Cryptocurrency

#2535 Matiaga St. Brgy.
Bagong Buhay II,Sampol Sapang Palay,

CSJDM, Bulacan Headwaters College LTA Sampol Campus
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
#2535 Matiaga St. Brgy. Bagong Buhay II,Sampol Sapang Palay,
DEDICATION
This research is dedicated to those people who keep continuing
building new horizons for our better future. The new formulations,
techniques, and improvements being provided by the past researchers
gives us guide in making this research possible, all of the evidences and
research study has a very large contribution in this work thanks to all
researchers who gives us new ideas and knowledge in everyday life.
The Researchers, 2020

ABSTRACT
CHAPTER I
SCIENTITIFIC PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrency is a virtual money/banking account for those who uses electronic
gadgets or digital banking, established in 2008 during the financial crisis and was first
used in public in 2009. It is used to digital method of payment and money exchange
currency for its security it uses strong cryptographic interface to avoid illegal activities
such as identity theft for the users. Cryptocurrency also decentralize control, opposed to
centralized digital currency and banking systems in the world. It has a custom ledger
called “blockchain” for public transparencies and financial transaction database.
Cryptocurrency has its own money called e-cash “electronic cash” to make a hassle-free
transaction in payment, these days the most used Cryptocurrency example is g-cash and
used by millions of people around the world.
A cryptocurrency (or crypto currency) is a digital asset designed to work as
a medium of exchange. The decentralized control of each cryptocurrency works
through distributed ledger technology, typically a blockchain, that serves as a public
financial transaction database. The system does not require a central authority, its state is
maintained through distributed consensus. The system keeps an overview of
cryptocurrency units and their ownership. The system defines whether new
cryptocurrency units can be created. If new cryptocurrency units can be created, the
system defines the circumstances of their origin and how to determine the ownership of
these new units.
Ownership of cryptocurrency units can be proved exclusively cryptographically.
The system allows transactions to be performed in which ownership of the cryptographic
units is changed. A transaction statement can only be issued by an entity proving the
current ownership of these units.
A bitcoin, first released as open-source software in 2009, is generally
considered the first decentralized cryptocurrency. Since the release of bitcoin, over
6,000 altcoins (alternative variants of bitcoin, or other cryptocurrencies) have been
created. In 1983, the American cryptographer David Chaum conceived an
anonymous cryptographic electronic money called e-cash. Later, in 1995, he
implemented it through Digi-cash, an early form of cryptographic electronic payments
which required user software in order to withdraw notes from a bank and designate
specific encrypted keys before it can be sent to a recipient. This allowed the digital
currency to be untraceable by the issuing bank, the government, or any third party.
The first decentralized cryptocurrency,
bitcoin, was created in 2009 by pseudonymous developer Satoshi Nakamoto. It
used SHA-256, a cryptographic hash function, as its proof-of-work scheme. In April
2011, Name coin was created as an attempt at forming a decentralized DNS, which would
make internet censorship very difficult. Soon after, in October 2011, Litecoin was
released. It was the first successful cryptocurrency to use scrypt as its hash function
instead of SHA-256. Another notable cryptocurrency, Peercoin was the first to use a
proof-of-work/proof-of-stake hybrid.
AIMS OF THE STUDY:
1.) Evaluate how bitcoins affect the problem of identity theft on our society;
2.) Determine whether bitcoins are truly useful as a tool to solve the identity theft;
3.) Make new ideas and recommendations to improve this way of solution to fight
financial crimes.
HYPOTHESIS
Bitcoins can provide enough security for the account users, the blockchain
(passage way of processing transactions) have the power to stop hackers as well as
identity thieves to solve financial crimes.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE
Bitcoin – The unique cryptocurrency of the millennium: In the technological era,
technical terms such as cryptocurrency and bitcoins have captured the attention of both
tech-savvy individuals and the internet experts. As per the published article “A Short
Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies” by Fabiana Schar and Aleksander
Berentsen, the bitcoin first came into existence with a white paper that was published in
the year 2008 (Berentsen & Schar, 2018). The creators of the model intended to introduce
a “cash-less payment model” that would allow electronic transactions instead of the
physical cash-based transactions. In order to help understand the readers the concept of
the bitcoin, the authors have highlighted the cash transactions as well as the electronic
payment system (Abdi, 2014).
The major difference between the traditional payment model and
the electronic payment via bitcoin is that there is no involvement of physical cash in the
later system. The bitcoin is a virtual monetary unit that has no physical or tangible
representation (Abramaowicz, 2016). In order to effectively use this currency, it is always
necessary to establish, the total number of monetary units that exist and the number of
new monetary units that have been created. Such an approach is highly important to make
sure that all the involved participants consent about the ownership rights relating to the
digital currency units.
Cryptocurrency has revolutionized the payment system: In the recent times, the
cryptocurrency has brought about transformational change in the online payment system
and according to Chiu and Koeppl, in the coming years the different kinds of
cryptocurrencies will expand at a faster rate. Various kinds of cryptocurrencies have
come into existence such as the Litecoin, Zcash, Dash, Ripple, Bitcoin and many more
(Ahmad, et al., 2018). But the most successful cryptocurrency that has captured the
attention of the tech freaks is the Bitcoin. Appendix 2 highlights the value of one Bitcoin
unit in terms of the U.S. dollar. This rising trend shows that the innovative currency has
gained high popularity and it will further gain more popularity due to its usefulness and
unique value. Most of the types of cryptocurrencies are fundamentally built by the
professional computer experts and scientists who emphasize on overall feasibility,
effectiveness and security aspects of this virtual payment model. Chiu and Koeppl in their
research. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency. Essentially, that means a
digital currency generated by a network of computers using sophisticated mathematical
formulae. The process of production is called bitcoin mining. Bitcoin can be used for
electronic transactions, but it has no actual physical form. The origin of bitcoin is
shrouded in mystery. It was ‘created’ by Satoshi Nakamoto, a name which seems to be an
alias. Various people have claimed to be – or denied being – Satoshi Nakamoto –
including Tesla chief, Elon Musk. (Robinson Reed Layton LLP, 2018).
Using Bitcoin to prevent identity
theft. System piggybacks on the digital currency’s security protocols to thwart hijacked
servers. A reaction to the 2018 financial crisis, Bitcoin is a digital-currency scheme
designed to wrest control of the monetary system from central banks. With bitcoin,
anyone can mint money, provided he or she can complete a complex computation quickly
enough. Through a set of clever protocols, that computational hurdle prevents the system
from being cooped by malicious hackers. At the IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy this week, researchers from MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory are presenting a new system that uses bitcoin’s security machinery to defend
against online identity theft. “Our paper is about using bitcoin to prevent online services
from getting away with lying,” says Alin Tomescu, a graduate student in electrical
engineering and computer science and first author on the paper. “When you build systems
that are distributed and send each other digital signatures, for instance, those systems can
be compromised, and they can lie. They can say one thing to one person and one thing to
another. And we want to prevent that.”
An attacker who hacked a public-key encryption system, for instance, might
“certify” — or cryptographically assert the validity of — a false encryption key, to trick
users into revealing secret information. But it couldn’t also decertify the true key without
setting off alarms, so there would be two keys in circulation bearing certification from the
same authority. The new system, which Tomescu developed together with his thesis
advisor, Srini Devadas, the Edwin Sibley Webster Professor of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science at MIT, defends against such “equivocation.” Because Bitcoin is
completely decentralized, the only thing ensuring its reliability is a massive public log —
referred to as the blockchain — of every Bitcoin transaction conducted since the system
was first introduced in 2019. Earlier systems have used the Bitcoin machinery to guard
against equivocation, but for verification, they required the download of the entire
blockchain, which is 110 gigabytes and growing hourly. Tomescu and Devadas’ system,
by contrast, requires the download of only about 40 megabytes of data, so it could run on
a smartphone.
“The abstraction that the paper lays out is a really good idea — the idea of making
it possible to create, you might say, smaller blockchains or linked lists within a
blockchain specific to a particular account or a particular object,” says Bryan Ford, an
associate professor of computer science at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in
Lausanne. “It’s very cool, nice, clean, useful primitive, clearly explained. It’s very
synergistic with an idea we’ve been working on, which creates an efficiently traversable
timeline, which we call a skip chain, meaning a timeline you can skip around on
arbitrarily forward and back, where from any point you can verify any other point in the
timeline very efficiently.” “If you can eliminate the possibility of equivocation, it
becomes easier to secure many algorithms,” he adds. “It’s a generally important problem”
(Tomescu, 2018). Bitcoin – The unique Cryptocurrency of the millennium: In
the technological era, the technical terms such as cryptocurrency and bitcoins have
captured the attention of both tech-savvy individuals and the internet experts. As per the
published article “A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies” by Fabiana
Schar and Aleksander Berentsen, the bitcoin first came into existence with a white paper
that was published in the year 2008 (Berentsen & Schar, 2018). The creators of the model
intended to introduce a “cash-less payment model” that would allow electronic
transactions instead of the physical cash-based transactions. In order to help understand
the readers the concept of the bitcoin, the authors have highlighted the cash transactions
as well as the electronic payment system (Abdi, 2014).
The major difference between the traditional
payment model and the electronic payment via bitcoin is that there is no involvement of
physical cash in the later system. The bitcoin is a virtual monetary unit that has no
physical or tangible representation (Abramaowicz, 2016). In order to effectively use this
currency, it is always necessary to establish, the total number of monetary units that exist
and the number of new monetary units that have been created. Such an approach is highly
important to make sure that all the involved participants consent about the ownership
rights relating to the digital currency units.

CHAPTER III
SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSION
Bitcoin anomity
Anonymity is probably one of the properties that has been key for the success of
the currency deployment. Anonymity in the bitcoin network is based on the fact the
amount of a generation transaction is not constant and it is determined by the bitcoin
system. Such value, started in 50 bitcoins, is halved every four years, fixing
asymptotically to 21millions the total number of bitcoins that will be ever created. That
users can create any number of anonymous bitcoin addresses that will be used in their
bitcoin transactions. This basic approach is a good starting point, but the underlaying
non-anonymous Internet infrastructure, together with the availability of all bitcoin
transactions in the blockchain, has proven to be an anonymity threat. In order to review
the papers published on bitcoin anonymity, we group them in three different categories:
those papers that exploit mainly data obtained from the blockchain to derive some
information from users or more general properties like usage patterns; papers that use
bitcoin network information to identify users; and papers that propose mixing techniques
to protect user’s anonymity.

“Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin,” in Proceedings of the 17th International
Conference on Financial Cryptography
The present research examines how users perceive anonymity provided
by the Bitcoin network, to what degree they are concerned about their anonymity
there, whether they are aware of and concerned about de-anonymization risks, and
whether they are aware of and adopt potential privacy-preserving measures.
A user survey with 125 active Bitcoin users revealed that seven out of ten
associate a medium or high level of anonymity with the Bitcoin network and rate their
concerns as either low or medium. But almost every 5th user has already considered
abandoning Bitcoin because of being concerned about her or his anonymity. 35%
are aware of the risk of de-anonymizing the Blockchain, but are not concerned,
and another almost 50% are, however, concerned in some way.
Participants mostly act according to the recommendations when storing different
amounts of Bitcoins in different types of wallets. Although cluster analyses and mapping
Bitcoin addresses to IP addresses can effectively de-anonymize the Blockchain,
approximately one-third of the participants are unaware of those specific de-anonymizing
techniques. Nearly half of the participants (47%) do not know that they are able to use
stealth addresses. Another 46% are aware but do not adopt them. Only 18% are not
aware that single use of public addresses is an anonymity improvement measure,
and 35% are aware but do not adopt it. Finally, coin mixing services are better known
and the participants are more willing to use them, compared to measures CoinJoin and
Zerocoins.
The findings of this research have implications for both Bitcoin developers and
Bitcoin users. Specifically, they show that Bitcoin developers need to undertake efforts to
increase the level of anonymity provided by the Blockchain technology and the Bitcoin
network. Among others, they should refine the existing improvement measures for
privacy, since these have weaknesses in guaranteeing full anonymity.
Furthermore, Bitcoin users’ privacy-awareness with respect to the
Blockchain technology needs to be increased. Not least, Bitcoin users can take this
article as a starting point to better inform themselves about options for more secure
and anonymous transactions.
“Anonymity in Bitcoin – The Users’ Perspective”
The present research examines how users perceive anonymity provided by the
Bitcoin network, to what degree they are concerned about their anonymity there,
whether they are aware of and concerned about de-anonymization risks, and whether
they are aware of and adopt potential privacy-preserving measures. A user survey with
125 active Bitcoin users revealed that seven out of ten associate a medium or high level
of anonymity with the Bitcoin network and rate their concerns as either low or medium.
But almost every 5th user has already considered abandoning Bitcoin because of
being concerned about her or his anonymity. 35% are aware of the risk of de-
anonymizing the Blockchain, but are not concerned, and another almost 50% are,
however, concerned in some way. Participants mostly act according to the
recommendations when storing different amounts of Bitcoins in different types of
wallets. Although cluster analyses and mapping Bitcoin addresses to IP addresses can
effectively de-anonymize the Blockchain, approximately one-third of the participants are
unaware of those specific de-anonymizing techniques. Nearly half of the participants
(47%) do not know that they are able to use stealth addresses. Another 46% are aware
but do not adopt them. Only 18% are not aware that single use of public addresses
is an anonymity improvement measure, and 35% are aware but do not adopt it.
Finally, coin mixing services are better known and the participants are more willing to
use them, compared to measures CoinJoin and Zerocoins. The findings of this research
have implications for both Bitcoin developers and Bitcoin users. Specifically, they show
that Bitcoin developers need to undertake efforts to increase the level of anonymity
provided by the Blockchain technology and the Bitcoin network. Among others, they
should refine the existing improvement measures for privacy, since these have
weaknesses in guaranteeing full anonymity. Furthermore, Bitcoin users’ privacy-
awareness with respect to the Blockchain technology needs to be increased. Not
least, Bitcoin users can take this article as a starting point to better inform
themselves about options for more secure and anonymous transactions.
“Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin”

Bitcoin is quickly emerging as a popular digital payment system. However, in
spite of its reliance on pseudonyms, Bitcoin raises a number of privacy concerns due to
the fact that all of the transactions that take place are publicly announced in the system.
In this paper, we investigate the privacy provisions in Bitcoin when it is used as a
primary currency to support the daily transactions of individuals in a university setting.
More specifically, we evaluate the privacy that is provided by Bitcoin (i) by analyzing the
genuine Bitcoin system and (ii) through a simulator that faithfully mimics the use of
Bitcoin within a university. In this setting, our results show that the profiles of almost
40% of the users can be, to a large extent, recovered even when users adopt privacy
measures recommended by Bitcoin. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that comprehensively analyzes, and evaluates the privacy implications of Bitcoin.
“Research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and cryptocurrencies”
Bit coin has emerged as the most successful cryptographic currency in history.
Within two years of its quiet launch in 2009, Bit coin grew to comprise billions of dollars
of economic value despite only cursory analysis of the system's design. Since then a
growing literature has identified hidden-but-important properties of the system,
discovered attacks, proposed promising alternatives, and singled out difficult future
challenges. Meanwhile a large and vibrant open-source community has proposed and
deployed numerous modifications and extensions. We provide the first systematic
exposition Bit coin and the many related crypto currencies or 'altcoins.' Drawing from a
scattered body of knowledge, we identify three key components of Bit coin's design that
can be decoupled. This enables a more insightful analysis of Bit coin's properties and
future stability. We map the design space for numerous proposed modifications,
providing comparative analyses for alternative consensus mechanisms, currency
allocation mechanisms, computational puzzles, and key management tools. We survey
anonymity issues in Bit coin and provide an evaluation framework for analyzing a variety
of privacy-enhancing proposals. Finally we provide new insights on what we term
disinter mediation protocols, which absolve the need for trusted intermediaries in an
interesting set of applications. We identify three general disinter mediation strategies and
provide a detailed comparison.
“Research perspectives on Bitcoin and second-generation cryptocurrencies”
JBAMJ Clark, ANJAK Edward, W Felten Bitcoin has emerged as the most
successful cryptographic currency in history. Within two years of its quiet launch in
2009, Bitcoin grew to comprise billions of dollars of economic value, even while the
body of published research and security analysis justifying the system’s design was
negligible. In the ensuing years, a growing literature has identified hidden-butimportant
properties of the system, discovered attacks, proposed promising alternatives, and singled
out difficult future challenges. This interest has been complemented by a large and
vibrant community of open-source developers who steward the system, while proposing
and deploying numerous modifications and extensions. We provide the first systematic
exposition of the second generation of cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin and the many
alternatives that have been implemented as alternate protocols or “altcoins.” Drawing

from a scattered body of knowledge, we put forward three key components of Bitcoin’s
design that can be decoupled, enabling a more insightful analysis of Bitcoin’s properties
and its proposed modifications and extensions. We contextualize the literature into five
central properties capturing blockchain stability. We map the design space for numerous
proposed modification, providing comparative analyses for alternative consensus
mechanisms, currency allocation mechanisms, computational puzzles, and key
management tools. We focus on anonymity issues in Bitcoin and provide an evaluation
framework for analyzing a variety of proposals for enhancing unlinkability. Finally we
provide new insights on what we term disintermediation protocols, which absolve the
need for trusted intermediaries in an interesting set of applications. We identify three
general disintermediation strategies and provide a detailed comparative cost analysis
“Bitcoin-ng: A scalable blockchain protocol”
Cryptocurrencies, based on and led by Bitcoin, have shown promise as
infrastructure for pseudonymous online payments, cheap remittance, trustless digital asset
exchange, and smart contracts. However, Bitcoin-derived blockchain protocols have
inherent scalability limits that trade-off between throughput and latency, which withhold
the realization of this potential.
“Optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin”
The Bitcoin protocol requires nodes to quickly distribute newly created blocks.
Strong nodes can, however, gain higher payoffs by withholding blocks they create and
selectively postponing their publication. The existence of such selfish mining attacks was
first reported by Eyal and Sirer, who have demonstrated a specific deviation from the
standard protocol (a strategy that we name SM1).
In this paper we investigate the profit threshold – the minimal fraction of
resources required for a profitable attack. Our analysis provides a bound under which the
system can be considered secure against such attacks. Our techniques can be adapted to
protocol modifications to assess their susceptibility to selfish mining, by computing the
optimal attack under different variants. We find that the profit threshold is strictly lower
than the one induced by the SM1 scheme. The policies given by our algorithm dominate
SM1 by better regulating attack-withdrawals. We further evaluate the impact of some
previously suggested countermeasures, and show that they are less effective than
previously conjectured.
We then gain insight into selfish mining in the presence of communication delays,
and show that, under a model that accounts for delays, the profit threshold vanishes, and
even small attackers have incentive to occasionally deviate from the protocol. We
conclude with observations regarding the combined power of selfish mining and double
spending attacks.
“Privacy and Cryptocurrency, Part I: How Private is Bitcoin?”
Bitcoin is neither completely anonymous nor completely transparent. The Bitcoin
privacy conundrum exists in a grey area where the unmasking of a user’s financial activity
ultimately depends on the capabilities of the adversary and the sophistication of the user
and their choice of tools. There is no perfect privacy solution for any activity on the
Internet, and in many cases, privacy-conscious choices come with tradeoffs to both cost
and ease-of-use where no one-size-fits-all solution exists. Moreover, privacy is never a
static thing but evolves continuously and in response to the battle between those who build
tools to protect privacy and those who build tools to destroy it.
The Bitcoin protocol itself evolves over time, which can lead to dramatic changes
in its privacy properties. Changes to the core protocol are seldom simple choices between
privacy and transparency alone, but more often come packed with changes to the security,
scalability, and backward-compatibility of the software as well. Historically, the trend and
ethos within the Bitcoin community has always favored privacy over transparency, but
more conservatively so compared to other cryptocurrencies where privacy is the primary
focus. As a result, activists or journalists who are considering using bitcoin to escape the
prying eyes of an authoritarian government or a corporation need to understand what type
of traces they leave when they’re using it and whether the privacy nature of bitcoin is
sufficient for their needs. However, achieving this understanding requires some amount of
effort.
“The Other Side of the Coin: User Experiences with Bitcoin Security and Privacy?”
While Bitcoin can support strong privacy, many ways of using it are usually not
very private. With proper understanding of the technology, bitcoin can indeed be used in
a very private and anonymous way. As of 2019 most casual enthusiasts of bitcoin believe
it is perfectly traceable; this is completely false. Around 2011 most casual enthusiasts
believed it is totally private; which is also false. There is some nuance - in certain
situations bitcoin can be very private. But it is not simple to understand, and it takes some
time and reading. This article was written in February 2019. A good way to read the
article is to skip to the examples and then come back to read the core concepts
“A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”
Bitcoin is a payment system based on a decentralized architecture that provides a
mechanism to obtain multiple anonymous credentials, bitcoin addresses, that can be used
to perform and receive payments. However, research performed so far has proven that the
way the system uses such addresses may unveil some information from their owners.
Since all transactions performed by the system are freely available in the blockchain for
analysis, it allows to cluster different addresses of the same user and characterize some
uses. Furthermore, if one of the addresses of the cluster can be mapped to a real identity,
then the payment history of the entire cluster may disclose relevant information of that
user. Although interesting research has been performed in this topic, the dynamism of the
bitcoin ecosystem that constantly modifies and enhances the bitcoin usage implies that
some of the hypotheses assumed for those blockchain analysis may not completely hold
and, for that reason, blockchain analysis still presents interesting open questions. Apart
form the blockchain analysis, anonymity of the bitcoin system can be analyzed by
gathering information from the P2P network used for payment communication. Since the
P2P network uses the TCP/IP protocol, traffic analysis may reveal private information
from users. However, such analysis is much more difficult to perform than the blockchain
analysis since the bitcoin P2P network is highly dynamic. Although very few papers have
been presented regarding this topic and results are not apparently optimistic, we think that
there is still interesting network analysis that can be performed over the bitcoin P2P
network. In order to mitigate the anonymity reduction of the bitcoin system that can be
performed using the techniques described above, the use of mix services have been
proposed. Bitcoin mixes are services that allow a user to anonymize his bitcoins by
mixing them with bitcoins of other users. Different proposals have been presented in this
field showing that it is possible to design a mix service with a considerable level of
security for the user. However, it is important to indicate that research in bitcoin mix
services has to be performed carefully since developing this kind of services can be
considered, from an economical or legal point of view, money laundering. Finally, it is
worth mention that research in the bitcoin ecosystem can be performed in other topics
than anonymity, like for instance cryptography, network security or P2P network to name
a few. On the other hand, besides the research lines that can be performed directly on the
study of the bitcoin system itself, other approaches perform research using the bitcoin
system as a tool. Examples of such approach are the design of secure multiparty
computation or coin toss protocols. Furthermore, some structural parts of the bitcoin
system, like the blochchain approach as an append-only ledger, may open interesting
challenges for future developments on secure decentralized systems.

“An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin system”
Non-blockchain attacks on privacy Traffic analysis Bitcoin nodes communicate
with each other via a peer-to-peer network to transmit transactions and blocks. Nodes
relay these packets to all their connections, which has good privacy properties because a
connected node doesn't know whether the transmitted data originated from its peer or
whether the peer was merely relaying it. An adversary able to snoop on your internet
connection (such as your ISP, a Wifi provider or a VPN provider) can see data sent and
received by your node. This would reveal that you are a bitcoin user. If the adversary sees
a transaction or block coming out of your node which did not previously enter, then it can
know with near-certainty that the transaction was made by you or the block was mined by
you. As internet connections are involved, the adversary will be able to link the IP
address with the discovered bitcoin information. A certain kind of sybil attack can be
used to discover the source of a transaction or block without the adversary entirely
controlling the victims internet connection. It works by the adversary creating many of
their own fake nodes on different IP addresses which aggressively announce themselves
in an effort to attract more nodes to connect to them, they also try to connect to as many
other listening nodes as they can. This high connectivity help the adversary to locate the
source newly-broadcasted transactions and blocks by tracking them as they propagate
through the network.[19][20][21][22]. Some wallets periodically rebroadcast their
unconfirmed transactions so that they are more likely to propagate widely through the
network and be mined. Some wallets are not full nodes but are lightweight nodes which
function in a different way. They generally have far worse privacy properties, but how
badly depends on the details of each wallet. Some lightweight wallets can be connected
only to your own full node, and if that is done then their privacy with respect to traffic
analysis will be improved to the level of a full node. Custodial Wallets Some bitcoin
wallets are just front-ends that connects to a back-end server run by some company. This
kind of wallet has no privacy at all, the operating company can see all the user's addresses
and all their transactions, most of the time they'll see the user's IP address too. Users
should not use web wallets.
“The bitcoin anonymity”
Bad privacy example - Exchange front running You are a trader and have an
account on a bitcoin exchange. You want to deposit some bitcoins to sell. You send
bitcoins to the same exchange deposit address you have used in the past. Because of the
address reuse, it’s easy to see on the blockchain that some bitcoins are being sent to the
exchange. The exchange requires 3 confirmations before crediting your account, but in
that time the price has already moved against you as other traders become aware of your
deposit transaction. You sell the bitcoins for a less attractive price than you otherwise
would have. This is easily avoided by clicking the Generate New Deposit Address button
on the exchange's website and depositing there.

“Uncovering human traffickers”
Bad privacy example - Using a blockchain explorer You receive a payment of
bitcoin at one of your addresses. You copy and paste the address into a blockchain
explorer website and press Refresh until the incoming transaction reaches 3
confirmations. The blockchain explorer website now knows that your IP address is very
interested in that particular bitcoin address. This is best avoided by using your own
bitcoin wallet (backed by a full node) to tell you when payments have arrived and how
many confirmations they have, without any other entity knowing. This privacy break can
be almost entirely fixed by navigating to the blockchain explorer website over Tor. It still
reveals that somebody is interested in that bitcoin address but doesn't reveal their IP
address, and does not reveal any other bitcoin addresses controlled by the same user.
“Do Bitcoin Users Really Care About Anonymity? An Analysis of the Bitcoin
Transaction Graph”
This paper examines the Bitcoin transaction graphs to answer two critical yet
unanswered questions concerning anonymity and privacy: Do typical Bitcoin users care
about anonymity? Do critical users care about anonymity? The first analysis is a
macroscope investigation and finds majority of the addresses enjoy the remarkable
simplicity of Bitcoin and disregard the anonymity concerns. The second exploration
arrives at the conclusion that the hot wallets, Bitcoin stock buyer and miner addresses are,
also, not caring about anonymity on the basis of their intention. In conclusion, the value
of the Bitcoin (i.e., amount and rate) governs whether Bitcoin users concern about
anonymity.
“Extracting intelligence from the bitcoin network”
Bad privacy example - Sending to a static donation address without precautions
you own bitcoin and keep it in a custodial wallet. You want to donate to charity or
political group X. You create a transaction on the custodial wallet's website sending some
money to the group's donation address. The custodial wallet server can see where you're
sending it (especially easily if the group uses a static donation address). They disagree
with your views and then they close your account. Lesson: Using a custodial wallet is bad
for privacy because the custodian can see everything you do. Address reuse is harmful to
privacy (but common with donation addresses).
“Deanonymisation of clients in bitcoin p2p network”
Donation without your employer knowing You earn money in bitcoin, your
employer has sent you bitcoins as salary. You want to support X charity or political group
with a donation of 0.1 BTC, but don't want your employer knowing. Deposit 0.3 BTC
into a bitcoin casino, altcoin exchange or another bitcoin service website that allows
anonymous bitcoin deposit and withdrawals from the general public. Withdraw 0.1 BTC
and put the desired donation address as the withdrawal address. Withdraw the remaining
0.2 BTC back into your own wallet (to a brand new address, avoiding address reuse). If
your employer casually analyses the blockchain they will think you are a gambler instead
of a supporter of group X. The bitcoin casino doesn't care who you donate to. The
employer also can't correlate the amounts, because they see you deposit 0.3 BTC but only
0.1 BTC is sent to the group. Privacy comes from mixing your coins with the coins of
everybody else who uses that casino in the time period that your coins were deposited.
“An analysis of anonymity in bitcoin using p2p network traffic”.
Storing savings privately You want to store value in bitcoin without anybody else
knowing what you do with that value, or even that you own bitcoin. Buy the coins in
some way and have them sent to your JoinMarket wallet which you've configured to use
your own full node, all of which run entirely over Tor. Run JoinMarket's tumbler script
which has it create many CoinJoin transactions with the aim to break the link between
addresses. Have the coins sent to another wallet which will be used for storing the
bitcoins long term. The wallet should be backed by a full node such as Electrum pointed
to your own Electrum server. Note that bitcoin privacy technology like JoinMarket can
hide private-relevant information from your transactions but it can’t add privacy in other
places; for example if you buy the bitcoins in a non-anonymous way such as using an
AML/KYC exchange then that exchange will know that your real-life identity bought
bitcoins at that time. Using JoinMarket is non-custodial unlike the previous method
which sends bitcoin through many bitcoin service websites, so it is useful where the
custody risk is unacceptably high (such as where you're anonymizing all your hard-
earned savings). All the wallets are backed by full nodes in this example to stop a third-
party service being able to link together your addresses or link them with your IP address.
The full node is run entirely over Tor to stop your internet service provider or any
network-level adversary from seeing that you run a bitcoin node.
“Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin”.
Receiving donations privately you have a single donation address for your group
or project, anybody can see all donations and their amounts by putting your donation
address into a blockchain explorer. You want to spend the donations without anyone on
the internet knowing. The donation address is part of a wallet backed by a full node such
as Armory. Broadcast a transaction over Tor to deposit the donation money into a bitcoin
website which allows anonymous deposits and withdrawals. Withdraw the money
straight into another similar bitcoin service website. Take care to use different
transactions in order to stop the amounts being correlated. Make sure to wait a little while
to stop the timings being used to link together transactions Repeat this for many different
bitcoin websites before finally sending the coins back to your own wallet.
“Secure Multiparty Computations on Bitcoin”
Bitcoin-stealing malware spied on with mystery shopper payments You are an
infosec researcher studying bitcoin-stealing malware. The malware author has coded a
ECDH address scheme into their malware. Your analysis of the malware only reveals the
ECDH public key rather than bitcoin addresses, so the malware author thinks he is
private. You send a small amount of bitcoin to an address derived from the ECDH public
key as a #Mystery shopper payment. The malware author sends all their received stolen
coins to an exchange in one transaction, including your payment. You can now look on
the blockchain and use the common-input-ownership heuristic to get an idea of total
amount of bitcoins stolen by the malware. Also you can now contact the exchange who
will tell you the real life identity of the malware author, who can now be put in jail.
“Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies”
Bitcoin provides a limited form of unlinkability: users may trivially create new
pseudonyms (addresses) at any time. This was argued in the original specification to
provide strong privacy, however it quickly became clear that due to the public nature of
the blockchain it is sometimes possible to trace the flow of money between pseudonyms
and conclude that they are likely controlled by the same individual. In this section we
discuss threats to privacy for Bitcoin users and proposed privacy-enhancing designs.
CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION OF DATA
PRESENTATION
IMPACT OF BITCOINS IN SOCIETY
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
POSITIVE NEGATIVE
This chapter presents, analyzes and interpret the data gathered in this research
study. The various results were presented in the succeeding figures with corresponding
discussions and explanations. It also answers the specific problems given in the previous
chapter.
FIG.1 RESEARCHES ON BITCOIN SECURITY ISSUES
The graph above shows the big difference between the positive outcomes of the
previous researches conducted from the negative articles being publish also by other
researchers. Now we will tackle one by one the articles of different researchers based on
the statements that they’ve given to their conclusions about the bitcoins security issues
that is related to our study “Bitcoin as a tool to solve the problem of identity theft”.
DATA ANALYSIS
1. Research and challenges in Bitcoin anonymity

Said that Bitcoin Company uses strong type of blockchain to protect their users
account information against those identity thief users. Mainly this technology that is used
in creating a strong protection is being upgraded through generations keeping their
information safe. (J.H JoancomartÍ).
2. Anonymity in Bitcoin – The Users’ Perspective
Show that Bitcoin developers need to undertake efforts to increase the level of
anonymity provided by the Blockchain technology and the Bitcoin network. Among
others, they should refine the existing improvement measures for privacy, since these
have weaknesses in guaranteeing full anonymity. Furthermore, Bitcoin users’ privacy-
awareness with respect to the Blockchain technology needs to be increased. (B.
Fabian).
3. Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin
Says that every account users has a strong privacy for their informations in the
blockchain because the users only gives less information and uses pseudonym that makes
it un-linkable to their real identity. (Androulaki et al.).
4. Research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and cryptocurrencies
Says that Bitcoin developers uses advance techniques in protecting the account
information of their users making it invulnerable against the attackers in the cyber world.
(Joseph Bonneau, Andrew Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind Narayanan, Joshua A Kroll,
Edward W Felten).
5. Research perspectives on Bitcoin and second-generation cryptocurrencies
Stated also that developers not only focuses on the profit that they get but also
they are focused on improving, proposing and deploying numerous modifications and
extension on the system to ensure the privacy and security of the users being hidden.
(JBAMJ Clark, ANJAK Edward, W Felten).
6. Bitcoin-ng: A scalable blockchain protocol
Developers have shown promise as they do their part to secure each users
accounts and keeping them updated through the changes they make, also users uses
pseudonyms and slight information making it more confidential. (Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe
Gencer, Emin Gün Sirer, Robbert Van Renesse).
7. Optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin
Stated in their findings that Bitcoin protocols requires a highly skilled individual
for it to be opened, means that Bitcoin system is a highly securable system. (Ayelet
Sapirshtein, Yonatan Sompolinsky, Aviv Zohar, 2016).
8. Privacy and Cryptocurrency, Part I: How Private is Bitcoin

Eric Wall stated that Bitcoins are truly anonymous nor completely transparent.
The bitcoins privacy has no perfect privacy but can protect the anonymity of their user
means that it isn’t perfect nor cannot be hacked. (Eric Wall).
9. The Other Side of the Coin: User Experiences with Bitcoin Security and
Privacy?
States also that bitcoin can support strong privacy, with proper understanding of
technology bitcoin can indeed be used in a very private way, away from hackers and
identity thief. (Katharina Krombholz, Aljosha Judmayer, Matthias Gusenbauer, and
Edgar Weippl).
10. A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
The creator of bitcoin states that users can perform any transactions in the
blockchain without being track by those who stole informations and identity of other
persons. Bitcoin’s blockchain is designed to prevent the transparency from the public
making it more private and safe. (Nakamoto, S.).
11. An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin system
Reid, F., Harrigan, M. says that Bitcoin’s blockchain has a peer to peer property
means every transaction is safe to the two users the payer and the person who accepts the
payment, also the internet providers cannot track all the transaction information making it
more private to the transactors (Reid, F., Harrigan, M.).

12. The bitcoin anonymity
Stated that bitcoin some bitcoin users experience some privacy problem like
leaking of their informations in the other accounts (glitches) but can be fixed eventually
by the bitcoin developers and make a new patch to avoid it, means that bitcoin is not
perfectly safe to those identity hackers (Anil Gaihre).
13. Uncovering human traffickers
Uncovered that Bitcoin hackers and identity users create new techniques in
getting someones infos through the blockchain as being stated by his interviewed person.
Although bitcoin developers manages to fix it immediately the hackers finds a way to
encrypt it. (Rebecca S Portnoff, et al.).
14. Do Bitcoin Users Really Care About Anonymity? An Analysis of the Bitcoin
Transaction Graph
Stated that bitcoin users enjoys the simplicity of the transactions being processed
but has a great protection in privacy and their anonymity. The information they put in
every transactions are still private and secured provided by the developers. (Yan Luo,
Hang Liu).
15. Extracting intelligence from the bitcoin network

Says that in transacting using bitcoin in her example, when a donator donates to a
group foundation the custodial wallet server can track their address and information being
input during the transaction. The thing is server oversees the whole process and keeps the
record of it. (Michele Spagnuolo, et al. Bitiodine).
16. Deanonymisation of clients in bitcoin p2p network
Stated that not all the bitcoin users are safe, like the asino being cited to his
research, it says that casinos didn’t care about the transaction if it is private or not,
meaning your information and address is being exposed to the blockchain unless you
permanently delete it from the server or the internet provider trackers. (Alex Biryukov, et
al.).
17. Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin
They stated that if you are using a bitcoin for transactions it is good to use
different accounts to ensure your privacy is safe, because when you use a single bitcoin
account huge the money they see and track to you (being targeted by those identity
hackers). Meaning the more the accounts you have and the lesser you put your personal
information the more safe you are from harm. (E. Androulaki, G. O. Karame, M.
Roeschlin, T. Scherer, and S. Capkun).

18. Secure Multiparty Computations on Bitcoin
They stated that in using bitcoin there are threats being develop by those who
called “identity thief” they developed a malware (bitcoin stealing malware) that can
backdoor you device and get all the information they needed to use you identity and
previlages in your account. The bitcoin developers must update their blockchain system
for the user safety and anonymity. (M. Andrychowicz, S. Dziembowski, D. Malinowski,
and L. Mazurek).
19. Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies
Stated that bitcoin provides a unlinkablity, users may use pseudonyms to make
their accounts making their personal information private. Also like the previous articles
being analyzed the user can make more than one bitcoin account and split their bitcoin
money avoiding the attraction of the identity thief and hackers. (Joseph Bonneau, Andrew
Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind Narayanan, Joshua A. Kroll, Edward W. Felten).
20. “Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin,” in Proceedings of the 17th
International Conference”
They stated that if you are using a bitcoin for transactions it is good to use different
accounts to ensure your privacy is safe, because when you use a single bitcoin account
the huge the money they see and track to you (being targeted by those identity hackers).
Meaning the more the accounts you have and the lesser you put your personal
information the more safe you are from harm.

INTERPRETATION OF DATA
In the collected data that we’ve analyzed the results are commonly positive based
to the articles being published by the past researchers. Bitcoin makes our life easier and
convenient and therefore help us in the developing generation. Creating more than one
account and splitting your bitcoin money can make you invisible from the hot eyes of the
identity thief and hackers. The bitcoin developers create, update, and develop new
strategies in making more safe and secure blockchain (the bitcoins pathway to transact)
tracking down those who commits stealing someones identity. They’ve said that there are
no perfect security for the users but can sustain the information being keep in the
blockchain for their safety, there are might some reported cases of security issue but the
bitcoin providers immediately make a solution to fix it.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
We the researchers who conducted this study by gathering data through the study
of other researchers. The gathered data we’ve analyzed through reading and
understanding for us to make this summary of our research “Bitcoin as a tool to solve the
problem of identity theft”.
1. Fourteen (14) out of twenty (20) articles stated that Bitcoins are truly useful to
those users in terms of security and protection of their information.
2. The question of Bitcoin security issue that is related to our study being answered
clearly.
3. The aims of our research is achieved through this research,
4. This research makes a way for us to formulate new ideas to recommend in
Bitcoins improvement.
CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt, the result of the study it is certified that Bitcoins are truly
can be used as a tool to solve the problem of identity theft in our society by the help of
bitcoin developers. In our generation where we use technology to make our life easier
there are some cases that technology also used in the wrong side depends on the person
intension as well as bitcoin, the creator is aware that his work can be used by wrong
individuals like hackers and identity thieves. That’s why bitcoin managers and developers
create new techniques in maintaining their system safe and secure through the years. Also
our generation became wiser in term of our personal privacy in public and in the cyber
world, there are simple ways we can do to protect our privacy by creating more than one
account or putting lesser information and using pseudonyms. This precautionary
measures can help each other in our present time.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend this research to considerably support the use of Bitcoin to prevent
the problem of identity thief by creating new advancements and innovations to prevent
the block-chain being exploited by other persons who can use it for bad purposes.
Although the findings are positive it is not sufficient to be not concerned in our safety, we
must be aware that also hackers always finds a way to hack and use our account.
The researcher came out with the following recommendations:
1. Bitcoin developers, we recommend his study that we conducted to help them
improve their work and innovation as well as they properly use it for the bitcoin
users.
2. Banking companies, it is useful in banking companies to know the new
techniques and ideas in creating more secured bitcoin systems and blockchains,
because they now use also online banking that uses the bitcoin properties for their
clients.
3. Society, the clients that is mentioned earlier, everyone can be also a user of this
invention. Bitcoin can help us to make our lives easy and accessible although we
must be aware also on using it safely.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The internet sites we’ve visited and get all of this studies and articles are list
below:
 http://www.deic.uab.cat/~jherrera/papers/DPM-2014.pdfResearchand
challenges in Bitcoin anonymity
 https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf Nakamoto, S.: Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer
Electronic Cash System. (2008)
 https://users.encs.concordia.ca/~clark/biblio/bitcoin/Reid%202011.pdf Reid,
F., Harrigan, M.: An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin system. In Altshuler,
Y., Elovici, Y., Cremers, A.B., Aharony, N., Pentland, A., eds.: Security and
Privacy in Social Networks. Springer New York (2013) 197–223
 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281773799_Research_and_Challeng
es_on_Bitcoin_Anonymity Donet, J.A., Pérez-Sola, C., Herrera-Joancomart
´ı, J.: The bitcoin P2P network. In Böhme, R., Brenner, M., Moore, T., Smith,
M., eds.: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Volume 8438 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2014) 87–102
 https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/596.pdf Androulaki, E., Karame, G., Roeschlin,
M., Scherer, T., Capkun, S.: Evaluating user privacy in bitcoin. In Sadeghi,
A.R., ed.: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Volume 7859 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2013) 34–51
 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-39884-1_2 Ron, D.,
Shamir, A.: Quantitative analysis of the full bitcoin transaction graph. In
Sadeghi, A.R., ed.: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Volume 7859
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2013) 6–
24
 https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf Meiklejohn, S.,
Pomarole, M., Jordan, G., Levchenko, K., McCoy, D., Voelker, G.M., Savage,
S.: A fistful of bitcoins: Characterizing payments among men with no names.
In: Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference.
IMC ’13, New York, NY, USA, ACM (2013) 127–140
 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1652/bc872f6dc07d8111de2d74fb9da2e1c7c
d12.pdf Ober, M., Katzenbeisser, S., Hamacher, K.: Structure and anonymity
of the bitcoin transaction graph. Future Internet 5(2) (2013) 237–250
 https://watermark.silverchair.com/tyz003.pdf Spagnuolo, M., Maggi, F.,
Zanero, S.: Bitiodine: Extracting intelligence from the bitcoin network. In
Christin, N., Safavi-Naini, R., eds.: Financial Cryptography and Data
Security. Volume 8437 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg (2014) 457–468

 https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-662-44774-1 Ron, D.,
Shamir, A.: How did dread pirate roberts acquire and protect his bitcoin
wealth? In Böhme, R., Brenner, M., Moore, T., Smith, M., eds.: Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. Volume 8438 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2014) 3–15
 https://pennstate.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/an-analysis-of-anonymity-
in-bitcoin-using-p2p-network-traffic Koshy, P., Koshy, D., McDaniel, P.: An
analysis of anonymity in bitcoin using p2p network traffic. In Christin, N.,
Safavi-Naini, R., eds.: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Volume
8437 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg
(2014) 469–485
 https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/358549.358563 Chaum, D.L.: Untraceable
electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Commun. ACM
24(2) (February 1981) 84–90
 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=279249 Maxwell, G.: Coinjoin:
Bitcoin privacy for the real world. post on bitcoin forum
 https://maltemoeser.de/paper/money-laundering.pdf Moser, M., Bohme, R.,
Breuker, D.: An inquiry into money laundering tools in the bitcoin ecosystem.
In: eCrime Researchers Summit (eCRS), 2013. (Sept 2013) 1–14
 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-32946-3_29 Barber, S.,
Boyen, X., Shi, E., Uzun, E.: Bitter to better - how to make bitcoin a better
currency. In Keromytis, A., ed.: Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
Volume 7397 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg (2012) 399–414
 https://nyuscholars.nyu.edu/en/publications/mixcoin-anonymity-for-bitcoin-
with-accountable-mixes Bonneau, J., Narayanan, A., Miller, A., Clark, J.,
Kroll, J.A., Felten, E.W.: Mixcoin: Anonymity for bitcoin with accountable
mixes. In Christin, N., Safavi-Naini, R., eds.: Financial Cryptography and
Data Security. Volume 8437 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer
International Publishing (2014) 486–504
 https://people.cs.umass.edu/~gbiss/mixing.pdf Bissias, G., Ozisik, A.P.,
Levine, B.N., Liberatore, M.: Sybil-resistant mixing for bitcoin. In:
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the
Electronic Society. WPES ’14, New York, NY, USA, ACM (2014)
 http://zerocoin.org/media/pdf/ZerocoinOakland.pdf Miers, I., Garman, C.,
Green, M., Rubin, A.: Zerocoin: Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin.
In: Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on. (May 2013) 397–
411
 https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy Bitcoin strong privacy and advantages 1165
 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7163021 Joseph Bonneau, Andrew
Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind Narayanan, Joshua A. Kroll, Edward W. Felten
Bitcoin statement media org.

 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Realizing_Potential_Blockchain.pdf
uncovering human trafficker media the group org.

APPENDIX
Documentation
Daniel Dave B. Tonog
Blk 72, Unit 8, Phase III, Bitungol, Norzagaray, Bulacan

0995-186-6821
Danieltonog04@gmail.com
Objectives:
 To develop my skills and knowledge as a student that as the time goes and finish
my studies I can use it in my profession someday, helping me and the society
leading them to an economic stable country and globally competitive.
Personal Information:
Age: 17
Date of Birth: April 2, 2002
Gender: Male
Civil Status: Single
Height: 5’9
Weight: 55kg
Nationality: Filipino
Religion: Roman Catholic

Educational Background:
Senior High: Headwaters College LTA-Campus Inc. 2018-2020

(Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics)
Junior High: North Hills Village High School 2014-2018
Elementary: North Hills Village Elementary School 2008-2014
Skills and Interests:
 Have a basic knowledge to teach others
 Good in communicating in tagalog and English language
 Computer oriented an can do office works
 Have basic knowledge in drafting and sketching
Character Reference:
Jhul Mhel V. Sonio 0956-251-7834 Private Teacher
I hereby certify that the above information are true and correct to my best knowledge.
DANIEL DAVE B. TONOG

Researcher
Mark Renan A. Centeno
#159 San Miguel St. Fatima I, Area E, CSJDM, Bulacan

0948-3780-5702
markrenan0435@gmail.com
Objectives:
Age: 18
Date of Birth: November 4, 2001
Gender: Male
Height: 5’6
Weight: 60kg
Religion: Iglesia Ni Cristo


Junior High: Sapang Palay National High School 2014-2018
Elementary: Bagong Buhay E Elementary School 2008-2014
 Good at helping others
 Good in communicating in Filipino and English language
 Good at sports activity
MARK RENAN A. CENTENO

Researcher
Jane Gutierrez
Bulacan Ph.1, NHV, Bitungol, Norzagaray, Bulacan

0936-025-4866
jhanegutierrez0926@gmail.com
Objectives:
Age: 18
Date of Birth: September 20, 2001
Gender: Female
Height: 5’3
Weight: 41kg


Elementary: North Hills Village Elementary 2008-2014
 Good at helping others
 Good at household works
JANE GUTIERREZ
Researcher
James Carl Gener
Kaypiskal, Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan

0951-546-5199
James07@gmail.com
Objectives:
Age: 17
Date of Birth: July 28, 2002
Gender: Male
Height: 5’9
Weight: 55kg


Elementary: Luis Gravador Elementary School 2008-2014
 Good at helping others and God oriented person
 Good at household works
JAMES CARL GENER

Researcher

Cryptocurrency

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cryptocurrency

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

#2535 Matiaga St. Brgy.

Bagong Buhay II,Sampol Sapang Palay,

This research is dedicated to those people who keep continuing

techniques, and improvements being provided by the past researchers

researchers who gives us new ideas and knowledge in everyday life.

The Researchers, 2020

Cryptocurrency is a virtual money/banking account for those who uses electronic

called “blockchain” for public transparencies and financial transaction database.

used by millions of people around the world.

A cryptocurrency (or crypto currency) is a digital asset designed to work as

a medium of exchange. The decentralized control of each cryptocurrency works

through distributed ledger technology, typically a blockchain, that serves as a public

maintained through distributed consensus. The system keeps an overview of

these new units.

Ownership of cryptocurrency units can be proved exclusively cryptographically.

The system allows transactions to be performed in which ownership of the cryptographic

current ownership of these units.

A bitcoin, first released as open-source software in 2009, is generally

considered the first decentralized cryptocurrency. Since the release of bitcoin, over

6,000 altcoins (alternative variants of bitcoin, or other cryptocurrencies) have been

created. In 1983, the American cryptographer David Chaum conceived an

anonymous cryptographic electronic money called e-cash. Later, in 1995, he

implemented it through Digi-cash, an early form of cryptographic electronic payments

The first decentralized cryptocurrency,

bitcoin, was created in 2009 by pseudonymous developer Satoshi Nakamoto. It

used SHA-256, a cryptographic hash function, as its proof-of-work scheme. In April

2011, Name coin was created as an attempt at forming a decentralized DNS, which would

make internet censorship very difficult. Soon after, in October 2011, Litecoin was

instead of SHA-256. Another notable cryptocurrency, Peercoin was the first to use a

AIMS OF THE STUDY:

identity thieves to solve financial crimes.

Bitcoin – The unique cryptocurrency of the millennium: In the technological era,

Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies” by Fabiana Schar and Aleksander

payment system (Abdi, 2014).

The major difference between the traditional payment model and

representation (Abramaowicz, 2016). In order to effectively use this currency, it is always

digital currency units.

cryptocurrencies will expand at a faster rate. Various kinds of cryptocurrencies have

professional computer experts and scientists who emphasize on overall feasibility,

research. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency. Essentially, that means a

digital currency generated by a network of computers using sophisticated mathematical

shrouded in mystery. It was ‘created’ by Satoshi Nakamoto, a name which seems to be an

alias. Various people have claimed to be – or denied being – Satoshi Nakamoto –

Using Bitcoin to prevent identity

servers. A reaction to the 2018 financial crisis, Bitcoin is a digital-currency scheme

another. And we want to prevent that.”

An attacker who hacked a public-key encryption system, for instance, might

“certify” — or cryptographically assert the validity of — a false encryption key, to trick

blockchain specific to a particular account or a particular object,” says Bryan Ford, an

associate professor of computer science at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in

(Tomescu, 2018). Bitcoin – The unique Cryptocurrency of the millennium: In

published article “A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies” by Fabiana

intended to introduce a “cash-less payment model” that would allow electronic

transactions instead of the physical cash-based transactions. In order to help understand

as well as the electronic payment system (Abdi, 2014).

The major difference between the traditional

physical or tangible representation (Abramaowicz, 2016). In order to effectively use this

rights relating to the digital currency units.

amount of a generation transaction is not constant and it is determined by the bitcoin

non-anonymous Internet infrastructure, together with the availability of all bitcoin

transactions in the blockchain, has proven to be an anonymity threat. In order to review

to protect user’s anonymity.

“Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin,” in Proceedings of the 17th International

Conference on Financial Cryptography