G.R. No.

223852 : September 14, 2016

 
EDNA ROQUE ALEGUELA, FELIPE GONZALES, DOLORES COCHESA,
LUISA CAGALINGAN, REYNALDO JUNSAY, BONIFACIA RODRIQUEZ,
CONEY CERDENA, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER
THEM, Petitioners, v. EASTERN PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND J&M
PROPERTIES AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Respondents.
 
REYES, J.:
 
FACTS:
 
The petitioners herein are the occupants of the subject properties situated at
J. B. Miguel Street, Barangay Bambang, Pasig City, particularly, the parcel of
land covered by Title No. PT-130608 under the name of respondent Eastern
Petroleum, and the parcels of land covered by PT-140851 and PT-140844
under the name of respondent J&M Properties. The respondents' titles were
issued by the Register of Deeds following the presentation of a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January 27, 2006 that named them as the lots'
purchasers.
 
Subsequent to the sale, the respondents sought to take possession of the
lots but the petitioners refused to vacate the premises. This prompted the
respondents to institute ejectment suits with the MeTC, although these were
dismissed by the MeTC. Thereafter, the respondents filed with the RTC an
action for recovery of possession with damages against the petitioners,
along with their co-defendants Placido "Eddie" Cagalingan (Cagalingan) and
Avelino Flores (Flores) who also occupied the subject lots.
 
The petitioners contended that they had been occupying the lots for more
than 50 years. The properties had been declared part of the Areas for
Priority Development under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517, otherwise
known as the Urban Land Reform Act. The issuance of the certificates of title
under the respondents' names allegedly violated Sections 6 and 7 of P.D.
No. 1517 and Section 2 of P.D. No. 2016, which give tenants like petitioners
the right of first refusal to purchase the land they are occupying.
 
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate
the premises and surrender possession to the respondents. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA explained that while the
petitioners were the occupants of the properties within an urban land reform
zone, they failed to establish that they were legitimate tenants thereof.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are tenants, as contemplated by the law,
who are entitled to a right of first refusal over the disputed properties?
 
HELD: Court of Appeals’ decision is sustained.
 
CIVIL LAW: tenants under P.D. No. 1517
 
The law that applies to the issue on the petitioners' entitlement to a right of
first refusal over the disputed properties is P.D. No. 1517, which grants
legitimate tenants in urban land reform areas certain benefits affecting land
acquisition and ownership. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517 grants preferential
rights to landless tenants/occupants to acquire land within urban land reform
areas, while Section 2 of P.D. No. 2016 prohibits the eviction of qualified
tenants/occupants.
 
The protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517 and P.D. No. 2016 extends only to
landless urban families who meet these qualifications: (a) they are tenants
as defined under Section 3(f) of P.D. No. 1517; (b) they built a home on the
land they are leasing or occupying; (c) the land they are leasing or
occupying is within an Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform
Zone; and (d) they have resided on the land continuously for the last 10
years or more.
 
Tenant refers to the rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not
include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without
the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those
whose possession is under litigation.
 
In this case, there is no dispute that the subject properties fall within the
scope of P.D. No. 1517, after the petitioners and their co-defendants,
Cagalingan and Flores, supplied sufficient proof on the lots' nature. However,
unlike Cagalingan and Flores who were able to submit proofs of their
respective tenancy arrangements with the lots' previous owners, the
petitioners opted not to present their own contracts with the owners. Such
failure was critical to their defense because proof of tenancy is a vital
condition that could render P.D. No. 1517 applicable to a case.
 
Based on the records, the petitioners were only able to prove that they were
the lots' possessors. Their possession, however, could be based on the other
modes specifically excluded by P.D. No. 1517 from its cover, namely,
tolerance, force or deceit. Where no contracts are presented to qualify
persons as legitimate tenants, the protection afforded therein cannot be
rightfully invoked. Given the foregoing, the CA was correct in ruling in favor
of the respondents.
 
Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.