PPR 257: Philosophers on Religion

Week Six: Hume

1. Hume’s empiricist foundations and sceptical conclusions

Hume´s epistemology births as a reaction to Descarte´s and Locke´s

work. His critic flows from the notion of rational insight defended by
Descaste´s and in less manner by Locke. Descartes thought can be
considered as a rationalist realism, because hi defends the existence of a
reality, which is known by the mind. Descartes argument points to the
questionable nature of sensible perception which is deceivable and
doubtful. Moreover, he concludes that such an un-trustable insight can’t
be consider knowledge, but that the fact that we can reach this kind of
conclusions could be. In this way, he will reach his fundamental truth, if I
think therefore I am. He then will develop the construction of his system
dividing reality into three categories of substances.
This substantialist categorization inherent to Descarte´s thought
establishes entities to be conformed by an underlying part, which allows
the substance to be differentiated from the other substances. Descartes
system can’t be understood without the three substances. This is because
the concept of mind and consciousness is central. Res cognitans (humans)
have perfect conception of themselves. Res “god” is confirmed by the
ontological argument, which can be established as fundamental through
the first fundamental truth. The second fundamental truth flows, again,
from the imperfect character of the Res cognitans, which dialectically can
be confirmed. Finally, the existence of the res extensa can be confirmed
by the exitence of god, who in his perfection, is likely not to deceive
humans, and therefore, the existence of an external reality apart from god
and individuals can be confirmed.
/Hume se emancipa de Descartes, pq es un racionalista, y x lo tanto de
resto mal, y de Locke, pq no lleva sus conclusiones a la ultima
conclusión. Sin embargo, escepticismo inicial de la exposición de
Descartes lo comparte hasta cierto punto. Es decir, Hume coincide en ese
escepticismo, pero es más radical. Hay una confusión anterior en la
filosofía, que concibe la percepción sensible como reflejo de la realidad.
Sin embargo, esto no tiene pq cumplirse siempre, dado que la percepción
sensible no es nada más que un estímulo. ESE es el pensamiento de
Hume, que por lo tanto lo emancipa de Descartes, en cuanto que, el
confunde las impresiones sensibles con una suerte de reflejo de un
supuesto mundo exterior.
 En cuanto a Locke, la confusión es similar puesto que el sostiene, en
primer lugar, la existencia de una realidad externa al individuo cuyo
conocimiento tenemos a través de los sentidos. Y cuya clasificación
llevamos a cabo a través de su pensamiento en diversas clases 1º y 2º.

2. The principle of the pinhole camera

3. The example of Hume’s rejection of ‘cause and effect’

4. Hume as anti-metaphysician and his anticipation of agnosticism

Hume’s Philosophy of Religion:

5. Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)

6. William Paley’s Teleological Argument: The analogy of the watch

7. Hume’s replies to Paley in Dialogues, organised by J. L. Mackie:

i) weakness of analogy; ii) existence of alternative hypotheses;
iii) Divine mind in need of explanation; iv) ambivalence of world (evil
as well as good); v) arguing beyond known phenomena

Bibliography

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp-Smith

(London: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947).
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975).
William Paley, Natural Theology, ed. Frederick Ferre (London: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
J Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
Thomas Holden, Spectres of False Divinity: Hume’s Moral Atheism (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
Norman Kemp-Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its
Origins and Central Doctrines (London: Macmillan, 1966).
J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982).
E. C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970).
David Norton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
D. Z. Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter 3.
Mark Wynn, God and Goodness: A Natural Theological Perspective (London:
Routledge, 1999).

Pregunta de examen

1.Critically evaluate Hume’s scepticism in metaphysics and religion.

A plausible objection (o superación) to Hume´s ideology can be made through Kant´s work.
In terms of metaphysical critic, Hume underestimates the function of the mind in the creation
of knowledge. Originally his critic refused the utility of mind as a useful source of
knowledge. Mainly because it operated on a secondary stage in relationship to sensitive
insight. This may not be the most certain account of mind faculties. For instance, these can be
understood as an organizing tool, capable of relating different sensitive impressions by
appealing to a criterion.
In terms of the religion/ no tengo ni puta idea
Hume main religious doctrine is the objection of the established philosophical arguments for
the existence of God. In this sense, he focuses on the ontological argument, and the design
argument. Briefly speaking, the first argument considers god to be necessary because of its
inherent perfection, which, makes it necessary to exist.
The design argument establishes that the necessity of god due to the complexity of the world
functioning. In this sense god must exist, because this reality needs of a planner, and adjuster
for its continuity.
Las críticas de Hume irían derivadas principalmente de su epistemología y de su concepción
de la causa efecto. Asimismo, el primer argumento no lo podría sostener por lo excesivo de la
carga metafísica, y por el hecho de sostenerse a través del racionalismo, y apelando a la
mente, la cual dada la concepción negativa que tiene hume de esta, no se puede sostener.
Por el contrario, el segundo erra x hacer uso de una analogía débil, la cual es solo la unión de
dos ideas que realmente no garantiza la existencia de una entidad tal como dios, y que podría
ser explicado desde otra lógica.