The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited

The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
Author(s): Baki Tezcan

Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2009), pp.
460-504
Published by: Brill
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'< * Journal of the Economic and WiPw (it) |7eSHo|
BRILL Social History of the Orient 52 (2009) 460-504 brill.nl/jesh
The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
Baki Tezcan*
Abstract
In 1585-8, the Ottoman silver currency, the akge, was officially devalued by 100% against
the Venetian gold ducat and foreign silver currencies, and its silver content was reduced by
44%. Some scholars have interpreted this devaluation and debasement as a consequence of
the silver influx from the Americas, whereas others have referred to the difficulties that the
Ottoman state had to face in financing its war effort against the Safavids in Persia. This
study suggests that the unification of a number of distinct regional monetary zones in an
interregional imperial economy by the second half of the sixteenth century must be regarded
as an important factor that contributed to the monetary crisis of 1585.
En 1585-88,I'akge, la monnaie d'argent ottomane, fut devaluee officiellement de 100% par

rapport au ducat d'or venitien et les monnaies d'argent etrangeres, et le pourcentage d'ar
gent en fut reduit de 44%. Certains chercheurs interpretent cette devaluation et cette
depreciation comme etant la consequence de l'influx d'argent venant des Ameriques, tan
disque d'autres attribuent les problemes de l'etat ottoman au financement des guerres
contre les Safavides d'Iran. Cette contribution suggere que l'unification d'un bon nombre
de zones monetaires regionales qui differaient entre elles en une seule economie imperiale
interregionale dans la seconde moitie du XVT siecle doit etre regardee comme un facteur
important ayant contribue a la crise monetaire de 1585.
Keywords
Ottoman Empire, devaluation, debasement, economic integration, monetarization
One of the enigmas of early modern Ottoman history has been the debase
ment of the main Ottoman silver currency, the akge, around 1585. Almost
425 years after the event neither the exact date of the debasement nor the
dynamics that brought it about can be established with any precision.
Although most scholars acknowledge the existence of a relationship
*) Baki Tezcan, Assistant Professor of History, and Religious Studies, Department of

History, and Religious Studies Program, University of California, Davis, USA, btezcan@
ucdavis.edu.
? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/156852009X458223

The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of1585 Revisited AG 1
between the influx of Spanish silver from the Americas into the Ottoman
Empire and the debasement, the reason why an abundance of silver should
bring about such a debasement of the silver currency is not quite clear.
According to Bernard Lewis, "[t]he Ottoman rulers, accustomed to crises
of shortage, were quite unable to understand or meet a crisis resulting from
an excess of silver," and thus took the same measures that they would have
taken if they faced a shortage, hence the debasement.1
Halil Inalcik asserts that the devaluation and debasement were "a conse
quence of the flood of American silver." The relationship he creates between
the two events is based on the theory of a general price increase caused by
the influx of American silver followed by a devaluation and debasement
which was inspired by Earl Hamilton's work.2 Using multiple sets of data,
Omer Lutfi Barkan demonstrates that the Ottoman economy experienced
a general price increase which was very similar to the changes in the Euro
pean economy. According to Barkan, the rise in prices and the devaluation
of the akce were parallel developments that were brought about by "inter
national movements in precious metals, changes in trade patterns, the
tremendous expenditures of the Ottoman government for various wars
undertaken at the time, and a great population increase which took place
in most of Europe, as well as in the remainder of the Mediterranean world,
during the sixteenth century."3
?evket Pamuk has recently revised Barkan's price indices and found an
error in his calculations for the years 1555 and 1573, the only years in the
sixteenth century prior to the devaluation for which Barkan had price data.
After Pamuk's correction, the price increases between 1489 and 1573
expressed in grams of silver were reduced to 31% from 60%. After this
1) Bernard Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire." Studia
Islamica 9 (1958): 119-20.
2) Halil Inalcik, "Notes on a Study of the Turkish Economy during the Establishment and
Rise of the Ottoman Empire." Tr. Douglas Howard [revised translation of "Osmanh Impa
ratorlugunun kurulus ve inkisafi devrinde Turkiye'nin iktisadi vaziyeti iizerinde bir tetkik
munasebetiyle." Belleten 15 (1951): 629-90]. In The Middle East and the Balkans under the
Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, Halil Inalcik (Bloomington: Indiana Uni
versity Turkish Studies, 1993): 241, 243-4; Earl J. Hamilton, "American Treasure and
Andalusian Prices, 1503-1660: A Study in the Spanish Price Revolution." Journal of
Economic and Business History 1 (1928): 1-35
3) Omer L. Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in
the Economic History of the Near East." Tr. Justin McCarthy [abridged translation with
revisions of "XVI. asnn ikinci yansinda Turkiye'de fiyat hareketleri." Belleten 34 (1970):
557-607]. International Journal of Middle East Studies G (1975): 13.
462 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
correction, the debasement and devaluation appear to have preceded the

rise in prices, rather than followed them.4 Actually, prices of barley, rye,
and wheat taken from inheritance records in Edirne by Barkan in another
study also indicate that, despite some fluctuations in-between, the prices of
1543 and 1582 are almost identical, which suggests that the sharp infla
tion actually started in the mid 1580s, in other words around the time of
the devaluation.5
These findings support Niels Steensgaard s argument that the increase in
prices should have started after the devaluation and not before. Both
Steensgaard and Pamuk suggest that the debasement of the currency has to
be explained in terms of the scarcity of funds available to the treasury.
More specifically, Pamuk states that "[w]ith the outbreak of another war
with Iran in 1578, the treasury began to experience shortages of silver for
payments to the soldiers."6 It is definitely true that the long wars of the late
sixteenth century created a burden on the Ottoman treasury. The extent of
this burden, however, seems to be somewhat exaggerated.
According to the balance sheet of the imperial treasury for the fiscal year
1582-3, four years after the outbreak of the Ottoman-Safavid war, Ottoman
finances actually seemed to be doing well. Despite the fact that Murad III
appropriated all of the revenues coming from Egypt, which was more
than 520,000 gold ducats, or 31,200,000 akces, for his personal treasury,
the central treasury had a surplus of 2,071,212 akces.7 This surplus was
4) ?evket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press, 2000): 122; compare Barkan, "Fiyat Hareketleri": 569. See also ?evket Pamuk,
"The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered." International Journal of
Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 69-89; ?evket Pamuk, "Prices in the Ottoman Empire,
1469-1914." International Journal of Middle East Studies ?>G (2004): 451-68; ?evket Pamuk,
Istanbul ve Diger Kentlerde 500 Yilhk Fiyatlar ve Ucretler, 1469-1998 (Ankara: Devlet Ista
tistik Enstitusu, 2000).
5) Omer L. Barkan, "Edirne Askeri Kassami'na ait tereke defterleri (1545-1659)." Belgeler
3.5-6 (1966): 87, 155, 447.
6) Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India
Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1974): 79; Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire: 125, 132, 137.
7) The deficit of 12,830,005 akces noted by Baki (Jakir, "Geleneksel donem (Tanzimat
oncesi) Osmanh biitce gelirleri." In Osmank Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Butgeler, eds M. Gene
and E. Ozvar. 2 vols. (Istanbul: Osmanh Bankasi Arsiv ve Arastirma Merkezi, 2006): vol.
1: 171, is misleading. First, there is a calculation error, the deficit according to (fakir's
numbers should have been 8,841,285 akces. Second, (Jakir did not include the treasury's
profit of 4,912,497 akces from tefdviit, an income item that is constituted by the difference
of exchange rates in receiving and expending funds in currencies other than the akce. While
The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of1585 Revisited 463
achieved at a time when a total of 38,207 soldiers, including auxiliary

troops and cadets, received regular salaries?9,000 more than in 1574.
Moreover, 10,000,000 akces were sent to Ozdemiroglu Osman Pasha in
Shirvan for the payment of his troops, numbering at least another 4,000.8
Thus as late as 1583, in the midst of the Safavid wars, while the number of
people who received salaries from the treasury had increased by almost
50% in the previous ten years, the Ottoman central treasury was able to
deal with the situation, despite the fact that more than 11 % of the reve
nues, which totaled 279,649,967 akces, were transferred to the personal
treasury of the sultan and were thus not available to cover expenditures.
It is therefore justified to ask why the Ottoman government devalued
the akce by 100% and debased its silver content by 44% almost immedi
ately afterwards, if the financial picture was this rosy. Following the lead of
Halil Sahillioglu,91 argue that the Ottoman government responded to the
dictate of market forces, which had already practically debased the akce as
a result of the unification of the Ottoman currency zones. As will be shown,
the treasury counted most gold ducats for 59 akces when it received them as income, for
instance, it valued them at 60 akces when it spent them; on this practice and its later evolu
tion, see Baki Tezcan, "Tefavut." Osmanh Ara?ttrmalan I Journal of Ottoman Studies 24
(2004): 333-44. The 6,000,000 akce credit the treasury received from the sultan is also not
included among the income items although its repayment is noted among the expendi
tures. If one were to revise the total income accordingly, it rises to 279,649,967 akces,
producing a surplus of 2,071,212 akces; Halil Sahillioglu, "III. Murad donemine ait 1582
83 (hicri 990) tarihli biitce?ceviriyazi." In Osmanh Maliyesi Kurumlar ve Biitceler, eds
M. Gene and E. Ozvar. 2 vols. (Istanbul: Osmanh Bankasi Arsiv ve Arastirma Merkezi, 2006):
vol. 2: 33, 46. The surplus of 36,165,890 akces for the same year that is shown in Pamuk,
A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire: 133, is the amount of money carried over to
the next fiscal year, which includes funds worth 34,094,678 akces that were carried over
from the previous year; the difference between them, 2,071,212 akces, is equivalent to the
actual surplus.
8) The figures for 1583 [and 1574] are: 16,905 [13,599] janissaries, 8,346 [5,957] cavalry
soldiers (altt boluk), 3,736 [2,124] auxiliary troops (cebeciydn, tobciydn, arabaciyan-i fob),
and 9,220 [7,495] cadets (acemiydn), making a total of38,207 [29,175] souls. Since 16,905
janissaries received 39,008,019 akces, 10,000,000 would be enough to pay the yearly sala
ries of another 4,000 janissaries. Yet since most probably Osman Pashas soldiers were
recruited to become janissaries after a few years of service, their pay scale should have been
lower, so he may have had more than 4,000 troops; for 1583 figures see Sahillioglu, "1582
83 tarihli biitce": 45; for 1574 figures, see Koci Bey, Kogi Bey Risalesi, ed. Ali Kemali Aksiit
(Istanbul: Vakit, 1939): 27-8.
9) Halil Sahillioglu, "Kurulustan XVTI. asnn sonlanna kadar Osmanh para tarihi uzerinde
dir deneme." Ph.D. dissertation (Istanbul Universitesi, 1958).
464 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
the different currency market zones of the Ottoman Empire operated

on different gold?silver ratios. The debasement of the akce was closely
related to the unification of these zones and the consequent disappearance
of arbitrage opportunities as the different gold?silver ratios moved closer
to each other.
The first section of the study focuses on the former Mamluk lands
and demonstrates that the gold?silver ratio in the Levant and Egypt
was different from the one in the central lands of the Ottoman Empire
in the early sixteenth century. Yet by the mid-sixteenth century this
ratio had come much closer to the one prevalent in Istanbul. The second
section concentrates on the former Safavid lands of the Ottoman Empire
and argues that a Persian devaluation in the mid-sixteenth century changed
the gold?silver ratio in these lands, making silver more valuable
in terms of gold and creating an Ottoman silver currency, the sahi, that
was overvalued in terms of its silver content. As the connections between
the sahi zone and the Levant increased as a result of their unification
under the Ottomans, the monetary issues related to the sahi affected the
Levant as well.
In the third section, I will point out that the arrival of Spanish silver
from the Americas intensified the expansion of the sahi's use in the empire
by providing ample supplies to mint overvalued silver coinage which liter
ally invaded the Ottoman domains, threatening a change in the gold?sil
ver ratio at the center. Consequently, the value of silver increased above the
level that could support the weight and fineness of the akce. In the last
section I will argue that these results proved to be disadvantageous for the
Ottoman center as the Ottoman treasury had a vested interest in keeping
gold more expensive in relation to silver in the capital. Thus in 1585 the
Ottoman administration not only acknowledged a situation created by
market forces but also made an effort to intervene by trying to increase the
value of gold against silver. Yet the effort of the administration failed, and
in 1600 the Ottoman center finally revalued silver in relation to gold.
When the Ottomans conquered a new region, the Ottoman administra

tion, at least initially, did not endeavor to unify its dominions under a
single law; they mostly continued to follow the local traditions of the are
that were brought under Ottoman sovereignty in matters relating to
taxation and land laws. Whether this was a conscious policy,10 or just a
matter of necessity in the relative absence of efficient central political
tools of enforcement, is open to debate. Different regional currencies were
among the local practices that the Ottoman administration continued to
allow in its eastern and southern provinces. Thus the empire was divided
into a number of currency zones in which coins of different weights con
stituted the major denomination in daily use. As will be shown later in this
study, the Ottoman center benefited from the existence of these zones as
long as gold was comparatively cheaper in them than it was in the capital.
The limits of these zones were probably dictated by the geographical
limits of the economic units rather than by political boundaries. For
instance, despite its political unity, the Safavid Empire included two dis
tinct currency zones. Similarly, although both greater Syria and the Hejaz
had been part of the Mamluk Empire, the two regions had slightly different
units of silver currency.11 Thus, as the political inheritor of different eco
nomic zones, the Ottoman Empire consisted of different currency zones.
Although the akce reigned supreme in the central lands of the empire,
that is to say in the Balkans and in western as well as central Anatolia,12 the
eastern and southern lands that were conquered in the sixteenth century
used quite a number of different currencies. As will be discussed below, the
exchange values of these currencies among themselves seem to have been
determined by the regional gold?silver ratios. Thus rather than the silver
content of the coins in question, their varying values against the Venetian
ducat, or the Ottoman sultani^ seem to have been the decisive factor in
10) See Halil Inalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest." Studia Islamica 2 (1954): 103-29.
n) Stephen Album, A Checklist of Islamic Coins, second ed. (Santa Rosa: Stephen Album,
1998): 126. The silver coins of Aleppo and Mecca, for instance, are valued differently in an
inventory of the Ottoman imperial treasury from 1518; Halil Sahillioglu, "The Role of
International Monetary and Metal Movements in Ottoman Monetary History, 1300
1750." Tr. liter Turan and Rhoads Murphey [translation of "Osmanh para tarihinde diinya
para ve maden hareketlerinin yeri (1300-1750)." Geli?me Dergisi Special Issue (1978):
1-38]. In Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J. F. Richards
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1983): 297, Table 4a.
12) I would suggest that the widespread use of the akce in Anatolia and the Balkans by the
beginning of the sixteenth century must have been the result of a long process of economic
integration and a certain degree of monetarization, which, if studied, may shed further
light on the various debasements under Mehmed II.
13) In the period under study the two gold coins, the Venetian ducat and the Ottoman
sultani, were identical in weight and fineness. Since I use a number of Ottoman terms to
466 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
the establishment of their exchange values among themselves in their

respective regions.
In the former Mamluk lands of Egypt and greater Syria, for instance,
the standard coin in circulation was heavier than the akce. Among a sam
ple of 67 extant coins struck during the reign of Selim I (r. 1512-20) right
after the conquest of the Mamluk Empire in Jidda (1), Damascus (23),
Aleppo (33), Hudayda (1), and Egypt (9)?if one excludes four coins the
weights of which were equal to or lower than 0.73 g., which was the stand
ard weight of the akce at the time?the average weight of the remaining 63
coins is 0.89 g.14
Although these weights cannot be relied on to judge the standard cur
rency weight of the region, as the coins may have been clipped, they do
suggest that the standard silver currency of the area was heavier than the
akce. This is supported by archival evidence to the effect that the silver
coins struck in Aleppo were worth 2 akces in 1518 and were called pare or
para (piece), most probably after the ??/Xhalf), or qita (piece), the Arabic
terms used to denote the standard Mamluk silver coin introduced by the
Mamluk ruler al-Mu'ayyad (r. 1412-21), the muayyadi, which the Europe
ans called maidinP This difference in the silver standard of the region, as
well as the name given to the local coins by the Ottomans, suggests that
the Ottoman local currency in the area was modeled on the one used in
Mamluk times.
At the time the Ottomans conquered the Levant and Egypt, the cur
rency situation in the Mamluk Empire seems to have been in disarray.
Although it is asserted that the Mamluk gold coins were of the same stand
ard as the Venetian ducats and the Ottoman sultanis, the archival and liter
ary evidence suggests otherwise. The weight of the Mamluk gold ashrafi
seems to have varied from one Mamluk sultans reign to the next, and from
Egypt to Syria. This difference in weight was also reflected in the exchange
value of the ashrafi, which at times fell below that of the Venetian ducat.16
denote the different silver currencies in circulation, I prefer the ducat to denote the stan
dard gold coin of the region in order to prevent further confusion by introducing yet
another Ottoman term.
14) Ciineyt Olcer, Sultan Yavuz Selim ?ah bin Bayazid Han Donemi Osmanli Sikkeleri
(Istanbul: Yenilik, 1989): 182-6.
15) On the origins of the designation nisf, see Paul Balog, The Coinage of the Mamluk Sul
tans of Egypt and Syria (New York: The American Numismatic Society, 1964): 47, 387.
16) Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire: 95; Sahillioglu, "Osmanli para
tarihi": 96, n. 9; Ahmed Akgiinduz, ed., Osmanli Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri.
Although the weight of the Mamluk gold coin was less than the Otto
man one, that of the standard Mamluk silver coin was more than the Otto
man akce, weighing around 1.4-1.5 g. in the late fifteenth century, and ca.
1.1 g. in the early sixteenth century, if one were to rely on the weight of
extant coins. When Selim I conquered the area, the gold coins struck in his
name followed the standard of the ghawri ashrafls, which were the most
recent and the least valuable in terms of silver currency. Yet the silver coins
struck in the name of Selim I by the first Ottoman governor of Egypt seem
to have lowered standards even more, and probably continued the trend of
debasement visible since the late fifteenth century.17
Around 1522, new silver coins were struck that were decreed to be
equivalent to the value of two and a half of the former coins, meaning
those that had been struck by the first Ottoman governor. Twenty-five of
the new silver coins were to be worth one gold ducat. Although there
seems to have been quite a bit of opposition to this policy, the Ottoman
administrative code (kanunname) of Egypt, dated to 1524-5, sanctioned it.
According to this code, out of a 100 dirhems (307.2 g.) mix of silver and
copper, which was to contain 84% silver, 250 paras were to be struck. Thus
each para was supposed to weigh 1.23 g. and contain 1.03 g. of silver. Not
surprisingly, the average weight of a sample of 4 silver coins struck in Egypt
in the name of Siileyman I (r. 1520-66) is thus 1.22 g. Moreover,
25 of these paras were to equal the value of a gold coin struck in accord
ance with the standards of Istanbul, and the future gold coins to be struck
in Egypt were to follow that standard, that is ca. 3.55 g. of pure gold for
a sultani.18
Although there is no conclusive evidence, what seems to have happened
in 1522, and was indeed sanctioned in 1524-5, was a restoration of the
9 vols. (Istanbul: Osmanh Arastirmalan Vakfi, 1990-6): vol. 3: 260, 272; Sahillioglu,
"Ottoman Monetary History": 297, Table 4a; Halil Sahillioglu, "1524-1525 Osmanh biit
cesi." Istanbul Universitesi Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasi 41 (1982-3): 434, 437-8.
17) Norman D. Nicol, Raafet El-Nabarawy, and Jere L. Bacharach, eds, Catalog of the
Islamic Coins, Glass Weights, Dies and Medals in the Egyptian National Library, Cairo
(Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1982): 95, 98; Sahillioglu, "Osmanh para tarihi":
96-7, n. 9, 11; Olcer, Osmanh Sikkeleri: 159; Stanford J. Shaw, The Financial and Admin
istrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962): 65.
18) Sahillioglu, "Osmanh para tarihi": 97, n. 11; ibrahim Artuk, Kanuni Sultan Suleyman
Adma Basilan Sikkeler (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1972): 64-65; Akgundiiz, Osmanh
Kanunndmeleri; vol. 6: 139.
468 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
Mamluk standards, as the administrative code refers to the exchange rate

of 25 paras to the ducat as the "old law (kanun-i kadim)"19 Unfortunately,
we do not know the exact weight and fineness of the last Mamluk silver
coins, but Eliyahu Ashtor, relying on the account of a contemporary Euro
pean traveler, suggests that 25 made a ducat in 1507, and that the gold?
silver ratio accompanying this exchange rate was 1:8.5, which signifies a
sharp increase in the value of silver against gold hence implying a silver
scarcity, as, according to Ashtor, the ratio in 1497 had been 1:11.1. The
gold?silver ratio instituted by the Ottomans in 1522 and sanctioned in
1524-5 was 1:7.25.20 Thus either the Ottomans had further increased the
value of silver against gold, or this increase had already taken place between
1507 and 1517, the date of the Ottoman conquest. Actually, Balog sug
gests that the Mamluk silver coins struck during the reign of Qansawh al
Ghawri (1501-16) "were drastically reduced to a mere 1 gram." If this last
reduction had not changed the value of the ducat, the gold?silver ratio at
the time the Ottomans conquered Egypt might have been around 1:7.14,
which is quite close to the one instituted by the Ottomans. It is beyond
doubt, however, that the Ottoman administration sanctioned a gold?
silver ratio that was quite different from the one prevalent in Istanbul,
which was 1:11.3 at the time.21
These varying gold?silver ratios point toward the existence of great
arbitrage opportunities which resulted from the large discrepancy between
the value of gold in Istanbul and Egypt. In Istanbul a gold ducat was worth
55 akces, each containing 0.73 g. of silver, which would make a little more
than 40 g. of silver, while in Egypt the same gold coin could be obtained
with less than 26 g. of silver. Thus 26 g. of silver coinage exchanged with
gold in Egypt was worth 40 g. of silver in Istanbul. Apparently, silver was
much more valuable in Egypt than in Istanbul, or gold was much cheaper,
which suggests that silver would have moved south to Egypt while gold
would have headed north to Istanbul. The latter part of this equation is
19) Akgiindiiz, Osmanh Kanunnameleri: vol. 6: 124.

20) Eliyahu Ashtor, Les metauxprecieux et la balance despayements du proche-orient a la basse
epoque (Paris: SEVPEN, 1971): 49. The gold?silver ratio may be calculated by multiply
ing the silver content of the silver currency with its exchange rate against the gold currency,
and then dividing the result by the weight of the gold currency: (1.03 x 25): 3.55 = 7.25.
21) Balog, The Coinage of the Mamluk Sultans: 43. At that time 420 akces were struck from
100 dirhems (307.2 g.) of pure silver, so an akce contained 0.73 g. of silver. 55 akces made
a ducat. Thus (0.73 x 55): 3.55 = 11.3; Sahillioglu, "1524-1525": 434; Sahillioglu, "Osmanh
para tarihi'>: 42, 64.
verified by the fact that Egypt sent its tribute to the Ottoman capital in
gold coins, a point that will be revisited below.
It is also interesting to note that while the Egyptian para contained only
1.03 g. of silver, it was valued at 2 akces in relation to the Ottoman akce,
which was supposed to contain 0.73 g. of silver at that time.22 Intrinsically,
the para should have been worth 1.4 akces, or 1.5 akces at the most. Thus
the Egyptian para was definitely overvalued in terms of its silver content.
This only makes sense when the exchange value of the para and the akce
against the gold ducat is taken into consideration. Using the gold ducat as
a measure according to which 25 paras equaled 55 akces, one would expect
the para to be worth 2.2 akces (55/25). This is significantly closer to the
official exchange rate of 2 akces to the para. The respective values of the
para and the akce against the ducat must therefore have been decisive for
establishing their exchange values against each other?not a comparison of
their silver contents.
The available evidence thus suggests that Egypt and the Levant which
constituted the Ottoman para zone, on the one hand, and Anatolia and
the Balkans, where the akce reigned supreme, on the other, had different
gold?silver ratios in the early sixteenth century. Although these two
regions are close to each other, this difference was not new. For instance,
for the Middle Ages, the ratio of gold to silver is suggested to have
been 1:14 in the Muslim Middle East while it was 1:18 in Byzantium.23
What this meant in practice was that one could get a unit of gold in
exchange for 14 units of silver in Cairo, go to Constantinople, exchange
that unit of gold for 18 units of silver, bring the silver to Cairo, convert it
to gold again, and keep an extra 4 units of silver as a 28.6% profit created
by arbitrage opportunities. This same sort of opportunity apparently also
existed in the early sixteenth century, as the gold?silver ratios in Cairo
and Istanbul were 1:7.25 and 1:11.3, respectively.
Arbitrage opportunities occur when two market zones function rela
tively independently from each other; due to less developed market rela
tions zones are either not well informed about each other's respective
22) For the value of the para in terms of the akce in Egypt, see Akgiinduz, Osmanli Kanun
ndmeleri'. vol. 6; 111. Three financial regulations from the Adana area that date from
ca. 1526, 1536, and 1547 give the exchange rate of the para as 2 akces as well; Akgunduz,
Osmanli Kanunndmeleri: vol. 5: 608, 613, vol. 7: 191.
23) K. N. Chaudhuri, "The Economic and Monetary Problem of European Trade with
Asia during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." The Journal of European Economic
History 4 (1975): 343.
470 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
conditions, or they are not engaged in a sufficient number of transactions

to have an influence on each other. If, on the other hand, these two zones
had been economically well-connected to each other, the movement of
silver to the place where it was more valuable in terms of gold would even
tually alter the gold?silver ratios in both regions, bringing them to the
same level, at which point arbitrage profits would no longer be possible. It
seems that such a development did indeed take place with regard to the
Levant and the central lands of the Ottoman Empire during the first half
of the sixteenth century.
Andrea Berengo, whose letters from Aleppo written in 1555-6 have
been published, provides some data to establish the weight and the
exchange rate of the para during this period. He states that 6 maidins, or
paras, were worth a mocenigo, a Venetian silver currency of almost pure
silver that weighed 6.52 g. To be more precise, Berengo notes that
47 mocenigos were exchanged for 300 maidins in terms of their weight,
which suggests that each para contained 1.02 g. of silver. This silver con
tent is quite close to the prescribed silver content of the para, 1.03 g. Yet
the exchange value he assigns to the ducat is 40 paras,24 which is well above
the prescribed rate of 25 paras in the administrative code of Egypt.
At 40 paras a ducat with each para containing 1.03 g. of silver, a ducat
was worth 41.2 g. of silver in the Levant in 1555, which gives a gold?
silver ratio of 1:11.6. However, in Istanbul, the ducat was worth 60 akces
around the same time. With each akce containing 0.73 g. of silver, this
would make 43.8 g. of silver and indicate a gold?silver ratio of 1:12.34.
Thus, in the thirty years between 1525 and 1555, the gold?silver ratio
prevalent in the Levant apparently came much closer to the one in the
central lands of the Ottoman Empire, most probably as a result of increas
ing commercial connections that evened out the differences which had
created the arbitrage profits in the first place. Moreover, the exchange rate
of the akce against the para changed to reflect the new value of the ducat
in paras. Whereas the para was valued at 2 akces in 1525 when 25 paras
made a ducat, later rates suggest that 1.5 akces were counted as the equiv
alent of one para, which makes sense since now 40 paras and 60 akces
equaled each other in terms of the value of the ducat.25
24) UgoTucci, ed., Lettresdun marchandvenitienAndreaBerengo, 1553-1556(Paris: SEVPEN,

1957): 95, 354, 355, 359.
25) Walther Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen umgerechnet in Gold (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz,
1991): 13, 42-3.
Even at the new rate of the para against the ducat, silver was slightly
more valuable in the Levant than it was in the central lands of the empire
as one needed 2.6 g. less silver to get a ducat in Aleppo than one would in
Istanbul. Yet in the 1550s, Egypt was experiencing a silver drainage to an
unknown destination, where silver must have been even more valuable
than it was in the para zone. As is evident from an imperial order sent to
the governor of Egypt in 1552, among the solutions offered was an increase
of the copper content of the para. Although no action was taken at the
time, around 1565 a debasement did take place in Egypt the exact ratio of
which is open to debate. An Arabic source suggests that it was around
8.7%, yet depending on slightly different interpretations of the text, it
might have been as much as 16.5%.26
Interestingly enough, within the next few years the Ottoman akce went
through a similar debasement. Sometime around 1566, the number of
akces to be struck from 100 dirhems of silver increased from 420 to 450,
decreasing the silver content of the akce from 0.73 g. to 0.68 g.27 Yet nei
ther in the Levant, nor in the central lands of the empire did an official
devaluation against the ducat take place, which suggests that the govern
ment was trying to make silver more valuable in relation to gold. Silver was
most probably moving to an unidentified destination where it was more
valuable than in the Ottoman domains, as is suggested by the correspond
ence between the capital and Egypt in 1552, and the government was try
ing to keep it in the imperial zone by increasing its value against gold.
In short, the available evidence suggests that the Ottoman central
administration aimed to keep its currency zones separate by trying to
restore pre-conquest rates, as was the case in Egypt in 1522-5. Moreover,
the correspondence of 1552 between the Ottoman center and Egypt
implies that the Ottoman administrators perceived their domains as differ
ent currency zones; otherwise a debasement limited to Egypt would not
have been considered. Yet the evidence also suggests that while Egypt and
26) Sahillioglu, "Osmanli para tarihi": 85-7, 98 (n. 18); compare Pamuk, A Monetary History
of the Ottoman Empire: 96 (n. 18); Muhammad Ibn Abi al-Surur, Al-Minah al-rahmaniyya
ft al-dawlat al-uthmaniyya, ed. Layla al-Sabbagh (Damascus: Dar al-Bashair, 1995): 172,
however, supports Sahillioglu's argument and suggests that the para was debased by ca.
8.7%. For different interpretations of the relevant statement in this text, see Baki Tezcan,
"Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Osman
II (1618-1622)." Ph.D. dissertation (Princeton University, 2001): 314-5, n. 44.
27) The exact date of this debasement is not known, but it was in effect by 1572; Sahillioglu,
"Osmanli para tarihi": 64, 74 (n. 7).
472 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
the Levant had been an independent currency zone in which a different

gold?silver ratio operated at the time of the Ottoman conquest, by the
middle of the sixteenth century this area had become far better integrated
into the markets of the central Ottoman lands as indicated by the change
in its gold?silver ratio, which came quite close to the one prevalent in
Istanbul. Thus it seems justified to claim that the forces of the market oper
ated against the will of the administration by bringing the different cur
rency zones closer to each other, a point to be discussed further below.
Finally, the Egyptian debasement of ca. 1565 and the Ottoman one
around the same time, which were not accompanied by a devaluation of
the coinage in terms of the official value of the ducat, imply that a new
currency zone in which silver was relatively more scarce and valuable in
terms of gold was in close contact with the rest of the empire. According
to the correspondence between Cairo and Istanbul in 1552, silver was
moving toward this unidentified area, and the way to stop this movement
was a debasement of the coinage. In the next section, I will argue that this
area was Persia.
II
Another currency zone in the Ottoman Empire can be characterized as the
realm of the sahi, originally a Persian silver currency that continued to
circulate in Safavid Persia even after the Ottomans struck their own sahis
following the conquest of the western Safavid lands during the reign of
Suleyman I. The market value of the Ottoman sahi in terms of the akce
and the para has a lot to do with the Persian shahi?* which was introduced
by the Safavid ruler Shah Ismail in the early sixteenth century.
The Safavid coinage went through a number of debasements during
the sixteenth century, but only those that happened in the second half
of the sixteenth century seem to have had an impact on the Ottoman
akce. Around 1501, at the outset of the reign of Shah Ismail, the Safavid
50 dinar piece called shahi weighed 9.4 g.29 According to Stephen Album,
in 1518 the weight of the shahi was reduced to 7.88 g. Around 1530, it
28) In order to distinguish the Persian from the Ottoman coin, the former will be referre
to hereafter as shahi, the latter as sahi.
29) H. L. Rabino di Borgomale, Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shdhs of Iran, 1500-1941
(Hertford: Stephen Austin and Sons, 1945): Table II (following p. 8); see Tezcan, "Search
ing for Osman": 315-6 (n. 46), for a discussion on the accuracy of this weight.
was further reduced to 6.22 g. Some ten years later, the shahi weighed
5.25 g. Around 1547, the shahi was debased once again to 4.67 g.30
Thus, if Album's conclusions are correct, between 1501 and 1550, the
Safavid shahi lost half of its silver content. The Ottoman akce, however,
did not go through any debasements between 1491 and the reign of
Selim II (1566-74). Consequently, one could claim that the Safavid debase
ments of the first half of the sixteenth century did not have an impact on
the Ottoman akce.
This picture, however, changes in the second half of the sixteenth cen
tury. Berengo, our Venetian merchant in Aleppo, provides some valuable
information regarding a Persian debasement in his letters of 1555. That
year no silk arrived from Persia since the Safavid shah himself had bought
500 loads of it for export to India. Yet the shah paid the merchants half the
price "because he has made the money the half of what they were worth in
spite of the protests of the people, i.e. his coins are called saie [shahi] they
are worth here 18 soldi a piece, and he has made two out of one and given
them out as good coin."31 In a subsequent letter, Berengo states that the
new shahi that the shah had struck was worth half the value of the old one,
i.e. 9 soldi. At this time, 18 soldi were worth approximately 0.11 gold
ducats. Thus one would expect the former Persian shahi to be worth
4.5 paras, and the new one 2.25 paras at 40 paras, or maidins, per ducat.
Berengo cites the very same values.32
Berengo is not the only source which suggests that the Safavids under
took a major debasement before the Ottoman one. Fernand Braudel states
30) Album, A Checklist of Islamic Coins: 126-7; Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen: 59-61, relying
on Rabino di Borgomale, Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shahs of Iran, 1500-1941: 28, 30,
regards the denomination of these coins differently, yet he does agree that the shahi lost a
lot of its silver content during the reign of Tahmasp. I took Albums western Safavid stan
dard into consideration here. The Safavids also had an eastern standard in the provinces of
Khorasan and Gurgan, while the province of Mazandaran had its own standard; see Album,
A Checklist of Islamic Coins: 126, n. 138.
31) Quoted by Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: 419; this
particular letter is dated November 3, 1555.
32) Tucci, Lettres d'un marchand venitien Andrea Berengo, 1553-1556: 92 (letter #86, dated
November 15, 1555), 101 (#93, November 17), 113 (#100, November 17), 126 (#109,
November 18); see also letters #87, 88, 91, 96, pp. 93, 95, 98, 106. 20 soldi made a lira,
and in 1533 a Venetian gold ducat was valued at 7 lire and 18 soldi; in 1562, its value is
recorded as 8 lire; W. A. Shaw, The History of Currency, 1252 to 1894, third ed. (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons and Clement Wilson, 1896): 317. If we take 8 lire as the value of the
ducat in 1555 as well, we would arrive at (18: [8 x 20] =) 0.1125.
474 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
that the Ottoman devaluation of the mid 1580s "followed a similar deval
uation in Persia,... which had devalued the currency by 50 per cent at a
stroke." Inalcik, who perhaps relied on Braudel, states that a 50% devalua
tion occurred in Persia in 1585. However, Steensgaard asserts that he did
not find any evidence in support of Braudel s statement, although he was
aware of the debasement that Berengo refers to, which he prefers to regard
simply as "a 50% devaluation in terms of money of account." Pamuk, on
the other hand, believes that there might have been a devaluation in Iran
in 1584, and suggests that, if proven, this devaluation would have been a
major factor in contributing to the Ottoman devaluation and debasement
of the later 1580s, yet he adds that the evidence is not clear.33
Although twentieth-century studies tend to concentrate on the 1580s to
date the Safavid devaluation, which is probably due to Braudels wording,
the primary source of Braudels source carries us further back. Braudel cites
J. W. Zinkeisen,34 but the ultimate source is an Italian physician, Minadoi
(1540-1615), who, after taking his medical degree, traveled for seven years
in the Ottoman dominions. In his book on the Ottoman-Safavid wars,
which he wrote in 1587 with an account of the events of the war through
to the end of 1586, he states:
Touching the reuenues of this kingdome [Safavid Persia], the common opinion is, that
in the dayes of Kinge Tamas [Tahmasp (1524-76)] the crowne did yearely receaue into
the Chamber of Casbin, foure or Hue millions of gold, which afterward he caused to
be worth eight millions, by a sudden enhaunsing of the value of his coyne, geuing in
commandment by most seuere Edictes, that ouer all his Empyre, for a certayne space,
all the money that he had receaued, should bee taken and accompted for asmuch more
as it was worth, and accordingly made pay to his souldiers and Sultans, & all other that
were in his pay. Which example (mee-thinkes) was well followed by Amurat the now
king of the Turkes [Murad III (1574-95)], who receauing at the Citty of Cairo the
Cechino of gold [sequin] for xliii. Maidini, he put it out againe in Constantinople, to
pay his Capigi and Ianissaries, withall lxxxv. Maidini, commanding that it should be
of that value ouer all the Citty, and countryes subiect vnto it.35
33) Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,
tr. Sian Reynolds. 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972): vol. 1: 540, vol. 2: 1195;
Inalcik, "Notes on a Study of the Turkish Economy": 253, n. 109; Steensgaard, The Asian
Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: 419; Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman
Empire-. 137.
34) J.W Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa. 7 vols. (Gotha: F. A. Perthes,
1840-63): vol. 3: 802-3.
35) Iohn-Thomas Minadoi, The History of the Warres hetweene the Tvrkes and the Persians, tr.
Abraham Hartwell (London: Iohn Wolfe, 1595): 76.
Minadoi's account of the Persian devaluation thus suggests that it hap

pened during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, i.e. before 1576, and not in the
early 1580s. The information provided by Minadoi, who apparently had
not witnessed the devaluation but had heard about it, is in line with Ber
engo's account. Since the fiscal reforms of the Ilkhanid ruler Ghazan Khan
(r. 1295-1304), Persia had a regulated system of money of account, accord
ing to which 10,000 dinars made a toman (Mongol for 10,000).
Silver coins came in different denominations with their values assigned in
dinars.36 What Berengo refers to as the old shahi was equivalent to the
50 dinars piece of ca. 4.6 g. The information provided by both Berengo
and Minadoi suggests that Tahmasp increased the value of this coin to
100 dinars and struck smaller coins of ca. 2.3 g. that he valued at 50 dinars.
The numismatic evidence supports this hypothesis to a large extent.
Album, whose work represents the latest research on Safavid coinage,
argues that the 2.3 g. coins were worth half a shahi, i.e. 25 dinars, in the
period 1547-52, while the shahis of 50 dinars weighed ca. 4.7 g. Around
1553, the denominational value of the former shahi was increased to 80
dinars, and that of the former half shahi to 40 dinars. In 976 / 1568-9, the
denominational values of these two coins were further increased to 100
and 50 dinars respectively, fixing the 50 dinar shahi at ca. 2.3 g., a standard
that survived well until 1596.37
Album, however, does not provide any justification for his choice of
80 and 40 dinars, which is based on the assumption that the bisti, i.e.
20 dinars, was the main denominational value in the period 1553-68.
However, Berengo's testimony from 1555 quoted above indicates that the
main unit of the Safavid currency in circulation was the shahi. Moreover,
Arthur Edwards, an English merchant who worked under the umbrella of
the Russia Company, wrote to his superiors from Shirvan on April 26,
1566 stating that "200 shaughes is a tumen." Edwards also quotes most
prices in shahis, which confirms that the shahi of 50 dinars was the main
unit of denomination at the time.38 Thus if Albums bisti standard for
1553-68 were corrected with the shahi, the Safavid debasement of 1553,
36) Walther Hinz, "The Value of the Toman in the Middle Ages." In Ydd-ndme-ye Irdni-ye
Minorsky, eds Mojtaba Minovi and I. Afshar (Tehran: Publications of Tehran University,
1969): 90-5.
37) Album, A Checklist of Islamic Coins: 127-8; I omit Albums discussion of the eastern
standards within the Safavid Empire, which would not have had much of an influence on
the Ottomans.
38) E. Delmar Morgan and C. H. Coote, eds, Early Voyages to Russia and Persia. 2 vols.
476 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
established by numismatic evidence, would corroborate the report of Ber

engo from 1555 and Minadoi's reference to the reign of Shah Tahmasp as
the time of the Safavid devaluation.
Unfortunately, Berengo does not provide any information about the
exchange rate between the Persian shahi of 50 dinars and the Ottoman
akce. Yet the exchange rate he quotes for the old Persian shahi, i.e. 4.5
paras, suggests that the old Persian shahi should have been worth ca. 7
akces or 5 paras prior to its devaluation.39 Not surprisingly, the Ottoman
sahi was also valued at 7 akces and 5 paras as will be discussed below. The
new Persian shahi, then, should have been worth 3.5 akces. There is addi
tional evidence which suggests that the new Persian shahi was worth the
equivalent of 4 akces in Iran.40
The Ottomans, after their conquest of the western Safavid lands in the
1530s, struck coins that were larger than the akce and were meant to take
the place of the former Persian shahis. According to the numismatic evi
dence, these coins originally seem to have weighed 4.4 g., which is quite
close to the weight of the Persian shahi prior to its debasement.41 Although
there is no evidence to establish the official weight or the exchange rate of
these initial Ottoman sahis, these coins most probably had a value of 7
akces, or 5 paras, like the Persian shahi before the debasement. Then in
(London: Hakluyt Society, 1885-6): vol. 2: 387-9, 391-2. Other letters published in the
same volume confirm the centrality of the shahi; see, for instance, pp. 394, 396.
39) Since, according to Berengo, the former shahi was worth 4.5 maidins, and 40 maidins
were worth a gold ducat, which at the time was worth 60 akces, one shahi prior to its
devaluation should have been worth (60: 40 x 4.5 =) 6.75 akces. As for the exchange value
of the shahi in terms of the maidin, or para, in the absence of smaller currency, one could
imagine that its current value might have been 5 maidins.
40) In a letter from Shirvan dated August 8, 1566, Arthur Edwards states that the "Dollars"
the Ottomans bring with them to Iran are valued at 10 shahis; Morgan and Coote, Early
Voyages to Russia and Persia: vol. 2: 401. Around the same time, the large silver coins of
Central Europe, that is the "Dollars" Edwards talks about, were valued at 40 akces in the
Ottoman Empire, thus 4 akces should have made one shahi. Moreover, taking the value of
the Venetian ducat as a constant that equates 10 Goldmark of 1871, Hinz calculates the
value of the Persian shahi in 1566 as 66 2/3 Pf., and that of the akce in 1564 as 16 2/3 Pf.,
supporting the argument that the Persian shahi after its devaluation was valued at 4 akces;
Islamische Wdhrungen: viii, 43, 60.
41) See, for instance, Artuk, Kanuni Sultan Suleyman Adina Basilan Sikkeler. 68, no. 173;
the weight of this coin might have been more than 4.4 g. since the extant coins may have
been subject to clipping. On the other hand, there are also coins of this sort that are much
lighter, and which may have been struck after a debasement, or may represent a different
denomination; see Artuk, Kanuni Sultan Suleyman Adina Basilan Sikkeler. 23, no. 61.
1555, after the debasement of the Persian shahi?worth 50 dinars in terms

of money of account?to half its weight, the Ottomans had two alterna
tives. If they were to follow the Safavids, they could strike coins of half the
weight and keep the same value in terms of money of account, for instance
2.2 g. for 7 akces, or they could have kept the same weight and assign a
value of 14 akces to it. In this case the akce would have been effectively
devalued to half its silver value, which did indeed eventually happen at
the end of the sixteenth century.42 Alternatively, they could have kept
the same weight as well as the exchange value of the coin in terms of the
akce, but effectively devalue the Persian money of account in the sense that
two new Persian shahis worth 100 dinars (instead of one former Persian
shahi of 50 dinars) would be worth 1 Ottoman sahi of 7 akces. In this
case the Ottoman silver coins would have had a tremendous advantage
in Persian markets in terms of their buying power and a silver drainage
would follow.
The Ottoman administration seems to have followed a path which at
first does not appear to make any sense. The exchange value of the Otto
man sahi in terms of the akce was kept at the same level, but its weight was
reduced, probably by some 13%, as the earliest document which specifies
the weight and the exchange rate of the Ottoman sahi states that it included
3.84 g. of silver and was worth 7 akces.43 This seems to be an inappropriate
solution to the problem at hand since 7 akces, even after the last devalua
tion of ca. 1566, contained 4.78 g. of silver, which was almost
25% more than the silver content of the sahi.
The solution may, however, not have been as inappropriate as it seems
at first glance. In Persia, a gold ducat is recorded to have been worth
13 shahis in the 1560s after the debasement. As discussed above, these
shahis must have weighed around 2.3 g. Thus a gold ducat was worth
42) Not surprisingly, after the debasement of the 1580s, the silver content of the akce was
eventually reduced to 0.32 g. in 1600, at which weight seven of them would weigh 2.24 g.,
and 14 of them 4.48 g., which is quite close to the weights of the Persian shahi in its old
and new forms.
43) Sahillioglu, "Osmanh para tarihi": 101, n. 36. Sahillioglu states that the production of
the 3.84 g. Ottoman sahi coins started in Baghdad in February 1566; "Ottoman Monetary
History": 286. The rate of debasement suggested here is a very rough approximation.
Although we know that the Ottoman sahi was supposed to weigh 3.84 g. in 1566, we do
not know the official weight of the larger coins that were struck by Suleyman I earlier, the
heaviest extant example of which from the Baghdad mint is 4.4 g.; Artuk, Kanuni Sultan
Suleyman Adina Basilan Sikkeler. 23.
478 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
ca. 30.3 g. of silver in Persia, while it was almost 41 g. of silver in Istanbul

at the time.44 Market forces would thus have moved silver to Persia, where
it was more valuable in terms of gold. On the other hand, if one could cre
ate a buffer zone around the Persian border where silver was as valuable as
in Persia, the arbitrage profits could remain within the imperial borders.
Whether the decision was made with such reasoning in mind, or the
center simply followed the market rationale that would have emerged in
Baghdad, which is much closer to Persia than it is to Istanbul, the value
of the Ottoman sahi reflected a gold?silver ratio that was much closer
to the one current in Persia than the one in Istanbul. Although there is
no contemporary record, circumstantial evidence suggests that 8 Ottoman
sahis must have been exchanged for a ducat in the eastern provinces of the
empire in the 1560s. First of all, 8 sahis would include 30.72 g. of silver,
which is quite close to the estimated weight of silver exchanged for a ducat
in Persia. Second, the sources that cite the value of the ducat against the
sahi later in the century either quote 8 sahis for a ducat, or, after the rise in
the value of the ducat, 8 sahis for a "ducat of account."45 Thus an exchange
rate of 8 sahis per ducat in the 1560s would not have been unreasonable.
If one takes this estimated exchange value of the Ottoman sahi against
the ducat as a starting point, its value against the akce becomes under
standable. As pointed out above, although the para contained only as much
44) Laurence Chapman, an English merchant, in a letter from Qazvin dated April 28, 1569,
asserts that "twelve duckets... [make] one hundred sixe and fiftie shawghs" i.e. 13 shahis
for a ducat; Morgan and Coote, Early Voyages to Russia and Persia: vol. 2: 413. The very
same letter in Richard Hakluyt, ed., The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques & Discov
eries of the English Nation. 12 vols. (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1903-05): vol. 3:
142, reads "... 165. shaughs," which is probably a mistake in rendering 156. Hinz, "The
Value of the Toman in the Middle Ages": 92, relies on the latter edition of the letter, thus
his figure needs to be corrected. Moreover Hinz takes these ducats to be Hungarian ducats
although there is no such qualification in the letter. The context, which is the price of kersey
clothes in Aleppo, rather suggests that it should be Venetian ducats. For the weight of the
shahi, see above, p. 475. In the Istanbul of the late 1560s, a gold ducat was worth 60 akces
while 450 akces were struck from 307.2 g. of silver, thus (307.2: 450) x 60 = 40.96; see
n. 27 above.
45) See for instance, Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen: 14 (a quote from 1579), 43 (from 1577);
William Barret reports from Aleppo in 1584 that in Baghdad and Basra 8 sahis make a
ducat of account; Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques & Discoveries of the
English Nation: vol. 6: 10, 12. The ducat of account in late sixteenth-century Levant
included 40 paras (8 sahis) which was the value of the real ducat between the 1550s and the
late 1570s; seeTucci, Lettres dun marchand venitien Andrea Berengo, 1553-1556: 354, and
the quotes in Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen: 12-4.
silver as was used for 1.4 akces in the 1520s, it was valued as 2 akces
because the Ottoman government had determined the exchange values of
its two different silver currencies according to their respective values against
the gold ducat. When their values changed in relation to the ducat in the
mid-sixteenth century, their exchange value against each other changed as
well. If one applies the same principle to the sahi, one would expect a sahi
to be worth 7.5 akces, as the ducat was worth 60 akces and most probably
8 sahis at the time. The value of the sahi against the akce which one finds
in the Ottoman records is very close to this and must therefore have been
calculated according to this principle.46 Had the center been motivated by
the intrinsic silver content of the sahi, a sahi that contained 3.84 g. silver,
which equaled 5.6 akces, would have been valued at 5.5, or at most
6 akces. The official value of 7-7.5 akces assigned to the sahi makes it clear
that the center determined the exchange rate of this regional currency in
terms of its relative value against gold, which was also the principle used in
the determination of the paras value in the early sixteenth century, rather
than its intrinsic silver value.
The assumption of the administration must have been that the trade
with Safavid Persia had a certain monetary impact on the eastern and
southeastern provinces. A devaluation in the Safavid Empire could at best
have had an influence on those areas but not really on western Anatolia, let
alone the Balkans. The fact that previous Safavid debasements had not had
an impact on the Ottoman akce shows that this assumption was not neces
sarily wrong.47 The Ottoman administration thus responded to the ques
tion at hand with the experience of the past, which was an experience
based on more limited trade zones with multiple local economies in which
different gold?silver ratios could operate, creating arbitrage profits for the
few who were well-connected in many zones.
The Ottoman administration regarded its domains as separate, exclu
sive, and mainly self-sufficient units. The regional markets were supposed
to operate with the regional currency, and interregional trade was sup
posed to be under governmental supervision and was to be conducted with
goods, or gold. Giicer, for instance, shows how regulated the grain market
46) Although the government decreed the exchange value of the sahi as 7 akces, this was
most probably its value when it was part of a payment made to the treasury. In 1582, the
government accepted sahis at 7 akces each, yet counted them as 7.5 akces when they were
used in payment; see Sahillioglu, "1582-83 tarihli biitce": 32, 44.
47) See above, pp. 472-473.
480 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
was. Every administrative district was viewed as a self-contained unit, and

the movement of the produce between the districts was supposed to be
under governmental supervision.48 Yet this ideal system with regard to the
grain market apparently did not work as intended, otherwise it would be
quite difficult to account for Sokollus own trade in grain with Venice, or
the various violations of the prohibition by less exalted people.49 As will be
shown below, things were changing in the currency market as well.
Although the use of the Ottoman ?ahi might have prevented silver losses
that would have accrued from international arbitrage between the Otto
man and Safavid empires, it also created discrepancies within the empire.
Seven akces were supposed to contain 4.78 g. of silver, making the face
value of the Ottoman sahi, which contained 3.84 g. of silver, almost 25%
more than its silver value. Had the southeastern provinces not been in
close economic contact with the rest of the empire this discrepancy might
not have caused a great deal of trouble. It would have enriched a limited
few, who were trading between Anatolia and Baghdad, for instance, but it
would not really have affected the coinage in general. After all, the use of
the Ottoman ?ahi was meant to be limited to the former Safavid lands of
the empire. When it was struck, it was not intended to be used as a method
of payment in Syria or Anatolia.
Yet by the late 1560s, the Ottoman economic zones had apparently
become much more united than the Ottoman administration thought
they were, because the ?ahi had quickly invaded the Levant. What is fasci
nating about the expansion of the use of the ?ahi is that it was welcomed
by the public despite the fact that it was an overvalued piece of silver. In
1572, its going rate in Aleppo seems to have been 5 paras, which must
have been the result of its independent value against the ducat in the east
ern provinces. If a ducat was worth 40 paras in Aleppo and 8 sahis in
Baghdad, the exchange rate of the ?ahi would have been 5 paras a ?ahi,
despite the fact that a sahi s silver content was worth only 3.5 paras. Appar
ently this is exactly what happened. The finance director of Aleppo drew
the Ottoman capital's attention to the fact that the sahi was overvalued in
terms of its silver content, and that its value had to be reduced to 4 paras.
48) Liitfi Gii^er, "XVI. yiizyil sonlannda Osmanli Imparatoriugu dahilinde hububat ticareti
nin tabi oldugu kayitlar." Istanbul Universitesi tktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasi 13 (1951-2): 79-98.
49) Gucer, "XVI. yiizyil sonlannda Osmanli Imparatoriugu dahilinde hububat ticaretinin
tabi oldugu kayitlar": 79-81; Anonymous, "Hirzii'l-Muluk." In Osmanli Devlet Teskildtina
Dair Kaynaklar: Kitab-i Miistetdb?Kitabu Mesalihil Miislimin ve MendfiTl-Muminin?
Hirzii'l-Muluk, ed. Yasar Yiicel (Ankara: TurkTarih Kurumu, 1988): 178.
Merchants coming from Anatolia, who used to bring either gold coins or
goods to barter with, now brought silver, converted it to sahis in the mint
of Diyarbekir, and used the sahis for their purchases.50
Since around this time 450 akces were struck from 100 dirhems of sil
ver, one may suppose that the price of silver could not have been any
higher than 450 akces per 100 dirhems in Anatolia. Most probably, it was
actually a little cheaper than that since one had to pay certain fees for the
mint. If one took 100 dirhems of silver to the southern mints of the empire,
one could get 80 sahis.51 These sahis were worth at least 560 akces at
7 akces a sahi. Thus 450 akces worth of silver produced an extra 110 akces
worth of purchasing power in the Levant, which amounts to a profit of
24.4%.
After the finance director of Aleppo had explained this situation to the
capital in 1572, the Ottoman center responded favorably to his request
and ordered the exchange rate of the sahi to be reduced to 4 paras. Although
at 4 paras the sahi would make 6 akces and would still be overvalued, the
arbitrage profit would be reduced to 6.7%. Yet it seems that the order was
of no avail. European travelers noted the value of the sahi at 4.5 paras in
1574, and at 5 paras in 1577 and 1579.52
Thus the sahi started to be used in the greater Syria area at the latest by
the early 1570s. Minting sahis soon became quite popular in the region
and spread from the mint of Baghdad to the mints of Aleppo and Diyarbe
kir. By the late 1570s investors had raised their bids for the tax-farms of the
mints that struck sahis by almost 25,000 ducats.53 In 1582, the provincial
50) Sahillioglu, "Osmanli para tarihi": 101, n. 36.

51) When 420 akces were struck from 100 dirhems of silver, the dirhem of silver was valued
at 4 akces per dirhem in the balance sheet of the imperial treasury; see Omer L. Barkan,
"954-955 (1547-1548) mail yilina ait bir Osmanli butcesi." Istanbul Universitesi Iktisat
Fakiiltesi Mecmuasi 19 (1957-8): 276. The value of silver at 4 akces per dirhem does not
seem to have changed after the debasement of the mid 1560s; see the imperial order cited
by Celil Ender, Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri Osmanli Arsivindeki Niimismatik ile ilgili
Belgeler Katalogu (Istanbul: Turk Niimismatik Dernegi Yayinlan, 1996): 10, no. 104. Since
a sahi included 3.84 g. of silver, with 100 dirhems (307.2 g) of silver, one could strike
80 sahis (307.2: 3.84 = 80) if one were to disregard the mint fee.
52) For the order, see Sahillioglu, "Osmanli para tarihi": 101, n. 36. With sahis valued at
6 akces, someone could strike (80 x 6 =) 480 akces worth of sahis with 100 dirhems of silver
which would yield only 450 akces if one were to strike akces; thus: 480-450 = 30; 30: 450 x
100 = 6.7%. For the quotes by European travelers, see Hinz, Islamische Wdhrungen: 13, 44.
53) See the documents cited by Ender, Niimismatik ile ilgili Belgeler. 5, no. 47-8; Sahillioglu,
"Osmanli para tarihi": 102 n. 37, 259.
482 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
administrators of Damascus reported to the capital that people were no

longer interested in the para, and that the mint was exclusively producing
sahis since 80 sahis struck from 100 dirhems (307.2 g.) of silver made 400
paras at 5 paras a sahi, whereas one would get far fewer paras if one were to
strike paras out of silver. According to the administrators, the sahi s silver
content was worth only 3.5 paras. Although the center seems to have
responded favorably to this request to adjust the coins' weights, and hence
exchange values, the order does not seem to have been of any avail, as the
sahi was still valued at 5 paras in 1584.54
A currency's acceptance as a means of payment is ultimately based on
the willingness of the market to operate with it. It seems that the Levantine
market had reached a consensus about the value to be assigned to the sahi,
and the official orders that sought to assign a lower value to it were disre
garded. This point is extremely important as it suggests that already at the
beginning of the 1570s, before the long wars of the Ottomans had started,
and before Spanish silver arrived in large quantities, there had already been
a great demand for currency; this was due to the operations of the market,
and was not the result of fiscal difficulties faced by the treasury. Otherwise
it would be quite difficult to account for the public acceptance of the sahi
at a face value that was far above the value of its actual silver content.
Pamuk assumes that the sahi's overvaluation resulted from a policy pur
sued by the government, and speculates as to why the Ottoman center
might have chosen to adopt such a policy.55 Although the government
might indeed have adopted a "policy" in determining the weight and
exchange value of the sahi in the eastern provinces, in the Levant things do
not seem to have been under its control. The orders of the center to the
financial director of Aleppo in 1572, and to the authorities in Damascus
in 1582, suggest that the government actually tried to intervene in order
to reduce the exchange rate of the sahi yet their endeavor turned out to be
unsuccessful. Thus one cannot assume that the overvaluation of the sahi in
the Levant was the result of central policies.
Evidently the volume of commercial transactions was increasing, and
the available silver currency in circulation was not sufficient to finance
this higher volume. By valuing the sahi at 5 paras instead of 3.5 paras, the
54) See the document cited by Ender, Numismatik ile ilgili Belgeler. 13, no. 135. In 1584,
Barret stated that in Baghdad a sahi was equivalent to 5 paras "as in Aleppo"; Hakluyt, The
Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation: vol. 6: 10.
55) Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire: 103.
Levantine market increased the amount of money in circulation by almost

43% without changing the amount of silver that was available. The accept
ance by the public of the sahi, a larger coin than either the Ottoman akce
or the Levantine para, at a higher face value than its silver content consti
tuted a way of increasing the total amount of money in circulation while
staying within the limits set by the scarcity of silver to strike coins with.
This market operation would not have worked out had the public been
reluctant to participate in it. It were after all the people who used the sahi
in the Levant, and they could very well have refused to accept it at such an
unrealistic value. But they did not. They actually declined to accept it at a
lower value, which would have been more realistic in terms of its silver
content.
Thus, the para in the Levant seems to have acquired a value that was
independent of its silver content. Just as the $5 bills in circulation today
are equivalent to five $1 bills although they contain exactly the same
amount of paper, so the sahi was worth five paras although its silver con
tent was much less than that of five paras combined. That this was indeed
the case is also proven by the contemporary exchange rates of these two
silver coins in relation to the ducat. As late as 1579, a Venetian ducat was
valued at 40 paras, or 8 sahis in Egypt, and 42 paras in Tripoli, while in the
latter city the sahi was valued at 5.5 paras, which suggests that the going
rate of the ?ahi at ca. 5 paras was accepted even when one was dealing with
gold currency.56 These figures also indicate that in the Levant gold had
become comparatively cheaper in relation to silver, as 8 ?ahis included less
silver than 40 paras yet they were accepted as the equivalent of a ducat.
One could also argue that silver had become more expensive in relation
to gold, which may be ascribed to the Persian devaluation. The gold?
silver ratio prevalent in the Safavid Empire was adopted in the eastern
provinces of the Ottoman Empire as these areas were in close contact with
Persia. Yet as the eastern provinces came to be integrated into the larger
imperial market, the gold?silver ratio of Persia moved to the west, cance
ling out arbitrage profits that could be realized in the context of the rela
tively isolated existence of two different economic zones. Although in the
first half of the sixteenth century a similar development had taken place
between Egypt and the Levant, on the one hand, and the central lands of
the empire, on the other, that integration had occurred at the gold?silver
56) Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen: 14.
484 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
ratio of the center. This time, however, the ratio of the periphery was per
meating the center.
Thus a local Ottoman currency, which was meant to be used exclusively
in the former Safavid lands, entered daily usage in greater Syria and Egypt;
it found acceptance at a face value that was more than the value of its silver
content, increasing the total amount of money in circulation, perhaps, in
order to finance the increased volume of trade. Although the Ottomans
sanctioned this use by permitting the production of sahis in Levantine
mints, the administration was actually following the requirements of eco
nomic developments rather than initiating them, as becomes clear from
the unsuccessful attempt of the government to reduce the exchange value
of the sahi. However, there was yet another development that accelerated
the process which led to the official debasement and devaluation of the
akce: the influx of Spanish silver from the Americas.
Ill
Starting in the mid 1570s Spanish silver reals entered the Levant in ever
larger quantities, which contributed to the expansion of the use of the sahi
as the main currency of payment in the area and beyond.57 Before their
arrival in such large quantities, the reals were valued at 40 akces per piastre,
or a piece of eight reals, which the Ottomans called gurus.58 However, after
they flooded the Ottoman market, the Spanish reals came to be valued
in terms of their weight. The unit with which the market operated was
90 reals, which weighed 100 dirhems.59 In 1555, 100 dirhems of Venetian
silver coins were valued at 300 paras. A quotation from a document from
57) Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: 78; Micheline Bau
lant, ed., Lettres de negociants marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612 (Paris: A. Colin,
1953): 13, 15 (n. 11), 25, 36.
58) Although Ottoman financial records do not differentiate between different types of
large silver coins until the early seventeenth century, it seems that the gurus valued at 40
akces could well have been the Spanish piastre, or the Joachimsthaler of Central Europe,
after which the Spanish piastre, or the "piece of eight [reals]" was modeled, hence the name
"dollar." Sahillioglu quotes an entry from the daily record book of the imperial treasury
dated to early September 1569, according to which several guruses valued at 40, 20, and
10 akces entered the treasury; "Ottoman Monetary History": 282 n. 30. These three values
would only make sense if one were referring to the Spanish real pieces of eight, four,
and two.
59) Barret, in Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques & Discoveries of the English
Tripoli dated April 1582, the earliest source I could find for the value of
Spanish silver, suggests the same price.60
One would expect that with the arrival of the Spanish silver the amount
of silver available in the market would increase, and thus the price of silver
would decrease. However, not only do we have no idea about the exact
quantity of silver that entered the Ottoman Empire, we are also clueless
about how much silver was in circulation to begin with. For the influx of
silver to make an impact on the imperial market, it had to represent a size
able portion of the already accumulated stock. Unfortunately, we are far
from the point at which any estimates of these figures can be made, but
contemporary sources do offer a clue as to why the price of silver actually
increased.
If, as the Damascene authorities wrote to Istanbul in 1582, no one
was asking the mint to strike paras when one could get 80 sahis out of
100 dirhems of silver that were valued at 400 paras, then the price paid for
90 Spanish reals would be expected to rise toward 400 paras. That is to say,
if the foreign merchants who brought silver to the Levant were sufficiently
informed of the silver market, they would be expected to negotiate the value
of their silver in accordance with the amount of sahis that one could strike
out of 100 dirhems of silver. Thus 300 paras per 90 reals weighing 100
dirhems, which had been the price of silver in 1555 when there were no sahis
in the Levantine market, would not have held for long after April 1582, the
date of the first lump-sum quote I could find. Not surprisingly, the following
note, most probably reflecting the situation in 1583, suggests that the old
price paid for 100 dirhems of silver was indeed abandoned soon:
Mony at Tripolie. A duckett is 40 medins. A chekins is 42 medins. A sayd [saye?] is 4

medins V2. Two aspers is one medine? 90 realls of platte [i.e. silver] is a pesoe and
waied [worth ?] 8 ducketts V2, 12 medins, now 16. Att Amand William Barrett sould
a rioall [a single rial, not a rial of eight] of Spaigne for 4 medins.
Mony atAllepo. A duckett is 40 medins corant. A chekins is 48 medins. A saye is 5 medins.

Two aspers is V2 is [sic] one medin. 90 realls of platt is a peso, and a peso is wourth 9 ducketts
10 medins (beinge wayght, or else not). A doller (being weyght) is 32 medins.61
Nation: vol. 6: 10, 12, 13; G. Hermite's letter from 1584 in Baulant, Lettres de negociants
marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612: 60.
60) Tucci, Lettres dun marchand venitien Andrea Berengo, 1553-1556: 95; Baulant, Lettres de
negociants marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612: 36.
61) Sir William Foster, ed., The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant 1584-1602. With his
Autobiography and Selections from his Correspondence (London: Hakluyt Society, 1931): 292.
486 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
While a single real is 4 paras, and the dollar, a piece of eight reals, is
(4x8=) 32 paras, 90 reals make ([9 ducats of account x 40] + 10 =) 370
paras in Aleppo, which is more than the 360 paras that one would expect
them to make at 4 paras per real. The only explanation for this phenome
non is that 90 reals were traded as 100 dirhems of silver, which would
make 80 sahis that are worth 400 paras. Buying 90 reals for 370 paras?
which must have been paid either in goods, or sahis, since 370 paras actu
ally included more than 100 dirhems of silver?and then converting them
into sahis would create, at these rates, a profit of 30 paras, which is almost
8 reals. In Tripoli, where no official mint existed, no such immediate prof
its could be made.62 Thus the value of 90 reals was not as high in Tripoli as
it was in Aleppo, where a mint struck sahis.
Some of the sahis produced in the mint of Aleppo in 1582 found their
way to Anatolia and the Balkans. The mints in western Anatolia and the
Balkans did not produce ?ahis. Yet the balance sheet of the imperial treas
ury for the fiscal year of 1582-3 suggests that the ?ahi must have entered
the daily monetary transactions in the central lands of the empire as well.
During this fiscal year the value of the sahis that entered the Ottoman
treasury was more than 53.5 million akces. The contributions of the
provincial treasuries of Aleppo, Damascus, Erzurum, and Baghdad, where
the sahi could be expected to circulate at this time, were a little less than
45 million akces.63 Even if one assumes that all of the contributions
from these provinces reached the treasury in the form of sahis, which is
quite unlikely, at least 8.5 million akces worth of ?ahis must have been paid
into the treasury from sources of income located in the central lands of the
empire.
This note, written by Sanderson s apprentice John Hanger, is not dated, yet the price quoted
for a peso, or 90 reals, which is 100 dirhems of silver, seems to be the same as the one
quoted by G. Hermite, a French merchant, on May 1, 1583, in Aleppo; see Baulant, Lettres
de negotiants marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612: 51. Thus Hanger, who joined Sand
erson in 1599, was probably copying something from an earlier date because the exchange
rates of the 1600s were quite different, and the piastre had replaced the ducat as a money
of account; compare Baulant, Lettres de negotiants marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612:
39, 132-45. Also William Barrett must have been the same person as William Barret who
was earlier noted in Aleppo in 1584; see n. 45 above.
62) Actually, a mint was opened in Tripoli on a local initiative to strike sahis sometime
around 1585, yet the government ordered it to be closed down; see Sahillioglu, "Osmanli
para tarihi": 264 (n. 18).
63) Sahillioglu, "1582-83 tarihli biitce": 35, 38-9.
There is both archival and literary evidence to suggest that the sahi
circulated not only in Anatolia, but also in the Balkans. Selaniki, an Otto
man chronicler of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, states
that the overvalued sahi came from the borderland between the Ottomans
and the Safavids and reached the farthest points of Rumelia during the
reign of Murad III (r. 1574-95). Selaniki is not exaggerating, as the sahi
even reached beyond Rumelia and was recorded in the principalities of
Wallachia and Moldavia.64
The dynamics of the expansion of the sahi beyond the zone where it was
meant to circulate is of great significance for our understanding of the
devaluation of the Ottoman akce against the ducat and the piastre in 1585
6, as well as its debasement. The actual debasement of the akce was directly
related to the expansion of the sahi into Anatolia and the Balkans. Sahilli
oglu argues that as the government did not take steps to adjust the exchange
rates of the various coins in circulation, "the money changers, counterfeit
ers, and guilds took matters into their own hands and clipped the corners
of the undervalued akce."65 Since the exchange rate of the sahi was
7 akces, the public would be expected to clip the akces to the point at
which 7 of them would weigh the same as a ?ahi.
Moreover, as the correspondence of the Ottoman authorities in Aleppo
with the center in 1572 suggests,66 in the early 1570s silver had already
started to move from Anatolia to the Levant in the hands of merchants,
since its purchasing power was stronger there. Thus the spread of the sahi
and its acceptance at an overvalued rate even in tax payments to the gov
ernment might well have caused some scarcity of silver for striking akces in
the central lands of the empire, or it might have raised the price of silver.
In order not to lose the silver in the market to the Levantine mints that
offered overvalued sahis in payment, Anatolian mints might well have
increased their buying price of silver, which could only work if they were
to produce akces at a debased weight, or add some copper to the silver
content of the akce.
There is evidence that debased akces were struck in Anatolian and Bal
kan mints already in the 1570s when the use of the sahi expanded in the
64) Mustafa Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki, ed. M. Ipsirli. 2 vols. (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi
Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Yayinlan, 1989): vol. 1: 427; Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman
Empire: 93.
65) Sahillioglu, "Ottoman Monetary History": 286.
66) See n. 50 above.
488 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
Levant,67 and there are also indications that the silver brought by the Euro
pean merchants could find its way to these mints. In May 1583, G. Her
mite, a French merchant in Aleppo, recorded the price of [90] reals as 9.25
ducats of account at the mint and 9.5 in the contraband market.68 Debased
akces in their turn could increase the value of the sahi in terms of the akce,
or make the Levantine mints feel free to produce debased sahis. And there
is indeed evidence which suggests that the counterfeit production of sahis
by private individuals, as well as by unauthorized mints, had already started
by 1583.69 Hence the references to the sahi in literary and archival sources
as an alloyed and counterfeit coin (magsusy kem-ayar; zagal).70 Once the
debased akces made the sahi worth more than its prescribed value?which
had been an inflated one to start with and thus created a market for debased
sahis?the price of silver would be expected to increase further. And
indeed, Hermite notes in April 1584 that the value of [90] reals rose fur
ther "for the increase [in the value] of the sahis that are eight akces."71
It is at this point that the Safavid wars come into the picture. In imme
diate need of cash, the treasury had to accept the overvalued sahis as pay
ment instead of expecting gold coins from the Levant, which in turn
opened new avenues for the expansion of the use of the sahi as suggested
by the balance sheet of the imperial treasury for 1582-3. But more impor
tantly, when a commander general was on campaign, and funds from pro
vincial treasuries were assigned to him for expenditures in the east, as had
been the case with Ferhad Pasha in 1583-5, tax farmers may have felt freer
to use debased sahis in their payments since a commander in war would
not have the luxury to refuse funds brought to his treasury.
Once debased sahis started to be produced and possibly found accept
ance by the treasury for military campaigns, the price of silver could rise
further to exceed its ceiling of 400 paras, or 10 ducats of account, which is
the equivalent of the 80 sahis that one could strike from 100 dirhems
of silver. This expectation is substantiated by the letters of French mer
chants from Aleppo in 1584 and 1585. According to these letters, the price
67) See, for instance, the orders cited by Ender, Niimismatik ile ilgili Belgeler. 5 (#50),
10 (#96-7).
68) Baulant, Lettres de negociants marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612: 51.
69) See the orders cited by Ender, Niimismatik ile ilgili Belgeler. 15 (#145, from 1583;
#150 from 1584), 16 (#155 from 1585).
70) Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki: vol. 1: 427; Sinan Pasha, Telhisdt (originally untitled), Siiley
maniye Kiituphanesi, Esad Efendi 2236, f. 70a.
71) Baulant, Lettres de negociants marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612: 63.
of 100 dirhems of silver in the contraband market reached 11 ducats of

account and 35 paras in April 1585, five months prior to the official deval
uation of the akce.72
Apparently things got out of control in 1584 when the price of silver
exceeded its possible ceiling. The rising trend in the price of silver between
1582 and 1584 was a byproduct of the sahi; had the sahi not already been
an overvalued silver coin that was widely accepted in the Levant, the prof
its of melting Spanish reals and converting them into local currency would
not have been that high. If one were to strike akces from 90 Spanish reals
that weighed 100 dirhems, one would get 450 akces, equating a Spanish
real with 5 akces, and the gurus as a piece of eight reals with 40 akces,
which was the official exchange rate. Thus one could not make a profit by
melting Spanish silver and converting it into akces and there would not
have been an incentive for speculating on the silver market. Yet there was
a great deal of profit to be made if one were to convert the reals into ?ahis,
as the 80 sahis that one could strike from 90 reals made 560 akces at 7
akces a sahi, or 640 akces at 8 akces a sahi.
It was primarily this sahi-related pressure on the price of silver that
played an important role in the devaluation of the akce. Since silver in the
form of the sahi was overvalued in the Levant, the price of silver would be
expected to rise in Anatolia if the two regions had been closely connected
as I have suggested. Both the clipping and the debased production of the
akce indicate a move in that direction, which is yet another indication of
how quickly information traveled and arbitrage profits diminished in the
imperial economic zone.
Moreover, it seems that just as the use of the overvalued sahi had not
made an impact on the value of the gold ducat in the late 1570s, the
de facto debasement of the akce does not seem to have had an immediate
influence on the exchange rate of the ducat. As late as 1577, the Ottoman
gold coin was quoted as being worth 60 akces.73 More importantly, a con
temporary Ottoman author, writing in 1581 while working at the provin
cial finance department of Aleppo, notes that the de facto debasement did
not have an impact on the value of the ducat in terms of the akce: "The
money-changers... have divided the 'osmani [i.e. the akce] coins into three
categories. Of the small ones they spend 60 on one florin, of the large ones
72) Baulant, Lettres de negotiants marseillais, les Freres Hermite, 1570-1612: 60, 63, 72.
490 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
50 and 45, and of the drachms of medium grade 55."74 This observation
suggests that the old exchange rate of 60 akces to the ducat was still valid
even though the akces in question included much less silver than pre
scribed. It seems that gold had become cheaper in relation to silver, follow
ing the developments in the eastern provinces and the Levant. It was this
development that the government was reacting to when it finally devalued
the akce in September 1585.
IV
So far I have shown that the Ottoman central administration percei

its domains as separate economic units and determined exchange r
accordingly. However, both the example of Egypt where between
and 1555 the gold?silver ratio reached a level that was much close
that of the central lands of the empire, and the example of the sahi, w
was meant to be used as a regional currency but practically invaded the
of the empire in the 1570s and early 1580s, suggest that the Otto
domains were developing into one big imperial economic market. In
section I argue that the rise in the value of silver in relation to go
result of the spread of the sahi had an important impact on the go
ment s decision to intervene, because the central treasury had bee
greatest profiteer of arbitrage opportunities that were now disappea
Although one may consider the government s pursuit of arbitrage
tunities as a fiscal measure of sorts, I interpret the primary motiv
behind it as the exploitation of economic resources for the benefi
the dynastic institution of rule. Thus the devaluation of 1585 was
tuted with the interests of the imperial treasury in mind, rather than
larger economy.
In September 1585, official exchange rates were decreed as 110 akces f
the gold ducat and 65 akces for the gurus, or the Spanish piastre.75
values do not seem to have reflected the actual values of the ducat an
gurus. The market value of these coins seems to have stood at 85
74) Mustafa Ali, Mustafd 'Alt's Counsel for Sultans of 1581, ed., tr. Andreas Tietze.
(Vienna: Verlag der dsterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1979-82): vol.
184. Ali's remarks about the 1585 devaluation constitute a later addition to the text
75) The rates were to be considered two akces lower, i.e. 108 and 63 akces respectively
the treasury received these in the form of income items; see Sahillioglu, "Osmanh
tarihi": 75 n. 12.
60 akces respectively in 1584 and early 1585. Although their prices may
have risen somewhat further prior to September, the ratio of the value of
the ducat to that of the gurus in the free market seems to have been quite
different from the new ratio instituted by the government. The actual
figures for 1584 and early 1585, 85 and 60 akces in Istanbul, or 47 and
33 paras in Baghdad, as well as available figures for 1582, around 70 and
50 akces in Istanbul for the ducat and the gurus respectively,76 suggest that
the gold ducat was worth around 1.4 gurus. On the other hand, the former
official exchange rates for the ducat and the gurus were 60 and 40 akces
respectively, which implies that the ducat had been valued at 1.5 gurus. In
1585, however, the government valued the ducat around 1.7 gurus.
Berthier, a French diplomat in Istanbul, wrote on February 5, 1586, five
months after the official devaluation, that the value of the ducat had been
raised "higher than it was [in the market] ."77
It seems that the market forces had made gold ducats somewhat cheaper
in relation to silver (1.4 piastre as opposed to 1.5), or silver had gained in
value against gold, developments that had been observed earlier in the
Levant and the eastern provinces as a result of the spread of the sahi. Istan
bul was thus about to join the rest of the empire in a different gold?silver
ratio. The Ottoman government aimed at reversing this trend. In order to
comprehend the motives of the government, some overview of the role of
gold in Ottoman finances in the sixteenth century is in order.
Although the lands that made up the Ottoman Empire had quite a
number of different currencies, some of which have been referred to above,
the currency used for fiscal transactions between these lands as well as
large-scale commercial transactions, at least up to the 1570s, had been the
gold coin, either the Ottoman sultani, or the Venetian ducat, which were
more or less of the same weight. The balance sheet of the Ottoman central
treasury for the fiscal year 1582-3 suggests that the relative absence of gold
in the revenues might have been a more important issue than silver scarcity
in the decision of the Ottoman administration to devalue the akce.
The Ottomans had started to strike gold coins during the reign of
Mehmed II (1451-81), yet the available evidence from various inventories
76) For the figures from 1582, 1584, and 1585, see Sahillioglu, "Osmanh para tarihi":
74 n. 11, 231 n. 1; for the figures from Baghdad, see Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations
Voyages Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation: vol. 6: 10.
77) Cited by Cemal Kafadar, "When Coins turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers became
Robbers of Shadows: The Boundaries of Ottoman Economic Imagination at the End of the
Sixteenth Century." Ph.D. dissertation (McGill University, 1986): 65.
492 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
suggests that the share of gold in the pool of currencies in circulation was
not great before the reign of Suleyman I.78 The extant balance sheet of the
imperial treasury for the fiscal year 1524-5 includes a list of currencies,
together with their respective numbers in coins, in which payments to the
treasury were received. According to this balance sheet, 7.9% of the total
income reached the treasury in gold specie, 47.5% of which in sultanis.79
Although a similar balance sheet for 1547-8 does not provide the same sort
of list, a number of entries nevertheless refer to some of the income items
that were received in gold coins, however without much specification as to
whether these coins were of Ottoman or foreign origin. These entries sug
gest that in 1547-8, at least 21.8% of the total income was received in gold
coinage.80 Not surprisingly, the increase in the payments made to the treas
ury in gold had to do with the Arab provinces, where gold was in relative
abundance.81
In 1524-5, the contribution of the Arab provinces to the imperial treasury
was minimal: in all 5,268,145 akces, almost exclusively in gold coinage on
a total income of 141,272,658 akces. Moreover, the comparative notes
added to the entries, which record the income from the same items in
the previous fiscal year 1523-4, suggest that the Arab provinces were then
unable to send any surplus at all, which is probably why the treasury closed
the year with a deficit of almost 2,000,000 akces.82 In 1547-8, however, the
78) Sahillioglu, "Ottoman Monetary History": Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 4a, on pp. 293-7.

79) Sahillioglu, "1524-1525": 434, provides the number of gold coins. I established their
respective values in akces from internal evidence gathered from pp. 437 and 442, using
some approximation for the values of the engiirusi, a Hungarian gold coin, and the akce-/
Marfel, which must be the Venetian marcello, and then calculated their proportions in
terms of their value in akces.
80) Barkan, "954-955 (1547-1548)": 246-9. I have adjusted the subtotals of the provinces
of Syria and Diyarbekir to reflect the actual total of the items; thus the total under C,
p. 246, should read: 489,922 gold coins worth 27,925,460 akces.
81) Egypt enjoyed a relative abundance of gold thanks to its connections with sub-Saharan
Africa; see the sources cited by Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire: 97,
n. 23. Aleppo was also rich in gold since it was a major center of interregional and interna
tional commerce. According to Sahillioglu, "Osmanh para tarihi": 90, the provincial trea
sury of Aleppo would collect its taxes in the local currency, and then convert them into gold
coins by distributing local silver coins to the merchants of the region and collecting gold
from them in return, a practice called tehdil-i hasene.
82) Sahillioglu, "1524-1525": 437 n.; the deficit is 1,895,464 akces, p. 423. In 1523,
Ahmed Pasha was appointed governor of Egypt where he is said to have declared his inde
pendence and struck coins in his own name; Ibn Abi al-Surur, Al-Minah: 139-41. Although
his rebellion was suppressed and he was executed in Egypt, the aftermath of the crisis might
Arab provinces and Diyarbekir made a contribution of 28,211,339 akces

worth, almost exclusively in gold coinage. Without this large contribution,
the Ottoman central treasury would have been ca. 12,000,000 akces in
deficit for 1547-8. One must note, however, that the tribute of Egypt is
not included anywhere in this balance sheet.83 Thus one may assume that,
with the addition of the tribute of Egypt, the total contribution of the
Arab provinces in other years would have been much higher.
Probably thanks to these contributions, which made it possible for the
Ottoman treasury balances to show surpluses during the sixteenth century,
quite a large amount of gold accumulated in the treasury. The holdings of
the imperial treasury on 11 March 1548 totaled 86,889,845 akces worth
of specie, 58% of which consisted of gold coinage.84 This 58% share of the
akce value of gold coinage in the akce value of all the currencies held in the
treasury at the end of the fiscal year seems to have been much larger than
the share of the same in the akce value of all the coins entering the treasury
during the year.85 The Ottomans thus apparently tried to hoard the gold as
a reserve, and to pay their expenditures mainly with akces.
The next extant balance sheet of the imperial treasury is from the fiscal
year 1567-8. Unfortunately, it neither includes a list of the different cur
rencies making up the income, nor an inventory of the holdings of the
treasury at the end of the fiscal year. Yet again, some of the entries indicate
that income items related to those entries were paid into the imperial treas
ury in gold coinage. These entries record that in the fiscal year of 1567-8
at least 26.5% of the total income was received in gold coinage. Not sur
prisingly, these income items in gold came exclusively from the Arab prov
inces, without which the treasury would have closed the year with a deficit
of more than 50,000,000 akces.86
These balance sheets underline two important points. First, without the
Arab provinces the Ottoman administrative-military apparatus could not
have financed its expenditures in the sixteenth century. These provinces
have postponed the dispatch of the Egyptian tribute to 1525. The events may also have
affected the finances of Aleppo.
83) Compare Omer L. Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) mali yihna ait bir Osmanh
biitcesi." Istanbul Universitesi tktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasi 19 (1957-8): 302, 307; Sahillioglu,
"1582-83 tarihli biitce": 38, 46.
84) Barkan, "954-955 (1547-1548)": 275.
85) See n. 78-80 above.
86) Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568)": 299, 302-4. There are a number of inconsis
tencies in the figures of the document; I tried to go by the totals whenever possible.
494 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
both financed themselves and provided surplus revenues for the expendi
tures of the center elsewhere. It would probably not be an exaggeration to
claim that the westward and eastward expansion of the empire during
the reign of Suleyman I was financed by the center at the expense of the
Arab provinces.
Second, Ottoman finances benefited greatly from arbitrage profits.
Collecting its revenues in gold coins from the Arab lands where a slightly
different gold?silver ratio was still in effect in the second half of the six
teenth century made these revenues more valuable in Istanbul than they
were, for example, in Egypt. To give an example, let us assume that the
tribute of Egypt, 500,000 ducats, that was supposed to enter the personal
treasury of the sultan every year, was sent in silver currency. Up to 1585,
500,000 ducats were worth 30 million akces in Istanbul according to the
official exchange rate. The silver currency equivalent of the Egyptian trib
ute was 20 million paras, again according to the official exchange rate
of 40 paras a ducat. After the Egyptian debasement of 1565, at the most
optimistic estimate, 328 paras contained 100 dirhems of silver, which was
necessary to strike 450 akces. Thus had the Egyptian tribute been sent in
paras to be melted and converted into akces, the treasury would have
received 27,439,024 akces, which is 2,560,976 akces less than if the trib
ute had been sent in gold. Hence the Ottoman central treasury made a
profit of 9.3% by maintaining different gold?silver ratios in its central
lands and its southern provinces. Every 10 akces worth of revenue col
lected in silver in the Levant was worth almost 11 akces to the central
treasury. Separate currency zones, which could only operate in the absence
of full integration, and the profits of arbitrage associated with such an
economic setting, were in the interest of the Ottoman center.
When one looks at the balance sheet for the fiscal year of 1582-3, how
ever, it seems that the Ottoman center was losing its arbitrage profits. The
Arab provinces, with the exception of Egypt, could not procure much
gold. This particular balance sheet provides very detailed lists of the various
kinds of specie, including those that were carried over from the previous
fiscal year, those that entered the treasury during 1582-3, and those that
were carried over to the next fiscal year. The very existence and detailed
nature of these lists are suggestive of the significance the Ottoman admin
istration attached to the emerging problem of gold?silver ratios. Accord
ing to these lists, 15.5% of the total income entered the treasury in gold
coins. The balance sheet also indicates that Egypt sent a tribute of 522,228
gold coins, which went straight into the personal treasury of the sultan.87
Once the value of this tribute is deducted from the total value of all gold
coins that entered the treasury as part of the revenues for 1582-3, the
remainder is 10,316,728 akces worth of gold coins.
The reason for the relative lack of gold coins is not that the Arab prov
inces failed to support the central treasury with their usual contributions.
On the contrary, the provinces of Aleppo and Damascus seem to have sent
their largest contributions ever when one compares this balance sheet with
others.88 The contribution of the provinces of Aleppo and Damascus,
which used to send their payments in gold coinage in the past, is 37,087,420
akces worth, almost 27 million more than the total value of gold coins that
entered the treasury, excluding the tribute of Egypt. Apparently, the treas
uries of the finance department in Aleppo and Damascus failed to procure
gold. Instead they seem to have used sahis, of which the revenues included
53,546,933 akces worth, which is slightly more than 20% of the total
revenues for 1582-3, or 23% if the Egyptian revenue is excluded from the
total, since it went straight into the private treasury of the sultan.
When the revenues of the Levant were sent in sahis as opposed to duc
ats, as was the case for this year, the central treasury was losing money. For
instance, in 1582-3, the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo made a con
tribution of ca. 37 million akces to the central treasury, most of which
must have been in sahis. Let us suppose that all of this contribution was
sent in gold coins as opposed to sahis. 37 million akces worth of sahis
equaled 5,285,714 sahis, which would make 660,714 gold coins in accord
ance with the official rates of 5 paras a sahi and 40 paras a ducat. This
much gold would make 39,642,840 akces in Istanbul. Hence the treasury
lost more than two and a half million akces which it would have made had
the contributions been sent in gold.
Thus in the early 1580s the sahi became the second most important cur
rency after the akce in Ottoman revenues, replacing gold coins to a great
extent, and causing a great deal of loss in arbitrage profits for the Ottoman
87) Sahillioglu, "1582-83 tarihli biitce": 31-5, 38-46.

88) Compare Sahillioglu, "1524-1525": 437-8; Barkan, "954-955 (1547-1548)": 247-8;
Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568)": 302; Sahillioglu, "1582-83 tarihli biitce": 38-9.
The balance sheet for 1527-8 does not reflect the actual income but an ideal situation, yet
its figures are lower than those for 1582-3; Omer L. Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528)
mali yilina ait bir biitce ornegi." Istanbul Universitesi Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasi 15 (1953
4): 294-5.
496 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
center. Moreover, for the Ottoman center more was at stake than a simple
loss of future profits. A change in the gold?silver ratio that would make
silver more valuable against gold would have the effect of decreasing the
value of the Ottoman gold reserves in the private treasury of the sultan in
the imperial palace. Even in the most dire straits that Ottoman finances
went through during the Habsburg wars in the 1590s and the 1600s, and
during the four accessions that took place between 1617 and 1623, which
created an immense burden on the treasury because of the accession ben
efits paid to the soldiers, the private treasury of the sultan was still able to
cover the deficits of the central treasury. Thus the amount of gold that had
been accumulated during the sixteenth century must have been immense.
Consequently, one would be justified in claiming that it was quite impor
tant for the Ottoman center to protect the value of its gold reserves.
In sum, the Ottoman center had several reasons not to accept the new
gold?silver ratio, which had been carried by the sahi, the child of the
integration of the Ottoman economic zones into a big imperial market in
a period of economic expansion, from the Safavid borders to the Ottoman
capital. It is this observation rather than the fiscal difficulties which the
treasury faced in financing the war effort, which did not really exist at this
point as far as the balance sheet of 1582-3 is concerned, that may help to
explain the intervention of the Ottoman administration in September 1585.
As noted above, the Ottoman administration devalued the akce more
than the market had done. While the most recent market rates prior to the
devaluation were 85 akces for the ducat and 60 akces for the gurus, the
official rates were announced at 110 and 65 akces respectively. The deci
sion was thus clearly aimed at making gold more valuable in relation to
silver, or at stopping the spread of the gold?silver ratio of the south and
the east to the center of the empire. In that sense the assumption that
Murad III was aiming to increase the value of his treasury is a point
well made.89
But more importantly, the devaluation was aimed at the destruction of
the sahi, which the administration had come to regard as a major problem.
In 1591, when Sinan Pasha reminded Murad III that he had accomplished
a great deal since assuming the grand vizierate little more than two years
earlier, he noted that he had succeeded in eliminating the sahi from
89) That was the interpretation of some contemporaries; see Cemal Kafadar, "Les troubles
monetaires de la fin du xvie siecle et la prise de conscience ottomane du declin." Annales:
economies, societes, civilisations AG (1991): 385.
circulation.90 It was Sinan Pasha who had taken over and completed the
debasement operation started by Mehmed Pasha in 1588, three years after
the devaluation.91
Although the Ottoman economic market had started to operate with
the de facto debased akces, the government did not make extensive use of
these akces in salary payments. Even after the devaluation of the akce
against the gold ducat and the gurus in September 1585, at least some
of the soldiers of the central army continued to receive their salaries in
good akces for a few years. As noted by Reinhold Lubenau around 1587,
although the exchange rate of the gurus, which used to be 40 akces, had
risen by this time to 80 akces, the Janissaries received their salaries in
the old akces, 40 of which still made a gurus.92 Thus the devaluation of
the akce and its official debasement had not taken place at the same time.
In September 1585, the government devalued the de facto debased akce
while apparently still using the good akces in salary payments. It was only
in 1588 that the Ottoman administration decided to pursue a full-scale
official debasement of the akce by replacing all of the coins in circulation
with new ones that were going to contain 0.38 g. of silver as against to the
former standard of 0.68 g.93
In April 1589, when the imperial cavalry troops rebelled because they
were being paid in debased coinage, they asked for the execution of the
vizier Mehmed Pasha and the finance minister Mahmud Efendi, whom
they held responsible for the official debasement. While recounting the
incident, Selaniki makes the executioner say to Mahmud Efendi: "Are you
the one who struck akces from the mines at [the rate of] eight akces [per
90) Sinan Pasha, TelhisaP. f. 70a; for the dating of this telhis, see Suraiya Faroqhi, "Die Vor
lagen (telhise) des Grosswesirs Sinan pasa an Sultan Murad III." Ph.D. dissertation (Uni
versitat Hamburg, 1967): 36-7, 212, 218. One could also add that Sinan Pashas references
to his former grand vizierate and his governorship in Damascus in its aftermath, as well as
his statement that it had been almost two and a half years since he had assumed his post for
the second time, suggest that the telhis in question must have been written in the summer
of 1591, before his dismissal in August.
91) Kafadar, "The Boundaries of Ottoman Economic Imagination at the End of the
Sixteenth Century": 93-4.
93) Sahillioglu, "Osmanli para tarihi": 66, 224-5, 233-4 (n. 27-34). In addition to the
documents cited by Sahillioglu, see also Ender, Niimismatik ile ilgili Belgeler: 18, no. 174,
177.
498 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
dirhem]?"94 Although it is not clear whether the akces in which the cavalry
troops received their salaries were the officially debased ones, the context
of this remark as well as the timing of the incident right after the beginning
of the debasement operation suggest that this was the case.95
It seems that the imperial army had a strong leverage against the admin
istration in expecting their salaries to be paid in good coin. Yet this was
becoming more difficult given the de facto debasement of the akce since
at least the 1570s. An alternative for the good akce would have been the
ducat or the gurus, but neither was used much in the market. After
the expansion of the use of the sahi, the piastres that entered the country
were converted into ?ahis in order to take advantage of the overvaluation
of the coin. As for the ducat, the southern provinces, its principal source,
now sent their yearly contributions in overvalued sahis and probably kept
the ducats for themselves.
In 1585, by valuing the gurus at 65 akces, five akces above its most
recently quoted market value, the government was hoping to stop the con
version of Spanish silver into sahis by outbidding the profits made
by minting ?ahis. As for the quite high value of the ducat at 110 akces,
25 akces more than its most recent market value, this overvaluation of the
ducat suggests that the administration was trying to reverse the trend that
made silver more valuable than gold. At a higher exchange rate, the center
thought, the southern provinces would again send their tributes in gold
coins as opposed to overvalued ?ahis. Yet the overvaluation of the ducat led
to yet another round of practical debasement for the akce, pushing the
exchange rates yet further up. Although the government tried to keep the
value of gold relatively high, eventually the ducat and the gurus were val
ued at 120 and 80 akces respectively, which meant a return to the old ratio
of 1.5 guru? per ducat through a devaluation of 100% in comparison with
the pre-1585 rates of 60 and 40 akces.
94) Selaniki, Tarih-i Seldnikr: vol. 1: 211. Selaniki was not present in the capital at this
point; see p. 209.
95) According to Ali, it was the more than 1,000,000 akces, which were delivered by
"Kartakoz, the tax-farmer of the levy on wine sales," and were initially refused by the finance
minister Mahmud Efendi, which caused the trouble; Kafadar, "The Boundaries of Otto
man Economic Imagination at the End of the Sixteenth Century": 77. Ali, like Selaniki,
was not in the capital at this time and his account is based on what he had heard from
second hand sources. Sahillioglu believes that these akces may well have been the product
of the official debasement; "Osmanli para tarihi": 228.
When the debasement had finally been fully realized in 1588, however,
the rate of this debasement was not what one would have expected it to be.
If the value of both gold and large silver coins increased by 100%, one
would expect the debasement to reduce the size of the akce by half. Yet the
new akces contained 0.38 g., which indicates a debasement of 44% from
0.68 g. Thus the official gold?silver ratio was changed from 1:11.5 to
1:13.1, making gold relatively more expensive than silver.
The Ottoman central government was clearly aiming to reverse the trend
toward a unification of the Ottoman currency zones with a gold?silver
ratio that had made silver relatively more expensive than gold in the east
ern and southern provinces. Yet this effort proved unsuccessful; as the
southern provinces were reluctant to follow suit and debase their curren
cies accordingly,96 the debasement operation took the empire back into the
earlier part of the sixteenth century, when separate currency zones with
different gold?silver ratios co-existed. Over the next ten years, during
which the de facto debasement and devaluation of the akce continued, the
situation proved impossible to sustain.
In 1600 the Ottoman center undertook yet another debasement, which
reduced the silver content of the akce to 0.32 g., this time without an
accompanying devaluation in terms of the ducat, thus changing the gold?
silver ratio once again from 1:13.1 to 1:11. This decree, which made silver
relatively more expensive than gold, was an acknowledgement of market
realities on the part of the administration.97 Sanderson, an English mer
chant in Istanbul at the time, did not have much faith in the operation.
However, this time the debasement did prove to be successful, at least for
more than ten years to come.98 Moreover, in 1600 another debasement
took place in Syria, and this was accompanied by an official devaluation.
The new rate of the ducat and the weight of the para, which was decreed
at 80 paras of 0.48 g. each, suggest that both the Levant and the central
lands of the empire had finally become united in the same gold?silver
ratio, since in both areas one needed ca. 38 g. of silver to get a ducat.99
96) Selaniki, Tarih-i Seldniki: vol. 1: 430; Sahillioglu, "Osmanh para tarihi": 223-4.
97) Katib Qelebi, Fezleke. 2 vols. (Istanbul: Ceride-i Havadis Matbaasi, 1286-7 AH): vol. 1:
142-3; Sahillioglu, "Osmanh para tarihi": 225.
98) Foster, The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant 1584-1602: 202; in 1610, George
Sandys, an English traveler still quoted 120 akces for a ducat in Istanbul; see A Relation of
a Iourney begun An: Dom: 1610 (London: W. Barrett, 1615): 73, 77.
99) Muhammad Ibn Jum'a, "Al-bashat wa al-qudat." In Wuldt dimashqfi al- 'ahdal- uthmdni,
500 B. Tezcan /JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
In the late seventeenth century this process of the unification of the dif
ferent zones of the empire was to take its final shape. During the mid-sev
enteenth century the large European silver currencies, mostly called gurus
with an accompanying adjective, such as tarn, or kamil for the
Spanish piastre, came to be used as a common currency in the Ottoman
Empire,100 which led to the creation in the late seventeenth century of an
Ottoman kuru? that was meant to be used all over the empire. This new
imperial large silver coin was accompanied by the adoption of the para as
an imperial small silver currency that was minted in Istanbul as well as in
Egypt. Although the akce eventually disappeared, the para survived through
to the end of the Ottoman Empire and was even used during the early
period of the Turkish Republic as a monetary unit that denoted 1/40 of
a kurus. The kurus survives to this day in Turkey as well as in Egypt
(pronounced [qjirsh) to denote a penny.
Thus it was in the sixteenth century that the foundations of the early
modern monetary system of the Middle East were laid through the unifi
cation of different zones of regional currencies into a unified imperial zone.
Although the ?ahi, the coin that played a significant role in this process,
eventually disappeared together with the differences in the gold?silver
ratios of the Ottoman provinces, the Egyptian para came to replace the
akce. The fact that para came to mean money in modern Turkish is a
reminder of the market forces that unified a number of different monetary
zones in the sixteenth-century Middle East.
A final question I would like to address is whether one can talk about a
"monetarization" of the Ottoman economy parallel to all of these develop
ments. This article does not prove that a monetary economy emerged in
the Ottoman domains during the sixteenth century. After all, the emer
gence of a monetary economy based on the idea of production targeting a
market where goods are bought and sold, and not bartered, is not some
thing that one can precisely date to a certain moment in the gradual devel
opment of the use of money. Even if there were strict criteria to determine
the existence of a monetary economy, such as the amount of money in
circulation, the velocity of circulation, and the relative value of the
non-monetary sector, it seems doubtful whether one could gather enough
ed. S. al-Munajjid (Dimashq, [s.n.], 1949): 26. Yet the fineness of the new para is not indi
cated, thus there might still have been a discrepancy between the gold?silver ratios.
ioo) Pamuk, "In the Absence of Domestic Currency: Debased European Coinage in the
Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire." Journal ofEconomic History 57 (1997): 345-66.
data to test the "monetariness," or the "market-orientedness," of an econ

omy according to such criteria during the sixteenth century.
On the other hand, the evidence presented above shows that the pre
sixteenth-century Middle East consisted of different currency zones that
had different gold?silver ratios, as had been the case for the Islamic Middle
East and Byzantium in the Middle Ages. The monetary developments in
the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, however, indicate a sharp decrease
in opportunities for arbitrage with regard to profits that could be made by
taking advantage of the different gold?silver ratios that existed in differ
ent currency zones. I have shown that in 1525, there were great opportuni
ties for arbitrage between Cairo and Istanbul, but by 1555, arbitrage
profits would still have been possible but they would not have been as great
as 30 years before. I have also shown that in the 1560s, great arbitrage
profits could be realized since silver was much more valuable in Baghdad
than it was in Aleppo and in Istanbul. But Aleppo soon started to use the
sahi and forced an increase in the market value of silver, which soon affected
Anatolia and even the Balkans, so much so that by 1584 gold?silver ratios
in Baghdad and Istanbul had come to be the same.
I have also argued that the devaluation of 1585 and the debasement of
1588 were both aimed at the establishment of a different gold?silver ratio
that would increase the value of gold in relation to silver, and that this
would have been to the advantage of the Ottoman administration, which
had a vested interest in keeping the currency zones separate from each other
because it greatly benefited from arbitrage opportunities. But governmental
fiat was not strong enough to reverse market forces, hence the de facto
debasement of the akce in the hands of the public continued during the
1590s. Eventually, however, the Ottoman administration came to realize
that it was futile to try to reverse the processes brought about by market
forces, and in 1600 a higher value for silver in relation to gold was sanc
tioned, which proved to be more successful than the devaluation of 1585.
Both the decreasing opportunities for arbitrage throughout the sixteenth
century, and the failure of the greatest profiteer of arbitrage, the Ottoman
administration, to reverse the trend, suggest that the large Ottoman
domains were economically well connected to each other. Information
about profit opportunities traveled fast. Most importantly, increasing
demand for a product that allowed for large profits in a certain area, in this
case the relatively cheap silver of Anatolia with which overvalued sahis
could be struck in the east and the south, soon increased its price in the
whole imperial market, thus destroying opportunities for arbitrage profits.
502 B. Tezcan I JESHO 52 (2009) 460-504
Consequently, even though one cannot assert that the Ottoman economy
of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries was a fully-fledged
market economy, it is justified to claim that the Ottoman economy of this
period was much more market oriented and much more monetary than it
had been a century before.101
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The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited

Author(s): Baki Tezcan

The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited

En 1585-88,I'akge, la monnaie d'argent ottomane, fut devaluee officiellement de 100% par

*) Baki Tezcan, Assistant Professor of History, and Religious Studies, Department of

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/156852009X458223

correction, the debasement and devaluation appear to have preceded the

achieved at a time when a total of 38,207 soldiers, including auxiliary

the different currency market zones of the Ottoman Empire operated

When the Ottomans conquered a new region, the Ottoman administra

the establishment of their exchange values among themselves in their

Mamluk standards, as the administrative code refers to the exchange rate

19) Akgiindiiz, Osmanh Kanunnameleri: vol. 6: 124.

conditions, or they are not engaged in a sufficient number of transactions

24) UgoTucci, ed., Lettresdun marchandvenitienAndreaBerengo, 1553-1556(Paris: SEVPEN,

the Levant had been an independent currency zone in which a different

Minadoi's account of the Persian devaluation thus suggests that it hap

established by numismatic evidence, would corroborate the report of Ber

1555, after the debasement of the Persian shahi?worth 50 dinars in terms

ca. 30.3 g. of silver in Persia, while it was almost 41 g. of silver in Istanbul

was. Every administrative district was viewed as a self-contained unit, and

50) Sahillioglu, "Osmanli para tarihi": 101, n. 36.

administrators of Damascus reported to the capital that people were no

Levantine market increased the amount of money in circulation by almost

56) Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen: 14.

Mony at Tripolie. A duckett is 40 medins. A chekins is 42 medins. A sayd [saye?] is 4

Mony atAllepo. A duckett is 40 medins corant. A chekins is 48 medins. A saye is 5 medins.

of 100 dirhems of silver in the contraband market reached 11 ducats of

So far I have shown that the Ottoman central administration percei

78) Sahillioglu, "Ottoman Monetary History": Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 4a, on pp. 293-7.

Arab provinces and Diyarbekir made a contribution of 28,211,339 akces

87) Sahillioglu, "1582-83 tarihli biitce": 31-5, 38-46.

data to test the "monetariness," or the "market-orientedness," of an econ

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