Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Ecosystem Services
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecoser

Understanding the governance of the Payment for Environmental

Services Programme in Costa Rica: A policy process perspective
Jean-François Le Coq a,b,n, Geraldine Froger c, Denis Pesche a, Thomas Legrand d,
Fernando Saenz b
a
CIRAD, UMR ART-Dev, F-34398 Montpellier Cedex 5, France
b
UNA, CINPE, Campus Benjamin Nunez, Lagunilla, Heredia, Costa Rica
c
LEREPS, Université de Toulouse, ENFA, IEP de Toulouse, UT1 Capitole, UT2J, 21 allée de Brienne, 31 000 Toulouse, France
d
UVSQ, Cemotev, 47°bd Vauban, 78047 Guyancourt Cedex, France

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Costa Rica was a pioneer in implementing the concept of ecosystem services through a dedicated policy
Received 10 November 2014 instrument: the Payment for Environmental Services programme (PESP) formalised in February 1996 in
Received in revised form the 4th forestry law. However, the policy process that led to the design of the PESP and its consequences
12 August 2015
for its subsequent governance have never been fully analysed. Our paper aims at answering three
Accepted 1 October 2015
Available online 17 October 2015
questions: why PESP was adopted, what are the factors which enabled the speedy adoption of PESP, and
how does the policy process affect the governance of the programme. Between 2008 and 2012, we in-
Keywords: terviewed 42 key representatives and stakeholders involved in the policy process. We also reviewed
Policy process laws, decrees, and academic and grey literature. We combined the sequential policy cycle model to
Environmental services
identify the sequences of the genesis of the PESP from the problem setting to the decision sequence, and
Interest groups
a cognitive approach to the policy process to identify the internal and external factors that led to its
Governance
Forest conservation genesis. We show that the PESP was rapidly adopted because of the particular domestic context, plus
Costa Rica several internal and exogenous factors. First, deforestation was widely acknowledged and forestry in-
centive instruments already existed as did consolidated forestry organisations and institutions. Second,
compromises were reached between leading actors in a context in which the forestry sector interest
group was the most powerful. Third, public subsidies were banned in the framework of an international
agreement on trade while the international carbon market offered new opportunities. The key elements
of the governance of the Costa Rican PESP, such as its scope, nature and decision structure, reflect the
existing balance of power between interest groups from different sectors (forestry, conservation, agri-
culture) involved in the management of forested areas. We conclude that analysing the policy process is
important to understand PES governance and to promote sound PES development.
& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have received a
great deal of attention as an instrument to support conservation
effort (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Wunder, 2005), but the role
of interplay between actors in the emergence and design of this
instrument has been far less studied (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008;
Corbera et al., 2009; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). Costa Rica, con-
sidered worldwide as a pioneer country for environmental ser-
vices, developed a specific policy instrument: the Payment for
Environmental Services Programme (PESP). Whereas in many
countries PES remain local, Costa Rica developed a national system
n the emergence of PESP as a social and institutional innovation
Correspondence to: CIRAD, ART-Dev, TA C-113, 73 rue Jean-François Breton,
34398 Montpellier Cedex 5, France. Fax: þ 33 4 67 61 44 15
E-mail address: jflecoq@cirad.fr (J.-F. Le Coq).
that was institutionalised by the 4th forestry law (#7575) as early
as 1996, i.e., prior to popularisation of the environmental services
concept and the first definition of PES schemes (Wunder, 2005). As
a pioneer case, the Costa Rican PES experience has been thor-
oughly described (Chomitz et al., 1999; Camacho et al., 2000;
Castro et al., 2000; Pagiola, 2008) and its results in terms of en-
vironmental effects or poverty reduction largely assessed (Miranda
et al., 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007;
Locatelli et al., 2008; Barton et al., 2009; Daniels et al., 2010;
Porras, 2010; Pfaff and Robalino, 2012; Robalino and Pfaff, 2013).
However, the policy process that led to the emergence of the
Costa Rican PESP and its consequences for its subsequent gov-
ernance have never been fully analysed. Some authors analysed
(Camacho et al., 2000; Segura-Bonilla, 2003) arguing that PESP
represented a new way of considering the environment resulting

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.003
2212-0416/& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
254 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265

Table 1
Key features of PESP and major changes during its implementation from 1997 to 2014. (Source: authors based on Pagiola, 2008; Le Coq et al., 2013; Matulis, 2013; Porras
et al. 2013, and the revision of forestry law #7575 and decrees, and interviews with FONAFIFO administration).

Key features 1997–2001 2002–2006 2007–2014

Scope Forest and forest plantation

Ecosystem services 4 Environmental services: mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, hydrological services, biodiversity conservation, and scenic beauty
Payment system 3 PES modalities: -forest protection, -re- -Suppression of PES for forest man- 10 PES modalities enabling differentiation of payment ac-
forestation, -forest management agement-Creation of PES for agrofor- cording to the importance of the ES (PES conservation in
estry systems biodiversity hotspots, or water services; PES for pasture re-
generation in Kyoto lands); -Reintroduction of PES for forest
management (2010)
Revalorisation of PES amount for reforestation
Prioritisation of payments according to the location of plots (biological corridor and low development
index) enabling some degree of payment targeting Creation of indigenous PES to enable landholders
with no land title to be incorporated into PES
Management Shared between FONAFIFO (fund raising Operational management concentrated in FONAFIFO, which is in charge of promotion, selection of
system and administration) and SINAC (priority beneficiaries, and administration of the fund SINAC is primarily involved in criteria priority setting and
and selection of beneficiaries) control of deforestation
Development of GIS control and monitoring
Creation of quotas for local forestry organisations
Monitoring and checking contract completion by forest landowners by the forestry regent supervised by Colegio de agronomos (CIA)
Financial and administrative control of the programme by the Contraloria General de la Republica (CGR)
Board of FONAFIFO with 5 members: 3 public, and 2 private representatives nominated by the National Forestry Office (ONF)
Funding system 100% Public funding through an oil tax Oil tax þ international loans and grants Oil tax þ international loans and donations þ private con-
tributions þwater tariff

NB: FONAFIFO: Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal; SINAC: Sistema Nacional de Área de Conservación; CIA: Colegio de Ingenieros Agrónomos; ONF: Oficina Nacional
Forestal; CGR: Contraloría General de la republica.

from a learning process. On the other hand, Pagiola (2008) high-
lighted the continuity of the PESP in comparison of previous policy
instruments to support the Costa Rican forestry sector, and con-
sidered that the main changes were the justification of the forestry
support from the wood industry in the provision of ES, and the
source of funding for this support policy. Fletcher and Breitling
(2012) argued that PESP is the continuation of public intervention,
while Matulis (2013) saw a shift towards a neoliberal policy, and
Brockett and Gottfried (2002) saw the emergence of a hybrid
regime.
In this paper, our objective is to thoroughly analyse the policy
process which led to the Costa Rican PESP in order to better un-
derstand the current governance of the payments for Environ-
mental Services as an instrument to foster forest conservation. We
specifically address the three following questions: Why was PESP
selected as a policy instrument in the Costa Rican context? Which
factors enabled the rapid adoption of PESP? How did the policy
process shape the current governance of the PESP? We hypothe-
sised that the rapid adoption of the Costa Rican Payment for En-
vironmental Services Programme (PESP) was due to the specific
context and to a combination of several internal and exogenous
factors, and that the main feature of the PES governance reflected
the balance of power between different interest groups involved in
the policy process.
2. Background: brief history of the PESP
percentage of fuel tax. In line with the existing forestry incentives
derived from previous laws, the PESP initially consisted in three
PES contracts, so called PES modalities: forest protection, refor-
estation, and forest management (Pagiola, 2008; Daniels et al.,
2010) but by 2014, it had evolved into 16 modalities1.
PESP underwent changes during its implementation with re-
spect to funding sources, the payment system, and administrative
management (Le Coq et al., 2013; Porras et al., 2013), but some key
features of PESP governance have remained unchanged since its
inception (Table 1). First, the main funding sources are still public
funds, in particular fuel tax (Blackman and Woodward, 2010), even
if the funding sources have been diversified (Matulis, 2013). Sec-
ond, PESP is an input-based PES (Engel et al., 2008) and its degree
of commoditisation is low (Muradian et al., 2010), even if the
prioritisation system for conservation contracts has been en-
hanced to take into account forest potential for biodiversity con-
servation or for the provision of water services (Le Coq et al.,
2013). Moreover, the two main modalities are still “forest protec-
tion”, which is the main modality, and represents the most con-
tracts and the biggest area affected (89% of total PES area)2, and
“reforestation” which can be undertaken for wood production
(Lansing, 2013). Third, in terms of PESP management, the legal
composition of FONAFIFO board has remained unchanged (Ta-
ble 1) as has the control process of landowner contracts through
the private forestry regent and the overall supervision of the PESP
by the National System of the Conservation Area (Sistema Nacional
de Area de Conservacion – SINAC). The monitoring and evaluation
system is still oriented towards forested areas.

The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Pro-

gramme (PESP) was institutionalised with the 4th forestry law 3. Analytical framework and methodology
(#7575 of 1996). This law established three key components of
PESP (Pagiola, 2008): (1) recognition of the provision by the forest 3.1. Policy process analysis
and tree plantations of four environmental services: mitigation of
greenhouse gas emissions, hydrological services, biodiversity To analyse the emergence and implementation of the PESP, we
conservation, and scenic beauty; (2) a regulatory basis to contract
landowners for the services provided by their forest lands, and 1
FONAFIFO website: http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/psa/modalidades_psa.html –
recognition of the National Fund for Forest Financing (Fondo Na-
Accessed 2014-10-03.
cional de Financiamento Forestal, FONAFIFO) as administrator of the 2
Estimation of the authors based on FONAFIFO statistics for PES between 1997
programme; (3) the definition of a funding mechanism through a and 2011 available in FONAFIFO (2012).
 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265 255

4th forestry
law National PES Programme

1960 1990 1995 1996 1997 2013

(1) agenda (2) policy (3) policy (4) policy (5) policy
setting formulation adoption implementation evaluation

External and internal factors External and internal factors

during policy formulation during policy implementation
and adoption

Context prior
to policy change
Interaction between actors (interest groups)
with different resources
- Interests and cognitive patterns

- Institutions

- Ideas
Policy output :
4th forestry law and governance of the
Payment for Environmental Services Programme

Fig. 1. Analytical framework for the analysis of the policy process applied to the Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Programme (PESP), using the “3 I” model
developed by Hall (1997) and Surel (2000) and the five-step sequential model developed by Anderson (1975).

used an analytical framework derived from two complementary
streams of policy process analysis: the sequential model of public
policies, and a cognitive approach (Fig. 1).
The sequential model of public policies treats the policy process
as a succession of sequences. Since the first version of this model
(Laswell, 1956), scholars have proposed different ways of breaking
down the sequences (Brewer, 1974). Here, we used the five step
model developed by Anderson (1975) to identify the sequences of
the policy process of the PESP (Fig. 1): (1) the policy agenda, which
consists in the identification of the problem and raises of aware-
ness of the State, (2) policy formulation, which consists in devel-
oping a solution to the problem, (3) policy adoption, which is the
public decision to adopt the solution and develop an action pro-
gramme, (4) policy implementation, which is the action programme
implemented by the administrator of the programme, and (5)
policy evaluation of the results with respect to the objective of the
programme, which may provide feedback for a new cycle of se-
quences leading to a new policy.
The cognitive approach overcomes the limits of the sequential
model, such as the lack of causal theory, legalistic and top-down
bias, and oversimplification (Sabatier, 2007). We used two streams
of cognitive approaches to understand the causes of the policy
changes. To understand the situation prior to PESP adoption
(Fig. 1), we used the “3 I model” (Institutions, Interest and Idea)
developed by Hall (1997) and Surel (2000), who consider that
policy change results from the conjunction of three factors: In-
stitutions, Interests, and Ideas. To analyse the policy output, i.e. the
PESP principles and governance, we used the approach of Has-
senteufel (2008): we assumed policy output to be the result of the
interaction between the actors who developed strategies accord-
ing to their interests and their policy action resources.
3.2. ES and PES governance
As part of environmental governance (Lemos and Agrawal,
2006), ES and PES governance can be described through multiple
dimensions. To characterise PESP governance we consider two
dimensions. First, in line with the literature on PES governance
structure (Vatn, 2014), and the governance model (Matzdorf et al.,
2013), we consider the type of actors involved in the decision
process regarding PES. In particular, as governance differs from
government since it involves a different range of actors (private,
community, etc.) from those in the public sector (government), we
pay particular attention to the respective role of the state and of
non-state actors in the PESP decision process and management.
Second, we consider the key features that characterise ES gov-
ernance between market and hierarchy (Muradian and Rival,
2012) and the key characteristics that affect PES results (Sattler
et al., 2013). Thus we consider (1) the source of funding of PES,
including its origin (state/non state) and nature (compulsory/vo-
luntary), (2) the type of ES considered, how they are bundled and
their degree of commoditization, and (3) the system of payment,
including the mode of payment (input or output-based), type (in-
kind/in-cash), frequency (one-off, periodical), timing (upfront,
after ES delivery), and eligibility (horizontal, targeted3). Additional
attention is paid to the conditionality of PES including technical
and administrative requisites as part of the rule of access to PES.
3.3. Research protocol
To capture the governance features of PES and the underlying
PESP policy process, we combined desk reviews and direct inter-
views with stakeholders (Table 2). To identify the different stages
of the policy process, we reviewed literature on forest policies and
PESP. We captured PESP governance through a review of the
academic literature and Spanish and English grey literature on the
PESP, which we complemented with a review of the law, decrees,
and manuals of PESP procedures and direct interviews with the
technical staff of FONAFIFO. Based on this information, we re-
constructed the initial state and evolution of the different features
of PESP governance.
3
Horizontal PES refers to open to all potential ES providers, while targeted PES
aim either at a specific area or a specific type of providers (Sattler et al., 2013).
256 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265

To grasp the conditions of emergence and shape of the project,

Description of governance and timeline of chan-

Summary of debate Timeline of modifications in

Stakeholders' interests and positions regarding

we reviewed the different versions of law projects, and the min-

the text of the law List of stakeholders Stake-

utes of the debate in the legislative process of the 4th forestry law.
Further, between 2008 and 2012, we conducted 42 face-to-face
qualitative interviews with key representatives and stakeholders
Intermediary research products
who were involved in the policy process (see Appendix A for the

holders' interests and positions

list of stakeholders interviewed). We identified the interviewees
using the snowballing method (i.e. the first actors were identified
thanks to their direct involvement in the policy process and were
then asked to identify other actors involved in the process); they

ges in governance
were deputies, civil servants, representatives of organisations, and
scholars. The interviewees were invited to describe their own

governance
trajectory, the role they had played in the emergence and evolu-
Timeline

tion of the PESP, as well as their own perception of the PESP (see
Appendix B for the interview guidelines). From these individual
interviews, we characterised the key factors which explain the
holders involved in adoption of the 4th law
Minutes of debates Interviews with stake-

Law, decree and manual of procedures In-

Face-to-face interviews with stakeholders

adoption of the PESP and its key governance features as set down
in the 4th forestry law. We also recorded their interest in PESP and
their perception of its main governance features and the changes it
involved in PESP implementation

underwent during the implementation phase. By crossing in-

terviews with PESP managers

formation from individual interviews with some grey literature, to

Review of the literature

cross check the statements made by the interviewees, we were

able to characterise the positions, strategies, and resources of the
interest groups involved in the process, and link PESP governance
and PES design
Data sources

to interplay between the stakeholders.

4. Results
Scope PES modality Access condi-

4.1. Context prior to PESP adoption

Internal decision Management

Interest groups Justifications

Institutions Interests Ideas

The context prior to policy formulation and the adoption in

1996 of the 4th forestry law, which included the PESP principles,
was characterised by three key elements: an acknowledged de-
Date of key event

forestation issue and existing forestry policy framework and in-

tions Priority

struments, the consolidated forestry administration and the pri-

Resources
Variables

vate forestry representation of interests, and the emergence of

new ideas regarding forest function and conservation instruments.
Research stages, analytical concepts, variables, data sources and intermediary research products.

4.1.1. Deforestation issue and policy framework

Interplay between actors (Hassenteufel, 2008)
Matzdorf et al., 2013; Vatn, 2014) and char-

Since 1969 and until the creation of the PESP in 1996 (Table 3),
PES Governance (Muradian & Rival , 2012;

Costa Rica had progressively developed a support policy for the

forestry sector characterised by a three pronged strategy, which is
now included in the PESP: reforestation, sustainable forest man-
acteristics (Sattler et al., 2013)

agement, and conservation of existing forest. This policy consisted

Policy cycle (Anderson, 1975)
3 I (Hall, 1997; Surel, 2000)

in supporting forest landowners, from large forestry companies to

small-scale farmers or landowners. Hence after a sharp decrease in
forested area, from 53% of the country in 1961 to 21% in 1987
Analytical concept

(FONAFIFO, 2012), resulting from intense land clearing especially

to develop beef cattle raising, facilitated by land colonisation po-
licies and the expansion of the road network, deforestation began
to slow down in late 1980s due to the combination of socio-eco-
nomic factors, such as the reduction in the price of meat and the
first effects of most recent incentives encouraging reforestation
Analysis of key factors explaining PESP
Characterisation of key features of PES
Analysis of key factors in the adoption

(Calvo-Alvarado et al., 2009). However, in 1996, stakeholders still

governance features and how they
Identification of policy cycle phases

considered deforestation to be an important issue because the first

statistics providing evidence for this reversal were only published
in 1997 after the adoption of the PESP.
and design of the PESP

and how it evolved

4.1.2. Public administration and private organisation of forestry

sector
Research stages

During the period 1969–1995, along with the forest policy

framework, public institutions dealing with forestry and environ-
evolved

mental issues developed, and private representation of the for-

Table 2

estry sector was consolidated.

The public forestry administration, which was almost non-
Table 3
Costa Rican legal forest framework and policy instruments from 1969 until the creation of the PESP (1996) (Sources: our interviews with stakeholders 2008–2012; Camacho et al., 2000).

Year Policy document Policy orientation Policy instrument Mechanism Beneficiary

J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265

1969 First forestry law (#4465) Promote reforestation through forest – – –
plantation
1979 Reforestation law Promote reforestation through forest Income tax reduction Fiscal incentive to compensate for plantation estab- Large companies who pay income tax
plantation lishment and maintenance costs
1986 Second forestry law Promote reforestation through forest Forestry credit certificate (CAF)a Fiscal incentive to compensate for plantation estab- Small and medium enterprises; farmers
(#7032) plantation lishment and maintenance costs
1988 Promote reforestation through forest Forestry credit certificate paid in advance Idem 1986, but paid in advance Small and medium forestry farmers who
plantation (CAFA)b belong to organisations
1988 Promote tree plantation in agro-forestry Forestry development fund (FDF)c Direct support Small and medium scale farmers (even
systems without a land title)
1990 Third forestry law (# 7174) Promote reforestation through forest CAF, CAFA and FDF Direct support Small medium, and large forestry
plantation companies
1992 Reduce deforestation due to wood extrac- Forestry credit certificate for forest man- Direct support) Forest landowners
tion practices agement (CAFMA)d
1995 Conserve existing forest Certificate for forest protectiond Direct support Forest landowners
1996 Fourth forestry law (# Promote reforestation, sustainable man- Payment for Environmental Services Pro- Direct support (Payment for conservation, planta- Forest landowners
7575) agement and conservation gramme (PESP) tion, management of forest)

5: CPB, Certificado de Protección del Bosque.

a
CAF, Certificado de Abono Forestal.
b
CAFA, Certificado de Abono Forestal por Adelantado.
c
FDF, Fondo para el Desarrollo Forestal.
d
CAFMA, Certificado de Abono Forestal por Manejo del Bosque.

257
258 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265

International Convention of the environment

External World Trade Organization
Development of international
factors negotiation
mechanisms of compensation

1994: Ratification of 1995 : FMI/CR agreement

Climate Change protocol on a ban on subsidies

Debate on new Adoption

3 Forestry laws of 4th forestry
forestry law projects Reformulation of a
proposal forestry law proposal law
Policy
process (including
ES recognition
1990 1994 1995 and PES principles) February
1996

1994 : New government and Minister of Environment

Internal Event : “from forest to society”
factors
1994 : 3 international conference
on ecological economics

1994 : Creation and strengthening of Costa Rican Chamber of Forestry

Experimental local projects with contractual payment as compensation for forest protection

Fig. 2. Key internal and external factors in the 4th forestry law and the adoption of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) in Costa Rica (1990–1996).

existent in the 1960s, expanded in the 1970s and 1980s along with
the implementation of the first and second forestry laws and the
creation of the Direction of Forestry (DGF) within the Ministry of
Agriculture. In 1990, forestry sector institutions gained more au-
tonomy and institutional strength in the policy arena thanks to the
creation of the Ministry of Natural Resources Energy and Mine
(Ministry de Recursos Naturales, Energia y Mineria – MIRENEM)
which merged the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mine with
institutions such as the General Department of Forestry, the
Wildlife Department, and the National Parks Services. Despite
these enhancements, the Direction of Forestry was unable to as-
sume proper control over all forestry activities (Brockett and
Gottfried, 2002).
During the same period, the private forestry interest groups
including small- and large-scale forest owners and their re-
presentation at local and national levels were gradually con-
solidated. In the 1980s, the General Department of Forestry pro-
moted the creation of numerous local forestry organisations as
interlocutors and intermediaries to facilitate the implementation
of the forestry policy aimed at smallholders—such as CODEFORSA
in the northern region, ASIREA in the Caribbean zone, COOPE-
MADEREROS in the southern zone, the CAC Hojancha in the
northeast region, AGUADEFOR in the Guanacaste region, and
FUNDECOR in the central valley region. These organisations were
created to provide economic, administrative and technical support
to forestry farmers. They also benefited from support from inter-
national cooperation and national public policy (Barrantes, 2009).
In 1989, the representation of the interest of small and medium
forestry farmers was strengthened at national level, with the
creation of the “Peasant forestry national council” (Junta Nacional
Forestal Campesina – JUNAFORCA), which was the result of an in-
itiative of a number of local forestry organisations, and which
defends sustainable community management of the forest and
agroforestry. This organisation shared views and interests with
environmentalist organisations and with representatives of small
farmers, especially with the National Peasant Platform, which was
founded at the same time (Mesa Nacional Campesina – MNC).
Regarding the interests of forestry companies, two representative
organisations were created in the 1980s: the Chamber of Reforestation
Enterprises (Cámara Nacional de Reforestadores – CANAFOR) to defend
the interests of the large forestry enterprises who developed refor-
estation programmes in the 1970s and 1980s; and the National
Chamber of the Wood Industry (Cámara Nacional de la Industria Ma-
derera – CANAIMA) to represent large-scale saw mills and wood
processing factories. These two organisations were not close to JU-
NAFORCA because of their different social base and the classical dif-
ference in the views of large/small structures, business oriented/family
oriented activities, and producers/processors opposing economic
interests.
Further, in 1994, with the support of USAID (United States
Agency for International Development) and the GTZ (Gesellschaft
für technische Zusammenarbeit), the Costa Rican Chamber of For-
estry (Camara Costaricense Forestal – CCF) was created to represent
the whole private forestry sector of Costa Rica. This organisation
began with some representatives of forestry and large-scale timber
companies who were convinced of the need to unite the sector
and introduce more sustainable practices. By promoting agree-
ment and dialogue among the stakeholders of the forestry sector,
the Chamber of Forestry expanded its memberships to include
some local forestry organisations. The Chamber of Forestry began a
dialogue with JUNAFORCA with the aim of achieving a wider re-
presentation of the forestry sector.
4.1.3. Emergence of new ideas on forest and forestry
In the early 1990s, two new ideas about forest and forestry policy
and instruments emerged in the public and private forestry, aca-
demic, and cooperation sectors. The first idea was to consider forest
not only as a producer of a commodity (wood) but also as a provider
of a number of valuable services for society. The second idea was
that a positive incentive to maintain forest could be an effective way
to overcome the deforestation issue. In the private forestry sector,
large companies and small forestry producers' representatives were
convinced that sustainable practices required public support but
public funds were increasingly difficult to obtain in the context of
national budget deficits, stabilisation policies and structural adjust-
ment plans (De Camino et al., 2000). On one hand, organisations of
 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265 259

small forestry landowners with more conservationist views, such as

Favourable to conservation, not

Favourable to management, re-
Favourable to agroforestry PES
AGUADEFOR and CAC Hojancha, were questioning the logic of public
support for the forestry sector: “why give incentives to cut and plant

forestation, agroforestry
trees, instead of protecting the existing forest?” On the other hand,

Favourable to PES on
with the reduction in forested area, representatives of the wood

to management
industry were preoccupied with the sustainability of their own

Not favourable
PES modalities
activity.

agroforestry
In the academic sector, scientific studies in the 1960s were
oriented toward the inventory of natural resources to characterise
forest biodiversity. But, in the 1990s, new disciplines emerged
such as environmental and ecological economics. Many studies
assessed the economic benefits of national parks and natural re-

Favourable
sources, in order to demonstrate the importance of nature for

Sources of
funding
society. In the early 1990s, the first economic valuation of the
Monteverde reserve located in north-western Costa Rica was car-

–
ried out by Tropical Science Centre (TSC) with the support of
USAID, the World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy and
World Resources Institute (Echeverría et al., 1995). From 1993 on,
in the framework of the Collaborative Research in Environmental

Institutional
governance

Favourable
Economics and Development programme, an initiative by the In-

Objectives and positions of main interest groups with respect to forestry issues in 1995 in Costa Rica (Sources: our interviews with stakeholders 2008–2012).
ternational Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and
the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), the TSC undertook

–
Main objectives and interests related Position in the debate on the future 4th forestry law
numerous economic valuations of the environment (Rojas and
Aylward, 2003). In a complementary way, from 1993 to 1997, a

Recognition of PSE
project named “Economic Incentives for Watershed Protection”
was implemented in collaboration with the TSC and the Master’s

(Favourable)
mechanism

Favourable

Favourable

Favourable
Programme in Economic Policy of the Costa Rican National Uni-
versity. It consisted in 24 sub-studies and benefited from inputs
from a research team of 18 economists and natural scientists, and

–
led to the dissemination of a series of working papers. Meanwhile,

Recognition of ES provi-
Costa Rican scholars with relations with American scholars in-
creased their own skills in the economic valuation of the en-
sion by the forest
vironment. In 1994, the third International Conference of Ecolo-
gical Economics brought a large number of international scientists

(Favourable)
Mesa Nacional Campesina Develop agriculture and agroforestry Favourable

Favourable

Favourable
to Costa Rica (Costanza et al., 1996). This conference strengthened
this discipline in Costa Rica and raised the awareness of policy
makers and of society about the value of natural resources and
–

ecosystems, especially forested areas.

Sustain forestry activity (production

Sustain forestry activity (as income

Land use extension for agriculture

generation for local communities)

In the cooperation sector, new mechanisms to promote forest

Maintain biodiversity and natural

for local income diversification

protection and sustainable management practices were being ex-

perimented in the late 1980s and early 1990s at local scale, two
examples being the Boscosa project by the foundation Neotropica
of timber for industry)

in the Osa Peninsula (Southern region) (Campos Arce 1991; Gott-

fried et al., 1994), and the Foresta project (1989–1996) funded by
to forest issues

USAID and implemented by FUNDECOR in the central valley

ecosystems

(USAID, 1996). These projects empirically tested the very first ap-
plication of the principle of contractual payment for conservation.
This principle was included in the set of forestry instruments in
1995 with the creation of a “Certificate for Forest Protection”
(Table 3) which rapidly achieved success (FONAFIFO, 2005).
Costa Rican Chamber of
National Chamber of
Leading professional

4.2. The adoption of PESP, key factors and groups of actors

UPA Nacional
organisations

JUNAFORCA
Agriculture

The definition and adoption of the key principles of the PSEP

Forestry

took place within a short period (1995–1996) which corresponded

FECON

to the policy formulation and adoption sequences of the 4th for-

estry law adopted in February 1996 (Fig. 1). We identified the key
Large forestry company, the

internal and external factors that led to the rapid formulation and
Large farms (businesses)

adoption of this law and the interplays between the groups of

Small farms (peasants)

Ecologists associations
Small forestry farmers

–no opinion expressed.

actors in the decision process which led to the creation of the PESP.
Conservation sector
Agricultural sector

timber industry
Forestry sector
Interest group

4.2.1. Key internal and external factors in the policy formulation

In the early 1990s, three key factors encouraged the formula-
tion and rapid adoption of the 4th forestry law (Fig. 2).
Table 4

The first factor was external: the increasing importance of en-

vironmental issues on the international agenda. For the leaders of
260 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265
the forestry sector, especially the Chamber of Forestry and some
local organisations including FUNDECOR, the ratification of the
Climate Change and Biodiversity Convention in 1992 was an op-
portunity to finance the support required by the forestry sector.
This opportunity was strengthened by the ratification of the Cli-
mate Change Protocol by the government of Costa Rica in 19944.
This government initiative, which was supported by the forestry
sector, was rapidly exploited. Then, in 1995, the Office of joint
implementation (“Oficina Costaricense de Implementacion Con-
junta” – OCIC) was created to formulate carbon compensation
projects. The opportunity to finance forest policy for forest ser-
vices, in particular carbon sequestration, was promising.
The second factor was endogenous and political. In 1994, José
Maria Figueres Olsen, who had used the environmental issue as an
important electoral-campaign theme, was elected president. He
nominated a new Minister of Environment, Rene Castro, who was
a member of a network of American scholars specialised in en-
vironmental economics and of the national network of scholars
and forestry organisations. The Minister of Environment was
looking for a new way to conceptualise the benefits of the forest in
order to justify the need to support forestry. In 1994, the Minister
organised a large conference “From forest to society” with politi-
cians, scholars, and actors from the forestry sector, where he
publicly introduced the notion of environmental services and the
need to pay for these services (Costa Rica. Presidencia de la Re-
pública, 1994).
The third and key factor came from the international scene and
external actors. It was the ban on subsidies to productive sectors
following an agreement between the Ministry of Finance, the
President of Costa Rica, and the International Monetary Fund in
the framework of World Trade Organisation negotiation (De Ca-
mino et al., 2000; Brockett and Gottfried, 2002). This ban threa-
tened existing incentives and gave the formulation and the
adoption sequences of the future 4th forestry law a sense of ur-
gency. The Ministry of Environment exploited environmental ser-
vices and paying for them as a new way of legitimising support for
the forestry sector, switching from public subsidy incentives to a
market-based instrument rhetoric.
4.2.2. The interest groups around forest issue and their resources
We identified three main interest groups with divergent views
of the forest issue, the forestry law and instruments in 1995
(Table 4): (1) the forestry sector groups comprising the large for-
estry companies and the wood industry represented mainly by the
Chamber of Forestry (CCF), and the small-scale forestry farmer
landowners represented by the JUNAFORCA; (2) the conservationist
group mainly represented by the Costa Rican federation of con-
servationists (FECON); and (3) the agricultural sector groups com-
posed of large-scale farmers represented by the National Chamber
of Agriculture (CNA) and some interprofessional bodies such as the
agro-industrial sugarcane league (LAICA), and the small and med-
ium-scale farmers and peasants who in the mid-1990s, were re-
presented by two main organisations, the National Syndicate of
small and medium agricultural producers (UPA Nacional) and the
National Platform of Peasants (MNC).
In 1995–1996, while the formulation and adoption of the for-
estry law and the design of the PESP was underway, the forestry
4
In addition, Costa Rica was already committed to conservation at national
level with the development of national parks and conservation areas (Evans, 1999)
as well as at international level with the ratification of multiple international
conventions including the convention on the Protection of Flora, Fauna and Natural
Scenic Beauty in the Countries of the Americas (1940), the Convention on Inter-
national Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES – 1975), the
Convention on Wetlands (RAMSAR – 1975) or the Convention on Biological Di-
versity (CBD – 1992).
sector interest groups had access to major resources and alliances
to defend their point of view (Table 4). First, they had strong in-
stitutional and political resources thanks to their alliance with the
Ministry of Environment. This Ministry was part of the main-
stream of the National Liberation Party which had just won the
elections and had a majority in the national assembly. Second, the
forestry sector had strong organisational resources. The Chamber
of Forestry, which played a leading role in the dialogue process
and benefited from international cooperation, also benefited from
strong leadership and technical capacities at that time. The for-
estry sector enjoyed strong and broad representativeness, as it
represented both large companies and small landowners located
throughout the country. Third, these interest groups benefited
from academic support since their proposal was in line with the
views of many scholars in Costa Rica.
The conservationist interest groups had been increasing in
importance since the mid-1980s. Many local environmentalist
associations and NGOs, which, in 1989, were grouped together in
the FECON network, denounced local environmental issues. This
network had connections with some civil servants at the Ministry
of Environment, but their conflicting position limited the extent of
their institutional alliances. Politically, even if a small fraction of
the National Platform of Peasants (MNC) shared some of their
ideas, no clear alliance was formed between deputies and re-
presentative of the conservationist movement. The conserva-
tionists had good academic support from biologists and ecologists
who were losing their audience in the local scientific debate faced
with the rise of ecological and environmental economics. Despite
support from international NGOs, their financial resources were
limited. Ultimately, favourable public opinion was their main re-
source, since Costa Rican citizens had become interested in their
natural resources through mass media campaigns.
Interest groups in the agricultural sector were traditionally the
main opponents of forest conservation since their economic de-
velopment depended on land colonisation. However, they were
poorly invested in the forestry agenda negotiation, because of an
economic crisis (with falling meat and coffee prices), and an in-
stitutional crisis with the reform of agricultural public adminis-
tration and a reduction of public support (Lansing, 2013). In ad-
dition, their representation was not united as there were strong
opposition to the agricultural agenda between representatives of
large-scale companies and those of small famers. In addition, the
small farmers were divided among themselves, which further
sapped their power.
In addition to the three main interests groups described above,
it is worth noting that indigenous groups, who collectively manage
large extents of forest in their territories, were poorly integrated in
the forestry law policy process. Indigenous territories have only
benefitted from the PESP since 2002 thanks to the creation of
Agroforestry PES contract in 2002 following the mobilisation of
indigenous and small holder groups (Rosa et al., 2004).
4.2.3. From 1995 to February 1996: the political negotiation process
before the adoption of the 4th forestry law and the PESP
In the early 1990s, a proposal for a new forestry law was dis-
cussed in the national assembly but a consensus was not reached
(Brockett and Gottfried, 2002). In the new political context of
1995, three forestry law proposals were introduced one after an-
other, each supporting different views. The first proposal, made by
the Ministry of Environment, had the support of the private for-
estry sector (especially the Chamber of Forestry) and favoured a
productive strategy. The second proposal, called “Cut only what
has been planted” (Cortar únicamente lo que ha sido plantado –
CULPA) was submitted by a deputy belonging to a minority frac-
tion of the majority party in the assembly, which supported a
more conservationist strategy, as it proposed to ban the
 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265
exploitation of natural forest. A third proposal was introduced by
the Committee of the National Assembly in charge of the in-
struction of this law, which aimed to reconcile the previous views.
Finally, faced with the emergence of an incentive system for
forestry activities, a compromise was found and formalised in the
4th forestry law. The ideas of ES provision by forest and wood
plantations, as well as the principle of PES (earmarked oil tax and a
management role for FONAFIFO), were introduced in the final
version of the law, as a justification for supporting forest produc-
tion and the conservation of forest on private land, as well as
promising mechanisms to finance forestry incentives. The main
point under discussion was the prohibition of land use change for
forested areas. This ban on deforestation was not in the interest of
the agricultural sector as it would limit agricultural growth. It was
not in the interest of the forestry sector, as it restricted their rights
on private property. However, the forestry sector representatives
finally accepted it, as it was part of the compromise required to get
the law accepted. Moreover, the ban was balanced by the creation
of PESP to maintain forestry incentives.
5. Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the policy process and the in-
terplay between interest groups make it possible to understand
the extent and pace of change that the adoption of the PESP re-
presents, the respective roles of international and national factors,
as well as of scientific information in the design of the PESP, and
the key elements of PESP governance. We then draw some con-
clusions regarding the analysis of the policy process to help un-
derstand PES diversity and to support PES emergence in contexts
that prevail in other countries.
5.1. Policy process: pace and extent of change
The rapid pace of the policy process leading to PESP adoption
reflected the sense of urgency created by external threats, such as
the ban on public subsidies to productive sectors in the framework
of the World Trade Organisation negotiation, to the sustainability
of existing forestry incentives. This particular combination in time
led to a specific policy window (Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007)
that was evidenced in different countries by the increased use of
the ES concept (Le Coq et al., 2012), as one of the factors enabling
the promotion of ES (Swallow et al., 2010).
Although the PESP has been considered as a policy innovation,
in fact, the change in practices it represents was limited (Pagiola,
2008; Fletcher and Breitling, 2012). PESP, as a continuation of
previous instruments, i.e., forest credit certificates, can be inter-
preted as the result of the primacy of the forestry interests groups
in the policy process whose interest was in maintaining existing
instruments. This continuity is embedded in a long term trajectory
of conservation commitments of Costa Rica (Evans, 1999) and is
consistent with the path dependency observed in the changes in
environmental policies in other countries (Froger and Méral,
2012).
Actually, most of the changes occurred in the implementation
sequence of the programme (i.e. after 1997) due both to the
change in the balance of power and resources between interest
groups (Le Coq et al., 2013) and to the “learn by doing” process
(Porras et al., 2013). These changes did not alter the core govern-
ance feature of PESP (scope, input-based nature of payment,
structure of decision) (Table 1) but they did help reinforce the
legitimacy of the programme, which is a key factor for PES sus-
tainably (Corbera et al., 2007). Changes occurred regarding PES
modalities. A PES modality for agroforestry system was included in
2003 to incorporate smallholder farmers in the programme. The
261
forest management modality was abandoned between 2003 and
2009 following denunciation by conservation groups, but was re-
activated under pressure from groups supporting productive for-
estry (Le Coq et al., 2013; Porras et al., 2013). Indeed, even if
groups interested in productive forestry argue for the develop-
ment of a reforestation and forest management modality, these
modalities represent a minor part of the budget compared with
conservation contracts, which represent 89% of the total area un-
der PES contracts (FONAFIFO, 2012). The predominance of the
conservation contract can be explained by different factors. First,
conservation PES contracts have been considered by the produc-
tive forestry interests as a compensation for the prohibition of land
use change laid down in the forestry law, and are thus not opposed
to this modality (Le Coq et al., 2012). Second, demand for refor-
estation (as well as for forest management) PES is limited due to
technical and economic constraints (Locatelli et al., 2008 ; Navarro
and Bermúdez, 2013). Third, the demand for conservation PES is
high – even higher than the funds available (Pagiola, 2008; Ma-
tulis, 2013), as it calls for limited investment. Fourth, the aware-
ness of the Costa Rican population of environment issues has been
increasing thanks to information distributed at different levels
(academic, institutions, professionals, mass media) on global
warming and biodiversity depletion, creating a “conservation
culture” in the country, within which cutting trees (from natural
forest, but even on reforested plots) has become unpopular,
thereby limiting the social acceptance of expanding such activities
(ONF, personal communication 2012). The other changes concern
the diversification and differentiation of conservation PES (Porras
et al., 2013) to increase its efficiency, the refinement of the selec-
tion procedure for conservation PES to ensure more transparency,
and the setting of quotas for forestry intermediary organisations
(Matulis, 2013; Bosselmann and Lund, 2013) to strengthen their
support for the programme and to facilitate access by small-
holders. Finally, some changes also occurred in the administration
of PESP. The civil servants status of FONAFIFO was adjusted to fit
the public administration law following the request the Contraloria
General de la Republica (Fonafifo, pers. com. 2012), which made it
possible to claim legitimacy vis-à-vis public procedure. The func-
tion of FONAFIFO was extended to include the selection of PESP
beneficiaries (Robalino et al., 2011) at the expense of SINAC office,
in order to make the process of recruitment of PES beneficiaries
more efficient. Nevertheless, the SINAC, which represents the in-
terest of biodiversity, still plays an important role, as it continues
to participate in the definition of the priority criteria for PES al-
location, and gives priority to forest areas located in protected
areas and biological corridors.
5.2. Influence of international actors
The genesis of PESP is an example of indirect and diffuse in-
ternational influence in which domestic interest groups domi-
nated the process, although external organisations could have
acquired a dominant position in policy making through financial
support or normative argumentation (Bernauer and Gampfer,
2013). Indeed, international conservation NGOs were not directly
involved in the genesis of the PESP, whereas in many countries
they have played a crucial role in the establishment of PES
(Wunder and Albán, 2008; Hrabanski et al., 2013). International
cooperation actors were not directly involved in the design of the
PESP, although they are directly involved in many other PES ex-
periments (Swallow et al., 2010). In Costa Rica, they facilitated
good conditions by supporting a technical consensus in the for-
estry sector (Brockett and Gottfried, 2002), and facilitated the
creation of the representative platform for the private forestry
sector. They also contributed by supporting two projects, Boscosa
and Reforesta, which were used as references for the national PES.
262 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265
The indirect influence of external actors was important in the
overarching environment of PESP design. Indeed, in the 1990s,
international actors, such as International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, supported a more neoliberal orientation of policies in
Costa Rica (Fletcher and Breitling, 2012).
Although the PESP design and its governance features derived
more from internal debate led by domestic interest groups than
from international normative debate, the influence of interna-
tional actors and norms became more direct and more rigorous
during the implementation sequence. This is illustrated by three
events: (1) the integration of funding from international co-
operation in the PESP since 2001 with the Ecomercado Project
funded by the World Bank and Global Environmental Fund (Pa-
giola, 2008); (2) the creation of the “regeneration modality” in
2004 to benefit from the specific condition set by the Kyoto pro-
tocol (Le Coq et al., 2013); and (3) the current REDD þ negotiation
process (Rosendal and Schei, 2014). International actors including
the World Bank have been influential in the integration of prior-
itisation criteria with respect to the poverty index and the inclu-
sion of a specific indigenous PES modality (Fonafifo staff, personal
communication; 2012).
5.3. The policy process explains PES governance features
Three specific key features of the PESP discussed in the litera-
ture can be understood by examining the PESP policy process: the
scope, the input-based payment associated with limited commo-
dification, and the structure of decision making.
The scope of the PESP includes the forest ecosystem and the
whole rural landscape. As it originated in the forestry sector, the
PESP did not intend to preserve a specific service, e.g. a hydraulic
oriented PES (Kosoy et al., 2007; Quintero et al., 2009), which can
cover all the land uses in a watershed. The forestry law states the
recognition of ES from a forest and from tree plantations, which
mainly concern exotic species (Baltodano, 2007). This scope re-
flects the view of the forest as productive, which is supported by
the private forestry sector. The forestry law also deregulated for-
estry plantations, eliminating any need for permits for harvesting,
transporting, industrialising, or exporting plantation timber
(Brockett and Gottfried, 2002), which also supports forestry
groups’ interests. The legal scope of the PESP justifies support for
plantation, although this has been denounced by the conservation
groups who defend the restoration of the forest ecosystem (Bal-
todano, 2007). It also justifies payment to support the adoption of
sustainable forest management, which has also been denounced
by conservation groups (Le Coq et al., 2013).
The input-based payment (Engel et al., 2008) and the low
commodification (Muradian et al., 2010) of the PESP result from
three characteristics of the policy process and the interplay be-
tween actors: (1) the rapid pace of the policy sequence, as it was
easier to maintain the input-based payment of the previous for-
estry incentives than to create a more complex output-based
payment; (2) the willingness of the forestry interest groups to
justify the forest incentive, not the provision of a specific ecosys-
tem service, like the Mexican PES programmes, which are oriented
toward water services (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008), or carbon and
biodiversity (Corbera et al., 2009); and (3) the conception and
justification of PES as a compensation for the ban on changes in
forest land use (Legrand et al., 2013), not for the remuneration of
the provision of specific ES. Accordingly, the monitoring process of
the PESP has been focussed on forested area and not on ES pro-
vision, even though the overall objective of the PESP should be ES
provision and not forest conservation per se (Contraloria General
de la Republica, 2011).
The PESP structure of decision is controlled by forestry-oriented
entities. The FONAFIFO management board includes two private
forestry sector representatives, one from the wood industry and one
small forestry landowner, both designated by the National Forestry
Office (ONF, Oficina Nacional Forestal). The FONAFIFO management
board does not include representatives of conservation organisa-
tions even though they are part of the ONF, as their representation
in the ONF is limited. The participation of indigenous re-
presentatives in the board is not laid down by the 4th law, even
though they manage 10% of the national forest area and have been
receiving 20% of annual payments since 2008 (Molina Murillo et al.,
2014). Likewise, local authorities are not represented in the decision
structure of PESP, in contrast to other PES, such as the PINFOR
programme (Programa de Incentivos Forestales) in Guatemala (Bos-
colo et al., 2010) or watershed PES, such as the Pimampiro muni-
cipal watershed-protection scheme and the PROFAFOR carbon-se-
questration programme in Ecuador (Wunder and Albán, 2008).
In the end, the design of the PESP was basically limited to a
negotiation within the forestry sector, whereas the broad partici-
pation of stakeholders is considered to be a key factor in en-
vironmental governance (Newig and Fritsch, 2009). This explains
the efficiency of the design process and the board’s reactivity in
the face of threats and opportunities arising from international
factors. On the other hand, it limited the participation of certain
actors who are important for the provision of ES today, namely the
indigenous population, and for the funding of ES, tourism. The
tourism sector has been identified as a beneficiary of ES for scenic
beauty (Castro et al., 2000) but never directly participates in PESP
funding. For instance, entry fees to national parks are used to fund
park administration, but not the PESP. However, tourism activities
such as car rentals support the PESP through the acquisition of a
certificate for environmental services (CSA) to compensate for
their carbon emissions.
Finally, the continued state-centred emphasis on the manage-
ment and funding of the PESP contrasts with the user-funding PES
model that has been promoted in the PES literature, in which
private international and national funding sources are considered
likely to be more sustainable (Engel et al., 2008). The Costa Rican
PES programme shows that financial sustainability can derive from
sustained commitment of the State supported in dialogue with
representative forestry groups and not from commitments by
private funders. Indeed, although the fuel tax included in the
forestry law was considered as a jumpstart, and it was envisioned
that carbon-abatement trading would provide significant funding
to the programme (Castro et al., 2000; Sage and Sanchez, 2002;
Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007); the PESP failed to be financed by
the international carbon market as it did not include the principle
of additionality in its design, but a principle of compensation for
reduction of land use rights (Legrand et al., 2013). To compensate
for this shortfall, the continuing role of State in funding the pro-
gramme has been crucial, as it provides the core funding through
fuel tax allocation and additional funding by negotiating interna-
tional loans and the creation of water tariffs. The latter could be
considered as an introduction of neoliberal logic (Matulis, 2013)
but is still a non-voluntary contribution of ES users where public
involvement plays a key role (Pagiola, 2008).
6. Conclusion
Understanding the genesis of the Payment for Environmental
Services programme in Costa Rica (PESP) allowed us to explain key
elements of its governance, including its scope, nature, and deci-
sion making structure.
We showed that the PESP, which was adopted in 1996, was
formalised to legitimise the previous forest incentive and to get
round the international agreement on the ban of public subsidies to
productive sectors in the framework of World Trade Organisation
 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265
negotiations. The rapid institutionalisation of the PESP through the
adoption of the 4th forestry law in 1996 relied on the conjunction of
four prior enabling conditions as well as on international and do-
mestic conditions. The set of the four prior enabling conditions
comprised: (1) a clearly defined and widely acknowledged defor-
estation issue; (2) the existence of specific public administration
and incentive programmes; (3) consolidated organisations re-
presenting the interests of forestry stakeholders; and (4) new ideas
about the representation of the forest and support schemes. In
addition, in the mid-1990s, international conditions both threa-
tened the funding of existing instruments, and created opportu-
nities for new funding of this instrument. At the same time, do-
mestic conditions pushed the PESP forward, thanks to newly elec-
ted elites who were members of international ecological economics
networks and a powerful interest group in the forestry sector.
From the Costa Rican experience, we believe that the main is-
sue for PES design and implementation is the ability to achieve a
compromise among interest groups with divergent views of nat-
ural resources. A strong leading group and good relationship be-
tween public and private representatives are keys to achieving
institutionalisation and legitimacy of the PES which are key con-
ditions for their sustainability. In Costa Rica, no strong organised
groups were opposed to forest conservation. Conversely, in many
tropical countries, agricultural or wood extraction lobbies are still
strong and may limit adoption or implementation of a PES pro-
gramme strictly oriented towards conservation. Searching for a
compromise including tree plantation for production as well as
forest conservation could be a way to increase the social support of
the interest groups for conservation and PES programmes.
While Costa Rica is considered as a world reference for PES, we
argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the PESP policy
process when drawing lessons for the development of PES in other
Appendix A.
Key representatives and stakeholders interviewed on the subject of the PESP policy process (42 face-to-face qualitative interviews;
2008-2012; Costa Rica).
(Number of interviewees as a function of their origin)
Civil servants FONAFIFO (5); SINAC (3); CIA(2); MAG (2)
Forestry sector organisations ONF (2), CCF (3), JUNAFORCA (1), Fundecor (3), Codeforsa (1), private enterprise (1)
Conservationist organizations Fecon (1), Asoprofleifas (2), others (4)
Agricultural organisations MNC (1), UPA Nacional (1), UNAG (1), Other (3)
Politicians ex minister (1), ex deputies (3)
Academics UNA (3), UCR (2), TEC (1), CATIE (3), other (3)
Total
List of acronyms:
FONAFIFO Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal
SINAC Sistema Nacional de Área de Conservación
CIA Colegio de Ingenieros Agrónomos
MAG Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería
ONF Oficina Nacional Forestal
CCF Cámara Costarricense Forestal
JUNAFORCA Junta Nacional Forestal Campesina
FECON Costa Rican federation of conservationists
MNC Mesa Nacional Campesina
UPA Nacional National Syndicate of small and medium-scale
agricultural producers
UNA Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica
263
contexts. A policy process analysis should be used to complement
feasibility studies in PES promotion initiatives, which are often
based on a normative conception of PES. First, identifying stake-
holders' interests and policy window may help institutionalise PES
schemes. Second, understanding the interplay between actors may
help to design and implement legitimate PES in a given context
(Corbera et al., 2007; Gross-Camp et al., 2012). Third, analysis of
the policy process may help better understand and overcome in-
herent difficulties in PES design and implementation such as the
limited willingness of the private sector to invest in PES, the lim-
ited efficiency or equity of PES, and the conjunction of multiple
objectives (Wunder et al., 2008; Muradian et al., 2010). To con-
clude, whereas most PES design processes emphasised ES valua-
tion and the identification of ES demand and funding mechanisms,
the Costa Rican experience shows that a great deal of attention
should be paid to the policy process and to the interplay between
actors. Strengthening organisations that are representative of the
ES offer and creating dialogue between divergent interest groups
involved in the management of natural resources are keys to the
successful design of sustainable PES.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the French National Agency of
Research (ANR-08-STRA-13). We acknowledge the support of
SERENA (Environmental Services and Rural Space Uses) project
and Cécile Fovet-Rabot for useful comments on previous versions
of the manuscript. The views expressed and any errors remain our
own responsibility.
Total
12
11
7
6
4
12
42
UCR Universidad de Costa Rica
TEC Tecnológico de Costa Rica
CATIE Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y de
Enseñanza
Appendix B.
Interview guideline
1. The interviewee presents him/herself
264 J.-F. Le Coq et al. / Ecosystem Services 16 (2015) 253–265

The interviewee is invited to briefly present his/her curriculum vitae, including training, and job experience to enable the interviewer to
grasp the interviewee's main role and functions in public or private organisations, and his/her role in the PESP policy process.
2. Analysis of the main decisions made during the PESP policy process and their outputs

A list of changes in governance decisions to be analysed with the interviewees was drawn up (based on our desk review and pre-
liminary interviews with FONAFIFO civil servants).
These decisions concerned the emergence of the PESP and the decision process embedded in the 4th law, on the one hand, and changes
in governance features during the implementation phase of the PESP, on the other hand.
It specifically concerned the choice regarding

1. The content of the 4th forestry law (ban on changes in land use, etc.) and the specific articles regarding PES (scope and definition of ES,
management and funding source);
2. The choice of PES modalities, the level of payment per modality, the decision on budget allocation among the modalities, modes of
access and conditions (prerequisites), prioritisation criteria, funding sources and PES management (including composition of the FO-
NAFIFO board, the monitoring and control process)
For each decision identified, depending on the interviewee's background, the following issues were discussed:
3. How and why was this decision taken?
4. What was the context of the decisions (external, internal factors, etc.)?
5. Who were the main actors involved in the decision?
6. What were the positions, arguments, resources, and the strategy of the different stakeholders?
7. How was the final decision taken? Based on which criteria and justification?

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