Compiled Case Digest in Persons and Family Relation Civil Code Family Code

Persons and
Family
Relation
Compliled Case Digest
Bautista, Bryan, Bautista, Paulo, Bilas, Gelliane Christine, Bogbog, Aleli, Bolide, Rouelli Gift,
Corres, Kaiser John, De Guzman, Mageryl Shay, Diaz, Charina, Donggayao, Bryan Christopher
Gironella, Jsa Noble, Mabitazan, Tedd, Macarimpas, Raihanah Sarah, Narag, Janro, Reyes,
Jareed, Rosario, Keouh, Savellano, Michael Niño Jesus, Solda, Ace Aries
Case Title G.R./SCRA No.
EFFECTIVITY
Lara v. Del Rosario 94 Phil 778
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
G.R.
Philippines International Trading Corp. v. Angeles 108461
No.
G.R.
National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga 158761
No.
G.R.
Basa v. Mercado L-42226
No.
Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives Inc. v. Energy G.R.
192717
Regulatory Commission No.
COMPUTATION OF TIME
G.R.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown 162155
No.
G.R.
People v. Del Rosario L-7234
No.
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
G.R.
D.M. Consunji Inc v. Court of Appeals 137873
No.
G.R.
People v. Gasacao 168445
No.
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
G.R.
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales L-55960
No.
G.R.
Laureno v. Court of Appeals 114776
No.
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio G.R.
140047
Construction Inc. No.
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS
G.R.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals 112193
No.
G.R.
Bernabe v. Alejo 140500
No.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity G.R.
181556
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. No.
G.R.
Montanez v. Cipriano 181089
No.
G.R.
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice 188056
No.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
Guy v. Court of Appeals G.R. 163707
Persons and Family Relation 1

No.
G.R.
F.F. Cruz & Co.., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp. 187521
No.
G.R.
People v. Morial 129295
No.
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL
G.R.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown 1622155
No.
G.R.
Magkalas v. National Housing Authority 138823
No.
EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW
G.R.
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan 165835
No.
STARE DECISIS
G.R.
Ting v. Velez-Ting 166562
No.
G.R.
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals 110398
No.
LAW OF THE CASE
G.R.
Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations 141600
No.
OBITER DICTUM
G.R.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 142947
No.
G.R.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals 146486
No.
G.R.
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation 134284
No.
DURA LEX SED LEX
People v. Veneracion 249 SCRA 251
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
G.R.
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales L-55960
No.
EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW
G.R.
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. L-30642
No.
G.R.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals 112170
No.
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTIONS
G.R.
Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs L-24170
No.
NATIONALITY/ CITIZENSHIP THEORY
G.R.
Llorente v. Court of Appeals 124371
No.
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION

G.R.
Miciano v. Brimo L-22595
No.
RENVOI
G.R.
Aznar v. Garcia L-16749
No.
G.R.
Bellis v. Bellis L-23768
No.
G.R.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin L-27860
No.
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS
G.R.
Van Dorn v. Romillo L-68470
No.
G.R.
Bank of America NT and SA v. American Realty Co. 133876
No.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
G.R.
University of the East v. Jader 13234417
No.
G.R.
G.F. Equity Inc. v. Valenzona 156841
No.
G.R.
Go. V. Cordero 164703
No.
G.R.
Villanueva v. Rosqueta 180764
No.
G.R.
Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp. 184315
No.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
G.R.
Custodio v. Court of Appeals 116100
No.
G.R.
Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon 156168
No.
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
G.R.
Hotel Nikko v. Reyes 154259
No.
LIABILITY OF EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
G.R.
Manuel v. People of the Philippines 165842
No.
G.R.
Romero v. People of the Philippines 167546
No.
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES
G.R.
Pe v. Pe L-17396
No.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
G.R.
Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals L-14628
No.
Galang v. Court of Appeals G.R. L-17248

No.
G.R.
Gasheem Shookagt Baksh v. Court of Appeals 97336
No.
G.R.
Wassmer v. Velez L-20089
No.
G.R.
Natividad v. Tunac 143130
No.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
G.R.
Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc. 172525
No.
G.R.
Car Cool Philippines v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation 138088
No.
G.R.
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines 181995
No.
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
G.R.
Valenzuala v. Court of Appeals L-56168
No.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
G.R.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals 120706
No.
G.R.
Padalhin v. Lavina 183026
No.
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE
G.R.
Philex Mining Corp. v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue 125704
No.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME
G.R.
Manantan v. Court of Appeals 107152
No.
G.R.
Nuguid v. Nicdao 150758
No.
G.R.
People v. Agacer 177751
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (OTHER SOURCES OF

OBLIGATIONS)
G.R.
People v. Bayotas 102007
No.
G.R.
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip 133978
No.
G.R.
Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appeals 108395
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION, FRAUD,

PHYSICAL INJURIES)
G.R.
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc. 150256
No.
G.R.
International Flavors and Fragrance (Phils.) Inc. v. Argos 130362
No.

G.R.
Ruiz v. Ucol L-45404
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
G.R.
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp. 141309
No.
G.R.
Cojuanco v. Court of Appeals 119398
No.
G.R.
Manila Electric Company v. Castillocase 182976
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
G.R.
Barredo v. Garcia 48006
No.
G.R.
Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco 165732
No.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
G.R.
City of Pasig v. COMELEC 165732
No.
G.R.
Beltran v. People 125646
No.
G.R.
Merced v. Diez L-15315
No.
G.R.
Donato v. Luna L-53642
No.
G.R.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals 150758
No.
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
Geluz v. Court of Appeals 2 SCRA 801
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT
G.R.
Catalan v. Basa 159657
No.
G.R.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals 127540
No.
G.R.
Mendezona v. Ozamis 143370
No.
G.R.
Oposa v. Factoran Jr. 101083
No.
KINDS OF DOMICILE
G.R.
Marcos v. COMELEC 119976
No.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
G.R.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals 112193
No.
G.R.
Bernabe v. Alejo 140500
No.

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE
G.R.
Ancheta v. Ancheta 145370
No.
Adm. MTJ-92-
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
No. 716
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF

MARRIAGE
G.R.
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia vda. De Damian' 155733
No.
G.R.
Eugenio v. Velez 85140
No.
G.R.
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals 83598
No.
LEGAL CAPACITY
G.R.
Silverio v. Republic 174689
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Cagandahan 166676
No.
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
A.M. MTJ-99-
Beso v. Judge Daguman
No. 1211
A.M. MTJ-02-
Aranes v. Occiano
No. 1390
MARRIAGE LICENSE
G.R.
Alcantara v. Alcantara 167746
No.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA 277
G.R.
Carino v. Carino 132529
No.
Sy v. Court of Appeals 330 SCRA 550
G.R.
Sevilla v. Cardenas 167684
No.
G.R.
Abbas v. Abbas 183896
No.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE

REQUIREMENT
A.M. MTJ-00-
Manzano v. Sanchez
No. 1329
G.R.
Ninal v. Badayog 133778
No.
A.M. MTJ-92-
Cosca v.Palaypayon
No. 721
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
G.R.
Morigo v. People 145226
No.

THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
A.M. MTJ-94-
Moreno v. Bernabe
No. 963
A.M. MTJ-96-
Navarro v. Domagtoy
No. 963
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
G.R.
Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals 135216
No.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
G.R.
Republic v. Iyoy 152577
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Obrecido III 154380
No.
G.R.
Van Dorn v. Romillo L-68470
No.
G.R.
San Luis v. San Luis 133743
No.
G.R.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas 186571
No.
G.R.
Garcia-Recio v. Recio 138322
No.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
A.M. MTJ-
Atienza v. Brillantes
No. 92706
BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
G.R.
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan Lee 183622
No.
G.R.
Quita v. Court of Appeals 124862
No.
G.R.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals 150758
No.
G.R.
Jarillo v. People of the Philipppines 164435
No.
A.C.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo 6148
No.
G.R.
Weigel v. Sempio Dy L-53703
No.
G.R.
Montanez v. Cipriano 181089
No.
VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
G.R.
Republic v. Nolasco 94053
No.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA 277
G.R.
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals 111717
No.

G.R.
Manuel v. People of the Philippines 165842
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Bermudes 160258
No.
G.R.
Calisterio v. Calisterio 136467
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Granada 187512
No.
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40 FC
G.R.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals 1084818
No.
A.M. MTJ-
Atienza v. Brillantes
No. 92706
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
G.R.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Lao 119190
No.
G.R.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 112019
No.
G.R.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 126010
No.
G.R.
Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines 184063
No.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 108763
No.
G.R.
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals 130087
No.
G.R.
Tongol v. Tongol 157610
No.
G.R.
Marcos v. Marcos 136490
No.
G.R.
Te v. Te 161793
No.
G.R.
Agraviador v. Agraviador 170729
No.
G.R.
Marable v. Marable 178741
No.
G.R.
Aurelio v. Aurelio 175367
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 159594
No.
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
G.R.
Republic v. Encelan 170022
No.
Mendoza v. Republic G.R. 157649

No.
G.R.
Republic v. Galang 168796
No.
G.R.
Ochosa v. Alano 167459
No.
G.R.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes 185286
No.
G.R.
Toring v. Toring 165321
No.
G.R.
Ligeralde v. Patilunghug 168796
No.
G.R.
Suazo v. Suazo 164493
No.
G.R.
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga 170925
No.
G.R.
Alcazar v. Alcazar 174451
No.
G.R.
Najera v. Najera 164817
No.
G.R.
Halili v. Santos-Halili 165424
No.
G.R.
Paras v. Paras 147824
No.
G.R.
Zamora v. Court of Appeals 141917
No.
G.R.
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris 162368
No.
G.R.
Antonio v. Reyes 155800
No.
G.R.
Carating v.-Siayngco v. Siayngco 158896
No.
G.R.
Villalon v. Villalon 167206
No.
G.R.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals 127358
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano 149498
No.
G.R.
Dedel v. Court of Appeals 151867
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Dagdag 109975
No.
G.R.
Pesca v. Pesca 136921
No.
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE,

GROUNDS
Mallion v. Alcantara G.R. 141528

No.
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE
G.R.
Leonor v. Court of Appeals 112597
No.
PARTIES
G.R.
Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic 169766
No.
G.R.
Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli 173614
No.
G.R.
Catalan v. Court of Appeals 167109
No.
G.R.
Ninal v. Badayog 133778
No.
G.R.
Carlos v. Sandoval 179922
No.
G.R.
Ablaza v. Republic 158298
No.
APPEARANCE OF THE STATE
G.R.
Maquilan v. Maquilan 155409
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar 139676
No.
G.R.
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin 137590
No.
G.R.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals 116607
No.
A.M. RTJ-04-
Corpus v. Ochotorena
No. 1861
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
G.R.
Pacete v. Carriaga L-53880
No.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
G.R.
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis 138509
No.
G.R.
Ty v. Court of Appeals 127406
No.
EFFECTS
G.R.
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes 122749
No.
G.R.
Dino v. Dino 178044
No.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES, CONCEALMENT
G.R.
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals 132955
No.
Anaya v. Palaroan G.R. L-27930

No.
G.R.
Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon 47101
No.
FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE
G.R.
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals 132955
No.
A.C.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo 6148
No.
G.R.
Reyes v. Zaballero L-3561
No.
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION
G.R.
Alcazar v. Alcazar 174451
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Jimenez v. Canizares L-12790
No.
LEGAL SEPARATION, GROUNDS
G.R.
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong 15320
No.
G.R.
Gaudioncio v. Penaranda 79284
No.
G.R.
Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals 82606
No.
DEFENSES, CONDONATION/ PARDON
G.R.
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals 96602
No.
G.R.
Ginez v. Bugayong L-10033
No.
G.R.
People v. Zapata L-3047
No.
G.R.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano L-13553
No.
DEFENSES, CONSENT
G.R.
Matubis v. Praxedes L-11766
No.
G.R.
People v. Schneckenburger 48183
No.
G.R.
People v. Sensano 37720
No.
DEFENSES, MUTUAL GUILT
G.R.
Benedicto v. De La Rama 1056
No.
DEFENSES, COLLUSION
De Ocampo v. Florenciano G.R. L-13553

No.
DEFENSES, PRESCRIPTION
G.R.
Brown v. Yambao L-10699
No.
G.R.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano L-13553
No.
G.R.
Contreras v. Macaraig L-29138
No.
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, PROCEDURE
G.R.
Banez v. Banez 132592
No.
G.R.
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio L-30977
No.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
G.R.
Araneta c. Concepcion L-9667
No.
G.R.
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr. L-34132
No.
G.R.
No.
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE
G.R.
No.
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE
G.R.
Sabalones v. Court of Appeals 106169
No.
G.R.
Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals 115640
No.
G.R.
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio L-30977
No.
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
G.R.
Laperal v. Republic L-18008
No.
G.R.
Siochi v. Gozon 169900
No.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
G.R.
Pelayo v. Lauron 129295
No.
G.R.
Go v. Court of Appeals 114791
No.
G.R.
Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo 17014
No.
G.R.
Illusorio v. Bildner-Illusorio 139789
No.
Goitia v. Campos Rueda G.R. 11263

No.
G.R.
Cuenca v. Cuenca L-7231
No.
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER
G.R.
Arcaba v. Vda De Batocael 146683
No.
G.R.
Matabuena v. Cervantes L-28771
No.
G.R.
Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company 12707
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, COMPONENTS
G.R.
Navarro v. Escobido 153788
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. 187023
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, EXCLUDED PROPERTY
G.R.
Ching v. Court of Appeals 124642
No.
G.R.
Tan v. Court of Appeals 120594
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, DISSOLUTION
G.R.
In Re Muller v. Muller 149615
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, COMPONENTS
G.R.
Dela Pena v. Avila 187490
No.
G.R.
Titan Construction Co. v. David 169584
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIABILITIES
G.R.
Ayala Investment & Development Co. v. Court of Appeals 188305
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISPOSITION
G.R.
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servavio 157537
No.
G.R.
Ros v. Philippine National Bank 170166
No.
G.R.
Siochi v. Gozon 169900
No.
G.R.
Aggabao v. Parulan 165803
No.
G.R.
Fuentes v. Roca 178902
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION

G.R.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v Pascual 163744
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIQUIDATION
G.R.
Quiao v. Quiao 176556
No.
VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS
G.R.
Dino v. Dino 178044
No.
G.R.
Maxey v. Court of Appeals L-45870
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes 122749
No.
G.R.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals 127358
No.
G.R.
Maquilan vs. Maquilan 155409
No.
G.R.
Gonzales vs. Gonzales 159521
No.
G.R.
Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr 152716
No.
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Tumlos v. Fernandez 137650
No.
G.R.
Francisco v. Master Iron Works 151967
No.
G.R.
Joaquino v. Reyes 154645
No.
G.R.
Saguid vs. Court of Appeals 150611
No.
G.R. L-50127-
Juaniza v. Jose
No. 28
G.R.
Adriano v. Court of Appeals 124118
No.
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS
Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court 229 SCRA 274
SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY
Hiyas v. Acuna 500 SCRA 514
Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court 309 SCRA 340
G.R.
Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals 129242
No.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 475 SCRA 1

PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals 19 SCRA 756
FAMILY HOME
G.R.
Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan 185920
No.
G.R.
Modequillo v. Breva 86355
No.
G.R.
Josef v. Santos 165060
No.
G.R.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Product, Inc. 172263
No.
G.R.
Gomez v. Sta. Ines 132537
No.
G.R.
Manacop v. Court of Appeals 97898
No.
G.R.
Taneo v. Court of Appeals 108532
No.
G.R.
Fortaleza v. Lapitan 178288
No.
KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN
G.R.
De Asis v. Court of Appeals 108532
No.
G.R.
Fernandez v. Fernandez 143256
No.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY, GROUNDS
G.R.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals 123450
No.
G.R.
Angeles v. Maglaya 153798
No.
G.R.
Jao v. Court of Appeals L-49162
No.
G.R.
Babiera v. Catotal 138493
No.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY
G.R.
Liyao, Jr.v. Tanhoti-Liyao 138961
No.
G.R.
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon 142877
No.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY
G.R.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals 125901
No.
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals 124814
No.
Eceta v. Eceta G.R. 157037

No.
G.R.
Alberto v. Court of Appeals 86639
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Rivero v. Court of Appeals 141273
No.
G.R.
People v. Bayani 120894
No.
G.R.
People vs. Manahan 128157
No.
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
G.R.
Nepomuceno v. Lopez 181258
No.
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva 496 SCRA 135
G.R.
Cruz v. Cristobal 140422
No.
G.R.
Perla v. Baring 172471
No.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES
G.R.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals 125901
No.
Agustin v. Court of Appeals 460 SCRA 315
Herrera v. Alba 460 SCRA 197
G.R.
People v. Vallejo 144656
No.
G.R.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz 171713
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Guy v. Court of Appeals 163707
No.
G.R.
Marquino v. Itermediate Appelaye Court 72078
No.
G.R.
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor 174680
No.
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
G.R.
Briones v. Miguel 156343
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Abadilla 133054
No.
G.R.
Verceles v. Posada 159785
No.
G.R.
People v. Glabo 129248
No.
G.R.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals 122906
No.

G.R.
Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals 111455
No.
G.R.
Silva v. Court of Appeals 114742
No.
G.R.
David v. Court of Appeals 111180
No.
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
G.R.
De Santos v. Angeles 105619
No.
Abadilla v. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 448
WHO MAY ADOPT
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Toledano 94147
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Alarcon-Vergara 95551
No.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION
G.R.
In re: adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim 168992
No.
G.R.
Landingin v. Republic 164948
No.
G.R.
Cang v. Court of Appeals 105308
No.
A.M. RTJ-96-
Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen
No. 1362
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
G.R.
Republic v. Hernandez 117209
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia 148311
No.
G.R.
Teotico v. Del Val L-18753
No.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
G.R.
Lahom v. Sibulo 143989
No.
SUPPORT
G.R.
Lam v. Chua 131286
No.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
G.R.
Briones v. Miguel 156343
No.
Quimiging v. Icao G.R. L-26795

No.
G.R.
Francisco v. Zandueta 43794
No.
G.R.
Santero v. Court of Appeals L-61700
No.
G.R.
Gotardo v. Buling 165166
No.
WHEN DEMANDABLE
G.R.
Lacson v Lacson 150644
No.
WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT
G.R.
Lim v. Lim 163209
No.
G.R.
Verceles v. Posada 159785
No.
G.R.
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals 125041
No.
G.R.
De Guzman v. Perez 156013
No.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY
G.R.
Lacson v. Lacson 150644
No.
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE
G.R.
Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals
No. 118671
SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS
G.R.
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
No. L-48219
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
G.R.
Silva v. Court of Appeals
No. 114742
WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
G.R.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals
No. 122906
G.R.
Vancil v. Belmes
No. 133323
G.R.
Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
No. 140817
G.R.
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals 116773
No.
G.R.
Sombong v. Court of Appeals
No. 111876
TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE
G.R.
Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals
No. 174485

G.R.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
No. 154994
G.R.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 113054
No.
G.R.
Golangco v. Court of Appeals 124724
No.
G.R.
David v. Court of Appeals
No. 111180
G.R.
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
No. 115640
G.R.
Perez v. Court of Appeals
No. 118870
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL

AUTHORITY
G.R.
Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. 70890
G.R.
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
No. 85044
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
G.R.
Aquinas School v. Inton
No. 184202
G.R.
St. Joseph's College v. Miranda
No. 182353
G.R.
St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos
No. 143363
G.R.
Amadora v. Court of Appeals
No. L-47745
G.R.
Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-70458
G.R.
Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals
No. 84698
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN
G.R.
Remo v. Scretary of Foreign Affairs
No. 169202
G.R.
Yasin v. Judge Shari's District Court
No. 94986
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
G.R.
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
No. 148311
G.R.
In re Julian Lim Wang
No. 159966
G.R.
In re Change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
No. L-51201
USE OF DIFFERENT NAME
G.R.
People v. Estrada
No. 164368

G.R.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
No. 112170
AMMENDMENTS/ CORRECTIONS OF ENTRIES
G.R.
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
No. 189476
G.R.
Lee v. Court of Appeals
No. 118387
G.R.
In re change of name of Julian Wang
No. 159966
G.R.
Silverio v. Republic
No. 174689
G.R.
Republic v. Cagandahan
No. 166676
G.R.
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himalayan City
No. 181174
EFFECTIVITY
LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954
Facts:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars,
operated a taxi business under the name of “Waval Taxi.” He employed among others three
mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to
37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days
advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company,
as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their
jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this
action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight
hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article
302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give them one
month notices. Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So
only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the
Eight-Hour Labor Law is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of

Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said
Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This
repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year
after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs
by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after
the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of “salary corresponding to said month.”
commonly known as “mesada.” If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day,
week, or month, then computation of the month’s salary payable would be impossible. Article
302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Facts:
Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal
personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in
necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates.
Issue:
Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette.
Ruling:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for
determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its
publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2

does not prevent the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public
nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the
people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON. PRESIDING

JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES
G.R. No. 108641 October 21, 1996
Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to
the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable
and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone
from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the
requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null
and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve
applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has
already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari
seeking the reversal of the said decision.
Issue:

Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the
said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada
vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall
be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B.

GONZAGA
G.R. No. 158761 December 4, 2007
Facts:
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of

Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric
Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the screening committee resolved
to disqualify respondent because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code
(ECEC), promulgated by petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate
whose spouse occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is
prohibited to run as director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECO’s by-laws, however, do
not provide for such ground for disqualification. Respondent averred that the ECEC was null and

void because it had not been published. NEA, on the other hand, failed to prove whether the
ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue:
Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not complying
with the publication requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for
not complying with the publication requirement. It observed that while ZAMSURECO complied
with the requirements of filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it
offered no proof of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general
circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations
contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the
country. It is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO

G.R. No. L-42226 July 26,
1935
Facts:
Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and
testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator
of the estate, declared him the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin
Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction
because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of
hearing.
They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first

publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the Ing Katipunan where the notice was
published was not a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by law.
Issues:
a) Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement
b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
Ruling:
The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the
notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the
hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days
before the day appointed for the hearing.
The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the
fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a
bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that
the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.

ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.,

Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are
rural electric cooperatives established under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National

Electrification Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are
members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. PRESCO is a
member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in
the distribution of . On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit
on the recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their
consumers. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural
electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995,
an application for approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable
rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the
ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not
inconsistent with the provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC, together with the
applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel of the ERB. All
electric cooperatives were directed to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy
Regulatory Board had prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of the 22
March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27 March 2006 Order
of the ERC directing the refund of over-recoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective
and invalid policy guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-
submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive application.
Issue:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended
by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the
University of the Philippines (U.P.) Law Center, and their retroactive application.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process.
Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that
"laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided." Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. However, there are several exceptions to the requirement
of publication such as an interpretative regulation. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the general public. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative regulations. The policy
guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it’s IRR, particularly on the computation of the
cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant the IRR.
Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.

COMPUTATION OF TIME
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

INC.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
Facts:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On

March 11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund
or tax credit of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a
petition for review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond
the two-year reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. The Court of Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the
Supreme Court ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or
a leap year.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary
period.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary
period because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365
years is repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under
Executive Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
COMPUTATION OF TIME
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The
information was filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the
information to ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article
90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed
the case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code
does not provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the
Civil Code which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to
Article 13 of the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the
Supreme Court held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take
effect so the new provisions should apply.
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO
G.R. No. 137873 April 20,
2010
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego’s widow then filed a petition for damages in the
Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria
Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the
ruling in Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute
an ordinary civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions
simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although
she has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent’s case is an
exception because private respondent was not aware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed
her claim for benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but
of her rights as well. The decision of the court is affirmed.

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO

G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005
Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency,
Inc., which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao
were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew
remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large
scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao
appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that he can’t be held liable for illegal recruitment
because he was just a mere employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not
aware of the law against prohibition on bonds and deposits under section 60 of the Omnibus
Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. 8042.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment.
Ruling:
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that he was just a mere employee of the
manning agency because he was the company’s crewing manager. As testified by the witnesses,
the accused appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from receiving job
applications, interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the agency’s requirement of
payment of performance or cash bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme Court held further
that appellants defense of ignorance is not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil
Code which states that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The
defense of goodwill is neither unavailable because the appellant failed to deploy the
complainants without valid reasons.

YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth more or less Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee testified that she was
married to Sy Kiat on Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai
Cho, and Chun Yen as their children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage through
evidences like Yao Kee’s and Gan Ching’s testimony, Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registration
stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the certificate by the Embassy of the People’s Republic
of China affirming the fact of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was valid.
Ruling:
Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the validity of foreign marriages the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact must be proven and the alleged foreign
marriage must be proven by convincing evidence. The petitioners have provided the fact of
marriage however the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage with Chinese
Law or custom. In such absence of foreign law, the doctrine of processual presumption must be
applied. The Supreme Court then held that in the absence of a foreign law it must be presumed as
the same as ours. In the Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be valid without the presence of a
solemnizing officer; therefore the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void.

LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
Facts:
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines Limited on 1979.
However because of the recession that hit the Airline Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant
Company initiated cost-cutting measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the
plaintiff. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant. Laureano then
cited Singapore Laws to his case since he was employed in the Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case.
b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in order to employ
them. The plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of the laws of Singapore that he cited
to his case. Under the principle of processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts
it will be presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply. Further, under
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the petitioner’s action for damages due to
illegal dismissal has already prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four
(4) years after the effective date has prescribed.

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs. V.P.

EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004
Facts:
On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of Housing, and
Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–
Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting
Company, a firm duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.
On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex

International, Inc a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture
agreement with Ajyal. However since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board, it had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an
agreement that the execution of the project will be under their joint management. To comply
with the requirements of performance bond, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a
guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees
for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service contracts
abroad. Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of
Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank,
but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee. The Surety
Bond was later amended to increase the amount of coverage and to change the bank in whose
favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB
and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the
project. However, they were not able to start the project on schedule because of that surety bond
was also extended and the Advance Payment Guarantee was extended three times more until it
was cancelled for reimbursement.
On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner
demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. VPECI advised
the Philguarantee not to pay Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable
settlement of the Project. VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that
it had already paid to Rafidain Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying however Central Bank
authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank. Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit
payment to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to

reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to
pay so a case was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraq’s laws should be applied in determining
VPECI's failure to pay in the performance of its obligations under the service contract.
Ruling:
Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract, since one of the
parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the
problem of whether respondent VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of
Iraq. However, those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove. Under the
doctrine of processual presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held
that the petitioner guarantor should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner as a
guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI
has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the
creditor. It could also set up compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the
principal debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights
and remedies by making the payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully
due the creditor and demandable of the principal debtor.

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 31, 1996
Facts:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.
Fabian until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and
Evelyn F. Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement
of successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr.,
and the petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as illegitimate
children of their defunct father. The lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate
daughter or Jose Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to
one-half portion of share of the legitimate. So the petitioners filed a motion for partial
reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by
virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. It was denied, hence this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively.
Ruling:
Private respondent’s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was
brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that
the recognition of natural children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except
when the parents die during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other hand submit that
with the New Family Code on August 31, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction on the ground of
prescription. Further, the Family Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not impair the vested right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present law which is
the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively because its application will impair the vested
right of the respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has

vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The
son was born on September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe
died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. Regional
Trial Court dismissed the complaint and said that the death of the putative father had barred the
action. Further, under the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm
or deny the child’s filiation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of
the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child
has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take
away his right.
Issue:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.
Ruling:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the
latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim,

considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without
the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for
the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF

INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009
Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed on
June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was
already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors,
creditors and the general public. The trial court gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity
Bank. In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that “After the payment of all
liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at
the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants
of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the
closed bank”. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for
Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle
Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their

operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal
maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the
past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.” The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation
to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal
effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein
authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative
intent to the contrary, Section 28. Effectivity Clause. “This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation”.
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes
re-married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the
Regional Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the
Family Code. On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004,
Silverio’s daughter filed a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Lourdes then contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the
Family Code, Article 40 cannot be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry
without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the
complaint ruling that the existing law at the time of the second marriage do not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The
complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor
of the respondent. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code
is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Even the accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab
initio, the first and second marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also,
Art. 40 should be applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of
anyone. The petition is thereby granted.
DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
Facts:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's
"buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written
demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges
for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City on February 6, 2009.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order
No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat
of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the petitioners directly
went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further
argued that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against
enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only future cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.
However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does
not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or
the confirmation of already existing rights.A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be
applied retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
Facts:
On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate valued 10 million
more or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy with their children five children. On
June 13, 1997, private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by
their mother Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial
Court alleging that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. However,
petitioner and co-heirs alleged that private respondent’s claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim
stating that in exchange for the financial and educational support received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei and any and all liabilities.
The petition was denied in the lower court and the motion for reconsidered dismissed in
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was made.

Issue:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from claiming
successional rights.
Ruling:
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from claiming successional
rights because it does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received Php 300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The document does
not specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary rights, hence it can’t be construed as a
waiver of successional rights. The Supreme Court held that under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code
any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parent or
guardian. Parents may repudiate the inheritance only by judicial authorization. Not having been
judicially approved, the release and waiver claim is null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012
Facts:

Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower
Agusan Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract
Agreement with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor,
equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the
East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the main
contract. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly
progress billing which the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days
from receipt thereof.


The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress
accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to
conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative
of DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced the
construction of the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. However, before the project
was completed, HRCC pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the
overdue application plus legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed
to comply with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the
latter’s progress billings, i.e. joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was
justified in not paying the amount stated in HRCC’s progress billings.
Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC’s valuation of the
completed works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint
measurement of HRCC’s completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. Further, on
account of its failure to demand the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works, had
effectively waived its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to
HRCC’s submission of its monthly progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls for a
determination as to which of the parties’ respective valuation of accomplished works should be
given credence. FFCCI claims that its valuation should be upheld since the same was the result
of a measurement of the completed works conducted by it and the DPWH.
On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of
FFCCI’s failure to observe the joint measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent of its
completed works. FFCCI admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress
billings, it never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual provision of a prior joint
quantification. Such repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its
contractual right to require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so
impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “rights may be waived unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs”. The tribunal
cannot see any such violation in this case.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS
PEOPLE vs. MORIAL

G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
Facts:
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with
Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession
admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police
tortured him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial
confession claiming that such confession was made without the assistance of counsel given him
by the police was not present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend some personal

matters while the interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that
he was present when Morial signed the admission.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence against the accused.
Ruling:
The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An excused under
custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start until
the termination of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel “necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time
the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of
the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of
the extrajudicial confession.” Section 2A of RA No 7438 requires that “any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the absence
of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted”. Additionally, there was an invalid
waiver of the right to counsel since this right cannot be waived unless the same is made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was
offered in evidence.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN

G. R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
Facts:
On April 14, 2000, the Taxpayer filed its petition for review claiming refund based on its
final adjusted return filed on April 14, 1998, Counting 365 days a year pursuant to Article 13 of
the Civil Code, the CTA found that the petition was filed beyond the two year respective period

equivalent to 730 days for filing the claim under Section 229 of the NIRC, ruling that the petition
was filed 731 days after the filing of the return.On Appeal, the CA reversed the CTA and ruled
that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA.
Ruling:
The SC affirmed the CA's reversal but ruled that the basis for the reversal is EO 292 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, a more recent law, which provides that a year is composed of
12 calendar months.
Section 31 provides that a “year” shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. Both

article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code
of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months and the number of days is
irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the Supreme
Court held that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the
more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Using this, the petition was filed on the last day of the 24th month from the day the
taxpayer filed its final adjusted return.
MAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008
Facts:
Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as TAG-

77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa
Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.
On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named
Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession,
control (sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During
the Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063.
After conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where plaintiff’s structure
is located should be classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined in
compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential
development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through
counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two
other spouses have erected structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the
NHA. In a letter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff
recognizing the latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was
identified for relocation.
On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance
of a restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City.
The Order denying plaintiff’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-
G.R. No. 33833). On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said
decision and order of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioner’s structure will violate the
vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice clause of the
constitution.
Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of this
case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to
order her relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause
guaranteed under the Constitution.
Petitioner’s contentions must necessarily fail. The NHA’s authority to order the
relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1315. Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as
a blighted area and was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No.
1315 included petitioner’s property. The NHA, as the decree’s designated administrator for the

national government, was empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the
expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their improvements.
P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take possession,
control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. Clearly, the
NHA, by force of law, has the authority to order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition
of her structure in case of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can
effectively carry out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315.
Inasmuch as petitioner’s property was located in the area identified as an open space by
the NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in
accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial
order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right over the
subject property when the NHA recognized her as the census owner by assigning to her a tag
number (TAG No. 77-0063).
EFFECT OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED

GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
with application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan
denying the motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture
commenced by the Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.
The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the
Garcias allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic then filed the Sandiganbayan through
the OMB a petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias.
The case was docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of
forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(forfeiture II). Thus
the two cases were consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but
subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA
7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered
substantially the same properties identified in both Forfeiture I and II.
Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that
the plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the second division of SB
pursuan to R 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that
the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the criminal case of plunder.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA
1379.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings pursuant to RA 1379.
Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in nature. It is a divestiture of property
without compensation in consequence of an offense.
STARE DECISIS

TING vs. VELEZ-TING
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
Facts:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of
Cebu City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been realized
Ruling:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it,
must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted.

STARE DECISIS
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997
Facts:
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife,
daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets
were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22,
1980. The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas
Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National
Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a
result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies
of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private
respondents’ families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for
the death of Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr.,
16, and Elfreda de la Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents
purchased ticket numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in
the passenger manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22,
1980 and sank that night after being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a
result of the collision, some of the passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however,
denied that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the
fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was
seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to
the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and
satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the
PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the
trial court to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not
join in the agreement.
Issues:
a) Whether the members of private respondents’ families were actually passengers of the
Don Juan;
b) Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of

petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this
case;
c) Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner’s liability; and
d) Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
unwarranted.
Ruling:
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don
Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he
purchased tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati
office of petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on
April 22, 1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers
of the tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria
appear.
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the
extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the
appellate court relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
which case was brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although
the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the
crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio
Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third
Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the
imminent danger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the
M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship
and supervise the abandoning of the ship.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the
total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a ship-owner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-
owner.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private
respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the
Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas
couple. Under petitioner’s formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la
Victoria spouses should receive P97, 714.28.

LAW OF THE CASE
FULGENCIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 141600 September 12, 2003
Facts:
Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates showing when they
received notice of the NLRC’s June 16, 1998 Decision, and the date when they filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation under
Section 11, Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service upon the respondents was not
resorted to; hence, the dismissal thereof by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the
Rules of Court impede the cause of justice.
Ruling:
Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override substantial justice. It
is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case
on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

OBITER DICTUM
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142947 March 19, 2002
Facts:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress
forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and
that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her
but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand
denied Orly’s allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and
she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her.
Issue:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it
is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was
not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-
grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against
him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that
the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an
erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a
prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file
an action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage.

OBITER DICTUM
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005
Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The
Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable.
On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual
harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James
Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in
benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-
finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred
by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the
investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this
recommendation was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the
Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not
removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private
respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed
Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an
impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Ombudsman’s Deputies are impeachable.
b) Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable.
Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-

00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that
“The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment”.
Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading

commentators in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his
Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or
not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable
officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor
presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the
previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.
Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the

private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an
impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute
grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no
longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar
to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation
from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the
former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12
and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

OBITER DICTUM
AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284 December 1, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel
Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed
between Ayala and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions.
Among the Special Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit
the building plans to the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter’s approval b) the
construction of the building shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before
1979. Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released
even if the purchase price shall have been fully paid and c) there shall be no resale of the
property.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.

Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent
any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of
restrictions may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation,
that is, for the payment of damages.

DURA LEX SED LEX
PEOPLE vs. VENERACION

G.R. No. 119987-88 October 12,
1995
Facts:
On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion.
Respondent judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather
imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The
respondent judge refused to act.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose
the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or
moral beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent
in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in
the Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence,
both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.
Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish
the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged
marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law

or custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in
China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORP.

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
Facts:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in
the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved
to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for
additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the WCA.
Issue:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
Ruling:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the

WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not
availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may
be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized
that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be
defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law
killeth but its spirit giveth life.
URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170 April 10,
1996
Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC
of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to
take his letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger
Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name “Oscar
Perez” when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of
complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida
reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was
charged under the wrong law.
Ruling:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers.
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTION
ASAALI vs. COMMISSION OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. L-24170 December 16, 1968
Facts:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers.

Issue:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid
on the contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.
Ruling:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to
protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high
seas. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only
within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction
while on Philippine ship.
NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP THEORY
LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo
Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo
departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an
American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo
was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was

living in with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with
the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital
union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery
against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in
1952.On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they
bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all
his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo
died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC
granted her petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half
of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally
among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.
Ruling:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by
foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred
back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow
the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the
will of the deceased.
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION, EXCEPTION
MICIANO vs. BRIMO

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano,
the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo,

one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
disposition.
Ruling:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must
govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the
testator. Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the
Civil Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice
the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in
such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
RENVOI
AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he

resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national
law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under
California law.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect
that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The
case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law only.
RENVOI
BELLIS vs. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
Facts:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills,
his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on
the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights
of the illegitimate children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that
the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
RENVOI
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN

G.R. No. L-27860 March 29,

1974
Facts:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of
the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary
provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the
laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended
that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was
possible).
Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact
to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the
time of her death (and not said law at any other time).
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner’s business
in Ermita, Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of
the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of the
certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
Ruling:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and
financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. As borne by the records,
BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US)
Dollar loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2)
El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private.
As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein
respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, dated 17
February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon,
located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to
enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the
said mortgage, which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an
action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the
real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for
the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
Ruling:
Yes.In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself.In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.Thus, when the
foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the

forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
Facts:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988. During his last year, 1st
semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given
an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given
by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson
after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988
the professor gave him a grade of 5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held
April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he
took a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class
review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not
able to take the bar exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish,
and serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights when he was
not able to take the 1988 bar examinations due to UE’s negligence.
Issue:
Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral
damages?
Ruling:
Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent
for the latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of
their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain
when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar
examinations as what Court of Appeals held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for
himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his
affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking
the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are
other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective
examinee must meet. Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the

date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is deleted.
GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA

G.R. No. 156841 June 30, 2005
Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired
Valenzona as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of
employment. He was tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team,
coach exhibition games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event
conducted, play-off games, etc.
He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the conduct of its team
and players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as fixed by the corporation
in good physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public
and to conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty,
morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything detrimental to the best interest of
the corporation.
He also agreed to endorse the corporation’s products in commercial advertising,

promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still photographs, motion
pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him
with a service vehicle and gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting
January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during the contract,
the coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the contract can
be terminated by the corporation. (Paragraph 3)
Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the
contract was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to the terms of the contract as he had trust
and confidence in Uytengsu who recommended him to GF Equity.
Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988, he was
advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter dated September 26, 1988, invoking
their right as specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later
than September 30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services. Six
(6) years after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzona’s counsel demanded from GF Equity payment of
compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But GF
Equity refused the claim. Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of

contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of
the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and
legal and factual basis. He prayed award for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. He challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the
elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear transgression of Art. 1308 of the NCC and reliance
thereon did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal.
GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate
Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should
be instituted before a labor arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and
it declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and
ordered GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity abused its right by
arbitrarily terminating Valenzona’s employment, finding Valenzona’s claim for damages as
valid. The court ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative
of applicable laws and established jurisprudence.
Ruling:
GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract to
law, morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is
guilty of laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years.
In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate
the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its
opinion. To validate the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for
void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.
Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed within the
statutory period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was filed for
breach of contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed
the action six (6) years from the date of his cause of action.
Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages,
exemplary damages, must be set aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner. Attorney’s fees are awarded because GF Equity refused
to pay the balance of Valenzona’s salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled to litigate.

GO vs. CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing
Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels.
After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to
meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go
who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero
was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the
Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of
US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive
commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each
vessel.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he
was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to
the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and
Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to
answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to
find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the
second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson,
Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale
between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold
Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring
together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights,
thus depriving him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack

of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no
act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial
court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his
answer within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on
February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do
with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines.
On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection
with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress
status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the
services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the
vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission
for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997
considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29,
2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354
and setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the
Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go
(G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
Issue:
a) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
b) Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the
principal, AFFA.
Ruling:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because
only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued
by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by
Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the

Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of
AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations
cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break
the contract can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly
held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT
25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in
violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral
damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA

G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the
Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her
courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her
resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her
will on orders of her superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to
respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for
prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva),
then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction
order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA
issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO
lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.
But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner
Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC
found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven
months before the Bureau’s centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision,
holding instead that petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction
order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages
from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to
respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo
warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy
Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.
Ruling:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in
bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21

of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse
of right or duty.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave
him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order
issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to
replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva
ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of
the law the Deputy Commissioner.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184315 November 25,
2009
Facts:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994,
Chronicle Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing" for brevity) published in the Manila
Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10
and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony,"
which term according to him is commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe
an individual who was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez due to special and
extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in
illegal and dishonorable business activities.
The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of
Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the
same fate as the former. According to him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet
Corporation, it was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world
prices of gold and unprofitable investments it ventured into. Moreover, one of the articles
portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife
Corporation, of which he is the Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had
nothing to do with it. And that if his group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor
problems as in Grepalife.
In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles were not
defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having
ascertained their contents. In any event, they claim that these articles are privileged and/or
constitute reasonable and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which
cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against them. They likewise alleged that they were
acting within the bounds of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of libel.

Ruling:
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the
labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the
former President to gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced
others to disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and
uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that
he induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5)
the tagging of Yuchengco as a "corporate raider" seeking to profit from something he did not
work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a
condition that was dishonorable.
There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where
there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation.In the
instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the
writing and publication of the subject libelous articles. When malice in fact is proven, assertions
and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since
being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from
attaching to a defamatory imputation.
Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the
courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the attendant circumstances that respondents were
animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and
frequency of the publication of the defamatory articles. Finally, even if we assume for the sake of
argument that actual malice was not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to
the finding of the Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair
commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of
qualifiedly privileged communications.
In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and
reinstate the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
original Decision. This Court, however, finds the award of damages in the total amount of One
Hundred Million Pesos by the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances.

CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
Facts:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said
property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and
spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two
possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20
meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the
previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and
length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing
thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters
in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway
making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses
along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her
adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent
access to the public street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right
of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the
public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as
an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper?
Ruling:
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal

wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a
material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of
right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be
applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be
willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing
a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of
a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by
contract. The fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed
by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after
payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right
to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty
on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right
cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in
damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no
cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum
absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action
reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON

GR. No. 156168 December 14, 2004
Facts:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad,
either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who
travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable
Banking Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines,
engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit
card facilities, among others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an
Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar
transactions within and outside the Philippines.
The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of
$3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon
together with some reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong for business and
pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon
went to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong.
There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.).
The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of
paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on credit. He then
presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier
for verification.

Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other
shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon
sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply
did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the
Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Issue:
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.
Ruling:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which
he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the
breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.

VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES

GR. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the
Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for
damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as
exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on
October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend,
approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s
birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party, when
he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and
asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a
Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he
claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the

celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart
denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession
that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the
party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have
been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the
request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had
plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.
Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE

GR. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18,
1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January
1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got
married through a civil wedding in BaguioCity without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo
was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy
against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his
marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first

marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount
0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary
reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed
the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with
malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact
or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged
and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith
of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is
later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court rules against the petitioner.
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and
caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public
policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the
interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim
of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the
attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages
to be just and reasonable.

LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
SONNY D. ROMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009
Facts:
On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero
and the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose
Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for
Naga City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision
resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes,
Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived
although they sustained serious injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur. After trial on the merits, the MTC
acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was,
however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of
P3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate
damages and loss of earning capacity.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur which on July 17,
2001, affirmed the MTC judgment in toto. Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals. On March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s acquittal freed him of civil liability?
Ruling:
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, the Supreme Court agrees with
the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime
charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton
and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently,
petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is
another matter. While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was
established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove
negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that
there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly
liable.
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES
CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE

G.R. No.L-17396 May 30, 1962
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town
of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her

parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a
collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name,
defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family.
Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only
their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship.
The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and
since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The
plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The
affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their
residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from
said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's
clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's
aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a
handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the
police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that
it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the
uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that
the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their
part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both
of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love
with defendant who is a married man."
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, compensatory, exemplary and
corrective damages.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is
shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her
to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family
who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a
member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine

love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but
through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury
to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
Facts:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher
in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years
younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life
insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private
maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner
admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having
ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on
October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on
February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.
The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as
the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to
pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the
fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five
hundred pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court
of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the
moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the
petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be —
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of
damages.


BEATRIZ GALANG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No.L-17248 January 29, 1962
Facts:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's
mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her
house and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother,
appellant Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the
marriage, with the exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the
marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the
latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made
them alight from the bus and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino
agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their
lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to act as
their sponsor; that after making these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo
remained in Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7,
appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license
but failed because Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although both prospective
contracting parties signed the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he
going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never
returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that
Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was
unsavory.
The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals
considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.
Issues:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged
breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest
intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award
of moral damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met
the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the
apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the
petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since
he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or
agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that
he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money
and his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual
expenses.
Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
Ruling:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to
his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the
court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the
country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.

WASSMER vs. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-
to-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is
leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed,
that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Issue:
Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all
the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC
which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC

G.R. No. 143130 July 10, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay
Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two
became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to
get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon
arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside
his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa
cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June
1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992,
Ronald and his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's
house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families agreed to have the
wedding in January 1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten married that year so they postponed it.
Meanwhile, Elsa started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for
the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby
which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two
families decided that Elsa should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her
during her postnatal period. During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.
It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the
former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting,
Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly
contend they are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because
Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement had already been much
publicized in their town.
Issue:
Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less
by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became
lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by
the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a
position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these
circumstances in this case.
In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the
families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's
miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a

relationship gone awry.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. vs. RRN INC.

G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic
corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter
respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent
filed a claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which
consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum
of P5, 275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount of P442, 014.73. Petitioner filed a
counterclaim for overpayment in the amount of P2, 512,997.96. The parties admitted several
facts before the CIAC. It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and
Conditions of Sub-contract. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for
petitioner in any of its projects, a part or the whole of the works more particularly described in
Conditions of Sub-Contract and other Sub-contract documents.
On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a "Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment,

Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for
the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos.
4501200300-000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00
respectively, or a total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that respondent will
perform variation orders in the Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied
manpower chargeable against respondent. Respondent was not able to finish the entire works
with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of
P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read 2003], respondent, through its former counsel
sent a letter to petitioner demanding for the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to
P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back charges in the amount of P4,063,633.43. On
September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as material back charges.
Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another letter to petitioner for them to meet and
settle their dispute. On January 8, 2004, respondent sent another letter to petitioner regarding the
cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding. Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner
sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account and the failure in their negotiations for
amicable settlement.
Issue:
Whether or not the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials is constitutes to
unjust enrichment.
Ruling:
No, the court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in affirming that the CIAC
award for the values of inventoried materials considering that respondent RRN has no basis to

claim because Engr. Bonifacio admitted that respondent RRN failed to establish whether the
materials came from respondent or from petitioner and that it was petitioner that actually
installed the said materials as part of remaining works that the petitioner took over from
respondent rrn. The claim for the value of inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled
entry because in the computation of the final account, respondent RRN was credited the full
contract price and the cost of variations which included the inventoried materials.
Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is
quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented
before the CIAC. It insists that its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for
respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the supposed agreement on
the charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent
should be made to pay based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions the
amounts awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for
completing the work left unfinished by respondent.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation

G.R. NO. 138088 January 23, 2006
Facts:
On December 19, 2005, USHIO Realty and Development Corporation filed an ejectment
case against CAR COOL Philippines Inc., to recover the possession of a parcel of land at Quezon
Avenue. USHIO Realty contends that despite several and repeated demands and notices from the
former owners of the land, spouses Lopez, and also from the new owners, USHIO Realty, CAR
COOL still failed to vacate the property. On December 3, 1995 USHIO Realty sent the final
demand to CAR COOL, giving a non extendable 15 days within which to vacate the property.
CAR COOL refused to vacate the property, hence the ejectment case.
The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered in the ejectment case in favor of USHIO Realty.
CAR COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision affirming the
decision of the MeTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with
modification, granting rentals to USHIO Realty.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and
attorney’s fees in favor of USHIO Realty
Ruling:
USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical possession of the
said property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should
pay USHIO Realty rental as a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property. Contrary to CAR COOL’s contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals
for the property does not constitute unjust enrichment.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

G.R. No. 181995 July 16,
2012
Facts:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial
pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL
embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts.
Subsequently, PAL posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir
was one of those awarded with the opportunity.
Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle, Washington, United
States of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary training of his skills and knowledge to
handle the new aircraft. He completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5,
1996 after rendering 25 years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service, the petitioner
applied for an optional retirement authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between PAL and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to
reconsider his retirement in that the company has yet to recover the cost of his training. In the
event that he finally decides to leave, PAL will deduct the unrecovered cost of his training from
his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave thereafter. Elegir’s counsel sent PAL a letter of
correspondence stating that the cost of training should not be deducted from his retirement pay.
Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from Elegir’s retirement pay
the amount unrecovered from his training.
Ruling:
PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the New Civil Code,
they had the right to demand payment since Elegir will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
PAL. Unjustly enriching is unduly profiting one’s self on something which does not
meritoriously belong to him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, “Nemo cum
alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest”. Elgir has the right to retire since he has reached a certain

number of flight hours which is considered a long stay in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and
his subsequent training sponsored by PAL was put to waste when he decides to have an early
retirement from PAL after his training. It would be unfair for PAL if Elegir has gained new skills
for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL has still not even recovered the cost of
training.
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-56168 December 22, 1988
Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. Telosa initiated
a loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a
parcel of land measuring 50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena
experienced financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of Lucian’s shareholders.
It was found out in its investigation that key officers of the bank had certain anomalies or had
resorted to unsound banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and
its creditors.
Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received orders to turn its
non-monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among one of the accounts it decides to
liquidate was the Telosa account in the amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a
demand letter asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes the
bank only Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on the demand received.
Meanwhile Carlos Telosa died in January 13, 1968. The rural bank claiming that the payment
was not fully paid petitioned the foreclosure the Telosa’s land to satisfy the claim. The lot was
then sold to the highest bidder and was consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds on
September 11, 1972. Telosa now pray for the annulment of the land back to them because they
have already paid the loan of Php 300.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the return of the Telosa’s
land.
Ruling:

The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can exercise at any time
the rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank took advantage of the Telosa’s by making a
document that was not the contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard
the particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the
officer of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state can intervene because there has been a
preponderance of proof that the loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue
of the power of the state the bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially settled.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120706 January 31,
2000
Facts:
Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are living in an
apartment being leased to them by Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also resides in the same
compound where the apartment was located. Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying
government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on
a cash or credit basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the condition that after
her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between
her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the brother of the
deceased husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accusing him of having
adulterous relationship with Bing. Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to
Rodrigo’s sick mother, in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent
that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To
make matters worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the doubt of
fidelity and frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed her desire to leave her
husband. Nestor was forced to demand from Rodrigo damages and a public apology.
Issue:

Whether or not Nestor’s right to privacy had been shattered by Rodrigo and is Nestor
entitled to damages.
Ruling:
The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the defendant claims that
there was neither violation done that was enlisted under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil
Code which constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying
into the privacy of another’s residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was form of that
manner. The Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be
exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for
human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of
every county, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated, in short if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed
defective, thus, under this article, the right of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. There is no
question that Nestor suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and
social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous, and insulting
language. Nestor, therefore is entitled to damages.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
PADALHIN vs. LAVINA

G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012
Facts:
Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively. In the course of their stay at Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided
twice. Prior to the raids, BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household
helpers in the ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who
would come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid was conducted
while Lavina and his wife were attending a diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal
Investigation Division Intelligent Office of Kenya took picture of Lavina’s house with the aid of
Lavina’shouse helpers. The second raid again took place when Lavina was not present at the
house, pictures were taken.
Lavina received information from the DFA in Manila that an investigation team was sent
to Kenya to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the Philippine
Embassy in Kenya, own one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin. The
investigating team comprised by Manalo, Ebdalin, and Dizon entered the Lavina residence
without any search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavina alleged that the
team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory tusk. Lavina
subsequently filed before the RTC for damages against the spouses Padalhin, and the 3 members
of the investigation team.

Issue:
Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the petitioners violated
Lavina’s right to privacy.
Ruling:
The Article 26 of the civil code state the instances when a person’s right are disturbed.
There is no doubt that the unwarranted seizures done where against Lavina’s privacy rights. The
act was defended by Padalhin stating that he had no malice or bad faith when he ordered the
search and seizure. The Supreme Court ruled that Nestor’s surreptitious acts negate his allegation
of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept the ivories in his diplomatic residence then, his
behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor
violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one’s residence and he
cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.
Damages are in order against the Padalhins.
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998
Facts:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liability for the
2 , 3 , and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd of 1992 in the total amount of
nd rd
P123,821.52. In a letter dated August 1992, Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax
liabilities stating it has pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid for the years 1989
to 1991 in the amount of P119,977,032.02 plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax
credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities. BIR stated that it was the mistake of its
employees who in investigating tax claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly.
Issue:
Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the non-payment of the taxes
due by Philex.
Ruling:
The BIR being a collector of taxes has the right to demand for due taxes. The non-
payment of Philex cannot be justified by the lapse of duty by the tax collector. The Officer

having a mistake cannot be a reason not to pay because it was in neglect of his duty. Philex
regardless has to pay the taxes. The taxes in the first place could not be subject to legal
compensation because taxes cannot be offset against claims of taxes by the government; the
relationship of the government and its taxpayers is not a debtor-creditor relationship.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL
MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

2001
Facts:
In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal WilfredoAmbrocio decided to catch
shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him
that they should borrow the Ford Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan came
to get Nicolas at the Manantan Technical School.
When they arrived at the farm they had drank beer. At about 12:00 they went home. Then
at about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M., Miguel Tabangin (Defense Witness), Nicolas, and Ambrocio returned
home with a duck. They ate and drank up to 8:00 in the evening. Manantan, soon after, invited
the others to go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and were not able to bowl but rather
decided to go to a night club. They decided to go home after the festivities.
Manantan drove the car. Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat while Nicolas and
Ambrocio sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour
along the middle of the highway because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they met a

jeepney with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid the collision
but was no able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at
the center of the road. The men were brought to the hospital but unfortunately Nicolas died.
Ambrocio suffered minor injuries to his head and legs.
The parents of the deceased filed a criminal case against Manantan but the case was ruled
in favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben
Nicolas now seek for the enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues that
he can be held no longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused.
Ruling:
The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of Manantan was due to
reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper. There exist two types of acquittal, the first
is acquittal because the accused was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the
second is the acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil liability is
extinguished while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one extinguished since civil
liability merely requires preponderance of evidence. The case prospers in pursuance of article 29
of the New Civil Code.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL
NUGUID vs. NICDAO

G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas
PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April
to August thereof, Clarita Nicdao and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked
if they could borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship, Nuguid
lent the Nicdao spouses money.
Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand Pesos until the amount
reached to an aggregate of One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show
good faith in her part, issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the
loan. The checks are to be deposited in Nuguid’s account upon non-payment of the amount
within one year. In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson Ching, demanded payment of the
loan but Nicdao refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the
checks in her account in Ching’s account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to

loan to Nicdao. The checks were all dishonored because of it being drawn against insufficient
funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was to give them chance
to make good on their loan as represented in the checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a
complaint was brought against Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the
Regional Trial Court Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal plus
interest and suffer imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a total of 14 years. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision due to substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial
court. Nuguid now filed for a petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of
the violation of B.P. 22.
b) Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract.
Ruling:
The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme Court that Nicdao
has already made overpayments of the amount due. The acquittal was due to the reason that the
crime was non-existent already since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon.
The criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only to be deposited
upon non-compliance of the payment of the principal debt
Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in the case. It was one of the reasons why the
debt of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are applied first to interest. The interest was
unconscionable. The Court ruled that since the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt
remained in its principal amount. The principal was actually paid in full already as per Article
1956 of the Civil Code.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT
PEOPLE vs. AGACER

G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013
Facts:
The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his
farm in preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis
Delanter, his brother Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting
the palay that Cesario had raised.
Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, came out of
the nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of Cesario. The group of men then
surrounded Cesario and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the
accused started fire on Cesario’s harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops.
While Cesario was trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near Cesario. Eddie did
what was told and pulled out a shotgun from the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario
on the left portion of his chest. As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal

wounds on Cesario. The gang of men then fled the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt
of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brother’s arose upon the final judgment of the
Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for damages was deemed
instituted in the criminal action then their civil liability has also been proven. According to
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Also Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. And the same is
strengthened finally by Article 1161 of the Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising
from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a
person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its
effects, a crime has dual character; First, as an offense against the state because of the
disturbance of the social order, and second as an offense against the private person injured by the
crime.
DEATH AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY
PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June
19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the
accused died. The findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4,
1992.
The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas’ civil liability
arising from the crime. In the Solicitor General’s comment the civil liability hasn’t yet expired.
The solicitor general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of
the accused-appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the

criminal and civil liability shall be extinguished.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the
controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death
extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent
civil action against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as
instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it
follows that the death dissolves both civil and criminal liability.
The Solicitor General’s dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was
contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising from other sources of
obligation other than delicts. It is therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal
liability and civil liability arising from delict only.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
CANCIO vs. ISIP

G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also
known as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was
dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other
two cases of B.P. 22 were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were
then dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.
Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga. After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case.
The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The

court granted the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice
to the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of
the sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases.
Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already
barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal
of the criminal case of estafa.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action
was made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action
was the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner
was seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was
not anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it
is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed
regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL
HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108395 March 7,
1997
Facts:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine
Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez,
along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence,
Guaring died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals
where the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out
that the deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the
court that the civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his
criminal liability necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil

liability aroused from his criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming
that the civil case should pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable
doubt, which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of
the heirs was based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not
quasi-delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal
was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been
held that the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus,
the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur
only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the
proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages of
the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the civil liability of the
accused.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)
ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.

G.R. No. 150256 March 25,
2004
Facts:
Petitioner CatalinoArafiles seeks a review of the CA decision which dismissed his
complaint for damages against respondent’s publisher Philippine Journalists Inc, Manuel
Villareal Jr., Editor Max Buan Jr. and reporter Romy Morales. Respondent Morales wrote a
report that appeared on People’s Journal Tonight, which related how EmelitaDespuig, an
employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NAIS) of PAG-ASA, lodged a

complaint against petitioner, a NAIS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible
abduction with attempted rape and the supposed details of the rape. About a year after the report
was published, Arafiles instituted the complaint for damages, alleging that on account of the
“grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item”, his reputation as a
director of NAIS was injured, that he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he
was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist and that the news deferred his promotion.
Issue:
Whether or not the article published constitute a libelous material, which would make the
editors liable for defamation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the news article is not malicious.In actions for damages for
libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be
examined and viewed as a whole.In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the
whole of the article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire
publication. The headlines of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language
which follows.The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been
in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the
headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of
the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs,
in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified, sufficiently convey to
the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had
reported at the police headquarters.Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name
and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case,
had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press.
The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of
stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently
with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS

G.R. No. 130362 September 10,
2001
Facts:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director
respectively of the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case
against Hernan H. Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as
pesona non grata in his personal announcement after termination of their services. They later
filed a separate civil case for damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as

employer with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.
The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI’s motion to dismiss for respondent’s failure to reserve its
right to institute a separate civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial
Court granted Argos and Pineda’s petition which was later affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary
liability in an independent civil action.
Ruling:
IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable
for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being
sued for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of
defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33
contemplates an action against the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an
action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFI’s petition for dismissal.
RUIZ vs. UCOL

G.R. No.L-454404 August 7,
1987
Facts:
AgustinaTagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an
administrative charge against defendant-appelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center

of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool
used by Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucol’s husband against Ruiz. She
was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the
charges. The said case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol
based on the alleged libelous portions of Ucol’s answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered
judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages. Ucol moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then
granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil
action for damages.
Ruling:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial
court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which
gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action
distinct from the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that
the appeal of Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being
charged by Ruiz to be a harassment suit on the followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do
with the administrative complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucol’s
answer in the administrative case after the administrative case’s dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as
a private prosecutor in the criminal caseactively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was
the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols
by filing a civil action for damages.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO

G.R. No. 141309 June 19,
2007

Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad
valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.
Prior to the effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,”
and “More”, all manufactured by Fortune, as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette
brands were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended
that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property
without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway
contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because
she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter
is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code would
prosper against the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil action under Article
32 of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of
his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. Under Sec. 38,
Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence.
The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general
law, the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has been defined as the commission or omission of
an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in
person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in
quasi-delict is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the offender, and there
are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The

reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged
wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of
good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is
otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact
that defendant acted without evil intent.
COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which
he entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his
horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and
winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings
were being withheld on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government
Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.
The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to
give back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is
already in court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings
since there was no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if
he did not withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained
that bad faith did not attend his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso
stated that he returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner
begs to differ.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional
rights to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article
32 of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in
any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without
due process of law.
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as

arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from
PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the
properties of petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of
moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court
nevertheless states that bad faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. Under the Article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad
faith.To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.
A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued

specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently
no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order
requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due
process.The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued
sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013
Facts:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style
of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito
Ignacio and Peter Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect
Permanent Lights electric meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent
Light, proceeded to check the electric meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors
noticed that the electric meter was tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was
found out that indeed the meter has been tampered with.
Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric
meter. The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered unusually high readings. The
petitioners are now requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more
accurate reading. The respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly
removed without following the required procedure. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents
entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused
its rights when it disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue
of damages to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional
rights of the respondent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the
violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of
Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative
of the Energy Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of
the law or a duly authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that
the meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if
there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832
provides that even if flagrante delicto, there must be still be a written notice or warning to the
owner of the house or the establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court
awards exemplary damages to Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article
32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of damages in cases where the rights of individuals,

including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
BARREDO vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. 48006 July 8, 1942
Facts:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage
thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against
Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually
convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi
and the employer of Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which
provides that negligence of employers in the selection of their employees can be civilly liable.
Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil
suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
Issue:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under
Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within
his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence
and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because
it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him,
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not
being sued for damages arising from a criminal act, but rather for his own negligence in selecting
his employee under Article 1903.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO

G.R. No. 165732 December 14,
2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a
specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the
bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing
her death.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may
be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not
the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of
regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance
of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.

CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC

1999
Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted
and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig
passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig
City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15,
1997.Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to
suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC
on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta
called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the
proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case.
Hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall
have been finally decided by the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial
questions and that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a
boundary dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must
first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.While
it may be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and
does not come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very
well suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked

to the first.
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily
becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such
issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility.
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage
and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of
psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on
concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial
question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues.
Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal
action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage
other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent
courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for
all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being
prosecuted for concubinage.

MERCED vs. DIEZ

G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging
that he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by
Elizabeth’s relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that
petitioner has been previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the
suspension of the criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent
marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence
of the first marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto
of the contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would
be illegal and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action
for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not
lie unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first
be secured.

DONATO vs. LUNA

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
Facts:
An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner
married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz
Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion
to suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his
second marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case of bigamy.
Ruling:
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of
petitioner’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit
was filed by Paz Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to marriage was obtained
through duress, violence or intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the
issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that
prior to petitioner’s second marriage he had been living with private respondent as husband and
wife for more than five years. He only came up with the story that his consent to the marriage
was secured through force, threat and intimidation one year from the solemnization of the second
marriage.

TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Less than a year
after, petitioner told Leticia that he has been previously married and that he is leaving to live
with his first wife, Hilda Villareyes. On January25, 1993 petitioner contracted yet another
marriage with Nilda Villegas. Ancajas learned of this third marriage she verified if the petitioner
is truly married to Hilda, to which it was affirmative. She then filed a criminal complaint of
bigamy against herein petitioner. His marriage to Ancajas however was subsequently nullified on
ground of psychological incapacity while the criminal complaint was pending. He now raises the
defense that the bigamy is not committed in lieu of the nullity of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity bars the prosecution of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void;
the nullity of the second marriage is not per se an argument for avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. The declaration of nullity is absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is
null and void purely because it is a second marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and
void on ground of psychological incapacity. Although the judicial declaration for nullity of
marriage retroacts to the date of the celebration of marriage insofar as the vinculum between the

spouses is concerned, the marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is the
liability of incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No . L-16439 July 20, 1961
Facts:
Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married Nita got pregnant to
which she had got an abortion from private respondent Oscar Lazo. After Nita’s marriage with
plaintiff, she again became pregnant but due to her work priorities, she again had again had
abortion with the same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now sues
an award for damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not know of, nor gave his
consent to the abortions. He is suing for damages for the unborn child.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child.
Ruling:
No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received; no such action could derivatively accrue to its parents. No transmission of
rights can take place from on due to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code
limits the application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive. However, moral damages could be awarded for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant

to is lost, and the disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such
case. It is clear that the husband is only intent on recovering money from the doctor.
CATALAN vs. BASA

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007
Facts:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological
incapacity of schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September
1949. On June 1951 he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December
1953 Feliciano was declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold
the properties to herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed an
action or declaration of nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging
that the donation to Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected
the donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano’s donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.
Ruling:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However
the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof

to this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the
property in question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still
be presumed capable of attending to his rights.
DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001
Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to spouses Felipe
and Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who claim to
be her closest surviving relatives allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim
that the sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void.
Ruling:
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of
advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person is not
incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities.
However when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the
person from properly , intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she is

undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony shows that at the time of the execution of
the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste
and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that
she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land.
MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002
Facts:
Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said respective titles
caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They ultimately trace
their ownership to a deed of sale executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning
the deed of sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the execution of
the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the seller.
Ruling:
The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true
state of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. It has
been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by
reason of physical infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental faculties to such
extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently and fairly protecting her property rights is

she considered incapacitated. Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time
of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083 July 10, 1993
Facts:
Petitioners are all minor duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The
minors further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
They seek to cancel all existing timber license agreements and restrain the Secretary of DENR
from issuing anymore TLAs in the protection of our forest reserves and nature in general.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing and capacity to sue.
Ruling:
Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. The court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for other of their
generations and for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality in behalf of the

succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
KINDS OF DOMICILE
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte. Private respondent who was then the incumbent representative filed a petition for the
cancellation and disqualification alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.
Ruling:
Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place and 2) animus manendi or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence
implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a

person in a given area. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an
individual to have different residences but have only one domicile. These concepts however have
evolved in political law to be used synonymously. When the Constitution however speaks of
residence in election law, it actually means only domicile. An individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Based on the
evidence, petitioner clearly only had numerous residences, but maintained her domicile to be in
Leyte.
ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
Facts:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of this were born two
children. Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death private respondents filed a case for
declaration of acknowledgement as illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such
action interposing that under the Family code the method by which respondents can prove their
filiation has already prescribed, that his while the putative parent is alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

Ruling:
Respondents are establishing their filiation by “open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child” under the Civil Code which provides for four years before the
attainment of age of majority. The Family Code on the other hand provides that such manner of
establishing filiation can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code
cannot be applied in the case. Retroactive application cannot be applied if a vested right is
impaired or prejudiced in the process. The right of action of the minor child for recognition has
been vested by the filing of complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior
effectively of the Family Code.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The
son was born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in
behalf of Adrian filed a complaint for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son
of Fiscal Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are challenging the
petition on grounds that the action has prescribed on ground that the Family code has retroactive
application and hence, the manner of proving filiation by “open and continuous possession of a
status of a legitimate child” must have been brought within the lifetime of the putative parent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.
Ruling:
The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code
has already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is one which
is absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Certainly the retroactive
effect of the family code finds no application in this case.

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA

G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On
December 1992, respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children.
On January 1994, petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the
parties executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a
declaration of nullity of his marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner was never served the summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in
default and the marriage declared void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification
of the decision declaring the marriage void on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.
Ruling:
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her,
hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment
or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is
expressly stated that there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal
separation. The court just did the opposite as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law.
Our Constitution is committed to the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The motion for a new trial is granted.

ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge.
Respondent stands charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming
of a Judge. It is alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan
during the existence of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage
contract with Priscilla. He also caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as
legitimate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited
with said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It
makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not
only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public
is deeply interested. Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing
matrimony. Respondent Judge is dismissed from service.

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without
descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are
their respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa
consist of her half and full-blood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo’s side, his sisters, nephews
and nieces, illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of
administration stated that Guillermo and Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate
claimants are her natural siblings. Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with
five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon
Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa’s estate. If Luis Delgado is the
legitimate child of Felisa she is barred from inheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between
Felisa and Ramon.
Ruling:
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years
cannot be doubted. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of
marriage arises other evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued
to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration
under oath of Guilermo that he was married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of
marriage. Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors
and evidence presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence
Luis Delgado can inherit from Josefa.

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
Facts:
Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that their sister,
Vitaliana, was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by herein
petitioner in his residence in Misamis Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died
and petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot be the
subject of habeas corpus proceedings. As her common law husband, petitioner now claims
custody over Vitaliana’s body.
Issue:
Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitaliana’s body instead of
the immediate relatives.
Ruling:
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for years as husband and wife may be considered legally mauled in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship
produces a community of property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying
Vitaliana. Custody of the dead body must be awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code.

BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 83598 March, 7, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died
intestate. They had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their parents.
Private respondents on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and
as such are entitled to inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino
did not marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalino was
successfully overcome.
Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by cogent
proof of which the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place. Private
respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina were married and that
their children were recognized as legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of
marriage because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a
matter of constitutional concern.

LEGAL CAPACITY
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation culminating with sex reassignment surgery in
Thailand. From then on, petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to
have his name in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to female.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth certificate.
Ruling:
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
However a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not
sanction such change of name under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment. A person’s sex is an essential requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow
the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment.

LEGAL CAPACITY
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female in the birth
certificate. While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that
continued to develop and be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as a male person. He
now seeks to alter his name of Jennifer to Jeff.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.
Ruling:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy. The court is of the
view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. The petition is granted.

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
BESO vs. DAGUMAN

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 January 28, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent
Judge. After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her
to check with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found
out that the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against
herein respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.
Ruling:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the
court jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of
Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize
the marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.
AUTHORITY OF A SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO

A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
Facts:
On 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner’s marriage to her late
groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the
“vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with
lack of marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act
of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and

COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746 August 28, 2007
Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner)
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person “fixer” who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.
Aquilino Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained
in Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never
went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and
respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in
Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license
number “7054133” is not identical with the marriage license number which appears in their
marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent against herein petitioner before the
MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.
Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family
Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
In the case at bar, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil registrar specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a
license was issued to the parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior
to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do
not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to
annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect
its validity but the parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally,
administratively liable.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal civil registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties is
No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said
marriage license to the parties.
The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony
will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not
duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued
by the local civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and
regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their
civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.COURT OF APPEALS and

ANGELINA M. CASTRO
GR No. 103047 September 2,
1994
Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she
was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with
the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a
declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization
of their marriage?
Rulings:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the
Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the
office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the
testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition
because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with
notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs.SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

GR No. 132529 February 2,
2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two
children. And the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In
November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent
for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the
one hundred forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that
they have no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño
who allegedly married in the said municipality on June 20, 1969.
Issue:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño
are valid in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits?
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil
registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data to the issuance of a marriage license.
Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt
from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The
fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40
of Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by
the provisions of articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent,
not being the legal wife is not one of them. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits”
were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-
ownership, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in
the present case; both parties of the first marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of
the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his
legal heirs, namely, his children.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
FILIPINA SYvs.COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 127263 April 12,
2000
Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22
years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left
their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in
the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation
before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation
of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving
a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4,
1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for
lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage
license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her
petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?
Ruling:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The
marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona,
Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona.
From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after
the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there
being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The
marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining
issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the
marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time of celebration.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces
of the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced
to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date,
the father of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its
Decision dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for
lack of the requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?
Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in
issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of

Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the
logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said
logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is
of great weight.
Therefore, the instant petition is denied.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in
the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon,
he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that
he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license
was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus
their marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of
the RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?
Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license
for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot
be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be
applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
The petition is therefore granted.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8,
2001
Facts:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.” For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with

theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00.
ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47
of the Family Code.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of a
Marriage license?
b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father’s marriage void after his death?
Ruling:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In
this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment is
legitimate.
JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
Facts:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on
October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received;
(5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple expedient
of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is
alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents
for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee
of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to
account for the difference. Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of
court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado,
Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy
reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent
Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent
judge. Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said
fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the
complaints charged?
Ruling:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should
be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a
virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to
the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided
for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the
formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.

Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school
year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984,
LucioMorigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant
to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia
filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the
court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992,
appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused’s
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October
19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision
finding Lucio Morigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23,
1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void
ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this
decision, which then became final and executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC
decision on the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus
held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that
there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of
bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears
no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was
not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence
and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE

A.M. No. MJT-94-963 July 14, 1995
Facts:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge
Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the
Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage
contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She
claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
In his comment,Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo

Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.The Respondent
Judge contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate
the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to
help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to
her pregnant condition. In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to
perform the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was
definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without
a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance
of the law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he
solemnized the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required
marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at
most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good
intentions could never justify violation of the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 and is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY

A.M. No. MJT-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
FlorianoDadorSumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October
27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint

respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack
of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts,
are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much
to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on
a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office
of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union
and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
Facts:
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue
of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on
the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil. During the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate
as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the
marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed
the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in
favor of Pedro Pilapil and against TomasaGuison. Such decision was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid?
b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the
marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the
assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
On the second issue some considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The
alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya
declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open
court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted
that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the
questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no
indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that
Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records
Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,
issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob.
Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. The
burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church,
Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely
a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged
in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.
On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision
affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
applicable to the case at bar?
Ruling:
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business
in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that
his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that
she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100
San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving
heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of
the Province of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998
Issues:
a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case
b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At
that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then
seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of
the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint
labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the divorce between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee.
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TINOL STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
Facts:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went
to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did
not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial
court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a
similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. In its
October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of
the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her
to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. The petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF
GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May
18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a
Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared
as "single" and "Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in

the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had
ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the
quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
(a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d)
Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information
of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;and (e)
Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for respondent:
(Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995. Based on the records, the Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring
him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at
the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The case is thus
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December
1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's)
bed. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of
assets and liabilities.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that
the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and
Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the
parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on
June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent
17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his
first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while
the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. Respondent made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children. Respondent
passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. It is
evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by
his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties
and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the judiciary.
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a
divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage
with petitioner herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines.Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for
her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The
two cases were subsequently consolidated.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took
note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan
City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner.
On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition
for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. The CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.Hence, this
Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes
a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early
as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.
FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the
estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan,
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the
petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in
favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced
by Higino Castillon. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution.
The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. On November 27,
1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except
Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of
birth. Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned
records of birth that she and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly
void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one
of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and
admissions of the parties?
Ruling:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in
her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court
modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of
Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court
should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is denied.
VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner which was confirmed by
Villareyes.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. On November 10,
1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Court a quo convicting
petitioner of the crime of bigamy despite non-existence of the first marriage and
insufficiency of evidence.
b) Whether or not the Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy
despite the clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant
had been declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Court held that after a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. All three of these
documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. The documents issued by the National Statistics Office
merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. The marriage
contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering
that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted
to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. As such, this Court
rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. The State’s
penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly
done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the
Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37and 38may contract
marriage.As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present
in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting.
The act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a
church wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant
Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court. On appeal to
the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975
marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering their
decision.
Ruling:
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage
to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction,
was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise
doomed to fail.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides
that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian purposes, and
considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment to
be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which,
petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty
imposed by the lower courts.
Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment

from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO

A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children,
filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived
her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as
a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and
that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he
succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was
void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions. After hearing during which both complainant and respondent took the witness stand,
the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation that the said respondent
is suspended for three months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of
the profession.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross misconduct.
Ruling:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course,then the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also
exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear
preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then
liability attaches.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two
marriages and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to
the finding of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a
third marriage.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and

family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development
of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening
of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral
character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly
immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked
for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at
our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband
Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to
prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code),
and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when
she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
The petition is dismissed.
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO.

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On
January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V.
Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa,
Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. On May
14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage,
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against
respondent.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her
marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element
of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that
since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order dismissing the case.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among
others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere
declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in
contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against
respondent.
Ruling:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy. The elements of the
crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio
in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had
not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of
bigamy were alleged in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled
in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy,
since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The petition is granted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
Facts:
Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until
they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother
informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to
leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he
and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and
void.The trial court granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his
absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provision of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-
General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing
wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.In the case at
bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt
to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or
well-founded belief that she was already dead. The Court also views respondent's claim that
Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be
said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims
were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired
from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends
in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this
evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a
judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an
ordinary contract. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court
order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia
(Lea) A. Julaton. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by
the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening
and he berated her for being always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for
work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day,
Lea was nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.Sometime in
June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after
the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find
out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time
taxi driver. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor
General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered
judgment granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing
of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in
truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of
their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light
on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the
respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the
RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and

LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On
February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had
been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C.
Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where
Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their
quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita
stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio
met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera.
Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death
on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado
Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito,
who lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they
were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of
sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued
in his name, Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of
sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by
virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on
January 11, 1985. Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. On May
28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI
Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States
with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to
look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of
the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of
Aurelio transferred from the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later
to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for the funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout
Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting
but efforts to settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any
event it was
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property
to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the
property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented
himself to be single. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their
motion. On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in
dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not Aurelio’s marriage to respondent Luisita is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court finds that the
presumption of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita has not been
successfully assailed by appellee. Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelio's marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They
failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. What applies in this case, therefore,
is the general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his
subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.Consequently, there is
no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of
Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. In the
second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute saleexecuted with all the
solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due
course in her name.Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was error for the Court of
Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew
respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew
Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far
as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife.
There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in
good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos
in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in
Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer
Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance,
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry
Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared
in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However,
starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice
a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap
her.Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he
stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and
humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their
own vows.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision
of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390
of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is
to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.The phrase "or before the
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law
were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption
of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like
annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage
without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of
good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of judicial declaration is
also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society
require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance
only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of
the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A
civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones;
it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State
touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the
parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means
calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or
of the presumptive death of the absent spouseafter the lapse of the period provided for under the
law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent
marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and
decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the
children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from
her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications
with him, or with any of his relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her
husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition,
rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of
Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure, denied the Republic’s appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC
decision.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final
and executory judgment of the Regional Trial Court
b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code were established in this case.
Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title
XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases
covered by these rules. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express

provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The Republic of the Philippines, as
oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It
had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records
straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s
decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due
course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have
dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of
lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was
immediately final and executory.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to
dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by
express provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land
with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent
Marietta Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven
years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that
James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of

Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown,
for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico.
Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of
the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the
intestate estate of Teodorico. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in
favor of petitioner Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is
valid, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
Ruling:
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she
entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second
marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed
valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James
Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its
dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal
portions — one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the
deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of
the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by
right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right
of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and
nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and
nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are
incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their
own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased
brother.
It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely
to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
Facts:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada
(Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were
then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their
marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.Sometime in May
1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication
from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked
the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of
waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. On 7 February
2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA ruled
that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding.
Issues:
a) Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision
of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal.
b) Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the
evidence that respondent presented.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the CA ruling with regard to the first issue.Clearly, a petition
for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided
for" under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code
provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court
proceedings in the Family Code/By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows
that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in
the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if
the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence
that respondent had presented. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law."
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among
others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as
evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036
issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela
Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January
23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real
and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that
he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-
in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to
administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover
certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals
disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation
of their properties."
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first
marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible
error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said
house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening
the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter,
respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he
has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing
of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which
was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although
he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a
valid marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage
license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a
license.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of an immoral and illegal act by cohabiting with De
Castro.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution
of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five
children. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister
motives and bad faith. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness
for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a

Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and
continued when he was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no
duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are
judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their
marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the
house of defendant's mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they
can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But,
they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited
by the defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking
a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag,
a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical
examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married
her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as
void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have
sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit.The case has reached this
Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there
is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten
months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem,
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA

ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the
two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents
at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy,
and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's
parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January
1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance
to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to
locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage
was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
Issue:
Whether or not Leouel’s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding
to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis
(G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be
the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of
incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by
normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but
that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be

reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still
indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly
the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still
hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
The petition is denied.
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married and three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the
Regional Trial Court, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on
the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent, after
they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while
having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner
prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to
their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the
custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located
in Cavite.
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on
the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:"Psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article
46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate
nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
even finality.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective
support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These
matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December
21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood,
petitioner filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be
declared null and void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and
recrimination because of the respondent’s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family
business, refusal to change children’s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her
Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and
sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who
concluded that the respondent suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On February 9,
2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence, this petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the respondent’s
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Ruling:
No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations,
this case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled
under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested
mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes
unaware of his marital and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged
according to:
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the
performance of marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as:
(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage:
the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough patches. In
this case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s exacting standards but
they have gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without
any major parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically
abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo
Molina at the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named
Albert Andre Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of
“immaturity and irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his
friends and peers on whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, ;and he was never honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to
frequent quarrels between the petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel the sole breadwinner.
On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel
moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and
left Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of
friends eve after their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like
cooking meals, and Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May,
1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological
incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons. Essentially, it must be shown that they are incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get
along or are incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the
psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:

(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration”
of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.
BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003
Facts:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married
at Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon
City and begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all
day. During a family crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness
of a child, the petitioner would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her
pregnancy, she would insist the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal
dwelling. The husband would eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become
estranged from each other.
On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On
July 21, 1995, respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to
state a cause of action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state
the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status.
On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred
resolution of the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing
Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself.
According to Judge Pison, a perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner
has violated respondent’s right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected
petitioner’s claim that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when respondent
filed the second petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed without
prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court’s decision that the
allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if
proven true as well as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
49 in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its
termination and status.
Ruling:
Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner
in violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert
opinions need not be alleged, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –

x x x.
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the
dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice”.
TONGOL vs. TONGOL

G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007
Facts:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol
were married. From their marriage they begot four children.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas’ marriage was objected by the latter’s
family. The continuous interference of Filipinas’ parents, their attempts to break up their union
and their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of
Filipinas’ parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop
business, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk
shop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business
venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and began to
interfere with the operation of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof.
She also resented that her husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the
subject of their frequent and continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the
income of his business to his relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their
children.
Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless;
however, this was the fault of Orlando’s psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to
live separately from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for
dissolution of their conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister’s, his employee’s, and Dr.
Cecilia Villegas’ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the
respondent only consisted of her testimony.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or
“neglect”. Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be
grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third,
there was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological
incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage
obligations must correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support
for the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the spouse’s obligation to the
spouse but also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in
the rearing and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although,
the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that,
indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.
MARCOS vs. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was
on September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage
held at the Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park,
Manila. They were both military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military
service in 1987 and started a business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she
was able to put up a trading and construction company.Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the
petitioner’s urges on respondent to be gainfully employed to convince their children that their
father, as the breadwinner, is the head of the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson’s
failure to provide for his family, he began beating the children for slight mistakes and forcibly
having sex with his already weary wife. The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on
October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. Wilson became
violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her mother. The following day, Brenda and her
children sought refuge at her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she was diagnosed with
contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial Court’s ruling.
Issues:
a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the
declaration of psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be “medically or
clinically identified”. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary.
No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological
incapacity. The evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on
psychological incapacity. The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent’s loss of
employment for a period of more than six years. It was from this that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support and leave the family home. Therefore, his
psychological incapacity can be traced to this certain period and not before the marriage nor
during the inception of the marriage. Equally important, the condition was not proven to be
incurable, especially now that he is again gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to
court Rowena after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst
towards their families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward
eventually gave in to Rowena’s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000
pension. He provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their
house accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month.
After Edward proceeded to his parents’ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening
him that she would commit suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25
years old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward was being
treated like a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they
could live independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that
Edward go home else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house
of Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she
called. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence
that they live together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his
marriage with Rowena on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore,
recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the
Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
given the petitioner’s totality of evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological
assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality
disorder and Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial
Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent
personality disorder, he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions, tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing
things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowena’s affliction with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner
with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April
23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate
court.
AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR

G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010
Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at
a beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau
of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner’s family was
apprehensive because of the nature of the respondent’s work and that she came from a broken
family. They begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial
Court a petition of the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was
carefree, irresponsible immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like
cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an
affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to
bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also
claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became “very close” to
a male tenant in their house, discovered their love notes, and even caught them inside his room
several times. Respondent denied that she engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it
was Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have
their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda
Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he
died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between parties. On
November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his evidence
ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified
true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L.
Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate
Court, however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court’s decision on the grounds that
the psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave
and permanent.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner’s testimony established “difficulty”, “refusal”, and “neglect”.
However, it did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Moreover, Dr. Patac’s psychological report only enumerated the respondent’s
behavioral defects but failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological
incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not
physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.
These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In
Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting,
and Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of
used as a strict criteria or “straightjacket”.
MARABLE vs. MARABLE

G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011
Facts:
In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still
classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they
happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner
courted the respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love,
time and attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two
eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This
was followed by a church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prison. They begot five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from several schools because of
juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace,
love and affection from a relationship with another woman. Myrna eventually found out about
the affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed. Rosalino felt unloved,
unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward the respondent; left the conjugal home;
gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001,
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent on grounds of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his family background from a poor family
and his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for attention and
strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of the void in his
relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The
Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals
reversed the said decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayag’s psychological report merely made a general conclusion
that the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina
Doctrine. Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant,
rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act
responsibly during the marriage by working hard to provide for his family especially his
children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear that his family background was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when, actually, he was simply dissatisfied with
his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his extra-marital affairs and has
immediately terminated them.
In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearingdoes

not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.It must be
shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.That not being the
case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
AURELIO vs. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
Facts:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon
Aurelio were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment
revealed that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features
as seen from her quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence, intolerance, and inability to
delay her needs. On the part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he
suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of
drive to discern the plight of his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife,
arrogance and insensitivity toward his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible,
and incurable. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003,
the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision denying the motion. On February 21, 2003,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and found that respondent’s petition for declaration
for nullity of marriage complied with the Molina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend
upon the proofs presented in trial. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the Regional Trial
Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. On October 6, 2005, Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with
the standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in
the Molina Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness,
and (c) non-compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The root cause being their family
backgrounds, as determined by a competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition
establishes that the respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the
Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not complied with. Petition for
dismissal is denied.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March
16, 1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were
not blessed with children due to Catalina’s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April
6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that
Catalina’s psychological incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his
consent; engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take
care of their adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their
conjugal home to live with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L.
Reyes revealed that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not
curable. These manifested through her immaturity that rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the
petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac,
Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issues:
Ruling:
No. First, Catalina’s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore,
was not established. Eduardo’s testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes’ neuro-psychiatric
evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr.
Reyes merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and
childishness could no longer be treated due to Catalina’s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly,
Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity
which would have been achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo’s statements
but also with interviews by other persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or
supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her
basic marital functions. In this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or
standards to dispute psychological incapacity.
REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2009
Facts:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and
Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June
12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair
with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children
and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar
filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage
based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an
associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated
and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the
trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the
family home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda
Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not
suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from
one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies
her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding
sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The CA originally set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality
disorder/psychological illness. In its amended decision,the CA found two circumstances
indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1)
Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful
and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling. OSG filed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he
merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling.Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do
not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s
allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.
Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers does not
suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time
element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from
their marital counterparts. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad
signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization
unsupported by facts.

MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C. Mendoza met in 1989
upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-
door neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while in college – she, at Assumption College
while he, at San Beda taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they
became intimate which led to the pregnancy with their Daughter Alyssa Blanca. They got
married when she was eight months into her pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City,
June 24, 1991, after which they moved to her place, remaining dependent on their parents for
support.
Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished
college in October 1993. She took on various jobs, being the one with the fixed income, she
shouldered all of the family’s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational
needs). In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, Dominic’s co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they
started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present and
later asked her to issue two blank checks for the car’s insurance coverage, only to find out that
the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she
also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay
part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother
bailed him out of jail, but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were
even threatening her, her mother and her sister.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because Arabelle asked
him for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at
reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family
immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the
nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC,
petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson,
and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no
evidence. On August 18, 2000, the RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity –
gravity, antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the marriage between
petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed
decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.
Issue:
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and uncorroborated because
only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a need to verify her
findings concerning Dominic’s psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle’s ill-
feelings toward him during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets the guidelines for
psychological incapacity as characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." These guidelines do not necessarily require the root cause to be “medically or
clinically identified” by a physician or a psychologist. What is important is that totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Finally, petitioner
contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no
longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly requires the OSG to actively
participate in all stages of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.
REPUBLIC vs. GALANG

G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011
Facts:
On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy married in Pampanga. They lived
in Nestor’s father’s house in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-
illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed at
home as a housewife. Christopher is their only child.
On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy
was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she
was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondent’s testimony showed that Juvy: (a) refused to
wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she
went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent
entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondent’s ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money
deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondent’s signature in order to encash a check; (f)
made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in
gambling.According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity,
distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection towards him and their child.” He
posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be
incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he
found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order
of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate his allegations.
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a
psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According
to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.
On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties’ marriage. On November 25, 2004,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy’s indolence and lack of
responsibility coupled with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with
her marital obligations. The testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S. Guiang characterized Juvy’s
condition as permanent, incurable and existing at the time of celebration of her marriage with
respondent.
Issue:
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts.
Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or
she must be shown to be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married
person because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown. The psychological test was
uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore, biased towards Juvy’s negative traits. First, the
psychologist did not identify the types of psychological tests to determine the root cause of
Juvy’s psychological condition. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of
Juvy’s condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove incurability. The psychologist’s testimony
was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and associations, how she
acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality
developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological
condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
OCHOSA vs. ALANO

G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011
Facts:
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 – he, a young
lieutenant in the AFP; she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind
romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before
the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property.
Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they
found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their
daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to
stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in
one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security
Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City where they resided with their military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with
rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp
Crame.
Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the
country, Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male visitors in her bedroom
whenever Jose was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was
caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal
Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose
could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted
Bona.During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also
made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left
with Ramona and went to Basilan.In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is
Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his
marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage.In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition
and nullified the parties’ marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal,
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her “defects” (sexual disloyalty with Jose,
sexual promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of “juridical antecedence.” Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated Bona’s
psychological condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly from the information
gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that
the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of
sufficient corroboration. It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to
Jose’s assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and
was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when
Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it
was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later
incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict
areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by
the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following
decade. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after
her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
CAMACHO-REYES vs. REYES

G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University
of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. Petitioner
and respondent got marriedon December 5, 1976. At that time, petitioner was already five (5)
months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.Thereafter, they lived with
the Ramon’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by Ramon’s
parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.
Financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance
ofP1,500.00 from respondent stopped because Ramon resigned from his family’s
business. Because of this, Ramon engaged into (1) a fishpond business in Mindoro and
eventually, (2) a scrap paper and carton trading business which both failed..To prod respondent
into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-
laws. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with Maria Socorro’s mother where petitioner continued to carry the financial burdens
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital

affair. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical
operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he
accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room.
As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene,
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited, sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a
psychological assessment; however, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical
psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner, with the
knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. With the de
facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with
his children.
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA
reversed and set aside RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other
person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr.
Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno and Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically
constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical psychologists’
and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the
petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-
law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and
interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan’s
recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding
that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the
respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have
problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and
work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance
abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity
of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder
does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the
parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, however, even without the
experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
TORING vs. TORING

G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunt’s
house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting
lessons at his aunt’s house. They became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped
soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry
her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of
the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric
Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition
for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage
contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr.
Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies.
Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer – that she was very
extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he
regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s
tuition. However, not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she
also she incurred debts from other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of
a plasticware and cosmetics company. Also, during one of his visits to the country, he noticed
that Teresita’s stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical
examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his
worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of
sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”; other than these, no other
sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a
month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented
herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around.
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with
Ruling:
No. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson’s
testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the
results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related
to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have
been expected to know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely
recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations
during the marriage described as “refusal”, “difficulty” or “neglect”.

LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG

G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2012
Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four
children. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her
excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to
have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for
her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of
May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day
and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby
apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for
him. They then lived separately. Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for
psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated
to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young
and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October
22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC decision.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
jurisdiction.
(b) Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that
the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition
deserves outright dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in
jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. These
were not proven in the close scrutiny of the records.
No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3)
the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4)
such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5)
such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature
fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. An
adulterous life is not tantamount to psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36.
Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.
SUAZO vs. SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with
Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and
Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn
and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony
officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s
parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs
and worked for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to
work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels
often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman
with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their
relationship, she alleged in her complaint that from the start of their marriage until their
separation in July 1987, their relationship has been marred with bitter quarrels that caused
unbearable physical and emotional pain inflicted upon by Angelito; that one of the main reasons
for their quarrels was Angelito’s refusal to work, his indolence and excessive drinking; and that
Angelito’s psychological incapacity started at the time of their marriage and proves to be
continuous, permanent and incurable.
In the RTC, Jocelyn reiterated the incidents of her physical beating by Angelito but told
the Court that she was not treated violently before the marriage. Maryjane Serrano, Jocelyn’s
aunt, corroborated Jocelyn’s testimony. The psychologist testified that Angelito haed Chronic
Antisocial Disorder which was permanent and incurable. The RTC annulled the marriage on the
grounds provided by Santos v. Court of Appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
Ruling:
No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively
show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. The
psychologist derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for
her cause cannot of course be doubted. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from
him – all of which occurred after the marriage.
Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at
the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings
after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not
clarify when these beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration
of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects
her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must
exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal
to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. Standing alone, physical violence does not constitute psychological
incapacity.
ASPILLAGA vs. ASPILLAGA

G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students
at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines,
respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five months later, they became
sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and
language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They

begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was “tumultuous.” He described Aurora
as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained
that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family
decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to
nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case
(concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7,
1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket
to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three
months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan,
Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his
concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration
of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal
home to live with Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.
Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both parties suffered
psychological handicaps traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict,
domineering, disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual
relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage.
RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set aside the
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity is not mere “difficulty”, “refusal”, or “neglect”.
Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a
blissful marital union for several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony
in church rites in 1983, showing love and contentment with one another after a year of
marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the
harmonious relationship of the couple continued during their marriage for about eight years from
the time they married each other.
From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their
obligations to each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her
children and remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales
activities to augment the family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled
a lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfo’s acts of infidelity were
discovered that the marriage started to fail. While disagreements on money matters would, no
doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is
not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. At this juncture while this Court is convinced
that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is
nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void
due to psychological incapacity. Incurability was not proven. Incompatibility or irreconcilable
differences could not be equated with psychological incapacity.
ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at
the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds
went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture
shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by
letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a
year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent
was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in
the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went
to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There
was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan),
and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the
respondent to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioner’s complaint for
annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Ruling:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground
ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the spouses to
perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless,
Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her
and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their
wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a
half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since
leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s
psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on
information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was
hardly impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Rey’s experiences in childhood, did not
describe the “pattern of behavior” that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him “truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.
NAJERA vs. NAJERA

G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for
Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner
alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31,
1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial conference after the parties
signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina
Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at
their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part,
and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
HALILI vs. SANTOS- HALILI

G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After
the wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but
maintained their relationship nonetheless.Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City a petition for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. He also pointed out that
they never lived together as husband and wife and they never consummated their marriage. On
April 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court declared thatthe marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is null and void. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, on January 26,
2004. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court on
the ground that totality of the evidence presented failed to established petitioner's psychological
incapacity. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for reconsideration. On June 9,
2009, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that the petitioner
suffered from psychological incapacitywhich effectively prevented him to comply from his
Ruling:
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that petitioner had
psychological condition that was grave andincurable and had a deeply rooted cause and that
already existed at the time of the celebration of his marriage to the respondent.
PARAS vs. PARAS

G.R. No 147824 August 2, 2007
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased),
Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the
Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of
the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos
University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in
1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one
of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose
was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their
son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not
heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the
rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United
States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her
return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt
and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the
municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act of
maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file
the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose, obviously
named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that

he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a
sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the
United States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of
Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s education.
At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides,
their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that
there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What
caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was
further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her
boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity
of the marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the
present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards
required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects
oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s
factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present
case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she
argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case;
b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root
cause of Justo’s alleged psychologicalincapacity is necessary; and
c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
Ruling:
A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel
aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her charges "are true," but concluded
that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family
home are true,such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband
and father. However, by themselves, these grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage void
due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do notmanifest
that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge
as a married person. Whilethey may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological
incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while hisacts violated the
covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless
state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of
marriage in the future.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacitymust be
psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince thecourt that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of suchincapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, neverthelesssuch root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may begiven by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
ZAMORA vs. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their
marriage, they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce
any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as anurse. She returned
to the Philippines for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic
visits to Cebu Cityuntil 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on thealleged "psychological incapacity" of
private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his
position,he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as
evidenced by the fact that she had not bornepetitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that
private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact become an
American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than three
years. Respondentdenied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves
children as she is a nurse by profession and that shewould from time to time borrow her
husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup
of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with
different women, and he begot at leastthree children with them. On June 22, 1995, the trial court
rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented to defendant’s trip to theUnited States in 1974. She
[defendant] wanted to earn money there because she wanted to help her husband build a big
house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted that he has a child, and the
court is also convinced that he has two children.However, nothing in the evidence of plaintiff
shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed tocomply
with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological incapacity on the
part of defendant so that shecould not carry out the ordinary duties required in married life.
Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting
the result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if
evidence in this case already showsthe psychological incapacity of private respondent;
c) Whether or not private respondent’s refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for
more than twenty (20) years, her refusalto bear children with petitioner, and her living a
solitary life in the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications
of psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons withexpertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable todetermine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a
child;and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both partieswere psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Facts:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively
short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix.
Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began
when Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the
calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his
so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger,
temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be
a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix’s “leaving-the-house”
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family.
Issue:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?
Ruling:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to aserious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the rootcause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.Quite apart from being plainly
self-serving, petitioner’s evidence showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-
called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent
and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple’s relationship before the marriage
and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that
relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company
of respondent.
Infact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband.

Their problems began when petitionerstarted doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when
they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began towithdraw into his shell
and corner, and failed to perform his so- called marital obligations. Respondent could not
understandpetitioner’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to heranger, temper and jealousy.At any rate, Dr. Dayan
did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." Notably, when asked as to
the root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague,
evasive andinconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing"
She stated that there was a history of respondent’s parents having difficulties in their
relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent’sparents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disablingfactor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent’s character that effectively incapacitated him fromaccepting, and, thereby complying
with, the essential marital obligations. We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder,
the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violenttendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend moretime with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however isnot always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not anull and void
marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of
the family; it decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be"protected" by the state. Petition
dismissed with finality.
ANTONIO vs. REYES

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent
church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child,
which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in
August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.
Ruling:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and
extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his
wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to
invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity
have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity
of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate
pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust
and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile
with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO

G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004
Facts:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not
produce children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a
petition to the court seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological
incapacity exhibited through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and
humiliation. The lower court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision
relying on the doctor’s findings that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.

Issue:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated
sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuel’s relationship with another was caused merely by
his sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This
action caused by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the
doctor failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is
necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to
perform his marital obligations. With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions
constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital
obligations and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show
sufficiently that the couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it
showed that they were merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and
wanting to get out of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void
VILLALON vs. VILLALON

G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005
Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor,
petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his
marriage.On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answerdenying petitioner’s allegations.
She asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been “fruitful and characterized by joy,
contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship” and that their marital squabbles
were normal based on community standards. Petitioner’s success in his professional life aided
him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that
petitioner’s commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with “Casanova
Complex”. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as “a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
interpersonal and occupational functioning” with main symptoms of “grand ideation about
oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I
personality.” A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his
emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with
“Casanova Complex” exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to
another.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision which was
denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the grounds of psychological
incapacity of the husband.
Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is
the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to
their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he
engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history. The petition has no
merit.
BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
Facts:
July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court
in its decision declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab
initio. The court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property;
ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject
to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the
Court of Appeals, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants
like to P20, 000. The Court of Appeals dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed
in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Ruling:
The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the
property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court were there, both by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the
parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one
of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.
REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO

GR No. 149498 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then
gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor,
Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after
that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In
1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor
their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to
some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at
bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application
of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be
a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
Facts:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20,
1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case
for the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform basic
marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including
a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian
national. Despite the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had two children. When
the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children
by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered the illegitimate children
as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join the Jordanian national with her two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Dra.
Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found him
to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects
completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the
Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like
her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial
court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the
trial court’s judgment and ordered the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be
truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. The law intended to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality, which

make the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied
upon by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for
declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed.
Petition is denied.
REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001
Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag,
20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued
by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on
October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then
disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees
with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from
him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail
and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a
petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the
Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence,
only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her
only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991
to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that
should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The
Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion
between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without

waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of
Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given
until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office
of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically
incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married
person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”
Issue:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They
begot two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He
was always drunk and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical
injuries on her if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him
again. Erlinda was forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped
from jail. Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds
of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served
by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological
incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting
for the prosecutor’s manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision. The
court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not
given an opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was
prematurely rendered.
PESCA vs. PESCA

G. R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends
that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital
obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with
friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When
cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her.
At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence
of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home
to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the
morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence
of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight
physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be
null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and
ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still
subsists.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence
showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article
36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid
down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.” The petition was
denied.
GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
MALLION vs. ALCANTARA

GR No. 141528 October 31, 2006
Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of
nullity oh his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied
the petition. As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of
nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds
ogf lack of marriage license?
Ruling:
Res judicataapplies.
Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the

nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting
of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had
no marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not
question the absence of a marriage license.
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE
LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996
Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the
lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids.
While her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This
prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed
a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence
of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held infavour of the private respondent.
Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage
certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioner’s appeal.
The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same.
She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. The Court
explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in
the marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children
shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that “A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all”.
PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under
a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since
then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)

and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Issue:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
Ruling:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI

G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
Facts:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962.
They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26
2004, Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds:
1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from
getting a marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the
dismissal of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can
file an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC which
provides in sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may
be filled solely by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs.
Bayadog.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing
marriage license.
b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death
of Eulogio.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been living together for
at least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a marriage license.
The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio
with Enrico took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent heirs have
no standing to assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death of their father,
Eulogio.
While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same
rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the family code.
Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their
successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning the validity of his
second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.
CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced
in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
Ruling:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.
NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot
Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now
Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt
the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
Facts:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two
parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos
commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos
asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties
covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Court of Appeals should apply the Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
b) Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages
Ruling:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is
misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse
may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.
PARTIES
ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any
issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage
as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants,
or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from
succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent
and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as
minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision
correccional as maximum penalty.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June
15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed
as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
Compromise Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the
respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously
dated January 2, 2002.
Issue:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
Ruling:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
Where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse;
while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a
proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of
psychological capacity.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does
not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are
expressly prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement
is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily
or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement
which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law.
This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was
still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject
to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR

G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006
Facts:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in
Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration
of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with
his essential marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogio’s
psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature
contemplated by Article 36.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
marriage between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness,
jealousy and abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court
ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because
of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN

G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001
Facts:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were
married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence
filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for “declaration of nullity of Marriage” against
Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.
Ruling:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged
that at the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent
fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal
support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the
conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts for
reconciliation failed because Emilio’s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment
of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from
further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial
ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper articles of Emilio’s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal
possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case,
reception for Emilio’s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed
to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria’s
marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for
relief from judgment but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of
the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing.
Ruling:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from
judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court
may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition,
the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or
cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case
as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel
to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is
negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the
trial court of his client’s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance
at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy,
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004
Facts:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute
bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more
glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and
procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction
him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that
the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded
with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss,
which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall
be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial."
Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge
should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for
pre-trial.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and incompetence.
Ruling:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but
not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but
not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo
G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED
to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its
further retention.
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
PACETE vs. CARRIAGA

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well
as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child
named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,
1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is
to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now
Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in
order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored
by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults
in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.
MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled the same respondent contracted a second marriage
with petitioner Imelda Marbella- Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint a n information for bigamy was
files against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for
bigamy invoking the pending civil case as a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of respondent
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with the Criminal
Case. A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is
a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
Facts:
In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a
civil ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want
to declare their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church
wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo
Reyes married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church wedding followed.
In 1991, Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage
with Ofelia be declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they
got married. He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage
to Anna Maria was rendered only when his civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void
ab initio. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly
Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of
Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein
there was no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent,
before such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity
before he could contract a second marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that
private respondent’s second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid.
Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do
so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.
EFFECTS
VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during
their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the
parties following the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of their mutual
Psychological Incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations. The three older
children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with, the younger children shall be
placed in the custody of their mother. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.”
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
their desire to remain with their father Antonio Valdes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition
of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because
of Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the contract.
Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof,
the property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 137 or Article 148. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have obtained through their joint efforts.The rules set up to govern liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exist between common-law spouses.
EFFECTS
ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO

2011
Facts:
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and
respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent
who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America.
Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a
certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no
indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits. Dr.
Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent's
disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial
court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties'
properties.
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. What governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.
Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal Falsification of Public
Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
several parties and among them is the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner.
IBC 13 appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed a surety bond
but this document was found to be falsified. The two complaints for falsification of document
was brought before Manila prosecutor’s office and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio
Diaz III and respondent Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case with the DOJ, the
latter affirmed the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores
as an accused in the two criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to
include the respondent among those charged. Following the arraignment, the private prosecutor,
Rico and Associates, filed a new Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging damages
sustained by the petitioner as a result of the crimes committed by the accused. The motion was
admitted by the trial court. The respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Subsequently, respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates and the
appellate court pronounced that petitioner did not sustain any damages for the crime committed
by the respondent and the same has redounded to his benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such
pronouncement since it is a mere obiter dictum.
Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an
offended party is a mere obiter dictum.
Ruling:
The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an offended party
is not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point within the issue presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration
of the case and led up to the final conclusion and to any statement as to matter on which the
decision is predicated. Hence, in the instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not
an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his
petition assailing the admission of the amended informations. Argument on whether petitioner
Villanueva was the offended party was, thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision
contains the discussion on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.
ANAYA vs. PALAROAN

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that
defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to
Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his; and that “the non divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on
the part of the defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail
even before it had hardly commenced…Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was
solemnized between them constituted ‘FRAUD’’ in obtaining her consent, She prayed for the
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with anither woman is a ground for annulment of marriage
Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of
the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the Article, providing that “no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
BUCCAT vs. MANGONON DE BUCCAT

G.R. NO. 47101 April 25, 1941
Facts:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met, then they
came engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they
got married.However, after 89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth
to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he
agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that
Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Ruling:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution
in which the State is interested and where society rests.In this case, the court did not find any
proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It
was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s
condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical
manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in formations in Criminal
Cases entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto
Adriano and Rolando Advincula for Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Manila.
It appears that petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several
parties among them IBC 13.When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC
13 appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus the two complaints for
falsification of public document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office. The
charges against Respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City
Prosecutors Office.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco Villanueva Jr. was in
fact an aggrieved party.
Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that
it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken
from an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how
Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond
and its confirmation letter when it could have redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would
be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13
when it purchased a fake surety bond.
MACCARUBO vs. MACCARUBO

A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo. Complainant Florencie
Maccarrubo averred that she was started courting by respondent Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on
December 18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the
Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he
was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her
family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that
respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he
abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to the
present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. But respondent filed a petition for
nullity of marriage since it was contracted with vitiated consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it from the court’s declaration of
nullity of the marriage.
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant
started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting,
as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and
is a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Hence the respondent was
disbarred for gross misconduct.
REYES VS. ZABALLERO

G.R. No. L-3561 May 23, 1951
Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum payable
in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero
secured the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.
The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were
paid in Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November
30, 1944, Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which fell due on
October of the same year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and
unjust that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had considerably devaluated,
and that he had an option according to the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United
States currency. Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance.
Reyes, acting upon advice given by his attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for
guidance, received the money and executed the notarial deed of release of the real estate
mortgage. On the same day, he received payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit
in secret, without defendants’ knowledge, before a Notary Public stating that he had accepted
under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of P612, and that he had deposited
the whole amount paid by the debtors.
Issue:
What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?
Ruling:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and serious
injury to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants. Mere reluctance does
not detract from the voluntariness of one’s acts. There is a distinction between a case where a
person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where
he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executed a contract or performs an act against a
pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the
eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and
joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his
better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there
is no difference in law.
IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC
ALACAZAR vs. ALACAZAR

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the
validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
`Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants,
or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from
succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determinationof whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got
married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but
reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition
for review based on the following assigned errors:
Issue:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent
Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s
way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with
the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez in a complaint prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Cañizares upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her
genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for
that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.
Defendant however failed to submit her answer within the required period. Thereafter,
the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. This was not
followed by the defendant however. Moreover, the defendant was not present during the
scheduled hearings. Because of this, the judge ordered a judgment annulling the marriage of the
parties. The city attorney then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that defendant’s
impotency has not been satisfactorily proven since the defendant refused to undergo the physical
examination.
Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband-plaintiff.
Ruling:
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.
The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence.
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and
every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law,
not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved
to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage.
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in

favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.
GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13,
1975 They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age
of majority. Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with
William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct;
William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle
of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on
her and box her; on December 9, 1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down
because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the
house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other
siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her
parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he and Lucita
quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he claimed that he left the same, stayed
in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office
below.
Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal separation due to
the repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their children. William on the other hand
maintains that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and
ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired through his
sole efforts also, William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the petition since it Lucita who
abandoned their conjugal dwelling.
Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.
Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in
order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing
to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings
could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe.
What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial
interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground
for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. The claim
of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-
beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a
smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the
courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the
family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the
Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given
ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment
without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William
due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said
provision.
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
Facts:
Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for
legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of
damages. Private respondent also filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
Respondent Judge then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide support to the private
respondent.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended
in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent since the
civil action arises from the criminal action of concubinage. Petitioner also argues that his
conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can
prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil action for legal
separation should first be suspended and that he must first be convicted before deciding upon the
said civil action.
Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions
arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right
to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse, among others. An action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in
the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other.
Also, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon
proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as
that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for
its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the
requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by
final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the
framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a
modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang.However, in 1980, the petitioner
filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in addition to an earlier
action for support, also against him. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Thereafter, the judge rendered a decision of legal separation between the spouses and further
ordered the payment of support by Ho Hang to petitioner. However, there was no definite
disposition for the judicial separation of their property. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals seeking for the judicial separation of their conjugal properties.
The Court of Appeals however dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of
property for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not
covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code since the separation of the conjugal property was
agreed by the spouses.When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to
this Court for relief.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation of property was not
allowed.
Ruling:
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or
her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on
either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2.
Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even
if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she
returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning
1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private
respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for
the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as
husband or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many
children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted
her to file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in
which actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her. The private respondent has not
established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful
husband.
CONDONATION/PARDON
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991
Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera
Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both
defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera
Neri of adultery. According to the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a
friend went to Baguio City and proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in the
evening, co-accused Eduardo Arroyo entered the unit and thereafter proceeded inside the
master's bedroom where Ruby Neri and her friend was waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter
instructed to leave the room. After 45 minutes, both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out
from the room and joined Ruby Neri's friend at the living room.
Both Ruby Neri and Eduardp Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration contending that a
pardon has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and that her husband had later contracted
marriage with another woman. As proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance
made by Dr. Neri.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desitance executed by Dr. Neri signifies pardon.
Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"ART. 344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented
or pardoned the offenders."
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that
consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair,
nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the
filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only
on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February
1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the
crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the
complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of
our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private
honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy.
Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of
marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the
public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article
149: "The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects." Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
CONDONATION/PARDON
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant
Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later
moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-
law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then went to
Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the
house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1
day as husband and wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night
therein as husband and wife. On the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of
the information he received that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his query,
she merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed
on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely filed an
answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than she was condoned
by her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that
there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting
to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected
between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and
the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro
Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the
further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband
and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the
husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of
infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various
supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse
by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to by the
plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited,
the inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation.
CONDONATION/PARDON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA

G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951
Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his
wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual
intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14,
1947 whereby Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant
wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she
served. In the same court, on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint
for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September
1948. Each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the
contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.
Ruling:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first
complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that,
if the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should
he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that
his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by
him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because
at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that
this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt
the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon
was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby
reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in
accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.
CONDONATION/PARDON
JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who
are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found
the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that
while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas.
Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition
for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal separation.
Defendant poses as defense that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since
plaintiff never sought for her after having discovered her adulterous acts.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.
Ruling:
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home
(after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with
Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty
to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court
inferred the husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon
careful examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had
abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.
CONSENT AND FORMS
SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES

G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For failure to agree on
how they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from each other,
which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreementwhich provides among others that “neither of them can prosecute the
other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime arising from their separation.”
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and said
Asuncion gave birth to a child. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported
themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.
Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for legal separation against the defendant. The trial
court however dismissed the action on the ground that under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an
action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on
which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date
when the cause occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband
with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The
present action was, therefore, filed out of time. Also, article 100 of the new Civil Code provides
that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in the facts, the plaintiff has
consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband as proven by their “agreement.”
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff condoned the acts of the defendant.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the
date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the
date when cause occurred.The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above
Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the
legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be
noted that appellant did not even press this matter in her brief.
The very wording of the “agreement” gives no room for interpretation other than that
given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the
import of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed.
Article 100 Civil Code, specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of
the court's sympathy.
CONSENT AND FORMS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL

G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941
Facts:
On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant
Elena Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a
document which in part recites “en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos
concepto.”
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, secured a decree of divorce from the
civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. Subsequently, he contracted
another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel and since then they lived together as husband
and wife. Complainant then instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the
other for concubinage. The accused posed as defense the act of condonation made by the
complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid condonation in this case.
RULING:
The Court believes and so holds that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which
they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the
act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be
no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.
The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The offended
party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are
both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.As the term
"pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been
intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No
logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both
instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes
unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. We, therefore, hold
that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.
The Court reiterate that the agreement should be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement
to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of
the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and
manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is
anything morally condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but
with the legislative department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines
the limits of our authority.
CONSENT AND FORMS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO

G.R. No. L-37720 March 27,
1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one
child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of
Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything
for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she
could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met
the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him.
On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo
Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day. The court, in its
decision, stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been
somewhat cruel in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing
her sentence, the accused left her wife. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and
the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to
take her back. At the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful
wife if he would take her back.
He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he
would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the
second time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year
1924) and they have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living
with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as
husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven
years completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented
the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able
to obtain a divorce.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief
Ruling:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the
complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this
case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing
between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding.We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of
acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the
Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the
accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT
BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA

G.R. NO. L-1056 December 8, 1903
Facts:
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily living together
until August of 1892 when the defendant without any previous warning, took his wife to the
house of her parents and left her there. It was found out that in plaintiff’s complaint for
separation, she charges defendant of committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower
courts believed such adulterous acts committed by the defendant.
On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why he left his wife was
because he received a letter made by the plaintiff herself, addressed to a Spanish civil guard
named Zabal who was her lover. When the defendant asked plaintiff regarding the said letter, she
admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That
same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there. The
mother testified that about a year after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the
defendant believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on account of a
certain letter.
Issue:
Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this case
Ruling:
It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: “For the sin of each one of
them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.”The Court’s conclusion is that neither
one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make
such findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require." The
judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts: The allegations
of the complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the
defendant are true as therein stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria
Bermejo. The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros,
committed adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard.
As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled to
judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by
her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any
costs either in this court or the Court of First Instance.
COLLUSION

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
Facts:
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.
Issue:
Whether or not collusion existed in this case.
Ruling:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife
for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of
enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the
acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to
bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of
adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely
told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her
husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a
personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact
that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it
PRESCRIPTION
WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO

G.R. No. L-10699 October 18,
1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl. Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment. Thereafter the spouse lived separately. Yambao however testified that after
liberation, Brown lived martially with another woman and had begotten children by her.
The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Brown’s action had already
prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already
barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he
learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under
Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one
(1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from
and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the
correctness of such findings and conclusion.
The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because actions seeking a
decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy
of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
PRESCRIPTION

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
Facts:
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation. Both lower and appellate courts denied the petition on the ground that there was
confession of judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not there was confession of judgment.
Ruling:
Art. 100 of the Civil Code do not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession
made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a
confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in
court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the
plaintiff's demand. This is not present in this case. Yet, even supposing that the above statement
of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of
the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it
would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law
prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession
defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposesthe separation will immediately confess
judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally
separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she
refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does
not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against
collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
PRESCRIPTION
ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG

G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their Marriage, three
children were born. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.In September, 1962, Avelino
Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with one
Lily Ann Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for three days.
During these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos’ report in her
desire not to anger defendant.
Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby. Plaintiff then
entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to
return to his family. Defendant however told his father that he could not do anything. Thereafter,
plaintiff met with Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that she was willing to give
defendant but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant at his place of
work where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the
conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff
that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.On
December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not prescription has already set in
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year
after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the
essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable
social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of
its status.The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in
Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from
September 1962 or from December 1963. After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded
that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the
infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when plaintiff pleaded the
defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the
preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no
longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be
under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then
that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. The one year prescriptive
period is thus followed in this case.
PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
AIDA P. BAÑEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ

G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case
No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and
respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their
conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
respondent’s one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children.
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court. Petitioner however
contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be
taken. She concludes that respondent’s appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file
the record on appeal within the reglementary period.
Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal separation cases.
Ruling:
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject
of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the
same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case
would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will
necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of
legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and
become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents
of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
CARMEN LAPUZ SYvs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her;
that they had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity

ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
On May 31, 1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the death abated the action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in
its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation;
and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
“... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during
the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).” The action is absolutely dead
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action
for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of
the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before
final decree, abates the action.
However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any
share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor
of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their
nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after
a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the
action through a substitute of the deceased party.
LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION

G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal separation on the
ground of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three
minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her
passport. The husband opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging
that the wife had abandoned the children. The respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition
granting custody of the children to the wife and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support
for her and her children.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisband’s request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil
Code, which reads as follows: “ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.”
Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed
Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is
evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses.
The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed
passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity
for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy,
does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody
of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article
105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court
according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts,
rank in justice may be caused.
Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery by
the husband in the face of express allegations under oath to that effect, supported by
circumstantial evidence consisting of letter the authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why
assume that the children are in the custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal
dwelling, when it is precisely alleged in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned
the conjugal abode? Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the
discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force
provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is,
evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the
means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should
be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody.
LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.

G.R. No. L-34132 July 29,
1972
Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent
Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by
him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and
exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente
Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the
Civil Code. Thereafter, petitioner received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of
respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary
injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude
the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an
ancillary remedy to such a suit.
Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court
that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.The court where the action is pending
according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is
precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court
that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If
it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal
provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial
power to assert itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus:
"After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately
from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the
conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage
said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian
and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the
orders of the court."There would appear to be then recognition that the question of management
of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An
administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal
partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is
thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the
petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be
ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life
would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17,
1994
Facts:
In Concepcion Alanis’ complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April
1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage
to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and
several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his
name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies.
The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file their answers, which
was granted by the judge. However, defendants still failed to file their respective answers. Thus,
Alanis asked that defendants be declared in default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter,
Alanis submitted all evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper
Ruling:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment.In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties themselves.
It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus
upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment
are fully justified or not. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
further mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a
"cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by
the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if
not fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible
jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed
intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to
alone dictate.
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17,
1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well
as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child
named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to
be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.” The above stated provision calling
for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that
an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period.
In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The
significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
not fabricated.”
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-
SABALONES
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his
successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent
Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen
years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his
wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a
building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to
the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone
without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost
of his hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost
nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not
alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal
partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be
renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of
his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the
occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal
properties. The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint
administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be
issued against one or the other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he
cites Art. 124 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
Ruling:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds
that the petition has no merit. We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment
of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in
allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the
evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's
administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties
as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also
above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in
the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a
third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction now under challenge.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as
a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo
was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a
brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the
United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born
on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of
giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo
and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the
Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by
his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her
family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting
the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children
be granted.
Ruling:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody
of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against
the children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom
they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The
children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs.EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.
They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that
the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May
1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition
for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could
be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIPPINES

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
Facts:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc.
No. 433) a petition which reads: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on
March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this
Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R.
Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal
separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; That during her marriage to
Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased
to live with him for many years now; That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated
from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is
desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
Petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed
to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. The petition was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be
372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated
from his husband.
Ruling:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership
between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be
no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name
of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.
SIOCHI vs. GOZON

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
Facts:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this
case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property
regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a
notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still
pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money
and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the
guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter,
Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of
Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of
Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of
lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her
father, Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT
was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in
Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove
notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell
between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-
Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void
because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s
½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the
Cavite RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?
Ruling:
The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void.
Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the
properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement
is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that
the CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred.
As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected
by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal
property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal
separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that
the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court
said, “Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as
regards this point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no.
Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.
PELAYO vs. LAURON

G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
Facts:
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against
Marelo Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff
was called to render medical assistance to the defendant’s daughter-in-law, who was about to gie
birth. After the consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be
difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the
subject and also removed the afterbirth. The operation went on until morning, and on the same
day, visited several times and billed the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services
rendered to which defendants refused to pay. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the
defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law
had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and
that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was
accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be
absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Issue:
Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?
Ruling:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of
fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly
determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising
from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in
accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in
case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by
way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not
doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can
be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical
assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by
which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all
expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the face of the
above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the
plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants
during her childbirth, was the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the
defendants herein.
NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997
Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film
their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy
Go said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their
honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the
said wedding video because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for
damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the
spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense
on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their
agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the
wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their
claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim
after the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that
their honeymoon is to be done abroad and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary
to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their
wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering
the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding
which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no
longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral
damages in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and
humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as
allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Go’s
husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family
Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a
contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in
favor of the Ongs.
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO

G.R. No. 17014 August 29, 1921
Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City.
They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores
went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed
that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in
turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the
defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked
for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant
to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
Issues:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute
order or permanent mandatory injunction
Ruling:
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to
defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards
her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with
caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this
recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be
seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband.
She is under obligation to return to the domicile. “When people understand that they must live
together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot
shake off; they become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the
duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of
property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and
Scotland have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the
defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not
entitled to support.
ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER

G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated
from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila
and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in
Antipolo City. When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo
City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their
father with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC
of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to
the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus
to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in
Antipolo City.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. To justify
the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left
to the man and woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived
together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa Goitia,
plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of
Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted
marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in
which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and
provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist
from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint
against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects
that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties
and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage
is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that
defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by
law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for
separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES: MARITAL COMMUNICATION RULE
CUENCA vs. CUENCA

G.R. No. L-72321 December 8, 1988
Facts:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the
subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca
and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that
some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties
of Maria and Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not
legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa
Pagar.
On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit, Baldomero, Filomeno
Elpidio, Aida, Anita and Engracia Vda.de Cuenca denied the legitimacy of the marriage between
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of
the couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally
married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject
parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to rice with irrigation
under the present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang on the
East by Clerencia Tagonsod on the South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano
Agagdang containing an area of 1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at
P250.00 by the property records of Agusan.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the
present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by
Sergio Pagar, on the South, by Macaria Agagdang on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing
an area of 1.1722 hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of Agusan
belong to Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents. This declaration against interest
is further reiterated by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale executed by him on
October 19, 1950. These two documents, as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs
that the properties in question described in par. 2 of the complaint, belong exclusively to Maria
Bangahon as her paraphernal property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself in a
declaration against his interest. It was error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the
importance of the declaration of Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Maria Bangahon. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin
of the properties in question and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the
marriage by Maria Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the defendants
and their witnesses, More importantly, Juan Buyan and former Judge Francisco Ro.
Issue:
Whether or not the parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia
Ruling:
The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon manifestation of his counsel is
no longer a necessary party as Engracia Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of the land
in question sold to Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs' claim against defendant Bartolome
Sanchez moot and academic.
Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime expressed in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon executed on June 13, 1950 before
Notary Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh. "C") that:
Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan, planted to

coconut, under the present possession of the heirs of Maria Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot
No. 3062, Lucio Plaza, Lot No. 4319, A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of
A. Cuenca, on the south Road, on the West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon 3058, B. Adormio,
3059, A. Cuenca and east portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or
less (This is a portion of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of Municipality of Butuan which parcel of
land belongs exclusively to Maria Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate
from the conjugal property of the marriage of said Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife," In the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435
[August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v.
Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the
property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do
not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected
during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these
parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino
Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the
parcels were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show
that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the name of either respondent
Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the
title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under
the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld.
In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and
ineffective. The documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way
change the result. The motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason
given by the respondent court.
RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER
ARCABA vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL

G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two
lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼
share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to
take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin
Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila
and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room
while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand,
Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed

of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila,
who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being
made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.”
Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who
are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the
Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille
be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and

Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is
considered null and void.
OTHER
MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES

G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971
Facts:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena
donated to respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix
Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the
Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the
donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were
simply cohabitating.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
Ruling:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility
of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no
reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. The court,
however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.
OTHER
HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. 12707 August 10, 1918
Facts:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received
as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell and Co which was the duly
authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The car’s
value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta
Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some
repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value
disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an
estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim
but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to
the cost of the car were false; and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union also
stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is
void under the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
Ruling:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by
Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of
the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then
thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr.
Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection
of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this
valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of
necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the
validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)
NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO

G.R. No 153788 November 27, 2009
Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement.
Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because
no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before
the complaints for replevin were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and
bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing
it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfullydetained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise
placed under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of
the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse
party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may
recover from the applicant in the action.
The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the
applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for
a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin.
VILLANUEVA MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 143286 April 12, 2000
Facts:
Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight
children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared
under his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in
trust for his co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leon’s
death in 1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and
Maria Baltazar had been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but
registered only in 1971. In July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of
petitioners, his children, who thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their
respective pro- indiviso shares.
Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an action for partition with
annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They contended
that Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses.
The RTC declared that private respondents’ action had been barred by res judicata and that
petitioners are the “legal owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual
titles issued to them.
Issue:
Whether or not laches apply against the minor’s property that was held in trust.
Ruling:
No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents
Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their
failure to file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of
majority, they believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in 1975, not
in 1948, that they became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their
uncle’s actions, they filed for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in
Tijam cannot be applied here. They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioner’s
assertion.
Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of
law between Felipe’s children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon’s
fraudulent titling of Felipe’s 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust.
IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY

G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
Facts:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with
Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and
Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever
indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,
000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans
were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the
payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no
avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including
herein petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank.
The dispositive portion of the (1) Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of
P175,451.48 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from March 1, 1984
and until the whole amount is fully paid; (2) Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of
P92,158.85 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24,
1985, and until the whole amount is fully paid; (3) The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the total amount due under the First and Second Cause of Action; and (4) Ordering the
defendants to pay the costs of suit and expenses of litigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and
for canceling the certificate of sale that occurs in the petitioners’ conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in
seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The
issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing
court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was error for the
CA to propose the filing of a separate case to vindicate her claim.
We agree with petitioner.
The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this Under [Section 16, Rule
39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as
terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title
and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to
keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A third-party claimant may also resort
to an independent “separate action,” the object of which is the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful
seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a “separate action” is the
recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action,
distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or
without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and
may be availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the terceria is not
a condition sine qua non to the institution of a “separate action.”
It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of “terceria”
authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy considering that he is not a
party to the case against petitioner. Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent
motion to cancel and nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over
TCT No. T27957 [P](M).Petitioner then argues that it is the ministerial duty of the levying
officer to release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed.
It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of
the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant
unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioner’s]
motion was already pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen,
the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.
ABSOLUTE COMMUINTY PARTY (EXCLUDED PROPERTY)
CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004
Facts:
On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million
peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).Alfredo Ching together with two other
persons executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and severally
liable for the PBMCI obligations.The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos.
PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests,
penalties and other bank charges.)Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff
levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation stocks registered solely to
Alfredo Ching.Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000 common
shares.According to her, the shares were purchased out of the conjugal funds.She also argued
that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family).

Issue:
Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable.

Ruling:
Yes.. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to
the name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because Mr. Ching’s name appeared as
the sole registrant of the shares in the corporate books of CityCorp, that doesn’t mean that it is
his exclusive property and not to the conjugal partnership.

As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, the court said that “signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. It is not embarking in a business.”

For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show that the family
received benefits and advantages from the liability incurred. There is no presumption that when a
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would be benefited.

The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.

Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Ching’s common shares must not be levied because he is not the
sole owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal partnership.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code.
EXCLUDED PROPERTY
TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120594 June 10, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner ChiaoLiong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, particularly
described as Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in March 1987. As owner thereof,
petitioner says he has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle
until his older brother, Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent, took it from him.
Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the van is registered in his name under
Certificate of Registration. He claims in his testimony before the trial court that the said motor
vehicle was purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of over P100, 000. 00;
that he sent his brother to pay for the van and the receipt fro payment was placed in his name
because it was his money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that he allowed his brother to use
the van because the latter was working for his company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother
later refused to return the van to him and appropriated the same for himself.
On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family business
that was placed in petitioner’s name because at that time he was then leaving for the United
Stated and petitioner remaining Filipino in the family residing in the Philippines. When the
family business needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the deliver of machinery to its customers, he
asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as
down payment for the van, which would be available in about a month. After a month, he
himself paid the whole price out of a loan of P140, 000.00 from his friend Tan Pit Sin.
Nevertheless, respondent allowed the registration of the vehicle in petitioner’s name. It was also
their understanding that he would keep the van for himself because CLT Industries was not in a
position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he had been in possession of the
vehicle including the original registration papers thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to
time to use the van for deliveries of machinery.
After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding no merit in the
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trail court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner-appellant established proof of ownership over the subject
motor vehicle.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the motor
vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the same, thereby lending credence to the claim of
private respondent who has possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A
certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in one’s name indeed creates a strong presumption
of ownership. For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually
the owner thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by
competent proof.
The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trusts other than those enumerated
therein. Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is
undeniable that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor
vehicle was placed in the name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him
but by private respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his
name cannot repudiate the trust relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations
upon a title. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another
especially between brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a
legal document.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
DISSOLUTION
IN RE ELENA BUEANAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER

GR. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
Facts:
Elena Muller, petitioner, got married in to Helmut Muller, a German national, on
Hamburg dated Sept. 22, 1989. Then they resided there in a house owned by Helmut’ s parents
but later on sometime 1992 they permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut inherited the
house in Germany from his parents which he subsequently sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo as well as for the construction of a house. That property
was registered in the name of Elena Muller. During their marriage they had some
incompatibilities and Helmut was alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment. With that,
the spouses eventually got separated. On September 26, 1994, Helmut, respondent, filed a
petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
RTC terminated the regime of absolute community of property. It ruled that the
separation of properties shall be applied between the petitioner and respondent. The RTC ordered
the equal partition of personal properties located within the Philippines, except those acquired by
gratuitous title during their marriage. In relation to the property, respondent cannot recover his
funds expensed since it was a violation of Section7, Article XII of the Constitution which
prohibits aliens from procuring private lands.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no provision in the Constitution which
specifically prevents Helmut from procuring private land. With that decision it also ordered
Elena to reimburse him accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller, respondent, is entitled to be reimbursed by Elena Muller,
petitioner, with the funds used to purchase the property in Antipolo and to construct the house.
Ruling:
No, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement because it was clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property using the proceeds of his sold inherited property in Germany
despite the constitutional prohibition. It is provided in the Constitution that alien can’t own lands
here in the Philippines and this provision is absolute only to the exception of lands here in the
Philippines inherited. With that violation he is not favored in any way in the case. Also,
reimburse is considered a fruit of the property, with that Helmut can’t claim the fruits as well.
COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS
ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA vs GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA

G.R. No. 187490 February 8,
2012
Facts:
A parcel of residential land, together with the improvements in Marikina City was
previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to
Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono). On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila &
Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 secured by a Promissory Note and
notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property.

On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property to Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma with that it resulted to naming Gemma as the
owner of the subject realty on the Registry of Deeds. On 26 November 1997, Gemma also
constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel to Far East Bank and Trust Company [now
Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility evidenced by the
Promissory Notes

On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had
been titled in the name of Gemma. Gemma failed to pay the principal as well as the accumulated
interest and penalties on the loans she obtained hence, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property. FEBTC-BPI later
consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name.
On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment
of deed, claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to Gemma is null and
void
Whether or not the FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.
Ruling:
No, Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property
was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of
the mortgage debt,FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it
foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans
secured thereby.
COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL DAVID SR.

G.R. No. 169548 March 15,
2010
Facts:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March
25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the
spouses separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel
discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation
(Titan) with which the previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced. March 13,
1996, Manuel filed a Complaintfor Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that
the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He
prayed that the Deed of Sale be invalidated, that the property be returned to the spouses with a
new title be issued in their names.

Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property
on behalf of the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature
purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the
property. Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaintwhich was
granted by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint .
Martha failed to file an answer so she was declared in default.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership”. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil
Code ordains that “the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent,
except in cases provided by law”. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the
other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
LIABILITIES/ CHARGES
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 1185305 February 12, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC) granted a loan to
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) amounting P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo Ching,
Exec. Vice President PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981
making him jointly and severally liable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay
the loan with that, AIDC filed a complaint against PBM and Ching.
In the RTC’s decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount plus the interests. RTC issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Then,
deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice
of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioner alleging that petitioner cannot
enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private
respondents, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent Magsajo from
proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties
at public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by
Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
Ruling:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the
debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate ownership.
The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed by Ching was clearly for the
benefit of PMB and not for the Ching with his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the
surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
DISPOSITION
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO

G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011
Facts:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty
three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he
affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had
purchased the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr.
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio
(Servacio).

The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did
not follow their demand in which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According to the
petitioners, they contend that with the Protacio Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal
property of the spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between spouses Go Sr. and his
Marta was null and void.
RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because the sale
includes the children of Marta, that the participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of
the late Marta- that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property all
property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there is a proof that the
property thus acquired pertained exclusively.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void
because it was made without prior liquidation.
Ruling:
No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the
Family Code. Their property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership
governed by the Civil Code. With Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved
pursuant to Article175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although
becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership,
could not claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the
property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share and as a co-owner he could sell his undivided
share, he had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of
his co-owners.
DISPOSITION
JOE A. ROS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH

G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011
Facts:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974
and as security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of
land with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained
by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On
January 13, 1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the
mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures
affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the
family. PNB seeks for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that
it was petitioners’ own acts of omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on
the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage
Null and Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners.
Upon PNB’s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed
the complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner’s then petitioned for review to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.
Ruling:
Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of
the Civil Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be
liable and paragraph (1) one of the said provision states “all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for
the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership”. The loan was used
for additional working capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was
acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.
DISPOSITION
MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
Facts:
A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of
AlfredoGozon. On 23 December 1991, Elvira Gozon, Alfredo’s wife, filed a petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which
was then annotated on the title of the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was
still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which was
also annotated on the title of the land. After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo
executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The
Register of Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the
name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on TCT No.M-
10508.
October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc
(IDRI). Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the
Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to
IDRI. Mario then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of
Donation and Sale with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to the Agreement to Buy
and Sell he entered with Alfredo.
b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the Sale entered with
Alfredo.
Ruling:
No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal
property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal property. Still, Alfredo can’t sell said property without the
written consent of Elvira or given authority of the court. Without consent or authority, the
agreement is void.
No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of facts regarding the

property hence it should seek further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property. Besides,
had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo’s
donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the
Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the
other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.
DISPOSITION
SPOUSES AGGABAO vs. PARULAN, JR.

G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010
Facts:
Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January
1991. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property
and showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots;
(b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed
by Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners
delivered the final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that
said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on
April 15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses
praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and
the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners,
Aggabao spouses and Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific
performance with damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the
petitioners.
Issue:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should
apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
Ruling:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the
Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
“The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.”
Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code
may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners
did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted
their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners failed to
substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property,
had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that
they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the
administration.
DISPOSITION
MANUEL FUENTES vs. CONRADO ROCA

G.R. No. 178902 April 21,
2010
Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son,
Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano
offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and
eventually they entered into an agreement. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of
the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away,
followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was
void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on
the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconvened to
them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.The spouses
denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw
Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the
claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year
prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing her consent was forged.
b) Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed?
c) Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action
to annul that sale?
Ruling:
Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective notarization will merely
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument that falsified jurat,
taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of
Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an
authentic consent.
No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal
property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. The Family Code applied for this case. The Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI,
Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family
Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights. Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within
which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply
provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the
same would be void. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their
mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such
an action.
Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed
on the ownership of the property to their heirs.
DISSOLUTION
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008
Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the
union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an
apartment standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the
Family Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses weren’t able to
liquidate their conjugal partnership even after the declaration of their legal separation.
Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan
from petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their
properties including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in
favor of Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally
include the lot in question (bought from Sering).
When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated
foreclosure proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM’s.
Nicholson filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property
alleging that the property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in
its answer: Alleged that the lot registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank
also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for
failure to file an answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and
Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved
the regime of community of property of the spouses.
b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid.

Ruling:
No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not authomatically
result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the
conjugal assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired
before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation
and partition of the partnership.
No.Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses, where:“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”

Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her ½ undivided interests in the disputed
party even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee,
are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
LIQUIDATION
BRIGIDO QUIOA vs. RITA QUIAO

G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the
petitioner Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court dated
October 10, 2005 declared the legal separation, custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the
personal and real properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned from the
conjugal properties in favor of the common children. Neither party filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and appealed within the required period for legal separation. December 12,
2005, Rita filed a Motion for Execution and was later on granted.
Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the “net profit earned”. The Court defined it
asthe remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of
the] spouse and the debts basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the required
prescriptive period, the court granted the petition since its purpose was to clarify the meaning of
the “net profit earned”. With that on November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the “net profit
earned” be based on the Article 102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR)
praying for the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR. Brigido
then filed a Petition for Review questioning the following: dissolution and liquidation of the
common properties, meaning of the “net profit earned”, and the law governing the property
relation between him and Rita.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated October 10, 2005.
Ruling:
No. Brigido wasn’t able to timely appeal the decision of the court dated October 10,
2005, thus, the decision on that date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on his
right to question.The respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gain. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The husband and
wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the
dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according
to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."
VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS
ALAIN DIÑO vs. MA CARIDAD DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have beenchildhood friends an
d sweethearts. They lived together for ten years thenseparated. After two years, they reunited and
later on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad.
Healleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout theirmarriage and
was irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent
toward him. Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United
Stated at that time. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned
that she already filed a divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court
of California, and is now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there
was no collusion between the two parties.
A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad was suffering from

Narcissistic Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was
founded to be long-lasting and incurable.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The
man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void. All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The Court
agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of theFamily Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of
the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19.
PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE
MARGARET MAXEY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984
Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united
in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne
and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired
the parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919
sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and
Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.
Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26,
1962, before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of
sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from
the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide “When a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” Thus, the
property in question is owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by
Maxey alone was invalid.
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne
Maxey thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the
land.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the “military fashion” marriage of Maxey and Morales was
recognized as valid.
b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on
February 16, 1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six
months thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized
in 1919 through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General
Order No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613
which would recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called
"Military fashion" ceremony or arrangement.
Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by applying
Article 144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new
Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the
private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as
this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share
under the applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey
and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the
petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the private respondents
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable
considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return on the other.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001

Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom
he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that
Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For
failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the
funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee
submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the
death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased
was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article
40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage;
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by
the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.
ANTONIO VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005
Facts:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision,
declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered
the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular
support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner
appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack
of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do
not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,
the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution.
VOID MARRIAGES
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted
of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages
imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said
case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court
of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify
her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
Issue:
Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to
share in the conjugal property?
Ruling:
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article
34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time
of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to
dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code.
The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if
the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA that the crime of adultery does not
carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to
manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
VOID MARRIAGES
BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES

G.R. No. 159521 March 7, 1933
Facts:
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together
fromJanuary 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived
together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties
mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children’s support of P500
(five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the
title of certain properties be put in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada &
secured inthat jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28,
1927. Onthat same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as
well & had 3children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he
had agreed to pay monthly for thesupport of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the
payments fixed in the Renodivorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August
1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm &
ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courtsof Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is
requested to be enforced, and deliver to theGuardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have
been due to their children as their legalportion from respective estates had their parents died
intestate on November 28, 1927, they alsoprayed that the marriage existing between Barreto &
Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel
fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred ineducating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the
children also filed as intervenors in the case.
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff &
intervenors, butreduced the attorney’s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of
the action against thedefendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred
in their decision.
Issue:
Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts
of the PhilippineIslands would grant a divorce.
Ruling:
No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce,
because: The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the
divorcedone in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction
on thequestion of divorce. It’s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia
VS. Campos Rueda that theentire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until
the case was submitted prayingthe ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention
of the law regarding divorce & willbe done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The
matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquiredby
the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon
thecourt of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.
Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow
such to bedone, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel
thecourts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which
out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals.

VOID MARRIAGES
MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003
Facts:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebuand moved in with
Bruno in Manila. They had their first child in December thesame year. They purchased a
condominium unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983.
They got married inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and
Bruno,void ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal
partnership. The court found Suite 204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was
purchased on installment basis using Brunos exclusivefunds prior to the marriage. Their
properties were also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).
Issue:
Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno’s exclusive property
Ruling:
No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were
capacitated tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) theirunion
is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was
acquired during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership should
govern. Suite 204 must be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of
properties does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on
co-ownership
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, ETC. RELATIONSHIPS

SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO
Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he
had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that
Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For
failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no
knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao was void
because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
Ruling:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not
follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death
benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property.
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS
GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs.SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000
Facts:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to
occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of
any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay
P1,600.00 a month while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which
agreement was not complied with by the said defendants.
She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since
she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated
that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.
Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.
Ruling:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that “In
cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.”
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of
the property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it
is unsubstantiated.
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS

G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005
Facts:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984,
Josefina purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of
title in the name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco”. On January
13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed
his marital conformity to the deed.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of
execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel
of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had
no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of
which she attached to her affidavit.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a
petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when they
were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot
be held liable for the Eduardo’s personal obligations.
Ruling:
No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to
answer the liabilities of Eduardo.
Even though Eduardo and Josefina’s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held
conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of
such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had
enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her
mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.
MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES vs. LOURDES REYES,

MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR.
G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004
Facts:
In the marriage between Lourdes Reyes and the deceased husband Rodolfo Reyes,
Rodolfo has an illicit relationship with Milagros Joaquino. The deceased allegedly "put into
custody" some of the couple's conjugal properties to Milagros.
On July 12,1979, there is a transfer of property in favor of the petitioner and for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was
issued in the name of petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino. The complainant alleges that that the
funds used to purchase the property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased.
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in petitioner’s possession
and that the real and personal properties in petitioner’s possession are conjugal partnership
properties of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs
exclusively to respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes
to be apportioned among the other respondents as his forced heirs. Respondents therefore, pray
that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses
Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property
in respondents’ favor; that the two cars in petitioner’s possession be delivered to respondents and
that petitioner be made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to respondents as well as
attorney’s fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the common law relationship between Milagros Joaquino and the
deceases validates her claim of ownership.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created
upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation
or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the
husband and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code,
which we quote:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of
either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse."
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to
pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the
rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been
acquired during the existence of the marriage.
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been
applied. Thus, when a common-law couple has a legal impediment to marriage, only the property
acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall
be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Milagros
likewise failed to prove that she was indeed financially capable of purchasing the house and lot,
that she actually contributed to the payments, and that she was employed any time after 1961
when the property was purchased. The Certification and Affidavits stating that she borrowed
money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry business were also deemed to have no
probative values, they were not cross-examined by the respondents.
JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
Facts:
Gina S. Rey, private respondent and seventeen years old, was married but separated de
facto from her husband. Sometime in July 1987, she met Jacinto, petitioner, after a brief
courtship they decided to cohabit as husband and wife. In 1996, the couple decided to end up
their nine-year cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner in the RTC. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of the personal properties she contributed during her cohabitation with Jacinto and
the amount of 70,000.00 representing her contribution to the construction of their house be
reimbursed to her.
Issue:
Whether or not Gina Rey is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and
reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house.
Ruling:
Yes, Gina is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and reimbursement of
her contributions to the construction of their house.
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because
the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter.
Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, "…only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions..."Proof of actual contribution is required.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit,
there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein.
Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
VICTOR JUANIZA vs. EUGENIO JOSE

G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 3, 1979
Facts:
In November 23, 1967, the defendant Jose, registered owner and operator of a passenger
jeepney, involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National
Railways which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its
passengers. At that time the defendant is legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been
cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for sixteen years.
The court charged the defendant and Rosalia Arroyo for damages.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be
reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-
defendant, but was denied. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of
the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil
Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the provision of the Civil
Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for
damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the
jeepney, which figured in the collision.
MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all

surnamed ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000
Facts:
On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got married. Sometime in 1942
or prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she
died on June 11, 1968. On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio
married Vicenta. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all
his properties, and assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his
first and second marriage as devisees and legatees.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was
instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February
18, 1981 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City. The RTC allowed the probate of
the will.
On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending
before the RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will. In the
complaint plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother,
Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such,
acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and administration.
Issue:
Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's
marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the trial court and
respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the presumption of
conjugality of the disputed property, private respondents have also presented sufficient evidence
to support their allegation that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the
conjugal fund of his first marriage.
Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity

would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should
be allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts, petitioners in the instant
case have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the acquisition of the
property in question.
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
Facts:
Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law, their respective wives being sisters. Filed by
petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another
dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being
brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.
Ruling:
Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word “No”, the requirement is
mandatory for that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that “If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of “brothers and
sisters” as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in-law”
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA
G.R. No. 154132 August 31, 2006
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of
Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife
Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he
sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with
Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that
he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he
was then working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no
suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed.
Issue:
Whether or not necessity of earnest effort is needed.
Ruling:
No. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: “No suit between members of
the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.” This rule shall not
apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Article 222 of
the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the
same provisions, to wit: “No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.” In the case of Martinez v.
Martinez ruled that Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively
between or among family members.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family,
the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before the action can prosper.
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS vs. REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, and, SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No. 125465 June 29,1999
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they
are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land
as a result of the filing of the land registration case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio
was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession
of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the
possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the
writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint,
they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as
provided in Article 151.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts
exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
Ruling:
No. Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as
defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under
this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents
and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this
jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse
of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and

ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. His wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his
eleven children, who are all of legal age, survived him. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo
left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business
under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.
The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.
The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein.
However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners
who were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several
pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the
filling of an Omnibus Motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.
Ruling:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding,
the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary
civil actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy that the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right.
It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance
of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as
such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any
cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced.
NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-

GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are

brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased.
Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement
of Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents.
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal
against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court has no application
Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers.Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent
for the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in
ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code,
now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed
under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case
contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by
the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective
complaint.
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE

LA ROSA MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967
Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was
married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife
until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and
practice his profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason
deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff,
defendant has failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and
support of plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue,
while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between
members of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it
must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make
it so appear when the suit isfiledis by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the
law forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear,
the showing that efforts in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the
cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried
in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it
may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of
the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals
and the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its
face, the same involved a claim for future supportthat under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of
application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last
proviso of said Article 222, future support.
FAMILY HOME
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a
company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter
ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th
month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of
execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution
to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that
the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was
likewise denied by the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with
by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242
governs extrajudicial constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption
is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with
consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil
Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra
judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot
apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.
FAMILY HOME
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Facts:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del
Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land
located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family
home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in
Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not
one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of
the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home
by operation of law under Article 153.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
Ruling:
The petitioner’s contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family
home from the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was
the basis of the judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
FAMILY HOME
ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008
Facts:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case
for collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that
petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various
dates in 1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to
respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision
in Toto. Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed
in a Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21,
2002.
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on August 21, 2003. On
August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully
satisfy the judgment credit.
On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as
well as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment
award in favor of respondent is legal.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his
family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during
one’s lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred
institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our
nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as
a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction.
Despite petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to
determine the nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or
whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS

PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on
consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to
pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and
issued a writ of execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and
his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC
Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt
from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.Moreover, the debts for which
the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise
(that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to
have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or
after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of
the building.
FAMILY HOME
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO

vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005
Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and
Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz
Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands
while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title
(TCT) of the property.
Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s
copy of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued,
by virtue of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a
public auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together
with their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva
Vizcaya on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family
residence and is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents
assert that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family
home from the time they occupied it in 1972
Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home
shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is
not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was
instituted in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the
levied property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta
falls within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to
the constitution of the family home.
FAMILY HOME
FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.

G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacopand his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.On March 17, 1986, Private
Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered
into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which provides:
That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means
permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986,
the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It
enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private
respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of
the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal
properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at
public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of
execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the
judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet
matured, as there was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their
receivables had in fact been collected.
Issue:
Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution
issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted
under the provisions of the said Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need
to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall
be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2)
For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer,
mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building. The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective
from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4,
1987 (1988 being a leap year).
FAMILY HOME
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999
Facts:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of
private respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount
of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol,
Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also
located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on
February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after
petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9,
1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed

as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that
petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on
February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject
property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said
property has been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not
subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land
and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of
Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family
home that was extra judicially constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged
illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration
No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of
petitioners over said property.
Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the
Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless,
the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced
sale or attachment. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the
house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment
against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was
incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged
family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article
243 (2).
FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAUL

LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN
G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012
Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo
Lapitan (creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los
Baños, Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness
including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba
City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001.
At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest
bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Salethat was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Calamba City. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza
redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership on November 20, 2003 and the registration of the subject property in their names on
February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan’s formal
demandto vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the
petitioners were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the
foreclosed property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a
redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed
property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and
their children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the
forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on
January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even
notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from
forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced
sale before it was sold at the public auction.
KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN
MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
Facts:
Vircel D. Andres, as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an
action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis. She alleged that Manuel is the father
of Glen but as a father, he failed to provide support to his child. Manuel countered that he is not
the father of the child and so he has no obligation to support mentioned child. Thereafter, Vircel
moved for the dismissal of the case because of the father's judicial declaration denying that he is
the father of subject minor child. Six years later, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the
putative father. Manuel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata.
Issue:
a.) Whether or not the civil status of a son or his filiation and paternity could be left to the
will or agreement of his parents.
b.) Whether or not the child is barred from filing an action to ask for support from his
alleged father due to the dismissal of the first case filed.
Ruling:
No, a child’s civil status or his filiation and paternity cannot be left to the will of his
parents. Such issue must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence. In the case at bar, the civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from
which the right to support is derived being in issue, no conclusion could be given to such a denial
until an authoritative declaration has been given.
No, the child is not barred from filing an action to ask for support. The right to receive
support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise.
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his
existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the
voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is
the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, et al.

G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by
the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The
boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant.
Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental
technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989,
after the death of Dr. Jose, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same day,
Generosa sold her share to Rodolfo’s son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction,
Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and
Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez,
their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They claimed that Rodolfo is
not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de
Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.
Ruling:
No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his filiation.
The only public document he could show was the Application for Recognition of Back Pay
Rights under Act No. 897. 897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was not executed
to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and
possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they
died. Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment
by the child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such
as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate,
constant attendance to the child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of
being a child of his parents. However, it must be noted that possession of status of a child does
not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition
by his assumed parent. His baptismal certificate, although public documents, is evidence only to
prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of
the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of
proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when
Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan
City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7,
1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The pictures he presented do not also constitute proof
of filiation.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 123450 August 31,
2005
Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989.
A year later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul
his marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that
Ma. Theresa had already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such
marriage of Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa’s marriage was bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It
declared the child as being illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision
but on appeal, reversed its ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by
Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.
b) Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Ruling:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy
would come from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that
bigamous marriage is void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario
Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the so-
called “marriage” with the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to
Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child
Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the
void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.The status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived
or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of
the Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. He has no standing in
law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper
case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his
wife.Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the
very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
Facts:
Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving
behind four parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Aleli
claims that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together
with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs
of the decedent. For this matter, respondent prays that she be made administratrix of Francisco’s
estate. Petitioner Belen opposed respondent’s claim, alleging that the respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva
Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco Angeles.
Ruling:
No, respondent’s legitimacy was impugned, and for failing to establish the presumption
of her legitimacy, she could not validly claim that she is the legitimate child of the deceased. The
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis- that the child’s parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. In the case at bar,
respondent failed to prove such legal marriage of her parents, for she failed to show any marriage
certificate or marriage contract. She failed to present any priest, judge, mayor, or other
solemnizing authority to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between
her parents. Clearly, therefore, respondent could not be vested with the legal presumption of
legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco
and Genevova.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the legitimate filiation of a child can be
established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of
his/her supposed parents. But respondent failed to prove her legitimacy even in this aspect.
Respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila. But such birth certificate
was not signed by her putative father. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be
considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed
by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.
JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
Facts:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao. After such introduction, Jao
courted Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived
together. 1968, Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlene’s
pregnancy but when the child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of
such child. When the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a group blood
testing. The group blood testing result showed that Janice could not have been the possible
offspring of Jao and Arlene.
Issue:
Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the
legitimacy of Janice.
Ruling:
Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to impugn the
legitimacy of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed
parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal
scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by
such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of
the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that
of the alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons
does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types
will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father
and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by
consanguinity.
TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
Facts:
TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to the spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera
then 65 and 54 years old respectively, at the time of her birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal,
daughter of the late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena counters this claim, saying that she saw
with her own eyes that Teofista was actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto.
Presentacion testified that Teofista was born through the help of a “hilot” and that her mother
Flora forged the Teofista’s birth certificate, making it appear that HermogenaBabiera was the
mother by forging Hermogena’s signature. Presentacion further claims that Teofista’s real
surname is Guinto, her mother being single; the father, a carpenter, refused to sign the birth
certificate. Teofista on her defense, claims that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the
instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code which states that only the father could
impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack.
Issue:
Whether or not such petition may prosper considering Teofista’s claim that Presentacion
has no legal capacity to file the instant petition and can the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of her birth certificate be upheld.
Ruling:
Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is not covered by Article 171 for the prayer
therein is not to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that
the former is not the latter's child at all. The present action does not impugn Teofista’s filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the
first place. Presentacion only aims to assail and cancel Teofista’s birth certificate for the void and
simulated birth certificate of the latter would affect the former’s hereditary rights.
Also, Teofista’s birth certificate cannot be taken into consideration for there were already
irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar.More importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein
was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The most
significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of HermogenaBabiera which states that
she did not give birth to Teofista, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio’s.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, et al.

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
Facts:
Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with William Liyao from 1965 up to
William’s death in December, 1975 even though Corazon is still legally married but living
separately to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao himself was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-
Liyao at the time of his cohabitation with Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with the
company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage- Enrique and Bernadette, both
surnamed Yulo. In 1974, they begot a child, William Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William Liyao
paid for all the expenses for the subsistence of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her two
children from her subsisting marriage during their cohabitation. William Jr. was said to be in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, having
been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the
death of his alleged father, William Jr. prays that he be recognized as an illegitimate child and an
heir by the family of the deceased from his subsisting marriage. The deceased’s legitimate
children on their part, alleges that the deceased could not have fathered petitioner for their father
and mother have never been separated.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his legitimacy with that of his mother’s subsisting
marriage and establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.
Ruling:
Holding that Corazon’s marriage with Ramon Yulo is still subsisting, it is presumed that
petitioner is the legitimate child of Ramon Yulo and not the illegitimate child of William Liyao.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate. This presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive
and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil
Code provides: “Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.” No evidence other than that of physical
impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child can be admitted. Such physical
impossibility may be caused by: (a) By the impotence of the husband; (b) by the fact that
husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; (c) by the
serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy. Article 255 of the Civil Code provides that
only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of
the Civil Code can impugn such legitimacy. And, in the case at bar, the petition was initiated by
petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette
Yulo who are the undisputed children of Corazon and Ramon Yulo. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA

DIZON
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August 1964. It was within this
marriage that the petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon
acknowledged petitioners as his own illegitimate children through a notarized document.
Thereafter, Juan died intestate and petitioners filed a prayer that they be given their legitime and
be recognized as illegitimate children by the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan
Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners’ legitimacy as children of Danilo may be impugned and they
be recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon.
Ruling:
No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is
presumed that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in
the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the
husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. And only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Since the petitioners failed to show records of the
impossibility of their parents’ access to each other during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which preceded their birth, they cannot assail their presumed legitimacy. Failing therefore to
impugn their legitimacy, petitioners cannot claim that they are the acknowledged illegitimate
children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY
EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of
whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let
Angelita take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from
work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s
efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law
husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son
Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own
son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own
brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no
children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas’ brother even
testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce the competent evidences to
establish the child’s filiation with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim with
sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her
child’s birth. Not to mention the fact that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the
child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance
between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the
alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was sterile makes
it impossible that he and Angelita could have produced subject child. More importantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is
false because even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry
puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
KINDS OF RECOGNITION
CAMELO CABATANIAvs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124814 October 21,
2004
Facts:
Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and she was hired
as petitioner’s household help. It was then that petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse.
After a month, petitioner’s wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioner’s
wife dismissed Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia
demanded from him support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and
claimed that Florencia was already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial,
Florencia claimed that petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for
her after the dismissal and misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact her husband is still
alive. Trial court brushed this misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision the
similarities on personal appearances of the petitioner and respondent and favored the
respondent’s claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.
Ruling:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with
petitioner. Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her,
private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The
local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.
More importantly, the fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may
impugned the presumed legitimacy of the child.
With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in
this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective
test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove
paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
ROSALINA P. ECETA vs.MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA

G.R. NO. 157037 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Isaac and Rosalina married in 1926. The begot a child named Vicente. When Isaac died,
he left behind properties to which Rosalina and Vicente were the compulsory heirs. Thereafter,
Vicente also died but he had an illegitimate daughter, Ma. Theresa. Thus, the latter is a
compulsory heir together with Rosalina. Theresa then filed for a petition that she be made co-
owner of a property which was originally owned by Isaac, passed to Rosalina and Vicente upon
his death. Ma. Theresa’s contention was that she should be made as co-owner by virtue of her
father’s death. During pre-trial, Rosalina already admitted that she is the grandmother of Ma.
Theresa. On appeal though, she questions the alleged filiation and whether if such could be
established by mere birth certificate and by her admission during the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s filiation to her alleged father could be established by the
birth certificate and by the admission made.
Ruling:
Yes. Ma. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente through the duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed respondent’s birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have
acknowledged his paternity over Ma. Theresa, thus, the filiation of illegitimate children, like
legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement
of the child. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition;
it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994
Facts:
Aurora Reniva and Juan M. Alberto had a child born out of wedlock in the person of the
petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school records and
correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s
gun, died intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his
estate. The petition was granted but was reopened as petitioner filed a motion that she be
declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and be entitled to share in the estate of the
deceased. The court favored the petitioner but CA reversed such ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child.
Ruling:
Yes. During his lifetime, deceased acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to
recognize petitioner as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his family
name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and lastly, by
openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter.
Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and gang mates, and
openly visiting his daughter in school, had meetings with her at the MOPC, manifesting open
acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to
disprove.
Deceased died during the minority of the petitioner, thus, Art 285 of the Civil Code
allows her to file an action for recognition 4 years from the time she reaches majority age. Such
motion was filed seasonably before the expiration of the 4-yr period.
JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVEROvs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
Facts:
Benito DyChiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Shirley Arevalo.
They begot a son, BenedickArevaloDyChiao. When Benito Sr. died, Benedick, through her
natural mother and guardian ad litem, being a minor, filed a complaint on his behalf, against the
legitimate children of the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and that
he be given his share in the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by Mary Jane, daughter
of the deceased, but later on signed a compromise agreement with Benedick, recognizing the
latter as illegitimate son of her father and giving him his share in the estate. Attached to the
agreement was a SPA appointing Mary Jane to represent her brothers who are confined in a
mental hospital. Such compromise agreement was approved by the court, thus requiring the
compulsory recognition of Benedick. Thereafter, the Dy-Chiao brothers, through their uncle,
assailed such compromise agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the recognition of Benedick’s illegitimacy by Mary Jane is valid based on
the compromise agreement made.
Ruling:
No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil
status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further, such recognition is
ineffectual because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative
parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SGT. MORENO BAYANI

G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996
Facts:
Victim Ma. Elena Nieto, then 15 yrs old, was living with her paternal grandmother
together with her siblings as their parents were abroad. Appellant frequented their house as he
was a neighbor and a “kumpadre” of her paternal uncles. One day, appellant asked victim’s
grandmother for her consent to let victim accompany him to visit a friend. Victim’s grandmother
consented. After visiting his friend who was allegedly his mistress, appellant invited her to have
lunch in a hotel restaurant but victim declined and suggested they go home. Appellant however
said they would still visit another friend. Turns out, the building they went to was a motel, where
appellant deceived the friend they were going to visit was in the 2 nd floor. When appellant
opened a room, he forcibly let victim in and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her,
intimidating and threatening her with a gun pointed at her. After his lust was sated, he threatened
to kill her and her family if ever she’ll divulge the incident. Victim did not divulge the incident
because of fear, until it became apparent that she was pregnant. She was then sent to another
place for her safety and as the trial ensued, appellant’s contention was that victim consented to
the act, she being the appellant’s mistress. The trial court found him guilty of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his
crime.
Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape,
seduction, or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b)
acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every
case, to support the offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period
of the offense coincides, more or less, with the period of the conception. It has been held,
however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support
for the offspring as part of the sentence. Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code,
the offender in a rape case who is married, as in the case at bar, can only be sentenced to
indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.MANUEL MANAHAN

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999
Facts:
Victim TeresitaTibigar, then 16 yrs old was working at a canteen as stay-in waitress, and
sleeps at the 2nd floor of the canteen. Manahan is the brother-in-law of the owner of the canteen.
He and his wife lives temporarily with the owner as his wife was then pregnant. One night, as
victim was sleeping, she was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. When she
opened her eyes, she saw that it was Manahan who immediately placed himself on top of her.
Victim tried to shout but accused covered her mouth. She tried to free herself but to no avail. In
her weakened state, accused succeeded in raping her. Thereafter, he left her. Within the month,
victim left the canteen and returned to her parents. The incident resulted to her pregnancy, thus,
she was forced to divulge the rape incident to her parents. They then filed a criminal complaint
against accused. The accused on his part, alleged that they were lovers and that the sexual
congress between them were consensual. The court favored the testimony of the victim and
convicted accused of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not accused may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his
crime.
Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also
be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing
so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case at bar, compulsory acknowledgment
of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it
appears that the accused is a married man
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother

ARACELI LOPEZ
G.R. No. 181258 March 18,
2010
Facts:
Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner, Ben-hur. She
therefore filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents to the court as evidence is her birth
certificate which had not been signed by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to do
so. Another evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner obligating
himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each
month.
Issue:
Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of illegitimacy.
Ruling:
No. Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus such
is to be based on Art 172 which provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar,
the adduced evidence which is the note written by the alleged father, does not contain any
statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not a competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation as an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father is considered acceptable evidence. In the present case, the note
cannot be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not
even notarized. Further, the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
ELINO RIVERA, et al. vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA represented by

MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, et al.
G.R. No. 141501 July 21,
2006
Facts:
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter
was married to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had an illegitimate daughter, respondent
Angelina. Thereafter, Gonzales died intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then
executed an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate, some were allegedly acquired during the
cohabitation. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in
the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners who are Gonzales’ half-brothers contested such extra-judicial settlement and
questioned Angelina’s illegitimacy.Angelina adduced her birth certificate to prove her filiation.
Issue:
Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove Angelina’s filiation.
Ruling:
No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was
listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. It was previously held that the mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, and does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal
rights of such child.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of

the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements
made there by the interested parties. Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in
view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such
evidence.
Lastly, Gonzales was already 44 years old and on the verge of menopausal and that she
had been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it
was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor
even her adopted daughter.
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et al. vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, et al.

G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first marriage. Private
respondents on the other hand, claim to be Buenaventura’s children from his second marriage.
Long after their alleged father died, petitioners learned that respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of a certain property belonging to their alleged father and transferred such
to their names. Such was contested by the petitioners and filed a complaint to recover their
alleged shares in the property.
To prove their filiation, petitioners presented their baptismal certificates. Such contention
was also confirmed by witnesses presented during the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura was sufficiently
proven.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the
child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has
been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission.
In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of respondents were adduced. In the case of
Mercedes, she produced a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact
that records of birth for the year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was also presented
who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they
reside as being the children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to
prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing
evidences thus suffice to prove that petitioners are children of the late Buenaventura.
ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING, et al.

G.R. No. 172471 November 12,
2012
Facts:
Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2 years. As a result, Randy was
born to her. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he left them and refused to give
support to their son. Antonio for his part, denied that they ever cohabited although admitted that
he had a one night stand with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy’s birth and
baptismal certificates. She avers that she and Antonio supplied the information indicated in the
certificates, as the ‘hilot’ who assisted her went to Antonio’s house to solicit the said
information. Randy also testified, saying that he even had a vacation at her aunt, Antonio’s sister
for a week with which he 1st met Antonio, calling him Papa and while the latter hugged him, he
promised to support Randy.
Issue:
Whether or not Randy’s filiation to Antonio was sufficiently proven.
Ruling:
No. Respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The rules
for establishing filiation are found in Arts.175 and 172 of the Family Code. Whereas, in the case
at bar, the birth and baptismal certificates presented have no probative value to establish the
alleged filiation since the Antonio had not signed them. It is settled that such evidences adduced
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in their preparation. Mirasol failed to present the mentioned
hilot to prove her claim that it was Antonio who supplied the information in the certificates.
Besides, they do not contain Antonio’s signature and that there were also inconsistencies such as
Antonio’s middle name, signifying that he had no hand in their preparation.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his filiation. The single instance of
Antonio’s hug and promise to support Randy cannot be considered as proof of continuous
possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, the father’s conduct towards his son must be
spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Whereas, except for this mentioned single
instance, there were no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.
Lastly, assuming that Antonio indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol, still, none of these
sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES

EDGARDO A. TIJING, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of
whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let
Angelita take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from
work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s
efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law
husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son
Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own
son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own
brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no
children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas’ brother even
testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed
that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence
to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years
before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was
sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is
false because even Angelita had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not
necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the
prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162571 June 15,
2005
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. The respondents
alleged that the petitioner impregnated her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The baby’s
birth certificate was purportedly signed by the petitioner as the father. Arnel even shouldered the
prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption.
The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had
allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He admitted that their affair started in
1993 but theirs was an on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to
bear the prospect of losing his wife and family. Finally, the petitioner claims that the signature
and the community tax certificate attributed to him in the acknowledgement of Martin’s birth
certificate were falsified.
The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
opposed said motion invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and stating that
there was no cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery
and that under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the
putative father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the
trial court.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD.
b) Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search.
Ruling:
No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private
respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by
the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:In no
uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
HERRERA V. ALBA
G.R. No. 148220 June 15,
2005
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and
asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.Petitioner
opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that “under the present circumstances,
the DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to
obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.”In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and
affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner
merely desires to correct the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available
remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right
against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the
appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA
paternity testing.
Issue:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation.
Ruling:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an
overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the
requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and
filiation.Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of
proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the
putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward
and shift it to the putative father.There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father. The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of
either physical absence or impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The
child’s legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.Finally,
physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although
likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much
a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the
emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba,
respondent’s mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is
respondent’s biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court,
she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand,
denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated
that respondent is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s denial
by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they
resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to
the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating
acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO

G.R. No. 144656 May 9,
2002
Facts:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s house to seek help in
an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment.
At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to
Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next
morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and
thereafter strangled to death.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he
was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told
the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested
for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes
were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the
NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a
vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in
Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is
O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when
trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the
cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy
were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was
sentenced to death by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case.The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case
and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic
substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical
twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is
collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is
the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from
the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG V. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ

2007
Facts:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was
filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to
September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship,
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central
Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after
delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of
minor Joanne’s needs that is recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting
minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.Rogelio, despite Jinky’s
remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child
and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted
complaint.On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for
reconsideration seeking the court’s understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to
find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for
DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.
Ruling:
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne
for purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just
to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as
citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges
that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
COMPULSARY RECOGNITION
MICHAEL GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS

2006
Facts:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a.
Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors
were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for
the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled
without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss
alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and
not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release
of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and
all liabilities.The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could
not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of
non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.
Ruling:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must
necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in
order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release
or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their
supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It
would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the
latter do not have.
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants
even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one
complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
MARQUINO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR. No. 72078 June 27, 1994
Facts:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of
Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926
allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family
personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete.
She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession
of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and
his family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her
evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while
Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in

holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action
already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish
such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.
Issues:
a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the
heirs and
b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child
can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even
as an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative
father in an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the
former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the
case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time
of death of their father.IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is
dismissed.
TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR

GR. No. 174680 March 24,
2008
Facts:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that
she is one of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties
both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10
October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly
promised to give respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of
the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the
properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that
it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as
his illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further
encroachment upon the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.
The motion was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration
sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is
an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or
recognized as such by the latter.
Ruling:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child
suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the
Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming
illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the
death of the alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present
evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her
deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on
affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to
compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether
indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s
voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

GR. No. 156343 October 18,
2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in
Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P.
Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner
prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father
and has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority
was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority
was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both,
the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority
resided jointly in the father and the mother.
REPUBLIC vs. ABADILLA

GR. No. 133054 January 28,
1999
Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname “Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor
children, Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition
was granted.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the
deletion of the “date and place of marriage of parents” from the birth certificates of minors
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors’
surname from “Abadilla” to “Celestino.”
Issue:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.
Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.”Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.
VERCELES vs. POSADA

GR. No. 159785 April 27,
2007
Facts:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from
"My Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they
would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making
amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where
she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the
mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow
up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes
Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They
met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the
restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he
told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But
again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner
was proven.
Ruling:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s
filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no
evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
PEOPLE vs. GLABO
GR. No. 129248 December 7, 2001
Facts:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and
her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his
house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore,
accused-appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away
from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where
she was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie
down. He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made
push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant’s brute strength. She
shouted for help, but there were no neighbors nearby.
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She
went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath
the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo
floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the
kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant’s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However,
the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila’s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It
was her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought
Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.
Ruling:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power
to exercise parental authority over his children, no “further positive act is required of the parent
as the law itself provides for the child’s status.” Hence, accused-appellant should only be
ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and terms of support
shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201
of the Family Code.
DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
Facts:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V.
Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after
Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
father and grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial
court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for
relief from judgment and the court set aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her
opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the
court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision
and granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue:
Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.
Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother
has seen her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
“compelling reasons” for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her
child who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are
neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than
seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent,
or even to a third person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody
over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of
fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.
MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455 December 23, 1998
Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the child’s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in
charge at the hospital refused to place the presumed father’s surname as the child’s
surname in the certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration.
Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar’s office,
rejected the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar General’s Circular No. 4,
which provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on
or after August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the
status of the status of the registration of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of
the letter of the Civil Registrar General denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on
the grounds that it is contrary to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the
Pasig RTC to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his
illegitimate son using his surname. His petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration
and a motion to for leave to amend the petition to substitute the child’s mother as the petitioner.
His motion to amen was granted, but motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the
petition to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC’s decision
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register
thecertificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname
where the latter admitted paternity.
Ruling:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname
of their mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their
fathers in their record of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of
the Civil Code, which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where
he/she has been acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be
entitled to support inconformity with the provisions of the Family Code.
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 114742 July17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted
ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his
company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who
averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect
the moral and social values of the children.
Issue:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.
Ruling:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but
this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental
authority from immigrating to Holland with her two children.
DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Facts:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married,
and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually
followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar’s
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
Daisie’s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal
family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family
to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had
enrolled him at the HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and
ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of
suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie
Ruling:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary
support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar,
was married to another woman other than his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who,
as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an
illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her
rightful custody of her child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground
for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
DE SANTOS vs. ANGELES
GR. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their
relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow
doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his
first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to
Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his
de factoseparation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia
died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent
contracted a marriage in TagaytayCity celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981,
Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15, 000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate
proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in
November 1987, she argued inter aliathat private respondent's children were illegitimate. This
was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her
children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted
and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de
Santos. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since
only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her
half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.
Ruling:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of
parents, who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have
been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural
child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent
and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife
does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at
the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged
wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in
Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of
children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure
fiction.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN
AM No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the
grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With
respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and
publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to
the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children
with Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he
knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years
had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence
the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the
record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children.
Issue:
Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.
Ruling:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
Facts:
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America, married Lenita
Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.The
spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita,
who had been living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, aswell as
their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTCrendered a decision granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Can the spouses adopt the minors.
Ruling:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the
exceptional cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read
alongtogether with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except
in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2)
When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive
Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603 had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly
adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now
expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When
one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife
jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall
be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO

GR.No. 94147 June 8, 1994
Facts:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt
the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from
November 2, 1989 upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and
custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and
educate her son. The RTC granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The
Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No.
209expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of
E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185.
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks
to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be
read along together with Article 184.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. ALARCON VERGARA

GR. No. 95551 March 20, 1997
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition
before the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13
and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the
United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga.
His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two
children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the
adoption.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the
spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule,
aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from
adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three afore
quoted exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt
with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina
was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from
the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a
former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may
jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint
adoption and making it now mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.
Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not
petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must
also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar,
for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain
the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle
and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

GR No. 164948 June 27, 2006
Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia
Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2
children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being
supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner
failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to
prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptee’s biological mother
Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of
the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover,
abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27,
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the
Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned
of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for
legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then
left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving “rights of visitation at all
reasonable times and places” to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.Upon learning of the
petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition
thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were “too meager” compared to
theirs, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his
beloved children.”
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody
over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished
custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The
court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary. In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s
rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t
abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for
adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs. JUDGE ANTONIO

M. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997
Facts:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses
were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings
and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on
the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have
been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and
recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when
the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD
in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have
any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent
judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore,
there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to
coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.
Issue:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social
welfare officer of the court?
Ruling:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a
case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds,
after such case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary
measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by
judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance
with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts
hearing adoption cases:
(1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency,
of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already
filed;
(2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall
coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the
preparation and submittal of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and
social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that
respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have
been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary
competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was
routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption
proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was
observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in

jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption,
after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an
unfortunate childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal
terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself
a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in
the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent
Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ

Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to
Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to
his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the
change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to
each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further
contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of
right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this
would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor
being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of
causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging
protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against
the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of
action in a single petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or
proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Ruling:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1)
For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name
being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable
in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be
granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate
remedy available under our remedial law system.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime
B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old,
who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed
with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the
first name this was mistakenly registered as “MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional
ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of
its plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because
that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to
file a separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for
them as well as for the Government and the Courts."
Issue:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the
minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court,
correctly did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both
the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied
with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor,
is void and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s
surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the
Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion
for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of
Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
Facts:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix
Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will
before the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to
all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased
brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following
grounds. Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor
had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision
admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico
void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the
testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Issue:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding.
Ruling:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will,
because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner
thereof.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
LAHOM vs. SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
Facts:
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and
pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his
death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by
petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent continued
using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his
records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M.
Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in
connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her
household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but
respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last
three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view
of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support
from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards
petitioner which is not expected of a son.
That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces
whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by
their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable

relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil
Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection
towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of
petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"
Issue:
Can the adoption be rescinded?
Ruling:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right
to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex
sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
SUPPORT
LAM vs. CHUA

G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and
Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua
Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home,
indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to
agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of
present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated
in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null
and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support
Ruling:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to
include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on
March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his
Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor
child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines
Issue:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child.
He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and
during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such
that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as
the biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she
cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in
Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister
temporary custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is
studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was
pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold
Departure Order," alleging therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor
so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack
of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity
QUIMIGING vs. ICAO

G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 2970
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120
per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in
Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that
“no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen’s complaint.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations
and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus,
she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao.
FRANCISCO vs. ZANDUETA

G.R. No. 43794 August 9, 1935
Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario
Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case,
alleging that he is the latter’s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied
the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his
baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenio’s birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an
order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was
denied, hence the writ for certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein
petitioner, in compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during the
pendency of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his
status as petitioner’s son

Ruling:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner’s counsel really agreed to have him pay
the pension during the case’s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case
of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can
be derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his guardian ad
litem, his civil status as the petitioner’s son. As such, no right of support can be given because
the very civil status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in question.
It held that “(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a
person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof
that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the
former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a
simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final
judgment.” Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly
support in light of herein private respondent’s absence of aforementioned status.
SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
Facts:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children
with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had
four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein
private respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was
married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the
estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the
amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials
and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners
opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that they
have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and
the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.
Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed
another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito,
all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a
sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of
their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of
private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children
included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the
last four minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should
have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment
of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition
of the petitioners.
Issue:
a) Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
b) Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing?
Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be
regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the
New Civil Code.
Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to
follow the precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and
private respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.
GOTARDO vs. BULING

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
Facts:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and
support endent lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer,
the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties’ failure to amicably settle
the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a
casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth
to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide
support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of
and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed
her complaint for compulsory recognition and support endent lite.
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of
August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months)
when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of the
case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support,
retroactive from March 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should provide support.
Ruling:
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one’s
filiation may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name
has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
[testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the
amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.
WHEN IS SUPPORT DEMANDABLE
LACSON vs. LACSON

G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on
December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they
stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her
brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house
of Lea’s mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to
1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their
own.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.
Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents,
Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay
support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand
having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to
complete his point:Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the
time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be
paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing
of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective
demand for support was made upon him
LIM vs. LIM

G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009
Facts:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano
Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children
with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the
in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising
situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for
support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.
Ruling:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit
their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.
Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority,
petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.
VERCELES vs. POSADA

G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor
of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioner’s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office
starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de
Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to
attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My
Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they
would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started
making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room
where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid
of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks
was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proof of filiation.
Ruling:
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are
as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of
petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In
addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and
testimonies, to us, is convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s
illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no
evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters
MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children
Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support
pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner
and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in
Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only
19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New
Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of
her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had
totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to
enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her
daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University
and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year,
broken down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina
Issue:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support
Ruling:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the
second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters,
on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina
as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.
DE GUZMAN vs. PEREZ

G.R. No. 156013 July 25, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying
law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent
became pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2,
1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman
with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the
second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000
to help defray the cost of the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these
instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, private respondent
accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only
because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school.
However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her
and Robby’s needs. The child’s continued education thus became uncertain.
Issue:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his
station in life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect
Ruling:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not
depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any
parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family’s station
in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or her own
parental duties.
Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield
himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge
against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code." The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime
(known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY
LACSON vs. LACSON

G.R. No. 150644 August 28,
2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born onDecember
4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa,
petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to
seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with
Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her brother Noel
Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea’s
mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a
period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December
10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his
promise of support, despite Lea’s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit,
though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses.
Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward’s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave
small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took
up nursing at St. Paul’s College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of
her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully
employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since
1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward’s failure and neglect, their mother had,
from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify,
Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00to P600,000.00.
In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their
needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land
he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also
blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed
for in the complaint.
As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and
Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and
other conditions set forth in the court’s corresponding order of May 13, 1996. The RTC rendered
on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that
judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant
father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support
in arrears. In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to
Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the
petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with
right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between
the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from
unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.
Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide
respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters
have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to
have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong
done the herein respondents who are no less petitioner’s daughters.
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE
ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

1996
Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs: (a.)
Edmond Ruiz – only son; (b.) Maria Pilar Ruiz – adopted daughter; (c.) Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz. Testator
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately
distributed among Ruiz and respondents. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action
for the probate of his father's holographic will. Four years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a
petition for the probate and approval of the deceased’s will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence. The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator
bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court
ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments
totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. Edmond
moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the
estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00. Edmond withdrew his opposition to
the probate of the will. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00 Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch
Clerk of Court. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due
to Edmond’s lack of opposition. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but
only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances
for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their
share in the inheritance. CA sustained probate court’s order.
Issues:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment
of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority:
a) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren
b) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
c) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
Ruling:
No. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Allowance to widow and
family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance
as are provided by law.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors
c. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had
not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained.
d. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of
the estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make
such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.
ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet
been inventoried and appraised.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and
settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law
e. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by
petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to
his motion for release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the
August 26, 1993 order of the said court.
ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and
legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother
and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful
heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the
probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
cases.
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS

REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28,
1979
Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on
June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt,
wherein she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her
driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support
pendente lite for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support
on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-
Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for
reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the
pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive.
The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made
the husband appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.
Ruling:
Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will
not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the
pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the
case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the
period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the
accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and
because it wasn’t excessive.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children,
namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and
Suzanne had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends.
The legal conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation
rights. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him visitorial rights
to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays.
The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out
without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTC’s decision to the
Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She
eventually immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA, stated that
as alleged by Suzanne, Silva’s womanizing would have a negative influence on the children.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.
Ruling:
The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon
City RTC’s decision favoring Silva’s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne’s written
permission. The Supreme Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his
illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children. The Court clarified: “Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and
legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents;
neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither
the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to
the well-being of the child.”
The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of the
Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of
the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right
is personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva
(the father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but this
favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority
from immigrating to Holland with her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay
child support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father of the illegitimate child can
agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation, then there will be no problem. In case of
disagreement however, the father must file a petition asking the court to settle the terms and
conditions.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate
daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where
she found a work as a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March
1992, the court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May
1992, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the
judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court
issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for
custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let
Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme
Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of
law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the
mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had
not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that
Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship
proceeding?
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision.
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213
of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in
both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in
Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As
explained by the Code Commission: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the
rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than
seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent,
or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of
the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find
that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental
custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings,
and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in
a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best
position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet
another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded
the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.
VANCIL vs. BELMES

G.R. No. 132223 June 19,
2001
Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on
1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-
law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship

proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the
RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the
Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in
actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag,
Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the
petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American
citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or
to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential
right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code
provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor
Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’
a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia’s claim to
be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority
pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in
case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and
has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting
her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia
merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in
partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject
of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone
else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the
estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with
this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent
to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to
the jurisdiction of our courts here.
BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY

2001
Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married
on February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21,
1987, or four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion.
However, the conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13,
1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a
Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In
1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than
two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile
Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from
the court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City .
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names
changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to
Amouage Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses,
and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that
Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come
home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him
but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from
school.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for
nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further
orders from said court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is
applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth
and Sabrina by conversion.
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not
apply to this case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found
petitioner unworthy to care for her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was
capable both personally and financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a
Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws
of Islam in the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any
parent are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children, and [2] the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial
support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
parents.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to

Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-
Muslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the
Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy
environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides
that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children.
Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally
separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and
fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate children.
SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the
couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely
Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while
Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the
custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later,
Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US
with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child
was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned
Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate
transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria
entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely
temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in
Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was
brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner
did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not
be discharged as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The
spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and
imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed,
without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who
claimed to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of
petitioner’s complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the
child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named
Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn’t
entirely sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the
respondents to deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues
raised by respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem
respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the
mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the
circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount
consideration in this case which involves child custody.
The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?
Ruling:
Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the
nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite
under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that
“except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.”
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.”
Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we
have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free
will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right
of custody over a child.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all
depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of
custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the
petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in
the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.
Petition is dismissed.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the
CA which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor
daughter Simone.
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in
Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their
conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring
their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to
Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce
Simone in court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with
Agnes of their minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody
in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and
below.
Ruling:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
custody of the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article
213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s
unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor
child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s
custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother,
petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO

G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005
Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost
4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his
school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to
appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for
the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another
witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded
the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take
into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.” No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that
when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art
363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who
was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents
herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through
deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to
his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art.
214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when
both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been
successfully shown by private respondents.
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
Ruling:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of
a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of
the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove
petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father
is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at
the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to
allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts
of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws,
though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
GOLANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124724 December 22, 1997
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos
Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
couple had two children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a
hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July 21, 1994,
the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation rights of at
least one week in a month. Thereafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed
the order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals
affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this Court. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved
to dismiss the petition for failure of petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had
been committed by the appellate court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. She sought redress due to an alleged
incident on July 5, 1995, in which her estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. Due
to the incident, a criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was filed on July 1995 against
Rene by his son Justin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati on the basis of Justin’s
complaint-affidavit. On August 16, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
against him and set the hearing of the motion. After it was decided in favor of Luisa, Rene filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995
order.
Issue:
Whether or not Rene is denied of due process of law.
Ruling:
The trial court gave both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence and
witnesses. An adequate hearing was conducted and, based on the evidence, the trial court
deemed it proper to grant the writ of preliminary injunction.
The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction involves findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive
determination.
It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons
dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real
evidence, as well as to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying in the case.
This Supreme Court finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the
reversal of the trial court’s declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioner. The petition was partially granted.
DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced
him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his
house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked
Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie
agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled
Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie
filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
Issue:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule
102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as
the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each
other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the
case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody
of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against
her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other
than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under
the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled
to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody
of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an
illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her
rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Art.213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to
support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the
grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give
support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in
the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the
mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over
him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his
child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(private respondent).

ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as
a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo
was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a
brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the
United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born
on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of
giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo
and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the
Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by
his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her
family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting
the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children
be granted.
Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the
custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already
caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values
against the children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom
they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The
children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.
PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 118870 March 29, 1996
Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a
registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa
finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in
the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had
only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and
that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick
mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs
there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely
solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay
here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it
would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation
by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued
an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s
father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.
Issue:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?
Ruling:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also
contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
“SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife
are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care,
custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as
will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of
moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years
of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefor.”
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6
of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the
welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working
mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well,
applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to
qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as
the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic,
works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the
love and care that a mother gives to his child.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R.No. 70890 September 18, 1992
Facts:
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single
gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The
respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the
respondent Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility
in monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by
means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly
checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 85044 June 3, 1992
Facts:
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a
civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt
the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This
petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere
filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint,
ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
Issues:
a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant petition.
b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal
had been filed out of time.
Ruling:
Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit
or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental
authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of
parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.
In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged
with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
“Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil code”.
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON

G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011
Facts:
This case is about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a
student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and
not move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion
teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three
religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising
him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again
and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on
the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. She also
made the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose
and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil
Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic
Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action
for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed
Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for
moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of
P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of
damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin
for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
Ruling:
No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers
to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade
three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in
public schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons
had not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility
of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records,
certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came
from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the
students. They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a
classroom evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have
sufficient opportunity to observe her.
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE vs. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010
Facts:
While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the class where respondent Miranda
belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings
under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the
adviser is Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately
secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson,
who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by
looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his
group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound
in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts
of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically
burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his
medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, his wound had not completely healed
and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother,
who was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares
and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.00.
Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a
result of his injury due to the petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and
diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.
Ruling:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason’s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the
conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher
degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph
College will not exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of
inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process
for hiring and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for
conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the
teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools
should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More
importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from
expected risks and anticipated dangers.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
Facts:
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive
for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were
riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and
a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a
result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from
the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James
Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy
before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the
school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of
negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
Facts:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives
and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and
deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending
all his expectations and his life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their
respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
Issue:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
the death of Alfredo Amadora.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo
singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old
academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with
the students.
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable
as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or
heads of the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices.
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because
there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he
waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance.
Also, the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required
to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.
SALVOSA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-70458 October 5, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon.
Salvosa being the (Executive Vice President of BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of
the Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the school’s ROTC Unit.
As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He
received orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an
employee (officer) of the AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of
BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a
result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime
of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
under Article2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Ruling:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of
such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands,
to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]."
Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180— 'so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school ,
including recess time." In line with the case of Palisoc , a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A"recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities
where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not
include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without
more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody'
of the school, as contemplated in the law.

Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to
have been "at attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon
Castro. . Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held
solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
Facts:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the school’s academic community, while
in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a
suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the
attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action
against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
Ruling:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article
2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence
of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in
loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils
or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present
case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose
acts the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved
form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a

contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe
its rules and regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is
therefore held liable for his death.
Petition denied.
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE
REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R.
Rallonza, the following entries appears in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria
Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity
of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport
with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request
to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
However, the petitioner’s request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition to
change her surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname “Rallonza” to her middle name
“Remo” in her passport.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases
enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she
may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married
woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which
is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of
title xiii of the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet
in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.
Wherefore, the court denied the petition andaffirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE
YASIN vs. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law
of the Philippines, filed a petition to the respondent court, a petition to resume the use of her
maiden name and surname. The petition was denied by the respondent court on the ground that
the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule
103 Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be granted as it would
result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for
change of name.
Ruling:
The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should
not be applied to judicial conformation of the right of divorced woman to resume her maiden
name and surname. Wherefore the petition is granted.
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN, ARTICLES 364-369, CIVIL CODE
IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mother’s middle name and surname, and that she is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed
to Garcia her mother’s surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial
Court did not allow the use of her mother’s surname as her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a
motion for clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her middle
name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The Court ruled
that since no law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to
use as middle name the mother’s surname, the Court found no reason why Stephanie should not
allowed to use her mother’s surname Garcia as her middle name.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG

GR.No.159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a
petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best
interest to drop his middle name as this would help him adjust more easily to integrate himself
into Singaporean society.
Issue:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be changed.
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable
cause for which the change is sought. to justify a request for the change of name, the petitioner
must show not only some proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for the change of name which have been held
valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce. b.) When the change results as a legal consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
and was not aware of the alien parentage.
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA

ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
Facts:
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed
from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a
copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for
the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General,
Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the
Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the
same for resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit
A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte On June 15, 1952; she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the
St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and
her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling, she
used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at
Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After
graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of
Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was
registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under
the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.
Issue:
Whether or not she may be allowed for the change of name and her surname.
Ruling:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if
proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such
name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The
fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname
does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to
Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte.
Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname
from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of
the Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. If
another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared
her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of
name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to
the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME
PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA

G.R. No. 164368 April 2, 2009
Facts:
December 27, 1994, at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City, while the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man from the crowd walked towards the
center of the altar and sat on the Bishop’s chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant, saw
this. He requested the accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite
repeated request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim with his
nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it
a lot. After, he got up and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a
man, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to
drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the
hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” where he claims that: prosecution

failed to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; and that accused-
appellant was of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the court to allow
accused-appellant, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should
remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was
pending, counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental
and Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had
been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden
requesting the same. The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the “Demurrer to
Evidence.” Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at
the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the accused being confined and diagnosed with
“Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.”
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence
and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death,
Issue:
Whether or not he was indeed insane
Ruling:
When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have been done
voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability
unless he has acted during a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he
who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence.
There are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant
may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he attacked Mararac, then
went up the microphone.
Accused-appellant’s history of mental illness was brought to the courts.
To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct matters to be
determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a
legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing
should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, when
accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accused’s mental
condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on
appellant were intelligently answered by him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer
the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to
stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the
sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other
expert equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the medical history was not enough to create
a reasonable doubt in the judge’s mind of accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial,
subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, there
were letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well as the counsel’s filing of
motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellant’s state of mind, the
judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-
appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to death!
At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate
appellant’s mental condition at the time of the crime’s commission for him to avail of the
exempting circumstance of insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-
appellant’s competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in
his trial meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental
examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for
further proceedings.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME
URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,

1996
Facts:
Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in
receiving the copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was
discovered and reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be
accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as ”An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modification of sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of
Commonwealth Act No. 142.
Ruling:
No. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was
reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered
at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A
man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows
and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and
these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the
reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat
the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not
constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is
prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against
the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476 February 2,
2012
Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng
who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26,
1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July
22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to
Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted
a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does
not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic
records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the
birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and
2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using
the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by
alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of
the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was
published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November
7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered
by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. By Decision of
January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July
2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure
question of law.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be
made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
b) Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the
name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule
103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In
Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been
known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however.
She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the
present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status
in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then
would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of
respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City.
And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows,
neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he
failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the
case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have
as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any
interest that would be affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first
notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may
be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are
mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-
quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which
to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose
precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded
under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out.
LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001
Facts:
On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of money was filed by the International
Corporate Bank, Inc. against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales Jr., and Tomas
Gonzales who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills
(ALFA), Ramon C. Lee (ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice president)
on 17 March 1986. On 17 September 1987, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion to dismiss the third
party complaint which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated
27 June 1988. On 18 July 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to the third party complaint.
Meanwhile, on 12 July 1988, the trial issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias summons
upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of Lee and Lacdao's letter informing the court
that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon them considering that the management
of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988, the DBP
claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not
taken over the company which has a separate and distinct corporate personality and existence.
On 4 August 1988, the trial court issued an order advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take
the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA. On 16 August 1988, Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al. filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of
Summons which the trial court granted on 17 August 1988.
On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion for reconsideration submitting
that the Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no
longer officers of ALFA and Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. should have availed of another mode
of service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper
service upon ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of
summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for
reconsideration and requiring ALFA to file its answer through Lee and Lacdao as its corporate
officers. On 19 January 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by Lee and Lacdao
reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and
directors of ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or
on behalf of ALFA. In support of their second motion for reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao
attached thereto a copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA (Lee
and Lacdao included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the
management and control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the trial
court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order dated 2 January 1989 and declared that
service upon Lee and Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot be
considered as proper service of summons on ALFA. On 15 May 1989, Sacoba Manufacturing, et.
al. moved for a reconsideration of the Order which was affirmed by the court in is Order dated
14 August 1989 denying Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration.
On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by Sacoba

Manufacturing, et. al. before the Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, resolved to give due
course thereto on 21 September 1989. On 17 October 1989, the trial court, not having been
notified of the pending petition for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order declaring
as final the Order dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. in the said Order were
required to take positive steps in prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court
would not be constrained to dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on 25
October 1989 Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial
court took no further action. On 19 March 1990, after Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to
Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for certiorari, the appellate court rendered its decision,
setting aside the orders of trial court judge dated 25 April 1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April
1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court which
resolved to deny the same on 10 May 1990. Lee and Lacdao filed the petition for certiorari. In
the meantime, the appellate court inadvertently made an entry of judgment on 16 July 1990
erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a motion for reconsideration has been
pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in its Resolution dated 3
January 1991, the appellate court set aside the aforestated entry of judgment after further
considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the Supreme Court pursuant to
the Supreme Court's.
Issue:
a) Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement by Lee and Lacdao whereby all their
shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholder of
their positions as directors of the corporation.
b) Whether the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986
so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso facto
reverted to Lee and Lacdao as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section
59 of the new Corporation Code.
c) Whether there was proper service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, to
bind ALFA.
Ruling:
Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all
their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, Lee
and Lacdao ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as
required under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do
with the management of the enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be directors. Hence, the
transfer of their shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of
ALFA. The transfer of shares from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the
subject voting trust agreement. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and
the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stocks covered by the agreement to the DBP as
trustee, the latter because the stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In
the absence of a showing that the DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of
stock for the purpose of qualifying as directors of ALFA, Lee and Lacdao can no longer be
deemed to have retained their status as officers of ALFA which was the case before the
execution of the subject voting trust agreement. There is no dispute from the records that DBP
has taken over full control and management of the firm.
The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code reads that "Unless
expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the
end of the agreed period, and the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the
name of the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock
shall be reissued in the name of the transferors." However, it is manifestly clear from the terms
of the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is
contingent upon the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the five-year
period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred an its
rights, titles and interests in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated 24 January 1989 of the
Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is
stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had handled s account which included ALFA's assets
pursuant to a management agreement by and between the DBP and APT. Hence, there is
evidence on record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao
on 21 August 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the
legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.
It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the role on service of processes on a
corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court
processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the
existence of a corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The rationale of the rule is
that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make
it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with
any legal papers served on him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao do not fall under any of the enumerated
officers. The service of summons upon ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is not valid.
To rule otherwise will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by
such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.
IN RE CHARGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG

G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa
Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/ or correction/
cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to
drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to
Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle
name as this would help him to adjust easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society.
Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his registered name on
the cause mentioned.
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable
cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable r extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b.) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c.) When the change will avoid confusion;
d.) When the one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
Facts:
Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth
certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-
assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from
“Rommel” to “Mely.”
Issue:
Should the court allow the change of name?
Ruling:
No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the
determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held
that “while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its
effect. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.”
The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will have serious and wide-
ranging legal and public policy consequences,” i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to
women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code, etc.
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

Facts:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such
that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name
“Jennifer Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female
characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and
menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person.

Issue:
Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.
Ruling:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that
where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering
him as a male.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF

HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner, Ma. Cristina’s husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident
in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. Onthe annotation of Patrick’s birth certificate
reflects Patrick as having been acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito)as son on January 13, 1997,
that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22,1998 at
Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular Braza.Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a
copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998,
drawing her and her co-petitioners (her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file on December
23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himalayan City, Negros Occidental a petition to
correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille andPablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting
marriage between Ma. Cristinaand Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) thecorrection of the entriesin
Patrick's birth record with respect to hislegitimation, the name of the father and his
acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) adirective to Leon, Cecilia and
Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, tosubmit Patrick to DNA
testingto determine his paternity and filiations; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, thedeclaration of the
marriage of Lucille andPablo as bigamous. TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is notacting as a family court under the
Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the courtmay pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy even in anaction to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Ruling:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacyand filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Courtvis a visArticle 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure
by which anentry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generallybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk ora transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that isclearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentiousalterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded anddue
process is properly observed. The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration
of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void forbeing bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy,
which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 butby A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively,hence, the petition
should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.It is well to emphasize that,
doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can bequestioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attacksuch as the
petition filed before the courta quo.

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Persons and

Persons and Family Relation 1

Persons and Family Relation 2

Persons and Family Relation 3

Persons and Family Relation 4

Persons and Family Relation 5

Persons and Family Relation 6

Persons and Family Relation 7

Persons and Family Relation 8

Persons and Family Relation 9

Persons and Family Relation 10

Persons and Family Relation 11

Persons and Family Relation 12

Persons and Family Relation 13

Persons and Family Relation 14

Persons and Family Relation 15

Persons and Family Relation 16

Persons and Family Relation 17

Persons and Family Relation 18

Persons and Family Relation 19

LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO

Persons and Family Relation 20

LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

Persons and Family Relation 21

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON. PRESIDING

Persons and Family Relation 22

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B.

On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of

Persons and Family Relation 23

JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO

Persons and Family Relation 24

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.

Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.,

Persons and Family Relation 25

Persons and Family Relation 26

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

Persons and Family Relation 27

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

Persons and Family Relation 28

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

Persons and Family Relation 29

Persons and Family Relation 30

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO

Persons and Family Relation 31

YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES

Persons and Family Relation 32

LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Persons and Family Relation 33

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs. V.P.

On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex

Persons and Family Relation 34

Persons and Family Relation 35

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Persons and Family Relation 36

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

BERNABE vs. ALEJO

Persons and Family Relation 37

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF

Persons and Family Relation 38

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO

Persons and Family Relation 39