Ra Iocl

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
&
ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN
for
Proposed Petroleum Storage Depot of
IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal (Andhra Pradesh)
(March-2017)
Project Proponent
Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL),

HO, Indian Oil Bhavan, G-9, Ali Yavar Marg
Bandra (East), Mumbai-400 051
Study Conducted By
Shriram Institute for Industrial Research

(A Unit of Shriram Scientific & Industrial Research Foundation)
19, University Road, Delhi-110 007
Information Format
Project Title Quantitative Risk Assessment and Onsite Emergency Plan for Proposed
Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Andhra
Pradesh
Project Proponent Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), HO, Indian Oil Bhavan, G-9,
Ali Yavar Marg, Bandra (East), Mumbai-400 051
Project No. ENV-675
Type of Report QRA and OSEP
TC No. 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017
No. of Pages 114 + Annexures (A-1 to A-25)

Report Submitted to Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), HO,
Indian Oil Bhavan, G-9, Ali Yavar Marg, Bandra (East),
Mumbai-400 051
Project Team
1. Dr.V.K.Verma Joint Director (EPD) Overall Guidance and Supervision
2. Dr.Jagdish Kumar Asstt. Dir & Chief Env. Coordinator & FAE
3. Dr.D.S.Chatterjee Sr.Scientist Co-Env.Coordinator
4. Mr.R.K.Sharma Scientist ‘C’ Site Incharge
5. Mr.Rajiv Kukreja Scientist ‘C’ Project Team Member
6. Mr.Amit Bhadouria Asstt. Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member
7. Mr.Amit singh Jr.Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member
8. Mr.Gaurav Singhwal Jr.Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member
9. Mr.Ravi Singh Jr.Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member
10. Mr.Jai Prakash Jr.Scientist ‘B’ Project Team Member
Authorised Signatories
__________________ _______________ ___________________

Co- Env. Coordinator Env. Coordinator Head of Division (EPD)
Shriram Institute for Industrial Research

(A Unit of Shriram Scientific & Industrial Research Foundation)
19, University Road, Delhi-110 007
Project Title : QRA and Onsite DMP of Proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi
Project Proponent : Indian Oil Corporation Limited, HO, Mumbai
Project No. : ENV-675 TC No. : 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017
Table of Contents
Chapter/ Content Page No.

Clause
1. Introduction 1-5
1.1 Prelude 1
1.2 The Purpose of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study 1
1.3 The IOCL Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi 1
1.4 The Assignment 2
1.5 The Statutory/ Legal Requirements 3
1.6 Organization of the Report 4
1.7 Contents of the Report 4
2. Project Description 6-11
2.1 Project Description 6
2.2 Distribution of Petroleum Products 9
2.3 Brief Information on various Facilities 10
3. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) including 12-35
HAZOP (Hazard & Operability) Study
3.1 Genesis of Hazard Identification 12
3.2 Hazard Potential: Deciding Factors 12
3.3 Identification of Hazards 12
3.4 Applicability of MSIHC Rules, 2000 for proposed IOCL Depot at
Nakkanadoddi 13
3.5 Anticipation of Major Hazards 13
3.6 The objective of HIRA 14
3.7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 14
3.8 Identification of Emergencies in case of POL Depot 17
3.9 Emergency Classification 17
3.10 General Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot 19
3.11 Specific Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot 19
3.12 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study 22
3.13 Fault Tree Analysis 25
3.14 Event Tree Analysis 26
3.15 DOW Fire and Explosion Index (FETI) 28
4. Maximum Credible Accident Analysis 36-49
4.1 The Prelude (MCCA) 36
4.2 The Process of MCCA 37
4.3 Review of Past Accidents 37
4.4 Credible Accidents Involving Pipelines 41
4.5 Failure Scenarios (Probability of Failures) 42
4.6 The Maximum Tolerable Criteria of Risk: ALARP 47
5. Consequence Analysis 50-80
5.1 The Objective of Consequence Analysis 50
5.2 Modeling of Damage Distance due to Fire & Explosion 50
6. On-Site Emergency Plan and DMP 81-114
6.1 A General Overview of Disaster 81
6.2 The Need for Disaster Management at POL Installations 81
6.3 Objective of Disaster Management for the proposed IOCL Depot at 82
Nakkanadoddi
6.4 Fire and Explosion Hazard Management 83
6.5 Emergency Organization Chart 87
6.6 Emergency Responsibilities (Onsite) 89
Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

Chapter/ Content Page No.

Clause
6.7 Role and Responsibilities of Key Personnel 91
6.8 Emergency Control Center (ECC) 102
6.9 Assembly Points 103
6.10 Off-site Information and various facilities/ resources 103
6.11 Evacuation of Depot 106
6.12 Evacuation & Rehabilitation (Surrounding Areas) 108
6.13 Information to General Public: 108
6.14 Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders including External 109
Agencies
6.15 Reporting of the Incident: 111
6.16 Action after Reporting of Incident by the Depot 111
6.17 Termination of Emergency 112
6.18 Emergency Recovery Procedures 112
6.19 DMP for Road Transportation 113
6.20 Training and Education 113
6.21 Drill and Excercises 113
6.22 Wind Direction Indicator 113
6.23 Protective Actions 113
6.24 Preventive Measures 114
6.25 Emergency Preparedness Plan Review 114
Annexures
Annexure-1 Various Formats A-1 to A-6
Annexure-2 Material Safety Data Sheets A-7 to A-19
Annexure-3 Layout of proposed project A-20
Annexure-4 Single Line Diagram A-21
Annexure-5 Equipment Layout of Calibration Tower A-22
Annexure-6 Equipment Layout : Product Pump House A-23
Annexure-7 Emergency Evacuation Plan A-24
Annexure-8 Proposed Project Location on Topo Plan A-25

List of Tables
Table No. Description Page No.

Table-2.1 (a) Schedule of tanks Class ‘A’ Product (Flash Point <23°C) 8
Table-2.1 (b) Schedule of tanks Class ‘B’ Product (Flash Point 23°C <65°C) 8
Table-2.1 (c) Schedule of tanks Excluded Product (Flash Point 93°C) 9
Table-2.1 (d) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks 9
Table-2.1 (e) TLF point details 9
Table-2.1 (f) Schedule of Dyke 9
Table-2.1 (g) Schedule of Fire Fighting Pumps 9
Table-3.4 Applicability of MSIHC Rules to the proposed IOCL Depot at 13
Nakkanadoddi
Table-3.8 Anticipated Emergencies for POL Depot 17
Table-3.9 Type of Emergencies Anticipated at IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi 18
Table-3.10 General Emergencies Anticipated at proposed IOCL Depot at 19
Nakanadoddi
Table-3.11 (a) Situations leading to emergencies at proposed IOCL Depot at 20
Nakanadoddi
Table-3.11(b) Failure Modes & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi 21
Table-3.11(c) Hazard Scenarios & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi 21
Table-3.12 (a) Description of HAZOP Matrix 23
Table-3.12 (b) HAZOP Approach for Risk Identification of operations like TW Receipt; 24
TLF; PHO, ITT, TLF, TLD etc.
Table-3.15 (a) Hazard Matrix of DOW (F&EI) 30
Table-3.15 (b) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for MS 31
Table-3.15 (c) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for HSD 32
Table-3.15 (d) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for SKO 33
Table-3.15 (e) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for Ethanol 34
Table-3.15 (f) Process wise Hazard Classification based on DOW (F&EI) 35
Table-4.5 (a) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for road tankers and tank 43
wagons
Table-4.5 (b) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for atmospheric tanks and 44
vessels
Table-4.5 (c) Atmospheric storage tank fire frequencies 44
Table-4.5 (d) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for Pipes 45
Table-4.5 (e) Loss of Containment (LOC) frequencies for Pumps 45
Table-4.5 (f) Centrifugal Pump Failure Rate 45
Table-4.5 (g) Flange Failure Rates 45
Table-4.5 (h) Manual Valve Failure Rates 46
Table-4.5 (i) Actuated Valve Failure Rates 46
Table-5.2 (a) Stability Classes 53
Table-5.2 (b) Impacts of Heat Radiation Flux (IS 15656: 2006) 53
Table-5.2 (c) Impacts of Overpressure (IS 15656: 2006) 53
Table-6.4 (a) Fire-fighting facilities for proposed depot 85
Table-6.4 (b) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks 86
Table-6.4 (c) Schedule of Firefighting Pumps 86
Table-6.6 Onsite-Emergency Organogram of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot 89

Table No. Description Page No.

Table-6.7 Firefighting Team of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot 93
Table-6.10 (a) Contact details of district authorities 103
Table-6.10 (b) Demography in project core zone and 10-km buffer zone 104
Table-6.10 (c) Medical facilities in rural areas: Core zone & 10-km buffer zone 104
Table-6.10 (d) Medical facilities in towns 105
Table-6.10 (e) Locations of various hospitals & nursing homes 105
Table-6.10 (f) Contact information of ambulance services 105
Table-6.10 (g) Contact information of blood banks 105
Table-6.10 (h) Anantapur Emergency Numbers Information 106

Project No. : ENV-675 TC No. : 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017 Page 1 of 114
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Prelude
The petroleum products are potentially harmful due to their toxic, flammable and explosive
properties, if released into the environment, during their processing, handling, storage and
transportation. Nonetheless, most intensive precautions are to be taken, accidents are likely to
occur, hence the need for contingency planning. Risks can only be minimized, controlled, and
managed within defined and acceptable area by effective enforcement & adequate awareness.
But total risk can never be reduced to zero. “No Risk is not an Option”. The ultimate objective
is to minimize both controllable and unnecessary risks, to make responsible decisions aiming to
implement feasible and beneficial courses of preventive and corrective action.
1.2 The Purpose of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study
The purpose of QRA study is to identify the potential hazards leading to the risk as well as to
work on mitigation measures to reduce or minimize hazards to control risk associated with the
receipt, storage and distribution of petroleum products. The QRA includes identification of
hazard scenarios and consequence analysis. Scenario identification describes how an accident
occurs, while consequence analysis describes the anticipated damage to environment, life and
equipment. The overall aim of study would, therefore, be to identify the potential hazards,
assess the impacts of all probable accidental hazards and mitigating measures to reduce hazards
of the proposed project facilities under the scope of the study to ensure that the risk associated
with the design, construction and operational activities of the project shall be reduced to As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risk Analysis study requires involvement of various
sequential steps as follows:
(a) Hazard Identification : To identify sources of process accidents involving release

of hazardous material in the atmosphere and various
scenarios of occurrence
(b) Consequence : To estimate probable zone of impact of accidents as well

Assessment as the magnitude/ or scale/ or probability of damages with
respect to human beings and equipment and machinery
(c) Accident Frequency : Computation of the average likelihood of accidents
(d) Risk Assessment : Combining accident consequence and frequency to obtain

risk distribution within and beyond a process plant
1.3 The IOCL Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi
The existing petroleum storage depot of IOCL at Guntakal was commissioned in the year 1964
adjoining the Railway Station in an area of about 4 acres. The facilities in the depot do not meet
OISD requirements & due to paucity of space, it is not possible to make this depot OISD
compliant. In order to comply to the safety norms & to meet the growing demand for petroleum
product of Guntakal & surrounding towns, a bulk storage Petroleum Depot at Nakkanadoddi
Village, Guntakal is proposed to be set up on a 82.77 acre land acquired.

Hence, the project primarily aims at improving the Infrastructure Development for Petroleum
Product Storage & Transportation by
 Developing the storage facility of petroleum product, in compliance with OISD norms and
other statutory requirement, to ensure better availability of petroleum product in the state of
Andhra Pradesh.
 Fulfilling the local petroleum products demand of Guntakal & surrounding towns.
The proposed tankage facility would have the capacity to store 55060 KL of petroleum products,
with following details
 3 Nos. of Internal Floating Roof Vertical Tank (6000 KL each) for storage of MS (Petrol)
 3 Nos. of Cone Roof Vertical Tank (10000 KL each) for storage of HSD (Diesel)
 2 Nos. of Cone Roof Vertical Tank (1800 KL each) for storage of SKO
 2 Nos. of Internal Floating Roof Vertical Tank (1000 KL each) for storage of Ethanol
 1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (50 KL) for storage of MS (TTD)
 1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (50 KL) for storage of SKO (TTD)
 1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (50 KL) for storage of HSD (TTD)
 1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (20 KL) for storage of HSD (Own use)
 2 Nos. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (70 KL each) for storage of Ethanol (TTD)
 4 Nos. Under Ground Horizontal Tanks (200 KL each) for storage of Biodiesel
 1 No. of Above Ground Horizontal Tank (250 KL) for storage of Sludge
1.4 The Assignment
The Indian Oil Corporation Limited, HO, Mumbai has assigned Shriram Institute for Industrial
Research, Delhi the task to undertake QRA and to prepare Onsite Disaster Management Plan for
proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Village Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Andhra
Pradesh. The QRA has been carried out by identifying the hazards at the installation estimating
the likely hood of occurrence of the hazardous events and mathematical modeling for calculating
the consequences of each event. The scope of QRA & Onsite DMP is to carry out study with
respect to following:
 Identification of all probable failure cases for the proposed facilities and consequence
analysis with respect to flammability, thermal radiation, dispersion, explosion, overpressure,
toxic release effect, LFL distance etc. as applicable.
 Identification of risk by HAZOP/ FETI approaches/ result evaluation & computation of

summary.
 Hazard analysis/ damage model studies for tanks/ petroleum facilities, thermal radiation
effects etc.
 Emergency preparedness plan with respect to administration safety, environment, societal

risk, fire-fighting, communication power/ lighting, medical facilities, etc.

 Two types of accident scenarios to be considered viz. low frequency high consequence and
high frequency low consequence. These cases to generate information for guidance,
planning, and routine safety exercise and training tools etc. and will also be useful in
evaluation of damage to men and material in and around the depot. Failure cases are to be
selected by applicable/ relevant modern technical methodologies.
 Relevant computer model & programs, methodology and technique to be used to assess the
consequence and identify various impact zones and hazard distances. The hazard distances
are to be marked in overall plot plan to show the areas affected. The results of consequence
analysis also to be shown in form of tables, charts, figures etc.
 A detailed risk assessment study, to include the fire hazard in proposed facilities. A
consequence analysis for the accidental release of hydrocarbons in water bodies to be made.
 Hazard Identification using
- Manufacture, storage and import of hazardous chemical rules 1989 of GOI
- Fire explosion and Toxicity Index (FETI), a relative ranking technique based on toxic,
flammable and explosive properties of chemical.
- Other relevant ranking techniques
 Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis

- Chemical inventory analysis
- Identification of hazardous storage units.
 Consequence analysis
 Onsite and off-site emergency preparedness plan.
 With the use of latest appropriate simulation models, damage distance has to be quantified
and recommendations shall be made for specifying safe distance and risk minimization
measures which could be needed for safety.
 The onsite emergency preparedness plans to be prepared taking into account the various
emergency scenarios identified in the risk analysis. Recommendations to be suggested on
effective handling of identified emergencies.
1.5 The Statutory/ Legal Requirements
The QRA has been prepared in view of various regulations and legal instruments, which deals
with management of hazardous chemical in one form or the other. These can be categorized as
follows:
(a) The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended todate) and following Rules there
under:
 The Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 (amended todate).
 The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules,
2000.
 The Hazardous and other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016.
 The EIA Notification, 2006.

 The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996.
(b) The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987).
 Andhra Pradesh Factory Rules 1950
(c) The Inflammable Substances Act, 1952.
(d) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001).

 The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (amended 2005).
(e) The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 (amended 1992).

 The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 (amended 1993).
(f) The Petroleum Act, 1934.

 The Petroleum Rules, 2002.
(g) The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995.
(h) The Explosives Act, 1884 (amended todate).

 The Gas Cylinder Rules, 2004,
 The Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (Unfired) Rules, 1981 (amended 2002).
 The Explosives Rules, 2008.
1.6 Organization of the Report

The basic objective of identification of hazard and evaluation of risk is to aid the proponents of
the project to rationalize the procedure for an effective management of risk which are
controllable by adhering to necessary preventive and corrective actions. Organization of this
report includes following:
 Collection, collation and analysis of baseline data for various attributes associated with
receipt, storage and transportation of the petroleum products.
 Identification of hazards
 Evaluation of Risk both in qualitative & quantitative terms
 Consequence Analysis
 Onsite Disaster Management Plan
1.7 Contents of the Report

The QRA Report is based on the secondary data provided by IOCL, HO, Mumbai for Proposed
Development of Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Andhra
Pradesh. The analysis of the data together with modeling and interpretation has been carried out
for preparation of QRA and Onsite DMP report. Generic structure of the present report includes
following chapters in nutshell:

Chapter- 1 : Introduction
This chapter provides general information pertaining to purpose of the report, identification of
project and project proponent. It also includes legal and regulatory requirements as well as various
acts in pertinent to risk involved in operation and requirement of safety procedures.
Chapter- 2 : Project Description
This chapter provides detailed description of proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot of
IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, inclusive of tankage, capacity, POL receipt, Tank Truck (TT) loading,
unloading, Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) operation etc. It also provides information with respect to P&I
diagram and layout diagram.
Chapter- 3 : Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
Preliminary Hazard Analysis inclusive HAZOP, FTA and ETA are included in this chapter, which
have been carried out considering the process of TW receipt, TT loading, unloading and TLF
operations at the facility. DOW Fire and Explosion Index have been estimated based on Material
Factor, General Process Hazard and Special Process Hazard.
Chapter- 4 : Maximum Credible Accident Analysis
This chapter highlights the past accident history of similar kind of operations world over to assess
the causes and damage associated with the untoward incidents. Failure frequency of equipment has
been illustrated together with individual and societal risk. This would help in analyzing in situation
and to take adequate safeguard to prevent the happening of such incidents for the protection of
public health, environment and infrastructure.
Chapter- 5 : Consequence Analysis
Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) has been carried out considering various scenarios. Based on the
modeling damage distances have been estimated to envisage adequate safeguard measures. Chapter
illustrates modeling results based on Pool Fire, Jet Fire, Vapour Cloud Explosion, BLEVE etc.
Chapter- 6 : Onsite Emergency Plan/ Disaster Management Plan
This chapter provides various measures to prevent accidents through good design, operation,
maintenance and inspection by which it is possible to reduce the risk of an accident. It gives
detailed contingency planning for management of disasters and prevention of accidents.

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 Project Description
(a) Project Location
The proposed facility description of IOCL Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot is given below:
Facility : IOCL Petroleum Storage Depot
Address : Village Nakkanadoddi ,

Guntakal, Ananthapuram District
Location : The proposed Depot is planned at Nakkanadoddi Village,

Guntakal, Ananthapuram District. The nearest Railway station is
Guntakal railway station (about 10 km). The depot is
approximately at 290 Km from Hyderabad.
Geo codes : Latitude : 15.1647°N to 15.1602°N

Longitude : 77.4504°N to 77.4583°E
Surroundings : East Agricultural lands
West Agricultural lands
North Chennai-Mumbai Railway line
South Agricultural lands, NH 63
Project Layout is given at Annexure-3
(b) The Process of the Project
There would not be any manufacturing process involved in the proposed depot. The process
involved can be divided into
 Receipt of finished petroleum products (MS, HSD, SKO) through Rail Wagons.
 Unloading of Products (MS, SKO & HSD) from Tank trucks occasionally (TLD).
 Receipt of Ethanol through Tank trucks (TLD)
 Receipt of Bio Diesel through Tank trucks (TLD)
 Pump House Operations (PHO)
 Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) operations of MS, Ethanol Blended MS, HSD, Blended Diesel &
SKO
 Ethanol, Blue Dye & Bio Diesel Dosing
 Storage of petroleum products in storage tanks fabricated as per international standards.
 Dispatch of petroleum products through Tank Lorries.
The entire operation of RECEIPT, STORAGE AND DISPATCH of petroleum products would
be carried out in a closed system thereby eliminating risk of spillage of products and to achieve
enhanced safety.Typical process flow chart is as follows:

PICTORIAL DEPICTION OF THE PROCESS FLOW CHART:
TANKFARM FACILITIES
HSD CRVT SKO EthanolIF Bio-

MSIFRVT
CRVT RVT Diesel
UGHT
Total Automation
TRUCK LOADING FACILITIES
Vapour Recovery System

RECEIPT FROM BTFLN/BTPN WAGONS
8 Bays TLF Bottom Loading

(c) Receipt of Petroleum Products

The petroleum products viz. MS, HSD, SKO would be received from Vizag & Chennai through
Rail wagon rakes. An exclusive Railway siding in line with RDSO standards shall be
constructed for the depot. The DPR for setting up of Railway siding has been submitted to Local
Railway Authorities & in principle approval has been obtained.
(d) Storage for Petroleum Products& Other Facilities
Following tankages are proposed to be developed
Table-2.1 (a) Schedule of tanks Class ‘A’ Product (Flash Point <23°C)
Tag Size Product Nominal Licensed Location Type of
No. Capacity (KL) Capacity Tank
T-01A 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR
T-01B 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR
T-01C 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR
T-08A 03.00M Ǿ x 07.50M L Motor Spirit 53 50 UG HDR
T-03C 12.00M Ǿ x 11.50M H Ethanol 1295 1000 Dyke-III IFR
T-03D 12.00M Ǿ x 11.50M H Ethanol 1295 1000 Dyke-III IFR
T-08E 02.91M Ǿ x 10.50M L Ethanol 74 70 UG HDR
T-08F 02.91M Ǿ x 10.50M L Ethanol 74 70 UG HDR
Sub Total for Licensed Capacity of Class ‘A’ Products 20190 KL
Table-2.1 (b) Schedule of tanks Class ‘B’ Product (Flash Point 23°C <65°C)
Tag No. Size Product Nominal Licensed Location Type of
Capacity (KL) Capacity Tank
T-02A 30.00M Ǿ x 15.00M H HSD 10568 10000 Dyke-II CRV
T-02B 30.00M Ǿ x 15.00M H HSD 10568 10000 Dyke-II CRV
T-02C 30.00M Ǿ x 15.00M H HSD 10568 10000 Dyke-II CRV
T-08B 03.00M Ǿ x 07.50M L HSD 53 50 UG HDR
T-08C# 21.00M Ǿ x 06.00M L HSD 21 20 UG HDR
T-03A 14.00M Ǿ x 12.50M H SKO 1916 1800 Dyke-III CRV
T-03B 14.00M Ǿ x 12.50M H SKO 1916 1800 Dyke-III CRV
T-08D 03.00M Ǿ x 07.50M L SKO 53 50 UG HDR
Sub Total for Licensed Capacity of Class ‘A’ Products 33720 KL
# for own use

Table-2.1 (c) Schedule of tanks Excluded Product (Flash Point 93°C)
Tag Size Product Nominal Licensed Location Type of
No. Capacity (KL) Capacity Tank
T-08G 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR

T-03H 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR
T-03I 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR
T-08J 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR
Sub Total for Excluded Products 800 KL
Table-2.1 (d) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks

Tag No. Size Nominal Capacity (KL) Pumping Capacity
WT-01/02/03 24.00M Ǿ x 14.00ML 6310 5114

Total 15342 KL
The above tankage shall be developed in line with latest API 650 & OISD regulations.
Table-2.1 (e) TLF point details
Product Bay No. Loading Type Sub-total loading
points
Motor Spirit 1 to 6 Bottom 6
HSD 1 to 8 Bottom 8
SKO 7&8 Top & Bottom 4
Table-2.1 (f) Schedule of Dyke

Dyke Overall Dimensions Capacity
Dyke-I 81.00 M x 81.00 M 11451 KL
Dyke-II 98.00 M x 98.00 M 16919 KL
Dyke-III 74.00 M x 53.00 M 4176 KL
Table-2.1 (g) Schedule of Fire Fighting Pumps

Tag No. Description Nos. of Pump Capacity Head
(mWC)
Operating Standby
P-22A/B Jockey Pumps Electrical Driven 1 1 72 Cu.M/Hr. 110
P-23A/B/C/D/E Main Pumps Diesel Engine Driven 3 2 850 Cu.M/Hr 105
P-24A/B Foam Pump 1 1 25 Cu.M/Hr 120
(e) Separation Distances

The minimum separation distances between various facilities, offsite facilities & tanks within a
dyke shall be as per provisions of latest version of OISD 118 & OISD 244 Standards.
2.2 Distribution of Petroleum Products
The petroleum products shall be distributed to various Industries / Petrol Pumps through tank
trucks of capacity 9000 Litres to 24,000 Litres. On an average, 150 tank trucks are anticipated to
be filled on daily basis. 8-bay TLF shed with bottom loading facilities for MS and HSD is
proposed. Top loading facilities in addition to bottom loading facilities for SKO would be

provided. The loading facilities shall consist of PD metering system, batch controllers, blending
facilities for Ethanol, branded fuels etc. Vapour recovery system to be designed & developed for
handling MS. Tank Truck (TT) decantation facility with suitable capacity of Under Ground
(U/G) tanks to be provided.
2.3 Brief Information on various Facilities
I. Product Pump House (TWD Receipt & TT Dispatch):
 Pump House: 175 Mx 6 M with new product pumps.
 Pump House Manifold: 175 Mx 30 M
II. Product Piping:
 Set of piping from TW Siding to the Product Tanks
 Set of piping from Product Tanks to the pump house and
 Set of piping from pump house to the Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) shed.
III. Electrical Facilities:

 Transformer& HT Breaker
 New MCC Panel: 1 Set.
 DG Sets: 1250 KVA x 2 Nos.&750 KVA x 1 No. (Shall be as per connected load &
design requirements).
 Electrical Cabling, Lighting, Earthing.
IV. Fire Fighting Facilities:
 24 Mdiax 14 MHigh Water Tank of Capacity 6310 KL x 3 Nos.
 Fire Pumps: 5 Nos. x 850 Cu.M/ Hr x 105 M Head.
 Water Sprinkler system on proposed MS & HSD as per prevailing safety guidelines
issued by OISD
 Fixed Foam fighting system on proposed Diesel (HSD) and Petrol (MS) tanks as per
prevailing safety guidelines issued by OISD
 Centralized Foam Feeding system for fixed foam pourers & HVLR.
 Provision of Fire hydrant piping network for the entire depot facilities.
V. Other Civil Facilities:
 Room for the Transformer and HT Breaker
 Fire Pumps
 MCC room
 Dyke walls for proposed product tanks
 Roads and Storm water drains for the new product tank farms
 Driveway around TLF shed

VI. Automation of Entire Terminal:

 Tank Farm Management system: These shall comprise of automation of receipt of
products from Railway Sidings.
 Valve Automation system: All the Tank Body Valves and exchange pit valves shall
be automated including remote operation with necessary safety interlocks. Further,
the tank body Valves shall be fitted with Remote Operated Shut Off Valves
(ROSOV) to be closed by a safety PLC in case of emergency. The same shall be in
line with international SIL 2 requirements.
 Radar gages on all tanks: Each tank shall be provided with 2 nos SIL 2 certified
Radar gauges for automatic level measurement. The gauges shall function in remote
for the tank inventory and tank shut down procedures.
 Automatic Overspill Protection Switch: In addition to the dual redundant radar
gauges on each tank, an independent SIL 3 certified Level switch shall be provided
for shut of the tank in case of reaching high level alarm.
 Tank Lorry Filling System: The entire process of filling of the Tank Lorries shall be
automated along with necessary safety interlocks
 Access Control System: The system shall permit only authorized personnel to carry
out the operations within the terminal. The access shall be both role and application
based system.
 Control Room with equipment: The control room shall monitor and log all events
pertaining to the operation of the terminal on real time basis.
 Others:
- MOVs for the tank farm dyke valves for remote operation & real time
indication on status of valves
- Push Button Stations outside Tank body valves for remote switching off of
the product tank body valves.
- Emergency Shut Down Procedures for various terminal operation activities.
(i) Ethanol/ Bio-diesel/ Branded fuels dosing: Design and provision of suitable
dosing system for Ethanol with MS, Bio-Diesel with HSD with feasibility of
varying the blending ratio from 5% to 15% to be provided. Similarly design &
provision of suitable dosing system for branded fuels with feasibility of changing
the dosing ratio (in ppm) to be provided.
(ii) Blue dye/ Bio diesel handling facilities: Suitably designed for online blue dye
dosing to SKO storage tanks to be provided.
(iii) Non-plant Facilities: All the ancillary facilities like security, perimeter wall with
fencing, gates, internal fencing, internal roads, pavements, driveway, security,
Administrative block, Workmen change room, Control room, S & D room,
Locker shed, Calibration facility, sludge pits, Effluent Treatment Plant, Scrap
yard, PPE/First Aid room MCC rooms, DG sets and rooms, Electrical substation,
TT parking area, TT rest room Storage sheds for revenue store/Engineering
materials.

3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA)

INCLUDING HAZOP (HAZARD & OPERABILITY) STUDY
3.1 Genesis of Hazard Identification
"Hazard" is a characteristic of a system, plant or processes that present potential for an accident.
Therefore, all the relevant aspects of petroleum oil storage and handling process shall be
thoroughly examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unintentional event
or sequence of events, which can lead to an accident or disaster. Type, quantity, location &
conditions of release of the petroleum oils under various scenarios are to be examined in order to
estimate its damage potential, area affected, and the precautionary measures to be taken.
3.2 Hazard Potential: Deciding Factors
Factors needs to be considered to identify and analyze the hazard potential are:
1. Flash point & Boiling point of the petroleum oil
2. Inventory of the petroleum oil
3. Potential for loss from containment
4. Pool size & dike capacity
5. Potential for availability of ignition sources in the vicinity of leakage or spillage
Apart from the petroleum oil (MS, HSD and SKO) and Ethanol characteristics and process of its
handling, size & layout of the depot and its equipment are also to be analyzed in order to assess
the hazard potential. Similarly, domino or secondary effects of accidents occurring in one tank
of the depot on the other tanks and also from the adjoining area are to be analyzed.
3.3 Identification of Hazards
Petroleum oils (MS, HSD and SKO) and Ethanol are highly inflammable in their basic
character. These are dangerous because of their intrinsic properties i.e. flash point, ignition
energy required, heat of combustion, flammability limits, etc. In addition to such intrinsic
properties, extrinsic factors like storage & operating conditions and large storage quantity are
also to be considered for hazard identification. Material safety Data Sheets for the products
handled are attaché as Annexure-2.
The extent of the consequences arising from the petroleum oil depot would depend on quantity
of the oil present, mode of containment, and external factors like location, density of population
etc. In many cases, realization of hazard and its potential also depend on prevailing
meteorological conditions and availability of ignition source. Thus, most serious consequences
would arise from a large inventory of petroleum oil surrounded by a densely populated area.
Petroleum oils (MS, HSD and SKO) and Ethanol require interaction with air or oxygen for its
hazard to be realized. Under certain circumstances vapors of the oil when mixed with air may be
explosive especially in confined spaces. Following methods of hazard identification have been
employed in this study:
(a) Characterization of major hazardous units based on manufacture, storage and Import of
Hazardous Chemicals Rules, Ministry of Environment & Forest, Government of India,
referred here as MSIHC Rules.
(b) Identification of hazardous installations based on relative ranking technique, viz. Dow’s
Fire Explosion Index and Mond’s Toxicity Index (FEI & TI).

3.4 Applicability of MSIHC RULES, 2000 for proposed IOCL Depot at

Nakkanadoddi
Major hazard installations in the country have been identified & characterized by MSIHC Rules,
2000. The rules employ certain criteria based on flammable, explosive & toxic properties and
quantity of the chemicals. Indicative criteria adopted in the MSIHC Rules. As per provisions of
the MSIHC Rules, 2000 quantity of petroleum oil storage at the depot have been analyzed and
the applicable rules are identified based on the type of petroleum oil, quantity of storage and the
threshold quantity given in the rules.
Applicable regulations of the rules to the proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL
at Nakkanadoddi are identified in the following Table. Petroleum Oils are covered in MSIHC
Rules in Schedule-1 part 1 (b) (ii) & (iii). The threshold quantities are given in Schedule-2
(“isolated storage” at installations, other than those covered by Schedule-4). Applicability of the
rules are as follows:
Table-3.4 Applicability of MSIHC Rules to the proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi

Product No. of Licensed Maximum Total Threshold Quantity Applicable Rules
Tanks Capacity Capacity Product (MT) as per MSIHC
KL in MT# in MT Rules for Application of
Rules
4, 5, 7-9 & 10 to 12
13 to 15
MS 04 18050 13177 14867 7000 7000

Sch-1, para (b) (iii)
Ethanol 04 2140 1691
HSD 05 30070 25259
28179 10000 10000 Sch-1, para (b) (iv)
SKO 03 3650 2920
Total 16 53910 43046 As indicated above 2 (e) (i); 2 (e) (ii),
3,4 (1) (a); 4(1) (b),
4(2), 5, 7-9, 17,18
# Specific Gravity (MS = 0.73; HSD = 0.84; SKO = 0.80; Ethanol = 0.79)
3.5 Anticipation of Major Hazards

(a) Fire
The worst scenario as per risk analysis will be catastrophe failure of MS Tank and flooding of
dyke. Pool fire is possible in case of ignition source. Since it is petroleum installation, the
possibility of ignition source is ruled out.
(b) Vapour Cloud Explosion:
When a large amount of volatile flammable material is rapidly dispersed into the atmosphere, a
vapour cloud forms and disperses. If this cloud is ignited before it is diluted below its LEL, an
Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) or Flash Fire occurs.
(c) Small Spills
Small spills which pose no safety and health dangers are not likely to adversely affect the
environment, are to be handled by trained personnel.

 Eliminate the source of the spill by closing valves

 Recover the spilled products
 Avoid migration of product into the external drain
(d) Large Spills
Large spills contained inside the tank bund will be recovered manually / mechanically by
using sorbent pads. Ensure closure of drain valves.
3.6 The objective of HIRA
The objective of hazard identification is to identify the hazards and the unintended events, which
may lead to an accident. The first and foremost task is to identify the hazards that are inherent to
the process or plant and then focus on the evaluation of the events, which could be associated
with the hazards. A hazard is generally realized as a loss of containment of a hazardous material.
The route for such loss of containment can include release from pipelines containing liquid or
releases from vents/ relief or from vessel rupture. In case of Proposed Greenfield Petroleum
Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, the aim of Hazard Identification would be to identify
all possible hazards associated with the operational phase of the Depot. It is necessary to identify
what can happen and how and why it can happen. Major POL Operations identified at proposed
IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, which may lead to hazard, are:
 Rail Wagon Receipt of MS, HSD & SKO
 TT Receipt of Ethanol
 TT Loading & Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) Operations - MS, HSD,& SKO
 Pump House Operations (PHO): Tank Lorry Filling (TLF); Tank Lorry Decantation (TLD);
Inter-Tank Transfer (ITT) etc.
 TT Suck Back/ Unloading of MS, HSD & SKO.
 Ethanol Dosing at TLF
 Additive Dosing at TLF
 Tank Water Draining Operations
3.7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(a) Hazard Identification
The hydrocarbons to be received, handled, pumped and stored are MS, SKO, HSD and Ethanol.
Operations include, pumping, storage, inter tank transfer, dosing in case of kerosene and transfer
to Tank Trucks for dispatch to destination. The usual hazards know in these operations with the
above products are:
 Containment failure and fires.
 Spills and fires
 Evaporation and forming explosive mixture and Explosion
 Containment failure and toxic effects of Furfural.
(b) Internal Pipeline Failure
 The pipe system consists of pipelines, isolation valves, pipe supporting racks.
 Among many major leaks of flammable material studied the maximum leakage from
pipelines and they have resulted in fires and vapour cloud explosions.

 The pipe line failure occurs due to liquid hammer, vibration and fatigue of pipeline or
supporting structure or holding structure, pipeline and flange leaks, vapour lock, cavitations,
corrosion due failure of cathodic protection, stress – corrosion cracking, thermal expansion,
cyclic stress, structural failure and over pressurizing pipe system.
 Pipe blockages are known to unintended valve closure, human error, failure of valve to
operate, impurities and sludge formation blocking flow, broken parts in pipeline, fabrication
components, welding electrodes, weld failures, over - stressing, damages during installation.
 Other causes of pipeline failures include natural calamities like lightning, storm, flood,
earthquake and vehicle crash and sabotage.
 Valve leaks through flanges, seals, stump packing due to drying, corrosion wear or
inconsistent engineering practices are also the possible causes.
 The other significant reasons which can aggravate the situation are delays in activating
emergency response procedure, settlement of land under pipelines, road work near pipelines
resulting in damage to pipelines etc.
(c) Pump Failures
 Pump failures due to wear, drying at packing, hard substances like grit, packing / seal failure,
blockages on suction and discharge sides, dry running are known.
 Control system for valve operations etc. can fail due to incorrect setting or operation,
location of instruments, instrument failure, inconsistent maintenance practices including
contact failures and incorrect calibration. Such situations include failure of densitometer,
inadvertent inhibition of alarm / warning systems, bye-passing of critical interlocks etc.
 Engineering practices include Operation, Inspection, start-up/ shutdown practices, leak

detection and maintenance practices.
 The failure modes for liquids are significant for the reasons, pipeline pressure falls rapidly
following puncture owing to relative incompressibility of liquid. Initial high rate of release
reduces rapidly. The drain down the pipeline will be driven by system hydraulic head
initially and finally by static head, until equilibrium condition reaches.
 Explosion hazards occur in pipelines with release of product transported which comes in
contract with outside atmosphere creates a flammable atmosphere and can present an
explosion hazard also. The explosion hazards would be severe, if the contents are subjected
to BLEVE. Flame travel within pipe is known as deflagration and propagates from burning
gases, Detonation is characterized by pressure of shockwave in material and rate of
propagation would be higher than velocity of sound.
(d) Tank Failures
 In case of tanks (Conical Roof Tank and Floating Roof Tanks) containment failure can take
place and contents spread over. However, spread is limited to dyke size and if ignited, can

form a pool fire and result in intense heat radiation and also endanger neighboring tanks and
contents (domino effects), if the fire is not controlled.
 The causes for containment failure could be in general, over filling, collapse due to vacuum,
mechanical damage, external impact, rupture of tank shell. Reasons for overfill could be
instrument failure, lack of attention, wrong settings on instrument etc.
 Collapse due to vacuum can occur, if pumping out is carried out when the vent line is closed
or blocked due to other reasons.
 In case of floating roof tanks, seal failure, stucking-up of roof in a particular position or
sinking of floating roof rapidly and exposing of product to flammable conditions.
 The sources of ignition of spilled product or ignition of vapour could be due external source,
lightning or electro static discharge.
(e) Fire Hazard
 Liquid fires in process equipment typically involve leaks from flanges, pump packings,
broken low gauge pipes, corrosion holes, burst vessels, etc. or overflow from tanks and
drains. If the leaking liquid is then above the auto ignition temperature, ignition is
immediate. Otherwise an ignition source is necessary.
 Largest liquid fires involve storage tanks, particularly as a result of an initial, explosion
(cone roof tanks) or rim fires (floating roof tanks or after a small explosion in a cone roof
tank).
 A typical course of events in such a fire involves an initial spill, an ignition at the tank, and a
resulting local fire. This local fire may then be extinguished if response is rapid and the
emergency facilities have sufficient capacity.
 Delays, failure of emergency equipment, and inadequate capacity of equipment compared

with the size of the release result in gradual increase in the size of the fire.
 If the fire is large enough, it can spread through collapse of the tank, or through boil over
and frothing, or through radiation to nearby buildings and other tanks.
 In case of release of liquid at high pressure from piping, a different mechanism applies. The
liquid forms a spray or jet, which then leads to a jet fire. Such fires can be very intense, and
the flame surprisingly long. Additionally they can impinge on other equipment and cause
damage, leading to still larger releases.
(f) Domino Effects
When large fires and explosions occur elsewhere in the installation, it is possible for these to
affect other facilities, thereby resulting into the spread of effect from unit to unit. This is termed
as a domino effect. There is also the possibility of cascading effects in the nearby units.

3.8 Identification of Emergencies in case of POL Depot

In general, emergencies anticipated for POL Depot operations, may include but not limited to
following:
Table-3.8 Anticipated Emergencies for POL Depot
Sl. Type of Emergency Possible Causes
1 Pipeline leak with fire Failure of Pipe/ Gaskets/ Valves/etc.

 Tank containment failure and release of flammable
petroleum Product.
 Pool fires in tank storage, such as rim fires; dyke fires.
2 Tank farm Area
 Vapour cloud explosion in tank storage / dyke areas.
 Spillage/ leakage due to pipe/ gaskets/ valves failure
followed by fire.
 Containment failure and release of flammable
petroleum product
3 Tank truck loading gantry  Pool fires
 Vapour cloud explosion.
 Near captive power DG sets
 Near fire pumps preemies area
 Transfer pumps area
Fires in the remaining
4  Sump collection tanks contaminated Vessels
areas
 Slop tank
 Electrical fire
 Tankers sealing area
 Asphyxiation of persons
 Structural Collapse
5 Others  Road Accident involving incoming and outgoing Tank
Trucks in the Vicinity of the Depot and may lead to
secondary situation manifesting into fire.
3.9 Emergency Classification

Severity of accident and its likely impact area will determine the level of emergency and the
disaster management plan required for appropriate handling of an emergency. In case of the
proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels
on the basis of seriousness and response requirements. Emergency levels and the action needed
for each level are indicated below:
Level-I Emergency
This is an emergency or an incident which
(a) Can be effectively and safely managed and contained within the site, location or installation
by the available resources.
(b) Has no impact outside the site, location or installation.
(c) Is unlikely to be danger to life, the environment or to company assets or reputation.

Level-II Emergency
This is an emergency or incident which
(a) Cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the site, location or installation by
available resource. Hence, additional support would be required.
(b) Is having or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and
where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved.
(c) Is likely to be danger to life, to the environment, to company assets or reputation.
Level-III Emergency
This is an emergency or incident which is catastrophic and is likely to affect the population,
property and environment inside and outside the installation. Under such circumstances, the
management & control is to be done by District Administration.
Although the level-III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till the time
they step in, it shall be the responsibility of the Unit to manage the Emergency.
Level-1 & Level-II Emergencies shall normally be grouped as Onsite Emergency whereas,
Level-III as Off-site Emergency.
Type of Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot
Table-3.9 Type of Emergencies Anticipated at IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi
Sl. Type of Applicable Description of Emergency
Emergency EAP
 Oil spills from the flanges/Internal Pipeline /Gate
Valves.
1 Level-1 On site  Pinhole leakage from Internal Pipelines
 Failure of gasket resulting in leakage
 Spillages from tank truck due to over flow while
loading.
 Spillages from storage tank during receipt.
 Tank containment failure and release of flammable
2 Level-2 On site petroleum Product.
 Leakage from internal pipeline due to damage
 Failures caused by corrosion defects,
 Failures caused by miscellaneous factors such as pipe
material defects, natural hazards.
 Burst of product pipelines inside premises.
 Failure of storage tanks.
 Pool fires
3 Level-3 Off Site  Vapour cloud explosion.
 Agitation / forced entry by external group of people.
 Natural Perils – Earthquake, Flood, Cyclone etc.
 Sabotage, Bomb explosion / Threat
Important Note : The earlier emergency classification as per OISD-117 has been
renamed as per PNGRB Regulation- 2010 as follows.

OISD-117 classification ERDMP Regulation-2010 classification

Small Fire Level-1 Emergency
Major Fire Level-2 Emergency
Disaster Level-3 Emergency
3.10 General Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot
The emergencies that could be anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot atNakanadoddi, may be
as follows, but not limited to:
Table-3.10 General Emergencies Anticipated at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakanadoddi

Sl. Nature of Emergencies Level
(i) Slow isolated fire / Electrical Fire Slow isolated fire / Electrical Fire Level-1
(ii) Fast spreading fire due to flammable liquids/ Tank on fire Level-2
(iii) Explosion of compressed air vessels Level-2
(iv) Vapour cloud Explosion at Petroleum storage tanks Level-2
(v) Bursting of pipelines inside the premises & vessels Level-2
(vi) Spillage / Handling of petroleum products Level-1
(vii) Major accident such as structural or building collapse. Level-2
(viii) Overturning of truck containing flammable liquids. Level-2/3
(ix) Natural calamities like storm, flood, earthquake, etc. Level-3
(x) Sabotage, Act of terrorism, Civil commotion, Air raid etc. Level-3
(xi) Bomb Hoax Level-3
3.11 Specific Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot

Specific emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot at Nakanadoddi includes Fire
and Explosion. Fire hazard consequences can be disastrous, since these involve release of huge
quantities of hydrocarbons either stored or in dynamic condition in internal pipelines, tanks, TLF
areas, TTs, pumping from Tank Wagon to storage tanks etc. Toxic releases can affect personnel
working around. Detailed Risk Analysis provides a basis for consequence estimation. Consequence
Analysis illustrates the type of release, extent of damage and probability of occurrence of such
hazards considering various scenarios. The activities of the depot handling POL can broadly be
subdivided as follows, where hazardous situation can be anticipated.
Activities Place
Receipt of petroleum products Pumping from Tank Wagons at Railway Siding.
Petroleum products storage Tank Farm Area
Petroleum products pumping Pump House
Dispatch of petroleum products Tank Truck/ Tanker Lorry Filling

(a) Situations leading to Emergencies
Situations leading to hazard can, generally, be classified as Operational Conditions, Natural

Calamities and External Factors as illustrated below and are applicable in case of proposed
IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi.
Table-3.11 (a) Situations leading to emergencies at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakanadoddi
Condition Type of Emergency Level
Operational Condition Tank overflow Level-1
Oil escape to outside Level-1
Any tank on fire Level-1
Vapour Cloud Explosion Level-2
Tank Truck on fire at Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) bay Level-1
Fire in filling shed Level-1
Fire in pump house /Generator Room Level-1
Fire in Railway Siding /Rack in Tank Wagon Unloading bay Level-1
Pump manifold on fire Level-1
Dry Grass fire Level-1
Natural Calamities Earth Quake Level-3
leading to emergencies Severe Storm/ Lightening Level-3
Cyclone Level-3
Flood Level-3
External Factors leading Bomb Hoax Level-3
to emergencies Riot Level-3
Terrorist Activities Level-3
War Level-3
(b) System elements or events that can lead to major accidents/ emergencies
The emergency could be result of abnormal functioning within the facility or by natural factors:
 Manual / Human error
 Failure of interlocks
 Failure in Automation
The spillage of products due overflow will lead to formation of vapours and fire (Pool Fire)
depending upon physic-chemical properties.
 Motor Spirit (MS) may produce large volumes of vapour when released in appreciable
quantities to the atmosphere.
 SKO/HSD are heavier and less volatile.
At normal storage temperature these oils release vapour slowly and are hazardous only near the
surface of liquid. At elevated temperature class-B liquids attains the characteristics of class-A
liquids once the vapour are released. In case of loss of containment of MS, SKO & HSD the
liquids shall spill on the ground and form a liquid pool. In case of spillage of MS the rate of
vaporization shall be appreciable as its vapour pressure is comparatively higher than of
SKO/HSD. The mass of vapour & air mixture may not be sufficient to cause fir / explosion. The
liquid pool, if it catches fire, results in pool fire with long smoky flame. The flame may tilt

under the influence of wind and may cause injury to the people and property resulting in vapour
cloud explosion.
(c) Failure Cases

Broadly failure cases associated with the operation of proposed IOCL Depot can be as follows:
Table-3.11(b) Failure Modes & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi
Failure Description Mode of Failure Consequences
Catastrophic failure of MS/HSD/SKO storage tank Random failure Pool fire /VCE
MS/HSD/SKO Storage Tank on fire Random failure Pool fire /VCE
MS/HSD/SKO tank inlet line failure Random Failure Pool fire /VCE
TLF Pump discharge MS/HSD/SKO line failure Random Failure Pool fire /VCE
TW Pump discharge MS/HSD/SKO line failure Random Failure Pool fire /VCE
(d) Hazard Scenarios and effects
Various hazard scenarios, which are anticipated in case of the proposed IOCL Depot are
described below with significant effects.
Table-3.11(c) Hazard Scenarios & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi

Scenarios Effects Level of
Emergency
Tank on Fire Fire in any one storage tank can damage the tank as Level-2
well as other tanks in the immediate vicinity and may
have a cascading effect.
Gasket Failure in Pump Can cause pool fire/ jet fire and explosion, will Level-2
Discharge Line damage adjoining pipelines within the premises,
tanks and other equipment & infrastructure.
Hole in Pump Discharge Can cause pool fire/ jet fire and explosion, will Level-2
lines damage adjoining pipelines within the premises,
tanks and other equipment & infrastructure.
Failure of Loading Arm Can cause fire/explosion; will damage the trucks, Level-2
internal pipelines and entire loading bay.
Mechanical seal failure Can cause fire damaging the internal pipelines and Level-2
of pumps other pumps.
Vessel connection Can cause fire damaging all the tanks if the fire is not Level-2
Failure/ Catastrophic tackled immediately.
Failure of Storage Tank
Explosion can occur due to failure of tank nozzle Level-2
failure/ tank catastrophic failure.

All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However, maximum damage
can happen due to storage tank pipeline connection failure or in case of tank fire. In all the above
cases fire / explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapour of petroleum products coming out
from the containment. The sources of ignitions may be
(i) Hot work in the vicinity
(ii) Lightning
(iii) Generation of static electricity
(iv) Radiant heat from outside.
(v) Deliberate ignition or sabotage.
3.12 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study
The HAZOP technique is fairly widely known and provides a good review of causes and
conditions of risk. The basics of a HAZOP involve the understanding of process design, system
and equipment operations, equipment testing and maintenance, process chemistry, and safety
objectives. It is imperative to assess the process into logical sections and reviews each section by
identifying the parameters of the process and detailing the possible deviation of these parameters
from their desired values.
The possible causes for these deviations can be recorded along with any consequences that could
result from such deviations. In this manner, the hazards, accidents and the potential
consequences of an accident can be identified and recorded systematically. The HAZOP
technique uses special adjectives (such as “more,” “less,” “no,” etc.) combined with process
conditions (such as flow, pressure, etc.) to systematically consider all credible deviations from
normal conditions. The adjectives, known as guide words, are a unique feature of HAZOP
analysis. Guidelines of BS 61882 have been used for HAZOP Study of the proposed IOCL
Depot at Nakkanadoddi.
(a) Identification of Failure Scenarios
A hazardous material either flammable or toxic, are safe till these are fully contained and
maintained at desired parameters during receipt, storage, processing and transportation. In the
case of proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, the major causes of hazards could be attributed
to external factors like mechanical interference, material failure (corrosion) and other causes like
material defects and human error. The failure cases as described below but not limited to, are
identified as probable in case of operation of the proposed Depot:
 Complete/ partial failure of pump
 Complete/ partial failure of flanges
 Complete/ Partial failure of valves.
 Catastrophic failure of equipment (tanks)

(b) Development of HAZOP Matrix
Table-3.12 (a) Description of HAZOP Matrix

Matrix Code Occurrence
Frequency 0 Once per 1000 years
1 Once per 100 years
2 Once per 10 years
3 Once per year
4 Once per month
Severity 0 Minor
1 Appreciable
2 Major
3 Severe
4 Catastrophic
Hazard Category 1 Personnel Injury
2 Equipment Damage
3 Production Loss
4 Environment Impact
5 External Reaction
Risk Ranking : Frequency (F) x Severity (S)
Risk Matrix F4 0 4C 8R 12U 16U
F = Frequency Code F3 0 3C 6R 9R 12U
S = Severity Code F2 0 2C 4C 6R 8R
F1 0 1C 2C 3C 4C
F0 0 0 0 0 0
RR S0 S1 S2 S3 S4
Legends
U Unacceptable level of risk-fundamental re-design of system should be considered
R Risk reduction measures need to be incorporated
C Risk level does not warrant significant expenditure. However, control measures, possibly
procedural, should be implemented.

Table-3.12 (b) HAZOP Approach for Risk Identification of operations like TW Receipt; TLF; PHO, ITT, TLF, TLD etc.
GW Deviation Cause (s) Consequence Scenario Safeguard & Action
Flow/ No  Pump suction valve Rapid damage to pump. Frequency [3]  To ensure the effectiveness of flow/
Pressure closed Category [2] [3] pressure/ leak detectors through
With auto start of standby Severity [2] calibration on regular basis following
 No material inflow. pump, the other pump Risk [6R] M&I manual
would also be damaged.  Regular Maintenance of Pump as
recommended by the manufacturer.
 Follow Standard Operating Procedures
Flow/ Less  Pump not functioning Rapid damage to pump. Frequency [3]  To ensure the effectiveness of flow/
Pressure properly. Category [2] [3][4] pressure/ leak detectors through
Potential to cause high calibration on regular basis following
pressure in the line if the Severity [3]
 Leakage/ spillege from Risk [9R] M&I manual
valve/ flanges/ joints discharge of pump is  Pumping to be stopped immediately.
etc. blocked (partially/  Nearest valves to be closed first to cut off
completely). supplies to leaking lines and subsequently
 Control Valve Failure
With auto start of standby other valves to be closed.
 Blockage of discharge pump, the other pump  Care to be taken to prevent any spillage at
pump would also be damaged. sampling points –exchange pits, Tank
farm, Tank Roof
Fire Hazard at the spillage  Regular Maintenance of Pumps as
areas recommended by the manufacturer.
 Follow Standard Operating Procedures
Flow/ High  Pressure/ flow gauge Potential to overpressurize Frequency [3]  To ensure the effectiveness of flow/
Pressure faulty the tank during filling if the Category [2][3][4] pressure/ leak detectors through
relief valve is not sized to Severity [3] calibration on regular basis following
 Control Valve failure pass sufficient vapours. Risk [9R] M&I manual
 Pumping to be stopped immediately.
Potential to fill tank faster  Nearest valves to be closed first to cut off
 Pressure/ flow gauge than the stipulated time or to
faulty supplies to leaking lines and subsequently
create a situation in which other valves to be closed.
valve cannot be closed.  Care to be taken to prevent any spillage at
 TLF operator set high
Leakage/ spillage in sampling points –exchange pits, Tank
flow
surroundings farm, Tank Roof
 Regular Maintenance of Pumps as
Fire Hazard at the spillage recommended by the manufacturer.
areas  Follow Standard Operating Procedures

3.13 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) focuses on one particular accident event and provides a method for
determining basic causes of that event. FTA is used to identify combination of equipment failure
and human errors that can result in an accident. FTA is a graphical representation of
interrelationship between equipment failure and specific accident. The equipment faults and failure
that can be described in FTA can be grouped into three classes, namely:
a) Primary faults and failure – attributed to the equipment and not to any other external cause or
condition.
b) Secondary faults and failure – attributed to other external cause or condition.
c) Commands faults and failure – attributed neither to equipment intended nor to any external
cause but due to error command.
FTA seeks to relate the occurrence of an undesired event to one or more antecedent events. The
undesired event is called the “top event” and the antecedent events are called “basic events”. The
top event may be, and usually is, related to the basic events via certain intermediate events. The
fault tree diagram exhibits the casual chain linking the basic events to the intermediate events and
the latter to the top events. In this chain, logic gates illustrate the logical connection between events.
The principal logic gates are :
AND Gate (The output event occurs if and only if all input events occur)
OR Gate (The output event occurs if any of the input events occur)
The fault tree includes the following:
 Works backward from an undesirable event or ultimate consequence to the possible causes and
failures.
 Relates the occurrence of an undesired event to one or more preceding events.
 “Chain links” basic events to intermediate events that are in turn connected to top event.
 The probability of the top event can be calculated by the probability of chain events.
 It is based on the most likely or credible events that leads to a particular failure or accident.
 Analysis includes human error as well as equipment failure.

FTA Diagram for proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi
Fire & Explosion
Material Spillage Equipment

(Rupture/ Severe Failure/ Damage
Leakage)
Mechanical Catastrophic
Failure Failure
Complete/ Partial Sudden Rise
Failure of Flanges in Pressure
Material Corrosion Material defect

Control Pump
(Internal/
Valve Failure Dead-heading
environmental)
Pipeline/ Tank/ Valve/
Flange/
3.14 Event Tree Analysis

Event Tree Analysis (ETA) begins with an initiating events that describe potential accidents
accounting for (i) successes (ii) failure of available “safety function” as the accident progresses. The
safety function includes operator response or safety system response to the initiating event. The
general procedure for the ETA has following steps:
a) Identifying an initiating event of interest
b) Identifying safety functions designed to deal with the identifying event
c) Construction of the event tree
d) Results of accident event sequence

Release of Material Scenario of material release due to failure

of equipment, valves, flanges etc.
Instantaneous Continuous
Bottom Top
Two Phase Outflow Liquid
Ignition No Pool Vapours

Formation
Yes Ignition Yes

Ignition Pool Fire Flare
Yes
No
Detonation Evaporation No
Dispersion
Vapour Cloud Formation
No
Toxicity Ignition
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Pressure Waves Heat Radiation
Health Impacts Equipment Damage & Public Health Impacts

3.15 DOW Fire and Explosion Index (FETI)
The hazard classification guide developed by the Dow Chemical Company and published by the
American Institute of Chemical Engineering provides a method for estimating the potential loss as a
result of a fire or explosion in petro-chemical processes. It is a step-by-step objective evaluation of
the realistic fire or explosion potential of processing or storage equipment. It is based on empirical
analysis of actual events and widely used in many industries. The purpose of evaluation is to:
 Quantify expected fire and explosion damage.
 Identify equipment likely to contribute.
 Communicate F&E risk to management.
F& EI Procedure: This can be explained by following flowchart
Select Pertinent
Process Unit
Determine
Material Factor
Calculate F1 Calculate F2
General Process Hazards Factor Special Process Hazards Factor
Determine Process Unit Hazards

Factor F3 = F1 x F2
Determine F&EI
F&EI = F3 x Material Factor
Determine Area of Exposure
Determine Replacement Value in

Exposure Area

Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) is useful in identification of areas in which the potential risk reaches
a certain level. It estimates the global risk associated with a process unit and classifies the units
according to their general level of risk. FEI covers aspects related to the intrinsic hazard of
materials, the quantities handled and operating conditions. This factor gives index value for the area
which could be affected by an accident, the damage to property within the area and the working
days lost due to accidents. The method for evaluation of FEI involves following stages. Selection of
pertinent process unit which can have serious impact on plant safety
Step-1 : Selection of the Material, which appropriately represents the Fire/ Explosion
Hazard
Determination of Material Factor (MF): This factor for a given substance in the process unit gives
intrinsic potential to release energy in case of fire or an explosion. Material Factor can be directly
obtained from Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index Hazard classification Guide of American Institute of
Chemical Engineers, New York. The factor can also be evaluated from NFPA indices of danger,
health, flammability and reactivity.
 NFPA Health rating (Nh)
 NFPA Flammability rating (Nf)
 NFPA Instability rating (Ni)
Step-2 : Estimation of General Process Hazards (F1)
GPH factor is computed according to presence of exothermic reactions and loading and unloading
operations. The penalties due to each of these reactions / operations are summed up to compute
GPH factor.
 Exothermic Reaction (range of input 0.3 - 1.25)
 Endothermic Reaction (input range 0.2 - 0.4)
 Material Handling and Transfer (input range 0.25 - 0.8)
 Enclosed or Indoor Process or storage Units handling Flammable materials
 Ease of Access for Emergency Responders
 Drainage and Spill Control
 Computation of General Process Hazards Factor (F1)
Step-3 : Select Factors for Special Process Hazards (F2)
SPH factor can be evaluated for the operations close to flammable range or pressures different from
atmospheric. Penalties of these operations for both factors can be obtained from Dow’s EFI index
form.
 Toxicity of the material handled.
 Process or Storage operates at vacuum (<500mmHg) -penalty 0.5
 Operation in or near the flammable range (input range 0.0 - 0.8)

 Dust Explosion (input range 0.0 - 2.0)

 Pressure Penalty
 Operational Temperature
 Combustible and Flammable materials in Process
 Liquids or gases in Storage
 Solids in Storage or Process
 Corrosion and Erosion (input range 0.0 -0.75)
 Leakage, Joints, packing, flexible joints
 Use of Fired Equipment
 Hot Oil Heat Exchange Equipment
 Rotating Equipment
 Computation of Special Process Hazards Factor (F2)
Determination of Unit Hazard Factor: The Unit Hazard Factor is obtained by multiplication of
General Process Hazard (GPH) factor and Special Process Hazard (SPH) factor.
Step-4 : Estimation of DOW Fire and Explosion Index
DOW Fire and Explosion Index = M.F x F1 x F2
The DOW F&EI is a measure of how hazardous the process is given by following matrix:
Table-3.15 (a) Hazard Matrix of DOW (F&EI)

Degree of Hazard Fire and Explosion Index
Light 0-60
Moderate 61-96
Intermediate 97-127
Heavy 128-158
Severe >159

I. Process: Motor Spirit (Operations like TW Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc.)
Computation of DOW F&EI based on Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazard (GPH) and
Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of Motor Spirit are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (b).
Table-3.15 (b) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for MS
Sl. Parameter Factor
MF Material Factor (MF) of Motor Spirit 16.00
NFPA Health rating (Nh) 1
NFPA Flammability rating (Nf) 3
NFPA Instability rating (Ni) 0
1. Estimation of General Process Hazard (Base) 1.00
1A Exothermic Reaction (range of input 0.3 - 1.25) 1.00
1B Endothermic Reaction (input range 0.2 - 0.4) 0.20
1C Material Handling and Transfer (input range 0.25 - 0.8) 0.50
1D Enclosed or Indoor Process or storage Units handling Flammable 0.90
materials
1E Ease of Access for Emergency Responders 0.35
1F Drainage and Spill Control 0.00
General Process Hazard (F1) 3.95
2. Estimation of Special Process Hazard (Base) 1.00
2A Toxicity of the material handled. 0.20
2B Process or Storage operates at vacuum (<500mmHg) -penalty 0.5 0.50
2C Operation in or near the flammable range (input range 0.0 - 0.8) 0.50
2D Dust Explosion (input range 0.0 - 2.0) 0.10
2E Pressure Penalty 0.05
2F Low Temperature Operation 0.00
2G Liquids or gases in Storage 1.07
(Total : 13177000 kg)
2H Solids in Storage or Process 0.00
2I Corrosion and Erosion (input range 0.0 -0.75) 0.20
2J Leakage, Joints, packing, flexible joints 0.30
2K Use of Fired Equipment 0.00
2L Hot Oil Heat Exchange Equipment 0.00
2M Rotating Equipment 0.30
Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) 4.22
Fire & Explosion Index = M.F x F1 x F2 = 16 x 3.95 x 4.22 267

II. Process: HSD (Operations like TW Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc.)
Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of HSD are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (c).
Table-3.15 (c) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for HSD
MF Material Factor (MF) of HSD 10
materials
2G Liquids or gases in Storage (Existing : 25259000 kg) 1.84

III. Process: SKO (Operations like TW Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc.)
Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of SKO are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (d).
Table-3.15 (d) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for SKO
MF Material Factor (MF) of SKO 10
materials

IV. Process: Ethanol (Operations like TT Receipt, Storage, Pumping,

Blending etc.)
Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of Ethanol are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (e).
Table-3.15 (e) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for Ethanol
MF Material Factor (MF) of Ethanol 16
1D Enclosed or Indoor Process or storage Units handling Flammable
materials 0.90

Table-3.15 (f) Process wise Hazard Classification based on DOW (F&EI)

Process DOW F&EI Hazard
Classification
Motor Spirit
(Operations like Tank Wagon Receipt, TLF; 267 Severe

PHO, ITT, TLD etc)
HSD
(Operations like Tank Wagon Receipt, TLF; 189 Severe

PHO, ITT, TLD etc)
SKO
(Operations like Tank Wagon Receipt, TLF; 124 Intermediate

PHO, ITT, TLD etc)
Ethanol
(Operations like TT receipt, storage, pumping, 181 Severe

blending etc)

4. MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
4.1 The Prelude (MCCA)
A major emergency of any process includes damage to equipment, serious injury or loss of life.
It may cause extensive damage to property and serious disruption both inside and outside the
facility. Although, the emergency may be caused by a number of different factors, e.g. process
failure, human error, earthquake, machine crash or sabotage etc., it will normally manifest itself
in three basic forms
 Fire
 Explosion
 Toxic Hazard to Human Health and Environment
Risk Assessment provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility poses to the
public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous events and
categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible events are
calculated for different combinations of various aspects to simulate worst possible scenario.
These consequence predictions are combined to provide numerical measures of the risk for the
entire facility. MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with
maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include
quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the selection of
accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgment and
expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis. Detailed study helps in
plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in order to assess the magnitude of a
particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in
addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss of life, property and ecological
imbalances.
MCA analysis depends on following factors
 Preparation of an inventory of major accidents.

 Identification of potential hazard and representative failure cases from the processing units.
 Chemical release scenarios.
Fatal Accident Frequency Rate (FAFR) is defined as the number of deaths per 108 exposed
hours; this corresponds roughly to the number of death over a working life time among a group
of thousand workers. This is also referred as Fatal Accident Rate (FAR).
The risk ‘R’ to an individual can be computed as:
Where,
‘x’ is number of deaths in a particular type of potential accident,
‘F’ is the frequency of such an accident,
‘n’ is number of the types of potential accident,
‘N’ is total number of people at risk.

Accident Consequence Analysis
A hazard assessment is complete only if the consequences of the possible accident are known.
For this reason, the last step of a hazard assessment is to analyze the consequences that a
potential major accident could have on the plant itself, on the employees, on the neighborhood
and the environment. The results of the analysis can be used to determine which protective
measures, such as fire fighting systems, alarm system, or pressure-relief systems, have to be
installed. An accident consequence analysis should includes the following:
 A description of the accident (tank rupture, pipe rupture, failure of safety valve, fire)
 An estimate of the quantity of material released (toxic, flammable, explosive)
 A calculation of the dispersion of the material released (gas or evaporating liquid)
 An estimate of the effect (toxic, heat radiation, blast wave).
4.2 The Process of MCCA
The MCA analysis, therefore, involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of
potential vulnerability. Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:
 Review of Past Accidents.
 Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases
 Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the hazardous
material
 Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities and
atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure waves
 Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental release of
chemicals
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) inclusive of HAZOP, FTA, ETA and F&EI as
well as Consequence Analysis inclusive of Release Modeling, FHA, and Estimation of Damage
Distances etc. are covered in various chapters of this report.
4.3 Review of Past Accidents
Analysis of events arising out of the unsafe conditions is one of the basic requirements for
ensuring safety in any facility. The data required for such an analysis has either to be generated
by monitoring and/or collected from the records of the past occurrences. This data, when
analyzed, helps in formulation of the steps towards mitigation of hazards faced commonly.
Trends in safety of various activities can be evaluated and actions can be planned accordingly, to
improve the safety. Data analysis helps in correlating the causal factors and the corrective steps
to be taken for controlling the accidents. It is, therefore, of vital importance to collect the data
methodically, based on potential incidents, sections involved, causes of failure and the
preventive measures taken. This helps to face future eventualities with more preparedness.
Various major accidents occurred in the past relevant to receipt, storage and distribution of POL
world over are summarized below to have an overview of what went wrong? Where it went
wrong? Are process, operation, maintenance and handling of facility adequate? This would help
in devising action plan to prevent the occurrence of such kind of untoward incidents.

Accident Location and Gist of the Incident happened and

Date consequences
November 23, 2003, A battery of crude oil tanks exploded on a lease near the
Crude Oil Tank Explosion intersection of Highway 349 and County Road 300 about
32 km south of Midland, TX. Perenco LLC.
According to the field superintendent for Perenco, an
electrical spark caused the fire: “There seemed to have a
leak on the ‘lack unit’.” A lack unit measures how much
oil moves through the tanks and checks oil content. When
the pumper checking the lease turned off the lack unit, an
electrical spark set the leaking oil on fire. The workers
quickly left the lease to turn off the 18 wells that sent oil
to the tank battery. They were about 400 m away from the
battery when it exploded 45 minutes later. About 640
barrels of oil; three stock tanks, three water tanks and
associated equipment were destroyed
December 20, 2003, An explosion occurred in a tank at an oil plant, causing a
Flange Failure Causes Tank Fire fire which burned for more than an hour near Houston,
TX. at Marcus Oil and Chemical. A spokesman for the
Houston Fire Department said: “A flange on the south
side of the tank broke or cracked and let the hot oil out.
When in turn hit the atmosphere at 700 degrees, it burst
into flames.”
The fire department said the blaze was never a
considerable danger. No one was ever evacuated. There
was only one minor injury – a twisted ankle – in the
incident.
The Houston Fire Department said this was at least the
third time they’ve been called to Marcus Oil and
Chemical in the last five or six years.
October 29, 2009, In the evening shift of October 29, 2009, the Indian Oil
Indian oil corporation Ltd, Corporation’s POL (Petroleum Oil Lubricants) Terminal
Jaipur at Sanganer in Jaipur was preparing to transfer Kerosine
(SKO) and Motor Spirit (MS) to the neighbouring BPCL
Terminal, a routine operation for these Installations. A
crew of four (one shift officer and three operators) were
manning the IOC Installation. Kerosine was “lined up”
(pipeline made through) first and thereafter the operating
crew proceeded to prepare the MS tank (tank 401-A) for
pumping to BPCL installation.
In the process of lining up the MS tank, at about 6.10 pm,
a huge leak of the product took place as a jet of liquid
from the “Hammer Blind Valve” on the delivery line of
the tank leading to the MS pump. This liquid MS which
rapidly generated vapours, soon overwhelmed and
incapacitated the operator carrying out the “line up”

operation. The shift officer, who was nearby, tried to help

the operator, but he too was affected by the vapours and
liquid, and had to be removed to hospital in a semi-
conscious state. The 2 nd operator, who was incidentally in
the canteen at the time, also rushed to the spot, but he was
also completely overpowered by the strong MS vapours
and liquid and could not be rescued. The 3rd operator on
the shift, who was supposed to be on site, had earlier left
for home on some personal work and was thus not
available to initiate any rescue or mitigating steps.
With none of the operating crew being available any more
for initiating any control actions, the leak continued
unabated, and by the time the senior staff and civil
authorities could reach the site, had already engulfed
almost the entire installation, making their entry not only
difficult but also dangerous.
After about an hour and 15 minutes of the leak having
started, there was a a massive explosion followed by a
huge fireball covering the entire installation. It is
estimated that in this one hour and 15 or 20 minutes of
uncontrolled leak, about 1000 tons of MS could have
escaped out, which would have generated enough vapour
to cause an explosion with the equivalence of 20 tons of
TNT.
The source of ignition, which triggered the explosion and
fire could have been from one of the non flame proof
electrical equipment in the Administrative Block, or from
a vehicle being started in the installation.
The fire which followed the explosion soon spread to all
other tanks and continued to rage for about 11 days. The
management of IOCL had taken a considered decision to
allow the petroleum products to burn out to avoid further
possibilities of accident in the installation in the interest of
public safety.
Ultimately the entire, about 60,000 KL of petroleum
products stored in the Terminal (equivalent of about 1000-
1200 retail outlets) at the time of the accident was
consumed in the fire, and the installation was totally
destroyed. Buildings in the immediate neighbourhood
were heavily damaged with minor damages and window
panes breakages occurring up to around 2 Km from the
site.
The total loss estimated on account of the fire and
explosion as reported by IOC in the Press, which includes
the loss for finished products, stores, fixed assets and
compensation for third party losses, amounted to approx.,
Rs. 280 crores.

Eleven people lost their lives in the accident – six from

IOCL and five outsiders, and several others were injured.
IMMEDIATE CAUSES
The immediate cause of the accident was the non-

observance of normal safe procedure involving
sequence of valve operation in the line up activity and an
engineering design which permitted use of a “Hammer
Blind Valve”, a device which is used for positively
isolating a pipeline.
The design of the Hammer Blind valve allows a large area

at the top of the valve (at the valve bonnet) to be
completely open every time the valve position needed to
be changed. It was through this open area that the liquid
MS had gushed out, when the tank was being lined up
(made ready for pumping to BPCL) because another valve
connecting to the tank was also open when the Hammer
Blind was in the changeover position
11 December 2005, the On Sunday 11 December 2005, a series of explosions and

Buncefield Incident, Hemel subsequent fire destroyed large parts of the Buncefield oil
Hempstead storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead, and caused
widespread damage to neighbouring properties.
The main explosion took place at 06.01:32 hours and was

of massive proportions. It was followed by a large fire that
engulfed 23 large fuel storage tanks over a high
proportion of the Buncefield site.
The incident injured 43 people. Fortunately, no one was

seriously hurt and there were no fatalities. Nevertheless,
there was significant damage to both commercial and
residential properties near the Buncefield site. About 2000
people had to be evacuated from their homes and sections
of the M1 motorway were closed. The fire burned for five
days, destroying most of the site and emitting a large
plume of smoke into the atmosphere that dispersed over
southern England and beyond.

4.4 Credible Accidents Involving Pipelines
14-05-1972 Hearne, TX
11-05-1977 Abqaiq, Saudi
08-07-1977 Fairbanks, AK
21-07-1979 Texas City, TX
30-01-1980 Bayamon, Purto Rico
01-04-1990 Syzran, USSR
25-05-1989 San Bernadino, CA
14-07-1990 Tyumen, USSR
19-07-1990 Rawalpindi, Pakistan
30-11-1990 Middle East
21-02-1991 Nr. Crdoba, Spain
16-03-1991 California
10-04-1991 Selznikha, USSR
21-04-1991 Columbia
04-06-1991 Lake Charles, US
19-10-1991 Mexico, Tabasco
04-03-1992 Chester Creek, US
22-04-1992 Guadalajara, Mexico
20-05-1992 Azerbaijan, Baku
19-08-1992 River Chusovaya, USSR
03-10-1992 Antioquia, Columbia
06-10-1992 Maidstone, Canada
20-10-1992 Caucasus, USSR
10-11-1992 Columbia
06-01-1993 Strelice, Czechoslovakia
12-01-1993 Tyumen, Oblast, USSR
06-03-1993 Siberia, USSR
06-04-1993 Padilla, Bolivia
20-04-1993 Port Neches, TX US
04-06-1993 El Paso, TX US
04-06-1993 Paris, France
07-06-1993 Fazier Park, Calif, US
12-07-1993 Arauca, Columbia
30-07-1993 Quito, Ecquador
04-08-1993 Remeios, Columbia
14-08-1993 Barrancabermeja, Columbia
28-09-1993 Cairo Egypt

4.5 Failure Scenarios (Probability of Failures)
(a) Pipeline Failures

The pipe system consists of pipelines, isolation valves, NRV, ROV, pipe supporting racks etc.
Pipe failure may be due to many reasons, plausible could be:
 Pipeline failure occurs due to liquid hammer, vibration and fatigue of pipeline or
supporting structure or holding structure, pipeline and flange leaks, vapour lock,
cavitations, corrosion due failure of cathodic protection, stress-corrosion cracking,
thermal expansion, cyclic stress, structural failure and over pressurizing pipe system.
 Pipe blockages are known to unintended valve closure, human error, failure of valve to
operate, impurities and sludge formation blocking flow, broken parts in pipeline,
fabrication components, welding electrodes, weld failures, over-stressing, and damages
during installation.
 Other causes of pipeline failures include natural calamities like lightning, storm, flood,
earthquake and vehicle crash and sabotage.
 Valve leaks through flanges, seals, etc. due to corrosion wear or inconsistent engineering
practices are known.
 The other significant reasons which can aggravate the situation are delays in activating
emergency response procedure, settlement of land under pipelines, road work near
pipelines resulting in damage to pipelines etc.
(b) Pump Failures

Most plausible reasons for Pump Failure may be following:
 Pump failures due to wear, drying at packing, hard substances like grit, packing / seal
failure, blockages on suction and discharge sides, dry running are well known.
 Control system for valve operations etc. can fail due to incorrect setting or operation,
location of instruments, instrument failure, inconsistent maintenance practices including
contact failures and incorrect calibration. Such situations include failure of densitometer,
inadvertent inhibition of alarm / warning systems, bye-passing of critical interlocks etc.
 Engineering practices include Operation, Inspection, Startup shutdown practices, leak

detection and maintenance practices.
 The failure modes for liquids are significant for the reasons, pipeline pressure falls
rapidly following puncture owing to relative incompressibility of liquid. Initial high rate
of release reduces rapidly. The drain down the pipeline will be driven by system
hydraulic head initially and finally by static head, until equilibrium condition reaches.
 Explosion hazards occur in pipelines with release of product transported which comes in
contract with outside atmosphere creates a flammable atmosphere and can present an
explosion hazard also. Flame travel within pipe is known as deflagration and propagates
from burning gases, Detonation is characterized by pressure of shockwave in material
and rate of propagation would be higher than velocity of sound.

(c) Tank/ Storage Vessel Failures
In case of tanks/ storage vessels containment failure can take place and contents spread over.
However, the spread is limited to dyke size (if dyke is properly sized) and if ignited, can form a
pool fire and result in intense heat radiation and also endanger neighboring tanks and contents, if
the fire is not controlled.
 The causes for containment failure could be in general, over filling, collapse due to
vacuum, mechanical damage, external impact, rupture of tank shell.
 Reasons for overfill could be instrument failure, lack of attention, wrong settings on
instrument etc.
 Collapse due to vacuum can occur, if pumping out is carried out when the vent line is
closed or blocked due to other reasons.
 The sources of ignition of spilled product or ignition of vapour could be due external
source, lightning or electro static discharge.
(d) Frequencies of Failures Rates
The failure frequency data as given hereinafter represents typical facilities with similar
operations. The failure rates have been obtained from review of historical data for storage tanks.
The base event frequencies adopted for QRA study of Petroleum Storage Depot are summarized
in following tables:
Table-4.5 (a) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for road tankers and tank wagons
Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for road tankers and tank wagons (Atmospheric Tank)
Instantaneous release of the complete inventory 1 x 10-5 y-1
Continuous release from a hole the size of the largest connection (if the tank is partly 5 x 10-7 y-1
filled with liquid, the release is modeled from the liquid phase out of the largest liquid
connection.
Full bore rupture of the loading/ unloading hose (the outflow is from both sides of the full 4 x 10-6 y-1
bore rupture)
Leak of the loading/ unloading hose (the outflow is from a leak with an effective diameter 4 x 10-5 y-1
of 10% of the nominal diameter with maximum of 50 mm.
Full bore rupture of the loading/ unloading arm (outflow from both sides of the full bore 3 x 10-8 y-1
rupture)
Leak of the loading/ unloading arm (Outflow from a leak with an effective diameter of 3 x 10-7 y-1
10% of the nominal diameter, with a maximum of 50 mm.
(Source: CPR 18E Purple Book)

Table-4.5 (b) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for atmospheric tanks and vessels
Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for atmospheric tanks and vessels
Situation Single containment Tank with a In-ground tank

tank protective outer shell
Instantaneous release of the 5 x 10-6 y-1 5 x 10-7 y-1 -
complete inventory, directly to the
atmosphere
Instantaneous release of the - 5 x 10-7 y-1 1 x 10-8 y-1

complete inventory, from the
primary container into the
unimpaired secondary container or
outer shell
Continuous release of the complete 5 x 10-6 y-1 5 x 10-7 y-1 -

inventory in 10 minutes at a
constant rate of release, directly
into the atmosphere
Continuous release of the complete - 5 x 10-7 y-1 -

inventory in 10 minutes at a
constant rate of release, from the
primary container into the
unimpaired secondary container or
outer shell
Continuous release from a hole 1 x 10-4 y-1 - -

with an effective diameter of 10
mm, directly to the atmosphere
Continuous release from a hole - 1 x 10-4 y-1 -

with an effective diameter of 10
mm, from the primary container
into the unimpaired secondary
container or outer shell
Table-4.5 (c) Atmospheric storage tank fire frequencies

Type of Fire Floating Roof Fixed Roof Fixed plus Internal
Tank Tank Floating Roof Tank
Rim seal fire 1.6 x 10-3 y-1 - 1.6 x 10-3 y-1
Full surface fire on roof 1.2 x 10-4 y-1 - -
Internal explosion & full surface fire - 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 9.0 x 10-5 y-1
Internal explosion without fire - 2.5 x 10-5 y-1 2.5 x 10-5 y-1
Vent fire - 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 -
Small bund fire 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 9.0 x 10-5 y-1
Large bund fire (full bund area) 6.0 x 10-5 y-1 6.0 x 10-5 y-1 6.0 x 10-5 y-1
(Source: OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory)

Table-4.5 (d) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for Pipes

Description of Item Full bore rupture Leak (outflow is from a leak with
an effective diameter of 10% of the
nominal diameter, a maximum of
50 mm
Nominal diameter <75 mm 1 x 10-6 m-1 y-1 5 x 10-6 m-1 y-1

75 mm ≤ nominal diameter ≤ 150 mm 3 x 10-7 m-1 y-1 2 x 10-6 m-1 y-1
Nominal diameter >150 mm 1 x 10-7 m-1 y-1 5 x 10-7 m-1 y-1
Table-4.5 (e) Loss of Containment (LOC) frequencies for Pumps

Situation Catastrophic failure (full Leak (outflow is from leak with an
bore rupture of the largest effective diameter of 10% of the
connecting pipeline) nominal diameter of the largest
connecting pipeline with a maximum
of 50 mm)
Pumps without additional 1 x 10-4 y-1 5 x 10-4 y-1

provisions
Pumps with a wrought steel 5 x 10-5 y-1 2.5 x 10-4 y-1

containment
Table-4.5 (f) Centrifugal Pump Failure Rate

Process Pipe diameter Hole Size (mm) Failure Rate (per year)
D≤100 mm 5 4.0 x 10-3
20 5.6 x 10-4
50 9.9 x 10-5
Pipe diameter 5.8 x 10-5
D>100 mm 5 4.0 x 10-3
20 5.6 x 10-4
50 9.9 x 10-5
100 2.9 x 10-5
Pipe diameter 2.9 x 10-5
Table-4.5 (g) Flange Failure Rates

Process Pipe Diameter (D) Hole Size (mm) Failure Rate (per year)
D ≤ 50 mm 5 3.0 x 10-5
20 1.2 x 10-5
50 mm <D ≤ 100 mm 5 3.4 x 10-5
20 6.9 x 10-6
100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 4.4 x 10-5
20 9.5 x 10-6
D >150 mm 5 7.0 x 10-5
20 1.4 x 10-5

Table-4.5 (h) Manual Valve Failure Rates

D ≤ 20 mm 5 2.6 x 10-5
20 8.2 x 10-6
20 mm <D ≤ 50 mm 5 2.6 x 10-5
20 5.0 x 10-6
50 3.2 x 10-6
50 mm <D ≤ 100 mm 5 3.4 x 10-5
20 6.9 x 10-6
50 1.5 x 10-6
100 2.0 x 10-6
100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 4.2 x 10-5
20 8.6 x 10-6
50 1.8 x 10-6
100 6.3 x 10-7
150 1.8 x 10-6
100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 5.2 x 10-5
20 1.1 x 10-5
50 2.6 x 10-6
100 9.3 x 10-7
300 2.0 x 10-6
Table-4.5 (i) Actuated Valve Failure Rates
D ≤ 20 mm 5 2.8 x 10-4
20 6.1 x 10-5
20 mm <D ≤ 50 mm 5 2.8 x 10-4
20 4.5 x 10-5
50 1.6 x 10-5
50 mm <D ≤ 100 mm 5 2.6 x 10-4
20 4.4 x 10-5
50 8.3 x 10-6
100 9.4 x 10-6
100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 2.4 x 10-4
20 4.1 x 10-5
50 7.7 x 10-6
100 2.5 x 10-6
150 6.2 x 10-6

4.6 The Maximum Tolerable Criteria of RISK: ALARP
The risk is regarded as intolerable if it is above the "maximum tolerable criterion". The
objective of risk management is to make the risk "As Low As Reasonably Practicable"
(ALARP), which shall be least impacting the neighbourhood. While conducting the risk
analysis, a quantitative determination of risk involves three major steps:
IRPA (Individual Risk per Annum)
IRPA Fundamental improvements needed.

Intolerable Only to be considered if there are no
alternatives and people are well informed
10-3/yr
Too high, significant effort required to
improve
10-4/yr
The ALARP or Tolerable
High, investigate alternatives
region (Risk is tolerated only)
10-5/yr
Low, consider cost-effective alternatives
Broadly Acceptable region
(no need for detailed working to 10-6/yr
demonstrate ALARP)
Negligible, maintain normal precautions
NOTE : A risk of 10 per million per year, or 10-5/Year, effectively means that any person
standing at a point of this level of risk would have a 1 in 100 000 chance of being fatally injured
per year.
Further, in order to ensure objective of making the risk "as low as reasonably practicable"
(ALARP), the facility has to adhere to following:
 The site is maintained to an acceptable level and that all statuary regulations are applied.
 The detailed engineering designs are as per the relevant guidelines.
 The instrumentation and electrical components comply with the relevant standards
requirements.
 All personnel have been adequately trained for their respective tasks and organizational
measures are clearly followed.
A number of incident scenarios have been simulated, taking into account the prevailing
meteorological conditions, which are described in the consequence analysis alongwith the risk
contours.

Individual & Societal Risk
(i) Individual Risk
Individual risk is the combination of the frequency and consequence data for each hazardous
scenario, as has been illustrated below:
FN Curve showing Individual Risk tolerability
Intolerable Risk
Frequency (F)/ Yr
Tolerable if ALARP
Tolerable Risk
No. of Fatalities (N)
Worst Case Scenario Failure/LOC Area of Impact Anticipated

Frequency/year Fatalities
Instantaneous release of complete inventory from tanks 5.0 x 10-6 License Area 05
Full bore rupture of loading/unloading hose 4.0 x 10-6 License Area 02
Full bore rupture of loading/unloading arm 3.0 x 10-8 License Area 02
-4
Catastrophic failure of pumps 1.0 x 10 License Area 02
Internal explosion and full surface fire 9.0 x 10-5 License Area 05

(ii) Societal Risk
Societal risk is the combination of the frequency and consequence data for each hazardous
scenario on the receptors in the vicinity of the project site, as has been illustrated below:
FN Curve showing Societal Risk tolerability
Intolerable Risk
Frequency (F)/ Yr
Tolerable if ALARP
Tolerable Risk
No. of Fatalities (N)
Worst Case Scenario Failure/LOC Area of Impact Anticipated

Frequency/year Fatalities
Instantaneous release of complete inventory from tanks 5.0 x 10-6 License Area & 05+02 (07)
vicinity
Failure of Tank Lorry on Road (Release of Complete Inventory) 1.0 x 10-5 License Area & 02
vicinity
Internal explosion and full surface fire 9.0 x 10-5 License Area & 05 + 02 (07)
vicinity
With appropriate interventions with stringent monitoring of effectiveness and

regulatory compliance, the individual and societal risk would further be
curtailed.

5. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
5.1 The Objective of Consequence Analysis

The processes which have potential of risk, needs to be managed in such a way that the inherent
and unnecessary risk can be contained and minimized through best practices. In order to achieve
this objective potential risk has to be estimated in quantitative terms by means of modeling.
Since risk is a combination of frequency and consequence, the impact analysis is a necessary
step of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). An accident begins with an incident, which usually
results in loss of containment of material, thereby posing hazardous properties such as
flammability, explosivity, toxicity etc. Typical incidents may include the rupture of a pipeline, a
hole in a tank or pipe, runaway reaction, external fire impinging on the vessel and heating it.
Source models are used to quantitatively define the loss of containment scenario by estimating
the discharge rate, quantity released, duration of release, extent of flash and evaporation from
liquid pool and aerosol formation etc.
5.2 Modeling of Damage Distance due to Fire & Explosion
ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) model predicts how a hazardous gas
cloud disperses in the atmosphere after an accidental chemical release. ALOHA can predict rates
of chemical release from broken pipes, leaking tanks, and evaporating puddles, and can model
the dispersion of both neutrally buoyant and heavier-than-air gases. ALOHA is based on a
continuous point source with a Gaussian plume distribution.
I. Hazard Criteria for Modeling using ALOHA
ALOHA is intended for use during hazardous chemical emergencies and has been designed to
consider the following hazard criteria:
(a) Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)

AEGLs estimate the concentrations at which most people—including sensitive individuals will
begin to experience health effects if they are exposed to a hazardous chemical for a specific
length of time (duration). A chemical may have up to three AEGL values as follows, for a given
exposure duration, each of which corresponds to a specific tier of health effects.
 AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration, expressed as parts per million (ppm) or milligrams
per cubic meter (mg/m3), of a substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health
effects.
 AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above
which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could
experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired
ability to escape.
 AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above
which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could
experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic non-sensory effects.
However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of
exposure.

(b) Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)

The ERPGs are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs), which is predicted by ALOHA for the area
where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The ERPGs were
developed as planning guidelines, to anticipate human adverse health effects caused by exposure
to toxic chemicals. The ERPGs are three-tiered guidelines with one common denominator: a 1-
hour contact duration.
ERPG 1 : The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild
transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor.
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing
irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's
ability to take protective action.
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-
threatening health effects.
(c) Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs)
The TEELs are temporary Toxic Levels of Concern similar to ERPGs, and defined by the U.S.
Department of Energy for use when ERPGs aren't available. There are three TEEL levels that
are important for responders to consider:
TEEL-1 : Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all
individuals could be exposed without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or
perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.
individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious
health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.
individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.
(d) Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH)
The IDLH level is a limit originally established for selecting respirators for use in workplaces by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). A chemical's IDLH is an
estimate of the maximum concentration in the air to which a healthy worker could be exposed
without suffering permanent or escape-impairing health effects.
(e) Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)
ALOHA estimates the thermal radiation hazard from a fireball and/or a pool fire. Other
potential BLEVE hazards include overpressure, hazardous fragments, smoke, and toxic
byproducts from the fire. A common BLEVE scenario happens when a container of flammable
liquid or gas is heated by fire, increasing the inside pressure till its ruptures and failure. When
the container fails, the chemical is released in an explosion. If the chemical is above its boiling
point when the container fails, some or all of the liquid will flash-boil -- that is, instantaneously
become a gas. ALOHA assumes that any liquid not consumed in the fireball will form a Pool
Fire. A pool fire occurs when a flammable liquid forms a puddle on the ground and catches on
fire. Thermal radiation is the primary hazard associated with a pool fire.

(f) Vapor Cloud Explosion

When a flammable chemical is released into the atmosphere, it forms a vapor cloud, which tends
to disperse as it travels downwind. If the cloud encounters an ignition source, the parts of the
cloud where the concentration is within the flammable range (between the Lower and Upper
Explosive Limits) will burn. The speed at which the flame front moves through the cloud
determines whether it is a deflagration or a detonation. The severity of a vapor cloud explosion
depends on the chemical, the cloud size at the time of ignition, the type of ignition, and the
congestion level inside the cloud. Two primary hazards are associated with a vapor cloud
explosion: overpressure and hazardous fragments.
(g) Jet Fire
A jet fire, also referred to as a flame jet, occurs when a flammable chemical is rapidly released
from an opening in a container or pipe and immediately catches on fire - much like the flame
from a blowtorch. ALOHA can model a jet fire from the Pipeline and Tank sources. A two-
phase jet fire occurs when a gas that has been liquefied under pressure is released. Because the
liquid evaporates as it escapes, the chemical is released as an aerosol spray - that is, a mixture of
gas and tiny liquid droplets. ALOHA assumes the jet fire release is oriented vertically, although
the wind can tilt the flames in the downwind direction. Thermal radiation is the primary hazard
associated with a jet fire. Other potential jet fire hazards include smoke, toxic byproducts from
the fire, and secondary fires and explosions in the surrounding area.
(h) Flammable Level of Concern (LOC)
A Flammable Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold concentration of fuel in the air above,
which a flammable hazard may exist. Generally, this LOC will be some fraction of the Lower
Explosive Limit (LEL). Out of the ALOHA's default LOCs, the red zone represents the worst
hazard. In an actual vapor cloud, there will be areas where the concentration is higher than the
average and areas where the concentration is lower than the average. This is called
concentration patchiness. Because of concentration patchiness, there will be areas, called
pockets, where the chemical is in the flammable range even though the average concentration
has fallen below the LEL. ALOHA uses 60% of the LEL as the default LOC for the red threat
zone. Another common threat level used by responders is 10% of the LEL. ALOHA uses this
concentration as the default LOC for the yellow threat zone.
(i) Atmospheric Stability Classes
The atmosphere may be more or less turbulent at any given time, depending on the amount of
incoming solar radiation as well as the factor like atmospheric stability classes (A-F), each
representing a different degree of turbulence in the atmosphere. Stability class has a big effect on
ALOHA's prediction of the threat zone size for dispersion scenarios. Under unstable conditions, a
dispersing gas mixes rapidly with the air around it. ALOHA expects that the cloud will not extend as
far downwind as it would under more stable conditions, because the pollutant is soon diluted below
the LOC, and ALOHA displays a shorter threat zone than it would for more stable conditions.
# Unstable
When moderate-to-strong incoming solar radiation heats air near the ground thereby causing it
to rise and generating large eddies, the atmosphere is considered unstable (relatively turbulent).
 Very Unstable (Stability Class A)
 Unstable (Stability Class B)
 Slightly Unstable (Stability Class C)
# Neutral
Relatively strong wind speeds and moderate solar radiation are associated with neutral stability
(moderate turbulence): Stability Class D

# Stable
When solar radiations are relatively weak or absent, air near the surface has a reduced tendency
to rise, and less turbulence develops. The atmosphere is considered to be stable (less turbulent)
 Slightly Stable (Stability Class E)
 Stable (Stability Class F)
Table-5.2 (a) Stability Classes
Wind Speed Day : Incoming Solar Radiation Night : Cloud Cover
Less than 2 m/s A A-B B E F
2-3 m/s A-B B C E F
3-5 m/s B B-C C D E
5-6 m/s C C-D D D D
More than 6m/s C D D D D
II. Impacts of Thermal Radiation Flux

Impacts of Heat Radiation Flux (as per IS 15656: 2006) are given in table-4.2 (b) to assess the
damage distances of jet fire, pool fire and fire ball.
Table-5.2 (b) Impacts of Heat Radiation Flux (IS 15656: 2006)
Heat Radiation Impacts
4.0 kW/m2 Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s.
4.7 kW/m2 Accepted value to represent injury.
10.0 kW/m2 Second degree burn after 25 s.
12.5 kW/m2 Minimum energy required for melting of plastic
25.0 kW/m2 Minimum energy required to ignite wood
37.5 kW/m2 Sufficient to cause damage to the equipment
III. Impacts of Explosion

As per IS 15656: 2006, the effect of overpressure on human being is twofold:
(a) Direct effect of overpressure on human organs
When the pressure change is sudden, a pressure difference arises which can lead to damage of
some organs. Extent of damage varies with the overpressure along with factors such as position
of the person, protection inside a shelter, body weight as well as duration of overpressure. The
organs prone to get affected by overpressure are ear drum and lung.
(b) Effect of debris from structure damage affecting human.
The overpressure duration is important for determining the effects on structure. The positive
pressure phase can last for 10 to 250 milliseconds. The same overpressure can markedly have
different effects depending upon duration. The explosion overpressures of interest are:
Table-5.2 (c) Impacts of Overpressure (IS 15656: 2006)
Overpressure Impacts
1.7 bar (24.7 psi) Bursting of lung
0.3 bar (4.35 psi) Major damage to plant structure
0.2 bar (2.9 psi) Minor damage to steel frames
0.1 bar (1.45 psi) Repairable damage to plant equipment and structure
0.07 bar (1.02 psi) Shattering of glass
0.01 bar (0.145 psi) Crack in glass

IV. Inputs Parameter for ALOHA

(Modeling for MS Tank T-01A, T-01B & T01C in Dyke-I)
Site Data
Facility Proposed IOCL Depot
Location Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, District Anantapur
Geocodes 15°09’45.45”N; 77°27’8.34”E
Chemical Data
Fuel Gasoline (Motor Spirit)
Mol. Wt. 72 g/mol
AEGL-1 (60 min) N/A
AEGL-2 (60 min) 2900 ppm
AEGL-3 (60 min) 8600 ppm
IDLH 1100 ppm
LEL 10400 ppm
UEL 70400 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point 66.8°C
Vapour Pressure 0.25 atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration 26.3%
Atmospheric Data
Wind Speed 3.0 m/s from 90° true at 3 m
Pre-dominant Wind Direction (from) East
Ground Roughness Open Country
Cloud Cover 5 tenth
Stability Class C
Inversion No Inversion Height
Air Temperature 30°C
Relative Humidity 50%
Source Strength MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C
Tank Diameter 24 m 24 m 24 m
Tank Height 16 m 16 m 16 m
Tank is 70% full - Tank Contains Liquid Only (MS) Liquid Only (MS) Liquid Only (MS)
Internal Temperature 30° 30° 30°
Tank Volume 7238 m3 7238 m3 7238 m3
Chemical Mass in Tank 3910008 kg 3910008 kg 3910008 kg
Circular Opening Diameter of Leak 5 cm 5 cm 5 cm
Opening from tank bottom 1.0 m 1.0 m 1.0 m
Ground Type Concrete Concrete Concrete
Ground Temperature Equal to ambient Equal to ambient Equal to ambient
Modeling Scenario-I : Leaking Tank, Fuel (MS) is not burning & form an evaporating puddle
ALOHA limited the release duration to 1 hour
Assuming that :
 MS Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank
 Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning)
 The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed an evaporating puddle
 Wind Direction from East
Parameters MS Tank MS Tank MS Tank
T-01A T-01B T-01C
Total Amount Released 10482 kg 10482 kg 10482 kg
Max Average Sustained Release Rate (averaged over a minute or more) 217 kg/ min 217 kg/ min 217 kg/ min
The spread diameter of the puddle 36 m 36 m 36 m

Model Run Heavy Gas

Threat Modelled Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud
Tank ID (MS) MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C
Red {8600 ppm = AEGL-3 (60 min)} 39 m 39 m 39 m
Orange {2900 ppm = AEGL-2 (60 min)} 80 m 80 m 80 m
Yellow {N/A = AEGL-1 (60 min)} No recommended LOC value
Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud

MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking
TLF Area (8-Bay)

MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking
TLF Area (8-Bay)


MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking
TLF Area (8-Bay)
Model Run Heavy Gas

Threat Modelled Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud
Tank ID (MS) MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C
Red (7200 ppm = 60%LEL = Flame Pockets) 44 m 44 m 44 m
Yellow (1200 ppm = 10%LEL) 142 m 142 m 142 m

Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud




Threat Modelled Overpressure (blast force) from

Vapour Cloud Explosion
Type of Ignition Ignited by spark or flame
Tank ID (MS Tank) MS Tank MS Tank MS Tank
T-01A T-01B T-01C
24.7 psi (1.7 bar): Bursting of lung LOC never exceeded
4.35 psi (0.3 bar) : Major damage to plant equipment structure 29 m 29 m 29 m
2.9 psi (0.2 bar) : Minor damage to steel frame 32 m 32 m 32 m
1.45 psi (0.1 bar) : Reparable damage to plant and structure 44 m 44 m 44 m
1.02 psi (0.07 bar) : Shattering of glass 55 m 55 m 55 m
0.5 psi (0.03 bar) : Crack in glass 95 m 95 m 95 m
Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion

24.7 psi (1.7 bar) to 2.9 psi (0.2 bar)


24.7 psi (1.7 bar) to 2.9 psi (0.2 bar)

24.7 psi (1.7 bar) to 2.9 psi (0.2 bar)


1.45 psi (0.1 bar) to 0.5 psi (0.03 bar)

1.45 psi (0.1 bar) to 0.5 psi (0.03 bar)

1.45 psi (0.1 bar) to 0.5 psi (0.03 bar)

Modeling Scenario-II : Leaking Tank, Fuel (MS) is burning & forms a pool fire
ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour
Assuming that :
 Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank
 Wind Direction from East
Parameters MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C
Total Amount Burned 13783 kg 13783 kg 13783 kg
Maximum Burn Rate 231 kg/min 231 kg/min 231 kg/min
The spread diameter of the burning puddle 6.8 m 6.8 m 6.8 m
Maximum Flame Length 18 m 18 m 18 m
Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Pool

Fire
T-01A T-01B T-01C
4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 34 m 34 m 34 m
4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 32 m 32 m 32 m
10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 23 m 23 m 23 m
12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 20 m 20 m 20 m
25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 13 m 13 m 13 m
37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment <10 m <10 m <10 m

Thermal Radiations from Pool Fire

4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire

4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire

4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire


12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2
MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire

12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2
MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire


12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2
MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire
Modeling Scenario-III : BLEVE, Tank explodes & fuel (MS) burns in fireball
Assuming that :
 Wind Direction from E
Parameters MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C
Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 100% 100% 100%

Fireball Diameter 914 m 914 m 914 m
Burn Duration 40 secs 40 secs 40 secs
Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Fireball

T-01A T-01B T-01C
4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 2.9 km 2.9 km 2.9 km
4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 2.6 km 2.6 km 2.6 km
10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 1.8 km 1.8 km 1.8 km
12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 1.6 km 1.6 km 1.6 km
25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 1.1 km 1.1 km 1.1 km
37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment 863 m 863 m 863 m

Thermal Radiations from Fireball (BLEVE)

4.0 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10.0 kW/m2
MS Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball

12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2
MS Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball

V. Inputs Parameter for ALOHA

(Modeling for HSD Tanks T-02A, 02B & 02C)
Site Data
Facility IOCL Depot
Location Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, District Anantapur
Geocodes 15°09’45.45” N; 77°27’11.69”E
Chemical Data
Fuel High Speed Diesel
Mol. Wt. 142 g/mol
PAC-1 6.6 ppm
PAC-2 73 ppm
PAC-3 440 ppm
LEL 7500 ppm
UEL 54000 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point 445°K
Atmospheric Data
Wind Speed 3.0 m/s from 90° true at 3 m
Pre-dominant Wind Direction (from) East
Cloud Cover 5 tenth
Stability Class D
Air Temperature 30°C
Source Strength HSD Tank 02A HSD Tank 02B HSD Tank 02C
Tank Diameter 30 m 30 m 30 m
Tank Height 15 m 15 m 15 m
Tank is 70% full - Tank Contains Liquid Only (HSD) Liquid Only (HSD) Liquid Only (HSD)
Internal Temperature 30° 30° 30°
Tank Volume 10603 m3 10603 m3 10603 m3
Chemical Mass in Tank 5925000 kg 5925000 kg 5925000 kg
Circular Opening Diameter of Leak 5 cm 5 cm 5 cm
Opening from tank bottom 1.0 m 1.0 m 1.0 m
Ground Type Concrete Concrete Concrete
Ground Temperature Equal to ambient Equal to ambient Equal to ambient
Modeling Scenario-I : Leaking Tank, Fuel (HSD) is not burning & form an evaporating puddle
ALOHA limited the release duration to 1 hour
Assuming that :
 HSD Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank
HSD Tanks
HSD Tank 02A HSD Tank 02B HSD Tank 02C
Total Amount Released 181 kg 181 kg 181 kg
Max Average Sustained Release Rate 5.26 kg/min 5.26 kg/min 5.26 kg/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
The spread diameter of the puddle 42 m 42 m 42 m

Model Run Gaussian

Tank ID (HSD Tanks) HSD Tank 02A HSD Tank 02B HSD Tank 02C
Red (440 ppm = PAC3) 21 m 21 m 21 m
Orange (73 ppm = PAC-2) 50 m 50 m 50 m
Yellow (6.6 ppm = PAC-1) 353 m 353 m 353 m

HSD Tank T-02B (Dyke-II) is leaking


HSD Tank T-02A (Dyke-II) is leaking

HSD Tank T-02C (Dyke-II) is leaking
Modeling Scenario-II : Leaking Tank, Fuel (HSD) is burning & forms a pool fire
ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour. Assuming that :
Parameters HSD Tanks T-02A HSD Tank T-02B HSD Tank T-02C
Total Amount Burned 5167 kg 5167 kg 5167 kg
Maximum Burn Rate 87.1 kg/min 87.1 kg/min 87.1 kg/min
The spread diameter of the burning puddle 5.0 m 5.0 m 5.0 m
Maximum Flame Length 11 m 11 m 11 m
Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Pool Fire

Tank ID (HSD Tank) HSD Tanks HSD Tank HSD Tank
T-02A T-02B T-02C
4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 22 m 22 m 22 m
4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 20 m 20 m 20 m
10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 15 m 15 m 15 m
12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 14 m 14 m 14 m
25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood <10 m <10 m <10 m
37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment <10 m <10 m <10 m


4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
HSD Tank T-02B (Dyke-II) is leaking & burning in pool fire


4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
HSD Tank T-02A (Dyke-II) is leaking & burning in pool fire

4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
HSD Tank T-02C (Dyke-II) is leaking & burning in pool fire
Modeling Scenario-III : BLEVE, Tank explodes & fuel (HSD) burns in fireball
Assuming that :
Parameters HSD Tank T-02A HSD Tank T-02B HSD Tank T-02C
Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 100% 100% 100%
Fireball Diameter 992 m 992 m 992 m
Burn Duration 43 secs 43 secs 43 secs
Tank ID (MS Tank) HSD Tank HSD Tank HSD Tank

T-02A T-02B T-02C
4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 3.1 km 3.1 km 3.1 km
4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 4.7 km 4.7 km 4.7 km
10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 2.0 km 2.0 km 2.0 km
12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 1.7 km 1.7 km 1.7 km
25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 1.2 km 1.2 km 1.2 km
37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment 924 m 924 m 924 m


12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2
HSD Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball

4.0 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10.0 kW/m2
HSD Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball

VI. Inputs Parameter for ALOHA

(Modeling for SKO Tanks T-03A, T-03B)
Site Data
Facility IOCL Depot
Location Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Anantapur
Geocodes 15°09’42.24”N; 77°27’7.56”E
Chemical Data
Fuel Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO)
Mol. Wt. 170 g/mol
PAC-1 1.7 ppm
PAC-2 18 ppm
PAC-3 110 ppm
LEL 6000 ppm
UEL 49000 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point 487°K
Ambient Saturation Concentration 282 ppm
Atmospheric Data
Wind Speed 3.0 m/s from E at 3 m
Pre-dominant Wind Direction (from) E
Cloud Cover 5 tenth
Stability Class C
Air Temperature 30°c
Source strength SKO Tanks
Parameters SKO Tank T-03A SKO Tank T-03B
Tank Diameter 14 m 14 m
Tank Height 12.5 m 12.5 m
Tank is 70% full - Tank Contains Liquid Only (SKO) Liquid Only (SKO)
Internal Temperature 30° 30°
Tank Volume 1924 m3 1924 m3
Chemical Mass in Tank 1000498 kg 1000498 kg
Circular Opening Diameter of Leak 5 cm 5 cm
Opening from tank bottom 1.0 m 1.0 m
Ground Type Concrete Concrete
Ground Temperature Equal to ambient Equal to ambient
Modeling Scenario-I : Leaking Tank, Fuel (SKO) is not burning & form an evaporating puddle
ALOHA limited the release duration to 1 hour; Assuming that :
 SKO Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank
SKO Tank 03A SKO Tank 03B
Total Amount Released 23.1 kg 492 kg
Max Average Sustained Release Rate (averaged over a minute or more) 672 g/min 8.51 kg/min
The spread diameter of the puddle 43 m 32 m
Model Run Gaussian

Tank ID (SKO Tanks) SKO Tank 03A SKO Tank 03B
Red (110 ppm = PAC3) 21 m 21 m
Orange (18 ppm = PAC-2) 21 m 21 m
Yellow (1.7 ppm = PAC-1) 64 m 64 m


SKO Tank T-03A (Dyke-III) is leaking

SKO Tank T-03B (Dyke-III) is leaking

Modeling Scenario-II : Leaking Tank, Fuel (SKO) is burning & forms a pool fire
ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour. Assuming that :
Parameters SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B
Total Amount Burned 5222 kg 5222 kg
Maximum Burn Rate 88.2 kg/min 88.2 kg/min
The spread diameter of the burning puddle 5.3 m 5.3 m
Maximum Flame Length 10 m 10 m
Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Pool Fire

Tank ID (SKO Tank) SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B
4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 22 m 22 m
4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 20 m 20 m
10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 15 m 15 m
12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 14 m 14 m
25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood <10 m <10 m
37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment <10 m <10 m

4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
SKO Tank T-02A (Dyke-III) is leaking & burning in pool fire

4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2
SKO Tank T-02B (Dyke-III) is leaking & burning in pool fire

Modeling Scenario-III : BLEVE, Tank explodes & fuel (SKO) burns in fireball
ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour Assuming that :
Parameters SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B
Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 100% 100%
Fireball Diameter 580 m 580 m
Burn Duration 28 secs 28 secs

Tank ID (MS Tank) SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B
4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 1.9 km 1.9 km
4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 1.7 km 1.7 km
10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 1.2 km 1.2 km
12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 1.0 km 1.0 km
25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 719 m 719 m
37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment 559 m 559 m

4.0 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10.0 kW/m2
SKO Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball

12.5 kW/m2, 25.0 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2
SKO Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball

VII. Modeling for Instantaneous/ Continuous Release of Fuel from areas/

operations like TW Receipt; TLF; TLD; ITT; PHO etc.
Modeling Scenario-I Instantaneous Release of Fuel during various operations

Assuming that :
Instantaneous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.1 KL
Release Duration : 1 minute
Release Rate : 1.09 kg/s
Total Amount Released : 65.1 kg
Source temperature : Equal to ambient
Threat Modelled : Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud
Model Run : Heavy Gas
Red : 32 m (7200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets) Threat not drawn
because effects of near-field patchiness makes dispersion predictions
less reliable for short distances)
Orange : N/A
Yellow : 90 m (1200 ppm = 10% LEL)

Modeling Scenario-II Continuous Release of Fuel during various operations
Assuming that :
Continuous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.01 KL/s
Release Rate : 391 kg/min
Total Amount Released : 782 kg

Red : 81 m (7200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)
Orange : N/A
Yellow : 226 m (1200 ppm = 10% LEL)

VIII. Modeling for Instantaneous/ Continuous Release of Ethanol from various

operations of Depot (TT receipt, pumping, storage, blending/ mixing etc.)
Modeling Scenario-I Instantaneous Release of Ethanol during various operations

Assuming that :
Instantaneous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.1 KL
Release Rate : 1.29 kg/s
Total Amount Released : 77.7 kg
Threat Modelled : Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud

Red : No recommended LOC value – (N/A = ERPG-3)
Orange : 75 m (3300 ppm = ERPG-2)
Yellow : 108 m (1800 ppm = ERPG-1)

Red (19800 ppm = 60%LEL = Flame Pockets)# : 22 m
Yellow (3300 ppm = 10%LEL) : 75 m
# Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less
reliable for short distances.

Modeling Scenario-II Continuous Release of Ethanol during various operations
Assuming that :
Continuous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.01 KL/s
Release Rate : 466 kg/min
Total Amount Released : 2331 kg
Threat Modelled : Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud
Red (N/A = ERPG-3) : No recommended LOC value
Orange (3300 ppm = ERPG-2) : 173 m
Yellow (1800 ppm = ERPG-1) : 259 m


Red (19800 ppm = 60%LEL = Flame Pockets : 53 m
Yellow (3300 ppm = 10%LEL) : 173 m

6. ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN AND DMP

6.1 A General Overview of Disaster
Disaster is termed as an undesirable occurrence of events of such magnitude and nature that not
only adversely affects production, causes loss of human lives and property but also cause
substantial damage to the environment. The industrial installations are vulnerable to various
kinds of natural as well as manmade disasters. Examples of natural disasters are-Flood, Cyclone,
Earthquake, Lightening etc. whereas, that of manmade disasters are major fire, explosion,
sudden heavy leakage of toxic / poisonous liquids / gases, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist
activities, Plant failures, human error, vehicle crash, sabotage etc. It is impossible to forecast the
time and nature of disaster, which might strike the installation. In spite the fact that every
industry is expected to take steps to assess, minimize and minimize/ or eliminate the risks by
feasible means, the accidents still may occur, as the risk can only be minimized but never be
totally eliminated. However, an effective Disaster Management plan helps in minimizing the
losses in terms of human lives, plant assets and environmental damage and to resume the
working condition as soon as possible. Controlling the emergency will require prompt action by
the operating staff, the staff on various emergency teams and outside agencies/ organization,
when involved in combat operations. Minimizing the effect on the people may be achieved
through prompt rescue, evacuation, rehabilitation and communication, if situation so warrants.
In spite of various preventive and precautionary measures taken to be envisaged and

implemented, the possibility of a mishap can never be totally ruled out. Hence, the need to
prepare a contingency Plan for dealing with incidences which may likely to occur and are likely
to affect Life and / or Property or both within the Depot and in the immediate neighborhood.
Such an emergency could be the result of malfunction of the Plant & Equipment or non-
observance of operating instructions. It could, at times, be the consequence of acts outside the
control of plant management like severe storm, flood, or deliberate acts of arson or sabotage. A
Major Emergency in the plant is one which may cause serious injury or loss of life, damage to
the property and /or environment. This Onsite Disaster Management Plan also known as
Onsite Emergency Plan (OEP) explains the code of conduct of all personnel in the plant along
with the actions to be carried out in the event of an Emergency. This plan gives the guidelines
for employees, contractors, transporters, etc. It not only defines responsibilities but also informs
about prompt rescue operations, evacuations, rehabilitation, co-ordination and communication.
6.2 The Need for Disaster Management at POL Installations
A hazardous material either flammable or toxic are safe till these are fully contained and
maintained at desired parameters during receipt, storage, processing and transportation.
Nonetheless, most extensive precautions are to be taken, accidents are likely to occur, hence the
need of CONTINGENCY PLANNING. Risks can only be minimised, controlled, and managed
within defined and acceptable area by effective enforcement & adequate awareness. But total
risk can never be reduced to zero. “No Risk is not an Option”. The ultimate objective is to
minimise both controllable and unnecessary risks, to make responsible decisions aiming to
implement feasible and beneficial courses of corrective action.
Vasudevan Committee appointed by the Government of India to enquire into a major fire
incident that occurred in the Indian Oil Corporation Limited LPG plant in May 1983
recommended various safety measures to avoid recurrence of such incidents in future. As per the
report submitted by Vasudevan Committee, a contingency plan is to be framed for all LPG
plants as well as Petroleum Storage Points. Ministry of Home Affairs and Director of Civil
Shriram Institute for Industrial Research: Delhi

Defence, Government of India have also issued instructions in this context from time to time for
all storage installations. The Disaster Management Plan illustrated in this chapter covers the
steps required for handling emergencies at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, However,
the disastrous situation would be handled under instructions from Civil Authorities in Anantapur
District as the part of Off-site Emergencies.
Further, Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) issued Draft Regulations on
Codes of Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP)
Regulation, 2008, which are applicable to:
(a) Hydrocarbon Processing Installation (Refinery, Gas Processing, LNG Regasification,

Installations etc.)
(b) Pipeline such as Natural Gas, Propane, Butane etc) and the hydrocarbon product which
remains in gaseous state at NTP.
(c) Liquid Petroleum Product Pipeline.
(d) Commercial Petroleum Storage Facilities and Terminals including LNG Terminals.
(e) Hydrocarbon gas bottling installations having receipt, storage and handling facilities
including storage for LPG, Propane and Butane.
(f) City or local natural gas distribution facility.
(g) Dispensing stations and POL retail outlets.
(h) Transportation of petroleum products by road.
(i) Any other installation as may be notified by the Board from time to time.
6.3 Objective of Disaster Management for the proposed IOCL Depot at

Nakkanadoddi
The objective of any plant should be to have safe and trouble free operations for smooth
production. This has to be ensured through taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design
of plant, equipments, pipelines, etc. as per standard codes; ensuring selection of proper material
of construction, well designed codes / rules and instruments for safe operation of the plant.
Safety must be ensured afterwards by operating the plant not only considering feasible
safeguards but also by imparting training to staff periodically to build capacity to handle
emergency situation. In spite of all precautions, accidents may likely happen due to human error
or system malfunction or natural calamities. Any accident involving release of hazardous
material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial
installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as manmade disasters. It is impossible to
predict the time and nature of disaster. However, an effective disaster management plan, i.e. pre-
planned procedure involving proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources, helps to
minimize the loss to a minimum and resume the working conditions as soon as possible.
Hence, the overall objective of the preparation of DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP)
is to prepare contingency planning to prevent accidents through good design, operation,
maintenance and inspection by which it is possible to reduce the risk of an accident, but it is not
possible to eliminate it. Since, absolute safety is not achievable and an essential part of major
hazard control must also include mitigating the effects of major accidents. Disaster Management

Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The plan includes activities before
disaster, during disaster and post disaster. DMP is to formulate and provide organizational set up
and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any emergency
situation in order to:
(a) Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources
(b) Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.
(c) Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.
(d) Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.
(e) Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry
(f) Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.
The major aim of the Disaster Management Plan is to make use of the combined resources of the
project and the outside services to ensure:
 Effectiveness of the rescue operation and medical treatment of affected
 Safeguard other people
 Minimize damage to property and the environment
 Initially contain and ultimately bring the incident under control
 Provide authoritative information to the news media
 Secure the safe rehabilitation of affected area
 Preserve relevant records and equipment for the subsequent inquiry into the cause and
circumstances of the Emergency
In effect, it is essential to optimize operational efficiency for rescue, rehabilitation and render
medical help and to restore normalcy. The desired objectives can, therefore, be achieved through:
 Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential and
identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.
 Arrange/augment facilities for firefighting, safety, medical (both equipment and manpower)
 Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and communication facilities
as well as warning procedure.
6.4 Fire and Explosion Hazard Management
I. Fire Hazard Management
(a) Fire Hazard Summary
Petroleum products especially Motor Spirit are highly flammable liquid. Vapors are heavier than
air and may travel a considerable distance to a source of ignition and flash back to a leak or open
container. Vapor can spread along the ground and accumulate in low-lying areas or in confined
spaces, thereby resulting in a toxicity, flammability and explosion hazard. Liquid can float on
water and may travel to distant locations and/ or spread fire. During a fire, irritating, toxic and/

or hazardous gases, such as sulfur and nitrogen oxides and unidentified organic compounds, may
be generated. Closed systems may rupture violently when exposed to the heat of a fire or
excessive heat for a sufficient period of time.
(b) Extinguishing Media
Carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder or polymeric foam could be the good extinguishing
media. Water can extinguish the fire if used under favorable conditions and when hose streams
are applied by experienced firefighters trained in fighting all types of flammable liquid fires.
Fire-fighting foams are the extinguishing agents of choice for most flammable liquid fires.
(c) Fire Fighting Measures
 In order to ensure effectiveness in management of fire hazard, following instructions could

be envisaged:
 Evacuate area and fight fire from a safe distance or protected location.
 Approach fire from upwind to avoid toxic decomposition products.
 Stop leak before attempting to stop the fire. If the leak cannot be stopped, and if there is no
risk to the surrounding area, let the fire burn itself out.
 If the flames are extinguished without stopping the leak, vapors could form explosive
mixtures with air and re-ignite.
 Water can extinguish the fire if used under favorable conditions and when hose streams are
applied by experienced firefighters trained in fighting all types of flammable liquid fires.
 If possible, isolate materials not yet involved in the fire, and move these from fire area if this
can be done without risk, and protect personnel.
 Fire-exposed material should be cooled by application of hose streams sprinklers and this
should begin as soon as possible (within the first several minutes).
 Water sprinklers can be used to dilute spills to nonflammable mixtures and flush spills away
from ignition sources.
 Do not enter in the area of fire without wearing specialized protective equipment suitable for
the situation. Firefighter's normal protective equipment (Bunker Gear) may not provide
adequate protection. Chemical resistant clothing (e.g. chemical splash suit) and positive
pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (MSHA/NIOSH approved or equivalent) may be
necessary.
(d) Fire Fighting Equipment/ Material as well as Life Saving Equipment to be made
available at proposed Depot
Inventory of firefighting equipment/ material as well as lifesaving equipment available at Depot
are listed below:

Table-6.4 (a) Fire-fighting facilities for proposed depot
Sl. Description of Item Quantity / Details
1. Fire Water storage Static Tank 3 x 6375 KL

2. Fire Fighting pump sets 5 x 850 KL/Hr x 105 m Head
3. Jockey pump sets 2 x 72 KL/ Hr x 110 m Head
4. U/G Tank of 100 KL capacity with pumps & provision to 1 set
receive water from outside
5. Bore well pumps 3 Nos.
6. Well spread fire hydrant piping layout for the entire plant Approx. 4000 m
7. Remote operated & Fixed High Volume Long Range Foam 5 Nos.
cum water monitor
8. Trolley mounted High Volume Long Range Foam cum water 2 Nos.
monitor
9. Medium Expansion Foam Generator (Fixed) 4 Nos.
10. Medium Expansion Foam Generator (Portable) 2 Nos.
11. Mobile Foam Trailer with 3% AFFF (9000 litre) 3 Nos.
12. ATC Foam for Alcohol fire 1 KL
13. Hydro-carbon Gas Detectors (OP Type) 6 Nos.
14. Hydro-carbon Detectors (Point Type) 14 Nos.
15. Portable Gas Detector 1 Nos.
16. Explosimeter 1 No.
17. Oxygen meter 1 No.
18. Fire proximity suit 1 No.
19. SCABA with spare O2 cylinder 1 Set
20. Wheeled Portable Water cum Foam monitor 2 Nos.
21. Fixed water spray system for Storage Tanks 11 Nos.
22. Fixed Foam Pourer System for Storage Tanks 13 Nos.
23. Fixed Water monitors 45 Nos.
24. Double Hydrant points on stand post 75 Nos.
25. Jet Nozzle 5 Nos.
26. Universal Nozzle 5 Nos.
27. Foam Branch Pipe 5 Nos.
28. Stretcher with blanket 2 Nos.
29. First Aid Box 2 Nos.
30. Shock resistant Rubber Hand Gloves 2 pairs
31. Oil Sorbent Booms 2 Nos.
32. 75 kg DCP Fire Extinguisher 15 Nos.
35. 2.5 & 4.5 kg CO2 Fire Extinguisher 60 Nos.
36. Safety Hand lamp 2 Nos.
37. Leak arrestor kit with clamps 1 Set
Note: Any other additional firefighting equipment for which need is felt during design &
detailed engineering will be appropriately added to be compliant with the provisions of OISD
117 & OISD 244

Table-6.4 (b) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks
Tag No. Size Nominal Capacity (KL) Pumping Capacity
WT-01/02/03 24.00M Ǿ x 14.00M L 6310 5114
Total 15342 KL
Table-6.4 (c) Schedule of Firefighting Pumps

Tag No. Description Nos. of Pump Capacity Head
Operating Standby (mWC)
P-22A/B Jockey Pumps Electrical Driven 1 1 72 Cu.M/Hr. 110

P-23A/B/C/D/E Main Pumps Diesel Engine Driven 3 2 850 Cu.M/Hr 105
P-24A/B Foam Pump 1 1 25 Cu.M/Hr 120
II. Toxicity Hazard Management
Petroleum Products like MS, HSD, SKO and Ethanol have toxic effects on inhalation, ingestion
and on contact with skin. Hence, there is a need to envisage strategic planning to reduce the
effect of toxicity on exposure both short term and long term. Following measures could be
envisaged on direct exposure to the product:
Inhalation
Remove source of contamination or move victim to fresh air. If breathing has stopped, properly
trained personnel should begin artificial respiration or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
immediately. Obtain medical attention immediately.
Skin Contact
As quickly as possible, remove contaminated clothing, shoes and leather goods (e.g.
watchbands, belts). Quickly and gently blot or brush away excess chemical. Wash gently and
thoroughly with water and non-abrasive soap until the chemical is removed. Obtain medical
attention immediately. Completely decontaminate clothing, shoes and leather goods before re-
use or discard.
Eye Contact
Quickly and gently blot away excess chemical. Immediately flush the contaminated eye(s) with
lukewarm, gently flowing water until the chemical is removed, while holding the eyelid(s) open.
Obtain medical advice immediately.
Ingestion
Never give anything by mouth if the victim is rapidly losing consciousness, is unconscious or is
convulsing. Do not induce vomiting. Have victim drink 200 to 300 ml of water to dilute material
in the stomach. If vomiting occurs naturally, have victim lean forward to reduce risk of
aspiration. Repeat administration of water. Obtain medical attention immediately.

Effectiveness of First Aid Measures
Ensure the effectiveness of First Aid Measures by
 Providing general supportive measures (comfort, warmth, and rest).
 Consulting a doctor for all exposures except minor instances of inhalation or skin contact.
 All first aid procedures should be periodically reviewed by a doctor familiar with the
material and its conditions of use in the workplace.
Artificial Respiration
Give artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. Use the mouth method. Resuscitator can also
be used.
Mouth to mouth method
In case, there is any obstruction in breathing, remove if with your fingers or with a cloth
wrapped round your fingers. Several sharp blows between the shoulder blades will also help to
dislodge any obstruction.
 Lay person affected on his back. Put some support under his shoulder to raise them and
allow his head to fall backwards the head should be a little lower than the trunk.
 Remember speed is essential. Kneel beside the causality’s head and grasp his arms at the
wrist. Cross them firmly over the lower chest. This movement can force out air out of his
lungs. Press with hand crossed on the lower part of chest and maintain pressure for two
seconds. Release this pressure and pull his arm with a sweeping movement upwards and
outwards above his head and backward as far as possible.
 This movement should cause air to be drawn in his lungs. Retain the arm in this position
for three seconds. This will keep equal amount of time at every cycle.
 Repeat this movement rhythmically about twelve times per minute checking the mouth
frequently for obstruction. Each cycle there four take five seconds, two seconds for chest
pressure and three seconds for arm lift.
 With the casualty on its back there is danger of aspiration of vomit mucus or blood re-
entering the system. This risk can be reduced by keeping his head extended and a little
lower than the trunk. It should also be ensured that the mouth is kept open as far as
possible turning head to one side if necessary
6.5 Emergency Organization Chart
Role of key personnel of the proposed Depot has been defined so as to undertake combat
operations in the event of emergency in effective ways. The Chief Incident Controller and the
Site Incident Controller are most important key persons for effective control of an emergency at

site. They shall be supported by Emergency Management Team comprising of technical

resources from Operations & Maintenance, mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, civil,
communications, technical services etc. Fire & Safety, Security, HR (Personnel &
Administration), Finance & Accounts personnel will also have due roles & responsibilities as
defined in the Onsite Emergency Organogram of proposed IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot.
Offsite Incident
Commander
Affected (District
Stakeholders Magistrate)
& Government
Authorities Medical Services
& Ambulance
District/ Municipal
Transport Rescue &
Rehabilitation Team
Fire Brigade
Services
Police
Services
CHIEF INCIDENT
CONTROLLER
Level-1
Level-2 SITE INCIDENT Mutual Aid

CONTROLLER Agency
Level-3
Support Administrative & Fire Safety and Operation Team;

Services Communication Fire Team/ HSE Technical Team, etc.
Coordinator Coordinator
1. Support Services Include Communication Services, Engineering/Maintenance Services,

Medical and Occupational Health, Human Resource and Welfare Service, Security,
Media/Public Relations, Transport and Logistics, Finance, Contract and Procurement and
Environmental Services.
2. Role of both CIC and SIC can be merged depending upon the requirement.

6.6 Emergency Responsibilities (Onsite)
Key personnel of the organization and responsibilities assigned to them in case of an emergency
Table-6.6 Onsite-Emergency Organogram of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot
Sl. Emergency Organization Chart Depot Official Responsibilities
1 Chief Incident Controller Location Incharge Overall In-charge of Fire Combat
(Depot Manager)
2 Site Incident Controller Deputy Manager Fire Combat Team Leader
 Stop immediately filling
operations & remove hoses from
tank wagons & TTs after closing
the valves.
 Rush to the scene of fire with
available fire extinguishers & try
to extinguish the fire
immediately.
 Rush to the spot with available
hoses & nozzles & start
firefighting as per the
instructions of the fire chief
(CIC).
3 Administration Coordinator S&D Officer  All operations to be stopped,

tank valves to be closed, electric
mains to be switched off.
 If necessary, all filled TTTs
should be allowed to go through
the emergency gate.
4 Communication Coordinator S&D Officer  Inform about the incident to
Industry Members, Local Police
and State Government Agencies
like Fire Brigade, Factories
Dept., nearest Hospitals (as per
the priority displayed) and DGM
(O), TAPSO.
 Coordinate with DSP (Rural) &
DCP (Traffic) for ease of flow of
traffic en route for Fire Brigade
& Ambulance to reach the site.
 Coordinate with District
Administration in shifting the
injured persons to hospitals.
5 Fire & Safety Coordinator HSE Officer  Organize supply of firefighting
equipments as well as personnel
to the Fire Combat Team as per
the instructions of Fire Chief
(CIC).
 Replace all firefighting
equipments that are exhausted
after the fire is brought under
control.
Contd.

Table-6.6 contd.
Sl. Emergency Organization Chart Depot Official Responsibilities
6 Emergency Management Team HSE Officer
 Operations & Maintenance
 Mechanical
 Electrical Implement Orders as per the
 Instrumentation instructions of Fire Chief (CIC)
 Civil
 Communication Services
7 Security Coordinator Security Officer Half-filled TTs should not go out
without documents.
8 Support & Auxiliary Services Finance Officer
Team
 HR & Welfare Coordinator
 Transport & Logistics To be in touch with CC Team in
 Media & Public Relations region.
 Medical Services
 Finance Coordinator
 Material Coordinator
Note:
1. Senior Depot Manager shall be Chief Incident Controller for over all coordination.
2. HSE Officer Incharge of Safety shall be Site Incident Controller at Site.
3. All Coordinators shall report to the Site Incident Controller at site.
4. All IOCL Employees working inside shall assemble at ASSEMBLY POINT in front of
Administrative Office. (All IOCL Employees means the persons whose role is not defined in
the action plan)
6.7 Role and Responsibilities of Key Personnel
I. Chief Incident Controller (CIC) [Location In-charge/ Senior Depot Manager]
The Chief Incident Controller (CIC) will have overall responsibility to protect personnel, site
facilities, and the public before, during, and after an emergency or disaster. The CIC will be
present at the main emergency control centre for counsel and overall guidance. Responsibilities
of the Chief Incident Controller includes the following:
(a) Preparation, review and updation of the ERDMP
(b) Assessment of situation and declaration of emergency.
(c) Mobilization of main coordinators and key personnel.
(d) Activation Emergency Control Centre.
(e) Taking decision on seeking assistance from mutual aid members and external agencies like
Police, Fire Brigade, Hospitals etc.
(f) Continuous review of situation and decide on appropriate response strategy.

(g) Taking stock of casualties and ensure timely medical attention.
(h) Ensuring correct accounting and position of personnel after the emergency.
(i) Ordering evacuation of personnel as and when necessary.
(j) Taking decision in consultation with District Authorities when an Off-site emergency to be
declared.
II. Site Incident Controller (SIC) [HSE Officer Incharge of Safety]
The Site Incident Controller (SIC) as identified by the Chief Incident Controller and will report
directly to him. SIC will be nominated by the depot in each shift of 24-hrs. Responsibilities of
the Site Incident Controller shall include the following:
(a) The SIC will maintain a workable emergency control plan, establish emergency control
centers, organize and equip the organization as per OSEP and train the personnel;
(b) The SIC will be capable of making quick decisions and taking full charge;
(c) The SIC will communicate to the Emergency Control Centre where it can coordinate
activities among groups;
(d) The SIC will be responsible for ensuring that appropriate local and national government
authorities are notified, preparation of media statements, obtaining approval from the CIC
and releasing such statements once the approval is received;
(e) The SIC will also ensure the response to the incidents or the emergencies, as the case may
be, is in line with the depot procedures, coordinating business continuity or recovery plan
from the incident.
(f) He must ensure next of kin are notified in a timely manner;
(g) The SIC will also co-ordinate if any specialist support is required for the above purpose;
(h) The SIC will decide on seeking assistance of mutual aid members and external agencies like
police, fire brigade, hospital etc.
III. Administration and Communication Coordinator
Responsibilities of the administration and communication controller will include the following:
(a) To coordinate with mutual aid members and other external agencies;
(b) To direct them on arrival of external agencies to respective coordinators at desired locations;
(c) To activate the medical centre and render first aid to the injured. arrange ambulance and
coordination with hospitals for prompt medical attention to casualties;
(d) To ensure head counts at assembly points;
(e) To arrange procurement of spares for firefighting and additional medicines and drugs;

(f) To mobilize transport to various teams for facilitating the response measures;
(g) To monitor entry and exit of personnel into and out of premises;
(h) To ensure only authorized personnel enter into the premises;
(i) To regulate the flow of traffic into and out of premises and control the mob outside, if any,
with the assistance of the police.
(j) To provide administrative and logistics assistance to various teams; and
(k) To arrange evacuation as directed by the chief incident controller, and in coordination with
the civil authorities like police, panchayat/municipal authorities etc.
IV. Fire & Safety Coordinator and Fire Team
Responsibilities of the Fire and Safety Coordinator will include the following:
(a) To activate emergency sirens as per the practiced codes.
(b) To take charge of all firefighting and rescue operations and safety matters.
(c) To ensure that key personnel are called in and to release crew of firefighting operations as
per emergency procedure.
(d) Assess functioning of his team and communicate with the CIC and or administrative
controller for any replenishment or, replacement of manpower or firefighting equipment.
(e) Direct the fire brigade personnel and mutual aid members to their desired roles as also
proper positioning of the manpower and equipment.
(f) To decide the requirement of mutual aid and instruct fire station, who, in turn will contact
mutual aid members.
(g) To coordinate with outside fire brigades for properly coordinated firefighting operation.
(h) To ensure that casualties are promptly sent to first aid centre / hospital.
(i) To arrange requirement of additional firefighting resources including help from mutual aid
partners.
(j) Ensure empty and loaded trucks are removed to safer area to the extent possible so as not to
affect emergency handling operations.
(k) Continually liaise with the SIC and or CIC and implement the emergency combat strategies
as communicated by him.
(l) Ensure adequate hydrant pressure in the mains and monitor water level in the reservoir.
(m) Fire Organization Chart; Composition & Responsibilities of Teams

Fire organization chart as per table-6.7 depicts the duties and responsibilities of each IOCL
officer and staff member has prominently been displayed at appropriate locations in the depot.
Scope of responsibilities of firefighting team is given below:
 Combating team will fight the fire
 Auxillary team will supply the material and equipment.
 Rescue team will provide medical aid and equipment and remove the injured.
Raising of Alarm
 Person seeing/ noticing the fire will raise the alarm by shouting “fire-fire-fire” to attract the
attention of all.
 Person hearing the word fire shall operate nearby hand siren to give signal of emergency.
 Security personnel at gate shall operate electric siren to communicate emergency to all
personnel for action plan.
 If possible control and extinguish fire by operating nearest fire extinguisher.
 If it is not possible to extinguish, raise alarm through nearest hand operated siren.
Table-6.7 Firefighting Team of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot

Chief of Firefighting Team Location Incharge (Depot Manager)
Dy. Chief of Firefighting Team Deputy Manager (Depot)
Fire Combat Team Incharge HSE Officer
Fire Auxiliary Team Incharge S&D Officer
Fire Rescue Team Incharge Security Officer
Duties on Hearing the Fire Alarm
Fire-in-charge  To take control as Overall in-charge of the situation.

(Alternate in-charge)
 To rush to the scene of fire and issue instructions for speedy
combat.
 To work as Liaison Officer between outside Fire Brigade &
Police, State Administration.
 To withdraw the staff in case the human life is in peril.
 To give clearance signal when everything is in normal.
Fire Combat Team  On hearing the fire alarm the in-charge will rush to the scene of
fire and Issue instructions for speedy combat.
 The Fire Combating Member to ensure that the Fire Hydrant
system start in the auto mode.
 Other members of the team to rush to the scene of the fire with
fighting equipments to extinguish fire as per the instructions of
Fire-In-Charge.

 The Fire Combating Team to go for full action to extinguish the

Fire.
 Withdraw men to safe distance if any danger is expected
resulting into casualties.
 Simultaneous stopping of loading, closing of filling valves and

vehicles from fitting Area as per the Instructions from Fire Chief.
 If outside help is required inform Fire-In-Charge for Fire Brigade
/ Police
Fire Auxiliary Team  Immediately to take care of Telephone calls and take instructions
from Fire-In-Charge to contact outside parties for Assistance if
required.
 To take care of important documents.
 Assemble outside the office for detailing for further instructions.
 Restrict the Entry of outside unauthorized persons to the Depot
Premises.
 Allow outsider public to go to out of the Depot under noting of
security gate.
 Control Traffic at the Main Gate and keep clearance for outside
assistance.
 Give First Aid and Treatment to the Injured.
 Remove the Injured Persons to Hospital as per Instructions from
Fire Chief.
Fire Rescue Team  Report to In-Charge of the team and carry out duties as ordered
by him.
 Get all operations in the field stopped and all tank valves closed
with switching off Electric Main.
 Get all Tank Trucks and other vehicles out of gate and park
outside. Part Loaded TTs to be checked with dip Rod for the
Quantity. Take Down all TTs Nos.
 Ensure filling valves are closed.
 To get stores, Ware Houses and other Buildings premises closed.
 Take control of all the employees, other than the Fire Combating
Team.
 Organize supply of fire combating equipments, like Foam etc. as
well as the personnel to the Fire Combating Team.
 Replace all fire combating equipments that are used in fire
combating after the fire is brought under control.
 Keep the fire equipments in operating condition at all items.

Action Plan for Fire

Fire in Tank  Wet down the outside of the burning tank with water to cool it and to
prevent it from melting down and also to cool the oil as much as
possible.
 Start the sprinklers of the nearby oil storage tanks and structures to
keep down the temperature of burning tank.
 Apply the foam on the surface of burning oil, it should be applied to
the surface cautiously so that it does not overflow the tank and it
should be applied gently so as not to scatter the burning oil and thereby
to spread the fire. Apply the foam on one side of fire and build the
foam blanket from that side across the oil pool.
 Water should not be applied on burning oil tank since it being heavier
than oil settles at the bottom and would result in raising the height of
flames.
 Call for help from local fire brigade as per the instructions of chief fire
in charge.
 If space is available to take the oil from the burning tank, pump out the
oil to other tanks. DO NOT ATTEMPT this unless the efforts to
extinguish the fire are not successful and adequate help is available.
Vapour Cloud  When gaseous flammable material is released, a vapour cloud forms
Explosion and if it is ignited before it is diluted below its lower explosive limit, a
vapour cloud explosion or a flash fire will occur. Insignificant level of
confinement will result in flash fire.
 The vapour cloud explosion will result in overpressures.
 In case of vapour clouds, there is a good probability that this would get
ignited from an ignition source at a remote location, perhaps outside
the site boundary giving rise to a vapour cloud explosion / flash fire.
 The explosion would cause widespread damage to buildings and
structures and may be lethal to people present in the vicinity of cloud.
Also demolition of buildings and throwing of splinters may cause
death/ injury to people.
Fire at Tank  Be sure that master valves are closed.
Truck/ Lorry or
Tank Wagon  When oil is burning under the truck and tank truck is not leaking,
move it away from fire, if possible use water to cool the burning tank
truck and adjoining tank trucks.
 Put foam on the burning oil surface.
 Use foam or sand to fight fire around engine of tank trucks
 Where the leakage is near the bottom of tank, try to fill water into
the truck so that the oil level will be above the leak.
 Close valves and dome covers of the tank wagons and cool the tanks
with water, if enough help is available move the wagons away from
fire.

Fire in Pump  Call for help from all available employees and also from outside as
House per standing instructions, call for medical help if required.
 Work to prevent fire from spreading.
 Shut down the pumps by cutting off the power supply.
 Remove any person who might be trapped inside the pump house at
the start of the fire.
 Close tank valves and manifold valves to prevent oil from running
from tanks to pump house.
 Put sand on minor oil spills to absorb and smother the fire.
 Use CO2 extinguisher or sand on fire inside the motor.
Fire on Person’s  Lay down the person flat to prevent him from drawing flames into
Clothing his lungs. Do not allow him to run in panic to avoid spread of fire.
 Wrap the burning person in water blanket at the earliest possible
time. Be sure that the blanket does not cover the face of person on
fire.
 Small fire in clothing’s can often be beaten out with sacks / blankets
or merely by rolling on the ground.
 Call doctor immediately or rush the person to hospital.
Fire on a Large  Call for help of other employee, outside help as per mutual aid also
Leak in Internal to be called.
Pipelines  Take preventive necessary steps to avoid spread of fire.
 All pumping operations to be stopped and close valves on both sides
of the breach.
 Do build earth dykes around oil pool to prevent its flow to the
undesired area.
 If possible drain out contents from the pipeline on fire and cover
pipeline with sand or earth.
 Cool/wet down adjoining structures that might get affected by heat.
 Water fog has to be used to extinguish the fire, but be careful to
ensure that the water does not float away burning oil to a point
where it will spread the fire.
Fire at Small  Fire at a small leak in pipeline to be attacked with the nearest fire
Leak in Internal extinguisher before it gets a chance to spread and get out of control.
Pipelines  Preventive steps to ensure that the fire does not spread are to be
taken.
 Shut of flow of oil by closing bumps and valves on both sides.
 Cover oil pool with sand and cover pipeline with sand to plug the
leak.
 Apply foam on oil pool with foam generator,
 Build earth dykes around the pool to prevent spread of burning oil.

 Do not leave oil trapped in short length of pipes exposed to fire

between closed valves since oil so trapped and heated often bursts
spreading the fire .
 Cool adjacent structures.
Fires in  Call for help of other employees.

Structures
adjoining  Cooperate with fire fighters to prevent spread of fire.
installation  Clear away barrels / packages/unsafe material endangered by the
nearby fire.
 Suspend all filling operations and drive tank trucks to a safer place.
 If burning pieces fall in the installation beat out flames and splinters
with wet sacks or throw sand / earth on it
 Pipelines closed to fire should be covered with sand and if possible
drain out their contents by suction into tank.
 Cool adjacent structures.
Fire at Office  Disconnect supply to the affected area.
Building
 Attempt to extinguish fire with DCP/CO2 fire extinguisher or sand.
 If large fire use hydrant system
 Remove all flammable material {curtains. papers} from the vicinity
of fire.
 Attempt to save all records.
 Closed the cash box and arrange to move important document to a
safer place.
 After extinguishment of fire check thoroughly that the building is
safe and fire has been totally extinguished.
Action Plan for  Disconnect electrical supply to affected area.
Electrical Fire
 Extinguish fire with CO2 /DCP fire extinguishers.
 After isolating supply water can also be applied for the
extinguishment of fire
First Aid for  Remove clothing of the affected area without breaking the blisters.
Electrical Burns
 Apply lavishly at the affected part a warm solution of either. One
desert spoon of bicarbonate of soda mixed with a pint of warm
water.
 A teaspoonful of salt mixed with a glass of warm water.
 Cover the affected area with link soaked with similar solution and
bandage lightly if blisters are formed. If above solution are not
available cover affected area with a sterile dressing.
 Warm weak sweet tea may be given when the patient is able to
swallow.

V. Support and Auxiliary Services for proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi

The following additional coordinators are nominated and delegated with specific responsibilities
falling under the basic functions of SIC and CIC.
VI. Human Resources and Welfare Service Coordinator
VII. Transport and Logistic Services Coordinator
VIII. Media and Public Relations Coordinator
IX. Operations and Technical Coordinator
Roles & Responsibilities
 Immediately take charge of medical, welfare and media.
 Activate medical Centre and render first aid to the injured by assigning first-aid personnel to
specific duties.
 Arrange additional medical supplies, drugs and equipment’s, spares for firefighting, as
required.
 Arrange ambulance for transporting casualties and coordinate with hospitals for prompt
medical attention to casualties.
 Keep all the vehicles and drivers in readiness and send vehicles as per requirement of
different coordinators and officials. to mobilize transport to various teams for facilitating the
response measures;
 To monitor entry and exit of authorized personnel into and out of premises;
 Head Counts at assembly points.
 Take care of public relation, inform relatives of injured.
 Arrange canteen facilities and proper food / refreshment.
 Arrange to meet emergency clothing requirement.
 Arrange to contact the families of the injured.
 Maintaining public relation and arrange media briefing wherever necessary
 To control the mob outside, if any, with the assistance of the police and to provide
administrative and logistics assistance to various teams;
 Issue press statement with the approval of Competent Authority / OIC.

 Take help of welfare bodies, social organizations, NGO’s, local administrations, blood bank,
blood donors, hospitals, doctors, ambulance services, water supply department, transport hire
service, catering services as per requirement.
 Inform police, civil authorities, statutory authorities etc. with the approval of OIC, if
necessary.
Haulage & House Keeping Team
 To work in close association with SIC.
 To assist SIC in assessing scale of emergency and take corrective action to minimize damage
to equipment/Depot in consultation with other coordinators.
 To ensure that key mechanical personnel are present at site with proper tools.
 To render technical guidance and logistics to mechanical personnel.
Electrical supervisor & Electricians (OO/DSO/Shift Incharge)
 To work in close association with SIC.
 To assist SIC in assessing scale of emergency and take corrective action to minimize damage
to equipment/Depot in consultation with other coordinators.
 To ensure that key instrument personnel are present at site with proper tools.
 To render technical guidance and logistics to instrument personnel.
 To provide assistance to control room engineer for Depot shut down/instrument control
requirement.
 To ensure that key electrical personnel are present at site with proper tools.
 To render technical guidance and logistics to electrical personnel.
 To ensure electric supply of affected equipment/area isolated, if required.
 To ensure proper lighting is provided during handling of emergency, if required.
Operations Coordinator (OO/DSO/Shift Incharge)
 To assess the situation and apprise CIC, SIC and other key persons about the emergency
situation
 To handle Depot operations under directions of CIC.
 To direct emergency management team for appropriate action.

 To monitor all critical process parameters, alarms and ensure safety of Depot & equipment’s.
 To warn all the employees in the affected section / depot area and evacuate them to assembly
point if need arises.
 To assign time recorder to start Log of emergency as well as time recording.

 To initiate rescue activities; and first aid need to be given to injured persons pending arrival
of ambulance.
 To notify the adjacent areas.
 To ensure that only persons having authorized duties enter their area.
X. Security Coordinator
The Security Coordinator reports to the Chief / Site Incident Controller and is responsible for
security of the depot during any incident or emergency situation and for implementing the
actions below:
# Obtaining an approved visitor list from the security department or reception for ensuring that
personnel on the list are escorted to reception by security staff.
# Maintaining security of the office in the event of an office evacuation.
# Providing office security and assisting authorities in the event of civil unrest or when required
organizing additional security at the emergency scene.
# Obtaining initial briefing from Chief / Site Incident Controller and providing security
information and or status reports to Site Incident Controller during the emergency.
# Assuming responsibility for any task delegated by Chief Incident Controller.
# Assessing the emergency, identify security specific problems and recommend solutions to
Chief Incident Controller.
XI. Communications Services.

The Communications Coordinator will ensure the following actions:
# Ensuring the ECC equipment and systems are maintained to a high standard and remain
functional throughout the emergency.
# Ensuring a back-up communication system is available in the event of the ECC Room is not
available.
# Providing quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency
situations.

Communication Flow Chart

Employee/
Police Security
Public
Fire and gas
detection system
System
EMERGENCY
CONTROL
CENTRE
First MANAGEMENT
Responder TEAM
(Head Operations, Head CRISIS
Maintenance, Head MGMT
Technical, Head HSE, GROUP
SITE INCIDENT
Fire safety/HSE Head Security, Head
Coordinator and
CONTROLLER
(HR)
fire team
District
CHIEF INCIDENT Administration
and Central
CONTROLLER
Govt. agencies
Info. to Fire Mutual Aid
Brigade, Police, Members
Medical and
Government Others (required Note: Level I
Authorities coordinators of the
installation) Level II
Level III
Site Command Control Centre Incharge
 Inform to respective sections/coordinators about the emergency.
 Inform Chief incident controller and site incident controller.
 Take suitable action to protect the depot in consultation with site incident controller, Section
Operations.
 Communicate message (telephone) to person(s) working in area/ depot.
 Clearly note down type of emergency and the location.
 Inform State Emergency coordinators as per emergency telephone list.
Public Relations In charge:
 A competent and well equipped Public Relations / Information officer well trained in media
relations shall be assigned responsibility of interacting with media, government agencies,
local organizations and the general public.
 Initial releases shall be restricted to statements of facts such as the name of the +installation
involved, type and quantity of spill, time of spill, and countermeasure actions being taken.
All facts must be stated clearly and consistently to everyone.

 Plans shall also be developed to utilize local media and television stations for periodic
announcements during an emergency. This shall also assist in reducing rumours and
speculation.
Siren Codes
1. The Emergency siren/s are be located suitably to cover the whole area with the operational
control within the depot, which includes Hand Siren, Electric Siren & Push Button of MOV
etc. These are to be tested periodically to keep them in working condition.
2. Emergency siren codes are as follows, namely: -
(a) Emergency Level-I: A wailing siren for two minutes.
(b) Emergency Level-II and III: Same type of siren as in case of Level – I and II but the
same will be sounded for three times at the interval of one minutes i.e.( wailing siren 2
min + gap 1 min + wailing siren 2 min + gap 1min + wailing siren 2 min) total duration
of Disaster siren to be eight minutes.
(c) ALL CLEAR: Straight run siren for two minutes.
(d) TEST: Straight run siren for two minutes at frequency at least once a week
(e) Public address system provided with message.

6.8 Emergency Control Center (ECC)
The S&D room near the entrance gate will be the emergency control center. The ECC is away
from potential hazards and provides maximum safety to personnel and equipment. The buildings
outside the licensed area will be the shelter for employees and other personnel. Walkie-Talkies
as listed would be provided along with intercom for internal communication inside the Depot.
Also, electrical sirens, hand operated siren and manual call points would be provided at various
locations inside the Depot. Following supplies and dedicated equipment are made available at
the ECC.
(a) A copy of the QRA & OSEP is made available.
(b) Maps and diagrams showing buildings, roads, process lines, drainage trenches, and other
utilities are displayed.
(c) Maps showing the site, surrounding area, facilities etc. are displayed,
(d) Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of employees displayed.
(e) Updated lists of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of off-site groups and
organizations are made available that might have to be contacted during emergency.
(f) Dedicated and reliable communication equipments.
(g) Emergency lights and back up/ UPS power so that operations can continue in the event of
power failure.
(h) Logbooks for recording the sequence of events to assist in investigating causes, evaluating
performance, and preparing reports.

(i) ECC would have dedicated computer with LAN / internet facility to access the installation
data and also it has the latest and updated soft copies of all standard operating practices
(SOP) etc.
(j) Locations of ECC and Assembly Points are marked on the map.
6.9 Assembly Points
1. Emergency Assembly Point in front of S&D room is pre-designated areas in safe zone as per
quantitative risk assessment, where the personnel like workers, staff, contractor workers etc.
not involved in emergency operations (as per OSEP) shall assemble in case of an emergency.
2. The Designated assembly point are clearly marked with directional display board along the
route. Routes are well lighted with florescent marking.
3. During an emergency, pre-designated persons would take charge of this point and take the
roll call of the people reporting. Provisions are made for assembly points, communication
and headcount facilities at assembly points, and personnel to control the movement of
assembled employees.
4. The assembly point coordinators shall rush to their designated assembly point in the event of
emergency.
5. The assembly point coordinators will
 Keep in touch with Chief Incident Controller for further instruction.
 Ensure the assembling of people present in depot at Assembly point.

 Request the assembled persons, not to get panic and be ready for evacuation (if required).
 Keep in touch with Transport & Logistic Coordinator for arrangement of transport
facility for evacuation (if required)
 Carryout the head count of the assembled persons at the assembly point and report the
same to the CIC.
6.10 Off-site Information and various facilities/ resources
1. Contact details of district authorities are given in following table
Table-6.10 (a) Contact details of district authorities

District Authority/ Officer E-mail Contact Number
Collector & District Magistrate Collector_antp@ap.gov.in 08554-275806, 240801
Joint Collector & Addl. District Magistrate Jc_antp@ap.gov.in
IG/DIG/ Addl.DIG of Police, Anantapur range - 08554-240866, 274433
Superintendent of Police, Anantapur range - 08554-240105

2. Demographic information in Nakkanadoddi & 10 km Buffer Zone of Project Site are given
in following table.
Table-6.10 (b) Demography in project core zone and 10-km buffer zone
Village Households and Population
Area of the Total Total Total Male Total
Village (ha) Households Population Females
Nakkanadoddi (Core Zone) 1778 697 3098 1628 1470
Kasapuram 2672 859 3692 1863 1829
Sangala 670 95 386 199 187
Gundala 1375 377 1740 906 834
Ameenpalle 431 160 697 357 340
Konganapalle 2666 807 3886 1971 1915
Sakarabanda 755 150 715 360 355
Patha Kothacheruvu 2483 681 3064 1616 1448
Thimmapuram 1915 425 1840 936 904
Guntakal Rural 3686 462 1872 908 964
Donimukkala 1222 247 1035 527 508
Nelagonda 3034 1186 5403 2719 2684
Dancherla 1924 609 2489 1314 1175
3. Medical facilities in rural areas (project core zone & buffer zone) is given in table-6.10 (c),
medical facilities in towns is given in table-6.10 (d), details of hospitals, ambulance services
and blood banks are given in tables-(e), (f) & (g) respectively.
Table-6.10 (c) Medical facilities in rural areas: Core zone & 10-km buffer zone
Village Medical Facilities in Rural Areas : Core Zone & Buffer Zone
[a for <5 km; b for 5-10 km and c for >10 km; value in bracket indicates
number]
CHC PHC PHS HA HO D MHC FWC
Nakkanadoddi (Core Zone) b b (1) b b b (1) b
Kasapuram a a (1) a a a (1) a
Sangala b b a b b b b b
Gundala b b a c b b b b
Ameenpalle c c b c c c c c
Konganapalle c c (1) c c c (1) c
Sakarabanda c c a c c c c c
Patha Kothacheruvu c c (1) c c c (1) c
Thimmapuram b b a b b b b b
Guntakal Rural b b (1) b b b (1) b
Donimukkala a a a a a a a a
Nelagonda b b (1) b b b (1) b
Dancherla b b b c c b (1) C
CHC : Community Health Centre D : Dispensary
PHS : Primary Health Sub-centre MHC : Mobile Health Clinic
HA : Hospital Allopathic FWC : Family Welfare Centre
HO : Hospital Alternate Medicine

Table-6.10 (d) Medical facilities in towns
Town Hospitals Dispensaries/ Family welfare Charitable Medicine
(Allopathic & others) Health centres centres Hospitals Shops
No. No. of beds No. No. of beds No. No. of beds
Anantapur 2 650 1 30 1 30 15 240

Guntakal 2 130 1 0 1 10 0 51
Gooty - - 1 50 - - 1 33
Dharmavaram 1 20 1 50 1 10 3 24
Kadiri 1 100 - - 1 10 3 50
Hindupur 2 110 1 0 1 20 6 110
Table-6.10 (e) Locations of various hospitals & nursing homes

Name of Hospital/ Nursing Home Location Telephone No.
Government General Hospital Anantapur 08554– 275043
Sri Sathya Sai Institute of Higher Medical Science Prasanthi Nilayam, Anantapur 08554-287388
Ravi Teia Nursing Home Anantapur 08554-221865
Teia Nursing Home Hindupur 08554-222911
Akhila Praia Vyadyasala Dharamvaram 08554-222747
Table-6.10 (f) Contact information of ambulance services

Ambulance Service Location Contact Number
Harshita Ambulance Service Dharamvaram Road, Near Government 9866679507

Hospital, Anantapur
Bhavani Ambulance 15-180, Raju Road, Anantapur 9393711367
Naresh Ambulance C/O STD Booth, Government General 9908479051
Hospital, Anantapur
Pavani Ambulance Anantapur 9959470741
Indian Ambulance Anantapur 9000092700
Javahar Ambulance Service 6-1-911 a, Kovur Nagar, Anantapur 08554-248712
Jeevan Jyothi Hospital Ambulance Kamala Nagar, Anantapur 08554-249987
Service
Table-6.10 (g) Contact information of blood banks

Blood Bank Location Contact Number
Government General Hospital Blood Government Hospital Road, 08554-275043

Bank Aravindanagar, Anantapur
Indian Red Cross Society Blood Bank Engineering College Road, Maruthi 08554-246344,
Nagar, Anantapur 9393711178
Y.S.R.Red Drop - 9490180001

Alambana 15/50; Kamala Nagar, Anantapur; 9247421198
Rural Development Trust Bangalore Highway, Anantapur 08554-244208, 275503

4. Emergency number information of district Anantapur is given in following table.

Table-6.10 (h) Anantapur Emergency Numbers Information
Services Contact Number
Anantapur Help Line 09550105453
Ambulance 108
Electricity Complaints 1912
Fire 101
Health Information 104
Police 100
Traffic Help 1073
D.I.G 9440627223, 240866
S.P 9440796800, 240105
A.S.P.(A) 9440796801, 240333
A.S.P.(O) 9440796802, 274006
S.D.P.O 9440796803, 240303
Anantapur-1; Town police station (C.I ) 9440796804, 274033
Anantapur-1; Town police station(S.I) 9440796805, 274033
Anantapur-2; Town police station (C.I) 9440796806, 274333
Anantapur-2; Town police station (S.I ) 9440796815, 274333
R.D.T. Ambulance 275626
A.T.D.Ambulance 9849179539
Appolo Ambulance 274832
Anantapur Fire Station 220229
R.T.C Depot Manager 9848540651
R.T.C Enquiry 9959225866
R.T.C Reservation Counter 08554-243399
Railway Station 244444
Railway Enquiry 231053
6.11 Evacuation of Depot
Planning and training on evacuation techniques are important in preventing injuries. Evacuation
of local communities or people near the site may be prudent depending on the situation and
down-wind dispersion information etc. Although this action will normally be initiated and
handled by district authorities, the IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi will extend all necessary help
to implement such evacuation.
 The Chief Incident controller will intimate regarding evacuation. Evacuation of the
personnel shall be carried out in a planned manner along the escape route to assembly points.
Personnel will be evacuated at right angle to wind or opposite the wind direction.
 All Team Coordinators /Security will provide the exact head count details of depot
Employees during the emergency. Accounting for site personnel, visitors and contractors,
particularly those known to have been in the affected area will be done.
 Details of contract labor may vary depending upon day and time, but the exact numbers
(inside the depot) will be available at main gate (Security Supervisor keeps record of
contract person/ visitor etc. who have entered inside the depot. Total number of persons
available within the depot will be estimated by means of above information.

 Rescue operation will be carried out by the Rescue/Incident Control Team immediately
attending to the emergency. The above operations will be led by the Incident Controller at
site. The list of casualties etc. shall be reported to the Communication Coordinators who in
turn will be reporting the same to the Chief Incident Controller at site. Casualties will be
shifted to hospital, if required, by communication coordinators in consultation with Chief
Incident Controller.
 Evacuation of those personnel who are not required to be present will be carried out in
consultation with the Site Incident Controller. When required, all personnel shall proceed to
Assembly Point through designated routes.
 All Section heads/ Team Coordinators will ensure that the employees nominated by them
from their respective Sections must report at emergency site to extend their support to Team
Coordinators.
Evacuation Plan
When the emergency message received, all personnel will ensure that nearby personnel are
aware of the emergency, quickly shutdown operating equipment by pressing ESD buttons (e.g.,
Valves, Pumps, flow meters etc), close doors and exit the building using stairwells.
During emergency at IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi:
 TTs will be evacuated by TLF In-charge with the help of security personnel through
emergency route.
 All the workers/personnel whose role is not defined, are to be evacuated through emergency
route to assembly point (in front of safety store room) with the help of security personnel.
 Location of the Assembly Point is being intimated to the visitors by security supervisor and
also covered at the time of safety talk to the workers.
The practice for evacuation would be done at the time of mock fire drill.
Emergency Evacuation Plan is given in Annexure-7
The instructions for evacuation would be displayed with following information:
 All personnel must know where primary and alternate exits are located, and be familiar with
the various evacuation routes available.
 Be aware of all marked exits and evacuation routes from your area of the building. Know the
evacuation routes from your work area.
 When officially told to evacuate, leave by the nearest exit and alert others to do the same.
 Assist the disabled in exiting the building, if requested.
 Once outside, move to the assembly point designated for your building. Stay there until an
accurate head count has been taken.
 Keep streets and walkways next to exits clear for emergency vehicles and personnel. Keep
the street side of buildings clear so that emergency equipment can reach buildings.
 Do not return to an evacuated depot/ building until & unless directed to do so by the Safety
& Fire Department personnel.

6.12 Evacuation & Rehabilitation (Surrounding Areas)
In the event of major accident, the general public in surrounding areas will have very little time
to react and save themselves. The local population will have to be warned in a very short period.
Time available to population for a safe escape and threatened by the accident will depend on the
nature of accident. The effects of a fire on population may be injuries due to thermal radiation.
An explosion will give little time to warn population and area affected may be much larger than
that in case of a fire. Effects of an explosion on the population may be injuries caused by shock
wave, flying debris collapsing structures as well as exposure to thermal radiation.
Periodic Assessment
Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, Anantapur will carry out periodic assessment of the action
taken by the depot personnel during emergency through Emergency Response Drill.
Actions by General Population

On being warned of a major accident general public should take the following actions:
 Immediately go outdoors.
 Extinguish all flames.
 Keep torches handy. Store water for emergency use.
 Do not engage emergency phone lines by calling emergency services.
 Wait for further instructions from emergency services before moving out.
In the event of major disaster, it may become necessary to evacuate people from and around the
area likely to be affected by the accident. Sometimes, the evacuation may have to be made to
safe places within the complex area itself. At other times, however, especially in cases of
catastrophic disaster, it will be necessary to shift the entire population outside the complex area
to certain pre-designated places fixed in advance.
6.13 Information to General Public:
(1) The general public, likely to be affected shall be informed about safety measures to be
taken in the event of an emergency.
During On-site emergency Fire Mock Drill, the information will also be given to nearby
public for their participation to have holistic experience of the emergency &
precautionary measures to be adopted during emergencies.
Awareness camps will also be organised regularly for sensitizing the people about the
emergency nature.
(2) Display boards carrying Do’s and Don’ts would be located outside the gate. Do’s &
Don’ts during emergency situation for the public as well for the staff/ visitors would be
prepared & displayed appropriately.
(3) Safety leaflets with the information on Hazards of Petroleum products & action in case
of emergency will be distributed among population.

Public Awareness System
Programs will be conducted in villages through Corporate Social Responsibility and various
developments schemes. To avoid any panic, the necessary announcement would be made in
nearby villages, in the event of emergency.
The use of Electronic & Print Media
In order to bring awareness among the external public at large, the use of electronic media like
TV, Air & Press coverage will be used. The Welfare & Media co-coordinator of the depot would
prepare the Press release to the issued for the local press & other important dailies
6.14 Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders including External

Agencies
1. The stakeholders include external agencies such as District Authority, police, fire service,
revenue department, health department, pollution control board, National Disaster Response
Force (NDRF) and State Disaster Response Force (SDRF).
2. The roles and responsibilities of stakeholders are given below. These roles and
responsibilities are in line with National Disaster Management Guidelines on Chemical
Disasters, April, 2007, brought out by National Disaster Management Authority.
The Responsibilities of Various Stakeholders
(a) IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot will provide necessary information to Mutual Aid
Association, District Authority, Police and Fire Services.
 List of Hazardous Chemical and Systems which have potential to cause danger to
Human, Environment and Property.
 On-Site Emergency Plan and Periodic Mock Drill.
Above information would help authorities in mitigation, rescue and rehabilitation, with
resources identified and agreed with the authorities in advance.
(b) The district authority is responsible for the Off-Site emergency plan and it shall be
equipped with up-to-date Major Accident Hazard units, website, control room etc., with
provisions for monitoring the level of preparedness at all times. Regular meetings of various
stakeholders of Chemical Disaster Management will be conducted by district
administration/District Disaster Management Authority to review the preparedness of
Chemical Disaster Management and IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi would be participating
actively in all disaster management review meetings.
(c) The police will be an important component of all disaster management plans as they will be
associated with investigation of incident s/disasters. Police take overall charge of the Off-
Site situation until the arrival of the district collector or its representative at the scene.

(d) The fire services are one of the first responders and shall be adequately trained and equipped
to handle chemical emergencies. Fire services are to acquire a thorough knowledge of likely
hazards at the incident site and the emergency control measures required to contain it.
(e) In a chemical emergency, the revenue department shall coordinate with other agencies for
evacuation, establishment of shelters and provision of food, etc.
(f) When required for evacuation purposes in a chemical emergency, the department of
transport should made transport promptly available.
(g) The health department needs to assure that all victims get immediate medical attention on
the site as well as at the hospitals/health-care facility where they are shifted. In addition, the
department needs to network all the health-care facilities available in the vicinity for
effective management and also take effective measures to prevent the occurrence of any
epidemic.
(h) Pollution control boards need to ascertain the developing severity of the emergency in
accordance with responsive measures by constant monitoring of the environment. If and
when an area is fit for entry will depend upon the results of the monitoring. A
decontamination operation would be required to be carried out with the help of other
agencies and industries.
(a) The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and the State Disaster Response Force
(SDRF) are the specialized forces to manage these disasters in a longer run according to the
severity and nature of the disaster. Their specialized training is an effective measure that
needs to be built up and maintained with time for achieving a higher standard of
preparedness. They need to coordinate with other local agencies such as the Central
Industrial Security Force that may be responsible for security at the industrial site.
Roles of Various Outside Agencies in Off-site Emergency

Assistance may be required from outside agencies during the course of an emergency & SICs
will be responsible for establishing liaison with these agencies for effective assistance.
(a) District Magistrate, Police & Fire Brigade:
 In case of Petroleum Product Spillage, to ensure security at site to cordon off the areas and
post guards for preventing the villagers going near the site of the spillage.
 In case of fire, mobilization of Foam Tenders and Crew from local Fire Stations.
 Deployment & Home Guards , if necessary
 Traffic Control and Diversion
 Wireless Communication facilities.
 Evacuation of Civilian Population, if necessary
 Maintenance of communication with the public
(b) Irrigation Authorities:
To make available earth-moving equipments like bulldozers, drag line etc. for making approach
road and constructing bunds in the canal / river for containing the spread of products for
reclaiming the same.

(c) PWD Authorities:
 For construction of any temporary diversion.

 For repair of any damage to Roads or Bridges.
 Assistance for mobilizing equipment labour contractors (s) for de-watering the canal,
exposing the line and digging Bore-wells etc. for carrying out of the repairs.
(d) Assistance required from Mutual Aid Partners:
 Mutual Aid Members will render the help at the time of emergency. They will mobilize the
man power and available resources
 Equipments, Manpower, etc. to mitigate the loss due to disaster or accident. They will
provide support
 In order to combat the disaster situation in an efficient way and will provide.
- Fire Tender and Crew
- Firefighting material, First Aider, their hospital facilities etc..
- Technical expertise, communication facilities, vehicles as required
6.15 Reporting of the Incident:
1. All incidents covered under Level-I should be maintained by the depot for inspection
whenever called for inspection and Level-II and Level-III shall be reported to the Petroleum
and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) in the following format specified including
near miss incident. The above report should be submitted within 48 hours after occurrence of
the incidents or any other reason triggering major incident.
2. Investigation report of all major incidents shall be submitted to the PNGRB. An incident
shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs;
(a) fire for more than 15 minutes
(b) explosion / blowout
(c) fatal incident.
(d) loss above Rs. 10.0 Lac
(e) cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.
(f) plant shutdown / outage due to the incident
(g) Level-III incident
Any incidents in the depot will be reported to the concerned authority based on the
guidelines of the regulation & the format (given in Annexure-1).
6.16 Action after Reporting of Incident by the Depot
After reporting of the incidents to PNGRB, Nodal Officer of the Board (head of Technical
Standards the specifications and safety group) shall have responsibility of informing all the
Members of the Board and shall coordinate with appropriate level in National Disaster
Management Authority (NDMA) till normalization of the situation

6.17 Termination of Emergency
1. Termination activities should concentrate on giving accurate information to people who need
it most especially employees, neighborhood, District Authorities engaged in offsite
emergencies, and should begin as soon as the emergency phase of the operation is
completed.
2. The termination of emergency shall be declared through siren as per the Siren Code defined
by industry in case of Level- I and II. For Level-III termination of emergency shall be
declared by District Authority through appropriate mode of information transfer so as to
reach each and every one.
6.18 Emergency Recovery Procedures
1. After the emergency, the following activities need to be carried out in detail by the
concerned coordinator.
(a) Information to statutory authorities.
(b) Incident investigation.
(c) Damage assessment.
(d) Salvage of products, de-contamination, clean-up and restoration.
(e) A detailed report shall be prepared based on the entire experience of the incident,
including restorations, limitations and lessons learnt.
(f) Ambient air monitoring at the site as well as 5 km radius of the depot by State Pollution
Control Board to determine the contamination level affecting health. Termination of
Emergency
Business restoration planning is as important as having an emergency response plan. All the
management personnel need to be involved in bringing the operation to normalcy after an
emergency situation has occurred. This involves an emergency response planning and follows
up. The Location Incharge will be completely responsible for restoration of site.
Job Identified; Executives Responsible for Execution:
Retrieval of Data for Insurance Claim

Enabling Objective
Investigation
Information to Insurance Co. : Finance Section of the Depot with management’s

approval
Agencies and Lodging Claims
Information to District/State : Insurance Company

Authorities on Casualties/
Permanent Disabilities
Individual station Start-up Plan : Insurance Company in consultation and approval of

the IOCL management.
Format for Emergency Recovery Measures is given in Annexure-1

6.19 DMP for Road Transportation

The road transport of Petroleum product needs special attention. Resource mobilization for road
transport emergency as per PNGRB regulations shall be provided, the format for which is given
in Annexure-1.
6.20 Training and Education

Regular training shall be provided to all personnel who have a role in planning and operational
response to an emergency. The main goal of training for emergencies would be to enable the
participants to understand their respective roles in the response organization, the tasks associated
with each position and the procedures for maintaining effective communication with other
response functions and individuals.
6.21 Drill and Excercises
Emergency drills and exercises constitute another important component of emergency
preparedness. It refers to the enactment, under the assumption of a mock scenario, of the
implementation of response actions to be taken during an emergency
The frequency of the drills should vary depending on the severity of the hazard and shall be
conducted as per the schedule. Scenarios may be developed in such a manner as to accomplish
more than one event objective. Drills and exercises will be conducted as realistically as possible
Evaluation of drills and exercise will be carried out and include comments from the participants
and observers. Discrepancies noted by the drill observers during the drill will be pointed out
during the drill. A written evaluation of the drill or exercise shall be prepared by the individual
responsible for conducting the drill or exercise. The evaluation would facilitate to devise
appropriate actions for
 Areas that needs immediate corrective actions
 Areas where additional training is needed
 Correcting deficiencies in equipment, training, and facilities.
Records of drill, exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions would be duly maintained.
6.22 Wind Direction Indicator

A centrally located wind direction indicator shall be needed for on the spot measurement of
wind direction, which shall be helpful for in the selection of the evacuation site, assembling site
etc. in case of any minor/major leakage/fire. All the evacuated personnel to be shifted to upward
wind direction.
6.23 Protective Actions

Protective actions are aimed at protecting the life and health of pumping station personnel and
the public during an emergency. These typically include:
 Search and rescues operations
 Maintaining an account of personnel
 Depot evacuation
 Sheltering
 Control of access to affected areas
There are two distinctly different areas for the protection of personnel: the “ on-site” and “off-
site” areas. Planning differs for these two areas, due to the nature of the population affected.

6.24 Preventive Measures

Following preventive measures are suggested to ensure the safety of the proposed operation:
(a) Maintenance and Monitoring
IOCL shall establish the process maintenance and monitoring schedule for proper function of
safety related systems. Following tasks can be included in the above schedule:
 Checking of safety related operating conditions both in the control room and on site.
 Checking of safety related parts of the plant or site by visual inspection.
 Monitoring of safety related utilities such as electricity, coolant and work zone hazard
control measures, etc.
 Preparation of a maintenance plan and documentation of maintenance work specifying the
different maintenance intervals and the type of work to be performed.
(b) Inspection and Repairs
It is necessary to establish a plan for onsite inspections to ensure that schedule and the operating
conditions are stringently adhered to.
6.25 Emergency Preparedness Plan Review
The EPP and associated implementing procedures shall be reviewed to ensure compliance with
relevant regulations and applicable state and local emergency plans. The review should comprise
the plan, response procedures, equipment, training, drills and interfaces with local emergency
management agencies. The need for changes will be based on the following aspects.
 Written evaluation of drill and exercises which identify deficiencies
 Incorporation of more desirable methods, procedures, or organizations
 Changes in key personnel involved in the organization
 Changes in the organization structure of the facility
 Changes in the state regulations
 Modifications to the pumping station, which could affect emergency planning
 Recommendations received from other organizations and state agencies.
Emergencies occur very rarely, as such it is not a day to day activity nor a
planned activity at a fixed time schedule. The activities during the
emergencies are to be coordinated and this could be achieved by an
organizational approach, which has quick response and capabilities. The
organization shall be capable of providing quick response at any time round-
the-clock to meet the disasters. The emergency response coordination is
critical to the protection of properties and lives of the workers and the
community.

Annexures
Annexure-1 Various Formats
Annexure-2 Material Safety Data Sheets of MS, HSD, SKO & Ethanol
Annexure-3 Layout Plan of IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi
Annexure-4 Single Line Diagram of IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi
Annexure-5 Equipment Layout of Calibration Tower
Annexure-6 Equipment Layout : Product Pump House
Annexure-7 Emergency Evacuation Plan
Annexure-8 Proposed Project Location on Topo Plan
Project No. : ENV-675 TC No. : 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017 A-1
Annexure-1 (Various Formats)
Format-I Incident Reporting Format
1. Organisation 2. Sector
3. Location 4. Incident Sr. No.
5. Date of Incident 6. Time of Incident
7. Major / Minor / Near 8. Report -
miss Preliminary / Final
9. Fire / Incident 10. Duration of fire -
Hrs / Min
11. Type of Incident with loss of life / injury, Fire, Explosion, Blowout,
Electrocution, Fall from Height, Inhalation of Gas, Driving, Slip / Trip, Others,
NA
12. Location of Incident ( Name of Plant / Unit / Area / Facility / Tank farm /
Gantry / Road / Parking area etc )
13. Whether plant shutdown / caused outage of the facility? Yes / No

14. Fatalities nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
15. Injuries nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
16. Man - hours Lost a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
17. Direct Loss due to the incident (Rs. In Lacs). Loss to equipment / Machinery
as per Insurance claim etc.
18. Indirect Losses : Through put / Production Loss, etc.

19. Status of the Facility: Construction / Commissioning / Operation / Shutting
down / Turn around, Maintenance / Startup / Any other.
20. Brief Description of the Incident including post

incident measures.
( Attach details in separate sheet )
21. Whether similar Incident has occurred in past at the

same location, If yes, give brief description of the
incident and attach details in separate sheet.
22. Whether Internal Investigation has been completed.

If no, likely date by which it will be completed.
23. Whether internal investigation report (Major

Incident) has been submitted to PNGRB. If no, likely
date by which it will be submitted.
24. Cause of the Incident ( Tick the most relevant cause preferably one, maximum two )
A) Deviation from Procedure I) Not using the PPE
B) Lack of Job Knowledge J) Equipment failure
C) Lack of supervision K) Poor design / Layout etc.
D) Improper Inspection L) Inadequate facility
E) Improper Maintenance. ( Mech. / Elec. / Inst) M) Poor House Keeping
F) Improper material handling N) Natural Calamity

G) Negligent Driving O) Pilferage / Sabotage

H) Careless walking / climbing etc. P) Any other (give details)
25. Cause of leakage - Oil, Gas or Chemical ( Tick one only )
A) Weld leak from equipment / lines E) Leakage due to improper
operation
B) Leak from flange, gland etc. F) Leak due to improper
maintenance
C) Leak from rotary equipment G) Normal operation - Venting
/ draining
D) Metallurgical failure H) Any other
26. Cause of Ignition leading to fire ( Tick only one cause )
A) Near to hot work F) Static Electricity
B) Near to Furnace / Flare etc. G) Hammering / Fall of object
C) Auto - ignition H) Heat due to Friction
D) Loose electrical connection I) Lightning
E) Near to hot surface J) Any other ( pyrophoric etc )
27. Was the incident Avoidable? ( Yes / No )
28. The incident could have been avoided by the use of / or by ;
( Tick the most relevant point preferably one, maximum two )
A) Better supervision F) Personal Protective
Equipment
B) Adhering to specified operating procedure G) Better equipment
C) Imparting Training H) Management Control
D) Giving adequate time to do the activity through I) Adhering to specified
proper planning. maintenance procedure
E) Adhering to the work permit system J) Adhering to specified
Inspection / Testing
procedures.
K) Any other information;
Guidelines for filling the Incident Report:

1. All Major, Minor and Near miss incidents shall be reported in the quarterly report.
2. Incident Reporting form shall be filled up for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents.
3. Summary report shall be enclosed with every quarterly report.
4. Investigations shall be carried out for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents.
5. Investigation report of all Major incidents shall be submitted to PNGRB. An incident shall be treated as Major if
any of the following occurs;
- Fire for more than 15 minutes
- Explosion / Blowout
- Fatal Incident.
- Loss above Rs. 5.0 Lac.
- Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.
- Plant Shutdown / Outage due to the incident
6. Loss time Incident shall be monitored till the affected person joins duty. In case the affected person is yet to join
the duty, then the status of report submitted will be preliminary. Final report against the same incident shall be
sent once he joins duty and the man - hours lost are known.
7. All columns must be filled up.
8. For any additional information use separate sheets as required.
9. Quarterly report shall be sent to PNGRB within 15 to 30 days of end of quarter.
10. Immediate reporting of incident through fax/telephone shall continue as per the prevailing system.
Signature
Name
Designation of the Occupier/Manager

II. Format for Emergency Recovery Measures
Sl. Check-point Yes No Remarks

Post Emergency Recovery
Salvage of product
1. Check that spilled / accumulated product contents are transferred to the
OWS or collected in drums.
2. Check whether the quality and quantity estimation of the product extracted
from OWS has been done for further disposal in line with standing QC
guidelines by either transferring to service tanks or to nearest refinery for
blending / reprocessing or not.
3. Check that correct stock accounting of spilled product as loss has been
completed in accounting system.
4. Check that affected area has been completely cleaned and dried after
evacuation of spilled product.
5. Declare that affected area after salvage operations is fully clean and safe for
movement of the working personnel.
6. Check that all drains are not having any residual oil and are thoroughly
cleaned and dried.
7. Check that all control valves on product lines and OWS lines outside dyke
area and drains are completely closed after removal of the spilled product.
8. Check that interlocking system of tanks/gantry has been re-activated for
normal operations.
9. Check whether the soil testing of the affected area, if required, has been
done to assess the soil contamination level to meet the Environmental –
SPCB norms / requirements.
Taking care of affected manpower
10. Whether physical accounting of all personnel on duty during and after the
incident are ascertained by the Site Incident Controller and reconciled
immediately
11. Whether the first-aid treatment and post-incident health check of the
affected personnel has been undertaken in time
12. Whether these personnel are declared fully physically fit before allowing
them to resume their normal duties
13. Whether the records for such first aid and treatment of the affected
personnel are maintained in a well defined format
Addressing media and outside bodies
17. Whether the incident was appropriately informed to the local media in line
with the respective company’s Press and Media Policy
18. Whether the role of neighbouring population during the drill / disaster is
suitably informed to the population during subsequent meetings with local
administration / panchayat etc. for necessary improvements
19. Whether the awareness and preparedness on disaster is regularly assimilated
/ shared with nearby public / societies and stake holders.
Reporting
20. Check whether that disaster incident report was communicated to respective
controlling office / HQ promptly in a standard format.
21. Whether the incident reports are also sent to concern State Level Industry
Coordinator on time.
22. Check that detailed report on disaster in proper format was communicated
to PNGRB/ Factory inspector / Labour inspector / SPCB / District
Magistrate /PESO.
Investigation
23. Whether investigation teams are constituted as per respective company
policies

24. Whether RCA (Root Cause Analysis) of the disaster is conducted by the
investigating team
25. Whether detailed investigation into effective functioning of interlocks,
detection devices, automation controls and applicable norms are carried out
to find out possible improvements in design / construction / operations /
maintenance and training aspects etc.
26. Whether a system of initiating appropriate corrective measures including
suitable revisions to the Disaster Management Plan are adopted based on
findings of the investigation
Damage Assessment – Monetary and Physical
27. Check the valuation / cost of product loss / down gradation on account of
contamination, if any / Property / Structures / damaged assets – equipments.
28. Whether repairs and maintenance cost of property, assets and equipment are
assessed.
29. Whether any penalty by statutory authorities like SPCB / Factory Inspector
and Labour Commissioner are assessed.
30. Whether possible impact on environment are also assessed and appropriate
measures are taken
31. Whether damage assessment also include potential erosion of reputation –
from company, industry and national perspectives
Clean up and Restoration
32. Whether the affected area has been fully cleaned and cleared after due
clearance from investigation team
33. Check whether heat detectors, high level alarms, in built safety systems
(NRV, TSV etc.) are fully functional after the disaster incident.
34. Check whether all firefighting equipments like – hoses / nozzles / Fire
Extinguishers etc. have been put back at designated places and are fully
ready for reuse
35. Whether clear procedures are in place to allow resumption of normal
operations
III. Format for Road Transportation of Petroleum Products including format

for Transport Emergency Card (TREM)
Sl. Item Qty

Mechanical Equipment
1. Gaskets (Carbon Asbestos Filled)
2. Studs and bolts.
3. Teflon tapes.
4. ½” / ¾” crowbar (1 m long)
5. Spade / blind flange
6. Rope (Manila / Jute)
7. Spark arrestors.
8. 1” tapered wooden pegs.
9. Chopper
10. Spare fan belt for tank lorry with P.T.O. unit
11. Wind sock
12. M-Seal / epoxy-base cold-welding compound.
13. Wooden slippers
14. Teflon-taped spanners, wrenches
15. Spark-proof wrenches hammer and tools.
16. Barricading masts and ropes / tapes
17. Hoses

18. Chain pulley blocks and stay pipes

19. Small valve keys for operating valves in the tank truck
Electrical Equipment
1. Gas Explosi-meter
2. Flame-proof torches
3. Earthing wires (10 m long) with crocodile clips
Other Safety Items:
1. 1 roll of gunny / hessian cloth (about 10 mts. long)
2. First aid box (containing water gel compounds)
3. Soap
4. Blanket
5. Water Gel Blanket
6. Breathing Apparatus (With spare filled cylinder and Canister
gas masks)
7. Fire proximity suit
Fire Fighting Equipment:
1. Portable Dry Chemical Powder Fire Extinguishers
2. Fire-water Hoses
3. Triple Purpose diffuser nozzle for use with fire hoses.
Communication Equipment:
1. Hand operated sirens
2. Whistles
3. Megaphone, Mobile Phones, VHF sets.
Traffic Control Equipment:
1. Red lights (Battery operated) - for traffic diversion
2. Area maps
3. Diversion Boards
(a) In order to handle Emergencies, which may arise due to incident involving Petroleum
Product Transportation, it is required that a comprehensive Emergency Management Plan is
readily available with the industry as well as with other related authorities all along the
routes. The DMP/OSEP should be clearly understood by its users so that the emergencies
can be handled in a systematic manner with minimum response time in accordance with the
prescribed procedure.
(b) Copies of the QRA/DMP/OSEP shall be made available by the Industry to all the field
locations i.e. Installations, POL Depot / Installations, Refineries, Gas Processing Plants,
Dispatch units of etc., the concerned District Administration, Police Stations and Fire
Brigades en-route and within vicinity of specified tank truck routes, oil industry sales
personnel of concerned area as may be required.
TREM Card (Specific to Road Transportation)
TREM Card format including sample as per details shown in and Route Map shall is provided to
the Tank Truck Crew which shall be referred in case of an emergency

Transport Emergency Card Format

Nature of Hazard:
Protective Devices:
Emergency Action
Spillage
Fire
First Aid
Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) No
(For universal acceptance of material, both numbers should be mentioned on TREM Card)
Emergency Telephone Numbers/mobile numbers
Name and contact numbers of the control room/contact person of the supplying company
Name and contact numbers of the control room/contact person of the receiving company
Name and contact numbers of Transporter
Other important Name and contact numbers of civic authorities, fire and police
Note: The format is designed & provided in English, Hindi and local language where crews are
operating
The following is the sample transport emergency card formatted & circulated to the transporter
by the company.
SAMPLE TRANSPORT EMERGENCY CARD FORMAT:
Cargo: Petroleum Products
Nature of Hazard : Highly volatile and Inflammable.
Can cause Cold Burns
Inhaling vapour can cause nausea, breathlessness &headache.
Air / vapour mixture highly explosive.
Leakage can cause Vapour Cloud explosion and BLEVE.
Protective Devices : Hand gloves (Rubber / low temperature)

Safety Goggles
Self-contained Respiratory device to work in vapour-rich area
Low temperature / fire proximity suit
Emergency Action :
Try to move the vehicle to open area. (In case of the fuel is leaking from a stationary tanker
whose engine is shut, don’t try to start the engine).
Stop Engine.
Vehicle should not be left unguarded.
Contact Police, Fire Brigade, Sarpanch, nearest Oil Company by sending helper /passerby
Keep public and traffic away by displaying ‘Danger Boards’ at sufficient distance.
“No Smoking” and “No Naked Lights” within the cordoned off area.
Keep ready for action Fire Extinguishers and Safety Kit.
Stay Upwind.
Don’t park the vehicle blocking the route.
Spillage : Check the valves and caps for tightness by hand and stop leak if possible
Fire : If minor, try to extinguish by suitable fire extinguishers
First Aid : Pour water in case of cold or hot burn Seek medical help, if necessary
Emergency Telephone Numbers/mobile numbers

IOC _______________ HPC_______________________
BPC _____________________ IBP________________________
FIRE 101 _______________ POLICE 100_________________

Annexure-2 Material Safety Data Sheets
I. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) : Motor Spirit

(i) Identity of Material
Product Name Petrol, Motor Spirit
Trade Name Gasoline
Formula Complex Mixture of Hydrocarbons
UN No. 1203
CAS No. 86290-81-5
Hazchem Code 3Y*E
Label/Class Red & White Flammable Liquid/3.2 Group II
(ii) Physical and Chemical Properties

Physical State at 15°C and atmospheric pressure Liquid
Appearance Colourless
Solubility in Water Insoluble
Calorific Value (Kcal/Kg) 4.5E + 07
Vapor Pressure at 20°C, mm Hg 300 to 600
Evaporation Rate at 30oC 10 Approx.
Boiling Point/Range (oC) 32-215
Melting/Freezing Point/Range (°C) 90 to -75
Vapor Density (Air = 1) 3 to 4
Specific Gravity, 20°C (kg/m3) 720 - 775
Heat of Vaporization, Kcal/Kg 2.93E + 05
Specific Heat Liquid J/Kg 2.2E + 03
(iii) Fire and Explosive Data

Explosivity Moderate
Flammability Dangerous
Auto Ignition Temp °C 257
Explosive Limits % 1.4-7.4
Flash Point °C -43
Burning Rate 4 mm/min
Extinguishing Media Foam, CO2, DCP. Water may be ineffective and cause fire to spread.
May be used to cool fire exposed containers.
Special Procedures If leak or spill has not ignited use water spray to disperse vapors and to
protect men attempting to stop leak. Water spray may be used to flush
spills away from exposures.
Unusual Media Flash back may occur along vapor trail.
(iv) Reactive Hazards

Stability Stable
Incompatibility Oxidising Agents
Conditions to Avoid Keep away from Heat & Open Flame
Hazardous Combustion/ Decomposition Products Toxic Gases /Vapors
(v) Health Hazard Data

Entry Route Inhalation/ Skin Absorption
TLV-TWA, ppm 300
TLV-STEL ppm 500
Odor Threshold, ppm 0.25
Toxicity by Ingestion, LD50, g/kg 0.5 to 5
(vi) Sign/Symptoms of Exposure
Inhalation In very high concentration causes loss of consciousness, coma and sudden death. In less
severe cases headache, nausea, mental confusion and depression occurs. Moderately toxic
by inhalation.
Ingestion Irritation of gastrointestinal tract with vomiting, colic and diarrhea. Fatal dose for adult is
350 gms and for children 10-15 gm.
Contact Skin-irritation, prolonged contact can result in drying of skin, dermatitis and eye irritation.
(vii) Emergency Treatment (Immediate Action Required)

Inhalation Remove victim to fresh air, give artificial respiration (not mouth to mouth), if breathing
has stopped, oxygen if breathing is labored. Rescuers should take suitable precautions to
prevent being overcome by high vapor concentration.
Ingestion Give conscious victim water to drink, do not induce vomiting. Liquid paraffin, olive oil or
some vegetable oil is to be given orally to retard absorption of gasoline.
Contact Remove contaminated clothing and wash affected part.
(viii) Hazard Specification

NFPA Rating
Health (Nh) 1
Flammability (Nf) 3
Instability (Ni) 0
Material Factor 16
(ix) Safe Usage Data
Ventilation Adequate Ventilation
Protective Eyes Goggles / Face Shields
Equipment Respiratory Self contained breathing apparatus for containment/clean-up
operations
Gloves & Clothing Rubber
(x) Precautions
Handling & Storage
Gasoline should be stored in well ventilated, properly labeled and approved containers. Sniffing,
siphoning and use as a solvent and cleaning agent should be avoided. Do not transfer to

unlabeled, unsuitable or incorrectly labeled containers. All containers should be kept out of reach
of children and kept fully closed when not in use. Cleaning and inspection/maintenance of
storage tanks should be done according to proper procedures and precautions (work permit
system, gas freeing of tanks, using lifelines and wearing air supplied breathing apparatus).
Additional precautions are required where tanks may contain leaded gasoline.
Emergency Response Data (Release / Spill)
Avoid spillages. Should they occur, sand or earth are useful means of containment and
absorption. Because the vapors can travel along the ground for considerable distances, naked
flames n surrounding areas should be extinguished. Any action which might cause ignition of
gasoline/vapors should be avoided. Anybody in the nearby low-laying confined space should be
evacuated immediately until the area has been thoroughly ventilated and checked as safe to re-
enter. The sand/earth should be removed to safe area.
(xi) Motor Spirit/ Gasoline (Quality Requirements as per IS 2796-2000)
S. No. Characteristics BS III

1. Grade MS 91
2. Colour, Visual Orange
3. Density at 15°C kg/m3 720-775
4. Distillation
a) Recovery upto 70°C (E-70) percent by volume 10-45
b) Recovery upto 100°C (E-70) percent by volume 40-70
c) Recovery upto 150°C (E-70) percent by volume 75
d) Recovery upto 1800°C (E-70) percent by volume -
e) Final Boiling point, °C max 210
5. Research Octane Number (RON), min 91
6. Motor Octane Number (MON), min 81
7. Anti-Knock Index (AKI), min -
8. Existent Gum, g/m3, max 40
9. Potential Gum, g/m3, max -
10. Sulphur Tota, Percent by mass, max 0.015
11. Lead Content(as Pb), g/l, max 0.005
12. Reid Vapour Pressure (RVP) at 38°C kPa 60 (67) Max
13. Vapour Lock Index (VLI)
(VLI = 10RVP + 7E70)3, max
a) Summer 750 (900)
b) Other month 950 (1050)
14. Benzene content, Percent by volume max 1
15. Copper strip corrosion (for 3hr @ 50°C), max Class 1
16. Water tolerance of gasoline-alcohol blends, Temperature for phase
separation °C, Max
a) Summer 10
b) Winter 0
17. Engine intake system cleanliness Report MFA used
18. Olefin content, percent by volume, max 21
19. Oxidation stability, minutes, min 360
20. Aromatic content, percent by volume, max 42
21. Oxygen content, percent by mass, max 2.7
22. Oxygenates, percent by volume, max Ethanol 5

II. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) : High Speed Diesel (HSD)
Product Name Diesel Oil,Gas Oil

Trade Name HSD
Formula Complex Mixture of Hydrocarbons
UN No. 1202
Hazchem Code 3Y*
Label/Class Red Flammable Liquid
Physical State at 15°C at atmospheric pressure Liquid

Appearance Liquid Brown
Solubility in Water Insoluble (30 ppm)
Calorific Value (Kcal/Kg) 4.34E+07
Vapor Pressure at 20°C, mm Hg <1
Kinematic Viscosity, cSt at 40°C 2.0 to 5.0
Vapor Density (Air = 1) >3
Specific Gravity, 15°C, kg/m3 820 to 845
Heat of Vaporization, Kcal/Kg 2.71E+05
Specific Heat Liquid J/Kg 2.343E+03
Flammability Moderate
Auto Ignition Temp °C 256.6
Explosive Limits % 1.3 to 6.0
Flash Point °C 35-54
Extinguishing Media Foam, CO2, DCP. Water may be ineffective and cause fire to
spread. May be used to cool fire exposed containers.
Unusual Media Flash back may occur along vapor trail.
(iv) Reactive Hazards

Stability Stable

(v) Health Hazard Data

Entry Route Inhalation/ Skin Absorption
TLV-TWA, mg/m3 5 (Inhalation)
TLV-STEL, mg/m3 10
Odor Threshold, ppm 0.1
LD50, Rabbit, g /kg. 0.2 (oral)
LD50, Rat, g/kg 28 (oral)
(vi) Sign/ Symptoms of Exposure
Inhalation Dizziness, headache. Aspiration – rapidly developing, potential fatal chemical pneumonitis
Ingestion Nausea, vomiting
Contact Skin-irritation, eyes–irritation. Dermatitis may result on prolonged contact

Inhalation Remove victim to fresh air, give artificial respiration of necessary. If unconscious but
breathing place in the unconscious (recovery) position. Give external cardiac massage if
necessary.
Ingestion Do not induce vomiting.
Contact Remove contaminated clothing and wash affected part (skin/eyes) with plenty of water.
(viii) Hazard Specification

NFPA Rating
Health 0
Flammability 2
Stability 0
Material Factor 10
(ix) Safe Usage Data

Equipment
Respiratory Self contained breathing apparatus for containment/clean-up
operations
(x) Precautions
Handling & Storage
Diesel should be stored in well-ventilated, properly labeled and approved containers. Sniffing,
siphoning and use as a solvent and cleaning agent should be avoided. Do not transfer to
unlabeled, unsuitable or incorrectly labeled containers. All containers should be kept out of reach
of children and kept fully closed when not in use. Cleaning and inspection/maintenance of

storage tanks should be done according to proper procedures and precautions (work permit
system, gas freeing of tanks, using lifeline and wearing air supplied breathing apparatus.)
(xi) HSD (Quality Requirement as per IS 1460-2005)
S.No. Characteristics BS III

1. Acidity, inorganic Nil
2. Acidity, total mg of KOH/g, max To Report
3. Ash, percent by mass, max 0.01
4. Carbon residue (Ramsbottom) on 10 percent residue percent by 0.30
mass, max
5. Cetane number, min 51
6. Cetane index, min 46
7. Pour points, max
a) Winter 3°C
b) Summer 15°C
8. Copper strip corrosion for 3 hr at 100°C Not worse than
No.1
9. Distillation, percent (v/v) recovered
a) at 350°C -
b) at 360°C 95
c) at 370°C -
10. Flash Point
a) Abel°C, Min 35
b) Pensky Martens closed cup°C, Min 66
11. Kinematic Viscosity, cSt, at 40°C 2.0 to 5.0
12. Sediments, percent by mass, max -
13. Total contamination, mg/kg 24
14. Density at 15°C, kg/m3 820-860
15. Total sulphur, mg/kg, max 350
16. Water content, percent (v/v) -
Water content, mg/kg, max 200
17. Cold Filter Plugging point (CFPP), max
a) Winter 6°C
b) Summer 18°C
18. Total Sediments mg per 100 ml, max -
19. Oxidation Stability, g/m3, max 25
20. Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) percent by mass, max 11
21. Lubricity corrected wear scar diameter (WSD 1.4) at 60°C, micron, 460
max
22. Oxygen content percent by mass, max 0.6

III. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) : Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO)
Product Name Kerosene, Stove Oil, Illuminating Oil

Trade Name SKO
Formula Complex Mixture Of Hydrocarbons
UN No. 1223
Hazchem Code 3Y
Label/Class Red Flammable Liquid/ 3.3 Group II
Physical State Liquid

Appearance Colourless
Solubility in Water 0.0002 to 0.0004
Calorific Value (Kcal/Kg) 4.35E+07
Vapor Pressure at 20°C, mm Hg 5
Melting/ Freezing Point (°C) 43/ -49
Vapor Density (Air = 1) 4.1
Specific Gravity, 15°C, kg/m3 800 to 850
Heat of Vaporization, Kcal/Kg 2.72E+05
Specific Heat Liquid J/Kg 2.09E+03
Flammability Moderate
Auto Ignition Temp °C 228
Explosive Limits % 0.7 to 5
Flash Point °C 35
Extinguishing Media Foam, CO2, DCP. Water may be ineffective and cause fire to
spread. May be used to cool fire exposed containers.
Special Procedures If a leak or spill has not ignited, use water spray to disperse the
vapors and to provide for men attempting to stop a leak. Water
spray may be used to flush spills away from exposure.
(iv) Reactive Hazard
Stability Stable

(v) Health Hazard Data & Hazard Specification
Health Hazard Data Hazard Specification

Entry Route Skin Absorption NFPA Rating
TLV-TWA, mg/m3 100 Health 0
Odor Threshold, ppm 1 Flammability 2
LD50, Rabbit, g /kg. 0.2 (oral) Stability 0
LD50, Rat, g/kg 20 (oral) Material Factor 10
(vi) Sign/ Symptoms of Exposure
Inhalation Dizziness, headache and nausea; cns depressant/anesthetic effect. Continued

inhalation produces visual and auditory, hallucinations, delirium and mania. Also
symptoms of fatigue, somnolence, staggering gait, loss of memory.
Ingestion Spontaneous vomiting, low to moderate oral toxicity. Irritation of mouth, throat
& gastro intestinal tract, nausea, weakness, dizziness, slow and shallow
respiration, convulsions, unconsciousness.
Contact Skin-irritation, prolonged contact can result in drying of skin, dermatitis and eye
irritation.
Inhalation Remove victim to fresh air; give artificial respiration if breathing has stopped,
oxygen if breathing is laboured.
Ingestion Give conscious victim water to drink. Do not induce vomiting. Liquid paraffin,
olive oil or some vegetable oil is to be given orally to retard absorption of
gasoline. Gastric lavage and induction of vomiting are not advisable.
Contact Remove contaminated clothing and wash affected part (skin/eyes) with plenty of
water.
(viii) Safe Usage Data

Equipment
Respiratory Self contained breathing apparatus for
containment/clean-up operations

(ix) Precautions (Handling & Storage)

Kerosene should be stored in well-ventilated, properly labeled and approved containers. Sniffing,
siphoning and use a solvent and cleaning agent should be avoided. Do not transfer to unlabeled,
unsuitable or incorrectly labeled containers. All containers should be kept out of reach of
children and kept fully closed when not in use. Cleaning and inspection/maintenance of storage
tanks should be done according to proper procedures and precautions (work permit system, gas
freeing of tanks, using lifeline and wearing air supplied breathing apparatus.
(x) Superior Kerosene Oil (Quality Requirements as per IS 1459-1974)
S. No. Characteristics Requirement
1. Acidity, inorganic Nil
2. Burning quality
a) Char value, mg/kg of oil consumed, Max 20
b) Bloom on gas chimney Not darker than grey
3. Colour (Saybolt), Min 10
4. Copper strip corrosion for 3 hr at 50°C Not worse than No. 1
5. Distillation
a) Percent recovered below 200°C, Min 20

b) Final boiling point °C ,max 300
6. Flash Point (Abel)°C, min 35
7. Smoke point, mm, min 18
8. Total sulphur, percent by mass, max 0.25

(IV) Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS): Ethanol
1. IDENTIFICATION COMMERCIAL PRODUCT NAME: Ethanol (Ethyl Alcohol,

Spirit, Alcohol)
FORM: Liquid
COLOUR: Colourless
ODOR: Characteristic
2. COMPOSITION INFORMATION INGREDIENT NAME: Ethanol

CHEMICAL FORMULA: C2H5OH
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 46.07
CAS NO: 64-17-5
EU INDEX NO: 603-002-00-5
3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION HIGHLY FLAMMABLE (R16 S43)

FLASH POINT: (R11) 9°C
IGNITION TEMPERATURE: 425°C
EXPLOSION LIMITS:
LOWER: 3.5%v/v
UPPER: 19%v/v
PROTECTION AGAINST FIRE & EXPLOSION:
 Combustible vapours heavier than air. May form
explosive mixtures with air.
 Take measures to prevent electrostatic charges.
4. FIRST-AID MEASURES
4.1 SKIN CONTACT

 Irritating to skin. Remove affected person from source of contamination.
 Wash contaminated skin promptly with soap or mild detergent and water.
 Remove clothing promptly, if soaked through, and wash as above.
4.2 EYE CONTACT

 Irritating to eyes. Can be damaging if large amount is splashed into eyes.
 Wash eyes promptly with plenty of water, while lifting the eye lids.
 Continue to rinse for at least 15 minutes, and get medical attention.
4.3 INGESTION
 Intoxicating if ingested. (If ingested in undiluted form, it has a severe drying effect on mucous
membranes of mouth and throat.)
 Never Make an unconscious person vomit or drink fluids.
 Wash out mouth thoroughly, and give plenty of water to drink.
 Do not induce vomiting. Get medical attention immediately.
4.4 INHALATION
 Occupational exposure limits (8-hour reference period) 1000 ppm (1900 mg/m³).
 Intoxicating if continuously inhaled for a long period of time. Move the person to fresh air,
immediately perform artificial respiration if breathing has stopped.
 When breathing is difficult, properly-trained personnel may administer oxygen.
 Keep the person warm and at rest. Get medical attention promptly.

5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES EXTINGUISHING MEDIA

 Use extinguishing media appropriate for surrounding fire.
Water, dry chemicals, (BC or ABC powder), CO2, sand,
dolomite, etc. Foam.
 DO NOT extinguish fire unless flow can be stopped first.
5.1 SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING  Keep upwind. Shut down all possible sources of ignition.
PROCEDURES  Water may be ineffective but use to keep fire-exposed
containers cool.
 Keep run-off water out of sewers and water sources. Dike
for water control.
 Avoid water in straight hose stream; will scatter and spread
fire. Use spray or fog nozzles.
 Cool containers exposed to flames with water from the
side until well after the fire is out.
 Move container from fire area if it can be done without
risk.
 If risk of water pollution occurs, notify appropriate
authorities.
5.2 UNUSUAL FIRE & EXPLOSION  Makes explosive mixtures with air. Extremely flammable.
HAZARDS May explode in a fire.
 May travel considerable distance to source of ignition and
flash back.
5.3 HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION Gases of:

PRODUCTS  Carbon monoxide (CO)
 Carbon dioxide (CO2)
6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE SPILL CLEANUP METHODS

MEASURES  Ventilate well, stop flow of vapour or liquid if possible.
 Shut off or remove all possible sources of ignition.
 Do not allow chemical to enter confined spaces such as
sewers due to explosion risk.
 Sewers designed to preclude formation of explosive
concentrations of vapour may be permitted.
 Absorb small quantities with paper towels and evaporate in
safe place (fume hood).
 Allow sufficient time for vapours to completely clear the
hood ducts, then burn the paper in a location away from
combustible materials.
 Collect for reclamation or absorb in vermiculite, dry sand
or similar material.
 Clean-up personnel should use respiratory and/or liquid-
contact protection.
 Provide ventilation and confine spill.
 Do not allow runoff to sewer.
7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

7.1 USAGE PRECAUTIONS  Keep away from heat, sparks and open flame.
 Avoid spilling, skin and eye contact.
 Ventilate well, avoid breathing vapours.
 Use approved respirator if air contamination is above
acceptable level.
 Do not use contact lenses
7.2 STORAGE PRECAUTIONS  Flammable/combustible. Keep away from oxidizers, heat

and flames.
 May attack some plastics, rubber and coatings.
 Keep in cool, dry, ventilated storage and closed containers.
 Ground the container and transfer equipment to eliminate
static electric sparks.
7.3 STORAGE CRITERIA Flammable liquid storage.
8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS AND PERSONAL PROTECTION
.8.1 VENTILATION Store in a well-ventilated area.
8.2 RESPIRATORS No specific recommendation made, but respiratory protection

must be used if the general level exceeds the Occupational
Exposure Level (OEL).
8.3 PROTECTIVE GLOVES Use protective gloves made of butyl rubber.
8.4 EYE PROTECTION Wear approved chemical safety goggles where eye exposure is
reasonably probable.
8.5 OTHER PROTECTION 

Use engineering controls to reduce air contamination to
permissible exposure level.
 Provide eyewash station and safety shower.
 Wear appropriate clothing to prevent repeated or
prolonged skin contact.
9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES
APPEARANCE Liquid. Clear. Hygroscopic

COLOUR Colourless
ODOUR/TASTE Characteristic. Pleasant, agreeable
SOLUBILITY DESCRIPTION Miscible with water. Soluble in most organic solvents.
BOILING POINT (°C) ~78
MELTING POINT (°C) -117.3
SPECIFIC GRAVITY (water = 1) 0.79 @ 20°C
VAPOUR DENSITY (air = 1) 1.59
VAPOUR PRESSURE 44 mm Hg @20°C
EVAPORATION RATE 3.10
VOLATILE BY VOL. (%) 100
VISCOSITY 1.19 cps @ 20°C
FLASH POINT (°C) ~13 (Closed-cup method)
AUTO IGNITION TEMPERATURE(°C) 422
FLAMMABILITY LIMIT (lower %) 3.3
FLAMMABILITY LIMIT (upper %) 19
pH VALUE Neutral
10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY  STABILITY: Avoid heat, sparks, flames. Normally
stable.
 CONDITIONS TO AVOID: Reacts strongly with alkali
metals, alkaline earths, oxidizing agents (such as:
Perchlorates, CrO3, halogen oxides, peroxy compounds,
perchloric acid, non-metallic oxides, nitric acid, KMnO4,
salts of halogen, oxyacids), halogen-halogen compounds,
alkali oxides, non-metallic halides, anhydrides/sodium

acetate/acids, ethylene oxide, fluorine, hydrides,

mercury compounds, silver compounds, chromyl chloride,
UF6; capable of exploding with air in a vaporous/gaseous
state.
 HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION: Will not

polymerize.
 MATERIALS TO AVOID: Strong oxidizing agents.
 HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS:
Vapours/gases/fumes of:
- Carbon monoxide (CO).
- Carbon dioxide (CO2).
11. TOXICOLOGICAL  TOXIC DOSE 1-LD50 : 7060.00 mg/kg (oral rat)

INFORMATION  HEALTH WARNINGS: Vapour is harmful on prolonged
exposure or in high concentration. When in a concentration
of more than 50%, ethanol causes local mucosal lesions
through dehydration and albumin precipitation.
Absorption, which occurs swiftly from the gastrointestinal
tract, causes euphoria, with subsequent dizziness,
inebriation, paralysis, diminished reflex, excitability,
cyanosis, narcosis and respiratory paralysis. Dangerous
intolerance reactions and increased absorption occur
through the simultaneous action of disulfiram,
trichloroethylene, tetra-chloromethane, nitrobenzene,
carbon disulfide, aniline, lime-nitrogen, arsenic, lead and
mercury. CNS depressant. Repeated exposure may cause
chronic eye irritation. Defatting, drying and cracking of
skin. Mild dermatitis, allergic skin rash. Swallowing
concentrated chemical may cause severe internal injury.
 MEDICAL SYMPTOMS: Rhinitis (inflammation of the
nasal mucous membranes). Upper respiratory irritation.
Skin irritation. Nausea, vomiting.
 MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS: Convulsive disorders,
CNS problems.

Annexure-3: Layout of Proposed Project A-20
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Onsite Emergency Plan (OSEP) for proposed Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi
Annexure-4: Single Line Diagram A-21
Annexure-5: Equipment layout of calibration tower A-22
Annexure-6: Equipment layout: Product Pumphouse A-23
Annexure-7: Emergency Evacuation Plan A-24
ECC
Assembly
Area
Emergency Evacuation Plan

Annexure-8: Proposed Project Location on Topo Plan A-25

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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL),

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research

TC No. 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017

No. of Pages 114 + Annexures (A-1 to A-25)

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Shriram Institute for Industrial Research

Chapter/ Content Page No.

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

Chapter/ Content Page No.

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

Table No. Description Page No.

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

Table No. Description Page No.

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

(a) Hazard Identification : To identify sources of process accidents involving release

(b) Consequence : To estimate probable zone of impact of accidents as well

(c) Accident Frequency : Computation of the average likelihood of accidents

(d) Risk Assessment : Combining accident consequence and frequency to obtain

1.3 The IOCL Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

1.4 The Assignment

 Identification of risk by HAZOP/ FETI approaches/ result evaluation & computation of

 Emergency preparedness plan with respect to administration safety, environment, societal

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

 Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis

1.5 The Statutory/ Legal Requirements

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

(c) The Inflammable Substances Act, 1952.

(d) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001).

(e) The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 (amended 1992).

(f) The Petroleum Act, 1934.

(g) The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995.

(h) The Explosives Act, 1884 (amended todate).

1.6 Organization of the Report

1.7 Contents of the Report

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

Chapter- 2 : Project Description

Chapter- 3 : Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

Chapter- 4 : Maximum Credible Accident Analysis

Chapter- 5 : Consequence Analysis

Chapter- 6 : Onsite Emergency Plan/ Disaster Management Plan

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

2.1 Project Description

(a) Project Location

Facility : IOCL Petroleum Storage Depot

Address : Village Nakkanadoddi ,

Location : The proposed Depot is planned at Nakkanadoddi Village,

Geo codes : Latitude : 15.1647°N to 15.1602°N

Project Layout is given at Annexure-3

(b) The Process of the Project

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

PICTORIAL DEPICTION OF THE PROCESS FLOW CHART:

HSD CRVT SKO EthanolIF Bio-

TRUCK LOADING FACILITIES

Vapour Recovery System

8 Bays TLF Bottom Loading

(c) Receipt of Petroleum Products

T-01A 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR

T-01B 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR

T-01C 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR

T-08A 03.00M Ǿ x 07.50M L Motor Spirit 53 50 UG HDR

T-03C 12.00M Ǿ x 11.50M H Ethanol 1295 1000 Dyke-III IFR

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