Sage Publications, Inc.

The Politics of Agonism: A Critical Response to "Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and
the Aestheticization of Political Action" by Dana R. Villa
Author(s): Bonnie Honig
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 528-533
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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CRITICAL RESPONSES
EDITOR'SNOTE: Dana Villa'sessayonArendtand Nietzsche
intheMay1992issueofPolitical
Theoryengendered
a largenumber ofcriticalresponses.
I am sorrythatspace considerations
prevent
mefrompublishingthemalL.

THE POLITICS OF AGONISM

A CriticalResponseto "BeyondGood and Evil:
Arendt,Nietzsche,and theAestheticization
ofPoliticalAction"byDana R. Villa

BONNIEHONIG
HarvardUniversity

IN A RECENTESSAY,Dana Villa' walks HannahArendt'spolitical

thoughtalong a tightrope betweentwo abysses.To save her fromthe
dialogicalconsensualism ofherHabermasian he stressesthe
appropriators,
Nietzscheandimensionsof Arendt'saccountof action,in particular, its
nonsovereignty. But, lest Arendtfall intothe "creepingsubjectivism of
Nietzsche'spurelyagonistic model"(p. 288),Villathenstresses
Arendt'sturn
to Kant,in whosetheoryof tasteandjudgmentshe soughtthestability
and reassuranceof a sensuscommunisthatNietzscheand postmodern
Nietzscheansare said to dismisswithimpatience. The result(mycritical
responsenotwithstanding) is an elegantand commanding accountof an
agonistic,aestheticizedactionthatgoes "beyondgood and evil" without
fallingintothetrapofnihilisticsubjectivism.
Atthebeginning ofhisessay,havingreached"theheartoftheissue,"Villa
saysthat"Arendt's uniqueness ... canonlybe measured througha sustained
investigationof theNietzscheandimension, proand contra,of herwork"

AUTHOR'S NOTE: ThankstoSteveJohnston

and TracyStrong on earlier
fortheircomments
draftsofthisessay.

POLITICAL THEORY,Vol.21 No. 3 August1993 528-533

? 1993Sage Publications,
Inc.
528

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 Honig/POLITICS OF AGONISM 529

(p. 275). My aiminthisresponseis tosuggestthatmuchremainstobe done

onthisfront. Villa'scontrast ofNietzsche's"excessiveagonism"withArendt's
more"tame"variety (p. 288) producesmisleading readings ofbothNietzsche
and Arendtin whichtheinstitutionalism of boththinkers is neglectedand
is and
theiraestheticism overdrawn depoliticized.
Forexample,is Villacorrect thatKantian judgment is themechanism that
savesArendtian agonismfromsubjectivism? Arethereno otherpracticesor
institutions thatconditionand stabilizeactionon Arendt'saccount?What
about actionin concert,promising, forgiveness, law, the public-private
distinction, foundings, constitution-making, and amendment? The problem
is notmerelythatVillaleavestheseelements outofhisaccount.No reading
can includeeverything. The problemis thatVilla privileges judgmentas a
solutionto a problemArendtneverquitewantedto solve:theunruliness of
to
action,itsexcess,itsresistance beingcaptured-tamed-byanyperspec-
tive,interpretation, or story.
Thereis a tensionin Arendt'sthought betweentheboundlessactionshe
celebratesand theboundary-drawing functions of promising, forgiveness,
constitutions (all themselves formsorproducts ofaction),judgment, law,and
thepublic/private distinction. The tensionis a siteofcontestina democratic
regime,a sitefromwhichactionis generated. ButVilladoes notinvestigate
thattension.Instead,he resolvesit.He tamestheArendtian agon,bycon-
trastingit withan "excessive,""unrestricted," "uncritical"agonismand
subjectivism thathe attributes to a particularly wild-eyedNietzsche.The
contrast makesArendtian judgment looksuccessfulas a deviceofdomesti-
cation,anditmakesus thankful thatsheprovidedit.
It is undoubtedly truethatArendtherselftendedto relyon thisvery
contrast to distinguish herown accountfromNietzsche's.But herdebtto
Nietzscheis morecomplicatedthanVilla allows. Villa's uncriticaland
approving redeployment oftheradicallysubjectivist,nihilisticNietzschethat
Arendtoftenpresupposesprevents us fromappreciating thecomplexity of
Arendt'srelationto Nietzschebecause it stopsus fromaskingcritically
whether Nietzsche's agonismis really"excessive"and"antipolitical" (p. 276).
Once we pose thesequestions,however, otheraspectsofNietzscheanagon-
ism surfaceand ourunderstanding of theArendt-Nietzsche engagement is
deepenedandcomplicated.
Is Nietzsche'sagonismexcessive?In an earlyessay,"Homer'sContest,"
Nietzscheshowsthesamelove of theworldanddevotionto thecontestas
Arendt, thesamefearthattheagon'swinners couldshutdowntheagonand
fracture theforcesthat,united,havethepowerto maintain and preserveit.
Herehe espousesnota radicalsubjectism buta commitment to therespon-
siblemaintenance of a public,sharedspace of appearancesforthesake of

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530 POLITICAL THEORY /August1993

thecontest itenablesandsecures.Thisagonismis notunrestricted. Nietzsche

endorsestheancientGreek practice of ostracism to protect the agon from
domination by a single"individual who towers above the rest."2 For him,
ostracism evidencesnotan intolerance ofexcellence but a commitment to its
(re)production. By preserving theagon,ostracism secureda structured op-
portunity forindividuals totestthemselves anddeveloptheirowndistinctive
excellences.The agonprovidedtheplurality, equality, andcommonality-
thefreedom fromdomination-that bothNietzscheandArendt positas the
necessary conditions ofvirtuosic action.
The Nietzschewhowrote"Homer'sContest"is stillverymuchin evi-
denceinhislaterworks.In On theGenealogyofMorals,Nietzscheendorses
a conception oflaw whosevirtueis itspowerto imposemeasureand limit
an otherwiseunrestricted agonism,stabilizingan orderedsite of contest
without dominating it.Andscattered throughout his workareremarks that
echo Machiavelliin theiradmiration forRome and their reverence for
institutionsas wellas for the human capacitytofound, organize, and maintain
communities of knowledgeor power.3Villa makesno mentionof these
elements inNietzsche's thought.Indeed,hisrepeated references toNietzsche's
(and thepostmodern Nietzscheans') for
thirst will to power and Dion'ysian
fluxdo much toocclude them (pp. 276, 290-91,299). They must be occluded
ifVillais tosustainhisclaimthatArendt's turntotastejudgment underlines
thefalsenessofthe"Nietzschean dichotomy betweena universal, metaphys-
icallygrouned metadiscourse and a fragmented, postmetaphysical discursive
realm[driven by]thewilltopower"(p. 301).Thedichotomy is,indeed,false,
butitis notNietzsche's:Nietzsche'sownreverence foragonistic institutions
cutsacrossit.
And Arendtherselfknewthat,notin The Lifeof theMind,whereshe
wronglyaccuses Nietzscheof emasculating the will,butin The Human
Condition, whereshe praisesNietzscheforseeing"withunequaledclarity
theconnection betweenhumansovereignty andthefaculty ofmakingprom-
ises." FromNietzsche,Arendtborrowsnotonlythestabilizing practiceof
promising, theorized byNietzscheinthesecondessayofGenealogy, butalso
thatof forgiveness, a processof "constantmutualrelease"theorizedby
Nietzscheas a practiceofdismissing inthefirstessayofGenealogy.4 In the
place ofostracism, promising andforgiveness protect theArendtian agon-
thespace of freeand meaning-generative action-fromforcesthatmight
overwhelm it,fromthedomination ofa singlegreatfigure, passion,resent-
ment,orideology.Together thesepracticesbringsomepredictability to the
agonandsoftentheeffects ofaction'sboundlessness without domesticating
thecontingency thatis action'snecessaryconditionand without depriving
actionofitsexhilaration andgenerative power.Theydo not"tame"theagon

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 Honig/POLITICS OF AGONISM 531

(no morethanjudgment does); theycondition and structureitin waysthat

aremoreinternal toagonisticactionthaneventastejudgment is.5
ButArendt'stheorization ofpromising andforgiveness doesdepartfrom
Nietzsche in one important respect:the forgivingand promisingthat
Nietzscheprizesareindividualendeavors.Nietzsche'spromiser bindshim-
self in time;he commitshimselfto some futureactionbut notto other
persons.Andthedismissing of Nietzsche'slordsis a shrugofindifference
thatin no wayconstitutes an ongoingrelationship betweenthemandothers;
on thecontrary, itis meantto wardoffpreciselythat.By contrast, Arendt's
forgiving andpromising constitute lastingpoliticalcommunities; promising
bindssometoothersintimeandforgiving empowers thosebondstosurvive
evenin thefaceof action'sunpredictabilities. Arendttheorizes forgiveness
and promising forthesake ofa politicsof founding thatNietzschethought
could not (and shouldnot) take place in the inhospitable conditionsof
modernity.
Does thatmean thatNietzscheis, as Villa suggests,committed to a
"fragmented, postmetaphysical discursiverealm [drivenby] the will to
power"afterall? Arendtoftenthought so.6 But to leave matters thereis to
leaveunexplored oneofthe most suggestive aspectsoftheArendt-Nietzsche
engagement. IfNietzsche'saestheticism is forindividualsandnotforgroups,
ifitseffectis to individuate andevenisolatepersonsrather thanbindthem
together,thatis not,contraVilla,simplybecauseNietzschewastoobeholden
to an "aesthetics of existence"in whichhis "positively valorizednotionof
. . . than
difference remainspoetic"rather political,hisartistry isolatedrather
thanpublic(p. 300). It is becauseNietzschethought-asdid Arendt, often
enough-thaninan age likeours,whenever peoplegathertogether (whether
as actorsoras judgingspectators) theconditions ofmassnessbeginto setin.
Arendtthought thatthebestresponsetothispredicament was toretrieve the
possibilityofan authentic politicalactioncapableofresisting theriseofthe
social and theadministration of thelate modernstateby establishing new
communities ofmeaningandnewsitesofresistance. Nietzscherejectedthis
optionnotbecausehe was first, last,andforemost a radicalsubjectivistbut
becausehe thought thata periodofpreparation andbreedingmustprecede
theadventof greatpolitics.7 Throughaestheticself-discipline, individuals
mustworkon themselves andtransform theirnegativewilltovengeanceinto
positivecreativity. In the absence of properpreparation and individual
self-discipline (whichNietzschesometimes referstoas a periodofrecovery
andconvalescence),politicalactionwillinevitably sinkintoressentiment.
For Villa, Nietzsche'sprojectof self-fashioning standsas a "crucial
limitation"of "his contribution to thinking pluralityand difference in a
politicalway" (p. 300). But,Nietzschemightwellrespond,this(aesthetic)

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532 POLITICAL THEORY /August1993

preparation is a necessaryconditionof a possiblepoliticsin modernity: a

prelude.8 Moreover, thelatemodemNietzschean mightadd,theprojectof
aestheticpreparation is itselfpolitical(notprepolitical)becauseitspractices
of self-fashioning challengeexistingdistributions of power,disruptthe
hegemonicsocial,and proliferate politicalspaceswhentheyinterrupt the
routine,predictability,and repetition on which(on Arendt'sown account)
dominant patternsofprivaterealmidentity depend.
Arendt's insistenceonthepurity ofthepoliticalandhersegregation ofthe
privatefromthepublicpreventherfromseeingthepoliticalcharacter of
Nietzschean preparation. ButintheendthesuccessofArendt's ownpolitical
projectpresupposes thesuccessof Nietzsche'sprojectof individuation (or
ofone likeit).Otherwise, Arendt'sactioninconcertrisksslidingintomass
behavior. Conversely notonlyis theNietzschean projectofself-transforma-
tionitselfalreadypoliticalbut,further, itcannotsucceedwithout thesupport
of agonisticinstitutions like Arendt's.Otherwise, Nietzsche'sprojectof
preparationandtransformation riskslapsingintomerewithdrawalism. Thatis,
indeed,theriskofNietzsche's project-but itisnotnecessarilyitsfate.Arendt's
errorwastomistake theformer forthelatter. is torepeathers.
Villa'serror

NOTES

1. Dana R. Villa,"BeyondGood and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche,and theAestheticizationof

PoliticalAction,"PoliticalTheory20 (1992): 274-308.
2. FriedrchNietzsche, "Homer'sContest," inThePortableNietzsche, translatedandedited
byWalterKaufmann (New York:Viking,1954),36.
3. FriedrichNietzsche,On theGenealogyofMorals(hereafter GM), translated byWalter
Kaufmann and R. J.Hollingdale(New York:Vintage,1969),ii, 12. See also,forexample,The
WilltoPower(hereafter WP),translated byWalterKaufmann andR. J.Hollingdale(New York:
RandomHouse, 1967),#480;The Gay Science,translated by WalterKaufmann (New York:
Vintage,1974),#356.I discussNietzsche's reverence atlength
forinstitutions inPoliticalTheory
and theDisplacement ofPolitics(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity Press,1993),chap.3.
4. HannahArendt, TheHumanCondition (hereafterTHC) (Chicago:University ofChicago
Press,1958),245,240. Arendt Nietzscheforhishostility
criticizes towilling,buthercriticism
turnsinpartonan incomplete quotationfromTheWilltoPower.CompareWilling, vol.2 ofThe
Lifeof theMind,editedby MaryMacCarthy (New York:Harcourt BraceJovanovich, 1978),
170; and WP,#585(A). Her debtto Nietzsche'saccountof promising also tumson a partial
misreading (compareTHC at 245 andthefirst twoaphorisms ofthesecondessayof GM).And
herdebtto Nietzscheon forgiveness is unacknowledged. I argueforit and discusstheseand
otherissuesindetailinPoliticalTheory and theDisplacement ofPolitics,chaps.3 and4.
5. Becauseone ofthethingsthatVillavaluesmostaboutArendt's turntotastejudgment is
thatitmodifiesheraestheticized actioninternally(288), therearegrounds(thesamegrounds)
toprivilegethepracticesofpromising andforgiveness equally.

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 Honig/POLITICS OF AGONISM 533

6. Arendt thoughtNietzscheultimately failedtoappreciatethepowerinherent inpromising

becauseofhis"modemprejudicetosee thesourceofall powerinthewillpoweroftheisolated
individual"(THC, 245). As I arguebelow,thiswas no mereprejudicebuta commitment to a
practiceofpreparationpriorto politicalaction.
7. Nietzsche'stalkof greatpolitics-his allusionsto battle,mastery, and powerand to
greatmen,philosophers,
aristocratic, commanders, and legislators-providethosewhoare so
inclinedwiththeresourcesto treathimas an advocateof masterracedomination. Butthese
elementsof Nietzsche'sthought are ill at ease withhiscommnitment to agonismand withhis
valorizationof practicesof self-command and self-discipline. can be
Neitherinterpretation
sustainedwithoutsubduingsome elementsin Nietzsche'sthinking others.I
and highlighting
agreewithAlanWhite'sformulation: "Letus be as charitable letus
toNietzscheas toAristotle:
grantthatthosewho are mostnoble,admirableand self-affirming will notattemptto exploit
others."White,WithinNietzsche's Labyrinth (New York:Routledge, 1990),130.
8. My view of Nietzscheas a theorist ofpreparation drawson RichardFlathman'sWillful
Liberalism:VoluntarismandIndividuality inPoliticalTheory andPractice(Ithaca,NY: Comell
UniversityPress,1992).

BonnieHonigisAssociateProfessor ofGovernmentat HarvardUniversity.Sheis author

of Politics(CornellUniversity
of PoliticalTheoryand theDisplacement Press,1993)
and is currentlywritinga book on moral and political theoreticaltreatments of
dilemmas.

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