Risk Assessment Report of Prakash Industries Limited

Risk Assessment

Introduction
Hazard analysis involves the identification and quantification of the various hazards (unsafe
conditions) that exist in the proposed power plant operations. On the other hand, risk
analysis deals with the recognition and computation of risks, the equipment in the plant and
personnel are prone to, due to accidents resulting from the hazards present in the plant.
Risk analysis follows an extensive hazard analysis. It involves the identification and
assessment of risks the neighbouring populations are exposed to as a result of hazards
present. This requires a thorough knowledge of failure probability, credible accident
scenario, vulnerability of population etc. Much of this information is difficult to get or
generate. Consequently, the risk analysis is often confined to maximum credible accident
studies.
Approach
Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accidents consisting of an
event or sequence of events. The risk assessment study covers the following:
 Identification of potential hazard areas
 Identification of representative failure cases
 Visualization of the resulting scenarios in terms of fire (thermal radiation) and
explosion
 Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the
impact zones from the accidental scenarios;
 Assess the overall suitability of the site from hazard minimization and disaster
mitigation point of view
 Furnish specific recommendations on the minimization of the worst accident
possibilities
 Preparation of broad Disaster Management Plan (DMP), On-site and Off-site
Emergency Plan, which includes Occupational and Health Safety Plan.
Hazard Identification:
Identification of hazards in the proposed power plant is of primary significance in the
analysis, quantification and cost effective control of accidents involving chemicals and
process. A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the characteristic of
system/plant/process that presents potential for an accident. Hence, all the components of a
system/plant/process need to be thoroughly examined, to assess their potential for initiating
or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of events, which can be termed as an
accident. The following two methods for hazard identification have been employed in the
study:

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 Identification of major hazardous units based on Manufacture, Storage and Import of

Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 of Government of India (GOI Rules, 1989)
 Identification of hazardous units and segments of plants and storage units based on
relative ranking technique, viz. Fire-Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE&TI).
Classification of Major Hazardous Units
Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes; namely flammable
substances, unstable substances and toxic substances. The ratings for a large number of
chemicals based on flammability, reactivity and toxicity have been given in NFPA Codes 49
and 345 M. The major hazardous materials to be stored, transported, handled and utilized
within the facility have been summarized in the Table 1. The fuel storage details and
properties are given in Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 1: Hazardous Materials Proposed to be Stored / Transported

Materials Hazardous Properties

LDO Dangerous Goods class 3 - Flammable Liquid

Table 2: Category Wise Schedule of Storage Tanks

S. No. Material No. of Tanks Design Capacity (KL)
1 LDO 2 10 Kl for 2x100 MW
25 l for 2x150 MW

Table 3: Properties of Fuels in the Plant

Chemical Codes/Label TLV FBP MP FP UEL LEL
0
C %
3
LDO Flammable 5 mg/m 350 26 66 6.0 0.5

Identification of Major Hazard Installations Based on GOI Rules, 1989

Following accidents in the chemical industry in India over a few decades, a specific
legislation covering major hazard activities has been enforced by Govt. of India in 1989 in
conjunction with Environment Protection Act, 1986. This is referred here as GOI Rules 1989.
For the purpose of identifying major hazard installations the rules employ certain criteria
based on toxic, flammable and explosive properties of chemicals. A systematic analysis of
the fuels/chemicals and their quantities of storage has been carried out, to determine
threshold quantities as notified by GOI Rules, 1989 and the applicable rules are identified,
Applicability of storage rules are summarized in Table 4.

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Table 4: Applicability of GOI Rules to Fuel / Chemical Storage

S. No. Chemical/Fuel Listed in Total Threshold Quantity (T) for
Schedule Quantity Application Rules
(KL)
5,7-9,13-15 10-12

1 LDO 3 (1) 10 KL for 500 MT 50,000 MT

2x100 MW
and 25 KL

Hazard Assessment and Evaluation

An assessment of the conceptual design is conducted for the purpose of identifying and
examining hazards related to feed stock materials, major process components, utility and
support systems, environmental factors, proposed operations, facilities, and safeguards.

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

A preliminary hazard analysis is carried out initially to identify the major hazards associated
with storages and the processes of the plant. This is followed by consequence analysis to
quantify these hazards. Finally, the vulnerable zones are plotted for which risk reducing
measures are deduced and implemented. Preliminary hazard analysis for fuel storage area
and whole plant is given in Table 5 and Table 6. It is observed in Table 4 that the storage
quantity of LDO is 1500 MT against threshold requirement of application of Rules 5, 7-9 &
13-15 being 5000 MT. In view of the storage quantity being very less for application of rules
– 5, 7-9 & 13-15 as under Column 3 of part II of Schedule 3 of Manufacture, Storage and
Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules 1989, the Rules are not applicable for LDO storage
though LDO is considered as a flammable liquid. Hence, Onsite/ Off-site Emergency Plan
need not be prepared for the fuel storage tanks. MSDS of LDO have been provided here.
The same will be displayed in the oil storage area. Though On-site Emergency Plan is not
required to be prepared under Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical
Rules 1989, to conform to Sec. 41 ‘B’ of Factories Act 1948 the same will be prepared.

Table 5: Preliminary Hazard Analysis for the Storage Areas

Unit Capacity (KL) Hazard Identified

LDO 10 KL for 2x100 MW and Fire/Explosion

25 KL for2x150 MW

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Table 6: Preliminary Hazard Analysis for the Whole Plant in General

Description of Plausible
PHA Category Recommendation Provision
Hazard
Environmental If there is any Explosion and All electrical fittings
factors leakage in electrical flameproof and cables are
cable and fittings fittings as per provided as per
which may specified standards the specified
eventually become should be provided. standards. All
source of ignition. motor starters are
flame proof.
Environmental Highly inflammable A well designed fire Fire extinguisher of
factors nature of the liquid protection including small size and big
fuels may cause fire foam, dry powder, size are provided at
hazard in the storage and CO2 extinguisher all potential fire
facility. should be provided. hazard places. In
addition to the
above, fire hydrant
network is also
provided.

Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE&TI) Approach

Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Indexing (FE & TI) is a rapid ranking method for identifying the
degree of hazard. The application of FE & TI would help to make a quick assessment of the
nature and quantification of the hazard in these areas. However, this does not provide
precise information. The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical
value of F&EI as per the criteria given in Table 7.

Table 7: Definition of Degree Hazard

F & EI Range Degree of Hazard

0-60 Light

61-96 Moderate

97-127 Intermediate

128-158 Heavy

159and above Severe

By comparing the indices F&EI and TI, the unit in question is classified into one of the
following three categories established for the purpose as given in Table 8.

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Table 8: Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index

Category F & EI Toxicity Index (TI)

I F&EI < 65 TI < 6

II 65 < or = F&EI < 95 6 < OR = TI < 10

III F&EI > or = 95 TI > OR = 10

Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the
three hazard categories.

Results of FE and TI for Storage/Process Units:

Based on the GOI Rules 1989, the hazardous fuels used by the proposed power plant were
identified. Fire and Explosion are the likely hazards, which may occur due to the fuel
storage. Hence, Fire and Explosion index has been calculated for in plant storage.
Estimates of FE&TI are given in Table 9.

Table 9: F&EI and TI for Storage Unit

Total
S. No. Chemical/Fuel F&EI Category TI Category
Capacity (KL)
1 LDO 10 KL for 2.6 Light Nil -
2x100 MW &
25 KL

Conclusion
Results of FE & TI analysis show that the storage of LDO falls into Light category of fire
and explosion index with a Nil toxicity index.

Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA)

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures or catastrophes, causing
possible damage to the surrounding area. This section deals with the question of how the
consequences of the release of such substances and the damage to the surrounding area
can be determined by means of models. Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be
identified taking recourse to MCA analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques
to identify the hazards and calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of
heat radiation, toxic releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential
accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the
hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the
effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the

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surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. The reason
and purpose of consequence analysis are many folds like:
 Part of Risk Assessment
 Plant Layout/Code Requirements
 Protection of other plants
 Protection of the public
 Emergency Planning
 Design Criteria
The results of consequence analysis are useful for getting information about all known and
unknown effects that are of importance when some failure scenario occurs in the plant and
also to get information as how to deal with the possible catastrophic events. It also gives the
workers in the plant and people living in the vicinity of the area, an understanding of their
personal situation.
Damage Criteria
The fuel storage and unloading at the storage facility may lead to fire and explosion
hazards. The damage criteria due to an accidental release of any hydrocarbon arise from
fire and explosion. The vapors of these fuels are not toxic and hence no effects of toxicity
are expected. Tank fire would occur if the radiation intensity is high on the peripheral surface
of the tank leading to increase in internal tank pressure. Pool fire would occur when fuels
collected in the dyke due to leakage gets ignited.

Fire Damage
A flammable liquid in a pool will burn with a large turbulent diffusion flame. This releases
heat based on the heat of combustion and the burning rate of the liquid. A part of the heat is
radiated while the rest is carried away by convection of rising hot air and combustion
products. The radiations can heat the contents of a nearby storage or process unit to above
its ignition temperature and thus result in a spread of fire. The radiations can also cause
severe burns or fatalities of workers or fire fighters located within a certain distance. Hence,
it will be important to know beforehand the damage potential of a flammable liquid pool likely
to be created due to leakage or catastrophic failure of a storage or process vessel. This will
help to decide the location of other storage/process vessels, decide the type of protective
clothing the workers/fire fighters, the duration of time for which they can be in the zone, the
fire extinguishing measures needed and the protection methods needed for the nearby
storage/process vessels. The damage effect on equipment and people due to thermal
radiation intensity is given in Table 10. Similarly, the effect of incident radiation intensity and
exposure time on lethality is given in Table 11.

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Table 10: Damage due to Incident Radiation Intensities

Type of Damage Intensity
Incident Radiation
S. No. 2 Damage to Equipment Damage to People
(kW/m )

Damage to process 100% lethality in 1 min. 1%

1. 37.5
equipment lethality in 10 sec.
Minimum energy required to
25.0 ignite wood at indefinitely 100% lethality in 1 min.
2. long exposure without a Significant injury in10 sec.
flame
Minimum energy required for
3. 12.5 piloted ignition of wood, 1% lethality in 1 min. First
melting plastic tubing degree burns in 10 sec.

4. 4.0 -- Causes pain if duration is

longer than 20 sec,
however blistering
is un-likely(First degree
burns)
5. 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on
long exposures

Table 11: Radiation Exposure and Lethality

Radiation Intensity Exposure Time Degree of Burns
Lethality (%)
(KW/m2) (Seconds)
No discomfort even after
1.6 -- 0
long exposures
st
4.5 20 0 1
st
4.5 50 0 1
st
8.0 20 0 1
rd
8.0 50 <1 3
rd
8.0 60 <1 3
nd
12.0 20 <1 2
rd
12.0 50 8 3
12.5 Inst 10 --
25.0 Inst 50 --

37.5 Inst 100 --

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Scenarios Considered for MCA Analysis

Fuel Storage
The details of storage in the proposed power plant are given in Table 2. In case of fuel
released in the area catching fire, a steady state fire will occur. Failures in pipeline may
occur due to corrosion and mechanical defect. Failure of pipeline due to external
interference is not considered as this area is licensed area and all the work within this area
is closely supervised with trained personnel.

Modeling Scenarios
Based on the storage and consumption of various fuels the following failure scenarios for
the proposed power plant have been identified for MCA analysis and the scenarios are
discussed in Table 12. The fuel properties considered in modeling are given in Table 13.

Table 12: Scenario Considered for MCA Analysis

S. No.
Fuel/Chemical Total Quantity Scenario Considered

10 KL for 2x100 MW
1 Failure of LDO Tank Pool Fire
and 25 KL

Table 13: Properties of Fuels considered for Modeling

S. No. 0 Density
Fuel/Chemical Molecular Weight Boiling Point ( C) 3
(kg/m )

1 Failure of LDO Tank 114.24 400 880

Conclusions on MCA analysis

LDO Tank:
There will be two LDO storage tanks of 10 KL for 2x100 MW & 25 KL The results of MCA
analysis indicate that the maximum damage distances for 12.5-Kw/m2 thermal radiations
extends upto 13.845 m in the case of one full tank of LDO is on fire during worst
meteorological conditions. As the fire resistant dyke walls will be created, no cumulative
effect of one tank form on fire to create fire on other tank farm is envisaged.
Coal Handling Plant – Coal Dust Explosion
Coal dust when dispersed in air and ignited would explode. Crusher house and conveyor
systems are most susceptible to this hazard. To be explosive, the dust mixture should
have:
 Particles dispersed in the air with minimum size (typical figure is 400 microns);
 Dust concentrations must be reasonably uniform; and
 Minimum explosive concentration for coal dust (33% volatiles) is 50 gm/m3.

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Failure of dust extraction and suppression systems may lead to abnormal conditions and
may increase the concentration of coal dust to the explosive limits. Sources of ignition
present are incandescent bulbs with the glasses of bulkhead fittings missing, electric
equipment and cables, friction, spontaneous combustion in accumulated dust.
Dust explosions may occur without any warnings with Maximum Explosion Pressure up to
6.4 bars. Another dangerous characteristic of dust explosions is that it sets off secondary
explosions after the occurrence of the initial dust explosion. Many a times the secondary
explosions are more damaging than primary ones. The dust explosions are powerful enough
to destroy structures, kill or injure people and set dangerous fires likely to damage a large
portion of the Coal Handling Plant including collapse of its steel structure which may cripple
the lifeline of the power plant.
Stockpile areas shall be provided with automatic garden type sprinklers for dust suppression
as well as to reduce spontaneous ignition of the coal stockpiles. Necessary water
distribution network for drinking and service water with pumps, piping, tanks, valves etc will
be provided for distributing water at all transfer points, crusher house, control rooms etc.
Height of the coal stock pile should be maintained the specified standard so as to avoid
auto-ignition of coal in the storage yard.
A centralized control room with microprocessor based control system (PLC) has been
envisaged for operation of the coal handling plant. Except for locally controlled equipment
like traveling tripper, dust extraction / dust suppression / ventilation equipment, sump
pumps, water distribution system etc, all other inline equipment will be controlled from the
central control room but will have provision for local control as well. For all necessary
interlocks, control panels, MCC’s, mimic diagrams etc will be provided for safe and reliable
operation of the coal handling plant.
Control Measures for Coal Yards
The total quantity of coal shall be stored in separate stockpiles, with proper drains around to
collect washouts during monsoon season. Water sprinkling system shall be installed on
stocks of coal in required scales to prevent spontaneous combustion and consequent fire
hazards. The stock geometry shall be adopted to maintain minimum exposure of stock pile
areas towards predominant wind direction.
Identification of Hazardous
The various hazards associated, with the plant process apart from fuel storage have been
identified and are outlined in Table 14.

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Table 14: Properties of Fuels considered for Modeling

S. No. Hazard Hazard Safeguard Measures
Blocks/Area Hazard
Potential Identified
Coal stacking should
Fire may occur be done adopting
due to excessive standard
Coal Fire,
heat during practice to avoid
1 storage in Spontaneous
summer, if coal Moderate autoignition. Fire
open yard Combustion
is not stacked hydrants will be
properly. provided in the
coal yard at suitable
locations.
The equipments and
conveying system in
Coal
the CHP should be
handling
Fire and/or properly
plant Generation of
2 Dust maintained to avoid
including coal dust and Moderate
Explosions fugitive emission.
Bunker dust explosion
Suitable dust
area
extraction
system will be
provided.
Splinters of Burners should be
Fire(mainly near explosion may properly maintained
oil burners), heat other and operated to avoid
3 Steam equipments/ spillage of oil as well
Boilers Major
Explosion, Fuel buildings & as to ensure proper
Explosion cause fuel air
extensive ratio.
damage.
Fires in – Lube oil system
a) Lube oil should be made leak
systems proof by preventive
b) Cable maintenance. Good
galleries house keeping in the
Steam
4 c) Short circuits Fire may area should be
Turbine
in: propagate and ensured. The cable
Generator Major
. i) Control spread over to rakes should be de-
Buildings
Rooms other areas dusted periodically
ii) Switch-gears and inspected for any
Explosion due to leakage in the
leakage of insulation.
Hydrogen & fire
following it.
Switchyard Fire in cable Fire may The cable rakes
5
Control galleries and Moderate propagate due should be de-dusted
Room Switchgear/ to electric periodically and

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Control sparks to inspected for any

Room other areas. leakage in the
insulation.
Dyke wall should be of
adequate height. The
inter tank distances in
the tank farm should
be
maintained as per
Pool Fire/Fire design norms. The
Fire may
ball may occur tank farm area will be
LDO Tank propagate and
6 incase of direct barricaded with sign
Farms Major spread over to
contact with board preventing use
other areas.
flame. of
naked fire. Adequate
number of fire hydrant
points will be provided
and static fire hydrant
guns pointing towards
the tanks also to be
provided.

Hazardous Events with Greatest Contribution to Fatality Risk

The hazardous event scenarios likely to make the greatest contribution to the risk of
potential fatalities are summarized in Table 15. ‘Onsite facility’ refers to the operating site at
plant site, whereas ‘offsite facility’ refers to transport and handling systems, which are away
from the operating site.

Table 15: Hazardous Events Contributing to Risk at On-Site Facility

Risk
Hazardous Events Consequence of Interest
Rank
Onsite vehicle impact on Potential for single fatalities, onsite
3
personnel impact only
Entrapment/struck by Potential for single fatalities, onsite
3
Machinery impact only
Potential for single fatalities, onsite
Fall from heights 3
impact only
Potential for single fatalities, onsite
Electrocution 3
impact only
Potential for multiple fatalities,
Storage tank rupture and fire 3
onsite impact only

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Risk Assessment Summary

The preliminary risk assessment has been completed for the proposed power plant and
associated facilities and the broad conclusions are as follows:
 There will be no significant community impacts or environmental damage
consequences; and
 The hazardous event scenarios and risks in general at this facility can be adequately
managed to acceptable levels by performing the recommended safety studies as
part of detailed design, applying recommended control strategies and implementing
a Safety Management System.
Risk Reduction Opportunities
The following opportunities shall be considered as a potential means of reducing identified
risks during the detailed design phase:
 Buildings and plant structures shall be designed for cyclone floods and seismic
events to prevent structural collapse and integrity of weather (water) proofing for
storage of dangerous goods;
 Provision for adequate water capacity to supply fire protection systems and critical
process water;
 Isolate people from load carrying/mechanical handling systems, vehicle traffic and
storage and stacking locations;
 Installation of fit-for-purpose access ways and fall protection systems to facilitate
safe access to fixed and mobile plant;
 Provision and integrity of process tanks, waste holding tanks and bunded areas as
per relevant standards;
 Containment of hazardous materials;
 Security of facility to prevent unauthorized access to plant, introduction of prohibited
items and control of onsite traffic; and
 Development of emergency response management systems commensurate with site
specific hazards and risks (fire, explosion, rescue and first aid).
Effect of the fire Accident on the Surrounding On-site Activities
As per the modeling study the radiation effect due to fire having intensity of 37.5 KW/M2
will be felt upto 8.23 mtrs in case of LDO. This intensity of radiation can damage equipment.
However, no installation of the plant is within this radius. So there will be no damage to the
equipment. The radiation effect of intensity 12.5 KW/M2 will be felt upto a distance of 13.84
mtrs in case of LDO. The radiation of this intensity can melt plastics. However, there is no
installation in the plant within this limit of distance. Hence no damage will take place. The
threshold limit of 4.5 Kw/M2 will be felt upto a distance of 22.4 mtrs in case of LDO. This

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radiation intensity causes pain if a person is unable to reach cover within 20 sec. The
adjoining facilities of the storage space are cooling tower, empty temporary storage space,
site for proposed FGD, green belt area and the fire station. All the facilities as mentioned
above except green belt are more than 24mtrs distance from the place of occurrence fire.
Hence, there will not be any impact on the nearby facilities and no activity will be affected.

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