1

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-55624. November 19, 1982.]

BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, FIRST DIVISION, LABOR ARBITER BENIGNO
AYSON and JIMMY SAJONAS, respondents.

Guillermo B. Bondonil for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent NLRC.
Mauricio G. Domogan for respondent Sajonas.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner filed an application for clearance to terminate the services

of private respondent with the Ministry of Labor, Baguio Office, for willful
breach of trust, dishonesty and intimidation of co-employees. Conciliation
proceedings were conducted after which private respondent was
suspended and the case was submitted for compulsory arbitration. In his
position paper which was passed upon by the Labor Arbiter, petitioner
submitted its case on the basis of the complete records of the conciliation
proceedings which is comprised of investigation of witnesses. Private
respondent, who opposed petitioner's application did not appear during
the arbitration proceedings. However, he was represented by some union
members and was allowed by the Labor Arbiter to file a last minute position
paper without requiring a copy to be served upon petitioner. The Labor
Arbiter, without calling for the records submitted to the conciliator, denied
the application for clearance for insufficiency of evidence and ordered
petitioner to reinstate private respondent without loss of seniority rights.
On appeal, the Commission dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the present recourse of petitioner's alleging
denial of due process.
The Supreme Court held that it was a denial of elementary principles
of fair play for the Commission not to have ordered the elevation of the
entire records of the case with the affidavits earlier submitted as part of the
position paper but completely ignored by the Labor Arbiter; and that the
loss of trust and confidence and the wedge driven into the relationship of
the private respondent with both management and his co-employees
warrant the grant of clearance to terminate his employment.
Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside and the appropriate
office of the Labor Ministry ordered to grant the application for clearance
to terminate.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL; BOUND BY

FUNDAMENTAL AND ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS; CASE
AT BAR. — As pointed out by petitioner, "while an administrative tribunal
possessed of quasi-judicial powers is free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process" (Serrano vs. PSC, 24 SCRA 867; Singco vs.
COMELEC, 101 SCRA 420). Thus, in the case at bar, since the case was
decided on the basis of position papers, the petitioner had a right to be
served a copy of the respondent's position paper admitted and considered
by the arbiter and an opportunity to introduce evidence to refute it.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
IGNORING EVIDENCE WHICH FORMS PART OF RECORDS OF THE CASE. —
Where the petitioner specifically stressed to the arbiter that it was
"adopting the investigations which were enclosed with the application to
terminate, which are now parts of the record of the Ministry of Labor, as
part and parcel of this position paper. "but the arbiter, instead of calling for
the records submitted to the conciliator in the same small Baguio office,
denied the application for clearance on the ground that all that was before
it was a position paper with mere quotations about an investigation
conducted by Major Pagala, the respondent Commission on appeal, should
have ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case with the
affidavits earlier submitted as part of the position paper which were
completely ignored by the labor arbiter. Or at the very least, it should have
remanded the case to the labor arbiter consonant with the requirements
of administrative due process. Affirmance by the Commission of the
decision of the labor arbiter was a denial of the elementary principle of fair
play.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; THE MEANS SANCTIONED BY THE RULES OF
ASCERTAINING THE TRUTH. — The instant petition is a timely reminder to
labor arbiters and all who wield quasi-judicial power to ever bear in mind
that evidence is the means, sanctioned by rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
 or quasi-judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact. (Section
1, Rule 128). The object of evidence is to establish the truth by the use of
perceptive and reasoning faculties. (See Martin, Rules of Court, Vol. 5
Evidence p. 2 citing Chamberlayne on Trial Evidence and Thayer on Prelim.
Treat.)
4. ID.; SUMMARY PROCEDURES; SHOULD HEIGHTEN A CONCERN FOR
DUE PROCESS. — The statutory grant of power to use summary procedures
should heighten a concern for due process, for judicial perspectives in
administrative decision making, and for maintaining the visions which led
to the creation of administrative office.
5. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR CODE; TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT; LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; VALID GROUND. —
The loss of trust and confidence and the wedge driven into the relationship
of the private respondent with both management and his co-employees
warrant the grant of clearance to terminate employment.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J :
p

On August 18, 1978, the Baguio Country Club Corporation filed with
the Ministry of Labor office at Baguio City an application for clearance to
terminate the services of respondent Jimmy Sajonas for willful breach of
trust, telling lies in an investigation, taking money paid by customers,
threatening a fellow employee, committing dishonesty against guests and
committing four violations of the club rules and regulations which would
constitute valid grounds for dismissal.
On August 28, 1978, Jimmy Sajonas filed his opposition alleging that
his dismissal was without justifiable grounds to support it and that it would
contravene his constitutional right to security of tenure.
After a notice of investigation was issued, the case was referred to a
conciliator who recommended the preventive suspension of the
respondent.
The Regional Director suspended Sajonas and indorsed the case for
compulsory arbitration to Labor Arbiter Benigno Ayson.
On December 11, 1978, the labor arbiter came out with a decision
denying the application for clearance to dismiss Jimmy Sajonas for
insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner was ordered to reinstate Sajonas
with backwages from the time of suspension up to reinstatement and
without loss of seniority rights.
 The case was appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.
On January 17, 1980, the Commission rendered a decision dismissing the
appeal and affirming the decision of the labor arbiter.
The petitioner charges the public respondents with grave abuse of
discretion for having rendered an "unlawful, unconstitutional, and
unprecedented decision."
The main issue in this petition is the contention of the petitioner that
it was denied due process because its evidence was not considered by both
the labor arbiter and the NLRC. The petitioner states that as a result of this
ignoring of its evidence, the decisions of the public respondents are
contrary to the facts and the applicable law.
A careful consideration of the records of this petition convinces us
that there is merit in this petition. The summary procedures used by the
public respondents were too summary to satisfy the requirements of
justice and fair play.
The decision of the respondent Commission which affirmed the order
to reinstate Mr. Sajonas with full backwages was based on two grounds —
First, the evidence available to the labor arbiter when he decided this case
was such that the respondent had not sufficiently shown a just cause for
the complainant's dismissal. Second, the evidence to support the
application for clearance to dismiss the complainant was submitted too late
because it was submitted only on appeal.
The respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
when it affirmed the irregular and one-sided procedure adopted by the
labor arbiter in arriving at his finding of insufficiency of evidence and when
it decided to uphold a decision not only contrary to the facts but obviously
unfair and unjust. LibLex

When the Baguio office of the Ministry of Labor issued as part of the
conciliation process a notice of investigation for September 7, 1978 and
September 15, 1978, the petitioner Baguio Country Club submitted a
position paper accompanied by copies of the application to terminate
employment and the sworn statements of witnesses taken during the
investigation of the alleged anomalies. Jimmy Sajonas did not submit any
position paper. No position paper was served on the petitioner or its
counsel. The only document submitted was one with a short two
paragraphs comprising the grounds for opposition.
As a result of the conciliator's recommendation, the case was
indorsed for arbitration to the labor arbiter. Noting that Mr. Sajonas did not
appear at the arbitration proceedings and did not present any position
paper but left it to some union members to speak for him and allegedly
because Mr. Sajonas had promised to quietly resign, the petitioner merely
adopted the position paper filed during the conciliation proceedings.
 The irregular procedures used by the labor arbiter started at this
point.
The labor arbiter allowed a last minute position paper of respondent
Sajonas to be filed and without requiring a copy to be served upon the
Baguio Country Club and without affording the latter an opportunity to
refute or rebut the contents of the paper, forthwith decided the case.
The public respondents now argue in their comment that "it is
of no moment that petitioner was not furnished with a copy of Sajonas'
position paper" because as early as the conciliation stage it was already
apprised of the position of the employee, having been furnished Sajonas'
opposition and that it cannot feign ignorance. This stand of the public
respondents is erroneous. Since the case was decided on the basis of
position papers, the petitioner had a right to be served a copy of the
respondent's position paper admitted and considered by the arbiter and
an opportunity to introduce evidence to refute it. As explained by the
petitioner, it had been lulled into thinking that because the private
respondent had offered to resign and the employer had agreed to forego
the prosecution of criminal charges, there would no longer be any
complete or full-scale arbitration proceedings. Mr. Sajonas denies that he
promised to resign and contends that criminal proceedings were an
afterthought to harass the poor laborer. The fact that there were two
divergent and clashing allegations before them, not only on this point but
also on the principal issues of dishonesty and intimidation of co employees,
the public respondents should have adopted fairer and more accurate
methods of ascertaining truth.
As pointed out by the petitioner, "while an administrative tribunal
possessed of quasi-judicial powers is free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process." (Serrano v. PSC, 24 SCRA 867; and Singco v.
COMELEC, 101 SCRA 420). LibLex

The petitioner's position paper, passed upon by the labor arbiter,

stated that the petitioner had furnished the oppositor (Jimmy Sajonas) and
the ALU (the union of workers in the club) copies of the application to
terminate, as well as the investigations of witnesses against Jimmy Sajonas,
which distinctly show the infractions committed by oppositor, particularly
that of the incident of August 6, 1978 wherein Sajonas was supposed to
have pocketed a cash payment of a customer of the BCC, constituting
qualified theft. The petitioner specifically stressed to the arbiter that it was
"adopting the investigations which were enclosed with the application to
terminate, which are now parts of the record of the Ministry of Labor, as
part and parcel of this position paper."
 In other words, the petitioner submitted its case on the basis of the
complete records of the conciliation proceedings. The position paper was
before the arbiter but minus the sworn statements comprising the
investigations which formed part of the records of the same labor office.
Inexplicably, the arbiter came out with the conclusion that "there is
thus no document nor statement of evidencing value or of evidencing
character which we can consider as evidence to support the enumerated
violations for which Sajonas is supposed to be dismissed." Instead of calling
for the records submitted to the conciliator in the game small Baguio office,
the arbiter denied the application for clearance on the ground that all that
was before it was a position paper with mere quotations about an
investigation conducted by Major Pagala.
The error could have been corrected by the respondent Commission
when the petitioner urged that the sworn statements thus ignored by the
labor arbiter should be considered on appeal.
In the appeal to the Commission, the petitioner argued that
"submitted with this application to terminate are investigations of Erdulfo
Pagala on Bernadette Saliquio, Alma Jean Quidasol, Cristina Rico, and
Clarissa Adalla."
The respondent Commission may not have committed grave abuse
of discretion when it rejected the affidavits of these witnesses, the
information for estafa against Jimmy Sajonas filed by the assistant city
fiscal, and the resolution of the fiscal's office on the complaint for grave
threats, on the ground that "evidence cannot be submitted for the first time
on appeal." However, it was a denial of elementary principles of fair play for
the Commission not to have ordered the elevation of the entire records of
the case with the affidavits earlier submitted as part of the position paper
but completely ignored by the labor arbiter. Or at the very least, the case
should have been remanded to the labor arbiter consonant with the
requirements of administrative due process. LLjur

The ever increasing scope of administrative jurisdiction and the

statutory grant of expansive powers in the exercise of discretion by
administrative agencies illustrate our nation's faith in the administrative
process as an efficient and effective mode of public control over sensitive
areas of private activity. Because of the specific constitutional mandates on
social justice and protection to labor, and the fact that major labor-
management controversies are highly intricate and complex, the legislature
and executive have reposed uncommon reliance upon what they believe is
the expertise, the rational and efficient modes of ascertaining facts, and the
unbiased and discerning adjudicative techniques of the Ministry of Labor
and Employment and its instrumentalities.
 Experience has shown this faith to be justified. In the great majority
of petitions for review of decisions from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, we have sustained agency determinations and denied due
course to the petitions. However, we have never hesitated to exercise our
corrective powers and to reverse labor ministry decisions where the
ministry or a labor tribunal like the respondent commission has sustained
irregular procedures and through the invocation of summary methods,
including rules on appeal, has affirmed an order which tolerates a violation
of due process. This Court will reverse or modify an administrative decision
where the rights of a party were prejudiced because the administrative
findings, conclusions, or decisions are in violation of constitutional
provisions; in excess of statutory authority, or jurisdiction; made upon
irregular procedure; vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake; not supported
by substantial evidence adduced at the hearing or contained in the records
or disclosed to the parties; or arbitrary, capricious, or issued with grave
abuse of discretion, (Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. Castaneda v. Court of Appeals,
26 SCRA 186; Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745; Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921;
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 6 SCRA 1; Air Manila v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489;
Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners, 94 SCRA 61).
The instant petition is a timely reminder to labor arbiters and all who
wield quasi-judicial power to ever bear in mind that evidence is the means,
sanctioned by rules, of ascertaining in a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact. (Section 1, Rule 128) The
object of evidence is to establish the truth by the use of perceptive and
reasoning faculties. (See Martin, Rules of Court, Vol. 5 on Evidence, p. 2
citing Chamberlayne on Trial Evidence and Thayer on Prelim. Treat.) The
statutory grant of power to use summary procedures should heighten a
concern for due process, for judicial perspectives in administrative decision
making, and for maintaining the visions which led to the creation of the
administrative office.
From the records which formed part of the position paper submitted
to the labor a biter and those raised on appeal to the respondent
commission, this following have been established. LexLib

At about 10:30 in the morning of August 6, 1978, Miss Bernadette

Saliquio, a waitress at the Baguio Country Club served two glasses of
orange juice to the maid and children of a Mrs. Solon. Bartender Jimmy
Sajonas pocketed the cash payment of P7.00 for the juice and utilized
Chit No. 183100 signed by a Dr. Lodzinski for two bottles of beer to cover
up for the order of orange juice which was changed to two beers. In other
words, one chit was used twice. Miss Alma Jean Quidasol, checker, who
corroborated the testimony of Miss Saliquio, who checks the orders for
drinks, and who mentioned an earlier anomaly involving four loaves of
raisin bread, was threatened several days later by Sajonas for reporting the
 incident to management. Miss Cristina Rico, nutritionist, corroborated the
utterance of the threat "papatayin." An information for estafa was filed in
Criminal Case No. 40292 of the Baguio City Court but the case for grave
threats where the office of the City Fiscal "arrived at the indubitable
conclusion that the respondent indeed uttered threatening remarks" was
dismissed for having prescribed. We agree with the petitioner that the loss
of trust and confidence and the wedge driven into the relationship of the
private respondent with both management and his co-employees warrant
the grant of clearance to terminate his employment. We likewise note the
petitioner's statement that Mr. Sajonas has been working as bartender for
a hotel in Pangasinan since March, 1979 and was about to be promoted to
a hotel in Manila in November, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted. The decision
dated January 17, 1980 of the National Labor Relations Commission
affirming the December 11, 1978 decision of the labor arbiter is set aside.
The appropriate office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is ordered
to give the petitioner a clearance to terminate the employment of the
private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
(Baguio Country Club Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
|||

No. L-55624, [November 19, 1982], 204 PHIL 194-203)

 2

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-2068. October 20, 1948.]

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO,

Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.

E. M. Banzali for petitioner.

Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; RIGHT OF

CONFRONTATION NOT APPLICABLE TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. —
The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of
a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witnesses. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away
with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under
the due process clause to a fair trial. (Dequito and Saling Buhay vs.
Arellano, L-1336, May 28, 1948.)
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULES OF; SECTION 11 OF RULES 108 AS
AN ADJECTIVE LAW. — Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an
adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right.
3. ID.; SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND ADJECTIVE LAW, DEFINED AND
DISTINGUISHED. — Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two
terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a
term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system
prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J., 980.) Substantive law
is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part
of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights
or obtains redress for their invasion.
4. ID.; ID.; — As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which
declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for
committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides
or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
 5. ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AS REMEDIAL IN NATURE. —
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first
step taken in a criminal prosecution.
6. ID.; SECTION 11 OF RULE 108 AS PROCEDURAL. — As a rule of
evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is
"the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances
on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the method by which,
in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal
law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading,
evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) The
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without
throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
7. ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; CURTAILMENT OF ACCUSED'S
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, EFFECT OF. — The curtailment of
the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the
witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is not of such importance
as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. Preliminary investigation
is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely,
and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed
thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
8. ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF ACCUSED TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW IS NOT INFRINGED BY. — While section 11 of Rule 108
denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a
preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains
unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges
against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the
latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due
process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree
of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged
by the fact that this formality is frequently waived.
9. WORDS AND PHRASES; "REMEDY" AND "SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT"
EXPLAINED AND DISTINGUISHED. — The distinction between "remedy" and
"substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The difference is
somewhat a question of degree. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular
case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass
without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is
impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.
10. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; EXTENT AND SCOPE
OF THE POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE. —
That the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights,
 and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner
or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the court's power is not
merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the
time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a
power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of
procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source
and discarding old ones.

DECISION

TUASON, J :
p

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion

with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound
over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of
origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant
and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of
which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was
denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's
attorney to the Court or First Instance in support of his motion, the
accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In
that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges
and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered
the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined
and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal
and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of Rule 108, and
the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and
the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing
his right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was
committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the
opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction
or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to
return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling
Buhay vs. Arellano, G. R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case
the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the
complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the
preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we
sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule
108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the
matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of
the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it
or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to
pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of
right, compel the complainant and his witnesses to repeat in his presence
what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of
the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional
right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does
not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary
examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a
matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The
minority went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on
the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed
with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERIA, J., dissenting:

I am sorry to dissent from the decision.

The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary
investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and
after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the
petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and
form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to
petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence,
and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
 The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court
of First Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to the
justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-
examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present
special civil action of mandamus was instituted.
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his
evidence during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a
waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary investigation
provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he claims
to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a
motion with said court to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of
Masantol ordering the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His
motion having been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in
which he squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule
108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with
and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the
provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.
In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we
did not discuss and decide the question of validity or constitutionality of
said section 11 in connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that
question was not raised therein, and we merely construed the provisions
on preliminary investigation of Rule 108. In said case the writer of this
dissenting-opinion said:
"It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of
this dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one who
prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal procedure,
and the provisions on preliminary investigation in the draft were the
same as those of the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be
confronted with and to cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution. But the Supreme Court approved and adopted in
toto the draft, except the part referring to preliminary investigation
which it modified, by suppressing said right and enacting, in its stead,
the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the
old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority
decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes the exercise of the
right of a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or caprice
of a judge or officer conducting the preliminary investigation."
But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is
squarely presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to pass
upon it.
 Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the
Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The Constitution added
the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to
emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can
not enact or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that
rules which diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are
substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure.
It does not require an elaborate argument to show that the right
granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecution in preliminary investigation as
well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human
experience, according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against
another in his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily
contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his
testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is a
substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show,
even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a
probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and
therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to
prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the
trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding
anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails.
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law
to an accused outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in
the final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant
such right to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First
Instance in the City of Manila, because of the promptness, actual or
presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of in the
Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a
constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the
Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this
Court by the Constitution.
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this
Court in several cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or
validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the
defendant's right under discussion, it follows that said section 11
diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and
this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null
and void.
 The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited
case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice
of the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request to have
the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify again in the presence
of the defendant and be cross-examined by the latter, does not validate
said provision; because to make the exercise of an absolute right
discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or
officer making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or
modify it.
Petition is therefore granted.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and

Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:
"In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read,
interpreted, and applied in a way that will not contravene the
constitutional provision guaranteeing to all accused the right 'to
meet the witnesses face to face.' (Section 1 [17], Article III.)
"Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said
reglementary section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of
fundamental right to hear the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution and to cross-examine them.
"Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot
finally be convicted, he is liable to endure the ordeal eloquently
depicted in the decision, and the constitutional guarantee protects
defendants, not only from the jeopardy of being finally convicted and
punished, but also from the physical, mental and moral sufferings that
may unjustly be visited upon him in any one of the stages of the
criminal process instituted against him. He must be afforded the
opportunities to have the charges against him quashed, not only at
the final hearing, but also at the preliminary investigation, if by
confronting the witnesses for the prosecution he can convince the
court that the charges are groundless. There is no justice in compelling
him to undergo the troubles of a final hearing if at the preliminary
hearing the case can be terminated in his favor. Otherwise, the
preliminary investigation or hearing will be an empty gesture that
should not have a place within the framework of dignified and solemn
judicial proceedings."
On the strength of the above quoted opinion the petition should be
granted and so we vote.
RESOLUTION ON A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
March 8, 1949
TUASON, J :p
 This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito
and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G. R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional right of
an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply
to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination
be an infringement of his right to confront witness. As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose
the constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari.
Heeding the wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject.
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court 1 infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is said that
the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights.
We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section
11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a
substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive
rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.
J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to
a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J.,
27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares

what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them,
as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the
steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.)
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the
first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.
Evidence — which is "the mode and manner of proving the competent
facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in
dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the
method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress
obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal
procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154
So., 419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of
Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code
of evidence embodied in these Rules.
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States
Supreme Court said:
"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the
effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by
alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3
Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277,
326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L.
ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443. And there may be procedural
changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available
under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense,
or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner
as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107
U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170
U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is now well settled
that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence,
which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only
in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not
prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of
persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the
disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto
law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4
Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of
evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the
accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson vs.
Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which
changes the place of trial, Gut vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573;
or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new
one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed.,
485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570."
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of
the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the
witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as
to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the
beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process
of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere
restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to
fall within the constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to
cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to
be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at
the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only
stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to
the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality
is frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is
incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of
degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is
difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative
power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the
substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that
boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This
being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should
step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a
harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates
only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the
Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of
procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power
is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules
without regard to their source and discarding old ones.
The motion is denied.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones and Montemayor,
JJ., concur.

FERIA, J., dissenting:

I dissent.
The motion for reconsideration must be granted.
According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in a
preliminary investigation granted by law or provided for in General
Orders, No. 58, as amended, in force prior to the promulgation of the
Rules of Court, is not a substantive right but a mere matter of procedure,
and therefore this Court can suppress it in section 11, Rule 108, of the
Rules of Court, for the following reasons:
First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution." . . . "As a rule
of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . . "The
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court."
And therefore "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole Code of evidence
embodied in these rules."
Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an essential
part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may
be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder
can not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition."
Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive
right' is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree" . . . It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case
beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass
without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is
impossible to fix that boundary by general condition . . . "This being so, it
is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if
not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and
arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a
limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage."
Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law
from procedure, for the distinction is not always well understood.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and
regulates rights as opposed to objective or procedural law which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights. What constitutes practice and
procedure in the law is the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is
enforced, "that which regulates the formal steps in an action or judicial
proceedings; the course of procedure in courts; the form, manner and
order in which proceedings have been, and are accustomed to be had; the
form, manner and order of carrying on and conducting suits or
prosecutions in the courts through their various stages according to the
principles of law and the rules laid down by the respective courts." 31 Cyc.
Law and Procedure, p. 1153; id, 32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law
Dictionary; Anderson Law Dictionary; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the
Constitution or in any branch of the law, civil, criminal, administrative or
procedural law. In our old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as
amended, there are provisions which create, define and regulate
substantive rights, and many of those provisions such as those relating to
guardianship, adoption, evidence and many others are incorporated in
the Rules of Court for the sake of convenience and not because this Court
is empowered to promulgate them as rules of court. And our old law of
Criminal Procedure General Orders No. 58 grants the offended party the
right to commence a criminal action or file a complaint against the
offender and to intervene in the criminal prosecution against him, and
grants the defendant in the Court of First Instance (except in the City of
Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary investigation including his
rights during said investigation, and the rights at the trial, which are now
reproduced or incorporated in Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules
of Court, except the rights now in question. And all these, and others not
necessary for us to mention, are obviously substantive rights.
(1) As to the first argument, the premise "that preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially remedial is not correct.
Undoubtedly the majority means to say procedural, in line with the
conclusion in the resolution, because remedial law is one thing, and
procedural law is another. Obviously they are different branches of the
law. "Remedial statute" is "a statute providing a remedy for an injury as
distinguished from a penal statute. A statute giving a party a mode of
remedy for a wrong where he had none or a different one before . . .
Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply such defects, and
abridge such superfluities in the common law, as arise either from the
general imperfections of all human law, from change of time and
circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised determination of
unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause whatsoever."
(Black's Law Dictionary, third edition, pp. 1525, 1526.)
It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to
right of defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence and therefore is also
procedural." In the first place, the provisions of said section to the effect
that "the defendant, after the arrest and his delivery to the court has the
right to be informed of the complaint or information filed against him, and
also to be informed of the testimony and evidence presented against him,
and may be allowed to testify and present witnesses or evidence for him if
he so desires," are not rules of evidence; and in the second place, it is
evident that most of the rules of evidence, if not all, are substantive laws
that define, create or regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules of
evidence are substantive rights found in common law chiefly and growing
out of reasoning, experience and common sense of lawyers and courts."
(State vs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It is true that weighing of evidence
and the rules of practice with respect thereto form part of the law of
procedure, but the classification of proofs is sometime determined by the
substantive law." (U. S. vs. Genato, 15 Phil., 170, 176.) How can the law on
judicial notice, conclusive as well as juris tantum presumption, hearsay
and best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, interpretation of documents,
competency of a person to testify as a witness be considered procedural?
Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the
whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently wrong, not
only for the reason just stated, but because our contention that the
defendant can not be deprived of his right to be confronted with and
cross-examine the witness of the prosecution in s preliminary
investigation under consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear
down said section. Our theory, is that said section 11 should be so
construed as to be valid and effective, that is, that if the defendant asks
the court to recall the witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify
again in his presence, and to allow the former to cross-examine the latter,
the court or officer making the preliminary investigation is under
obligation to grant the request. But if the defendant does not so ask the
court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be confronted with
and cross-examine the witness against him.
(2) With respect to the second argument or reason, it is true that the
preliminary investigation as provided for in the General Orders, No. 58, as
amended, is not an essential part of due process of law, because "due
process of law" is not iron clad in its meaning; it does not necessarily
mean a particular procedure. Due process of law simply requires a
procedure that fully protects the life, liberty and property. For that reason
the investigation to be made by the City Fiscal of the City of Manila under
Act No. 612, now section 2465 of the Administrative Code, before filing an
information, was considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy the due
process of law constitutional requirement (U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1; U.
S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is also true that we have
already and correctly held that "The law having explicitly recognized and
established that no person charged with the commission of a crime shall
be deprived of his liberty or subjected to trial without prior preliminary
investigation (provided for in General Orders, No. 58, as amended) that
shall show that there are reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, there
can be no doubt that the accused who is deprived of his liberty, tried and
sentenced without the proper preliminary investigation having been made
in his regard, is convicted without due process of law," (United States vs.
Banzuela, 31 Phil., 564).
The ruling in Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, quoted
in the resolution, has no application to the present case, for the question
involved therein was the power of Congress to alter the rules of
evidence and procedure without violating the constitutional precept that
prohibits the passing of ex post facto law, while the question herein
involved is the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure, which diminish the substantive right of
a defendant, expressly prohibited by the same provision of the
Constitution that confers upon this Court the power to promulgate said
rules.
(3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion that
"the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of
exact definition ;" indeed "the difference is somewhat a question of
 degree," (Dexter vs. Edmonds, 89 F 487), is immaterial, because, as we
have already said in refuting the majority's first reason, remedy and
procedure are two completely different things.
As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from
procedural law and practice. But even assuming arguendo that it is
difficult to draw the line in any particular case beyond which the power of
the court over procedure can not pass without touching upon the
substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do in that case
would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of procedure which may
increase, diminish or modify substantive right in order to avoid violating
the constitutional prohibition above referred to. Because as this Supreme
Court is not empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or abrogate
substantive rights, but only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure which "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights," this Court can not step on them in making the rules, and the
Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect such incursion
as would affect the substantive rights of the accused in any manner.
Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and
cross-examine the witness against him in a preliminary investigation
would affect the accused not in a limited and unsubstantial but in a harsh
and arbitrary manner. The testimony of a witness given in the absence of
the defendant and without an opportunity on the part of the latter to
cross-examine him is a hearsay evidence, and it should not be admitted
against the defendant in a preliminary investigation that is granted to the
latter as a protection against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, supra). Otherwise, an accused
who is innocent and should not be arrested, or if arrested should be
released immediately a short time after his arrest after the preliminary
investigation, would have to be held for trial and wait for a considerable
period of time until the case is tried and acquitted after trial by the Courts
of First Instance in provinces on account of the admission of such
evidence in the preliminary investigation, evidence not admissible at the
trial.
Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the
necessary proceedings the decision of the majority reversed or modified
in accordance with my dissenting opinion.

PERFECTO, J.:

We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The motion
for reconsideration should be granted.
Footnotes
1.Rights of defendant after arrest. — After the arrest of the defendant and his
delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information
 filed against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of the
testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to
testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed
to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing
but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
2.The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The National Assembly shall
have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.

||| (Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, [October 20, 1948], 81 PHIL 640-658)
 3

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 1164. September 17, 1903.]

MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. HENRY

HOSKYN, defendant-appellant.

Jose M. Gay for appellant.

Palma, Gerona & Mercado for appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CONTRACT; EVIDENCE; LOST WRITING; VESTED RIGHT. — Under

the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, after proof of the
loss or destruction of a written instrument, its contents may be shown by
parol evidence, even if such testimony would have been incompetent
when the right of action accrued, there being, as a general rule, no vested
light of property in the rules of evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; RECITALS IN PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. — The recitals in a
public instrument can not be used as evidence to the prejudice of a
stranger to the deed not related to either of the parties by privity of
contract or estate.
3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — The defense of
the statute of limitations, not having been set up in the answer, can not in
this case be availed of in this court.
4. ID.; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. — To warrant the
granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence offered must be of such a character that its introduction would
probably change the result.

DECISION

WILLARD, J :p

The only exception in this case was to the judgment, and the only
question before us on the bill of exceptions is whether that judgment is
supported by the findings of fact stated in the decision.
It appears from the decision that Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in
question in 1855 from Don Pablo Garcia. Doña Petrona lived on the land until
her death, in 1876, when Don Manuel Aldeguer, their grandfather, was
appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four children, the present plaintiffs. In
1884 Don Manuel sold the land to one Martinez, who sold it to the
defendant, Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to Martinez, Don Manuel
stated that he acquired the property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia
twenty-four years before. The court finds that this declaration was the only
evidence in the case that Don Manuel had any title to the land.
1. The appellant defendant below assigns as error that the court found from
parol evidence alone the existence of the contract of sale between Don Pablo
and Doña Petrona. It is true the court says that no documentary evidence
was received on this point, but it is also stated that the existence of a written
contract was proved, as also its record in the registry of property, its
attachment to a complaint filed in court by the plaintiffs in 1892, its
subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the contents
thereof.
After such preliminary proof had been made, parol evidence of the contents
of the document was properly received (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 284).
Such a ruling does not infringe section 795, par. 6, of said Code, which
provides "that nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to divest
or injuriously affect any property right that has already become vested under
existing law," even if under article 1221 or other provisions of the Civil Code,
after the destruction of the instrument, such parol evidence of its contents
could not have been given. The general rule is that there is no vested right of
property in rules of evidence.
2. The recital in the document of sale by Don Manuel to Martinez proves
nothing against the plaintiffs, either according to the former law (Civil Code,
art. 1218) or according to the new Code (secs. 277 et seq.), and the claim of
the appellant to the contrary can not be sustained.
3. It is claimed by the appellant that he has acquired title by prescription, but
the defense of the statute of limitations, to have been available to the
defendant in this case, should have been set up in his answer. This was not
done. The court, therefore, made no finding thereon.
4. The appellant has moved for a new trial in this court under section 497,
par. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. This evidence is to the effect that one Bonifacio Garcia was never
the owner of the land in question and never sold it to the mother of the
plaintiffs.
Waiving all questions as to the sufficiency of the showing of due diligence by
the defendant, and as to the failure to procure the affidavits of the proffered
witnesses, the motion must be denied on the ground that such evidence is
not "of such a character as to probably change the result." The court finds
that the mother of the plaintiffs bought the land from Don Pablo Garcia.
Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would he immaterial. Such evidence
would merely strengthen the decision of the court. It would not overthrow it.
But the appellant says that the plaintiffs in their :complaint alleged that the
mother bought the property of Don Bonifacio. What took place during the
trial we do not know, but it is certain that evidence was introduced showing
that the purchase was made from Don Pablo, because the court has so
found. We must presume that this was done without objection on the part of
the defendant, for no exceptions relating to the matter appear in the record.
If such objections had been made, the court had power to allow the plaintiffs
to amend their complaint by striking out the name of Bonifacio and inserting
that of Pablo.
The motion for a new trial is denied and the judgment of the court below
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellant, and after the
expiration of twenty days, reckoned from the date of this decision, judgment
shall be rendered accordingly, and the case is returned to the court below for
compliance therewith.
Arellano, C .J ., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ ., concur.
||| (Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, G.R. No. 1164, [September 17, 1903], 2 PHIL 500-503)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 202206. March 5, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TENG

MONER y ADAM, accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, ** J : p

This is an appeal of the Decision 1 dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Teng Moner y Adam, which affirmed the Joint Decision 2 dated August 4,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95 in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-05-133982 and Q-05-133983. Anent Criminal Case No. Q-05-
133982, the trial court found appellant Teng Moner y Adam (Moner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II (sale of dangerous
drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In the same judgment, Moner and his co-
accused were acquitted of the charge of violating Section 11, Article II
(possession of dangerous drugs) of the same statute which was the subject
of Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983. CAIHTE

The crime of which Moner was convicted is described in the

Information dated April 25, 2005, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of April, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did
then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver,
transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, three
point ninety-one (3.91) grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 3
Subsequently, on May 16, 2005, Moner pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the
aforementioned charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs upon his
arraignment. 4
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals presented the factual
milieu of this case in this manner:
To establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the prosecution
presented three (3) witnesses namely: PO2 Joachim Panopio, PO3
Junnifer Tuldanes and PO3 Edwin Lirio.
The prosecution's evidence tends to establish the following
facts:
 On April 23, 2005, the police operatives of Las Piñas Police
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAIDSOTF)
had arrested a certain Joel Taudil for possession of illegal drugs.
Upon investigation, they gathered from Taudil that the source of the
illegal drugs was Teng Moner (herein accused-appellant) who hails
from Tandang Sora, Quezon City.
As per this information, Police Chief Inspector Jonathan Cabal
formed a team that would conduct a buy-bust operation for the
apprehension of accused-appellant. The team was composed of
himself, SPO4 Arnold Alabastro, SPO1 Warlie Hermo, PO3 Junnifer
Tuldanes, PO3 Edwin Lirio, PO2 Rodel Ordinaryo, PO1 Erwin Sabbun
and PO2 Joachim Panopio. The marked and boodle money were
given to PO2 Panopio who acted as the poseur-buyer.
Before proceeding with the buy-bust operation, the team
prepared the pre-operation report addressed to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the authority to operate outside their
jurisdiction and the coordination paper. Thereafter, they proceeded
to the Central Police District Office (CPDO), Camp Karingal, Quezon
City for proper coordination. Thereafter, the team together with
Taudil and a CPD-DIID personnel proceeded [to] No. 26 Varsity Lane,
Barangay Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Upon reaching the
place they made a surveillance and assumed their respective
positions.
At the target area, PO2 Panopio and Taudil went to accused-
appellant's house. While outside the gate, Taudil summoned
accused-appellant and the latter came out after a few minutes. The
two men talked with each other in the Muslim dialect. Taudil
introduced PO2 Panopio as his friend to accused-appellant and told
him that PO2 Panopio was interested to buy shabu. PO2 Panopio
asked for the price of five (5) grams of shabu. Accused-appellant
replied that the same would cost him P8,000.00 and asked him if he
has the money. When PO2 Panopio confirmed that he has the
money with him, accused-appellant asked them to wait and he went
inside the house. When he returned after a few minutes, he handed
a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected as shabu to PO2
Panopio who in turn gave him the marked and boodle money.
Accused-appellant was about to count the money when PO2
Panopio gave the pre-arranged signal to his team and introduced
himself as [a] police officer.
Accused-appellant resisted arrest and ran inside the house
but PO2 Panopio was able to catch up with him. The other members
of the team proceeded inside the house and they saw the other
accused gather[ed] around a table re-packing shabu. PO3 Lirio
confiscated the items from them and placed the same inside a
plastic bag.
 After accused-appellant and his co-accused were arrested, the
team proceeded to the Las Piñas City Police Station. The items
confiscated from them were turned over by PO2 Panopio to PO3
Dalagdagan who marked them in the presence of the police
operatives, accused-appellant and his co-accused. PO3 Dalagdagan
prepared the corresponding inventory of the confiscated items. The
specimens were then brought to the police crime laboratory for
testing. The specimens yielded positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Consequently, a case for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165 was filed against accused-appellant and another for Violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 against him and his co-accused.
In refutation of the prosecution's version, the defense
presented four (4) witnesses, to wit: Judie Durado, Fatima
Macabangen, accused-appellant and Richard Pascual.
It is the contention of the defense that on April 23, 2005,
accused-appellant and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. Q-05-
133983 were at the house located along No. 26 Varsity Lane, Philam,
Tandang Sora, Quezon City to prepare for the wedding of Fatima
Macabangen and Abubakar Usman to be held the following day.
While they were inside the house, several armed persons wearing
civilian clothes entered and announced that they were police
officers. They searched the whole house and gathered all of them in
the living room.
The police officer who was positioned behind accused-
appellant and Abubakar dropped a plastic sachet. The former asked
accused-appellant and Abubakar who owns the plastic sachet. When
accused-appellant denied its ownership, the police officer slapped
him and accused him of being a liar. Thereafter, they were all frisked
and handcuffed and were brought outside the house. Their personal
effects and belongings were confiscated by the police officers. Then
they boarded a jeepney and were brought to [the] Las Piñas Police
Station.
Upon their arrival, they were investigated. A police officer
asked them to call up anybody who can help them because they only
needed money for their release. Judie Dorado called up [his] mother.
They saw the other items allegedly confiscated from them only at the
police station. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, they were
brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City. From there, they went to
Makati for drug testing and were returned to Las Piñas Police
Station.DETACa

Subsequently, cases for Violation of R.A. No. 9165 were filed

against them. 5
After receiving the evidence for both sides, the trial court convicted
Moner on the charge of selling shabu while, at the same time, acquitting
him and his co-accused of the charge of possession of illegal drugs. The
dispositive portion of the August 4, 2009 Joint Decision of the trial court
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders its Joint Decision as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982:
The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM "GUILTY"
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165 or illegal selling of three point ninety-one (3.91) grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
to pay a FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php500,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983:
The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM, JUDIE
DURADO Y MACABANGEN, FATIMA MACABANGEN Y NUÑEZ,
ABUBAKAR USMAN Y MASTORA, GUIAMIL ABU Y JUANITEZ,
NORODIN USMAN Y MASTORA, RICHARD PASCUAL Y TANGALIN and
AMINA USMAN-MONER "NOT GUILTY" for violation of Section 11, Art.
II of R.A. 9165 considering that the prosecution failed to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The pieces of evidence subject matter of Crim. Case No. Q-05-
133983 are hereby ordered to be safely delivered to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition. 6
As can be expected, Moner elevated his case to the Court of Appeals
which, unfortunately for him, ruled to affirm the findings of the trial court
and dispositively held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated August 4, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal Case No.
Q-05-133982 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt is hereby AFFIRMED. 7
Hence, Moner interposes this appeal wherein he reiterates the same
errors on the part of the trial court contained in his Brief filed with the Court
of Appeals, to wit:
A. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED ITS
DECISION DATED AUGUST 4, 2009 FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT MONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
VIOLATING SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165, WHEN THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE THREE (3) PROSECUTION WITNESSES (PO2
JOACHIM PANOPIO, PO3 JUNNIFER TULDANES, AND PO3 EDWIN
LIRIO) ARE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE TO PROVE THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST.
B. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEN IT
RELIED SOLELY ON THE PERJURED TESTIMONIES OF THE
 PROSECUTION WITNESSES POLICE OFFICERS WHICH ARE FULL OF
INCONSISTENCIES.
C. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
DECISION WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO CLEARLY TESTIFIED THAT THERE
WAS REALLY NO BUY-BUST AND THAT APPELLANT MONER WAS NOT
SELLING ANY PROHIBITED DRUGS.
D. THE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED
DECISION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY PROVISION OF SEC. 19
OF R.A. NO. 9165, ON THE MATTER OF PHYSICAL INVENTORY, AND
PICTURE TAKING OF THE EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM THE
ACCUSED, AS WELL AS THE PROVISION OF SECTION 86 THEREOF. 8
In sum, Moner maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proof to sustain his conviction for the charge of sale of
dangerous drugs. He highlights the fact that the prosecution failed to
present in court the informant who pointed to him as a supplier of shabu.
He also stresses that the buy-bust operation was conducted without proper
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Likewise, he derides the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
inconsistent, incredible and unworthy of belief. Most importantly, he
underscores the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
statutorily mandated procedure for the handling and custody of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from him.
The appeal is without merit.
For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were
identified. 9
A perusal of the records of this case would reveal that the
aforementioned elements were established by the prosecution. The illegal
drugs and the marked money were presented and identified in court. More
importantly, Police Officer (PO) 2 Joachim Panopio (PO2 Panopio), who
acted as poseur-buyer, positively identified Moner as the seller of
the shabu to him for a consideration of P8,000.00.
With regard to Moner's contention that the prosecution's failure to
present the informant in court diminishes the case against him, we
reiterate our pronouncement on this matter in the recent case of People v.
Lafaran: 10
It has oft been held that the presentation of an informant as
witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a
prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not
 presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect
the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his
efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant's identity is
protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement.
Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely
essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need
to protect his security be disregarded. In the present case, as the
buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera,
their testimonies can take the place of that of the poseur-buyer. aDSIHc

Thus, we concur with the appellate court's finding that there

is no need to present the informant because PO2 Panopio, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, had testified in court. Furthermore, the other members
of the buy-bust team, namely PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes (PO3 Tuldanes) and
PO3 Edwin Lirio (PO3 Lirio), gave clear and credible testimonies with regard
to the criminal transaction that was consummated by appellant and PO2
Panopio.
In addition, we rule that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that were pointed out by Moner consist merely of
minor variances that do not deviate from the main narrative which is the
fact that Moner sold illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer. It has been held, time
and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations
of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses' credibility but even enhance
their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 11 It
bears stressing, too, that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded
full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. 12
Lastly, we can give no credence to Moner's contention that the
prosecution failed to prove an unbroken chain of custody in consonance
with the requirements of law.
To ensure that the drug specimen presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same material seized from him or that, at the
very least, a dangerous drug was actually taken from his possession, we
have adopted the chain of custody rule. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
has expressly defined chain of custody involving dangerous drugs and
other substances in the following terms in Section 1 (b) of DDB
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody
of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
 were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition[.]
In relation to this, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently
provides the following:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Furthermore, Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 relevantly states:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these
 requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
We have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not necessarily
render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation
inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required
if there is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized illegal drugs have been preserved, i.e., the illegal drugs being offered
in court as evidence is, without a specter of doubt, the very same item
recovered in the buy-bust operation. 13
With regard to the foregoing, Moner asserts that he should be
acquitted of the criminal charges levelled against him specifically because
of the following serious lapses in procedure committed by the
apprehending officers: (a) the physical inventory was not conducted at the
place where the seizure was made; (b) the seized item was not
photographed at the place of seizure; and (c) there was no physical
inventory and photograph of the seized item in the presence of the
accused, or his representative or counsel, with an elected public official and
a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The aforementioned concerns can be squarely addressed by a careful
and assiduous review of the records of this case accompanied by a liberal
application and understanding of relevant jurisprudence in support
thereof. Both object and testimonial evidence demonstrate that the
apprehending officers were able to mark the dangerous drugs seized and
to prepare a physical inventory of the same at the Las Piñas Police Station
which was the place where Moner and his co-accused were brought for
processing. The following excerpts lifted from the transcript of the
testimony of PO2 Panopio during trial confirm this fact: ETHIDa

Q Now, Mr. Witness, after your team recovered [the] evidence on top
of the table inside the house, arrested those persons whom you
identified a while ago and also arrested Teng Moner
recovered from him the buy-bust money, what happened
next?
A We brought them to the police headquarters.
Q In what headquarters did you bring the persons arrested?
A We brought them to Special Action. . . SAID-SOTF Las Piñas Police
Station.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, I would like to inform you that under Section 21 of
the Republic Act 9165, the arresting officer immediately after
the arrest of the accused or the person buy-bust for possession
must prepare the inventory of seized evidence.
A Yes, sir.
Q What do you mean by "yes"?
A We did prepare an inventory, sir.
Q So, you are aware of that provision?
A I just forgot the Section 21, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You do not know that doing an inventory is a requirement under
Section 21?
A Yes, your Honor.
PROS.: (to the witness)
Q Now, you said that you are aware of Section 21 an inventory must
be made. Do you know whether your team complied with that
provision of the law upon reaching the station?
A Yes, sir.
Q What do you mean by "yes"?
A We made an Inventory Report, sir.
Q Where is now that Inventory Report?
A It's with the documents I submitted earlier in court, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS: (to the Court)
This piece of document handed by the witness your Honor, the
Inventory of Property Seized be marked as Exhibit "OOO".
COURT: (to the witness)
Q That is the original, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS.: (to the Court)
Q The signature of PO3 Rufino G. Dalagdagan under the heading
"Received By:" be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-1";
the list of the articles appearing [in] the body of Exhibit "OOO"
be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-2". This Receipt
of Property Turned-Over, your Honor, which states: "I, PO3
RUFINO G. DALAGDAGAN OF SAID-SOTF, LAS PIÑAS CITY
POLICE STATION, SPD hereby acknowledge
received (sic) the items/articles listed hereunder [from]
 PO2 JOACHIM P. PANOPIO" and may we request, your honor
that letters appearing on the top of the name TENG MONER
ADAM, ET AL. (RTS) be marked as Exhibit "OOO-3".
PROS.: (to the witness)
Q Where were you, Mr. Witness, when this Exhibit "OOO" was
prepared?
A I was inside the office, sir.
Q Who prepared this Exhibit "OOO"?
A PO3 Rufino Dalagdagan, sir.
Q These items listed [in] the body of marked as Exhibit "OOO", who
made these items?
A I, myself, sir.
Q Now, showing to you this Exhibit marked as "OOO-3" particularly on
[the] letters RPS appearing inside the parenthesis, who placed
that entry (RPS)?
A Police Officer Dalagdagan, sir.
Q Where were you at the time when this (RPS) marked as Exhibit
"OOO-3" was made?
A I was inside the office, sir.
Q Where were those persons whom your team arrested when this
evidence marked as Exhibit "OOO" was made?
A They were also inside the office, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said a while ago that in consideration with the buy-bust money,
you received from the accused, Teng Moner, that plastic sachet
containing shabu. Upon reaching the station, what
happened to the plastic sachet, subject matter of the buy-
bust operation?
A I turned it over, sir.
Q To whom?
A PO3 Dalagdagan, sir.
Q And before you turned it over to the investigator, PO3
Dalagdagan, that shabu subject matter of the buy-bust
operation, what did you do with it?
A He placed [the] markings on it, sir.
Q So, you did not do anything on the shabu you bought from the
accused when it was the investigator who made the markings
on the shabu?
A Yes, sir.
 Q And what were the markings placed by the investigator, PO3
Dalagdagan, when you turned over the shabu, subject matter
of the buy-bust operation?
A He placed "TMA" . . . that's all I can recall, sir.
Q Now, would you be able to identify that plastic sachet, subject
matter of the buy-bust operation?
A Yes, sir.
Q Showing to you several pieces of evidence placed inside the brown
envelope. Kindly look at the same and pick from these several
items that plastic sachet, subject matter of the buy-bust
operation? cSEDTC

A (Witness picked from the bunch of evidence the plastic sachet which
already marked as Exhibit "P" and he read [the] markings
"TMAU1-23APR05".)
Q Now, you also stated a while ago that you were the one who
personally recovered the buy-bust money used in the operation
from the possession of the accused, Teng Moner. If the same
would be shown to you, would you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you also stated that the Request for Laboratory
Examination was made by the investigator, Now, who
delivered the plastic sachet subject matter of the buy-bust
operation for laboratory examination?
A We did, sir. 14 (Emphases supplied.)
Judging from the cited testimony, it is apparent that the
apprehending officers were able to substantially comply with the
requirements of the law regarding the custody of confiscated or seized
dangerous drugs. When cross-examined by the defense counsel during trial
about the reason behind the buy-bust team's noncompliance with standard
procedure, PO3 Tuldanes, one of the apprehending officers, gave the
following response:
ATTY. PALAD: (to witness)
Q Meaning you had no time to make the inventory right at the scene
of the alleged buy-bust?
A Yes, sir, because we were immediately instructed to pull out from
the area.
Q Was there any threat on your lives that you immediately pulled out
from the said area?
A It was not our area — Area of Responsibility — so we just wanted to
make sure, for security and immediately left, sir.
 Q So this fear for security, you did not follow this
photographing/inventory?
A We did not do that anymore, sir, because our security was at risk. 15
Verily, the circumstances that the buy-bust team proceeded first to
the Central Police District (CPD) Station, Camp Karingal in Quezon City and,
from there, they were accompanied by a police officer from the CPD to the
target location, aside from proving that it was a legitimate police operation,
supported the existence of a security risk to the buy-bust team. These
additional precautions taken by the buy-bust team underscored their
unfamiliarity with the location of the operation and, in fact, corroborated
the above-quoted testimony that the buy-bust team believed there was a
threat to their security.
With regard to the accused's allegation that the buy-bust team failed
to coordinate with the PDEA before proceeding with the operation that
nabbed Moner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals declare in
unison that the requisite prior coordination with PDEA did happen.
Likewise, our own review did not provide any reason for us to disbelieve
said established fact.
To reiterate, noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is
excusable as long as there exist justifiable grounds which prevented those
tasked to follow the same from strictly conforming to the said directive. The
preceding discussion clearly show that the apprehending officers in this
case did not totally disregard prescribed procedure but, instead,
demonstrated substantial compliance with what was required. It was
likewise explained that the divergence in procedure was not arbitrary or
whimsical but because the buy-bust team decided that they could not linger
at the crime scene as it would unduly expose them to security risks since
they were outside their area of responsibility.
Notably, in the recent case of Palo v. People, 16 we affirmed a
conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs despite the fact that
the seized illegal substance was only marked at the police station and that
there was no physical inventory or photograph of the same:
The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic
sachet at the police station, and not at the place of seizure, did not
compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has
declared that "marking upon immediate confiscation" contemplates
even marking done at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical
inventory nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders
the same inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items as these would be used in determining the guilt or innocence
of the accused. 17
 With regard to the third breach of procedure highlighted by Moner,
this Court cites People v. Usman 18 wherein we declared that the chain of
custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the
enumerated persons by law. In that case, the police officers who arrested
and processed the accused did not perform the prescribed taking of
photographs under the law but, nevertheless, the assailed conviction was
upheld. The Court reasoned thus:
[T]his Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody
should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor
is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. x x x. 19
In the case at bar, the records indicate that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved despite the
procedural infirmities that accompanied the process. On this score, we
quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
The record shows that upon the arrest of accused-appellant,
the shabu and marked money were confiscated from him by PO2
Panopio. Accused-appellant was immediately brought to the Las
Piñas Police Station where the items confiscated from him were
turned-over by PO2 Panopio to PO3 Dalagdagan, the investigator-
on-case. The latter received the confiscated items and marked
them in the presence of PO2 Panopio and accused-appellant. An
inventory of the confiscated items was also made.
Thereafter, the request for laboratory examination was
prepared by PO3 Dalagdagan and signed by P/C Insp. Jonathan A.
Cabal. The specimen together with the request was brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City by PO2 Panopio
and the other police officers. There, it was received by PSI Michael S.
Holada, who delivered the specimen and request for laboratory test
to the forensic chemist PIS Maridel C. Rodis. After examination, the
specimen submitted for testing proved positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The result of
the test was reduced to writing and signed by the forensic chemist.
It was duly noted by P/Sr. Supt. Ricardo Cacholaver. It is worth
stressing that the prosecution and defense had agreed to dispense
with the testimony of the forensic chemist and stipulated among
others that she could identify the documents and the specimens she
examined. 20 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.) SDAaTC

Anent Moner's allegation that the buy-bust team asked money from
him and his former co-accused in exchange for their liberty, it must be
emphasized that the said allegation only came to light when defense
counsel asked appellant what happened when he and his former co-
accused were brought to the Las Piñas Police Station. 21 Curiously, however,
defense counsel did not confront any of the prosecution witnesses
regarding the said accusation. More importantly, based on the
record, no criminal or administrative case relating thereto was ever filed by
Moner or any of his former co-accused against their alleged extortionists.
Nevertheless, on this particular issue, we would like to reiterate our ruling
that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed
by the courts with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. 22
At this juncture, it bears repeating that in cases involving violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who
are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. 23 Admittedly,
the buy-bust team did not follow certain aspects of procedure to the letter
but this was excusable under the saving clause of the chain of custody rule
and prevailing jurisprudence. As a consequence thereof, their arrest of
Moner in the performance of their duty cannot be described as having been
done so irregularly as to convince this Court to invalidate the credibility and
belief bestowed by the trial court on the prosecution evidence. Accordingly,
Moner must provide clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
aforesaid presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
duties but the records show that he has failed to do so. Absent any proof
of mishandling, tampering or switching of evidence presented against him
by the arresting officers and other authorities involved in the chain of
custody, the presumption remains.
This is not the first time that this Court has been confronted with the
question of whether or not to uphold the conviction of a person arrested
for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs who had been positively identified
by credible witnesses as the perpetrator of said crime but the manner by
which the evidence of illegal drugs was handled did not strictly comply with
the chain of custody rule. To reiterate past pronouncements, while ideally
the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in
reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. 24 Unfortunately, rigid obedience to procedure creates a scenario
wherein the safeguards that we set to shield the innocent are likewise
exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment. Realizing the
inconvenient truth that no perfect chain of custody can ever be achieved,
this Court has consistently held that the most important factor in the chain
of custody rule is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items. 25
We find it apropos to highlight this Court's discussion in Zalameda v.
People, 26 which was restated in the recent case of Saraum v. People: 27
 We would like to add that noncompliance with Section 21 of
said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the
photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not
render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule
128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For
evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which
forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence
must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
accorded it by the court x x x.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any
rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated
and/or seized drugs due to noncompliance with Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is
noncompliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight
— evidentiary merit or probative value — to be given the evidence.
The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on
the circumstances obtaining in each case.
Stated differently, if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled
precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the
consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy
the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence presented for
each particular case. In the case at bar, the trial court judge convicted
Moner on the strength of the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses
despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning the corpus delicti.
It should be noted that Section 21 (a) of the IRR of Republic Act No.
9165 provides that:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with
an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
 copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided,
finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures and custody over said items. (Emphases supplied.)
The above-quoted provision recognizes that the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence are well
within the power of trial court judges to decide. Paragraph (5), Section 5,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the
following power, among others:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. acEHCD

Jurisprudence explains the above-quoted constitutional provision in

the following manner:
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous
constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the
legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus,
both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the Supreme
Court the "power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law." However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the
concurrent power to "repeal, alter or supplement" such rules.
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-
sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in
Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress' subsidiary and corrective
power. This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to
observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court's
power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress." 28
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court. 29 This includes
the power to promulgate the rules of evidence.
 On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence are provided in the Rules of
Court issued by the Supreme Court. However, the chain of custody rule is
not found in the Rules of Court. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was
passed by the legislative department and its implementing rules were
promulgated by PDEA, in consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and other agencies under and within the executive department.
In the United States, the chain of custody rule is followed by the
federal courts using the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
Federal Court of Appeals applied this rule in United States v. Ricco 30 and
held as follows:
The "chain of custody" rule is found in Fed.R.Evid. 901,
which requires that the admission of an exhibit must be
preceded by "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims." x x x.
x x x As we have pointed out, the "'chain of custody' is not an
iron-clad requirement, and the fact of a 'missing link' does not
prevent the admission of real evidence, so long as there is sufficient
proof that the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been
altered in any material respect." x x x.
According to Cornell University's online legal encyclopedia, "[r]ules of
evidence are, as the name indicates, the rules by which a court determines
what evidence is admissible at trial. In the U.S., federal courts follow the
Federal Rules of Evidence, while state courts generally follow their own
rules." 31 In the U.S. State of Alaska, for example, the "chain of custody" rule
is found in Alaska Evidence Rule 901 (a). 32
Evidence is defined in Section 1 of Rule 128 33 as "the means,
sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the
truth respecting a matter of fact." Section 2 of the same Rule provides
that "[t]he rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials
and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules."
Furthermore, the said Rule provides for the admissibility of evidence, and
states that "[e]vidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." The Rules of Admissibility provide
that "[o]bjects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court.
When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to,
examined or viewed by the court." 34
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to
distinguish if a matter is a proper subject of the rules of evidence, which as
shown above are promulgated by the Court, or it is a subject of substantive
law, and should be passed by an act of Congress. The Court discussed this
distinction in the early case of Bustos v. Lucero: 35
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term
which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system
prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J., 980.)
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress
for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which
declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment
for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who
commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step
taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.
Evidence — which is "the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified
with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights
are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading,
evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.)
The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules
of Court. We can not tear down Section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of
evidence embodied in these Rules.
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U.S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United
States Supreme Court said:
"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial
opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation
may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of
evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386,
390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U.S.
221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
443. And there may be procedural changes which
operate to deny to the accused a defense available
under the laws in force at the time of the commission
of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a
harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the
constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U.S.,
221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs.
Utah, 170 U.S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620.
But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the
mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not
deprive the accused of a defense and which operate
 only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after
indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be
witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification
of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post
facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U.S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4
Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute
which changes the rules of evidence after the
indictment so as to render admissible against the
accused evidence previously held
inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U.S., 380, 43
L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the
place of trial, Gut vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed.,
573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal
appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs.
Missouri, 152 U.S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 570." SDHTEC

xxx xxx xxx

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is
incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question
of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.)
It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which
legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without
touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is
impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs.
Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme
Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and
the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary
manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited
and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's
power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of
procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This
power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general,
complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and
different rules without regard to their source and discarding old
ones.
To emphasize, the distinction in criminal law is this: substantive law
is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment
for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which
provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished. 36
Based on the above, it may be gleaned that the chain of custody rule
is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure. It is therefore the Court
who has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Relevant
portions of decisions elucidating on the chain of custody rule are quoted
below:
Saraum v. People: 37
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of
the persons who handled the confiscated items for the purpose
of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were
seized from the accused until the time they are presented in
court. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Mallillin v. People: 38
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited
substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact
that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in
these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized
possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact
of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the
first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also
be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations
omitted.)
These are matters well within the powers of courts to appreciate and
rule upon, and so, when the courts find appropriate, substantial
compliance with the chain of custody rule as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved may warrant the
conviction of the accused. This is the rationale, grounded on the
constitutional power of the Court, to pass upon the credibility and
admissibility of evidence that underlies the proviso in Section 21 (a) of
the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165.
To conclude, this Court has consistently espoused the time-honored
doctrine that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the findings
of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain
facts of substance and value, which have been plainly overlooked, might
affect the result of the case. 39 We do not believe that the explainable
deviations to the chain of custody rule demonstrated by the police officers
involved in this case are reason enough to overturn the findings of the trial
court judge, who personally observed and weighed the testimony of the
witnesses during trial and examined the evidence submitted by both
parties.
In light of the foregoing, we are compelled to dismiss the present
appeal and affirm the conviction of Moner for the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 27, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Del Castillo and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., is on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, *** J., please see Dissenting Opinion.

Separate Opinions
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., dissenting:

I respectfully submit my dissent to the ponencia which affirmed the

conviction of accused-appellant Teng Moner y Adam for violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 1 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." As will be explained
hereunder, my dissent is centered on the police officers' unjustified
deviation from the chain of custody procedure as required by RA 9165, as
amended.
Under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA
10640, 2 the physical inventory and photography of the seized items should
be conducted in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, with an elected public
official, and representatives from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory. The
purpose of this rule is to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody
and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence which could considerably affect a case. 3 Non-compliance with
this requirement, however, would not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. 4 AScHCD

Case law states that in determining whether or not there was indeed
a justifiable reason for the deviation in the aforesaid rule on witnesses, the
prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting
the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable — without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances — is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." 5 Verily,
mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to
contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for
non-compliance.
In this case, while the police officers indeed conducted an inventory
of the seized items as evidenced by the Receipt of Property Turned Over, 6 a
review of such document readily shows that no elected public official,
representative from the DOJ, or representative from the media signed the
same; thus, indicating that such required witnesses were absent during the
conduct of inventory. The foregoing facts were confirmed by no less than
the members of the buy-bust team who, unfortunately,
offered no explanation for the non-compliance with the rule on required
witnesses. 7 To reiterate, the arresting officers are compelled not only to
state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the
Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated
procedure, and that under the given circumstance, their actions were
reasonable. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable
grounds or show that special circumstances exist which would excuse their
transgression, I respectfully submit that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the items purportedly seized from the accused-appellant have been
compromised. To stress, the chain of custody procedure enshrined in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot
be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. 8
In the recent case of People v. Miranda, 9 the Court held that "as the
requirements are clearly set forth in the law, then the State retains
the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the
drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the
defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the
possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only
for the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon
further review."
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the above-stated reasons, I vote
to GRANT the appeal, and consequently, ACQUIT accused-appellant Teng
Moner y Adam.

Footnotes

*On leave.
**Per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018.
***Per Raffle dated February 26, 2018.
1.Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla with
Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Agnes Reyes-Carpio
concurring.
2.CA rollo, pp. 73-92; penned by Presiding Judge Henri Jean-Paul B. Inting.
3.Records, p. 2.
4.Id. at 35-36.
5.Rollo, pp. 6-9.
6.CA rollo, p. 92.
7.Rollo, p. 20.
8.CA rollo, p. 110.
9.Ampatuan v. People, 667 Phil. 747, 755 (2011).
10.771 Phil. 311, 326-327 (2015).
11.People v. Mamalumpon, 767 Phil. 845, 855 (2015).
12.People v. Castro, 711 Phil. 662, 673 (2013).
13.People v. Cunanan, 756 Phil. 40, 50 (2015).
14.TSN, October 18, 2005, pp. 27-40.
15.TSN, July 25, 2006, p. 64.
16.780 Phil. 681 (2016).
17.Id. at 694-695.
18.753 Phil. 200 (2015).
19.Id. at 214.
20.Rollo, p. 18.
21.TSN, June 4, 2008, p. 7.
22.People v. Ygot, G.R. No. 210715, July 18, 2016, 797 SCRA 87, 93.
23.People v. Minanga, 751 Phil. 240, 249 (2015).
24.Ambre v. People, 692 Phil. 681, 695 (2012).
25.Saraum v. People, 779 Phil. 122, 133 (2016).
26.614 Phil. 710, 741-742 (2009), citing People v. Del Monte, 575 Phil. 577, 586
(2008).
27.Supra note 25 at 133.
28.Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil.
543, 548-549 (2010).
29.Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees, 626 Phil. 93, 106 (2010).
30.52 F. 3d 58 — United States Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 1995, citing United
States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982).
31.Cornell University Law School Legal Information
Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/evidence. Last visited on March
1, 2017.
32.Evidence Rule 901 (a) states that if the government offers physical evidence (or
testimony describing physical evidence) in a criminal trial, and if that physical
evidence "is of such a nature as not to be readily identifiable," or if the
physical evidence is "susceptible to adulteration, contamination,
modification, tampering, or other changes in form attributable to accident,
carelessness, error or fraud," then the government must, as foundational
matter, "demonstrate [to a] reasonable certainty that the evidence is x x x
properly identified and free of the possible taints" identified in the rule.
33.Rules of Court.
34.Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 1.
35.81 Phil. 640, 649-652 (1948).
36.22 C.J.S. 49.
37.Supra note 25 at 132.
38.576 Phil. 576, 586-587 (2008).
39.People v. Mercado, 755 Phil. 863, 874 (2015).
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., dissenting:
1.Entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
Repealing Republic Act No. 6425, Otherwise Known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes," approved on June 7, 2002.
2.Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE
GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'" approved on July 15, 2014. The crime subject of this
 case was allegedly committed on April 23, 2005, prior to the enactment of RA
10640.
3.See People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 764 (2014).
4.People v. Goco, G.R. No. 219584, October 17, 2016, 806 SCRA 240, 252. See
also People v. Almorfe, 631 Phil. 51, 60 (2010).
5.People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1053 (2012).
6.See records, p. 100.
7.See Testimony of Police Officers (PO) 3 Edwin Lirio, TSN, September 19, 2006, pp.
65-66; Testimony of PO2 Joachim Panopio, TSN, February 14, 2006, pp. 10-
19; Testimony of PO2 Joachim Panopio, TSN, October 18, 2005, pp. 29-33.
8.Gamboa v. People, G.R. No. 220333, November 14, 2016, 808 SCRA 624, 637.
9. See G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018.

||| (People v. Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, [March 5, 2018])