,' of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila, Rolando
Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. 'Lando,' of 1274 Kagitingan
St., Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a.
'Curimao,' also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and
Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. 'Joel,' of 1282 Lualhati St.,
Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape
with Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias 'JR,'
JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have
already been charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
of the same offense under Criminal Case No. 94-138071,
and helping one another, with treachery taking advantage
of their superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy and
with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking
ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once
helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby warehouse,
covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head
with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y
LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the
latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said
accused together with their confederates ABUNDIO
LAGARTO y PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which
were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by
respondent Judge.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday
who was already dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts
after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from
SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12, 1994), pleaded `Not Guilty.'
Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a
decision[2] on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants
Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by
law."[3] Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City
Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified
in that the penalty of death be imposed" against
respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original
penalty (reclusion perpetua).  Refusing to act on the merits
of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge,
on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same
for lack of jurisdiction.  The pertinent portion reads:
The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the
accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the legal
requirements for the perfection of an appeal. 
Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court cannot
take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Public Prosecutor of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court
regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein
accused is hereby reiterated.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the
complete records of these cases, together with the notices
of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance
with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at
bench.  The basis of the trial court's determination of guilt
and its conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an
appropriate time on appeal.  We have thus clinically limited
our narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the
instant case relevant to the determination of the legal
question at hand, i.e., whether or not the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the
mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659,
after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with
Homicide.
We find for petitioner.
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our
system of justice.  If judges, under the guise of religious or
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes
the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority.  Under this sytem, judges are guided by
the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor,"[4] resist encroachments by
[5]
governments, political parties, or even the interference of
their own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the
evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide.  Since the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime for which respondent judge
found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he
was bound by its provisions.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:
Section 11.  Article 335 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 335.  When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1.  By using force or intimidation.
2.  When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3.  When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide
is committed, the penalty shall be death. x x x.[6]
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime
of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but
Death.  While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of
ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it
allows judges the discretion - depending on the existence of
circumstances modifying the offense committed - to
impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpertua only in
the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide
is not one of these three instances.  The law plainly and
unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the
occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of
discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty
under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of
death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing
the death sentence because of his religious convictions. 
While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its
bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place
for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of
death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. 
The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the
death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon
which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.  In People
vs. Limaco[7] we held that:
[W]hen ... private opinions not only form part of their
decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a
conclusion and determination of a case or the penalty
imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error, then
we are constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct
the error but for the guidance of the courts.  We have no
quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman or
jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today
there are quite a number of people who honestly believe
that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise
or ineffective.  However, as long as that penalty remains in
the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides
for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions.  It is a well settled rule that the courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws.  That question falls exclusively within the province of
the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive
who approves or vetoes them.  The only function of the
judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony
with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance
of the members of the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon
us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may
regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and
may recommend to the authority or department concerned,
its amendment, modification, or repeal, still, as long as said
law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as
decreed by the law-making body. [8]
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an
adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper
penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the
accused."[9] This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the
law.  This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a
penalty to which he disagrees.  In so doing, respondent
judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant
petition is GRANTED.  The case is hereby REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty
of death upon private respondents in consonance with
respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in
the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with
Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject
to automatic review by this Court of the decision imposing
the death penalty.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., see separate opinion.
Regalado, J., see concurring opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., joins J. Vitug in his separate opinion.
[1]
Rollo, p. 4, Except as to the penalty imposed, petitioner
and respondent court are in agreement as to the essential
facts of the case.
[3]
Rollo, p. 28, The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered, dismissing the information as against
ROLANDO MANLANGIT for lack of evidence, and
finding both accused HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and
ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA 'guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
charged in the Information of these cases, and sentencing
both accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessories provided for by law.'
Said accused are further ordered to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the private complainant the sum of P100,000 for
the death of the victim, ANGEL ALQUIZA; the sum of
P500,000 for moral damages and the amount of P52,000.00
for actual damages representing expenses incurred for the
wake and funeral of the victim.  They are further ordered to
pay the costs of these suits.
SO ORDERED.  (ANNEX 'A', Petition)