SONATRACH / FCP

HAZOP Report
Menzel Ledjmet East

CONTENTS

CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... 2

GLOSSARY....................................................................................................... 3

LIST OF DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY ................................................. 4

TERMINOLOGY................................................................................................................. 4
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................. 5

2 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 6

3 FACILITIES DESCRIPTION ........................................................................ 7

4 HAZOP ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ................................................. 8

5 HAZOP WORKSHEETS.............................................................................. 9

APPENDIX A – MLE HAZOP ATTENDANCE LIST ....................................... 25

APPENDIX B – MLE HAZOP WORKSHEETS .............................................. 29

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GLOSSARY
The following terms are generic to the Menzel Ledjmet East Project and may be
referred to in this document:

CCR Central Control Room

CPF Central Processing Facility
EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction
FCP First Calgary Petroleums Ltd.
FEED Front End Engineering
HP High Pressure
KO Knock out
LP Low Pressure
LPG Liquified Petroleum Gas
LER Local Equipment Room
MLE Menzel Ledjmet East
SH Sonatrach

The following terms are referred to in this document:

HAZOP Hazard and Operability

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LIST OF DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Terminology
The word “shall” is to be understood as a mandatory requirement.

The word “may” is to be understood as an action to be undertaken at the

Contractor’s discretion.

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Menzel Ledjmet East (MLE) gas field will be jointly developed by
Sonatrach (SH) and First Calgary Petroleums Ltd. (FCP). The MLE field lies
within the Ledjmet Block 405b in the Berkine Basin of Algeria approximately
220 km south-east of Hassi Messaoud.

The report is a HAZOP of the Central Processing Facility for the development
which will process the well fluids into streams of sales gas, LPG condensate
and oil for export by pipeline.

The Hazard Identification (HAZOP) workshop for the MLE Front End
Engineering Design (FEED) forms part of the overall Health, Safety and
Environmental (HSE) management activities planned for the project.

There were 362 actions arising from the HAZOP study for consideration by the
GOGC and Sonatrech/ FCP engineers. In addition a number of P&ID errors
and straightforward design changes agreed by the whole team at the HAZOP
were marked straight on the HAZOP masters. Finally a number of notes were
recorded to indicate intended activities by the GOGC engineers or to act as
aides-memoires.

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2 INTRODUCTION
The HAZOP was done on with reference to P&IDs. The drawings used are
contained in the document "HAZOP Master P&IDs" Ref: J8328A-F-HA-20012.
The HAZOP meeting was held between 22nd September to 10th October 2007
at the Genesis Offices, London.

Various persons attended according to the system under review. Those

attending are indicated in Appendix A.

The Hazard Identification (HAZOP) workshop for the MLE Front End
Engineering Design (FEED) forms part of the overall Health, Safety and
Environmental (HSE) management activities planned for the project.

The FEED HAZOP workshop is concerned with the identification of potential

safety and environmental hazards for the proposed MLE facilities: wells,
gathering system, CPF and export pipelines.

This report contains the following sections:

Section 3.0 Brief description of the new facilities

Section 4.0 Brief description of the HAZOP methodology and the guidewords
used.
Section 5.0 Worksheets and list of recommendations. .

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3 FACILITIES DESCRIPTION
The Menzel Ledjmet East (MLE) gas field will be jointly developed by
Sonatrach (SH) and First Calgary Petroleums Ltd. (FCP). The MLE field lies
within the Ledjmet Block 405b in the Berkine Basin of Algeria approximately
220 km south-east of Hassi Messaoud.

The development will consist of a field gathering system, Central Processing

Facility (CPF), infrastructure, and export pipelines. The plateau reservoir
production will be 230 MMscfd and the base concept is a standalone
development for the MLE field with space requirements to accommodate
facilities for processing of Central Area reservoir fluids at a future date.

The review was centred on the main Processing Facility and wells.

The incoming product to the Processing Facility is three-phase separated in a

pipe-type slug catcher and separator. Each of the product streams is treated to
produce streams of sales gas, LPG, condensate and oil. Sales gas is
compressed to 70 bar before export. Oil, condensate and LPG are stored on-
site before export. Three days storage at normal production rates is provided
for each product. The oil and condensate are stored in floating roof tanks and
the LPG in conventional spheres. Storage is also provided for any off spec
product which is returned to the on-site process systems for re-processing.

Each of the four products (gas, LPG, condensate and oil) is metered before
export by pipeline.

Limited quantities of produced and condensed water are expected and after
treatment to remove oil, the water will be disposed of by evaporation.

Electrical power for the plant is taken from the national grid. Utilities provided
on site include fuel gas, heating medium (hot oil), firewater, diesel, chemical
injection, open and closed drains and flares.

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4 HAZOP ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

The HAZOP review assessment was performed in accordance with the Terms
of Reference (J8328A-F-RT-20010) which contains the guideword used for the
study. As in any HAZOP the guidewords were required to identify hazards and
stimulate discussion.

Recording in a HAZOP was in full (i.e. all discussion was summarised to record
hazards and/or operability issues and the means of prevention, control or
mitigation). Where appropriate, recommendations (Actions) were raised for
future response by the design team, Client or EPC contractor.

To improve efficiency and to avoid raising actions for intended activities, the
following was adopted.

1. Where a P&ID change was noted by the HAZOP team and the change
was of a straightforward nature unlikely to raise a negative comment outside of
the HAZOP, changes were marked directly onto the HAZOP Master P&IDs with
the agreement of the full HAZOP team present. Such changes could include
drawing errors, missing spec breaks or inappropriate valve type. These are
recoded in the document “"HAZOP Master P&IDs" Ref: J8328A-F-HA-20012.
2. Where activities had not been done but were intended as part of the
design process these were recorded as notes in the HAZOP worksheets to
record the intended activity and/or to act as aides-memoires. Such activities
could include line sizing or material selection. These notes do not require a
formal response.
3. Where items were recommended which were not necessarily going to be
addressed in the future and for which there may not be agreement by the
responsible engineer outside the HAZOP, Actions were raised. These Actions
each require a formal response.

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5 HAZOP WORKSHEETS
Findings from the review meeting were marked up on HAZOP worksheets
which are given in Appendix B. Following the meeting the chairman reviewed
the worksheets to ensure that:

• Correct tag numbers were used

• Actions were comprehensible to those not at the HAZOP review
• Actions were numbered
• All cross references were completed.

In all 362 action items were recorded which are listed below with additional
information given in the worksheets in Appendix 1.

Action 1 Ensure that remote operation facilities for wells from CCR are defined according
to client review of well head control panel specification, including safety interlocks.
Action 2 Consider providing trunk line pig launcher as a permanent installed item.
Action 3 Ensure that close position indicated on 20-ESDV-0001 raises an alarm to allow
operator to shut down wells from CCR. Alternatively consider automatic shut down of
wells on a close position on the ESDV.
Action 4 In addition to Action 3, consider configuring existing PTs on manifold to give
PAH.
Action 5 Remove requirement to lock open valve upstream of barred Tee. Apply same
philosophy to all other valves whose closure do not jeopardise the safety of the plant or
major impact on production
Action 6 Provide check valve on each connection to test manifold
Action 7 Consider trip of well for low low pressure detected at well flow line.
Action 8 Consider high high pressure trip at well heads.
Action 9 Relocate 20-ESDV-0002 upstream of 20-LV-0003
Action 10 Ensure that inlet ESDV is closed on 20-LAHH-0001
Action 11 Review requirement for 20-PV-0009 in efficient plant operation
Action 12 Consider whether a balancing bypass valve across 20-PV-0009 would be
preferred to the present arrangement.
Action 13 Relocate 20-ESDV-0003 upstream of 20-PV-0009.
Action 14 Provide isolation valves to allow for maintenance of each inlet gas cooler bay.
Also provide valves to isolate complete gas cooling unit.
Action 15 Review isolation valving arrangements around the inlet scrubber and KO drum
vessels.
Action 16 Remove Hold 10 RE automatic control for cooler bypass as only occasional
manual control will be required
Action 17 Represent vibration monitoring of cooler fans on P&IDs
Action 18 Consider requirement for independent low temperature alarm downstream of
GC-25-01
Action 19 Consider requirement for independent high temperature alarm downstream of
GC-25-01

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Action 20 Move spec break from 93 to 83 bar to d/s isolation valve provided for cooler
GC-25-01
Action 21 Ensure that high high level trip closes all inlets to VD-25-07.
Action 22 Provide spare mercury and H2S removal beds after filter
Action 23 Consider separate PDAHs across the two beds in MB-25-01A/B
Action 24 Query purpose of 16”-PG-25-010-6c3A around MB-25-01B
Action 25 Ref -Uninsulated pipe section between VD-25-07 and mercury removal beds
Consider insulating this section of line for heat conservation.
Action 26 Consider avoidance of channelling within the design of the Mercury/H2S
removal beds, also consider whether a low differential alarm could be useful in this case.
Action 27 Consider a procedureised lock closed/lock open arrangement on the removal
bed system valves such that the beds always operate on the lead and lag system
Action 28 Consider providing means to directly sample removal bed material
Action 29 Consider removing connection to closed drains from MB-25-01A, MB-25-018
and MA-25-02, and instead divert to local tank or basin as liquids will be contaminated.
Action 30 Ensure that training program for operators, especially in the handling of
hazardous materials is contained within detailed design contractor scope.
Action 31 Review isolation of coolers for maintenance depending on proximity of existing
valves shown on P&ID 12091
Action 32 Consider whether individual valving on feed gas coolers is appropriate bearing
in mind this will allow at least partial production in the event of a tube failure.
Action 33 Provide automatic temperature control system for feed gas coolers
Action 34Query why only one PSV shown on drier inlet filter coalescer.
Action 35 Review need for Relief devices e.g bursting discs on shells of GA-24-01A/B
Action 36 Ensure that degasser vent connection is sized for gas blowby from VJ-24-01
Action 37 Ensure that condensate separator PSV is sized for gas blowby from VJ-24-01
Action 38 Review trip action on high high level in d/s boot on VJ-24-01 (presently the
entire gas plant is tripped and in addition it is doubtful whether the rest of the plant can
continue to operate)
Action 39 Ensure suitable manway at condensate end of VJ-24-01
Action 40 Remove locked open valve u/s of 24-PSV-0103 as only one PSV provided.
Action 41 Review philosophy of provision of PSVs as there seems to be inconsistency. In
some cases only one is provided and in others there are two. (note fire watch is confirmed
as not acceptable)
Action 42 Consider independent sample point within system to check performance of 24-
AT-0101. If sample points are provided consider whether one common moisture analysis
device could be used instead of individual devices per bed.
Action 43 Manway needs to be shown on P&ID for VK-24-02A/B/C.
Action 44 Justify designation of 24-FV-0004 as FC rather than FO or FL
Action 45 Consider taking FAL from 24-FIT-0001
Action 46 Consider TAL from 24-TIT-0001
Action 47 Consider duplicate TV as standby heater also relies on 24-TV-0001
Action 48 Consider control loop taken from 24-TIT-0001as a “critical loop” which provides
appropriate redundancy etc. within instrumentation.

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Action 49 If action 48 is implemented consider removing 24-TIT-0101 and similar

indicated TITs.
Action 50 Provide within the regeneration gas control sequence a command to set
minimum of hot oil flow through heaters in the cooling cycle to avoid overheating
Action 51 Query function of PSVs 24-PSV-0025A/B and 0031A/B
Action 52 Remove high temperature trip on gas dehydration beds leaving two transmitters
and consider both with indication only
Action 53 Review potential for bed material to be swept d/s in regeneration cycle for all
dehydration beds.
Action 54 Review actions arising from actuation of TAHH-0014. This action should include
trip of compressors
Action 55 Review trip action from 24-LAHH-0009 as presently only compressor is tripped
Action 56 Review GC-24-02 and VA-24-03 with regard to valve isolation for maintenance
Action 57 Remove u/s LO valve on 24-PSV-0111 and 0211
Action 58 Review the extent to which automatic change over from duty to standby
regeneration gas compressor can be permitted and configure within change over logic.
Action 59 Show both sets of valves to regeneration gas compressor inlets as open
(remove NC designation)
Action 60 Review this scenario (unintentional startup of standby compressor)as part of the
consideration of whether to adopt auto changeover
Action 61 Review need for speed control in design regeneration gas compressors
Action 62 Close 24-ESDV-0007 on regeneration gas compressor trip
Action 63 As temperature rise across regeneration gas compressor is normally very small
(few degrees) consider whether high temperature trip is required.
Action 64 In event of regeneration gas compressor failure consider whether it is possible
to allow limited duration flow of regeneration gas to flare.
Action 65 Consider repressurisation of all standby equipment required for online
changeover. This may require repressurisation bypass around double block and bleed
valves
Action 66 Review whether control valves should be fitted with operation bypasses to allow
manual operation. Consider specifically provision of these bypasses around 25-TV-
0005A/B
Action 67 Ensure double block and bleeds are provided u/s and d/s of 25-TV-0005A/B
Action 68 Consider whether PDIs across GG-25-02/03 should be converted to PDAH for
remote indication alarm
Action 69 Consider modifying present control system for JT valve to hand control as the
JT valve is used only for transient start up conditions.
Action 70 Query necessity of valve 25-HV-0002
Action 71 Consider TAH at 25-TT-0007
Action 72 Consider position indication on JT valve 25-PV-0014
Action 73 Ensure that low temperatures as a result of start up across JT valve are allowed
for in selection of materials.
Action 74 For preference follow the drainage arrangement shown on VD-25-03 for all
vessels on the plant, unless process reasons dictate a different arrangement.
Action 75 Consider tube leakage in GA-24-01A/B and if recompressor damage is credible
consider means of detection.

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Action 76 Review whether closure of 25-TV-0005B could result in under temperature of

3C3A spec line d/s of GG-25-03.
Action 77 Consider actuated valves at re-compressor suction lines to be operated as part
of the start up sequence
Action 78 Ensure re-compressors are protected by over-speed trips
Action 79 Review whether isolation valve would be a benefit in PG-25-247-3C3A
Action 80 Ensure turbo expander re-compressor vendor is advised of credible low
temperatures that may occur at re-compressor suction
Action 81 Consider taking TAL from 25-TIT-0004 (P&ID 12099)
Action 82 Ensure that seal gas take off and heater are depicted on the turbo expander re-
compressor P&ID.
Action 83 Consider including governing sizing case (eg. Fire case) for all PSVs on P&IDs
Action 84 Consider whether liquids from VG-27-01A/B could be rerouted to part of the
process rather than the closed drain drum. In any case take account of gas blowby. Also
applies to VG-27-02A/B
Action 85 As VG-27-01A/B will operate dry or nearly dry, consider whether design
adequately reflects this. Use of an initial charge of a “non-evaporating” liquid may be
possible. Also applies to VG-27-02A/B
Action 86 Show manway for VG-27-01A/B below demister. Also applies to VG-27-02A/B
Action 87 Consider providing utility connection on vessel nozzles as isolation valve with a
check valve. Also include on legend sheets.
Action 88 Ensure that tube bundles within all air coolers are individually isolatable.
Action 89 Review the location of primary fuel gas off-take bearing in mind requirements of
fuel gas supply pressure to turbines
Action 90 Based on operational experience, client recommendation is to use vane type
demisters to reduce risk of demister collapse during operation
Action 91 Ensure that 27-PSV-0114A/B are sized for reverse flow case described –
“Train 1 not in operation and train 2 operating with downstream blockage causing reverse
flow”
Action 92 Consider a bypass (preferably also with an ESDV) to allow operation of 27-
ESDV-0001 against a high differential pressure
Action 93 Consider separate seal gas take off for sales gas compressors as closure of 27-
ESDV-0004 will stop supply of seal gas to both compressor trains
Action 94 Review whether 27-PV-0005A/B should be FO rather than FC to avoid
operational flaring
Action 95 Provide over–pressure protection near feed gas coolers due to inadvertent
operation of start-up line
Action 96 Query presence of 20 micron filters in gas metering package
Action 97 Relocate seal gas take off u/s of metering package so that metered gas is not
returned to the plant
Action 98 Provide suitable facility to provide blowdown of export gas pipeline at plant
Action 99 Provide P&ID note to explain that 27-PDI-0015 is required for pigging purposes
Action 100 On legend sheet 12075 (typical 1) show online test facility for ESDVs (partial
stroke)
Action 101 Consider means of protecting pumps PA-25-01A/B against closed discharge,
eg: PAHH

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Action 102 Review pump PA-25-01A/B control and protection at vendor selection stage to
ensure protection against this event is provided
Action 103 Provide u/s and d/s pump PA-25-01A/B isolation valves as LO as there is only
one common pump minimum flow return flow line. Apply to other similar pump
arrangements elsewhere (but see action 106 below ref: separate minimum flow returns)
Action 104 Consider taking PAH from 25-PIT-0097 and/or a FAH from 25-FIT-0002
Action 105 Show vent connection for pumps PA-25-01A/B directly to cold flare rather than
d/s of the PSV/BDV/depressurisation nozzle on the vessel
Action 106 Consider individual minimum flow return lines for each pump PA-25-01A/B for
better pump protection
Action 107 Consider PAHH in the expander discharge drum to trip pumps PA-25-01A/B .
Action 108 Ensure that pump PA-25-01A/B is provided with internal vibration trip
Action 109 Show 25-ESDV-0004 as minimum distance from deethaniser vessel. Apply to
other vessel liquid outlet ESDVs as appropriate
Action 110 Allow for potential low pressure effects of water drainage after hydro-test in the
design of the deethaniser Apply as appropriate to other large vessels including LPG
spheres
Action 111 Review minimum flow arrangement for PA-25-02A/B which is different from
the arrangement of PA-25-01A/B in that there is only one FIT. As far as possible provide a
common arrangement for all minimum flow lines from pumps.
Action 112 Provide check valve in each of PG-25-085 and PG-25-086
Action 113 In previous P&ID review comments it was suggested that 25-TAHH-0017 be
removed. Review this suggestion according to loss of control in temperature f deethaniser
(hot oil temperature considerably exceeds deethaniser design temperature)
Action 114 Consider gas blowby from the debutaniser to the on spec or off spec oil
storage tanks eg, by including suitable degassing containment with vent or relief sized for
gas blowby.
Action 115 Ensure that PSVs on condensate degasser are sized for gas blowby from
debutaniser
Action 116 Allow for potential low pressure effects of hydro-test water draining in the
design of the debutaniser
Action 117 Where possible bearing in mind pressure drop considerations, include the
isolation valves either side of control valves within the reduced section rather than outside
to save the cost of use of larger valves.
Action 118 Consider a different flow control and pump protection arrangement such that
the reflux return to the debutaniser is controlled by an FV with a mechanical minimum stop
position. This would provide pump protection, allowing 25-FV-0007B to be deleted and
allow the flow measurement to be limited to the lines to storage
Action 119 Consider an interlock such that 25-HV-0007/0008 cannot be opened together
in normal operation
Action 120 Provide check valve in reflux line to debutaniser, consider also on minimum
flow return line as this offers a reverse flow route
Action 121 Consider routing the water stream from debutaniser reflux drum to cold drains
instead of water treatment facility
Action 122 Consider providing manual drain valve from debutaniser reflux drum as spring
return valve such that operator pressure is required to hold the valve open (rather than
manual valve being left open)

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Action 123 Bearing in mind that u/s filters (MA-25-03A/B) are precautionary consider
whether a simple bypass can be used as an alternative to a spare filter. Consider also
whether the same principle can be applied to the d/s filters (MA-25-04A/B.
Action 124 Relocate PSVs, 25-PSV-0051, 25-PSV-0054, 25-PSV-0057 and 25-PSV-0060
direct to vessel shell of LPG treatment filters.
Action 125 Add sample connection near 25-AI-0101 to allow excess water to be detected
Action 126 Provide suitable pressure relief to protect against more flow from regeneration
gas in the lower rated pressure system d/s of the LPG treatment beds.
Action 127 Provide suitable pressure relief to protect against back flow from regeneration
gas in the lower rated pressure system u/s of the LPG treatment beds.
Action 128 Depict LPG evacuation route from treatment beds on P&IDs 12132 and 12133
Action 129 Re-review P&IDs 12132 and 12133 when a preferred means of discharge of
LPG is established and the drawings reflect this
Action 130 Ensure that sequence valves in the regeneration systems are of suitable
integrity for their function. Ensure this is reflected in the package specification
Action 131 Instead of the present arrangement with flow returns from LPG export pumps
being sent to the inlet of the sphere being filled (using valve selection to the destination
sphere) use a common return line to the sphere inlet header.
Action 132 Consider replacing 25-HV-0020 with a normally closed manual valve as this is
not a normal flow route
Action 133 Take PAL from 25-PIC-0063
Action 134 Consider providing one fuel gas pressure control valve and control loop per
LPG sphere instead of a common valve
Action 135 Nominate control loop for pressure control within LPG spheres as “critical
loop”
Action 136 As far as possible select sphere construction material such that it will not be
damaged even after a rapid restart following depressurisation
Action 137 Justify the absence of blowdown facilities for LPG storage
Action 138 Confirm that fuel gas design pressure will not exceed pressure rating of
sphere
Action 139 Consider the weight of the sphere filled with water and the strength of the
foundations and legs for in-situ hydrotest.
Action 140 Show spectacle blind on line to cold drains from LPG tanks as closed,
consistent with other vessels
Action 141 Confirm that sample connection is indeed online analysis as indicated by Note
7 (P&ID 12145), if it is not intended as online analysis, consider providing this.
Action 142 Consider adding an additional manway to sphere for convenience and to aid
gas freeing. Ensure that all vessels comply with relevant client philosophy document with
respect to number and size of manways
Action 143 Ensure that calculations of low temperature arising from depressurisation in off
spec LPG sphere are based on realistic off spec composition data.
Action 144 Review requirements for TSVs for sections of liquid lines that may be locked in
and subject to thermal gains
Action 145 Review whether this protection (25-PAL-0085A and 25-PALL-0086A ) offers
adequate protection to the LPG booster pumps.
Action 146 Ensure that trip or failure of a LPG booster pump trips its associated export
pump by direct control signal and vice versa

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Action 147 For ease of operation and minimisation of valves delete the three returns
shown on P&IDs 12139, 12140 and 12141 and replace with a single line entering the LPG
sphere inlet header deleting all HVs but retaining a check valve on the single line.
Action 148 Consider taking FAL from 25-FIC-0012
Action 149 Provide check valve between each LPG booster pump and its export pump.
Action 150 Check pump data sheets to confirm that LPG Booster pump is rated for export
pump pressures. If lower pressures are used provide adequate PSV protection.
Action 151 Consider specifically the fire risk of the LPG export pumps in local fire
detection and pump shut off
Action 152 Consider providing high temperature alarm and/or trip for each LPG export
pump
Action 153 Query the function of 25-PSV-0084
Action 154 Review means of overpressure protection of the inlet manifold to LPG spheres
or find an alternative location to which the minimum flow return from the export pumps can
be routed
Action 155 Determine whether depressurisation of the LPG export pipeline is required at
plant and if so provide appropriate facilities
Action 156 Review potential for Prolonged shut down of pipeline and protect as
appropriate from pressure effects of thermal rise on pipeline causing vaporisation of LPG
Action 157 Ensure each P&ID depicting a pig trap includes a basic description of pig trap
safety features
Action 158 Consider low flow trip at discharge of off spec LPG rerun pumps
Action 159 Consider designing line PL-25-156 for full pump flow so that this line may be
used as a return from the on spec sphere (assumed to contain off spec product) to the off
spec sphere. Note there are implications on pump protection and control if this action is
followed.
Action 160 Provide check valve in each minimum return line from off spec LPG rerun
pumps
Action 161 Ensure that off spec LPG rerun pumps and u/s ESDV are included in the trip
logic for appropriate shutdown of deethaniser eg: high pressure and high level
Action 162 Confirm the capacity of a single off spec LPG rerun pump and consider the
possibility of using two in parallel when product is transferred from on spec sphere to off
spec sphere
Action 163 As an aid to operation consider the merits of a valve position indicator
(including manual valves) in the LPG rerun system, to avoid misdirected flow
Action 164 Query sizing case for 25-PSV-0079
Action 165 Consider software interlock on 21-HV-0001/0002 such that one is always open
and the other always closed Depict on P&ID
Action 166 Consider flow ratio alarm taken from 25-FY-0006
Action 167 Consider replacing TWs around GA-25-06/GA-25-02 with TIs
Action 168 Consider at least a TAH downstream of GC-21-03 and immediately u/s of the
junction to the on and off spec oil storage tanks In addition consider a TAHH
Action 169 Consider TAH on liquid outlet from VA-21-04
Action 170 Move spec break from 300 lb to 150lb system at 22-ESDV-0019
Action 171 Query function of 21-PSV-0011A/B

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Action 172 Consider over flow to bund for off spec oil storage tank with suitable lute to
preserve tank blanket gas. (This action also applies to the off spec condensate storage
tank)
Action 173 Bearing in mind the fuel gas supply pressure (7.5 bar) and the potential for
pressure control failure confirm that tank design pressure of 0.3 barg gives an adequate
safety margin. (This action also applies to the off spec condensate storage tank)
Action 174 Show connections from tank and boot to the atmospheric flare system instead
of LP flare as presently indicated on P&ID. (This action also applies to the off spec
condensate storage tank if Action 214 is accepted)
Action 175 Consider whether a pressure controlled inlet and outlet valve arrangement on
fixed roof storage tanks would be advantageous over the present arrangement of self
regulating valves.
Action 176 Indicate degassing boot on off spec tank(s) more clearly on P&ID and give at
least a special piping item number
Action 177 Consider whether the degassing boot on off spec tank(s) should be provided
as a pressure vessel with discharge to the LP flare system for better protection of the tank
and a safe location for gas blowby from the debutaniser. (refer also to action 214 ref: on
spec storage tank)
Action 178 Define means of treatment of oil contaminated with foam. eg. confirm that oil
may be reprocessed in the normal route via the stabiliser if it has been contaminated by
foam
Action 179 Consider whether a manually actuated foam injection on storage tanks system
would have any advantage over an automatic system
Action 180 Provide check valve on all incoming lines to condensate separator
Action 181 Consider gas blowby from any u/s source to VA-21-01 in the sizing criteria for
21-PSV-0002A/B
Action 182 Provide ESDV on condensate outlet from VA-21-01
Action 183 Confirm that chemical injection for anti-foam is not required at either slug
catcher or condensate separator
Action 184 Justify the presence of three level controllers in VA-21-01 when only one
interface and one total may seem to be required
Action 185 Consider LAH taken from 21-LIT-0009 to indicate high interface level in VA-
21-01
Action 186 Review potential for mercury and mercury compound accumulation within
produced water treatment and disposal facilities
Action 187 Confirm that the present arrangement for ratio flow control at CB-21-01 is
satisfactory eg. should 21-FIT-0003B be relocated to total flow u/s of junction to give better
flow control
Action 188 Review valving arrangements around exchangers GA-21-02 and GA-25-06 as
part of the general arrangements for maintenance and isolation of heat exchangers.
Action 189 Provide both LAL and LALL for VJ-21-02 (interface)
Action 190 Provide both LAH and LAHH for VJ-21-02 (interface)
Action 191 Review design of slug catcher to determine whether facilities can be provided
for hold up and access for removal of particulates before they are carried further in the
process.
Action 192 As condensate stabilisation column is isolated from compressor on closure of
ESDV-0003, control from column is lost. Provide suitable signal from pressure transmitter
(21-PIT-0025) u/s of compressor to send machine into recycle

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Action 193 Ensure that 21-PV-0017 is designated as fail open

Action 194 Consider un-loaders for off gas compressor control as part of the machine
selection process.
Action 195 Consider providing a restriction orifice on PG-21-040 to limit rate of rise of
pressure in this line
Action 196 Consider also local pressure gauge after restriction orifice to assist operator in
use of PG-21-040
Action 197 Ensure that VG-21-03 is designed for compressor KB-21-01 settle out
pressure
Action 198 Consider providing sight glass in line PL-21-029 to assist operator in draining
water from condensate stabilisation column
Action 199 Provide check valve in line from condensate stabiliser to VG-21-03 u/s of
junction of inlet from separator. Consider also check valve from separator in equivalent
position.
Action 200 Provide TAH and TAHH immediately d/s of KB-21-01 to protect machine from
high temperature
Action 201 Consider process gas temperature in the selection of the compressor KB-21-
01 both in materials of construction and type of compressor (eg. would centrifugal type be
more suitable). Alternatively a two stage machine with a drum and intercooler may be
required
Action 202 If temperature limitations affect choice of off gas compressor design away
from the present, consider a cooler u/s of VG-21-03
Action 203 Ensure that condensate separator PSV is sized for gas blowby from VD-25-01
and VD-25-07
Action 204 Consider check valve on line PL-21-028
Action 205 Consider providing check valve on PL-25-081 from deethaniser to debutaniser
Action 206 Confirm that flow from rerun condensate or oil pumps will not destabilise
condensate stabilisation column. (i.e that no operator throttling of flow at start up of pumps
is required)
Action 207 Provide check valve in PL-21-095
Action 208Confirm that VA-21-04 is not subject to over temperature from failure of 21-FV-
0009 open. Provide TAHH if necessary
Action 209 Consider providing bursting disc protection on tube side or design both sides
of GA-21-05 at same pressure
Action 210 Ensure that 21-PSV-0027A/B are sized for gas blowby from the debutaniser
Action 211 Provide suitable minimum flow return protection for pumps PA-21-02A/B
Action 212 As there are individual tank valves consider deleting the u/s valve 21-HV-0011
Action 213 Consider PAL taken from 21-PIT-0026
Action 214 Provide suitable protection from gas blowby (any u/s source) for on spec and
off spec condensate storage tanks (ref: action177 A simple arrangement like the
degassing boot on the off oil spec tank may not be adequate
Action 215 Move the check valve immediately u/s of 22-ESDV-0015, which itself should
be close to bund wall
Action 216 Add isolation valve at inlet to condensate storage tank. Applies to all other
storage tanks.
Action 217 Review required actions following actuation of TAHH-0029 for example
consider providing an ESDV u/s of VD-21-05 which should be closed on high temperature

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Action 218 Investigate what the correct lower design pressure for VD-21-05 should be
(whether it should be designed for vacuum)
Action 219 Consider reducing design pressure of VD-21-04 closer to its 0.5 barg
operating pressure and sizing PSVs for gas blowby
Action 220 Consider whether VD-21-05 can operate as shown on P&ID 12137. Consider
providing a fuel gas blanket supply to maintain a positive pressure within vessel.
Action 221 Review operating and trip level set points in VD-21-05 such that it may be
adequately shut down on high high level by closure of 25-ESDV-0006
Action 222 Provide inhibits for oil booster and export pumps from HVs (eg. 27-HV-0026)
on minimum flow returns from oil export and booster pumps such that pump cannot be
started if all HVs are closed. Also applies to inlet HVs eg. 22-HV-0030. This action applies
to equivalent valves in the condensate booster and export pumps system
Action 223 Query need for oil booster pumps given low delivery pressure requirements
Action 224 Confirm whether auto start of oil (and condensate) booster and export pump is
provided on loss of duty pump, and whether this is desirable.
Action 225 Provide check valve in each oil booster and export pump minimum flow return
line u/s of junction with header. (Applies to oil and condensate booster and export pumps.)
Action 226 As oil booster and export pump minimum flow return lines lead to storage
tanks, delete 22-TAHH-0009 as overheating will not occur in this large volume. Also
applies to 22-TAHH-0004 in condensate export system.
Action 227 Attention to a fire case at the oil and condensate export pumps should be fully
considered regarding SIL rating.
Action 228 Query function of 22-PSV-0037 and 22-PSV-0034A/B. (Also applies to 22-
PSV-0014 and 22-PSV-0011A/B in the condensate export system.)
Action 229 Ensure that an oil export back flow PSV is provided ideally close to export
point. Note that a similar PSV is not required for the condensate export line as the pipeline
has the same pressure rating as the plant export point.
Action 230 Review potential for overpressure due to thermal expansion of shut down of
oil or condensate pipeline and protect accordingly
Action 231 Provide oil export pig launcher with same pressure rating as export pipeline.
(Note this is presently 93 barg but is under review)
Action 232 Consider provision of inhibit of 22-HV-0024 such that oil re-run pumps cannot
be started unless valve is open. Note that this prevents rerouting of oil in on spec tank to
re-run without an override therefore consider as an alternative pump protection against this
scenario. Also applies to 22-HV-0012 for condensate re-run.
Action 233 In addition to preceding action provide a low low flow trip at discharge of oil
(PA-22-05A/B) and condensate (PA-22-02A/B) rerun pumps.
Action 234 Query function of 22- ESDV-0019. Depending on function could 22-ESDV-
0019 and 22-ESDV-0021 be replaced by a common ESDV d/s of the junction? (This may
require addition of check valves). Applies to 22-ESDV-0009/0010 on condensate re-run.
Action 235 Provide an equivalent valve to 22-HV-0014 (may be manual only) on the
supply to the condensate stabilisation column to enable use of the flow route from off spec
to on spec storage tank. Also applies to 22-HV-0002 on condensate re-run system.
Action 236 Provide a check valve on each minimum flow return from oil and condensate
re-run pumps
Action 237 At time of tank selection discuss with manufacturer potential for removal of/
dealing with excess vapour within an on spec floating tank due to incorrect product in tank.

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Action 238 Provide vibration monitoring and associated trips for the canned off spec
condensate re-run pumps. Applies to other canned pumps.
Action 239 Consider using one PIT for control of start up PV and main flow PVs, 45-PV-
0001A/B
Action 240 Consider leaving 24-PV-0009 (operating at a lower set point) permanently
available to the fuel gas system such that fuel gas supply is not lost in the event of 45 PV-
0001A/B failing closed.
Action 241 Consider using just one PV from the main fuel gas supply point instead of two
valves 45-PV-0001A/B.
Action 242 Consider removal of 45-ESDV-0001 as loss of blanket gas is an undesirable
event even in an emergency.
Action 243 Given that start up gas may be wet, check potential for hydrate formation
within the fuel gas system when using the start-up supply
Action 244 Ensure 45-PSV-0004A/B are sized for control valve 24-PV-0009 failure
Action 245 Provide temperature and pressure compensation of gas flow measuring
instruments and depict on P&IDs
Action 246 Provide suitable insulation on fuel gas distribution for condensation control.
Action 247 Consider independent low temperature TAL d/s of FE-45-01
Action 248 Provide independent TAH d/s of FE-45-01
Action 249 If flow loss to flare on spurious opening of 45-PV-0003 can be made up by
inlet PCV opening,consider some means of flow instrumentation to detect this situation.
Action 250 Ensure that the status of valves on manual depressurisation lines is consistent
across project (some valves as shown as closed whilst other have no indication)
Action 251 Include reverse flow from dryer system as a relief case in the sizing of 27-
PSV-0112A/B
Action 252 Ensure that closed drains drum connection to flare is designed to handle gas
blowby from VD-45-01
Action 253 Ensure the use of start up gas and change in Wobbe number is addressed
with the gas turbine vendor at point of selection.
Action 254 Ensure a suitable means is provided to address potential for condensation
within fuel gas distribution lines
Action 255 Provide 100% spare filter to MA-45-01 to allow for change over on line
Action 256 Consider servicing requirements for fuel gas superheater. In particular whether
a bypass could be useful or whether the item could be safely serviced online, in addition
take into account the results of the RAM study.
Action 257 As far as possible valves in a normally closed position are preferred to be
indicated with NC on P&IDs
Action 258 As 45-ESDV-0003 is protection against high high level in VD-45-03 only,
consider removing this valve and either a) rely only on an LAH or b) close inlet ESDVs to
VD-45-01 on LAHH in the LP drum.
Action 259 Consider providing nitrogen back up to the LP purge gas sent to flare. In
addition consider nitrogen back up for blanket gas users
Action 260 Consider nominating either 45-PIT-0005 or 0008 as “critical loop” and
removing the other. (i.e the function of both would be consolidated.)
Action 261 Consider PALs at remote points in LP fuel gas distribution header.
Action 262 Ensure 45-PSV-0006A/B are sized for control valve failure.

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Action 263 Ensure each LP fuel gas system user is provided with a check valve as
appropriate.
Action 264 Consider providing FALs on fuel gas supply to each header and/or lock open
valves at connection points.
Action 265 Remove LO valves on flare headers (LO valves at inlet to drum are acceptable
for maintenance of drum.)
Action 266 Review potential for hydrate formation on blowdown of process equipment u/s
of dryers. Consider the case where the equipment has been shut down for a period in cold
ambient conditions before a decision has been made to actuate blowdown.
Action 267 Consider locking open valves on nitrogen supply to all flare tips and within
nitrogen supply lines to safety critical users.
Action 268 Consider locking open the valves on the LP fuel gas supply to the pilot lines.
Action 269 Provide a suitably sized RO in the supply line of nitrogen to all flare tips.
Action 270 As far as possible requirements for protection from high noise levels from
PSVs and BDVs should be identified in FEED.
Action 271 Consider requirements for personnel protection insulation on HP flare drum
and accessible parts of the cold flare header.
Action 272 Consider changing materials of vapour line to HP flare from carbon steel to
stainless steel.
Action 273 Review design temperature of HP flare system to account for hot liquids from
the condensate stabiliser allowing for the 10 deg C margin to account for simulation errors
and the 20 deg C margin required by the design standards.
Action 274 If it is impractical to set the low low level trip above the actual level of the top
of the heating element in the HP flare drum, consider an interaction of level on the
temperature control within the vessel.
Action 275 Confirm whether PA-43-02 A/B are auto change over and if there is potential
to operate both pumps in the event of a high liquid level in the drum which is not
conducted away. Also applies to pumps from the LP and atmospheric flare drums.
Action 276 Ensure that valves required for inerting, draining etc. are shown on P&IDs at a
suitable stage of development.
Action 277 Provide the manual valve from header to the LP flare drum valve as LO
Action 278 Confirm that LP flare drum lower design temperature is acceptable to cover
credible cold flows from the closed drains drum
Action 279 Review potential for ice formation in the LP flare drum and protect accordingly
Action 280 Allowing for appropriate temperature margin confirm that the high design
temperature of the LP flare drum is compatible with discharge from condensate recovery
separator
Action 281 Review potential for loss of level through evaporation in LP, HP flare drums
and atmospheric drum and design accordingly
Action 282 As LAHH in any flare drum results in a plant shut down, review whether a
single instrument is acceptable. (eg. should a voting system be considered)
Action 283 Ensure that the atmospheric flare system is designed for gas blowby from the
debutaniser to both oil and condensate off spec storage tanks degassers.
Action 284 Ensure that the atmospheric flare system is able to withstand the temperature
of gas blowby from the debutaniser
Action 285 As an alternative or a supplement to an FALL consider providing a minimum
flow return for pumps PA-43-02A/B. Also applies to LP flare pumps and atmospheric flare
pumps.
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Action 286 Provide check valves at connection points from all vessels connected to the
closed drains header. Consider also for connections to cold drains header.
Action 287 Consider and justify extent to which mal-operation causing low or high
temperature or high velocity can be catered for in the design of the closed drains system.
Action 288 Ensure that closed drains drum and headers are designed for the maximum
credible temperature from a vessel under manual drainage.
Action 289 Provide personnel protection on accessible parts of the closed drains drum
and headers.
Action 290 Ensure that the line from the closed drains drum to the LP flare drum is sized
for relief from fire affecting the closed drains drum.
Action 291 Review effect of gas blowby from all sources to the closed drains drum on the
design of the LP flare system.
Action 292 Raise design pressure of VD-57-01 to 10 barg. Also applies to VD-57-02
Action 293 Procedures should cover pump out of pits following heavy rain.
Action 294 Provide suitable facilities in the design of the VD-57-01 to allow manual
drainage of last liquid content prior to maintenance.
Action 295 Consider means of protecting closed drains pumps against solids within the
closed drains drum either by direct protection or by specification of pumps.
Action 296 Ensure that the closed drains drum sits in sufficiently high saddles to allow
external inspection within the pit.
Action 297 Review design pressure philosophy to ensure that the design pressure of the
LP flare KO drum pumps is in alignment. Also applies to HP flare drum pumps and
atmospheric flare drum pumps.
Action 298 Consider a minimum flow bypass for the pump PA-57-01A/B back to the drum
to supplement or replace 57-FALL-0002. This arrangement could be used to run a flow of
liquid back to the drum to enable the operator to sample the fluid before deciding its
destination. Also applies to cold drains drum.
Action 299 Consider using an interlock on the valves from VD-57-01 to either FP-43-01 or
VA-21-01. Also applies to cold drains drum
Action 300 Ensure gas detection is provided to detect leaks in closed and cold drains pits
Action 301 Review potential for ice within stagnant section of piping to the burn pit and
protect accordingly.
Action 302 Based on a consideration of the maximum credible temperature within the
closed drains drum, provide protection against damage to the condensate separator
and/or burn pit.
Action 303 Provide removable spool on outlet of pumps PA-57-01A/B to allow removal for
maintenance, also applies to cold drains drum.
Action 304 Design basis for drainage to cold drains drum and closed drains drum to be
incorporated as a basis for operational procedures (eg starting the maximum number of
concurrent drainage operations)
Action 305 Ensure 57-LALL-0001 trips heater FE-57-01 as well as pumps PA-57-02A/B.
Action 306 Consider a second high high level alarm to warn the operator of high level on
the cold drains drum (note that though the P&ID shows an LAHH there is no trip action
identified)
Action 307 Ensure that the LP flare system is specified such that it will burn C3 and C4
rich gas satisfactorily from the cold drains drum.
Action 308 Investigate whether a top entry heater (FE-57-01) is feasible on the cold drains
drum. Alternatively consider heater pads mounted externally.
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Action 309 As drainage is controlled manually, cold drains drum pumps are inhibited on
cold liquid and most liquid would evaporate in drum, consider whether a simpler system
without a heater and a single pump manually operated could be used instead. This would
require vigilant attention to the level in the drum.
Action 310 As most fluids sent to VD-57-02 may evaporate determine the credible range
of liquids that pumps PA-57-02A/B may be required to pump and specify accordingly.
Action 311 Subject to permitted isolation considerations, consider use of a globe valve to
control flow from vessels to cold or closed drains.
Action 312 Consider extending personnel protection against cold on cold drain lines some
meters beyond second ball valve.
Action 313 Consider providing personnel protection against high temperatures some
metres down stream of the second ball valve on the closed drain line for high temperature
vessels.
Action 314 It is noted that the compressor suction scrubbers have two lines to closed
drain (operational and maintenance) whereas the fuel gas scrubbers have only one. Make
consistent and for preference show two separate lines to drain.
Action 315 Consider PDI possibly with alarm across the inlet strainer to PF-44-02
Action 316 Relocate NRV on oil pump discharge from API separator to a point d/s of the
junction with the recycle line. Slope line to drains header d/s of check valve
Action 317 Ensure that the API separator hazardous area classification is appropriately
selected and design any gas detection in the area of the API separator is selected
accordingly.
Action 318 Provide check valve on recycle line on oil pump from API separator
Action 319 Ensure that isolation arrangements on relief and blowdown systems conform
to the isolation philosophy.
Action 320 Review whether hydrate formation is credible d/s of any valve connected to
the HP flare system in the event of that valve passing.
Action 321 Show means of positive isolation between any slug catcher and flare relief
devices eg. removable spool or spacer. Review all systems connected to flare to ensure
these devices are provided
Action 322 Provide and ESDV on line 44-010 from debutaniser
Action 323 For consistency and because of 44-LALL-0004 on the condensate side of VA-
44-01, determine whether there should be an ESDV on the condensate outlet or consider
deletion of the low low trip (44-LALL-0004) as there is no major consequence foreseen on
loss of level.
Action 324 Where ESDVs are provided on liquid outlets on low pressure vessels on the
plant, and where loss of level does not create undue hazard, consider whether such
ESDVs could be deleted. Eg. VD-45-03 on P&ID 12171.
Action 325 Ensure that line from VA-44-01 to flare is sized for gas blowby from the
condensate separator.
Action 326 Ensure that line from VA-44-01 to flare is sized for gas blowby from the
debutaniser. Also applies to all other vessels connected to the inlet of the produced water
separator. In addition size inlet header accordingly for gas blowby.
Action 327 Ensure that level indication in water boot of VD-25-05 is visible from manual
drain valve position.
Action 328 Consider check valves on each 28 bar design pressure source feeding
produced water separator inlet header

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Action 329 Since blockages are possible within the produced water separator inlet
header, review pressure rating of the header as far as the LO valve. Alternatively consider
bringing different pressure sources into VA-44-01 via separate headers. Assessment of
this action will depend on how credible blockages are deemed to be.
Action 330 Review whether a block valve is required along side globe valve on LV
bypasses d/s of VA-44-01 to provide positive isolation prior to moving spec blinds.
Action 331 Determine the likely method by which methanol would be transported to site
and ensure that a safe means of filling is allowed for in the design. Also applies to diesel
tank
Action 332 All methanol injection points should be similarly designed. Specifically each
should be provided with a rotameter and needle valve to adjust flow.
Action 333 Review whether the drain valve d/s of spectacle blind on VD-42-01 outlet is
required.
Action 334 Given the 83 bar pressure differential across 42-PV-0004, consider use of an
RO in the recycle line.
Action 335 Ensure that double check valves at edge of methanol injection skid are of
dissimilar types and PSVs are sized for back flow.
Action 336 Consider designing VD-42-01 for full vacuum.
Action 337 Consider providing check valve d/s of 42-PV-0002B
Action 338 Refer to action 331. 42-PSV-0003 to be sized for closed in loading pump
pressure unless other means of protection are provided on the loading line. Note that this
could require 42-PSV-0003 be designed for liquid relief.
Action 339 Consider providing ESDV on outlet of VD-42-01 operated on low low level
and/or by “panic button” and/or fusible links operated by fire.
Action 340 Provide bund around methanol drum sized for drum contents. Fill connection
should be above bunded area.
Action 341 Ensure that level gauge on VD-42-01 or a repeat signal is visible at fill point. In
addition consider flashing light as a supplement to the audible alarm. Also applies to diesel
tank filling.
Action 342 Consider means of sampling delivered product prior to allowing it to be sent to
drum. Also applies to diesel tank.
Action 343 Show spec break between nitrogen line and VD-42-01 as trim on drum is
stainless steel
Action 344 Provide double block and bleed arrangement u/s of 42-PV-0006.
Action 345 Consider relocating 42-FI-0002 and flow meters at any other injection point
local to methanol injection skid. Provide double block and bleed d/s of flow meters. (For
operability reasons this is preferred at injection point rather than close to flow meter.)
Action 346 Show fill line on methanol drum as a dip tube going below liquid level and
provide an electrical continuity connection possibly interlocked with a fill valve such that
filing is not permissible without this system being connected.
Action 347 Consider draining requirements of all drum or tank fill lines bearing in mind the
hazards of the fluid in question.
Action 348 Consider a local PDI across diesel transfer pump strainer to indicate blockage.
Action 349 Provide bird/insect screen on diesel storage tank vent
Action 350 Consider an inlet filter on the fill line to RA-62-01
Action 351 Consider some means of re-circulating diesel through a filter or other device to
clean up product.

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Action 352 For greater reliability, consider two online pressure controlled valves with
different set pressures.
Action 353 Consider closing ESDVs on plant air and nitrogen on a single actuation of a
low low pressure trip on the instrument air receiver to maintain instrument air as long as
possible.
Action 354 Consider automatic shut down from 63-PALL-0007A/B/C (2oo3 voting) rather
than an operator permissive.
Action 355 Consider providing a check valve immediately d/s of 64-PV-0004
Action 356 Consider check valves provided on all essential nitrogen users eg. supply to
flare tips.
Action 357 Justify LC designation of valve on VL-64-03 bypass (rather than NC) and LO
designation on outlet from UN-64-01
Action 358 Consider suitable means of protection of nitrogen headers from overpressure
from nitrogen bottles, eg. PSV on nitrogen supply header
Action 359 Provide suitable drain valve eg. bypass around float valve. Valve and drain to
be located such that in mal-operation operator will not be exposed to nitrogen cloud
Action 360 Locate nitrogen generator vent with due regard to prevailing wind and high risk
areas. (air intakes or discharge near fire risk areas)
Action 361 Ensure that air and nitrogen facilities are sized for future plant or capable of
expansion
Action 362 Review necessity for LO valves on nitrogen essential users header and
individual supply lines.

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APPENDIX A – MLE HAZOP ATTENDANCE LIST

NAME Week 1 (17-21 September 2007)

17th 18th 19th 20th 21st
John Shorey Chairman-GOGC X X X X X
Shaina Thomas Secretary-GOGC X X X X X
John Campbell-GOGC X X (PT)
Kevin Walsh-GOGC X X X (PT)
Andrew Laffey-GOGC X (PT) X
David Aggarwal-GOGC
Len Dickins-GOGC X X X X X
John Veale-GOGC X
Alex Mutch-GOGC X X (PT)
Sam Richardson-GOGC X X (PT)
Andrew Emanuel-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Michael Carr-Sonatrach/FCP
Martin Taylor-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Paul Hochhausen-Sonatrach/FCP X X X (PT)
George Baches-Sonatrach/FCP
Philip Hardy-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT) X
Boukhous Abdelkader-
Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Rebouh Mohamed-Sonatrach/FCP X X X
Younsi M'hamed-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Mohamed Lansari-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Krouchi Mouloud-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT) X (PT)

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NAME Week 2 (24-28 September 2007)

24th 25th 26th 27th 28th
John Shorey Chairman-GOGC X X X X X
Shaina Thomas Secretary-GOGC X X X X X
John Campbell-GOGC X (PT) X X (PT)

Kevin Walsh-GOGC X (PT) X X (PT)

Andrew Laffey-GOGC X (PT) X (PT)
David Aggarwal-GOGC
Len Dickins-GOGC X X
John Veale-GOGC
Alex Mutch-GOGC X (PT)
Sam Richardson-GOGC
Andrew Emanuel-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Michael Carr-Sonatrach/FCP
Martin Taylor-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Paul Hochhausen-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT)
George Baches-Sonatrach/FCP
Philip Hardy-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT)
Boukhous Abdelkader-
Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Rebouh Mohamed-Sonatrach/FCP
Younsi M'hamed-Sonatrach/FCP X X X
Mohamed Lansari-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X X
Krouchi Mouloud-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT)

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NAME Week 3 (1-5 October 2007)

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
John Shorey Chairman-GOGC X X X X
Shaina Thomas Secretary-GOGC X X X X
John Campbell-GOGC X (PT) X (PT)
Kevin Walsh-GOGC X (PT) X (PT)
Andrew Laffey-GOGC X X X (PT)
David Aggarwal-GOGC X (PT)
Len Dickins-GOGC
John Veale-GOGC
Alex Mutch-GOGC
Sam Richardson-GOGC
Andrew Emanuel-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X
Michael Carr-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT)
Martin Taylor-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X
Paul Hochhausen-Sonatrach/FCP
George Baches-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT)
Philip Hardy-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT)
Boukhous Abdelkader-
Sonatrach/FCP X X X X
Rebouh Mohamed-Sonatrach/FCP
Younsi M'hamed-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT)
Mohamed Lansari-Sonatrach/FCP X X X X (PT)
Krouchi Mouloud-Sonatrach/FCP

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Name Week 4 (8-10 October 2007)

8th 9th 10th
John Shorey Chairman-GOGC X X X
Shaina Thomas Secretary-GOGC X X X
John Campbell-GOGC
Kevin Walsh-GOGC
Andrew Laffey-GOGC
David Aggarwal-GOGC X X X
Len Dickins-GOGC
John Veale-GOGC
Alex Mutch-GOGC
Sam Richardson-GOGC
Andrew Emanuel-Sonatrach/FCP
Michael Carr-Sonatrach/FCP X X X
Martin Taylor-Sonatrach/FCP X (PT) X X
Paul Hochhausen-Sonatrach/FCP
George Baches-Sonatrach/FCP X X X
Philip Hardy-Sonatrach/FCP
Boukhous Abdelkader-
Sonatrach/FCP X X
Rebouh Mohamed-Sonatrach/FCP
Younsi M'hamed-Sonatrach/FCP X
Mohamed Lansari-Sonatrach/FCP X X X
Krouchi Mouloud-Sonatrach/FCP

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 SONATRACH / FCP
HAZOP Report
Menzel Ledjmet East

APPENDIX B – MLE HAZOP WORKSHEETS

Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd Page 29 Date: Oct 07

File name: 20011 – HAZOP Report Revision: B1