Rapid Risk Assessment: Project: Ramagundam Fertilizer Complex

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT OF Doc No.
: A512-04-41-RRA-0001
RAMAGUNDAM FERTILIZER COMPLEX Rev. No: A
RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT
PROJECT : RAMAGUNDAM FERTILIZER COMPLEX
OWNER : CONSORTIUM OF EIL, NFL AND FCI
CONSULTANT : ENGINEERS INDIA LTD.
A 11.11.14 ISSUED AS DRAFT NC DK GG

Rev. No Date Purpose Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved

1
RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT OF Doc No.: A512-04-41-RRA-0001
PREFACE
Consortium of M/S Engineers India Ltd, NFL and FCI have proposed for setting up of new
Ammonia/Urea Fertilizer Complex at Ramagundam Unit, Ramagundam Mandal, District
Karimnagar of Telangana state. The new plant consists of ammonia and urea section along with
associated offsite and utility facilities within the premises of existing Ramagudam Fertilizer
complex. Ammonia plant will be single stream having a capacity of 2200 MTPD. The plant will
be designed to use NG/RLNG as feed and fuel. The Urea plant will be single stream having
capacity of 3850 MTPD prilled urea. New CPP of capacity 29.1 MW (Normal)/34.6 MW (Max)
and (GTG+HRSG) will be installed. Nearest ports are Krishnapatanam, Kakinada. This Report
pertains to New Ammonia and Urea facilities. Licensor for the new facilities KBR for Ammonia
and Stamicarbon for Urea were considered.

2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE
1.2 SCOPE OF WORK
2. SITE CONDITIONS
2.1 SITE_LOCATION_AND_VICINITY
2.2 METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
2.3 ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS
2.4 WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION
2.5 WEATHER_CATEGORY
3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
3.1 AMMONIA UNIT
3.2 UREA UNIT
3.3 OFFSITES
3.4 CPP
4. HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT

4.1 CATEGORIES OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT
4.2 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH MATERIALS HANDLED
5. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
5.1 FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS
5.2 GENERAL
5.3 MODES OF FAILURE
5.4 SELECTED FAILURE CASES
6. CONSEQUENCE_ANALYSIS
6.1 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS MODELING
6.2 SIZE AND DURATION OF LEAK
6.3 DAMAGE CRITERIA DUE TO VARIOUS SCENARIOS

3
6.4 HAZARD ASSESSMENT
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8. GLOSSARY
9. REFERENCES

4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A Rapid Risk Assessment of the risks envisaged at the proposed Fertilizer complex at
Ramagundam has been carried out by Engineers India Limited. The present report provides the
details of the consequences and recommendations for the risks involved. After modeling the
possible leak scenarios, consequence analysis shows that hazards due to high concentration of
ammonia cater the risks on a significance scale. Overall, even if some contribution of flammable
mixtures is found from natural gas and ammonia, it is clearly seen that toxic hazards of ammonia
dictate the risk profile both inside and outside the plant. The consequences due to minor leaks
which bear a higher probability are confined inside the complex. The consequences due to major
leaks like large holes and catastrophic ruptures reach outside the fertilizer complex which can
affect the outside population also. Even though these scenarios have a very low probability of
occurrence, appropriate disaster management plan should be employed for the protection of
population inside and outside the complex. It is highly recommended to provide gas detectors
along with emergency alarm wherever applicable. Water curtains are to be provided at critical
locations to dilute the toxic vapors of ammonia released. Breathing apparatus should be made
available for the plant personnel in the event of major ammonia leak in the facility. Control
rooms and other buildings should be positively pressurized and kept airtight to prevent the entry
of toxic gases.

5
1. INTRODUCTION
Ramagundam Fertilizer, a consortium of M/s Engineers India Ltd., NFL and FCI have proposed
for setting up of new Ammonia/Urea Fertilizer Complex at Ramagundam Unit, Ramagundam
Mandal, Karimnagar District, Telangana. The proposal consists of new ammonia and urea plant
along with associated offsite and utility facilities within the premises of existing Ramagundam
Fertilizer complex. Ammonia plant is a single stream having a capacity of 2200 MTPD. The
plant is designed to use NG/RLNG as feed and fuel. The urea plant is a single stream having
capacity of 3850 MTPD prilled urea. New captive power plant of 29.1 MW (Normal)/34.6MW
(Max.) (GTG + HRSG) will be installed to cater the extra power requirements. Nearest ports
located are Krishnapatanam and Kakinada
1.1 OBJECTIVE
The objectives of the Rapid Risk Assessment study are to identify all potential failure cases,
which might affect the population and property in the vicinity of the facilities, and provide
information necessary in developing strategies to prevent accidents and formulate the disaster
management plan.
The main objectives of the study are:
a) Identification of failure cases within the installations.
b) Evaluate process hazards emanating from the identified potential accident scenarios.
c) Analyze the damage effects to surroundings due to such incidents.
d) Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the hazard / risk.
The results are useful in developing a meaningful emergency plan and also serve as a powerful
training tool.
1.2 SCOPE OF WORK
The study covers the following units and associated piping and equipment as sources of hazards/
vulnerability:

6
Ammonia Unit
 Natural gas compression
 Reforming section
 Shift section
 CO2 removal section
 Methanation and Purification section
 Ammonia synthesis section
 Ammonia recovery
 Process condensate stripping section
Urea Unit
 Ammonia and CO2 compression section
 Urea Synthesis section
 Recirculation section
 Evaporation and MP section
 Prilling section
 Condensation section
 Urea desorption section
CPP
 GTG
 HRSG
OFFSITES
 Ammonia Storage tanks
 Tank manifold

7
2. SITE CONDITIONS
This chapter depicts the location of Ramagundam fertilizer complex. It also indicates the
meteorological data, which will be used for the Rapid Risk Assessment study.
2.1 SITE, LOCATION AND VICINITY
Ramagundam city is Municipal corporation and mandal in the district of Karimnagar, located in
the northern region of the state of Telangana in India.
Ramagundam, known as the City of Energy is located on the banks of Godavari River about 250
km (155 mi) north east of state capital, Hyderabad. It is situated at latitude of 18.46o and
longitude of N 79.45 o E and approximately 156 m above mean sea level.
2.2 METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
The consequences of released flammable or toxic material are largely dependent on the
prevailing weather conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of
flammable or toxic materials, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect
the atmospheric dispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are wind direction,
wind speed, atmospheric stability and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on
the results of the risk Assessment; however, it can have beneficial effects by absorption /
washout of released materials. Actual behavior of any release would largely depend on
prevailing weather condition at the time of release.
For the present Risk Assessment study, Meteorological data of Ramagundam have been taken
from the Climatological Tables of Observatories in India (1961-1990) published by Indian
Meteorological Department.
2.3 ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS
The Climatological data which have been used for the Risk Assessment study is summarized
below:

8
Table 2.3.1: Atmospheric parameters
S. No Parameter Average value considered for study

1. Ambient Temperature (OC) 32.1
2. Atmospheric Pressure (mm Hg) 760
3. Relative Humidity (%) 68
4. Solar Radiation flux (kW/m2) 0.7
2.4 WIND SPEED AND WIND DIRECTION
Based on the Meteorological data provided at the IMD table, it is observed that calm weather
can be experienced for 38-42% of the time in a year. Wind speed in the range of 2-5 m/s blows
58-62% of the time, and wind speed more than 5 m/s was not apparent during any part of the
year. Hence as a conservative approach, wind speed of 1 m/s would account for the calm
weather and 2 m/s for the rest of the time. Both the wind speeds are observed in almost equal
proportions during every part of the year. The predominant wind direction was observed from
west followed by south accounting for 13% and 9% respectively with calm weather observed for
around 41% of the year.
Table 2.4-1: Average mean wind speed (m/s)
Month Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
km/h 3.4 4.2 4.8 6.3 6.1 6.8 5.4 4.2 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.5
m/s 0.944 1.167 1.334 1.75 1.69 1.889 1.5 1.167 0.944 0.75 0.667 0.694
2.5 WEATHER CATEGORY
One of the most important characteristics of atmosphere is its stability. Stability of atmosphere is
its tendency to resist vertical motion or to suppress existing turbulence. This tendency directly
influences the ability of atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from the facilities. In
most dispersion scenarios, the relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground, varying in
thickness from a few meters to a few thousand meters. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces
in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature gradient.

9
Temperature normally decreases with increasing height in the atmosphere. The rate at which the
temperature of air decreases with height is called Environmental Lapse Rate (ELR). It will vary
from time to time and from place to place. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or
unstable according to ELR is less than, equal to or greater than Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate
(DALR), which is a constant value of 0.98°C/100 meters.
Pasquill stability parameter, based on Pasquill – Gifford categorization, is such a meteorological

parameter, which describes the stability of atmosphere, i.e., the degree of convective turbulence.
Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from `A' (extremely unstable) to `F' (stable).
Wind speeds, intensity of solar radiation (daytime insulation) and nighttime sky cover have been
identified as prime factors defining these stability categories. Table 3.3-3 indicates the various
Pasquill stability classes.
Table 2.5.1: Pasquill stability classes
Surface Wind Speed Day time solar radiation Night time cloud cover
(meter/s) Strong Medium Slight Thin < 3/8 Medium 3/8 Overcast >4/8
<2 A A–B B - - D
2–3 A–B B C E F D
3–5 B B–C C D E D
5–6 C C–D D D D D
>6 C D D D D D
Legend: A = Very unstable, B = Unstable, C = moderately unstable, D = Neutral, E =

moderately stable, F = stable
When the atmosphere is unstable and wind speeds are moderate or high or gusty, rapid
dispersion of pollutants will occur. Under these conditions, pollutant concentrations in air will be
moderate or low and the material will be dispersed rapidly. When the atmosphere is stable and
wind speed is low, dispersion of material will be limited and pollutant concentration in air will
be high.

10
Stability category for the present study is identified based on the cloud amount and wind speed.
Table 2.5.2: Average all cloud amount (oktas of sky)
Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1.6 1.55 1.55 2.2 2.85 5.4 6.5 6.35 5.15 3 2.25 1.85
For risk Assessment the representative average annual weather conditions are assessed based on
the following:
Wind speed less than 2 m/s would be experienced for 38-42% of the time in a year. In order to
realize the worst hazardous distances, weather stability of “F” was selected with wind speed 1
m/s for consequence analysis. Wind speed of 2-5 m/s can be realized for the remaining part of
the year. Cloud cover for these months is in the ranges of 2.2 to 6.5 oktas. This results in
stability class of D foe wind speeds of 2-5 m/s. As a conservative approach minimum velocity, 2
m/s has been selected with stability class D for risk Assessment. Average wind speed of greater
than 4 m/s can be realized in the month of June. Cloud cover for this month is 3.8. From this
information stability class of “D” was selected with wind speed 5 m/s for risk assessment.
Discussions, conclusions and recommendations pertaining to consequence analysis are based on

the worst weather condition. The consequence results are reported in tabular form for all the
weather conditions and are represented graphically for worst weather condition.
In the present study, the entire range of representative wind speeds, both during the day and
night, and cloud amount have been considered.
Table 2.5.3: Weather Conditions
Wind Speed Pasquill Stability

1 F
2 D

11
3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
3.1 AMMONIA UNIT- KBR
The key process features of KBR Ammonia purifier process are feed gas flexibility, mild
primary reforming, secondary reforming with excess air, mild reformed gas boiler conditions, a
gas turbine driven high efficiency process air compressor, cryogenic removal of excess nitrogen
and inerts from syngas, efficient synthesis scheme with a single horizontal converter and unitized
chiller. Purifier process also produces required CO2 by-product flow to convert the entire 2200
MTPD NH3 product to urea. The purifier process is inherently low energy consuming process
due to its unique parameters and integration as below. All of the process features in this plant
have been in operation in numerous KBR Purifier plants. Each of these features is discussed in
the following paragraphs.
Feed Gas Flexibility:
The KBR Purifier process uses a cryogenic nitrogen wash step to remove impurities from the
makeup synthesis gas. The process is uniquely able to handle variations in the composition of the
natural gas feed, including variations in hydrocarbon contents, N2 content and CO2 content. The
Purifier has the ability to absorb the variations in the raw synthesis, and maintain a stable
composition of the makeup gas to the synthesis loop.
Conversely, in a conventional plant, the flow rate of process air to the secondary reformer needs
to be controlled carefully to obtain the required H2 to N2 ratio in the makeup gas to the synthesis
loop.
With the ability to vary the flow rate of the process air, the loads on the air compressor,
secondary reformer and cryogenic Purifier were adjusted to maintain high ammonia capacity.
Unlike in the conventional process, the primary reformer’s operation has little impact during feed
gas composition variation. Operationally the whole plant is adjusted easily with varying feed gas
composition just by adjusting process air flow. Therefore, the plant has been able to maintain
high capacity during variations in the feed gas composition and is proven operationally flexible
due to this unique process.

12
Mild Primary Reforming:
Primary reforming is carried out at a much lower temperature than in conventional ammonia
process. The methane content of the process gas going to the secondary reformer is much higher
than in conventional ammonia plant. More of the reforming is shifted to the secondary reformer,
which is more suitable to the temperatures involved and in which essentially 100 percent of the
heat is recovered. The radiant duty in the primary reformer is thus greatly reduced.
Integrated Reforming Furnace & Gas Turbine:
Radiant duty of the primary reformer furnace in the Purifier Process is only about 60% whereas
power requirement of the process air compressor is about 1.5 times more of that in a
conventional ammonia plant. Due to this unique combination, the oxygen content of the gas
turbine exhaust provides a good match with the requirement of combustion air to the primary
reformer furnace burners. The exhaust of the gas turbine driver of the process air compressor is
thus integrated with the primary reformer furnace.
The gas turbine driven air compressor is started-up standalone without requiring imported steam
thus required capacity of the OSBL package boiler is significantly less. Not only installed cost is
reduced this way but energy efficiency of the ammonia plant as well as the whole complex is
significantly increased with such integration as commercially proven in numerous Purifier plants.
Ammonia plat exports steam to urea plant/ CO2 compressor steam turbine and offsite users and
meets all their demand by aforementioned integration as well as due to the fact that process
steam consumption in Purifier process reforming is less due to lower S/C ratio enabled due to
higher allowable CH4 slip exit the secondary reformer.
Ramagundam Power & Steam Integration with the Urea/OSBL:
The power & steam of Ramagundam complex is integrated with the Captive Power Plant (CPP)
to maximize overall energy efficiency. Purifier process due to its integrated furnace-gas turbine
feature and lower ISBL steam consumption along with the gas turbine based CPP are able to
meet the entire steam and power demand of the whole complex including CO2 compressor steam
turbine urea process and offsite. The configuration of CPP plant will have a gas turbine driven
generator (GTG) and steam turbine driven generator (STG). Heat recovery from the GT exhaust

13
is maximized and steam is generated at different pressure levels. Ramagundam will require MP
steam from OSBL only during it start-up & emergency, however start up steam is less, only
about 90t/h as air compressor does not require steam for its start up. Unlike in conventional
plants, Purifier plant does not require huge MP steam during trip of secondary reformer which is
a big relief while managing the transient operations.
Secondary Reforming with Excess Air:
In a conventional secondary reformer, the quantity of air is limited to the amount that is required
to produce a 3-to-1 ratio of H2 to N2 in the synthesis gas. With the Purifier process, the H2/N2
ratio is controlled at the Purifier so that extra air can be used in the secondary reformer. The
extra air provides additional reaction heat. Nearly 100 percent of the heat released in this vessel
is recovered compared to 40 to 50 percent in the radiant zone of the primary reformer. Therefore
shift of the duty from primary to secondary reformer makes the process more efficient.
In addition, because of the downstream Purifier, the allowable methane leakage is much higher
than in conventional plants, which further relaxes the reforming load by lowering the secondary
reformer outlet temperature. These two features result in much milder reforming conditions that
are advantageous in terms of both steady and reliable operations and longer equipment life.
The extra un-reformed methane, together with surplus N2 and most of the argon are recovered in
the Purifier system later in the process sequence, and returned to the reformer furnace as fuel.
Mild Reformed Gas Boiler Conditions:
Reformed gas (RG) boiler in Purifier process operates under significantly mild conditions of
inert gas temperature as well as heat flux. Typically RG boilers exit the secondary reformer may
be prone to failure due to severe high inlet temperature and high heat flux. Purifier process
enables to operate it at more than 100OC cooler which minimizes the process severity and thus
enhances equipment reliability.
More CO2 production for Urea Plant:
Since Purifier Process uses excess process air in the secondary reformer, more CO2 is produced
in the reforming section compared to a conventional process. Consequently, all the required CO2

14
for conversion of 2200 MTPD ammonia to urea, is produced from the CO2 removal unit as by-
product, even with light feed natural gas composition as in Ramagundam. In a conventional
ammonia plant, the CO2 production will always be shorter then required by urea plant which will
need to be made up by either having a large surplus syngas or by recovering Co2 from the
furnace flue gas which is not required in case of Purifier process.
Optimally Integrated 2-stage OASE Process based CO2 removal:
A 2-stage OASE process based CO2 removal system, licensed from BASF, has been optimally
integrated into the Purifier process based ammonia flow sheet. As explained later, KBR’s
Purifier Ammonia Process allows using lower steam/carbon ratio in the reformer mixed feed and
as a consequence the higher methane slip from the secondary reformer can be removed by the
cryogenic unit. The Reboiler heat duty available in the purifier process is well matched with low
Reboiler duty required for solvent regeneration in a 2-stage OASE process. KBR was first in the
ammonia industry to incorporate a 2-stage OASE (former aMDEA) process (a 1980’s Purifier
process based plant) and has a leading position ever since for integration and execution of this
CO2 removal technology.
Cryogenic Purification Unit:
The cryogenic purification unit is the heart of the KBR Purifier Process. In this unit, essentially
all the methane and about 60 percent of the argon in the raw synthesis gas are removed together
with the excess nitrogen as waste gas. This waste gas is returned to the primary reformer furnace
as fuel after it has been used to regenerate the driers. The product from this unit is a highly pure
synthesis gas. The synthesis gas contains H2 and N1 in ratio of 3 without any water or carbon
oxides, which are poisons for the synthesis catalyst, and inert content is about 0.2 percent.
Most of the net cooling required by the Purifier is provided by a gas expander, which causes a
modest pressure drop in the synthesis gas stream. Further cooling is provided by low-pressure
vaporization of the waste gas described above. The Purifier has two controls. The energy balance
is controlled by the amount of work removed from the system by the expander. The material
balance is controlled by a valve in the line on the liquid from the bottom of the column. This
valve is controlled by a hydrogen analyzer on the purified process gas exit the cryogenic system.

15
The highly pure and dry synthesis gas produced in the Purifier permits the operation of the
synthesis loop at lower pressure for the same level of refrigeration, thereby saving syngas
compressor power. This also leads to a very efficient ammonia synthesis process scheme with
savings in both syngas and refrigeration compressor power.
The cryogenic step allows a higher concentration of methane in the raw synthesis gas leaving the
secondary reformer since methane is removed from the syngas in the Purifier and used as fuel.
Thus, the secondary reformer outlet temperature is typically lower by more than 100°C than in a
conventional plant, and primary reformer radiant heat input as well as outlet gas temperature is
significantly less. Also, since higher methane content is allowed exit the secondary reformer, a
lower steam/carbon ratio in the primary reformer mixed feed (than in conventional process) can
be used. The lower S/C ratio maximizes MP steam export to the OSBL which makes the plant
more efficient. Complete removal of all traces of water and carbon dioxide lengthens the life of
the synthesis catalyst.
Another key advantage of the Purifier is that it stabilizes the operation of the plant by ' separating
the front end of the plant from the back end. First, it permits setting the hydrogen-to-nitrogen
ratio in the synthesis loop independently of the secondary reformer operation. Second, it
effectively compensates for any problems or upsets in the front end. For example, during
instances when the CO or the C02 leakage is higher than design, the CO and CO; will be
converted to methane in the methanator and all methane will be removed in the Purifier. The
synthesis loop operation will not be affected.
In a conventional ammonia process the above flexibility is not available. For example, the
process air rate must be carefully controlled in the front end of the plant to maintain a three- to-
one hydrogen-to-nitrogen ratio in the makeup gas to the synthesis loop. Also, during instances of
higher than normal CO or CO; leakages, the synthesis loop purge rate would have to be
increased to maintain the design loop inert level.
Finally, the Purifier also acts as a purge gas recovery unit as the entire loop purge is recycled to
this unit for hydrogen recovery as required. Purge gas from other existing ammonia units within
the complex can also be processed in this unit for increased ammonia production with minimal
added investment.

16
During plant start-up, the Purifier can be cooled down during the same time period when the
synthesis converter is heated up. Operators of Purifier plants report that the Purifier does not
extend the total start-up time of the plant. During a short shutdown, the inventory of liquid
nitrogen in the Purifier will keep the system cold, allowing quick restart. If preferred any time,
ammonia plant can be operated in Purifier bypass mode.
High Production Rates through Extended End of Run & Turnaround Flexibility:
Unlike in conventional ammonia plants, purifier plant can maintain production rates with rising
methane slip from reformers or rising CO slip from shift converter as consequent rising inerts
(methane) in make-up gas are removed in the purifier cold box. This is possible only in Purifier
process where all the make-up gas to synloop is processed through the cold box. Production rates
are thus maintained through extended operations of catalysts to end of runs which benefits the
owner greatly on plant life cycle basis. It provides much needed flexibility in planning plant
turnaround. Such details are compared in an attached published paper
Efficient KBR synthesis Scheme:
Since the makeup gas from the Purifier contains no carbon oxides and water, which are poisons
to the synthesis catalyst, it can be directly fed to the converter, joining with the recycle gas. Also,
the make-up syngas has little inert with negligible CH4 which provides a low inert synthesis loop
with high partial pressure of reactants H2 and N2. This process scheme has two advantages.
First, refrigeration requirements will be lower than other schemes, in which the moisture
containing makeup gas is mixed with converter effluent to first pass through the chilling train
before going back to the converter.
Second, the ammonia converter capacity is increased because of lower ammonia content in the
feed as a result of mixing the ammonia free makeup gas with the recycle gas. The low inert level
in the makeup gas also permits operation of the synthesis loop at lower pressures for a given
level of refrigeration, saving syngas compressor power.
Due to very low inert contents in a syn-loop based on purifier process, loop pressure is
significantly lower and required conversion is achieved in a single converter using lesser
catalyst. Thus, efficient ammonia plant with lesser compression power is achieved with

17
significantly less CAPEX. Attached published paper compares impact of make-up gas quality on
various types of syn-loops.
In the KBR synthesis scheme, ammonia synthesis is carried out in a single horizontal, three bed
converter.
Refrigeration in the synloop uses unitized chiller. This exchanger takes the place of several
refrigeration chillers and a recycle exchanger, thereby eliminating expensive high-pressure
piping and fittings and significantly reducing the pressure drop compared to the sum of
individual chiller pressure drops. The basic concept of this unit is the use of concentric tubes and
a compartmentalized shell to replace several equipment items with one. The converter effluent
flows through the annuli of the concentric tubes, with the recycle gas flowing through the inner
tubes. Refrigeration ammonia at four different temperatures and pressures boils on the shell side
in four compartments. Thus the converter effluent is simultaneously cooled by two media, the
recycle gas and ammonia refrigeration.
Due to highly pure synthesis loop makeup gas feed from the purifier, the life of the ammonia
synthesis catalyst is estimated as 18 years compared to only 10 years typical for that in the
conventional synthesis loop. Significantly higher catalyst life is typically found in purifier plants
in industry.
The synloop also incorporates high-pressure steam generation which improves overall heat
integration and improves energy efficiency by exporting steam for OSBL usage.
3.2 UREA UNIT- STAMICARBON
The Ammonia and CO2 from ammonia unit caters to Stamicarbon’s Urea melt of 3850 MTPD
which is based on the Pool Condenser Concept. Ammonia and carbon dioxide are introduced to
the high pressure synthesis using a high-pressure ammonia pump and a carbon dioxide
compressor. The ammonia then drives an ejector, which conveys a carbamate solution into the
pool condenser. In the high-pressure stripper, the carbon dioxide, entering the synthesis as a feed,
flows counter-current to the urea solution leaving the reactor. On the shell side, the high-pressure
stripper is heated with steam. The off-gas of the high-pressure stripper, containing the carbon
dioxide, together with the dissociated carbamate, is then fed into the pool condenser. In the pool

18
condenser, ammonia and carbon dioxide are condensed to form carbamate, and a substantial part
of the conversion to urea is already established here. The heat released by condensation and
subsequent formation of carbamate is used to produce re-usable low-pressure steam.
After the pool condenser, the remaining gases and a urea carbamate liquid enter the vertical
reactor. Here, the final part of the urea conversion takes place. The urea solution then leaves the
top of the reactor (via an overflow funnel) before being introduced into the high-pressure
stripper. Ammonia and carbon dioxide conversions in the synthesis section of a Stamicarbon
carbon dioxide stripping plant are high, reducing the need for a medium pressure stage to recycle
any unconverted ammonia and carbon dioxide. As a result, the Stamicarbon CO2 stripping
process is the only commercial available process that does not require a medium-pressure
recirculation stage downstream from the high-pressure stripper. Gases leaving the reactor are fed
into the high-pressure scrubber. Here, the gases are washed with the carbamate solution from the
low-pressure recirculation stage. The enriched carbamate solution is then fed into the high-
pressure ejector and, subsequently, to the pool condenser. Inert gases, containing some ammonia
and carbon dioxide, are then released into the 4-bar absorber.
Low-pressure recirculation section
This stage recovers the ammonia and carbon dioxide still present in the urea solution coming
from the high-pressure stripper. Thanks to the low ammonia and carbon dioxide concentrations
in the stripped urea solutions, the Stamicarbon CO2 stripping process is the only process that
requires just one single low-pressure recirculation stage. Coming out of the stripper, the urea
solution is fed into the dissociation heater, where most of the ammonia and carbon dioxide are
removed. The heat required for this heater is derived from the condensation of the low-pressure
steam produced in the urea synthesis. The ammonia and carbon dioxide are then fed into the low-
pressure carbamate condenser, where they are condensed. Because the ratio between ammonia
and carbon dioxide in the recovered gases is optimal, the quantity of water needed to dilute the
resultant ammonium carbamate solution can be kept to a minimum, maximizing conversion
figures for the urea plant. The resultant carbamate solution is fed, via a high-pressure carbamate
pump, back to the synthesis as a scrubbing agent in the high-pressure scrubber.

19
Before entering the urea solution tank, part of the water present in the urea solution is evaporated
by further preflashing in two steps (atmospheric and sub-atmospheric). The vent gas from the
recirculation stage is practically free from ammonia because it is scrubbed in an atmospheric
absorber.
Evaporation section
Waste-water treatment section before the entire urea production process is complete; the urea
solution present in the urea solution tank must be concentrated. The urea solution is therefore
sent to an evaporation section. The topology of this evaporation section depends on the applied
finishing section (prilling, granulation or pastillation). Depending on the requirements of the
finishing section, the evaporation section may, for example, consist of two consecutive
evaporators, where the water in the urea solution is evaporated under vacuum conditions. The
remaining urea melt has a urea concentration varying from 96 to 99.7wt%, depending on the
requirements of the downstream finishing section.
Waste-water treatment section
The process condensate coming from the evaporation section, together with other process
effluents such as sealing water from stuffing boxes, contains ammonia and urea. All of the
process condensate is collected in the ammonia water tank. From this tank, the water is fed to the
top part of the desorber. In the top part of the desorber, the bulk of ammonia and carbon dioxide
are stripped off from the water phase by using the off-gas from the bottom part of the desorber as
a stripping agent. The descending effluent still contains urea and some ammonia. To remove this
urea, this effluent is then fed to the hydrolyzer. The hydrolyzer is a liquid-filled column. In the
hydrolyser, the urea, at elevated pressure and temperature, is dissociated into ammonia and
carbon dioxide by the application of heat (steam) and retention time. The process condensate
feed is kept in counter-current contact with the steam in order to obtain extremely low urea
content in the hydrolyzer effluent. The remaining ammonia and carbon dioxide in the effluent of
the hydrolyzer are stripped off with steam at a reduced pressure in the bottom part of the
desorber. The off-gases leaving the top part of the Desorber are recycled to the synthesis section
after being condensed in the reflux condenser. The purity of the remaining water satisfies

20
requirements for boiler feed water make-up or cooling water make-up - which means that
Stamicarbon urea plants do not produce a waste-water stream.
This is followed by the adiabatic expansion and MP section and prilling section. Steam and
condensate system ensure that overall energy consumption is optimized.
3.3 Offsites
Two ammonia storage tanks of storage capacity 15000 m3 and 5000 m3 along with the tank
manifold are envisaged in the north side of the complex. Waste water generated in the ammonia
and urea plants will be treated in the new ETP
3.4 CPP
New CPP of 29.1 MW (normal)/ 34.6 MW (max) (GTG + HRSG) will be installed.
4. HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT
The new manufacturing facility handles various hazardous materials like Natural gas, Ammonia,
Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and various other hydrocarbons which have a potential to
cause fire, explosion and release/leakage of toxic chemicals may lead to major hazards.
There are various modes in which flammable and toxic chemicals can leak into atmosphere
causing adverse affects. It may be a small leak from gaskets of the flanged joints, failure of the
pipeline or even catastrophic failure of storage tanks.
4.1 CATEGORIES OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMPLEX
The manufacture of anhydrous liquid ammonia involves processing of hydrocarbons under high
temperature, high pressure conditions in the presence of various catalysts, chemicals etc. Typical
risks are as follows:
a) Ammonia Plant:
Fire /
Explosion  Glands/seal leaks in valves, pumps, compressors handling hydrogen, natural gas,
Risks naphtha, synthesis gas etc.
 Hose/pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints carrying combustible gases, vapours,
liquids.

21
High / Low
Temperature  Burns due to contact with hot surfaces of pipelines, equipments, etc. or leaking
Exposure steam lines, process fluids at high temperature.
Risks  Frost bite due to contact with anhydrous liquid ammonia at -33 deg. C
 Burns due to contact with pyrophoric catalyst
Toxic
Chemicals  Asphyxia due to inhalation of simple asphyxiants like CO2 , N2, H2, CH4, naphtha
Exposure etc. and chemical asphyxiants like CO, NH3, Nickel carbonyl, V2O5, Hydrazine,
Risks NOx, SOx, H2S etc.
 Acute toxicity due to inhalation of catalyst dusts containing heavy metals like Ni, Cr,
CO, Mo, Fe, Zn, Alumina etc. and silica gel molecular sieves, insulation fibers/dusts.
Corrosive /
Radioactive  Severe burns, damage to eyes, skin and body tissues due to contact with anhydrous
Chemicals ammonia
Exposure
Risks
b) Urea Plant
The manufacture of urea involves reaction of Ammonia and Carbon dioxide under high
temperature & pressure and subsequent recovery and concentration of the solution at various
pressure stages. Typical risks are as follows:
Fire / Explosion  Ammonia leaks from glands/ pump seals or flanged joints piping resulting in
Risks formation explosive mixtures in air.
 Accumulation of H2 may take place in HP Section in case CO2 purity from
Ammonia Plant is not within allowable limits. Ignition of this accumulated H2
can occur due to dissipation of static charge.
High / Low
Temperature  Refer to risks in Ammonia Plant
Exposure Risks
Toxic  Asphyxia due to inhalation of simple Exposure risk asphyxiants like CO2, N2,
Chemicals chemical asphyxiant and ammonia. Solution of Urea, Ammonium carbamate
Exposure Risks and ammonium carbonate containing high NH3 content.
 Irritation due to inhalation of urea dust.
Corrosive /  Severe burns, damage to eyes, skin and body tissues due to contact with
Radioactive anhydrous ammonia, conc. Urea and Ammonium carbamate solutions.
Chemicals
Exposure Risks
c) Power Plant
The captive Power Plant involves generation of steam in N.G./Naphtha-fired boilers and utilizing
the steam in Urea and Ammonia plants. Typical risks are as follows:

22
Fire / Explosion  Explosion and fire risks associated with storage and handling of B Class
Risks (Naphtha) and Natural gas handling pipelines (Refer off site Facilities).
 Fire Box explosion in Boiler
High / Low  Burns due to contact with hot surfaces of pipelines, equipments, etc. or leaking
Temp. steam lines
Exposure Risks
Toxic Chemical  Asphyxia due to inhalation of SOX and NOx.
Exposure Risk  Irritation due to inflammation caused by inhalation of Natural gas and the
Naphtha vapors
d) Offsite Facilities
The offsite facilities consist of integrated units for water and effluent treatment, inert gas
generation, cooling towers, storage of ammonia, supply / distribution of utilities like compressed
air, water, etc. Potential risks in the above offsite facilities are essentially on account of handling
of corrosive, toxic and reactive chemicals as well as inflammable petroleum products.
Fire / Explosion  Gland / Seal leaks in valves, pumps, compressor, handling naphtha, N.G.,
Risks ammonia hydrogen, syngas etc.
 Hose / pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints in pipes conveying petroleum
products, ammonia, hydrogen, syngas, etc.
 Leakage of petroleum products during tanker unloading operations
 Overheating / pressurization of storage tanks
 Improper earthing/ lightning protection of storage tanks and pipelines
 Improper sealing of floating roof tanks
 In adequate / improper breather valves leading to tank failures.
High / Low  Burns due to contact with hot surfaces of pipe lines, equipments, etc or leaking
Temp. steam lines.
Exposure Risks  Heat radiation burns from high intensity flames from the flare stack.
 Frost bite due to contact with anhydrous liquid ammonia at – 33 °C
Toxic  Asphyxia due to inhalation of simple asphyxiants like N2, H2, Naphtha, etc.
Chemicals and Chemical asphyxiants like Cl2, NH3, NOx, Sox, etc.
Exposure Risks  Toxicity due to inhalation of catalyst dust containing heavy metals like Ni, Pd,
Alumina etc. and perlite / insulation fibers, silica gel dust
Corrosive  Severe burners, damage to eyes, skin & body tissues due to contact with
Chemicals corrosive chemicals like anhydrous liquid Ammonia, Sulphuric acid,
Exposure Risks Hydrochloric acid, etc.
NOTE: All the above categories have been listed for representative purpose only. Risk
study will not be carried out for all the cases

23
4.2 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH MATERIALS HANDLED
AMMONIA:
It is a colorless gas with a sharp, strong odor similar to “smelling salts” which is readily
detectable at 20 ppm and is highly toxic gas, its IDLH being 300 ppm. It is also a combustible
gas which can explode under certain circumstances, although its lower explosive limit is rather
high being of the order of 16%. Anhydrous Ammonia is an irritating, flammable, and colorless
liquefied compressed gas packaged in cylinders under its own vapor pressure of 114 psig at 70oF.
Ammonia can cause severe eye, skin and respiratory tract burns and is severely irritating to nose,
throat, and lungs. Vapor contact may cause irritation and burns. Contact with liquid may cause
freezing of the tissue accompanied by corrosive caustic action and dehydration. Ammonia
Overexposure may also cause central nervous system effects including unconsciousness and
convulsions.
CARBON MONOXIDE:
Carbon monoxide is a poisonous, flammable and odorless high-pressure gas which acts on blood,
causing damage to central nervous system (CNS) and could be fatal even with adequate oxygen.
It can form explosive mixtures with air at 12.5-74% concentration. Self-contained breathing
apparatus must be worn by rescue workers. Depending on the concentration and duration of
exposure, inhalation may cause headache, drowsiness, dizziness, excitation, rapid breathing,
pallor, cyanosis, excess salivation, nausea, vomiting, hallucinations, confusion, angina,
convulsions, and unconsciousness. IDLH of CO is 1200 ppm.
The binding of CO with hemoglobin producing decreasing the oxygen carrying capacity of
blood, this is appear to be the principle mechanism of the toxic action of low-level carbon
monoxide exposure. Carbon monoxide reduces blood oxygen- carrying capacity, causing
dizziness, weakness and headache. Concentrations above 1000 ppm can be fatal within one hour.
UREA:
Urea is a colorless to white, prismatic crystals or white crystalline powder. It is almost odorless,
may gradually develop slight odor of ammonia, especially in the presence of moisture. It has a
saline cooling taste and melting point of 132.7o C.

24
It causes redness and irritation of skin and eyes. Adverse reactions include headache, nausea,
vomiting, syncope, disorientation, transient confusion and electrolyte depletion (hyponatremia
and hypokalemia). Urea is irritating to tissues, it causes pain at site of infusion and necrosis may
result if extravasations occur.
Urea is artificially released to the environment through direct application to soil as a nitrogen-
released fertilizer. If released to the atmosphere, urea will degrade rapidly in the vapour phase by
reaction with photo-chemically produced hydroxyl radicals. If released to soil, urea is hydrolyzed
to ammonium through soil urease activity. The rate of hydrolysis can be fast (24 hrs), however, a
number of variables (such as increasing the pellet size of the fertilizer) can decrease the
degradation rate from days to weeks. If released to water, urea can degrade readily through biotic
hydrolysis. The presence of naturally- occurring phytoplankton increases the degradation rate
because phytoplankton use urea as a nitrogen source and because urea is decomposed by
phytoplankton photosynthesis. Degradation of urea occurs much faster in sunlight than in dark
water. Biodegradation is expected to be the major fate process in the aquatic ecosystem. Urea
can biodegrade readily with the release of CO2 and ammonia.
NATURAL GAS
Sudden release of gas under pressure can cause a physical explosion with material in the vicinity
of failure (soil) hurling in all directions. Accidental release of gases from a high-pressure source
usually results in a turbulent jet. If ignited, this would form a jet flame. Such a flame
impingement causes structural weakness and in turn can cause extensive damage and failure.
Thermal radiation due to jet fire can cause various degrees of burns on human body and would
pose a potential radiation hazard. Moreover, their effects on inanimate objects like equipment,
piping or vegetation also need to be evaluated to assess the impact.
Low pressure vapour release or impinged release will normally spread out in the direction of
wind. If it finds an ignition source before being dispersed below Lower Flammability Limit
(LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame may travel back to source of leak. Any person
caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer fatal burn injury. In consequence analysis the distance to
LFL value is usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected by flash fire. Any other
combustible materials within the flash fire distance are also likely to catch fire and secondary fire

25
may ensue. In the area close to source of hydrocarbon leak, there is a possibility of oxygen
depletion.
5. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
5.1 Failure Mode Analysis
There are various modes in which flammable and toxic chemicals can leak into atmosphere causing
adverse affects. It may be small leaks from gaskets of the flanged joints, or guillotine failure of a pipeline
of even catastrophic failure of the storage tank. Some typical modes of failures and their possible causes
are discussed below:
S. No Failure Mode Probable Cause Remarks

1. Flange / Incorrect gasket Incorrect Attention to be paid during selection
Gasket failure installation. and installation of gaskets.
2. Weld failure It is normally due to poor quality Welding to be done by certified
of welds welders with right quality of
welding rods. Inspection and
radiography must also be done.
3. Pipe corrosion Sometimes fabrication or Pipes material of construction
erosion or installation leaves stress in the should be selected correctly. Design
failure due to pipes. Erosion or corrosion also is should take care of erosion effects.
stress sometimes the cause. And installation of pipes should not
leave any stress.
4. Over Over pressurization can occur due Necessary procedures should be
pressurization to failure of SRV or incorrect there to prevent.
of pipeline operation.
5. Deficient Pipes design and installation is It must be ensured that installation is
installation of sometimes not as per appropriate as per correct standards completely.
pipes standard.
6. Leaks from Leaks from glands, bonnets or Right selection of valves and their
valve failures valves spindle is maintenance should be ensured.

26
sometimes the cause.
7. Instruments Multifarious instruments are used Reliability of instruments working

failure for control of process parameters. must be ensured through proper
Any such instrument failure can selection and maintenance.
cause mishap.
8. Failures of Protective system like SRV, Reliability of protective system must
protective bursting discs, vent header, drain be ensured highest through
system lines etc. are provided to take care inspection and proper maintenance.
of abnormal conditions.
9. Operational Plant operational parameters Operating procedures must be
effort should not be exceeded beyond complete and strictly followed.
the permissible limits.
10. Other failures There are external other reasons Design and operating philosophy
causing the failures. must consider all possible reasons.
5.2 GENERAL
Identification of hazards is of primary significance in the analysis. A classical definition of

hazard states that hazard is the characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for
an accident. Hence all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly examined
in order to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of
events, which can be termed as an accident.
In Risk Assessment terminology a hazard is something with the potential to cause harm. Hence
the Hazard Identification step is an exercise that seeks to identify what can go wrong at the major
hazard installation or process in such a way that people may be harmed. The output of this step is
a list of events that need to be passed on to later steps for further analysis.
The potential hazards posed by the facility were identified based on the past accidents, lessons
learnt and a checklist method. This list includes the following elements.
• Catastrophic rupture of pressure vessel.

27
• “Guillotine-Breakage” of pipe-work
• Small hole, cracks or instrument tapping failure in piping and vessels.
• Flange leaks.
• Leaks from pump glands and similar seals.
5.3 MODES OF FAILURE
There are various potential sources of large leakage, which may release hazardous chemicals and
hydrocarbon materials into the atmosphere. These could be in form of gasket failure in flanged
joints, bleeder valve left open inadvertently, instrument tubing giving away, pump seal failure,
guillotine failure of equipment/ pipeline or any other source of leakage. Operating experience
can identify lots of these sources and their modes of failure. A list of general equipment and
pipeline failure mechanisms is as follows:
Material/Construction Defects
• Incorrect selection or supply of materials of construction
• Incorrect use of design codes
• Weld failures
• Failure of inadequate pipeline supports
Pre-Operational Failures
• Failure induced during delivery at site
• Failure induced during installation
• Pressure and temperature effects
• Overpressure
• Temperature expansion/contraction (improper stress analysis and support design)

28
• Low temperature brittle fracture (if metallurgy is incorrect)
• Fatigue loading (cycling and mechanical vibration)
Corrosion Failures
• Internal corrosion (e.g. ingress of moisture)
• External corrosion
• Cladding/insulation failure (e.g. ingress of moisture)
• Cathodic protection failure, if provided
Failures due to Operational Errors
• Human error
• Failure to inspect regularly and identify any defects
External Impact Induced Failures
• Dropped objects
• Impact from transport such as construction traffic
• Vandalism
• Subsidence
• Strong winds
Failure due to Fire
• External fire impinging on pipeline or equipment
• Rapid vaporization of cold liquid in contact with hot surfaces
5.4 SELECTED FAILURE CASES

29
A list of selected failure cases was prepared based on process knowledge, engineering judgment,
experience, past incidents associated with such facilities and considering the general mechanisms
for loss of containment. A list of cases has been identified for the consequence analysis study
based on the following.
• Cases with high chance of occurrence but having low consequence:
Example of such failure cases includes two-bolt gasket leak for flanges, seal failure for pumps,
sample connection failure, instrument tapping failure, drain/vent failure etc. The consequence
results will provide enough data for planning routine safety exercises. This will emphasize the
area where operator's vigilance is essential.
• Cases with low chance of occurrence but having high consequence (The example
includes catastrophic failure of lines, process pressure vessels, pressurized storages etc.)
This approach ensures at least one representative case of all possible types of accidental failure
events, is considered for the consequence analysis. Moreover, the list below includes at least one
accidental case comprising of release of different sorts of highly hazardous materials handled in
the onshore oil/gas production facilities. Although the list does not give complete failure
incidents considering all equipments, units, but the consequence of a similar incident considered
in the list below could be used to foresee the consequence of that particular accident.

30
Selected failure cases and likely consequences) outlines the failure cases those selected for
facilities of onshore oil/gas production facilities at Ramagundam Fertilizer Complex:
S. No Equipment Failure case Associated hazards
Ammonia Unit
1. Flammable
NG at B/L Instrument tapping failure, 20 mm
2. NG Compressor Flammable
Instrument tapping failure, 20 mm
Discharge
3. Flammable/ Toxic
HTS Effluent Large hole in bottom, 50 mm
4. Flammable/ Toxic
Converter effluent Catastrophic Failure
5. HP ammonia scrubber Flammable/ Toxic
vapour
6. Toxic
Process condensate
7. Large hole in bottom, 50 mm Toxic
8. Flammable/ Toxic
HP Ammonia scrubber Large hole in bottom, 50 mm
9. liquid Flammable/ Toxic
Catastrophic failure
Urea Plant
10. Flammable/ Toxic
Ammonia at B/L Instrument tapping failure, 20 mm
10 mm failure
HP Ammonia pump
12. Instrument tapping failure, 20 mm Flammable/ Toxic

Reactor Large hole in bottom, 50 mm
HP Carbamate pump Pump seal failure, 10 mm
CPP
15. Flammable
Gas Turbine generator Instrument tapping failure, 20 mm

31
S. No Equipment Failure case Associated hazards
Offsites
Tank Manifold leak
Ammonia Storage Tank
17. Flammable
Tank on Fire
6. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
The Risk assessment study has been carried out using the risk assessment software program
‘PHAST’ ver. 7.0 developed by DNV.
Consequence analysis involves the application of the mathematical, analytical and computer
models for calculation of the effects and damages subsequent to a hydrocarbon / toxic release
accident.
Computer models are used to predict the physical behavior of hazardous incidents. The model
uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of identified scenarios:
• Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in process equipment/pipe work
• Modeling of the size & shape of the flammable/toxic gas clouds from releases in the
atmosphere
• Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as jet
fire, pool fire, flash fire and fire ball.
• Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point of
release
The different consequences (Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire and Explosion effects) of loss of
containment accidents depend on the sequence of events & properties of material released
leading to the either toxic vapor dispersion, fire or explosion or both.

32
6.1 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS MODELLING
DISCHARGE RATE
The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the equipment,
size of the hole and phase of the release (liquid, gas or two-phase). The release rate decreases
with time as the equipment depressurizes. This reduction depends mainly on the inventory and
the action taken to isolate the leak and blow-down the equipment.
DISPERSION
Releases of gas into the open air form clouds whose dispersion is governed by the wind, by
turbulence around the site, the density of the gas and initial momentum of the release. In case of
flammable materials the sizes of these gas clouds above their Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) are
important in determining whether the release will ignite. In this study, the results of dispersion
modeling for flammable materials are presented LFL quantity.
FLASH FIRE
A flash fire occurs when a cloud of vapors/gas burns without generating any significant
overpressure. The cloud is typically ignited on its edge, remote from- the leak source. The
combustion zone moves through the cloud away from the ignition point. The duration of the
flash fire is relatively short but it may stabilize as a continuous jet fire from the leak source. For
flash fires, an approximate estimate for the extent of the total effect zone is the area over which
the cloud is above the LFL.
JET FIRE
Jet fires are burning jets of gas or atomized liquid whose shape is dominated by the momentum
of the release. The jet flame stabilizes on or close to the point of release and continues until the
release is stopped. Jet fire can be realized, if the leakage is immediately ignited. The effect of jet
flame impingement is severe as it may cut through equipment, pipeline or structure. The damage
effect of thermal radiation is depended on both the level of thermal radiation and duration of
exposure.

33
POOL FIRE
A cylindrical shape of the pool fire is presumed. Pool-fire calculations are then carried out as
part of an accidental scenario, e.g. in case a hydrocarbon liquid leak from a vessel leads to the
formation of an ignitable liquid pool. First no ignition is assumed, and pool evaporation and
dispersion calculations are being carried out. Subsequently late pool fires (ignition following
spreading of liquid pool) are considered. If the release is bunded, the diameter is given by the
size of the bund. If there is no bund, then the diameter is that which corresponds with a minimum
pool thickness, set by the type of surface on which the pool is spreading.
VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION
A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of flammable gas burns sufficiently quickly to
generate high overpressures (i.e. pressures in excess of ambient). The overpressure resulting
from an explosion of hydrocarbon gases is estimated considering the explosive mass available to
be the mass of hydrocarbon vapor between its lower and upper explosive limits.
BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION (BLEVE)
BLEVE occur when pressurized vessels containing volatile liquids, in particular liquefied gases,
are engulfed by external fires causing catastrophic rupture of the vessel and the formation of a
disastrous fireball.
TOXIC RELEASE
The aim of the toxic risk study is to determine whether the operators in the plant, people
occupied buildings and the public outside are likely to be affected by toxic substances. Toxic gas
cloud e.g. H2S, chlorine, Benzene etc is undertaken to the Immediately Dangerous to Life and
Health concentration (IDLH) limit to determine the extent of the toxic hazard created as the
result of loss of containment of a toxic substance.
6.2 SIZE AND DURATION OF RELEASE
Leak size considered for selected failure cases are listed below

34
Leak Size for selected failure scenario
Pump seal/ Flange gasket failure 10 mm hole size
Instrument tapping failure 20 mm hole size
Large hole 50 mm, complete rupture of 2” drain line
Catastrophic failure Complete rupture of pressure vessels
The discharge duration is taken as 10 minutes for continuous release scenarios as it is considered
that it would take plant personnel about 10 minutes to detect and isolate the leak.
Ref [5] AICHE, CCPS, Chemical process Quantitative Risk Analysis
6.3 DAMAGE CRITERIA DUE TO VARIOUS SCENARIOS
In order to appreciate the damage effect produced by various scenarios, physiological/physical

effects of the blast wave, thermal radiation or toxic vapor exposition are discussed.
LFL OR FLASH FIRE
Hydrocarbon vapor released accidentally will spread out in the direction of wind. This mixture
(hydrocarbon and air) finds an ignition source before being dispersed below lower flammability
limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame will travel back to the source of leak.
Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer fatal burn injury. Therefore, in consequence
analysis, the distance of LFL value is usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected
by the flash fire.
Flash fire (LFL) events are considered to cause direct harm to the population present within the
flammability range of the cloud. Fire escalation from flash fire such that process or storage
equipment or building may be affected is considered unlikely.

35
THERMAL HAZARD DUE TO POOL FIRE, JET FIRE AND FIRE BALL
Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet fire or fire ball may cause various degrees of burn on
human body and process equipment. Table 7.4-2 tabulates the damage effect due to thermal
radiation intensity.
Damage due to incident thermal radiation intensity
Incident radiation intensity

Type of damage
(KW/m²)
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment
Maximum flux level for thermally protected tanks

32.0
containing flammable liquid
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood,

12.5
melting of plastic tubing etc.
8.0 Maximum heat flux for un-insulated tanks
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover

4.0 within 20 seconds. However blistering of skin (1st degree
burns) is likely.
The hazard distances to the 37.5 kW/m2, 32 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2, 8 kW/m2 and 4 kW/m2
radiation levels, selected based on their effect on population, buildings and equipment were
modeled using PHAST.
VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION:
In the event of explosion taking place within the plant, the resultant blast wave will have
damaging effects on equipment, structures, building and piping falling within the overpressure
distances of the blast. Tanks, buildings, structures etc. can only tolerate low level of
overpressure. Human body, by comparison, can withstand higher overpressure. But injury or

36
fatality can be inflicted by collapse of building of structures. Table 7.4-3 illustrates the damage
effect of blast overpressure.
Damage Effects of Blast Overpressure
Blast Overpressure (psi) Damage Level
Major structure damage (assumed fatal to people inside

5.0
building or within other structures)
3.0 Oil storage tank failure
2.5 Eardrum rupture
Repairable damage, pressure vessels remain intact, light

2.0
structures collapse
1.0 Window pane breakage possible, causing some injuries
The hazard distances to the 5 psi, 3 psi and 2 psi overpressure levels, selected based on their
effects on equipment, buildings and population were modeled using PHAST.
TOXIC HAZARD:
The inhalation of toxic gases can give rise to effects, which range in severity from mild irritation
of the respiratory tract to death. Lethal effects of inhalation depend on the concentration of the
gas to which people are exposed and on the duration of exposure. Mostly this dependence is
nonlinear and as the concentration increases, the time required to produce a specific injury
decreases rapidly.
The hazard distances to Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health concentration (IDLH) limit is
selected to determine the extent of the toxic hazard created as the result of loss of containment of
a toxic substance.

37
6.4 HAZARD ASSESSMENT:
Natural Gas line Instrument tapping failure at B/L
2
Jet Fire radiation (kW/m ) Overpressure (psi) Toxic front
Weather Distance, m distances, m distance, m
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5
1F 36.36 34.92 33.6 -

24.88 19.77 15.53
2D 26 24.65 23.4 -
24.91 19.89 15.71
In order to find out the major consequences due to flammable effects of natural gas in the unit
battery limit, instrument tapping failure in the natural gas line is considered for study. The
thermal radiation due to jet fire of 37.5kW/m2 is limited to 16m around the battery limit. The
overpressure distances suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi would extend up to a distance
within 34 m but the effect is well within the complex.
NG Compressor Discharge Instrument tapping failure
2
Pool Fire radiation (kW/m ) Overpressure (psi) Toxic front
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5
1F 26.24 24.82 23.54 -

24.62 19.56 15.33
2D 25.94 24.59 23.37 -

24.64 19.68 15.52
In order to find out the major consequences due to flammable effects of natural gas in the unit,
instrument tapping failure in the natural gas compressor discharge line is considered for study.
The thermal radiation due to jet fire of 37.5kW/m2 is limited to 16m radius. The overpressure
distances suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a distance of 24 m but the
effect is well within the complex.
HTS Effluent Large hole in bottom, 50 mm

38
2
Jet Fire radiation (kW/m ) Overpressure (psi) Toxic (NH3) front
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F 35.75 29.09 26.66 10.83

13.43 7.8 0
2D 30.16 27.86 25.762 16.43

13.64 8.1 0
In order to find out the major consequences due to flammable and toxic effects of ammonia in
the HTS section, large hole in HTS effluent bottom line is considered for study. The thermal
radiation due to jet fire of 12.5kW/m2 is limited to 8m radius. The overpressure distances
suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a distance of 27 m but the effect is well
within the complex. The toxic front gets diluted very quickly after reaching a distance of 17m.
Process condensate large hole in bottom
2
Jet Fire radiation (kW/m ) Overpressure (psi) Toxic (CO) front
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=1200 ppm
1F 160.1 155.55 151.39 1099

18.5 12.45 2.42
2D 102.78 99.89 97.246 673

18.65 12.7 2.51
In order to find out the flammable and toxic effects of CO in the unit, large hole in the process
condensate line is considered for study. The thermal hazard due to jet fire radiation of 37.5
kW/m2 shows that the effect is limited within a diameter of 20m and within the unit. The
overpressure distances suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a distance
within 150m radius but the effect is well within the complex. The toxic front travels a long way
during 1F condition when compared to 2D, extending its effect outside the complex.

39
HP Ammonia scrubber liquid large hole in bottom
2
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F 203 195.5 188.75 3939

269 235 -
2D 190 183.5 177.2 3779

255 221 -
In order to find out the flammable and toxic effects of ammonia in the Ammonia recovery unit,
large hole in the HP Ammonia Scrubber liquid line is considered for study. The thermal hazard
due to jet fire radiation is limited within the range of 12.5kW/m2 and the effect is seen outside
the unit but well within the complex. The overpressure distances suggest that the blast pressure
of 5 psi could extend up to a distance within 188 m radius but the effect is well within the
complex. The toxic front travels a long way extending its effect way outside the complex.
Because of the pressure of ammonia released, the toxic vapors travel a long way extending its
effect outside the complex.
Catastrophic failure of HP Ammonia scrubber
Overpressure (psi) distances, m Toxic (NH3) front distance,

Weather m
2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F 231.122 192.39 156.99 6672
2D 231.35 192.57 157 2417
the Ammonia recovery unit, catastrophic failure of HP Ammonia Scrubber line is considered for
study. The overpressure distances suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a
distance within 177 m but the effect is well within the complex. The toxic front travels a long
way during 1F condition when compared to 2D, extending its effect way outside the complex.
Because of the pressure of ammonia and amount of inventory released, the toxic vapors travel a
long way extending its effect outside the complex.

40
Instrument tapping failure of Ammonia line at B/L
2
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F 24.79 23.71 22.72 1528

84.31 73.33 -
2D 24.63 23.58 22.62 1085

79.6 69.30 -
the battery limit, instrument tapping failure on Ammonia line is considered for study. The
thermal hazard due to jet fire radiation is limited within the range of 12.5kW/m2 and the effect is
seen outside the unit but well within the complex. The overpressure distances suggest that the
blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a distance within 23 m but the effect is well within the
unit. The toxic front travels a long way during 1F condition when compared to 2D, extending its
effect outside the complex. Because of the pressure of ammonia released, the toxic vapors travel
a long way extending its effect outside the complex.
HP Ammonia pump 10 mm failure
2
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F 13.5 12.71 11.98 1289.45

64.17 55.70 -
2D 13.37 12.6 11.9 869

60.55 52.74 -
In order to find out the consequences due to minor leaks in ammonia, 10 mm failure of HP
Ammonia pump is considered for study. The thermal hazard due to jet fire radiation is limited
within the range of 12.5kW/m2 and the effect is seen a little outside the unit but well within the
complex. The overpressure distances suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a
distance within 12 m but the effect is well within the unit. The toxic front travels a long way
during 1F condition when compared to 2D, extending its effect outside the complex. Because of
the pressure of ammonia released, the toxic vapors travel a long way extending its effect outside
the complex.

41
HP Ammonia pump Instrument tapping failure
2
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F 37.1 35.1 34 2259.6

119 104 -
2D 36.88 35.3 33.9 2001

112 98 -
the HP Ammonia section in urea plant, instrument tapping failure on Ammonia line is considered
for study. The thermal hazard due to jet fire radiation is limited within the range of 12.5kW/m2
and the effect is seen outside the unit but well within the complex. The overpressure distances
suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a distance within 34 m but the effect is
well within the unit. The toxic front travels a long way during 1F condition when compared to
2D, extending its effect outside the complex. Because of the pressure of ammonia released, the
toxic vapors travel a long way extending its effect outside the complex.
Large hole in bottom of the Reactor
2
Pool Fire radiation (kW/m ) Overpressure (psi) Toxic (NH3) front
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F - - - 331.95
- - -
2D - - - 274.96
- - -
the reactor, 50 mm large hole in the synthesis reactor is considered for study. The released
mixture because of the high temperature in the reactor flashes and disperses quickly reducing the
toxic front, limiting its effect within the complex.

42
Instrument tapping failure of HP Carbamate pump discharge line
2
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH=300 ppm
1F - - - 1581
84 - -
2D - - - 1417
79 - -
In order to find out the toxic consequences of ammonia in the recirculation section, instrument
tapping failure in HP Carbamate pump discharge line is considered for study. Ammonia because
of the high pressure release carries the toxic front to longer distances, in this case outside the
complex.
Instrument tapping failure, 20 mm of Gas Turbine generator
2
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5
1F 36.36 34.92 33.61 -

24.88 19.77 15.53
2D 26 24.65 23.40 -
24.91 19.90 15.72
The consequences due to minor to major leaks of natural gas in the power plant are studied
considering an instrument tapping failure in the GTG discharge line. The thermal hazard due to
jet fire radiation is limited to a distance of 16 m. The overpressure distances suggest that the blast
pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a distance within 34 m but the effect is well within the plant.

43
Tank Manifold leak of Ammonia Storage tank
2
4 12.5 37.5 2 3 5 IDLH= 300 ppm
1F 60.93 58.46 56.2 1691

103.34 87.74 -
2D 59.93 57.68 55.63 1033

92.71 82.76 -
The consequences due to minor to major leaks of ammonia in the offsite storage facilities are
studied considering an instrument tapping failure in the tank manifold. The thermal hazard due to
jet fire radiation is limited within the range of 12.5kW/m2 and the effect is seen to a distance of
88 m. This being affecting the storage tank area, it has to be ensured that the tanks are properly
insulated. The overpressure distances suggest that the blast pressure of 5 psi could extend up to a
distance within 56 m but the effect is well within the unit. The toxic front travels a long way
during 1F condition when compared to 2D, extending its effect outside the complex. Because of
the pressure of ammonia released, the toxic vapors travel a long way extending its effect outside
the complex.
Ammonia Storage tank on fire
2
4 8 32 2 3 5
1F NA NA NA
X X 18 NA
2D NA NA NA
X X 24 NA
The consequences due to major fire in ammonia storage tanks in the offsite storage facilities are
studied considering a tank on failure. The thermal hazard due to pool fire radiation of range of 32
kW/m2 is seen to a distance of 32 m. Ammonia stored at refrigerated conditions vaporizes at
ambient temperature the moment it comes outside.
In the case of catastrophic rupture of the storage tank a large amount of liquid ammonia would
get released. The foundation of the storage tank rests on pipes. The released ammonia liquid

44
would flow underneath the storage tank and surrounding dyke area. It is considered that the dyke
is leak proof and the entire contents of the tank be held within the dyke and the pit underneath
the tank in the event of catastrophic rupture of the tank. The presence of the dyke confines the
liquid ammonia within the dyke area.
As the liquid from the ruptured tank falls on the dyke at its boiling point and evaporates, the
release of ammonia vapor becomes continuous till the time the liquid inventory becomes
exhausted or the boil-off of the ammonia is terminated by external protective actions. The
vaporized ammonia would then form a cloud, which being heavier than air would travel along
the ground.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
i. As discussed in SECTION- 8, the risk level emanating from the fertilizer complex on
account of large holes (50 mm leaks) and rupture of vessel extend beyond the complex
limit. The level of individual risk of fatality would be considerably larger on the outside
than the inside of the complex. Hence to reduce the risk level outside the complex, it is
recommended to provide water curtains at strategic location facing the villages outside
the complex. The location can be near units handling toxic chemicals like Ammonia unit,
urea unit, and ammonia storage tank area. This should be operable from both local and
remote in case of emergency. The idea of the curtain is to arrest/dilute the toxic vapor
release from different sources inside the complex itself. Adequate contingency planning
should be devised and put into effect in case of any major hazardous release as the curtain
provided might not be 100% sufficient.
ii. Implement and maintain a specific Emergency (Disaster) Management Plan providing
guidance on emergency measures to protect both operators and local communities in the
event of toxic ammonia releases extending outside the complex.
iii. Disaster management plan has to be designed for the scenarios where the effect goes
outside the complex envisaging the risk involved and all plant personnel should be aware
of the same
iv. Early detection and warning system should be provided in the event of leak so that people
can move indoors, close doors, windows and ventilation to reduce chances of exposure of
high ammonia concentration and escape dreadful injury.

45
v. Adequate wind socks should be provided at strategic locations to notify people of the
wind direction so that they can escape accordingly in case of emergency.
vi. Ramagundam Fertilizer complex does not cause any domino effect on nearby industrial
equipment as the major hazards are mainly due to toxic release.
vii. Equipment failures can be prevented by adequate design, good operating and
maintenance practices etc. Frequency of testing of equipment has a great role in reducing
failure frequency. Higher the frequency, greater the reliability.
viii. Corrosion monitoring of piping and equipment should be done periodically to forewarn
against possible failures and plant preventive maintenance. It is advisable to keep updated
with the latest corrosion prevention and maintenance techniques.
ix. The acceptable individual risk to plant personnel is apparently higher than to public as
plant personnel are involved in daily operations, maintenance and emergency situations.
However, Ramagundam Fertilizer should endeavor to adopt all safe practices and
conform to regulations to keep the accident frequency at the minimum.
x. Ramagundam Fertilizer with the help of local authorities should check and prevent the
population growth around the plant boundary especially on the eastern and northern side.
xi. It is highly recommended to provide gas detectors along with emergency alarm wherever
applicable.
xii. Location of manning stations like operator cabin, sub station, control room etc. have to
decided in compliance with the safety regulations, standards and specifications as
applicable
xiii. Positive pressurization of the control room and other building and keeping them airtight
to prevent the entry of toxic gases.
xiv. Ammonia detectors to be provided at the inlet of HVAC system to automatically
shutdown the HVAC air intake and close fresh air suction dampers.
xv. Provide an alternative breathing air system within the control room for actuation in the
event of major ammonia leaks in the facility.
xvi. Urea plant should be provided with prilling towers based on natural draft so as to
minimize urea dust emissions.
xvii. Use refrigerated storage for large quantities of liquid ammonia since the initial release of
ammonia in the case of atmospheric storage is slower than in case of pressurized
ammonia storage systems

46
xviii. Catastrophic failure of storage tank is unforeseen since the tank is a double containment
construction wherein outer shell is also designed for retention of the liquid content in the
event of inner shell failure. Assuming proper safety instrumented functions are applied to
this system, catastrophic failure is a remote possibility. Possible causes that could lead to
catastrophic rupture are natural disaster like earthquakes or any acts of extreme terrorism.
xix. In case of any sabotage act like terrorism or hostile conditions like war, etc., it is
recommended that the security be tightened around the plant and the ammonia stock
should be kept as minimum as possible.
xx. All plant personnel should be made well aware of TRAINING IN FIRE FIGHTING &
SAFETY AND OHSAS-18001
xxi. Provision of muster locations at different locations with suitable protection means (e.g.
enclosed areas designed to protect people against a toxic gas cloud)
.
8. GLOSSARY
CASUALTY:
Someone who suffers serious injury or worse i.e. including fatal injuries. As a rough guide
fatalities are likely to be half the total casualties. But this may vary depending on the nature of
the event.
HAZARD A chemical or physical condition with the potential of causing damage.
FLAMMABILITY LIMITS in fuel-air systems, a range of compositions exists inside which a

(UFL – LFL) flame will propagate substantial distance from an ignition source. The limiting fuel
concentrations are termed as Upper flammability or explosives limit (Fuel concentrations
exceeding this are too rich) and Lower flammability or explosives limit (Fuel concentrations
below this are too lean).
FLASH FIRE The burning of a vapor cloud at very low flame propagation speed. Combustion
products are generated at a rate low enough for expansion to take place easily without significant
overpressure ahead or behind the flame front. The hazard is therefore only due to thermal effects.

47
POOL FIRE The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid at the seat of the
fire.
JET FIRE The combustion of material emerging from an orifice with a significant momentum.
OVERPRESSURE Maximum pressure above atmosphere pressure experiences during the

passage of a blast wave from an explosion expressed in this report as pounds per square inch
(psi).
EXPLOSION A rapid release of energy, which causes a pressure discontinuity or shock wave
moving away from the source. An explosion can be produced by detonation of a high explosive
or by the rapid burning of a flammable gas cloud. The resulting overpressure is sufficient to
cause damage inside and outside the cloud as the shock wave propagation into the atmosphere
beyond the cloud. Some authors use the term deflagration for this type of explosion
DOMINO EFFECT The effect that loss of containment of one installation leads to loss of
containment of other installations
EVENT TREE A logic diagram of success and failure combinations of events used to
identify accident sequences leading to all possible consequences of a given initiating event.
TLV “Threshold limit value” is defined as the concentration of the substance in air that can be
breathed for five consecutive 8 hours work day (40 hours work week) by most people without
side effect.
STEL “Short Term Exposure Limit” is the maximum permissible average exposure for the time
period specified (15 minutes).
IDLH “Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health” is the maximum concentration level from
which one could escape within 30 minutes without any escape impairing symptoms.
PASQUILL CLASS Classification to qualify the stability of the atmosphere, indicated by a

letter ranging from A, for very unstable, to F, for stable.
FREQUENCY The number of times an outcome is expected to occur in a given period of

time.

48
9. REFERENCES
1. Classification of hazardous locations, A. W. Cox, F. P. Lees and M. L. Ang, Published by

the Institute of Chemical engineers, U. K.
2. The reference manual, Volume-II, Cremer & Warner Ltd. U. K. (Presently Entec).
3. Risk analysis of six potentially hazardous industrial objects in the Rijnmond area; A pilot
study. A report to the Rijnmond Public Authority. D. Riedel publishing company, U. K.
4. Loss prevention in the process industries, Hazard identification, Assessment and Control,
Frank. P. Lees (Vol. I, II & III), Published by Butterworth-Heinemann, U. K.
5. AICHE, CCPS, Chemical process Quantitative Risk Analysis
6. Guideline for Quantitative Risk assessment, ‘Purple book’.

49

Rapid Risk Assessment: Project: Ramagundam Fertilizer Complex

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rapid Risk Assessment: Project: Ramagundam Fertilizer Complex

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT OF Doc No.

RAMAGUNDAM FERTILIZER COMPLEX Rev. No: A