PUBLICATION OF ALL STATUTES IS A CONDITION FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

Tañada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986

FACTS:
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which
are not, that publication means complete publication, and that the publication must be made in the Official
Gazette. The Solicitor General claimed that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil
Code meant that the publication required was not always imperative, and that publication, when necessary, did
not have to be made in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of all laws?

HELD:
Yes, the publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of all laws. Article 2 of the Civil Code
provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. It is not correct
to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.

The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

In this case, the SC ruled that pursuant to such requirement, the following shall be published, as a condition for
their effectivity: all presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the
Constitution, the charter of a city even if it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place, and circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published. On the other
hand, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not
covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

Hence, all laws shall be published in full to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED

De Roy v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988

FACTS:
The RTC found De Roy, petitioner, guilty of gross negligence and was affirmed by the CA. De Roy filed filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied the motion. De Roy contends
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for extension of time. She avers
that the ruling in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. CA, where the Court held the 15-day period for
appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, is not applicable. This is due to the non-
publication of the said decision in the official Gazette as of the time of the promulgation of the decision of the
CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of a Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette necessary for its effectivity

HELD:
No, the publication of an SC decision is not necessary for its effectivity. There is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
CIRCULARS WHICH PRESCRIBE A PENALTY MUST BE PUBLISHED BEFORE BECOMING EFFECTIVE

People v. Que Po Lay

G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:
Petitioner Que Po Lay failed to sell the $7000 in his possession to Central Bank through its agents within one
day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular no. 20. Petitioner contends that
Circular No 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to him, and that
consequently the circular had no force and effect.The Solicitor General opposes the contention stating that the
laws in question do not require such publication.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of Circular No. 20 necessary for its effectivity

HELD:
Yes, the publication of Circular No. 20 necessary. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the 15 th
day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the Civil Code
equally provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. As a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribes a penalty
for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle that before the
public is bound by its contents, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
INTERNAL RULES OR REGULATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED

National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial

G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010

FACTS:
NPC Circular No. 99-75 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced or
ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate additional
income for NPC." NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap
ACR cables. Respondent submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC, but was subsequently denied. Respondent
filed a petition before the RTC for the annulment of the circular as it violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the constitution because it was not published. NPC insists that there was no need to
publish the circular as it was addressed only to the disposal committees, heads of offices, regional and all other
officials involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC Circular No. 99-75 has to be published for its effectivity

HELD:
No, NPC Circular No. 99-75 does not have to be published. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not
involved in the bidding process.
(skipped)
THE PROVISION (SECTION 7, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION) ITSELF EXPRESSLY
PROVIDES THE LIMITATION, I.E. AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
The DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project. In a hearing, De Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri
testified before the Senate Blue Ribbon, where he narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
COMELEC’s Abalos’ bribery attempt, and that she (Arroyo) instructed him not to accept the bribe.
Petitioner, however, refused to answer the following questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project; (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it; and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve, petitioner invoking executive privilege, as laid down in the case of Senate v. Ermita.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 subject questions are covered by executive privilege

HELD:
Yes, the communications are covered by executive privilege. The provision (of the 1987 Constitution) itself
expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. There is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of certain information. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of
the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
PENAL LAWS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

9. Valeroso v. People
G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008

FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, the Central Police District served a warrant of arrest to Valeroso in a case of kidnapping with
ransom. In the course of the arrest, the police found an unlicensed firearm with live ammunition in his
possession. He was then charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866. In 1998, the trial
court convicted Valeroso of the crime charged and imposed a penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 2
months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and a fine of P15,000, pursuant to R.A. No. 8294, which
amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997. When petitioner appealed to the CA, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the retroactive application of R.A. No 8294, which amended P.D. No. 1866, is valid taking into
consideration that P.D. No. 1866 was the governing law at the time the petitioner committed the offense.

HELD:
Yes, the retroactive application of R.A. No. 8294 is valid. In this case, P.D. No. 1866 was the governing law at
the time Valeroso committed and was charged for illegal possession of firearms. P.D. No. 1866 imposes the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua for the said offense. However, R.A.
No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex
post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused.

According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles
on which the right of the State to punish and the commination * of the penalty are based, and regards it not as
an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the
accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
Therefore, as R.A. 8294 is favorable to the accused, its provisions warrant retroactive application. 11
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, LAWS MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

10. Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, et al.,

G.R. No. 104528, January 18, 1996

FACTS:
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc., Notwithstanding
the said land purchase agreements, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots to PNB. Unaware of this,
private respondents duly complied with their obligations and constructed their houses on the lots. The Marikina
Village defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder, the bank became owner of the lots.
Private respondents then filed suits with the HLURB. It ruled that PNB may collect only the remaining
amortizations from private respondents and cannot compel them to pay all over again for the lots they had
already bought from said subdivision developer. In the SC, PNB argues that the Office of the President erred
in applying P.D. No. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was
executed on December 18, 1975.

ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 957 is applicable retroactively to real estate mortgage executed prior to its enactment

HELD:
Yes, P.D. No. 957 is applicable retroactively to real estate mortgage executed prior to its enactment.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."
However, P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here,
executed prior to its enactment, and such intent must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting
innocent purchasers is to be achieved. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions
which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law, as an instrument of social justice, must favor the
weak.
RULINGS, CIRCULARS, RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE HAVE NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IF TO APPLY THEM WOULD PREJUDICE
THE TAXPAYER

11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.

G.R. No. 168129, April 24, 2007

FACTS:
In 1987, the VAT Law took effect. Respondent inquired whether the services it provides are exempt from the
payment of the VAT and petitioner issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that it is exempt from the VAT
coverage. In January 1998, the NIRC of 1997 became effective. In 1999, the BIR sent the respondent an
assessment notice for deficiency taxes for 1996 and 1997. On a petition for review with the CTA, the latter
declared VAT Ruling 231-88 void, and ordered respondent to pay the deficiency VAT. The respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the CTA granted, holding that the revocation of the subject VAT Ruling
cannot be applied retroactively as it would unduly prejudice the respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of the subject VAT Ruling should be applied prospectively

HELD:
Yes, the revocation of VAT Ruling 231-888 should be applied prospectively. Section 246 of the 1997 Tax
Code, as amended, provides that rulings, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the CIR have no
retroactive application if to apply them would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) where
the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
Although the respondent is declared to be subject to VAT, the revocation by the CTA in its 2003 Resolution of
the 1988 VAT Ruling cannot be given retroactive application because it would prejudice the respondent.
skipped
BIR CIRCULARS OR RULINGS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT WHERE THEIR APPLICATION
WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO TAXPAYERS

12. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals

G.R. No. L-52306, October 12, 1981

FACTS:
Petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30% of ½ of the film rentals, as provided under Section
24 (b) of the NIRC. The provision was implemented through Circular No. V-334. Petitioner withheld and turned
over to the BIR the amount of 30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in
trade or business within the Philippines. The last year that petitioner withheld taxes was in 1968. Thereafter,
RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the NIRC increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax
basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross income.” The foregoing was implemented by Circular
No. 4-71, which revoked Circular No. V-334, holding that the latter was erroneous for lack of legal basis
because the tax therein prescribed should be based on gross income without deduction whatever. The CIR
then issued against petitioner an assessment and demand of deficiency withholding income tax on remitted film
rentals for 1965 to 1968. Petitioner requested for a reconsideration and withdrawal of the assessment, but the
CIR instead issued a warrant of distraint and levy over petitioner’s real and personal properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 4-71 be applied retroactively so as to make petitioner liable for deficiency
withholding income tax for the period when Circular No. V-334 was controlling

HELD:
No, Circular No. 4-71 cannot be applied retroactively so as to make petitioner liable for deficiency withholding
income tax for the period of 1965-1968, when the Circular controlling at that time was Circular No. V-334.
Section 327 of the Tax Code provides that any revocation, modification, or reversal of and of the rules and
regulations or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be
given retroactive application if the relocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers ,
except in the following cases: (a) where the taxpayer deliberately mis-states or omits material facts from his
return or any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue: (b) where the facts subsequently
gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based;
or (c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith. In this case, the prejudice to petitioner of the retroactive application
of Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 is beyond question. Petitioner was no longer in a position to withhold taxes
due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and no longer had any control
over them when the new Circular was issued.
WHERE ONE LACKS KNOWLEDGE OF A RIGHT, THERE IS NO BASIS UPON WHICH WAIVER OF IT
CAN REST

13. DM. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

FACTS:
Juego was a construction worker of DMCI. While working on the 14th floor, the hanging platform he was on fell
and crushed him to death. The police report disclosed that the falling of the platform was due to the removal or
getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but
without a safety lock. Juego’s widow, Maria, filed a complaint for damages. DMIC raised the widow’s prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund which precluded her from claiming damages under the
Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code

HELD:
No. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of
it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from
the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tort fees or for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
An exception to said rule is on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the
first remedy. The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or on a mistake of fact nullifies the choice as it
was not an intelligent choice. Respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
STIPULATION WHEREBY STUDENT CANNOT TRANSFER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL WITHOUT
REFUNDING SCHOLARSHIP CASH NULL AND VOID

14. Cui v. Arellano University

G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961

FACTS:
Cui was enrolled at the College of Law at Arellano, where his uncle was the Dean. When his uncle left Arellano
to become a Dean of Abad Santos University (Abad Santos), Cui then enrolled for the last semester of his 4 th
year in Abad Santos and graduated there. Cui, during the time he was studying in Arellano was awarded
scholarship grants. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in Arellano.
The latter refused until after Cui paid back the sum corresponding to the scholarship grants awarded to him.
Cui was made to sign a contract wherein he “waive his right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to Arellano the equivalent of his scholarship cash.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the waiver of right to transfer to another school without refunding the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash” as stipulated in the contract valid?

HELD:
No, the waiver of right stipulated in the contract is not valid as it is against public policy. In order to declare a
contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be
done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals,
or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in the Director of Private
Schools’ Memorandum No. 33, s. 1949 is sound policy stating that scholarships are awarded in recognition of
merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. Scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value but to reward merit or help gifted students in
whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
FOR BEING IMBUED WITH PUBLIC POLICY, POSTING AND PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS
MANDATED BY ACT NO. 3135 MAY NOT BE WAIVED

15. Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc.

G.R. No. 139479, December 27, 2002

FACTS:
PNB granted NPI a P4 Million credit line secured by mortgages on NPI’s properties. The credit line was later
increased to P7.5 Million. NPI defaulted thus PNB sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The auction
sale was re-scheduled several times without need of republication of the notice of sale pursuant to “Agreement
to Postpone Sale” prepared by PNB and signed by both parties. NPI filed an action for annulment of
foreclosure and sale contending that the same is null and void for lack of publication. The RTC ordered the
annulment of the proceedings on the ground that there was lack of publication of the notice of sale, which was
later affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not parties to the mortgage validly made the waiver of posting and publication requirements

HELD:
No, parties to the mortgage have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of Act
No. 3135. Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be
inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the
public interest may be waived. The statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the
mortgagor's benefit, but for the public or third persons. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations
and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.
THE SAME SECTION IN THE OLD LAW NOT BEING RESTATED NOR RE-ENACTED IN THE NEW LAW
WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO IMPLIED REPEAL

16. Mecano v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992

FACTS:
Mecano is a Director II on the NBI and requested reimbursement for his medical expenses on the ground that
he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC. The then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III opined
that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. Mecano then re-submitted
his claim with the copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that "the issuance
of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code,
including the particular Section 699 of the latter." COA denied Mecano’s claim on the ground that Section 699
of the RAC has been repealed by the AC, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-
enacted in the AC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code

HELD:
No, the Administrative Code of 1987 did not repeal or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by
its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. Repeal by implication
proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. The intention to repeal
must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from
the time of the first enactment.

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. Here, it is apparent that the new Code does not
cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code.

Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy
for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. Thus, Section 699 of the RAC not being repealed, COA was ordered to give due course to
Mecano’s claim for benefits.
THE RULE THAT A NEW DOCTRINE ABROGATING AN OLD RULE SHOULD OPERATE
PROSPECTIVELY ONLY HOLDS MORE TRUE IN THE APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS

17. People v. Licera

G.R. No. L-39990, July 22, 1975

FACTS:
In 1961, Licera was granted authority by a governor to possess a Winchester rifle as a peace officer. On 1965,
a criminal charge for illegal possession of Winchester rifle was filed against Licera. The municipal court
convicted him of the said crime. On appeal to the CFI, Licera alleges that the MTC should have relied on the
ruling enunciated in the case of People vs Macarandang (decided in 1959) exempting peace officers from the
requirement relating to firearms. MTC relied on the ruling in People vs Mapa (decided in 1967) stating that Sec
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemptions from the requirements relating to firearms
including a peace officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in People in Macarandang be applied in the case.

HELD:
Yes. Article 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in
1961 and at the time of his apprehension in 1965, the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code — formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's
legal system. Mapa revoked Macarandang only in 1967. Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule,
especially those who relied and acted on the faith thereof.
THE IGNORANCE OF THE COURT OR HIS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO A CASE SUBMITTED TO HIM FOR DECISION ARE NOT REASONS FOR THE COURT
TO DISMISS THE CASE WITHOUT DECIDING ON THE ISSUE THEREIN

18. Chu Jan v. Bernas

G.R. No. 10010, August 1, 1916

FACTS:
Chu Jan and Bernas were the owners of the fighting cocks engaged in a match in Tabaco, Albay. Each of the
said persons had put up a wager of P160. The referee declared defendant’s cock as the winner. Petitioner filed
a complaint asking that his rooster be declared the winner. The justice of peace ruled a draw. Petitioner filed an
appeal. The Judge dismissed the appeal stating that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and
knows of no law whatever that governs the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning
cockfights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge can dismiss the case on the ground that he does not know the law on the subject and
where to find the same.

HELD:
No. The Civil Code, in Article 6 (2), provides that the customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law. Ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the
law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable
to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to
find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues.
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE - A PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE IN THESE CASES - THE PRIMARY RULE IS TO SEARCH FOR AND DETERMINE THE INTENT
AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW

19. People v. Purisima

G.R. No. L-42050-66, November 20, 1978

FACTS:
Accused averred that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his residence any
of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation. He added that the preamble of
a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or
confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute, that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the
decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such
explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the whereas clauses of the law be considered in the determination of the intent of the law

HELD:
YES. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the
abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently
general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions.
ACTS, NOT DESTRUCTIVE AND WHICH RIPENED INTO CUSTOM, CANNOT BE HELD TO BE
THEMSELVES UNREASONABLE OR IMPRUDENT

20. Martinez v. Van Buskirk

G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910

FACTS:
Martinez, was riding in a carromata along the left-hand side of the street, when a delivery wagon belonging to
the Van Buskirk, came along the street in the opposite direction at a great speed, and ran into the carromata
occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, wounding plaintiff. It appears from the undisputed
evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that to leave the horses and
assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all
cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the
defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cochero of the defendant is negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the
evidence in this case

HELD:
No. Acts, the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been
acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be
themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed, the very reason why they have been permitted by society is
that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most
ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once
resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far.
Skipped
A CUSTOM MUST BE PROVED AS A FACT, ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
21. Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988

FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and
personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. The respondents filed a petition for
the grant of letters of administration. They alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The petition was opposed by petitioners who
alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the
other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not
have a marriage certicate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of
their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into an agreement with
the parents of her husband; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written document is
exchanged just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that
she does not know as to the whereabouts of that document, because she and Sy Kiat were married for 46
years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now.
The probate court ruled in favor of the oppositors. On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
declaring that the respondents are the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many
years; and the petitioners as the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife
Yao Kee, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be
valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China.

Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was
conclusively proven.

ISSUE:
Is the validity of the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and customs on marriage
conclusive?

HELD:
No. Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory" The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according
to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local
custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact" (Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 [1907]). The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China
on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom
on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that
they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. 24
A YEAR IS COMPOSED OF 12 CALENDAR MONTHS; THE NUMBER OF DAYS IS IRRELEVANT

22. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.

G.R. No. 162155. August 28, 2007

FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Yap, Vice Chair of respondent, applied for the refund or credit of income tax paid in 1997.
On April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the CTA. On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the
petition as it was led beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or credit under
Sec. 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found that respondent led its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus,
its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code.
According to the CTA, the 2-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of
judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's
petition, which was led 731 days after respondent led its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correct in applying Article 13 of the Civil Code in the computation of the 2-year
prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims

HELD:
No. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to
365 days. In 1987, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted which provides that a "Year" shall be
understood to be 12 calendar months and the number of days is irrelevant. The Supreme Court hold that the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day
respondent led its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW.

23. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen while private respondent, Upton, is a US citizen. They were married in Hongkong
in 1972, and they subsequently obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA in 1982. Upton filed a suit against
petitioner, stating that petitioner's business in Manila forms part of their conjugal property, thus asking the court
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the same. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court where Upton had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". The RTC
denied the motion on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case.

Petitioner contends that private respondent is estopped from claiming a right on the conjugal property because
of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community of property. Private
respondent avers that the divorce decreed in Nevada is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by an alien abroad valid and binding in the Philippines even if it is
contrary to local law and public policy

HELD:
Yes, the said divorce decree obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines. It is true that
owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Civil Laws

IF THE FOREIGNER OBTAINS A VALID FOREIGN DIVORCE, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL HAVE THE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

25. San Luis v. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit,
with whom he had six children. Virginia died. His second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin with whom he
had a son. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court in
Hawaii which issued a Divorce Decree. His third marriage was with respondent Felicidad Sagalongos. They
had no children but they lived together from the time of their marriage until Felicisimo’s death.

Felicidad later sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate through a petition for letters of administration. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the Felicisimo’s
children by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Felicidad has no legal personality to
file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.

The trial court held that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE:
May a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad validly remarry?

HELD:
Yes. If the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article
26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being
a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the
state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Civil Laws

IF ONE IS NO LONGER A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF DIVORCE, HE COULD VERY WELL LOSE
HIS RIGHT TO INHERIT FROM THE SPOUSE

26. Fe D. Quita vs. Court of Appeals and Blandina Dandan

G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998

Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. On 23 July
1954 Fe obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, USA. Three weeks thereafter, she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the USA,
she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and her children opposed the petition for letters of administration filed by Inciong. Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened. Petitioner moved for the
immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. RTC disregarded the divorce
between petitioner and Arturo as it is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction, Only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.

ISSUE:
Was the petitioner still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the
U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried

HELD:
It would depend on her citizenship at the time of divorce. (Case is remanded to the court of origin). Petitioner
contends that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained.Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time
of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in
Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that
the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. The trial court did not grant private
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and
Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." It maintained that their divorce obtained in
1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a
Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Civil Laws

MATTERS BEARING UPON THE EXECUTION, INTERPRETATION AND VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT ARE
DETERMINED BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE CONTRACT IS MADE

27. Government v. Frank

G.R. No. L-2935, March 23, 1909
Johnson, J.

FACTS:
In 1903, in Chicago, USA, the defendant entered into a contract for two years with the plaintiff for which he is
hired as a stenographer. In 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further
compliance with the terms of the contract. Plaintiff commenced an action to recover from the defendant the
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half salary for the period consumed in travel.
The defendant alleged that he was a minor and the contract could not be enforced against him. The plaintiff
claims that under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male persons in said
Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the defendant that he was a minor when he entered into the contract tenable?

HELD:
NO. The defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made,
he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. At the time the contract
was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to
contract. Matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility
of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Civil Laws

THE RECOGNITION OF RENVOI THEORY IMPLIES THAT THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS INCORPORATING THE ORDINARY/INTERNAL LAW OF THE FOREIGN
STATE AND ITS RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.

28. Aznar v. Garcia

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Labrador, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI Davao approving among other things the final accounts of the
executor to deliver to Maria Lucy Christensen her legacy, and declaring her entitled to the residue of the
property. This is in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen, a national
of California and domiciled in the Philippines.

Edward E. Christensen executed a will in Manila declaring Maria Lucy Christensen as his sole heir. The will
also provides a devise of 3,600 in favor of Maria Helen Christensen, and stating among others that Maria Helen
Christensen is not related to him. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child. The
legal grounds of the opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines,
and (b) that the distribution is contrary to law in so far as it denies to Helen Christensen, her legitime.
The court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California
at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the absolute right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires.

ISSUE:
Is the will of Edward E. Christensen governed by the law of his national law (law of California)?

HELD:
NO. Applying the renvoi Ruling, the will of Edward E. Christensen is governed by the law of his domicile, the
Philippines. The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. If we must enforce the law of California, then we must
enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. The national law mentioned in Article
16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar.

The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. 31
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT: A PERSON SHOULD NOT USE HIS RIGHT UNJUSTLY OR
CONTRARY TO HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH, OTHERWISE HE OPENS HIMSELF TO LIABILITY
29. Uypitching v. Quiamco

G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006

Corona, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso approached Ernesto Quiamco, respondent, to amicably settle the civil aspect
of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a motorcycle with the
photocopy of its certificate of registration. No original copy of the certificate was given. It turned out later that
the said motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.,
a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Uypitching. To secure its payment, the
motorcycle was mortgaged to the petitioner corporation and when Gabutero could no longer pay, Davalan
assumed the obligation. However, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner
corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men." Nine years later,
petitioner, accompanied by policemen, went to respondent’s business establishment, where the motorcycle
was parked in an open space, to recover it. The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and
asked for respondent. While the police team leader and the clerk were talking, petitioner paced back and forth
inside the establishment uttering

"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." Unable to find the respondent, the policemen, on petitioner’s instruction
and over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
against respondent. The complaint was dismissed. Respondent, then, filed an action for damages against
petitioners. The RTC ruled that petitioner should be liable since he was motivated with malice and ill will when
he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless criminal complaint.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioners claimed that they should not be held liable
for petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle as its right
to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.

ISSUE:
Should petitioners be held liable for damages despite the claim that their action is merely exercise of their right
as seller-mortgagee to foreclose mortgage in case of default?

HELD:
Yes, petitioners should be held liable. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to
acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court
order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a
slanderous statement. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly
disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners'
acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides that “every person
must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due,
and observe honesty and good faith”. Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that
a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust
ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will
attach. 32
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended by
bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and
injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any
way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was
established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.
Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, petitioners should indemnify him. 33

WHEN A RIGHT IS EXERCISED IN A MANNER NOT CONFORMING WITH THE NORMS IN ARTICLE 19
AND RESULTS IN DAMAGE, A LEGAL WRONG IS COMMITTED AND WRONGDOER MUST BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE

30. Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
Cortes, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioners
liable for damages.

Restituto Tobias, private respondent, was an employee of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. (Globe
Mackay), petitioner, as its purchasing agent and administrative assistant. Tobias later allegedly discovered and
reported to his immediate supervisor and to Herbert Hendry, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of
Globe Mackay anomalies in the company regarding fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions.
Thereafter, Hendry confronted Tobias stating that the latter, as the number one suspect, should have one week
forced leave. When Tobias reported for work after the forced leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a
“swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie-detector test and the specimen of his handwriting, signature, and
initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. The police
investigators, however, cleared Tobias from the said anomalies. Later, petitioners filed criminal complaints for
Estafa which were all dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias was also terminated by petitioners from his employment.
In addition, when Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO), petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by
Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Eventually, Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC and CA held petitioners liable for
damages.

Petitioners contended that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to
dismiss private respondent. On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners'
abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

ISSUE:
Should petitioners be held liable for damages for the imputation of guilt and harassment during the
investigations despite its claim of lawful exercise of its right to dismiss employee?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners should be held liable for damages. Article 19 of the Civil Code is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights. It sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Article 20 of the Civil Code pertains to damage
arising from a violation of law; while Article 21 pertains to damages arising from a violation of morals, good
customs or public policy. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury."
Here, the imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgressed the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already 34
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is
liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages
under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. 35
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

WANT OF CARE TO THE CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS COUPLED WITH A

CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSE NATURALLY CALCULATED TO PRODUCE THEM WOULD
MAKE THE ERRING PARTY LIABLE

31. University of the East v. Jader

G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000

FACTS:
Jader sued UE for damages for moral damages when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations
arising from the latter's negligence. Jader alleged that he got an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1. He took
the removals examination but was belatedly informed that he had a failing mark. The graduation ceremony
invitation included his name as one of the candidates but had a footnote that the list is tentative and still subject
to the completion of requirements. Jader attended the ceremony, he marched with his parents, was given a
symbolic diploma, took pictures, tendered a blow-out, took a leave of absence without pay from work, and
enrolled at a pre-bar review class. Petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led Jader to believe that
he completed the requirements for an LLB degree when his name was included in the tentative list of
graduating students.

ISSUES:
Whether or not UE is liable for misleading a Jader into believing that he had satisfied all the requirements for
graduation

HELD:
Yes. UE may be held liable. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic
status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights
or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.
Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.

Here, UE ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform Jader
of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an L.L.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner
cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set
by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose from its
failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing
that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to
justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to Respondent. When one of two innocent
parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or
negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should
abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be 36
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
BAD FAITH IS PRESUMED IF THERE IS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS OF
THE LAW THAT PREJUDICES/INJURES ANOTHER.

32. Manila Electric Company v. Spouses Ramos

G.R. No. 195145, February 10, 2016
Brion, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the RTC ordering Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO) to restore the electric power connection of Spouses Sulpicio and Patricia
Ramos (respondents).

Spouses Ramos are registered customers of petitioner Meralco. Meralco's service inspector inspected the
respondents' electrical facilities and found an outside connection attached to their electric meter. The service
inspector traced the connection, an illegal one, to the residence and appliances of Nieves. Due to the discovery
of the illegal connection, the service inspector disconnected the respondents' electric services on the same day
without the knowledge of the respondents as they were not at home and their house was closed at the time.
The RTC ordered MERALCO to reconnect respondent’s electric service and the award of damages. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s order and denied MERALCO’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
MERALCO argues that under R.A. 7832, it had the right and authority to immediately disconnect the electric
service of the respondents after they were caught in flagrante delicto using a tampered electrical installation.
They argue that the discovery of an outside connection attached to their electric meter does not give
MERALCO the right to automatically disconnect their electric service as the law provides certain mandatory
requirements that should be observed before a disconnection could be effected. They claim that MERALCO
failed to comply with these statutory requirements.

ISSUE:
Does MERALCO have the right to immediately disconnect the electric service of the respondents upon
discovery of an outside connection attached to their electric meter?

HELD:
No, Meralco has no right to do so.
The distribution of electricity is a basic necessity that is imbued with public interest. Its provider is considered
as a public utility subject to the strict regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. Failure to
comply with these regulations gives rise to the presumption of bad faith or abuse of right. Nevertheless, the
State also recognizes that electricity is the property of the service provider. R.A. 7832 was enacted by
Congress to afford electric service providers multiple remedies to protect themselves from electricity pilferage.
These remedies include the immediate disconnection of the electric service of an erring customer, criminal
prosecution, and the imposition of surcharges. However, the service provider must avail of any or all of these
remedies within legal bounds, in strict compliance with the requirements and/or conditions set forth by law.
Additionally, Section 6 of R.A. 7832 affords a private electric utility the right and authority to immediately
disconnect the electric service of a consumer who has been caught in flagrante delicto doing any of the acts
covered by Section 4 (a). However, the law clearly states that the disconnection may only be done after serving
a written notice or warning to the consumer.

To reiterate, R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to be authorized to disconnect its
customer's electric service on the basis of alleged electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an
authorized ERB representative must be present during the inspection of the electric facilities; and second, even
if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto
committing the acts under Section 4 (a), the customer must still be given due notice prior to the disconnection.
After a thorough examination of the records of the case, we find no proof that MERALCO complied with these
two requirements under R.A. 7832. MERALCO never even alleged in its submissions that an ERB
representative or an officer of the law was present during the inspection of the respondents' electric meter. 38
Also, it did not claim that the respondents were ever notified beforehand of the impending disconnection of their
electric service.
In view of MERALCO's failure to comply with the strict requirements under Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No. 7832,
we hold that MERALCO had no authority to immediately disconnect the respondents' electric service. As a
result, the immediate disconnection of the respondents' electric service is presumed to be in bad faith. 39
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

GOOD FAITH IS PRESUMED, AND HE WHO ALLEGES BAD FAITH HAS THE DUTY TO PROVE THE
SAME

33. Heirs of Nala v. Artemio Cabansag

G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008
Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the CA Decision dismissing Nala's
appeal from the RTC decision that ordered them to pay damages to Cabansag.

Artemio Cabansag filed a complaint for damages against Purisima Nala and Atty. Alexander del Prado.
According to Cabansag, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa
Duyan Gomez. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses.
He received a demand letter from Atty. del Prado, in behalf of Nala, asking for the payment of rentals from
1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil
actions will be filed against him. Thereafter, another demand letter was sent to Cabansag. Atty. del Prado
claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely acting in behalf of his client, Nala,
who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and the CA affirmed
the decision with modification. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her interests over the
property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses Gomez to respondent when the
demand letters were sent.

ISSUE:
Do the demand letters sent by Atty. Del Prado, on behalf of Nala, give rise to an action for damages on the part
of the receiver Cabansag?

HELD:
No. Sending of demand letters by itself does not connote bad faith.
Based on the allegations in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages
is Article 19 of the Civil Code. The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A
person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it
is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to injure another. In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith;
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is
presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not
simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious
doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the
nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. del Prado,
acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for
Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that
respondent was illegally occupying the same. Therefore, in the absence of bad faith in sending demand letters,
Cabansag cannot recover damages. 40
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

THE EXERCISE OF A LEGAL RIGHT OR DUTY IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH NO INTENTION TO
PREJUDICE OR INJURE ANOTHER WILL NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES
34. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko) and Ruby Lim assail
the Decision CA reversing the Decision of RTC that dismissed Reyes’ complaint.

Roberto Reyes, also known as Amay Bisaya alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko, he was spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a birthday party of the
hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she will vouch for him. However, while lining up at the
buffet table, Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko) saw Reyes. Ms. Lim then requested a Ms. Fruto to
tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to
inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. When Reyes went to a corner and started
to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho
kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.” She then turned
around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming
and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.

Reyes filed a complaint for damages based on Article 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Lim and Hotel Nikko
contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the
process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

ISSUE:
Does Ms. Lim’s treatment to Reyes give rise for an action for damages against the latter and the hotel based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code?

HELD:
No. Reyes has no cause of action to file a complaint for damages.

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony
of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea
for all human hurts and social grievances. Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is to
set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under
Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21 refers to acts contra
bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to 41
injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone. 42
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

IN EVERY SITUATION OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, THEREFORE, THE INJURED PERSON ALONE
BEARS THE CONSEQUENCES

35. Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.

G.R. No. 178467, April 26, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
The petitioners, Sps. Carbonell assailed the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision by the RTC
dismissing the petitioners’ complaint, an action for damages, for its lack of merit.
The petitioners initiated against the respondent an action for damages, alleging that they had experienced
emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to
Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that later on turned out to be
counterfeit. Upon their return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the respondent's Pateros
branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released to them were
genuine inasmuch as the bills had come from the head office. In order to put the issue to rest, the counsel of
the petitioners had submitted the subject US$ 100 bills to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for
examination. The BSP had certified that the bills were near perfect genuine notes. Respondent’s
representatives reiterated their sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners had
encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip
all-expense-paid trip to Hong Kong. Unsatisfied with such offer, petitioners demanded moral damages of ₱10
Million and exemplary damages.

The petitioners argue that the respondent was liable for failing to observe the diligence required from it by not
doing an act from which the material damage had resulted by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution in the
performance of its duties. Hence, the respondent was guilty of gross negligence, misrepresentation and bad
faith amounting to fraud.

ISSUE:
Was the respondent bank liable to petitioners for the damages that they have suffered due to its issuance of
the subject bills?

HELD:
No, the respondent bank is not liable to petitioners. In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the
injured person alone bears the consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act that does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.

The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence required by law in observing
the standard operating procedure, in taking the necessary precautions for handling the US dollar bills in
question. It is thus significant that the BSP certified that the falsity of the US dollar notes in question, which
were "near perfect genuine notes," could be detected only with extreme difficulty even with the exercise of due
diligence. The respondent even formally apologized to them and even offered to reinstate the USD$500.00 in
their account as well as to give them the all-expense-paid round trip ticket to Hong Kong as means to assuage
their inconvenience.

Hence, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US
dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in handling the
US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor
remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking
institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they
could not be compensated for the damage sustained. 43
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT IN ITSELF AND ACTIONABLE WRONG

36. Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960
Concepcion, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal by Certiorari filed by the petitioner, from the CA decision modifying the CFI decision by
increasing the amount of actual, moral, and compensatory damages.

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu and petitioner, who
was 10 years younger, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged. She gave up teaching and
became an insurance underwriter. Intimacy developed between her and the petitioner since one evening in
1953 where they had sexual intercourse after coming from the movies on board a vessel where petitioner was
the apprentice pilot. Soledad told petitioner she was pregnant whereupon he promised to marry her. The child
was born on June 17, 1954. Subsequently on July 24, 1954, petitioner married one Romanita Perez.
Complainant, along with her child, brought an action against petitioner for damages for breach of promise to
marry. The trial court decided in favor of the complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Are moral damages recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?

HELD:
No, moral damages based on breach of promise to marry are not recoverable under our laws.
That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus v.
Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that
no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the
American States.

In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise
to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable.
The CA’s finding that the petitioner’s seduction power was the cause of Soledad’s yielding to his sexual desires
and finding him guilty of seduction thus, awarding the latter moral damages cannot be appreciated. We find
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is 10 years younger
than Soledad, but also because of the CFI’s finding that the latter surrendered herself to petitioner because of
she was overwhelmed by her love for him.

Hence, petitioner’s breach of his promise to marry Soledad is not actionable, and the award of moral damages
by the CA is improper. 44
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
MERE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG. BUT TO FORMALLY SET
A WEDDING AND GO THROUGH ALL THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED PREPARATION AND PUBLICITY, ONLY
TO WALK OUT OF IT WHEN THE MATRIMONY IS ABOUT TO BE SOLEMNIZED, IS QUITE DIFFERENT

37. Wassmer v. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
Bengzon, J.P., J.

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee Beatriz P. Wassmer (Wassmer) and defendant-appellany Francisco X. Velez (Velez),
following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 1954 as the big day. In
August 1954, Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and
the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and
gifts received. And then, on September 2, 1954, Velez, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for
Wassmer stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again. Sued by Wassmer for damages, Velez
filed no answer and was declared in default. Judgment was rendered ordering Velez to pay Wassmer
damages.

Velez asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. He argues that there is no provision in the Civil Code
authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. As provided in a number of cases ruled by the Court, the
mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.

ISSUE:
Was the breach of Velez in his promise to marry Wassmer constitute an actionable wrong provided that the
wedding was formally set and elaborate preparations for the same were made?

HELD:
Yes, Velez is liable to Wassmer for damages. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.”

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized,
is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which Vekez must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. 45
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY ENTITLES THE PLAINTIFF TO
RECOVER DAMAGES
38. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Private respondent was a 22-year old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation
duly respected in her community; petitioner was an Iranian citizen and was an exchange student taking a
medical course in Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. The petitioner courted the respondent and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They agreed to get married after
the end of the semester. Petitioner then visited the respondent’s parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval
to the marriage. Later, petitioner forced the private respondent to live with him in the Lozano Apartments.
Private respondent was a virgin before they started living together. A week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. Petitioner maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of
which, she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked respondent not to live
with him anymore after a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain which happened a day
before the filing of the complaint. Moreover, petitioner was already married to someone living in Bacolod.
Hence, private respondent seeks for a judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondent based on Article 21 of the Civil Code. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Was the petitioner’s breach of promise to marry contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy so as to
entitle private respondent to the award of damages?

HELD:
Yes, the petitioner’s breach of promise to marry private respondent is contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy; thus, the latter is entitled to damages.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding,
Article 21 of the CIvil Code is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage."
Hence, for petitioner’s fraudulent and deceptive promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is entitled to
the award of damages. 46
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED BY THE FAMILY IF THE INJURY IS CAUSED IN A MANNER

CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
39. Pe, et al. v. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
Bautista Angelo., J.

FACTS:
The petitioners are parents, brothers and sister of Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance, Lolita was 24
years old and unmarried. The respondent is a married man and worked as an agent of the La Perla Cigar and
Cigarette Factory. They stayed in the same town. The respondent frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext
that he wanted to teach her how to pray the rosary. They fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine
trysts. The rumors about their love affairs reached Lolita’s parents and the respondent was forbidden from
further seeing Lolita. Their love affair continued nonetheless. Lolita later disappeared from their residence. Her
family found a handwritten note from the defendant to Lolita regarding the date of their meeting.
The trial court did not consider the complaint as actionable because of the petitioners’ failure to prove that the
respondent deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners entitled to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages based on
Article 21 of the Civil Code for the acts of the respondent?

HELD:
Yes, the petitioners are entitled to recover damages for the acts of respondent.
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: “Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
In this case, there is no doubt that the claim of petitioners for damages is based on the fact that respondent,
being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing the petitioners injury in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, through an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.
Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a
collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other
and conducted clandestine love affairs. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of
Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Hence, petitioners are entitled to the award of damages because the respondent has committed an injury to the
former in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
New Civil Code. 47
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unjust Enrichment
THERE IS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN RESPONDENT OBTAINED INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
THE MORTGAGED VEHICLE AS THE PETITIONER SPOUSES HAD ALREADY OBTAINED THE
REQUIRED INSURANCE COVERAGE
40. Spouses Villalva v. RCBC Savings Bank
G.R. No. 165661, August 28, 2006
Puno, J.
FACTS:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC which seeks to reverse the decision of the CA
ordering Spouses Mario & Corazon Villalva (spouses) to pay Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation Saving
Bank (RCBC) P3,583.50 and issued a writ of replevin for the mortgaged vehicle.
Petitioner spouses issued forty-eight (48) checks to cover installment payments for a '93 Toyota Corolla which
were secured by a Deed of Chattel Mortgage. Under the Deed, the spouses were to insure the vehicle against
loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse and deliver the policies to the mortgagor. The
promissory notes and chattel mortgage are ultimately assigned and encashed by RCBC. The evidence shows
that the spouses procured the necessary insurance. They however failed to timely deliver the same to
respondent until much later. As a consequence, RCBC had the mortgaged vehicle insured in the meantime.
The insurance policy obtained by RCBC was later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by the
Spouses. The premium paid by respondent exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by insurer.
RCBC demanded that the spouses surrender the mortgaged vehicle within five days from notice by reason of
unpaid obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage. The petitioner spouses ignored the demand letter
and asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The
MTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Such was affirmed by the RTC, but subsequently reversed by the CA.
RCBC contends that to set aside its decision would result in the unjust enrichment of the petitioners on the
ground that its payment of insurance premiums on behalf of the petitioners unjustly enriched the latter.
ISSUE:
Is the mortgagee who obtained insurance policy but did not deliver said policy to the mortgagor as required by
the terms of a chattel mortgage unjustly enriched when the mortgagor paid for the premiums to obtain
insurance policy covering the same chattel and the same period?
HELD:
NO. He is not unjustly enriched since the spouses were able to secure the necessary insurance and only
delayed the furnishing thereof to RCBC.
Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It
may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a
person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. In the case at bar, petitioner spouses were not
enriched when respondent obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioner spouses
had already obtained the required insurance coverage for the vehicle.
Hence, the mortgagee who obtained insurance policy but did not deliver said policy to the mortgagor as
required by the terms of a chattel mortgage is not unjustly enriched when the mortgagor paid for the premiums
to obtain insurance policy covering the same chattel and the same period. 48
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unjust Enrichment
MONEY RECEIVED WITHOUT A VALID GROUND OR JUSTIFICATION MUST BE RETURNED UNDER
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
41. Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.
G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the CA’s decision, ordering petitioner
Carlos A. Loria to return to respondent Ludolfo Munoz the amount of P2,000,000 with actual damages.
In his complaint, Muñoz alleged that he was engaged in construction business. Loria visited Munoz in his office
and invited him to advance P2,000.00 for a subcontract of a river-dredging project in Guinobatan. Loria
represented that he would make arrangements such that Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation,
(Sunwaest) would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project. Sunwest in turn, would subcontract 20% or
P10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muñoz.
The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan was subjected to public bidding.
The project was awarded to Sunwest as the lowest bidder. Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag
and San Francisco Rivers without subcontracting Muñoz. With the project allegedly finished, Muñoz demanded
Loria to return his P2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not return the money.
Loria argued that the Munoz has no cause of action against him. Contrary to the claim of Munoz, he followed-
up on the approval of the project with the DPWH as agreed upon. He was therefore, entitiled to representation
expenses.
ISSUE:
Is Loria is liable to return the sum of ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz?
HELD:
Yes, Loria must return Munoz’s ₱2,000,000.00 under the principle of unjust enrichment. Under Article 22 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to
the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience.
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a real
or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person’s expense or damage.
In this case, Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of a government project to dredge the
Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the parties’ agreement,
Muñoz was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the ₱2,000,000.00.
Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muñoz’s money without valid basis or justification. Under Article
22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz. 49
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unjust Enrichment
AN ACCION IN REM VERSO DOES NOT APPLY IF THE ACTION IS PROSCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION OR BY THE APPLICATION OF THE IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE.
42. Frenzel v. Catito
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
The petition stems from a CA decision affirming the decision of the RTC, ruling that petitioner Alfred Fritz
Frenzel violated the Constitution thus barring him from recovering the money used in the purchase of parcels of
land allegedly taken by respondent Ederlina Catito and her family.
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel, an Australian citizen of German descent, proposed marriage to Ederlina Catito, a
Filipina married to a German national. He bought her numerous properties such as parcels of land in Quezon
City and Davao City. Knowing that alien ownership of real properties in the Philippines is prohibited, he agreed
that only Ederlina’s name would appear in the deed of sale as buyer of the property.
While staying abroad, Alfred received a letter from Ederlina’s husband begging him to leave his wife alone. To
avoid such event , Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. In 1985,
Alfred wrote to Ederlina’s father complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he
was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had
purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had
stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.
The RTC dismissed his complaint, stating that Frenzel is disqualified to own properties in the country, being an
alien. Petitioner argued that the properties in question were purchased using his personal funds, hence, he is
entitled to recovery.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner recover the money used in purchasing the several properties?
HELD:
No, futile is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. An action for
recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso.
This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application
of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso
over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his
sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff." 50
HUMAN RELATIONS
Respect for Other’s Privacy, Personality, Etc.
A PARENT IS LIABLE FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS RESULTING FROM HIS OWN MALICIOUS
CONDUCT, AS WHERE HE WRONGFULLY ENTICES HIS SON OR DAUGHTER TO LEAVE HIS OR HER
SPOUSE, BUT HE IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS HE ACTS MALICIOUSLY.
43. Tenchavez v. Escaño, et al.
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
The case is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Cebu denying the claim of petitioner Pastor Tenchavez
for legal separation with his estranged wife Vicenta Escano, and P1,000,000 in damages against Vicenta and
her parents, Dr. Mamerto and Mena Escano.
Vicenta scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry, exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez in 1948 before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was held unknown to Vicenta’s
parents. Upon learning of the same, Dr. Mamerta and Mena Escano, were against it being clandestinely
celebrated contrary to tradition and proposed of a re-celebration of the marriage before the church. One day,
however, a letter was sent to Mamerto informing him that Pastor is having an affair with another woman.
Vicenta, upon learning of the same, refused to live with Pastor and the spouses became estranged.
Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of
divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections. asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
ISSUE:
Are Vicenta’s parents are liable for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband?
HELD:
No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original
suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she
was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which
have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. 51
HUMAN RELATIONS
Respect for Other’s Privacy, Personality, Etc.
AN ADVERTISMENT MISREPRESENTING A HOUSE BELONGING TO ANOTHER MISTAKENLY AND
UNNECESSARILY EXPOSES THE PRIVATE LIFE OF A PERSON; THUS, PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE
26
44. St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-46061, November 14, 1984
Aquino, J.
FACTS:
This case is an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the CA and the TC awarding recovery of
damages to respondent Conrado J. Aramil whose house was mistakenly misrepresented by petitioner Saint
Louis Realty Corporation in a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio, but without permission of
Doctor Aramil, in the issue of the Sunday Times an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS".
Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family where it was
portrayed that the house of Doctor Aramil belonged to the latter. Doctor Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and a
member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake and wrote a letter
of protest on the same day to St. Louis Realty. The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St.
Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil
and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published. Aramil's counsel demanded
from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. In it answer, St. Louis Realty claimed
that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila
Times. It published in the issue of the Manila Times a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real
house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error. Aramil filed his
complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times a “NOTICE OF
RECTIFICATION".
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a
way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by Article 26.
ISSUE:
Does the wrongful advertisement violate the privacy of private respondent, thus entitling him to damages?
HELD:
Yes, the private respondent is entitled to damages as the wrongful advertisement violated his privacy.
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article
2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice
Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification “.
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that
he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life
was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. 52
HUMAN RELATIONS
Respect for Other’s Privacy, Personality, Etc.
ARTICLE 26 GRANTS CAUSE OF ACTION THOUGH NOT CONSTITUTING CRIMINAL OFFENSE
45. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the CA in the case
entitled "Sansio Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Romulo SG. Villanueva, et al."
An Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed by respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-
in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc.
(Sansio), against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi
Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances
bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was
unable to controvert the charges against her. she was indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the armed operatives of the Public
Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and their
two (2) daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she was
detained but released in the afternoon when her husband posted a bond. Gregorio filed a Motion for Deferment
of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the bounced checks, as certified
by the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. The B.P. Blg. 22 cases were
dismissed.
Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin .Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to
Dismisson the ground that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to
state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Is the civil suit filed by Gregorio based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution?
HELD:
It is based on quasi-delict.
Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of
breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal
dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to
privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of
the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded
when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to
controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the
charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she
was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the
criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city
residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and
humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her
tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her
arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is
prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the
act or omission of its employee Datuin. 53
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unfair Competition
WHAT LAW PROHIBITS IS NOT COMPETITION PER SE BUT UNFAIR COMPETITION
46. Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp.
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the RTC in awarding damages in favor of respondent Jesichris
Manufacturing Corporation against petitioner Willaware Products Corporation.
Respondent Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed a complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer
for permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner Willaware Products Corporation from manufacturing and
distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of respondent. Jesichris further alleged that in view
of the physical proximity of Willaware’s office to Jesichris’ office, and in view of the fact that some of the
Jesichris’ employees had transferred to Willaware, Willaware had developed familiarity with their products,
especially its plastic-made automotive parts. Jesichris discovered that Willaware had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling
these products at a lower price as Jesichris plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers .It was
futher alleged that Willaware deliberately copied their products all of which acts constitute unfair competition.
Willaware claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere
reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the specifications of
the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace.
ISSUE:
Did the petitioner commit acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Yes, the petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises
or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage." From the
foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust,
oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to
earn a livingIn order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an
injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated
by unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present. First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in
the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to
good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s former employees, deliberately copied
respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s customers.
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but
regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take
advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong. 54
HUMAN RELATIONS
Independent Civil Actions
ALTHOUGH PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE AND PERFORM THEIR
DUTIES AS WHAT RULES AND LAWS PROVIDE, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM TRAMPLING THE
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
47. Aberca, et al. v. Ver
G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988
Yap, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for certiorari before the SC, petitioners Rogelio Aberca et al. (Petitioners) seeks to annul and set
aside the order and resolution dismissing their complaint of damages against respondent members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for violation of human rights.
Petitioners claim that General Fabian Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa (TFM) of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) “to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses
in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila.” Due to said order, TFM
members raided several homes of the petitioners without the proper judicial warrants; that the petitioners were
arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers, and
also other acts which violated their Constitutional rights and civil liberties. Petitioners sought
actual/compensatory damages from the acts of the TFM. Petitioners based their cause of action for damages
under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss claiming that (a) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
against petitioners; and (b) they are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official
duties. According to them, since they are members of the AFP, their primary duty is to safeguard public safety
and order. That the Constitution no less provides that the President may call them to “prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof.”
ISSUE:
Are public officers exempted from liability when, during the performance of their official duties, they violate
Constitutional rights or liberties of an individual?
HELD:
No, public officers are still required to uphold the rights and liberties of an individual in the performance of their
functions.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt
the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their
acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. In addition, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioner’s right and cause of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speed means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, Art. 1146 of the Civil Code provides that “when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for
a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of
powers or authority arising from Martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same
must be brought within one year.
There is no doubt military authorities have the duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left
or of the right, or within or without, seeking to destroy our subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their
very existence. But, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be
observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not 55
and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation
of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. 56
HUMAN RELATIONS
Independent Civil Actions
AS RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE OR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS NOT ONE OF THE THREE CRIMES
MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES THAT MAY BE INSTITUTED IN CONNECTION WITH SAID OFFENSE
48. Corpus v. Paje
G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969
Capistrano, J.
FACTS:
This is a direct appeal on questions of law from order of the Rizal FCI dismissing the complaint of petitioner on
the ground that the action for quasi-delict has prescribed.
Petitioner’s husband, Clemente Marcia was involved in a car accident when the jeep driven by him collided with
a passenger bus of respondent, resulting in the former’s death and in physical injuries to two other persons.
Respondents were charged with homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Respondent
Felardo Paje, was found guilty and convicted of the crime charged in the information. While respondent
appealed the judgment of conviction in the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed a separate civil action for
damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against respondents. The Court of Appeals
reversed the judgement in the criminal case and acquitting respondent after finding that the reckless
imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident.
During the pretrial of the civil case, respondents asked the court to rule on their special defense that petitioners’
cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four
years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Art. 1144 of the Civil Code and action based
upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years.
The lower court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that their action was based upon a quasi-delict
and that it had prescribed.
ISSUE:
Is the filing of an independent and separate civil action for damages an available remedy for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence cases?
HELD:
No, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence cases.
Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be
proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud
(estafa) and physical injuries.
As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense.
Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the
acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a separate civil action. In the language of the
Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the
ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for
damages based upon the same act. 57
HUMAN RELATIONS
Independent Civil Actions

IN CASES OF DEFAMATION, FRAUD OR PHYSICAL INJURIES, A CIVIL ACTION MAY BE FILED

INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION, EVEN IF THERE HAS BEEN NO RESERVATION MADE
BY THE INJURED PARTY

49. Madeja v. Caro

G.R. No. L-51183, December 21, 1983
Abad Santos, J.

FACTS:
This petition seeks to set aside the order of respondent judge granting the motion to dismiss of private
respondent in the civil case for damages under Art. 33

Petitioner’s husband died after being treated for an appendectomy by private respondent. A criminal charge of
homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent. The information of the criminal
complaint also states that: “The offended party (petitioner) is reserving her right to file a separate civil action for
damages. While the criminal case was still pending, petitioner filed an action for damages against private
respondent, alleging that her husband died of gross negligence of private respondent.

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, invoking Sec. 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court stating that:
“criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in a
criminal action.”

Respondent Judge granted the motion to dismiss, claiming that the civil action for damages may be instituted
only after the final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

ISSUE:
Is the filing of an independent and separate civil action for damages an available remedy for homicide through
reckless imprudence?

HELD:
Yes, the filing of an independent and separate civil action for damages is an available remedy.
Sec. 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his
right to institute it separately. Article 33, however, creates an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal
action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such
reservation

Note: The term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
because the terms used with the latter are general terms. The Code of Commission recommended that the civil
action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law. If the intent has
been to establish a civil action for bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault
and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should like whether the offense committed is that
of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide or even death.” 58
HUMAN RELATIONS
Independent Civil Actions
ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE ASSUMES A DEFAMATION, FRAUD, OR PHYSICAL INJURIES
INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED

50. Bonite v. Zosa

G.R. No. L-33772. June 20, 1988

FACTS:
The case is a Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the CFI filed by herein petitioners, Heirs of
Florencio Bonite, against private respondent Eligio Abamonga, dismissing the complaint for damages, and the
order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order.

Florencio Bonite was working as "caminero" when he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a
result of which, Bonite died on that same day. Consequently, the surviving heirs of the deceased filed a criminal
complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence against the private respondent. After trial, the court
rendered a decision acquitting accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Subsequently, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same accused on account
of the death of Florencio Bonite. However, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages, ruling that
since there was no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action and that having been represented
by a private prosecutor in the criminal case, the acquittal operated as res judicata.

Private respondent avers that Article 33 (not Article 29) of the Civil Code applies to the case as the latter is not
applicable to offenses arising from tortious acts.

ISSUE:
Does Article 33, which grants the right for independent civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
apply to offenses arising out of criminal negligence?

HELD:
No. Article 33 of the Civil Code assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries intentionally committed. The
death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted
with malice. Criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code consists in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes
the negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
to determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no
independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be instituted
under said article.

In regard to private respondent’s claim that the specific provision applicable in the case at bar is Article 33 of
the Civil Code 9 (and not Article 29), because the latter is not applicable to criminal offenses proceeding from a
tortious act, we find the same to be devoid of merit. It is important to note that Article 29 of the Civil Code does
not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only
in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to file
a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on
reasonable doubt. It is a well-known main in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish

Therefore, Article 33 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar. 59
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question
THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHERE ONE CASE IS ADMINISTRATIVE AND THE OTHER IS
CIVIL
51. Te v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC on the ground of prejudicial
question.

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites. Later on, while his marriage
with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella
(Santella).

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent, an information charging petitioner with bigamy
was filed with the RTC. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed in the RTC an action for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. Private respondent also filed
with the PRC an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective
engineering licenses on the grounds of immorality. With respect to petitioner, she added that petitioner
committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.
Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), a motion to suspend the
proceedings in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and
criminal case for bigamy. The Board denied the same motion. The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals where the Court ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground
of prejudicial question was in accord with law. Respondent court likewise held that no prejudicial question
existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a
civil case.

ISSUES:
1. Does a prejudicial question exist between the civil case of annulment of marriage and criminal case of
bigamy?

2. Does a prejudicial question exist between the civil case of annulment of marriage and the administrative
case?

HELD:
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

1. No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all
that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.

The pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a
prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at
the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
2. No. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. 60
We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is
civil.

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals
of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended
notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as
the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial
body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed
or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall
proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting
for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. 61
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, EVEN IF PENDING IN THE HLURB, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY, RAISES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

52. San Miguel Properties v. Perez, et al.

G.R. No. 166836, September 04, 2013
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner purchased in 1992 and 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc., then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain
(Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345
square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three separate
deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to
petitioner, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters
purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which petitioner paid the full price of
P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to them.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under
the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989
pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.
Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of
titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the same time,
petitioner sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB, praying to compel BF Homes to release the
20 TCTs in its favor.

ISSUE:
Is the pending administrative case in the HLURB a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution on the ground of
prejudicial question?

HELD:
YES, it is a ground to suspend criminal prosecution on the ground of prejudicial question.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case.
In this case, contrary to the petitioner’s submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of
because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in
the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for
the criminal violation of PD 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action
civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB. 62
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF VITIATED CONSENT IS
DEEMED A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE ???
53. Zapanta v. Montesa
G.R. No. L-14534, February 28, 1962
Dizon, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Merardo L. Zapanta against the respondent Hon. Agustin P.
Montesa, Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, to enjoin the latter from proceeding with the Criminal Case for bigamy
pending the final determination of the Civil Case for annulment of marriage.
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco, an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent
Provincial Fiscal against petitioner alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and
without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant. Petitioner,
on the other hand, filed in the Court of First Instance a Civil Case against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the
annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. Respondent Yco, as defendant in
said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the
same was denied. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in the criminal case to suspend proceedings therein, on the
ground that the determination of the issue involved in the civil case was a prejudicial question. Respondent
judge denied the motion as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After
entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.

ISSUE:
Is the pendency of a petition for the annulment of the second marriage, on the ground that consent was
obtained through duress, force and intimidation, a prejudicial question in the prosecution for the crime of
bigamy?

HELD:
Yes. A prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal The prejudicial question — we
further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be
lodged in another court These requisites are present in the case at bar.

Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance prosper on the
ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime
of bigamy with which he was charged. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second
marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy.

In the case of People v. Aragon, we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage
is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be
decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the
contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of
duress, force and intimidation.
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question

NO JUDICIAL DECREE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY OF NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES

54. People v. Aragon
G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957
Labrador, J.

FACTS:
This is an Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy.
Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria
Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with
Maria Faicol in Iloilo City. The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said
office. After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused
was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu
where he maintained his first wife. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City. After Maria Gorrea’s death, the accused
brought Maria Faicol to Cebu, where she worked as a teacher-nurse. It would seem that the accused and Maria
Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical
maltreatment in the hands of the accused. Thereafter, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the
purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage
with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu. Although the
accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that
the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of
the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the
wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613
authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could
not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol,
either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of
the latter.
ISSUE:
Is the third marriage of the accused valid notwithstanding the lack of judicial decree nullifying the former void
marriage?
HELD:
YES, the third marriage is valid.
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.
In this case, the action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was
not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper. 64
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question

ABSENCE OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY AND MERE PRIVATE ACT OF SIGNING A MARRIAGE

CONTRACT BEAR NO LEGAL EFFECT, THUS, THE CONTRACT OF MARRIAGE IS NULL

55. Morigo v. People

G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:
Morigo and Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contact for a while but after receiving a card from
Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went
back to Canada for work, and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Canada, which was granted. In 1992,
Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the
ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a
suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Morigo should file a Declaration for the Nullity of Marriage with Barrete before his 2 nd marriage
in order to be free from the bigamy case

HELD:
No, Declaration for Nullity of Marriage is not needed in the instant case considering that the first marriage was
void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy case. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony
at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he
first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done.
Under the circumstances of the present case, the SC held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question
THE FINALITY OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF PETITIONER’S SECOND MARRIAGE
DOES NOT IMPEDE THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CHARGE FOR BIGAMY AGAINST HIM
56. Capili v. People
G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) to remand the Bigamy case of the Petitioner to the trial court for further
proceedings.
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner
thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration
of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event
that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question
in the instant criminal case.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter, the
petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had
already been declared void by the RTC. RTC granted the Manifestation of the Peitioner. However, the CA
reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceeding.
ISSUE:
Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy?
HELD:
No, the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then that the crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent.
Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's second marriage does not impede the filing of
a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 66
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question
THE SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY DOES NOT RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
MARRIAGE
57. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
This is an instant petition for review filed by Petitioner Tenebro assailing the decisions of the RTC and CA on
the case of Bigamy filed against him by Leticia Ancajas.
Petitioner in this case contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to petitioner.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of
"not guilty". During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he
sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that
no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further
testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage
at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. The petitioner further argues that
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on
which the second marriage was celebrated.
ISSUE:
Does the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is
an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroact to the date
on which the second marriage was celebrated.
HELD:
No, the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact
to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null
and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not
an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. 67
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP, A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A CASE FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI-SQUATTING
LAW
58. Apa v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 112381, March 20, 1995
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Fernandez of the RTC Lapu-
Lapu City, denying petitioners’ oral motion for the suspension of their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa, and Leonilo Jacalan,” as well as their motion for
consideration.
On February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, herein petitioners conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner,
ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property situated in Agus. The
petitioners thereby constructed their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of
the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice
because despite repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate
the premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial question
pending resolution concerning the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of
the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by
petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them.

ISSUE:
Is the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending in Civil Case No. 2247-L a prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

HELD:
YES, the question of ownership of the subject lot is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

The resolution of the question of ownership would necessarily be determinative of petitioners’ criminal liability
for squatting. A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to
private respondent and against the latter’s will. Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-
B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27
of the RTC at Lapu-Lapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of
petitioners’ criminal liability for squatting.
PROPERTY

A HOUSE IS AN IMMOVABLE EVEN IF THE OWNER OF THE HOUSE IS DIFFERENT

1. Ladera v. Hodges
Vol. 48, No. 12, O.G. 5374, September 23, 1952

FACTS:
Hodges entered into a contract of sale with Ladera. Ladera built a house on the lot. However, Ladera failed to
pay so Hodges rescinded and filed an action for ejection, The MTC ruled in favor of Hodges and issued an alia
writ of execution. Notices of sale were posted, but were not published in a newspaper of general circulation.
Hodges sold the house in a public auction to Magno. Ladera was not able to attend. Villa, later on purchased
the house from Magno. Ladera filed for the nullification of the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court against Hodges regarding the sales of real property. Hodges contends that the house, which was built
on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as a movable or personal property.

ISSUE:
Is a house built on a lot owned by another a movable property?

HELD:
No, a house built on a lot owned by another is not a movable property. As enumerated in the Civil Code,
immovable property includes lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil.
The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot was the one who built the
construction. Since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the
land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
BUILDING IS A SEPARATE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY FROM THE LAND IT IS ADHERED TO

2. Lopez v. Orosa, Jr.

G.R. Nos. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958

FACTS:
Lopez entered in to a contract with Orosa, Jr. and agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction
of a theatre. The Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of land formerly owned by Orosa, Jr. and was acquired
by Plaza Theatre, Inc. Lopez demanded payment. Plaza Theatre, Inc. mortaged its properties. It also obtained
a loan with Luzon Surety Co. In the registration of the land, the mortgage was not revealed. Lopez filed a case
for the unpaid balance. Lopez prayed that the land and building be sold in public auction with the proceeds
applied to the balance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of a building extends to the land on
which the building is adhered to.

HELD:
No. While real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, the inclusion of the building,
separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could mean that a
building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of any specific provision of law to the
contrary, a building is an immovable property, Irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on
which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. The law gives preference to unregistered refectionary credits
only with respect to the real estate upon which the refection or work was made.
PROPERTY THAT CAN BE REMOVED WITHOUT BREAKING THE MATERIAL OR DETERIORATION IS
PERSONAL PROPERTY

3. Yap v. Tañada
G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988

FACTS:
Gould Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. (GPI) filed a complaint against Yap seeking to recover the balance of the
price and installation cost of a water pump in Yap’s residences. Tañada rendered judgment requiring Yap to pay for the
unpaid balance. The water pump was sold to GPI as the highest bidder. Yap assails the validity of the execution
sale for being made without the required notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property under
the Rules of Court. Yap contends that the pump and its accessories are immovable property because it is
attached to the ground with character of permanency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the water pump in question an immovable property?

HELD:
No. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration
of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's
premises without being broken or suffering deterioration.
THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION KNOWN AS REPLEVIN IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO PERSONAL PROPERTY

4. Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin in the CFI of Manila against Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., and Dr. Villarama
for the recovery of the machineries and equipment at defendants’ factory. Respondent judge issued an order,
commanding the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to seize and take immediate possession of the properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of replevin applies in the case

HELD:
No. The special civil action known as replevin is applicable only to "personal property". Ordinarily replevin may
be brought to recover personal property unlawfully taken or detained from the owner provided such property is
capable of identification and delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property or incorporeal
personal property. In this case, the machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land,
particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could
not be separated from the latter "without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Hence, in order to
remove said outfit, it became necessary, not only to unbolt, but, also, to cut some of its wooden supports.
Moreover, said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry" carried
on said immovable and tended." For these reasons, they were already immovable property pursuant to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
MOVABLE EQUIPMENT TO BE IMMOBILIZED IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW MUST FIRST BE
“ESSENTIAL AND PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS” OF AN INDUSTRY

5. Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor and Treasurer

G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962

FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. Its
machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipment to produce finished products for sale,
nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the general public indiscriminately for business or
commercial purposes. City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner’s equipment. Petitioner
appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The BTA of
the City sustained the city assessor. The CTA held the petitioner liable to the payment of the realty tax on its
maintenance and repair equipment mentioned above.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the tools and equipment are immovable real properties

HELD:
No. Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be “essential and principal
elements” of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be “unable to function or carry on the
industrial purpose for which it was established.” The tools and equipment are not essential and principle municipal
elements of petitioner’s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals
— acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service.
PETITIONERS DO NOT CLAIM TO BE THE OWNERS OF THE LAND AND/OR BUILDING ON WHICH THE
MACHINERIES WERE PLACED. THIS BEING THE CASE, THE MACHINERIES IN QUESTION, WHILE IN
FACT BOLTED TO THE GROUND REMAIN MOVABLE PROPERTY SUSCEPTIBLE TO SEIZURE UNDER
A SEARCH WARRANT.

6. Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City]. Petitioner contends that
the machineries seized were real properties being printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of newspapers which cannot be done under
the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties seized are real properties.

HELD:
No. There is no merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.
Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered
immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo the Court ruled that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted
as the agent of the owner. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
TRANSFORMERS, ELECTRIC POSTS, TRANSMISSION LINES, INSULATORS, AND ELECTRIC METERS
QUALIFY AS “MACHINERIES” UNDER THE LGC, WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAX

7. Manila Electric Co. v. City Assessor

G.R. No. 166102, August 5, 2015

FACTS:
The present case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the decision of the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the CBAA, which upheld the decision of the LBAA,
ruling that MERALCO is liable for real property tax on its electric facilities (transformers, electric posts,
transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters). MERALCO contended that its electric facilities are not
subject to real property tax given that the definition of "machinery" under Section 199 (o) of the Local
Government Code, on which real property tax is imposed, must still be within the contemplation of real or
immovable property under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Respondents argued that under the LGC, the
transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO fall within the new
definition of "machineries," deemed as real properties subject to real property tax.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters owned by
MERALCO qualify as “machineries” subject to real property tax

HELD:
Yes, the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters qualify as machineries
subject to real property tax. While the LGC does not provide for a specific definition of "real property," Sections
199 (o) and 232 of the said Code, respectively, gives an extensive definition of what constitutes "machinery"
and unequivocally subjects such machinery to real property tax. Under Section 199 (o) of the Local
Government Code, machinery, to be deemed real property subject to real property tax, need no longer be
annexed to the land or building as these "may or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily to
the real property," and in fact, such machinery may even be "mobile." The same provision though
requires that to be machinery subject to real property tax, the physical facilities for production, installations, and
appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or not permanently
attached to the real property (a) must be actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the
particular industry, business, or activity; and (2) by their very nature and purpose, are designed for, or
necessary for manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes.
SUBMARINE OR UNDERSEA COMMUNICATION CABLES ARE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO REAL
PROPERTY TAX

8. Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas

G.R. No. 180110, May 30, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner, Capwire, is a Philippine corporation which provides international telecommunications services. It has
signed agreements with other local and foreign telecommunications companies covering an international
network of submarine cable system such as the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN). Capwire claims
that it co-owns a cable system together with PLDT and thus engaged an appraiser to assess the market value
of the said cable system. Capwire also avers that its cable system "interconnects at the PLDT Landing Station
in Nasugbu, Batangas," which is covered by a transfer certificate of title and tax declarations in the name of
PLDT. As such, the Provincial Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas had determined that the submarine cable
systems described in Capwire's Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties are taxable real property
and thus, subsequently issued an assessment of real properties against Capwire.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a submarine cable system considered as a real property which can be subjected to real
property tax

HELD:
Yes, submarine cable systems are considered as real properties subject to real property tax. Submarine or
undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines which this Court has recently declared
in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no longer exempted from
real property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local
Government Code. To the extent that the equipment's location is determinable to be within the taxing
authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for
communications and aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so that both pieces of
property do not merit a different treatment in the aspect of real property taxation. Both electric lines and
communications cables, in the strictest sense, are not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts,
relays or landing stations, but both may be classified under the term "machinery" as real property
under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the
owner's business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that are on real estate.
POWER BARGES INSTALLED BY ITS OWNER IN POWER FACILITIES ARE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT
TO REAL PROPERTY TAX

9. FELS Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas

G.R. Nos. 168557 & 170628, February 6, 2007

FACTS:
These are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari, filed by FELS Energy Inc., (FELS) and the
National Power Corporation (NPC), assailing the decision of the CA and its resolution which dismissed both
petitions on the ground of prescription. Petitioners maintained that the power barges are exempt from real
property taxes under Section 234 of the LGC because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by NPC,
a government- owned and controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of
electric power. On the other hand, the Provincial Assessor averred that the barges were real property for
purposes of taxation under Section 199 (c) of the LGC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not power barges in the case at bar considered as real properties subject to real property tax

HELD:
Yes, the power barges owned by FELS are considered as real properties subject to real property tax. Article
415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property.
Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery
and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on
a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.
HOUSE IS NOT PERSONAL BUT REAL PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF ATTACHMENT

10. Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc.

G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958

FACTS:
In 1949, Evangelista instituted a civil case against Rivera for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a
writ of attachment levied upon a house built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him. In due
course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction. The deed of
sale was issued to him on 22 October 1952. When Evangelista sought to take possession, Rivera refused to
surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and
that the latter is now the true owner. It appears that on 10 May 1952, a deed of sale had been issued to Alto
Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held on 29 September 1950, in compliance with a writ of
execution issued in another civil case. Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Rivera. After due
trial, the CFI Manila ruled for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to
Evangelista. The CA reversed the decision absolving Alto Surety from the complaint stating that although the
writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in
favor of Alto Surety, Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied
as if the house in question were immovable property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with, for
purpose of attachment, as immovable property

HELD:
Yes. Parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said
contract. However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly,
upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract.
The rules on execution do not allow, and should not be interpreted as to allow, the special consideration that
parties to a contract may have desired to impart to real estate as personal property, when they are not
ordinarily so. Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The regulation governing sales on
execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of property is suited
to its character, not to the character which the parties have given to it or desire to give it.
A CHATTEL MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED PERMANENTLY ON THE GROUND IS CONSIDERED AS
PERSONAL PROPERTY

11. Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.
G.R. No. L-58469, May 16, 1983

FACTS:
To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several
receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. To secure the collection of
receivables, it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials and a machinery – Artos Aero Dryer
Stentering Range (Dryer). Wearever defaulted thus the properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed.
The sheriff was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed the drive motor of the Dryer. The CA
reversed the order of the CFI, ordering the return of the drive motor since it cannot be the subject of a replevin
suit being an immovable bolted to the ground.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dryer is an immovable property

HELD:
Yes. If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so
agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery,
which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise
treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the
chattel mortgage.
THE NATURE OF THE MACHINERIES, THE FACT THAT THEY WERE BOLTED, HEAVY OR
CEMENTEDOES NOT MAKE THEM IPSO FACTO IMMOVABLE UNDER ARTICLE 415 PARAGRAPHS (3)
AND (5) OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BECAUSE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES MUST BE LOOKED INTO

12. Tsai v. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 12009 & 120109, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc. obtained 2 loans from PBCom, secured by a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over
the lot where its factory stands. Upon EVERTEX’s failure to meet its obligation, PBCom commenced extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings under Act 3135 and Act 1506 or “The Chattel Mortgage Law”. PBCom consolidated its
ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. It leased and eventually sold the entire factory premises to
Tsai, including the contested machineries. EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance,
and damages against PBCom, alleging inter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not
valid and that PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the properties which were not included in
the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the 1 st mortgage contract nor in the 2 nd contract which is a Chattel Mortgage,
and neither were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contested properties personal or movable properties

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or
cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable under
Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. This assertion, however, does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and
bolts do not foreclose the controversy. We have to look at the parties’ intent. While it is true that the controverted
properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the
parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts reached
the same finding that the true intention of PBCom and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and
equipment as chattels.

But reflective of the true intention of appellant PBCOM and appellee EVERTEX was the typing in capital
letters, immediately following the printed caption of mortgage, of the phrase "real and chattel. So also,
the "machineries and equipment" in the printed form of the bank had to be inserted in the blank
space of the printed contract and connected with the word "building" by typewritten slash marks.
Now, then, if the machineries in question were contemplated to be included in the real estate
mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically mentioning as
part III of Schedule A a listing of the machineries covered thereby. It would have sufficed to list them
as immovables in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage of the land and building involved.

As regards the 1979 contract, the intention of the parties is clear and beyond question. It refers solely
to chattels.
CONTRACTING PARTIES MAY VALIDLY STIPULATE THAT REAL PROPERTY BE CONSIDERED AS
PERSONAL

13. Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.

G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in chocolate making business. It entered into a lease agreement with the respondent
which provides that the machine used in chocolate-making “shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner
affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or
attached in any manner to what is permanent." Respondent then filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for a sum
of money with an application for a writ of replevin covering the subject machines. Petitioner contends that
although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become "immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the machines be considered as a personal property and subject to a writ of replevin

HELD:
Yes, the machines in this case should be considered as a personal property and are subject to a writ of
replevin Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates the immovable or real property. Paragraph 5 of Art 415
provides “Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works” However, the Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise.
A PROPERTY CONTINUES TO BE PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN “UNTIL THERE IS A FORMAL
DECLARATION ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW IT FROM BEING SUCH”

14. Laurel v. Garcia

G.R. No. 92013, July 15, 1990

FACTS:
The President issued EO 296 entitling non- Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and
services, including the Roponggi property which was for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy, in the event
of sale, lease or disposition. Petitioner contends that that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public
dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code hence, it cannot be appropriated,
and is outside the commerce of man. Respondents alleged that it has become patrimonial property because it
has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over 13 years and because the intention by
the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-use of the Roponggi property converted it into a patrimonial property?

HELD:
No. The non-use for 13 years of the Roponggi property did not convert it into a patrimonial property.
Article 420 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion shall include (2) Those which belong to
the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth. The Roppongi property is correctly classified under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code as property
belonging to the State and intended for some public service. A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially
if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
A PRIVATE PROPERTY WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME A FORESHORE LAND SHOULD BE
RETURNED TO PUBLIC DOMINION

15. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Morato

G.R. No. 107709, November 14, 1997

FACTS:
Morato is the grantee of a Free Patent Title of a lot situated in Quezon. He filed for such grant in 1972 and was
issued on 1974. At the time of the grant of free patent to Morato, the land was not reached by the water.
However, the sea advances had permanently invaded the subject land. The land was under water during high
tide in the month of August 1978. The water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the water is
about a kilometre long. During high tide, at least half of the land is 6 feet deep under water and 3 feet deep
during low tide. Petitioner avers that the land should be considered as a foreshore land and should be returned
to public dominion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said land be considered foreshore lands and be returned to public dominion

HELD:
Yes, the land should be considered as foreshore land and should be returned to public domain.

Art. 420. Of the Civil Code provides:

The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

Foreshore lands have been defined as the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the low of the tide. In this case a portion of the subject
land was invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land (632.5 square
meters) is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet deep during low tide. When the sea moved towards the
estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the
public domain. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public
domain.
AS A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION AKIN TO A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE, A ROAD RIGHT-OF-
WAY (RROW) CANNOT BE REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE PERSONS UNDER THE LAND
REGISTRATION LAW AND BE THE SUBJECT OF A TORRENS TITLE; AND IF ERRONEOUSLY
INCLUDED IN A TORRENS TITLE, THE LAND INVOLVED REMAINS AS SUCH A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC
DOMINION

16. Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 210669, August 1, 2017

FACTS:
HI-LON Manufacturing, Inc. (HI-LON) argues that the Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave abuse of
discretion when it held that HI-LON is not entitled to payment of just compensation for the 29,690 sq. m. portion
(used as road right-of-way (RROW) by the government) of the subject property registered under its name.

Sometime in 1978, the government, through the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (now DPWH),
converted to a road right-of-way RROW the subject property located in Calamba, Laguna, for the Manila South
Expressway Extension Project. The subject property was registered in the name of Commercial and Industrial
Real Estate Corporation (CIREC) which was later on transferred to Philippine Polymide Industrial Corporation
(PPIC). PPIC then mortgaged the subject property with the DBP which later acquired the property in a
foreclosure proceeding in 1985.

In 1987, the DBP submitted all its acquired assets, including the subject property, to the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) for disposal. APT disposed the subject property in a public bidding and subsequently executed a
Deed of Sale with TG Property, Inc. (TGPI) for the subject property. A TCT was issued in the name of TGPI,
covering the subject property.

In 1995, TGPI executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of HI-LON over the subject property. HI-LON
registered the Deed with the Register of Deeds which issued in its name a TCT. Sometime in 1998, HI-LON
requested assistance from DPWH for payment of just compensation. On post audit, the Supervising Auditor of
the DPWH arrived at the amount of ₱19.40/sq. m. as reasonable compensation.

Aggrieved, HI-LON filed a petition for review before the COA. In its assailed Decision, the COA declared HI-
LON not entitled to just compensation. The COA concluded that the proper valuation of the claim for just
compensation is irrelevant as HI-LON is not entitled thereto in the first place because HI-LON or its
predecessor-in-interest TGPI does not own the RROW in question, as it has been the property of the
Republic of the Philippines since its acquisition by the DBP up to the present.

ISSUE:
Whether or not HI-LON owns the RROW which is covered by the TCT registered under its name.

HELD:
No. Article 420 of the New Civil Code considers as property of public dominion those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character. Being of similar character as roads for public use, a RROW can be considered as a
property of public dominion, which is outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be
the object of a contract, except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other
incidental matters. As a property of public dominion akin to a public thoroughfare, a RROW cannot be
registered in the name of private persons under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens
Title; and if erroneously included in a Torrens Title, the land involved remains as such a property of public
dominion.
RIVERS AND THEIR NATURAL BEDS ARE OF PUBLIC DOMINION

17. Republic v. Santos III

G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012

FACTS:
Santos III applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the RTC in Paranaque City. He alleged that
the property had been formed through accretion and had been in open, notorious, public, continuous and
adverse possession for more than 30 years. The City of Parañaque opposed the application for land
registration, stating that title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that
the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. The RTC granted the
application, which was later on affirmed by CA. The Republic urges that assuming that the land sought to be
registered was previously a part of the Paranaque River which became an orchard after it dried up, the
respondents could not claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dried-up river bed forms part of public dominion and therefore, cannot be acquired by
acquisitive prescription.

HELD:
Yes. Rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion. Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property
as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties
considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code
declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a
title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the
land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only
the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of
course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and
cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be
alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be
alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through
prescription.
LANDS RECLAIMED FROM FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED AREAS ALSO FORM PART OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ARE ALSO INALIENABLE, UNLESS CONVERTED PURSUANT TO LAW INTO
ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

18. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority

G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

FACTS:
In 1998, Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of reclaimed
lands as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations. In 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda. PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA) which was approved by then President Estrada in 1999. The Amended JVA is not
an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not reclaimed lands are of public domain.

HELD:
Yes. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also
inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. The
ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which
holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Foreshore and submerged areas form part
of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part
of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. The mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands
are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically
make such lands private.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. While PEA may sell its alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals, it cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain to private corporations.
THERE MUST BE A LAW OR PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION OFFICIALLY CLASSIFYING THE
RECLAIMED LANDS AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE AND OPEN TO DISPOSITION OR CONCESSION

19. Chavez v. National Housing Authority

G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007

FACTS:
Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer, seeks to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between
the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) Pursuant to MO 161 issued by Pres. Aquino,
approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste
Management Plan, NHA was ordered to "conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the
dumpsite..”. NHA prepared the feasibility studies of the Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted
in the formulation of the "Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation Project" (SMDPRP).

In 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into between NHA and RBI (one of the top two contractors).
He issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation. In 1995, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975
square meters covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite. In 1996, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598
conveying in favor of NHA an additional 390,000 square meter area.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not reclaimed lands classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
2. Whether or not there needs to be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed
lands as alienable and disposable and open to disposition or concession for the reclaimed lands to be alienable

HELD:
1. YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, the inalienable lands covered by said
proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the
titles to such reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public
domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the
State. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to
NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it will not be able to transfer such lands to
qualified entities and thus, it will not achieve its purpose.

2. YES. The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain of
the State for the following reasons: First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations classifying the
reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. Second,
Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR anchored on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465
issued by President Ramos, without doubt, classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable.
Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the
lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such conclusion is
derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified
beneficiaries. MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special
Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in Public Estates Authority that "[t]here
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession.”
PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION, EVEN IF TITLED IN THE NAME OF AN INSTRUMENTALITY,
REMAIN OWNED BY THE REPUBLIC

20. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority

G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014

FACTS:
In the exercise of his legislative powers, President Marcos issued PD 66 in 1972, declaring as government
policy the establishment of export processing zones in strategic locations in the Philippines. Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA) was created to operate, administer, and manage the export processing zones
established in the Port of Mariveles, Bataan and such other export processing zones that may be created by
virtue of the decree. The decree declared the EPZA non-profit in character with all its revenues devoted to its
development, improvement, and maintenance. To maintain this non-profit character, the EPZA was declared
exempt from all taxes.

In 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811, establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
Certain parcels of land of the public domain located in Lapu-Lapu in Mactan, Cebu were reserved to serve as
site of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of RA 7916 or "the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995" to operate, administer, manage, and develop economic zones in the
country. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 282, directing the PEZA to assume and exercise all of the
EPZA’s powers, functions, and responsibilities.

FIRST PETITION
In 1998 the City of Lapu-Lapu demanded from the PEZA 32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the period
from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone, which granted the same. The MR
was denied. The CA dismissed the appeal for the ground of wrong mode of appeal.

SECOND PETITION
After the City of Lapu-Lapu had demanded payment of real property taxes from the PEZA, the Province of
Bataan followed suit. PEZA filed a petition for injunction before the RTC of Pasay, arguing that it is exempt from
payment of real property taxes. The trial court denied the PEZA’s petition for injunction. The PEZA filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari but the CA dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes

HELD:
YES. The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in character with all its revenues devoted for its
development, improvement, and maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit character, the EPZA was
explicitly declared exempt from real property taxes under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
on the other hand, does not specifically exempt the PEZA from payment of real property taxes. Nevertheless,
we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real
property exemption of the EPZA under PD No. 66.

Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties owned by the Republic of the
Philippines are exempt from real property taxes. Properties owned by the state are either property of public
dominion or patrimonial property. Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates property of public
dominion. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property
of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of
public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.

In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned economic zones. These economic
zones are property of public dominion. The City seeks to tax properties located within the Mactan Economic
Zone, the site of which was reserved by President Marcos under Proclamation No. 1811. Reserved lands are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man, and remain property of the Republic until withdrawn from public
use either by law or presidential proclamation.
Properties of public dominion, even if titled in the name of an instrumentality as in this case, remain
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. All told, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national
government. Furthermore, the lands owned by the PEZA are real properties owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. The City of Lapu Lapu and the Province of Bataan thus cannot collect real property taxes from the
PEZA. Petitions denied.
A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION CANNOT BE BURDENED BY A VOLUNTARY EASEMENT OF
RIGHT OF WAY IN FAVOR OF A PERSON, AND THE LATTER CANNOT CLAIM ANY RIGHT OF
POSSESSION OVER IT IF ITS USE BY THE PUBLIC IS BY MERE TOLERANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT

21. Villarico v. Sarmiento

G.R. No. 136438, November 11, 2004

FACTS:
Villarico is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City with an area of 66 square meters and covered by
TCT No. 95453. It is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the
government. As this highway was elevated by 4 meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the
DPWH constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access
to the highway. Petitioner filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents whose structures
on the government land allegedly closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue . Respondents
claim that petitioner has no right over the subject property as it belongs to the government. RTC found that
petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the public land in question. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of petitioner’s right of way carry possession over the same

HELD:
No. The of petitioner’s right of way does not carry possession over the same. It is not disputed that the lot on which
petitioner’s alleged "right of way" exists belongs to the state or property of public dominion. Public use is "use that is
not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public." Records show that the lot on which
the stairways were built is for the use of the people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a
property of public dominion.

Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or
otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not
subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.

Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it cannot be
burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere
tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he cannot
claim any right of possession over it.
LAND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IPSO JURE CONVERTED TO PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN UPON THE
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF IT AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE

22. Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic

G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of both the parties who assail the decision of the SC affirming the decision
of CA which denied the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land on the ground that
they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section
14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree)

Malabanan purchased a property from Velazco and filed an application for land registration in the RTC,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

Malabanan presented a certification issued by CENRO-DENR, declaring the land as alienable or disposable
since 982. RTC granted Malabanan's application, however CA reversed such. SC denied the petition on the
ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with
either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of PD 1529. Hence, both parties filed a motion for consideration.

Petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. The Republic reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to
convert it into patrimonial property of the state

HELD:
No. Mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable is not sufficient to convert it to
patrimonial property. We observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the
public domain, namely
:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land needs only to be classified as alienable
and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land
dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private property.

(b)Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of
the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the
requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession — possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier — the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to
run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section
14 (2) xszaof the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START TO RUN AGAINST PROPERTY WHICH IS STILL
CLASSIFIED AS PART OF PUBLIC DOMINION

23. Republic v. Aboitiz

G.R. No. 174626, October 23, 2013

FACTS: Aboitiz filed an Application for Registration of a parcel of land in Cebu. Hearing on the case ensued to
which Aboitiz submitted the necessary documents and presented witnesses. The RTC granted Aboitiz’s
application. The Republic appealed to the CA which reversed the ruling of the trial court.The CA later reversed
itself and granted the registration upon a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Aboitiz. In granting the application
for registration of land title, the CA relied on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. It stated that although the
application for registration of Aboitiz could not be granted pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 because
the possession of his predecessor-in-interest commenced in 1963 (beyond June 12, 1945), it could prosper by
virtue of acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 upon the lapse of thirty (30) years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land is susceptible to registration under Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529

HELD:
No, the subject land is still part of the public domain and hence not subject to registration under a claim of title
arising from prescription. In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, the Court clarified the import of Section 14(1) as
distinguished from Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz: “(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.”

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the
State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must
be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a
law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer
retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to
be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. In fine, the
Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal justification. Hence, the Court is constrained
to reverse the assailed CA Amended Decision and Resolution and to deny the application for registration of
land title of Aboitiz.
UNLESS THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS EXPRESSLY
CONVERTED INTO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY, THERE IS NO WAY FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
TO SET IN UNDER ARTICLE 1113 OF THE CIVIL CODE

24. Dumo v. Republic

G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018

FACTS: Severa Espinas, Erlinda Espinas, Aurora Espinas, and Virginia Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery
of Ownership, Possession and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the heirs of
Trinidad. The Subject Property was purchased by Espinas from Calica through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
19 October 1943. Espinas exercised acts of dominion over the Subject Property by appointing a caretaker to
oversee and administer the property. In 1963, Espinas executed an affidavit stating his claim of ownership over
the Subject Property. Espinas had also been paying realty taxes on the property. Dumo filed an application for
registration of 2 parcels of land alleging that the lots belonged to her mother and that she and her siblings
inherited them upon their mother's death. She further alleged that through a Deed of Partition with Absolute
Sale dated 6 February 1987, she acquired the subject lots from her siblings. Dumo traces her title from her
mother, Trinidad, who purchased the lots from Mabalay in August 1951. Mabalay was Dumo's maternal
grandfather. Mabalay purchased the properties from Calica. The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application
for land registration on the ground that the properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the
accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the RTC consolidated the land registration case with the Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages. The RTC found that the heirs of Espinas had a better right
to the property and rejected the application for registration of Dumo. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision dismissing
the application for registration of Dumo but held instead that the property still belonged to the public domain, and
the heirs of Espinas were not able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hence, Dumo filed
this petition before the Supreme Court raising, among others, that she and her predecessors-in-interest had
possessed the land in question for 56 years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land part of the public domain hence not susceptible to registration

HELD:
Yes. The land in question cannot be registered - it being a property of the public domain. It is true that under
Section 14 of PD No. 1529, one may acquire ownership of the land by prescription. Particularly, Section 14 (2)
provides that "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws" may file an application for registration of title to land. The existing law mentioned in PD No. 1529
is the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529 puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. A Indeed, Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529 provides that one
may acquire ownership of private lands by prescription. Land of the public domain is converted into
patrimonial property when there is an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. Without such declaration,
acquisitive prescription does not start to run, even if such land is alienable and disposable and the applicant is
in possession and occupation thereof. Mere classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable does
not make such land patrimonial property of the State – an express declaration by the State that such land is
no longer intended for public use, public service or the development of national wealth is imperative .
This is because even with such classification, the land remains to be part of the lands of the public domain.

Under CA No. 141, the power given to the President to classify lands as alienable and disposable
extends only to lands of the public domain. Lands of the public domain are public lands intended for public
use, or without being for public use, are intended for some public service or for the development of national
wealth.
PUBLIC LANDS NOT SHOWN HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED, RECLASSIFIED, OR RELEASED AS
ALIENABLE AGRICULTURAL LAND OR ALIENATED TO A PRIVATE PERSON REMAIN PART OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN

25. Republic v. Spouses Alejandre

G.R. No. 217336, October 17, 2018

FACTS:
Spouses Alejandre filed an application for the registration of a lot under PD No 1529 alleging that they own the
subject property by virtue of a deed of sale or conveyance; that the property was sold to them by Taleon
through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on 1990; that said land is presently occupied by them. The Republic
opposed the application raising among others that the subject property applied for is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic which is not subject to private appropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land still part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and thus not subject to
private appropriation

HELD:
Yes, the land is still part of the public domain and cannot be privately appropriated. Pursuant to Article 419 of
the Civil Code, property, in relation to the person to whom it belongs, is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. There are three kinds of property of public dominion: (1) those intended for public use; (2) those
intended for some public service; and (3) those intended for the development of national wealth.

As noted by Justice Paras:

It is believed that forest and mining lands are properties of public dominion of the third class, i.e., properties for
the development of the national wealth. Upon the other hand, the public agricultural lands before being made
available to the general public should also be properties of public dominion for the development of the national
wealth (and as such may not be acquired by prescription); but after being made so available, they become
patrimonial property of the State, and therefore subject to prescription. Moreover, once already acquired by
private individuals, they become private property.

Thus, it can be gathered from the foregoing that the subject of the land registration application under Section
14 of PD 1529 is either alienable and disposable land of public domain or private land. While Section 14(4)
does not describe or identify the kind of land unlike in (1), which refer to "alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain;" (2), which refer to "private lands"; and (3) "private lands or abandoned river beds," the land
covered by (4) cannot be other than alienable and disposable land of public domain, i.e., public agricultural
lands and private lands or lands of private ownership in the context of Article 435.

This premise proceeds from the well-entrenched rule that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion or ownership presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
classified, reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the inalienable lands of public domain. Therefore, the onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.

Respondents, based on the evidence that they adduced, are apparently claiming ownership over the
land subject of their application for registration by virtue of tradition, as a consequence of the contract
of sale, and by succession in so far as their predecessors-in-interest are concerned. Both modes are
derivative modes of acquiring ownership. Yet, they failed to prove the nature or classification of the land.
The fact that they acquired the same by sale and their transferor by succession is not incontrovertible proof that
it is of private dominion or ownership. In the absence of such incontrovertible proof of private ownership , the
well-entrenched presumption arising from the Regalian doctrine that the subject land is of public
domain or dominion must be overcome. Respondents failed to do this.
LANDS WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE OR PUBLIC SERVICE SUCH AS RESERVATIONS
FOR PUBLIC OR QUASI-PUBLIC USES ARE PROPERTY OF THE PUBLIC DOMINION AND REMAIN TO
BE SO AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN RESERVED

26. Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic

G.R. No. 177168, August 3, 2015

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the December 28, 2006 decision and March 28,
2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85179. NOVAI alleges that the CA erred, in
declaring, among others that the property is inalienable land of the public domain.

The case stemmed from a TCT issued in Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc (NOVAI)’s name which covers a land
situated inside the former Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation in Taguig. This property was previously a part of a
larger parcel of land which TCT’s under the name of the Republic.

President Garcia issued a Proclamation No. 423 which reserves for military purposes certain parcels of the
public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Rizal and Pasay City. Thereafter, then President
Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461 which excluded Fort McKinley a certain portion of land situated in the
provinces abovementioned and declared them as AFP Officers’ Village to be disposed of under the provisions of certain
laws. However, this area was subsequently reserved for veterans’ rehabilitation, medicare and training center sites.

The property was the subject of deed of sale between the Republic and NOVAI to which the TCT was
registered in favour of the latter. The Republic then sought to cancel NOVAI’s title on the ground that the property
was still part of the military reservation thus inalienable land of the public domain and cannot be the
subject of sale. The RTC ruled that the property was alienable and disposable in character. The Court of
Appeals reversed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property under NOVAI’s name is an inalienable land of public domain and cannot be the subject of
sale

HELD:
Yes, the property is an inalienable land which remains as a part of the public domain and could not have been
validly disposed of in NOVAI’s favor. Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on
Property, lands which are intended for public use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-
public uses are property of the public dominion and remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.

As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-public uses are outside the
commerce of man. They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or encumbrance; any sale, disposition or
encumbrance of such property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy. To be
subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of the public domain designated as reservations must first
be withdrawn, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, from the public or quasi-public use for
which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property,
pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of C.A. No. 141 and Article 422 of the Civil Code.

NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that the property was not intended for public or quasi-public use
or purpose.
REGARDLESS OF THE SOURCE OR CLASSIFICATION OF LAND IN THE POSSESSION OF A
MUNICIPALITY, EXCEPTING THOSE ACQUIRED WITH ITS OWN FUNDS IN ITS PRIVATE OR
CORPORATE CAPACITY, SUCH PROPERTY IS HELD IN TRUST FOR THE STATE FOR THE BENEFIT OF
ITS INHABITANTS, WHETHER IT BE FOR GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY PURPOSES

27. Rabucov. Villegas

G.R. Nos. L-24661, L-24915, & L-24916, February 28, 1974

FACTS:
The case at bar is a consolidated case involving the conversion of the lots in Malate area into disposable and
alienable lands of the state and placing its administration and disposal to the Land Tenure Administration to be
sold to bona fide occupants thereof. The City of Manila questions this as a deprivation of its property by
providing for its sale without the payment of just compensation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the converted lots owned by the City of Manila be disposed by the Congress even without just
compensation.

HELD:
Yes. The lots are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public
property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its
proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.
The Court reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity,
such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes.

RA 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their
conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants
thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide
discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.

The Court holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after
all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality
being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the
legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use" and stressed
that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in
its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should
be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of
Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation."
PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE AND MADE AVAILABLE TO THE
PUBLIC IN GENERAL ARE OUTSIDE THE COMMERCE OF MAN AND CANNOT BE DISPOSED OF OR
LEASED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT TO PRIVATE PERSONS

28. Macasiano v. Diokno G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the decision of the
RTC which granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for by respondents Municipality of Parañaque and
Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag for brevity) against petitioner. This is in connection with
Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 passed by respondent Municipality of Paranque that authorized the closure
of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque
Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The municipal council of Paranaque thereafter
issued a resolution authorizing Paranaque Mayor Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or
vending areas. By virtue of this, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative,
entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the
aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paranaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets. Macasiano, PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, then ordered the destruction and confiscation of
the stalls along the abovementioned streets. The respondents filed with the trial court a joint petition for
prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the validity of the
ordinance in question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a road or street, being used for public service and therefore public properties, can be subject to
private appropriation or private contract even by the Municipality of Parañaque.

HELD:
No. It is still a public property therefore cannot be subject of private appropriation. The property of provinces,
cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code).
As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states: Art. 424. Property for public use,
in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole
purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such
property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from
public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned.

It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last
sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as LGC.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular
traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government
has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
THE CLASSIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL PROPERTY DEVOTED FOR DISTINCTLY GOVERNMENTAL
PURPOSES AS PUBLIC SHOULD PREVAIL OVER THE CIVIL CODE CLASSIFICATION

29. Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968

FACTS:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of
the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “buildings and properties
which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for
by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to
consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered
individually by TCT in the name of Zamboanga Province. In 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province
of Zamboanga into 2: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur.

Sec. 6 of that law provided that funds of the assets and properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President. The Executive Secretary issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del
Norte had a vested right as owner of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is
entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. However, RA 3039 was approved providing that all
buildings, properties, and assets belonging to former province of Zamboanga located at the City of Zamboanga
are transferred to the latter free of charge. Consequently, the Secretary of Finance ordered the CIR to stop
from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of
P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Plaintiff-appellee
Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction"

ISSUE:
What is the nature of the 50 lots and buildings, patrimonial or properties for public use?

HELD:
If the property is owned by the municipality or municipal corporation, in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be
deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Applying the Civil Code, all the properties
in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial
properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the
school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase
"public works for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works
must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first
paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. On the other hand, applying the
norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties
in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this
norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes
like local administration, public education, public health, etc. We are more inclined to uphold this latter view.
Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the
same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they
can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the
detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws."

For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered
as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes
as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
TO CONVERT A BARRIO ROAD INTO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY, THE LAW REQUIRES THE LGU TO
ENACT AN ORDINANCE, APPROVED BY AT LEAST 2/3 OF THE SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS

30. Alolino v. Flores

G.R. No. 198774, April 4, 2016

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed from the decision of the CA which reversed the RTC
decision which dismissed Alolino's complaint against respondents Flores for the removal of their illegally
constructed structure.

Alolino is the registered owner of 2 contiguous parcels of land situated at No. 47 Gen. Luna Street, Barangay
Tuktukan, Taguig. Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. Later, he added a
second floor to the structure and extended his 2-storey house up to the edge of his property. The respondent
spouses Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately
adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house.

Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building permit. The
respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented
his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house. Alolino demanded that the
respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused. Thus, he complained about the illegal
construction to the Building Official of the Municipality of Taguig and another with the Barangay of Tuktukan.
The Building Official issued a Notice of Illegal Construction against the respondents. Sometime, the
respondents began constructing a 2 nd floor to their structure, again without securing a building permit. Alolino
filed another complaint with the Building Official of Taguig. The building official issued a second Notice of Illegal
Construction. The respondents did not comply with the directive from the building official. Alolino sent them a
demand letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter, the respondents refused to comply.

Alolino filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC praying for: (1) the removal of the
encroaching structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and (3) the
payment of damages. The respondents admitted to them that they did not secure a building permit because
the property was constructed on a municipal/barrio road. They claimed, however, that on March 1, 2004, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig (the Sanggunian) reclassified the property as a residential lot from its prior
classification as a barrio/municipal road.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a barrio road be converted to a patrimonial property by an LGU resolution

HELD:
No. The LGC authorizes an LGU to withdraw a local road from public use. To convert a barrio road into
patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3)
of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road. In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an
ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The difference between an ordinance and a resolution is
settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution is only a declaration of sentiment or
opinion of the legislative body. Properties of the LGU that are devoted to public service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these
properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC.

In exercising this authority, the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by
Congress. The Sanggunian's failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of the
barrio road. As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective citizenry. It is
outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable;(2) it is not subject to
registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not
susceptible to prescription; (4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (5) it is not
subject to attachment and execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements.
RES JUDICATA WILL NOT APPLY BETWEEN AN ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND AN ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA

31. Javier v. Veridiano II

G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Javier questions the order of a RTC citing the final decision of the city
court previously dismissing her complaint for forcible entry agaist respondent Rosete, and on the basis thereof,
dismissed her petition to quiet title on the ground of res judicata.

Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641 with the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands,
Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil
Case 926 before the City Court of Olongapo, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the
land by Babol. The case was dismissed on the ground that the area in question was outside Lot 1641.
Subsequently, Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and issued an OCT covering Lot No.
1641. Meanwhile, Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the
property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200 sq. m., to a certain Rosete. Thus Javier
demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the
demand. After about 4 years from the finality of the dismissal of civil case, petitioner instituted a
complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol and Rosete.

Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of parties and
causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory, and her
subsequent petition for quieting of title. With regard to the cause of action, she maintains that there is no
identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the
possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into the
ownership of the disputed land. Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in the two
cases since he is a successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the commencement of
the first action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata applies between an action for forcible entry and an action for quieting of title

HELD:
No, res judicata will not apply. There is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no identity of causes of
action. A complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of who has lawful
title over the disputed property. The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material
possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. On the other hand, the 2 nd
case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with
Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the
Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. Accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of
land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where
plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.

In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without
asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged
ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed
portion. The complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly
gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including the
right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a
judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares
only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination
of who has the right or title of ownership. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between
Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent
action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.
POSSESSION IS AN ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTE OF OWNERSHIP

32. Spouses Bustos v. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 120784-85, January 24, 2001

FACTS:
Paulino Fajardo died intestate. He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial. The
heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Fajardo. Manuela sold her share to Mendoza, husband
of Beatriz. Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-
law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands. Moses filed with the CFI, Pampanga a complaint for
partition claiming the ¼ share of Manuela which was sold to him. During the pendency of the case for partition,
Trinidad died. The heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad. Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son
of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Viray. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Moses. Moses sold
the subject land to spouses Bustos. In the meantime, spouses Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacios share of the
property, filed with the MTC an action for unlawful detainer against spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G.
Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the
subject land. The MTC decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of
execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction which was dismissed. Spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the CA which
dismissed the appeal and declared Mendoza as the true owner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land

HELD:
No, the petitioners cannot be ejected from their own land. In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined
with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful detainer case, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court as to
possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners
may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the CA affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject
land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the
land and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned
would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court
adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of
the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential attributes of
ownership is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to
possession of the same. An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) juses or attributes of ownership--the
right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or
vindicate and to the fruits--is a crippled owner.
A PERSON MAY BE DECLARED OWNER BUT HE MAY NOT BE ENTITLED TO POSSESSION

33. Heirs of Soriano v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128177, August 15, 2001

FACTS:
Adriano Soriano originally owned a piece of land in Lingayen, Pangasinan. His heirs subsequently leased it to
Spouses de Vera and Villasista for years, with Roman, son of Adriano acting as caretaker. Upon the death of
Adriano the lot was divided into 2 and given to his heirs. Spouses Abalos, private respondents, bought 1 whole
lot and ¾ of the other lot. The lots in question were registered in their name. They were also declared by the
court to be the undisputed owners thereof. Aggrieved, petitioner filed case against Spouses Abalos,
questioning their ownership and to annul the decision of ejectment. While the case was pending, Roman
Soriano is still in possession of the land claiming the rights of “Security of Tenure” as a tenant of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof

HELD:
No, a party who won in a land registration case cannot effectively eject the possessor. Possession and
ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally,
to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. A judgment of ownership does
not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident. Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP
and does not automatically include possession. This is especially true in the case at bar wherein
petitioner is occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant.

The court says “allegedly” due to the fact that there is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian
Reform and Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to
rest by final judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy Act, which
protects the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the lawful owners. The exercise of
the rights of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since the rights of Soriano
to possess the land are still pending litigation in the DARAB he is protected from dispossession of the land until
final judgment of said court unless Soriano’s occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.
MERE TOLERANCE OF THE OWNER DOES NOT ALLOW THE POSSESSION TO BE IN THE CONCEPT
OF AN OWNER - ???

34. Garcia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999

FACTS:
Spouses Magpayos mortgaged a parcel of land located at Makati City to PBCom. A Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage was registered and annotated on the TCT. When the said spouses failed to fulfill their obligation, the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom was the highest bidder. PBCom
filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, which was granted. During the time of the controversy,
petitioner, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, was in possession of the land. Upon service of the writ of possession to him, he
refused to honor it and filed a motion for intervention which was denied.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was granted. It held that the mortgage executed by the
Spouses Magpayos was void. It ruled that that the time of the execution of the Mortgage, the spouses were not
yet the owners of the property. This is evident from the fact that new Torrens title was issued to the Spouses
only after the execution of the mortgage. The vendor of the land, Atty. Garcia, father of both parties and whose
name was stated in the old TCT, was not in possession of the land at the time of the execution of the mortgage
and hence could not deliver the property by the execution of the document. At the time, the property was in the
possession of the plaintiff.

Upon appeal of PBCom, the CA reversed the lower court’s ruling. The CA opined that it appearing the Vendor Atty.
Garcia had control of the property which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise
registered, the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes of ownership
including the right to mortgage the land. Even if the Magpayos’ title to the land was issued 4 days following the
execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the Torrens system does
no vest ownership but is intended only to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land.
Petitioner filed a motion of reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the TCT issued after the execution of the mortgage contract is void

HELD:
No, the Mortgage to PBCom by the Spouses Magpayo is valid notwithstanding that the TCT over the property
was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration of the property does not confer
ownership. It is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale operates as a
formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of
ownership.
DISPOSITION OF HIS PROPERTY BY THE OWNER IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF OWNERSHIP

35. Rodil Enterprises v. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 129609 & 135537, November 29, 2001

FACTS:
The Republic leased the O’Racca Building to Rodil. Republic acquired ownership of the O’Racca Building, a former
alien property, by virtue of RA 477. Petitioner then subleased the Building to private respondents known as the
Association. The lease contract between Rodil and the Republic was renewed for another 15 years.
Subsequently, a new law was enacted known as BP 233, which authorized the sale of “former alien properties” classified
as commercial and industrial, and the O’RACCA building was classified as commercial property. Both Rodil and the
Association wanted to purchase the property and so they both offered their price, the former to the Republic,
and the latter, to DGSREPM. Despite the offer, the Republic granted Rodil’s request for another renewal of the lease.
However, DGSREPM recommended the suspension of the approval, and as a result a memo was issued
disapproving the renewal in favor of Rodil.

Rodil filed an action for specific performance, damages and injunction with prayer for TRO against
respondents, particularly for the Association to enjoin in collecting rentals from the occupants or sub-lessees.
However, both Rodil and the Republic, through OSG, filed a joint motion to dismiss the specific performance, which
was granted by the lower court. The order of dismissal was appealed by the Association to the CA.

The lower court granted the actions of Rodil. However, the CA set aside the decisions of the lower court,
specifically the order of dismissal. Rodil argues that the Republic, the only defendant who is a real party in
interest, signified its assent to having the action dismissed. Assuming arguendo that the Association was a real
party in interest, its counterclaim was nonetheless unmeritorious. On the other hand, the Association argues that its
counterclaim against Rodil cannot be dismissed because the trial court has not passed upon it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic, the real owner of the property, assents to the dismissal of the action for specific
performance

HELD:
Yes, because the Republic, as the owner of the O’Racca Building, merely exercised his right of ownership.
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without limitations other than those established by law.
Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has
no exception. The Republic being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a
lease contract with Rodil in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor the Republic has the right to
eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful
detainer are present.
A MORTGAGEE IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY

36. Isaguirre v. De Lara

G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000

FACTS:
Respondent approached petitioner, who was married to her, to help out in her financial difficulties. They agree d
to execute a document denominated as a “Deed of Salle and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” whereby respondent
sold a 250 sq m portion of Lot No. 502, together with the 2-story commercial and residential structure standing
thereon, in favor of petitioner, in consideration of the sum of Php 5,000. Petitioner filed a sales application over
the subject property. His application was granted, resulting in the issuance of an OCT. Meanwhile, respondent’s sales
application over the entire 1,000 sq m. of the subject property (including the 250 sq. m.) was also granted,
resulting in the issuance of an OCT in respondent’s favor.

To avoid the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages. The lower court
ruled in favor of petitioner. But when appealed to the CA, it reversed the lower court’s decision. It ruled that the contract
was not a sale, but an equitable mortgage. Respondent filed a motion for execution, praying for the immediate
delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was granted by the lower court. Then a writ of
possession was filed by respondent, which was again granted by court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration over the decision, asserting that he had the right of retention over the property until the
payment of the loan and the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgagee is entitled to retain possession of the property so long as the mortgage loan
remains unpaid.

HELD:
No, a mortgagee has no better right to possess the property over the owner. As a general rule, the mortgagor
retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does
not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property,
there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon
which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. The trial court correctly issued the writ of possession. Such writ was but a necessary consequence
of the decision affirming the validity of the OCT in the name of respondent, while at the same time nullifying the
OCT in the name of petitioner is an essential attribute of ownership.
RES JUDICATA WILL NOT APPLY BECAUSE AN EJECTMENT CASE INVOLVES A DIFFERENT CAUSE
OF ACTION FROM AN ACCION PUBLICIANA OR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA

37. Custodio v. Corrado

G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004

FACTS:
This is a review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversing the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissing respondent Rosendo F. Corrado’s Complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Injunction and Damages, in Civil Case No. 120.

Respondent Corrado filed an ejectment case against petitioner Custodio with the MTC docketed as Civil Case
No. 116. This case was dismissed and affirmed by the RTC upon appeal. Two years later, respondent filed with
the same MTC another complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil
Case No. 120, and which is the core case subject of the present petition.

The MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC,
which set aside and reversed the MTC decision. On appeal, the CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is
inapplicable because there is no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed
that the former is an ejectment suit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the date of
deprivation of possession while the latter is for recovery of possession, and not ejectment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata is applicable in this case

HELD:
No. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on
the merits and its cause of action is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession and
ownership. In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit and for failure of plaintiff-
private respondent to state the date when he was deprived of his possession, the court held that it did not
entitle him to file an ejectment suit against herein defendant-petitioner. In Civil Case No. 120, the cause of
action is for recovery of possession and not ejectment. These are two separate causes of action and therefore
the principle of res judicata does not apply to the present case.

Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of action from an accion
publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as Civil Case No. 120, and the judgment of the former shall not bar
the filing of another case for recovery of possession as an element of ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry
or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of
possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of
ownership. Incidentally, we agree with the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is not an accion
publiciana but more of an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the respondents allegation in the complaint that
he is the registered owner of the subject lot and that the petitioner had constructed a bungalow thereon and
had been continuously occupying the same since then.
AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF A PROPERTY IS THE SOLE REMEDY OF A LANDOWNER
WHOSE PROPERTY HAS BEEN WRONGFULLY OR ERRONEOUSLY REGISTERED IN ANOTHER'S
NAME AFTER ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE DECREE SO LONG AS THE PROPERTY HAS NOT
PASSED TO AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE

38. Abejaron v. Nabasa

G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-square meter portion
of a 175-square meter residential lot in General Santos. In 1945, Abejaron and his family started occupying the
118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built
thereon a family home. Knowing that the disputed land was public, petitioner declared only his house, and not
the disputed land, for taxation purposes. Later on, the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy.
Abejaron merely watched them do the survey and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that
he could not secure title over it as it was government property. Without his knowledge and consent, Nabasa
applied for and caused the titling in his name the entire Lot 1, including Abejaron's 118-square meter portion.
Nabasa was issued OCT. As the title included petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion of the lot, he filed a
protest with the Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and application. The case was eventually dismissed.

Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for reconveyance with damages seeking reconveyance of
his 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner in its
reconveyance case declaring the possession and occupancy of Abejaron over 118 square meters of lot in good
faith and thereby declaring the inclusion of said portion in the OCT issued to Nabasa erroneous. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud. It ruled that
Abejaron failed to substantiate the existence of actual fraud. There was no proof of irregularity neither in the
issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor was there a claim that fraud intervened in the
issuance of the title, thus, the title has become indefeasible.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner acquired title over the land in dispute

HELD:
No. An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree so long as
the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person
who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud is a
ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for
the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and
the fact of fraud.

As admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation purposes. While tax receipts
and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by other
effective proof. Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the earliest
of these was dated 1950.

Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title
through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible." As petitioner
Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of
title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.
AS LONG AS THE ALLEGATIONS DEMONSTRATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY, THE
FIRST LEVEL COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

39. Javier v. Lumontad

G.R. No. 203760, December 3, 2014

FACTS:
Javier filed an action for forcible entry against Lumontad. Petitioner alleged in his complaint that his father
Vicente was the owner of a parcel of land and petitioner’s family lived in a residential house erected on this land. Upon
his father’s death, petitioner continued possession over the same. The respondent gained entry into the subject
land and started to build a 2-storey building on a portion thereof, despite petitioner’s vigorous objections. The MTC
dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, the Court found that petitioner, being the owner and
possessor of the property in question, has the right to be respected in his possession and that respondent
forcibly and unlawfully deprived him of the same. The CA ruled that the issue of possession of the subject land
is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership, such that the former issue cannot be determined without
ruling on who really owns such land. It remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in the exercise of
the latter’s original jurisdiction in an action for recovery of ownership and possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling and ordered the remand of the case to the latter
court for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of ownership and possession

HELD:
No. In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building
has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The
plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as
long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter. A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that the required jurisdictional averments, so
as to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied with.

Said pleading alleges that petitioner, as the original owner’s, i.e., Vicente’s, successor-in-interest, was in prior
physical possession of the subject land but was eventually dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on
March 26, 2007 by respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry into the same and, thereafter,
erected a building thereon. Clearly, the means by which petitioner’s dispossession was effected cannot be said to have
been insufficiently alleged as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed by the CA. The “how” (through
unlawful entry and the construction of the subject building), “when” (March 26, 2007), and “where” (a 150 sq. m. portion
of the subject land) of the dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint.

Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by express
provision of Section 33 (2) of BP 129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court. Even in cases
where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts
maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to
make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. It must
be clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership.
THERE IS NO FORUM-SHOPPING FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IN THE CERTIFICATION ON NON-
FORUM SHOPPING OF THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE, A COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE
STATUS OF THE PENDING ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY

40. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Ando

G.R. No. 195669, May 30, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against herein respondents Ando. The MTCC
ruled that BUCCI failed to mention in its certification against non-forum-shopping a complete statement of the
present status of another case concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels of land earlier filed
before the RTC. The recovery of ownership case also involved the same parcel of land in the unlawful detainer
case. The case before the MTCC was eventually dismissed on failure to comply with the rule on certification
against forum shopping.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BUCCI guilty of forum-shopping

HELD:
No, BUCCI is not guilty of forum-shopping when it failed to disclose in the certification on non-forum shopping
of the unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the action for recovery of ownership of
property then pending before RTC Mandaue City. Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary
action of unlawful detainer and the land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical
or similar in the two cases. The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is entitled to, or should be
awarded, the material or physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact);
whereas the issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be recognized as lawful
owner of the disputed parcels of land.

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from
a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto.
An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit
that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to
recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession.
DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED AT THE TIME OF ACTUAL OR THREATENED
DISPOSSESSION. THUS, WHEN POSSESSION HAS ALREADY BEEN LOST, THE OWNER MUST
RESORT TO JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR THE RECOVERY OF PROPERTY

41. German Management and Services Inc. v. Court of Appeals

GR Nos. 76217 & L-76216, September 14, 1989

FACTS:
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision.
Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and 20 other persons, petitioner advised
the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Petitioner proceeded with the development of the
subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents. It deprived private
respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed
wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other
crops of private respondents; and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass private respondents from
their respective farmholdings.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against the petitioner. The MTC and RTC dismissed
private respondents' complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the Appellate Court gave due course to their
petition and held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were
forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner

HELD:
Yes. Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject
property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner
because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual
title to an estate. Title is not involved.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were
already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the
subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested.

Both the MTC and the RTC have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the
crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New
Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at
the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession
has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is
clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has
an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP CANNOT BE INVOKED AGAINST A LAWFUL CO-POSSESSOR OF THE
LAND

42. Caisip v. People

GR No. L-28716, November 18, 1970

FACTS:
Spouses Cabalag and Guevarra cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico. The
overseer of the hacienda is Caisip and the owner of the same is Roxas. The latter acquired a court ruling
against the spouses Cabalag and Guevarra for forcible entry which orders them to vacate the premises within
20 days. The order was carried out June 6, 1959, giving them until June 26 to vacate it.

On June 17, Gloria was seen by Caisip weeding the portion of Lot 105-A, which is a ricefield. The latter bade
her to stop what she was doing and to leave the premises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales
and Cpl. Villadelrey to help him shoo her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and leave
so the two police officers, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away. As a result, the clothes of
Gloria got torn. One of Gloria’s neighbours caught sight of the event and asked the officers to release her. Gloria
was later turned over to the police on duty for interrogation.

A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion. One of their defenses was
Article 429 of the Civil Code based on the Doctrine of Self-Help.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners Caisip et. al validly invoke Article 429

HELD:
No. Art. 429 of the Civil Code which provides that “The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force
as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property." cannot be used as a defense of the petitioner to justify their action.

Having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A, Gloria did not, on June
17, 1959 — or within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession
thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or
prevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a
property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry
was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay
in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom On
June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal authority therefor,
prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A),
and compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be
right or wrong ," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP AUTHORIZES THE LAWFUL POSSESSOR TO USE FORCE, NOT ONLY
TO PREVENT A THREATHENED UNLAWFUL INVASION OR USURPATION THEREOF; IT IS SORT OF
SELF-DEFENSE

43. People v. Pletcha, Jr.

No. 19029-CR, June 27, 1977

FACTS:
Pletcha Jr., a farmer, owns a land which has been cultivating for 19 years. In the morning of June 10, 1973,
eight men were seen by Pletcha constructing fence and wires on a piece of land in Hacienda Gaspit. It has
been alleged that a private corporation sought to take over the aforementioned land. Claiming actual
possession and ownership, Pletcha asked the group to desist from fencing pending the resurvey of the land.
However, Pletcha was ignored by the eight men.

Pletcha thereafter came back with a bolo, without any chance, however, to actually use it or threaten
them, because as soon as the group saw him they ran away. This prompted the eight men to file a
complaint for grave coercion. Tito Pletcha invoked the doctrine of self-help under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, giving him the right to use reasonable force to exclude any person threatening his peaceful ownership.

ISSUE:
Can Pletcha Jr. validly invokes self-help, hence, shall not be convicted of Grace Coercion.

HELD:
Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force not only to prevent a threatened
unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is sort of self-defense. The use of such necessary force to protect
proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws. The appellant need
not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of property. The situation required
immediate action and Article 429 gave him the self-executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance.
Article 429 confirms the right of the appellant, an owner and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel
an invasion, usurpation, actual, threatened or physical, of his property.
BEING LEGITIMATE POSSESSORS OF THE LAND AND HAVING EXERCISED LAWFUL MEANS TO
PROTECT THEIR POSSESSION, RESPONDENTS WERE NOT GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION

44. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative

G.R. No. 19299, July 18, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in commercial farming of bananas. It owned 1,023.8574 hectares of land in
Carmen, Davao. A big portion of this land measuring 958 hectares was initially deferred for acquisition and
distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Thereafter, 698.8897 hectares of the 958-hectare land were awarded to members of the Diamond Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARBMUPCO). Petitioner, however, maintained
management and control of 277.44 hectares of land, including a portion measuring 109.625 hectares (109-
hectare land). The 109 hectares was subsequently awarded to 278 CARP beneficiaries and the TCT of
petitioner Diamond Farms were cancelled.

In 2002, the petitioner filed unlawful occupation alleging that on November 1995, it was holder of TCT covering
the 109 hectares of land and grew export quality banana. Petitioner alleges that DAR’s order distributing land was not
yet final on account of appeals. Petitioner insists that prior to its receipt of the corresponding payment for the
land from the government or deposit in its favor of the compensation for the land in cash or in LBP bonds,
respondents cannot be deemed lawful possessors of the subject land and the valuable improvements thereon,
citing Section 16 (e) of the CARL. According to petitioner, "it has yet to receive any compensation for the lands
acquired by the government."

Respondent farmers refused to do their work and forcibly occupied 74-hectares which prohibited
petitioner from harvesting its produce. As a result, petitioner installed workers on a CARP-covered land
when the DAR has already identified the CARP beneficiaries of the land and has already ordered the
distribution of the land to them serves no other purpose than to create an impermissible roadblock to
installing the legitimate beneficiaries on the land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the actions taken by the respondents are lawful and within the contemplation of Article 429

HELD:
Yes. Actions taken by respondents to guard the land are reasonable and necessary to protect their
legitimate possession and prevent precisely what petitioner attempted to do. Such course was justified
under Article 429 of the Civil Code which reads “the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force
as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property.” Being legitimate possessors of the land and having exercised lawful means to
protect their possession, respondents were not guilty of unlawful occupation.
THE LAWFUL OWNER OF A PROPERTY HAVE THE RIGHT, UNDER ARTICLE 429 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
TO EXCLUDE ANY PERSON FROM ITS ENJOYMENT AND DISPOSAL

45. Spouses Fuentes v. Roca

G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

FACTS:
Spouses Rosario (wife) and Tarciano (husband) had been living separately for 30 years since 1958. In 1982
and during the marriage, Tarciano bought a piece of land from his parents. Tarciano decided to sell the land to
the Spouses Fuentes on 1989. Atty. Plagata prepared the documents of sale. The agreement required the
Spouses Fuentes to pay a downpayment and the balance after six months on the condition that Tarciano clear
the lot of the structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario, to the sale. The
parties relied on Atty. Plagata’s word that he went to see Rosario and had her sign the affidavit of consent. Upon
Tarciano's compliance with the other conditions, a new title was transferred to the Fuentes spouses. Tarciano
passed away followed by his wife, who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later on in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, respondents Rocas filed an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano's wife, Rosario, did not give her
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. The Fuentes
spouses denied the Rocas' allegations. They pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and
she alone could invoke it. The Fuentes also counter that the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale
on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Rosario (respondent Rocas) bring an action to annul the sale of conjugal property
without her consent after her death

HELD:
Yes. The sale was void from the beginning. Article 124 of the Family Code provides that without the other
spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the sale on a conjugal property, the same would be void.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance
of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother's (his wife's) written consent. The passage of time
did not erode the right to bring such an action.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died,
they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the respondent Rocas . As lawful owners,
the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment
and disposal.
However, the Spouses Fuentes should be entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarciano's heirs, the
Rocas, the P200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
The Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and building improvements on it.
Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the transaction, represented
that he got Rosario's signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that
the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. Further, the notarized document appears to have
comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of
absolute sale in their favor. In fact, they paid the balance due him. The Fuentes spouses are deemed as
possessors in good faith. According to Article 526 of the Civil Code, he is deemed a possessor in good faith if
he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the property
prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. What is more, they are entitled under Article 448
to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until
60
the reimbursement is made. The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil
Code, of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase in value
which the property may have acquired by reason of such

THE IMPOSITION BY AN OWNER OF SECURITY MEASURES ON HIS PROPERTY EMANATES FROM

THE ATTRIBUTES OF OWNERSHIP UNDER ARTICLE 429 OF THE CIVIL CODE
46. Saluday v. People
G.R. No. 215305. April 3, 2018
Carpio, Acting C.J.
FACTS: On 5 May 2009, the bus that petitioner boarded on was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint. SCAA Buco, a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to
disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to
check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious
individuals. SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-
black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy
for its small size. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor
answered that Saluday and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested Saluday
to board the bus and open the bag. When Saluday opened it, the bag revealed the contents of firearms.
Saluday was prosecuted and convicted of illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under Presidential Decree No. 1866, 4 as amended (PD 1866). He assails the legality of the search
and seizure conducted.
ISSUE: What is the basis of owners of private property in imposing security measures on their property without
violating the constituional right against unreasonable searches and seizures?
HELD: Article 429 of the Civil Code as an attribute of ownership.
In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained, “[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel
and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises.
Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised." Similarly,
shopping malls install metal detectors and body scanners, and require bag inspection as a requisite for entry.
Needless to say, any security lapse on the part of the mall owner can compromise public safety.
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have
every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are
accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter
those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the
former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems
from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of
privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes
a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where
passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy.
62
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
IT IS WITHIN THE RIGHT OF OWNERS TO FENCE AND ENCLOSE THEIR PROPERTY AND NO
DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED BY PERSONS INCIDENTALLY INJURED
47. Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
A civil case for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa (defendant herein)
against Cristino Custodio, et. al. (petitioners). During the pendency of this case, Mabasa died and was
substituted by his surviving spouse. In his complaint, he alleged that he owns a parcel of land surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. When the said property was purchased by Mabasa, there
were tenants occupying the premises. Sometime in 1982, Mabasa discovered that there had been built an
adobe fence in the passageway to the property making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by Spouses Santos along their property which is also along the passageway. Eventually, the
adobe fence was extended in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment located in defendant’s property vacated the area.
The trial court granted the easement of right of way and ordered petitioner spouses to give defendant
permanent access — ingress and egress, to the public street; and indemnity to petitioners. The prayer for
damages was denied.
Mabasa’s heirs appealed the dispositive portion of the decision regarding the denial of damages in their favor. The Court
of Appeals modified the decision and awarded damages in favor of defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant may recover damages for losses incurred in the form of unrealized rentals by
reason of the closure of the passageway.
HELD:
No. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence
not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as
owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement
of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents
had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a
compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave
private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right.
To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for
acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally
cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the
owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as
fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having
63
been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.
64
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
THE OWNER OF A THING CANNOT MAKE USE THEREOF IN A MANNER AS TO INJURE THE RIGHTS
OF A THIRD PERSON
48. Spouses Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No.74761, November 6, 1990
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS:
This is a petition whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages.
Spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent
corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Spouses Andamo instituted a criminal action; thereafter a civil action for damages was filed. The trial court
suspended the hearings over the civil case, the suspension was later affirmed by the IAC.
ISSUE:
Should respondent corporation be held liable for damages caused to Spouses Andamo?
HELD:
Yes. It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own
land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
65
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
SOLE ISSUE IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES IS MATERIAL POSSESSION
49. Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga
G.R. No.197743, March 12, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA reversing the MTC and the RTC in
upholding the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioners.
The Lopez’ owner of City Heights Subd. offered to construct the Naga City Hall within the premises of the subdivision.
The area where the hall will be built will be donated on the condition that it will be the subdivision that will
construct the city hall. The area donated was registered with Macario and Gimenez.
Petitioners contended that the plan to donate the area did not materialize as the contract to build the City Hall
was not awarded to the subdivision but to a different contractor. Petitioners claimed that the Macario and
officers of the subdivision met with Naga’s mayor to demand the return of the property; the mayor assured them that
the city would buy the property. Macario died without receiving payment. Petitioners as heirs demanded that
the city vacate and return the property. Failing to do so, they filed a complaint for unlawful detainer.
The City countered that the donation actually took place, as evidenced by a Deed of Donation. It also countered
that the property has long been declared in the city’s name for tax purposes. It further contended that it could not be
ejected from the premises as it possessed the rights of a builder in good faith.
ISSUE:
Does the mere invocation of ownership by the defendant render the action for unlawful detainer dismissible?
HELD:
No.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties - possession de facto and not possession
de jure.
When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession, or more particularly, to determine who between the parties has the better
right to possess the property. Nonetheless, the adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
66
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
REQUISITE FOR A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER THAT POSSESSION WAS
INITIALLY LAWFUL AND TURNED UNLAWFUL UPON EXPIRATION OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS
50. Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona
G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA’s decision upholding the MTC and RTC ordering petitioner
to vacate the disputed property.
Eversley is a public health facility operated by the DOH for the treatment to patients with leprosy. Since 1930, it
has occupied a portion of land in Mandaue, Cebu. Spouses Barbarona alleged that they are the owners of the
said lot by virtue of a TCT. They claim that they have acquired the property from Spouses Alba whose
ownership was covered by an OCT. Spouses Barbarona filed a complaint for ejectment before MTC Mandaue
on May 6, 2005. The Spouses Barbarona alleged that they had sent demand letters and that the occupants
were given until April 15, 2005 to vacate the premises. They further claimed that despite the lapse of the
period, the occupants refused to vacate.
In their Answer, the occupants alleged that since they had been in possession of the property for more than 70
years, the case was effectively one for recovery of possession, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.
The MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property finding the action was one of unlawful detainer which
was affirmed by the RTC. The CA upheld the lower court’s decision upon appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Spouses’ complaint was for unlawful detainer?
HELD:
The spouses’ complaint was not for unlawful detainer. The proper remedy should have been to file an accion publiciana
or reinvindicatoria to assert their right of possession or ownership.
Respondents' Complaint before the Municipal Trial Court states: “That [the occupants] are presently occupying
the above-mentioned property of the [Spouses Barbarona] without color [of] right or title. Such occupancy is
purely by mere tolerance. Indeed, [the occupants'] occupying the lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is
illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations with the [Spouses Barbarona.]”
Indeed, no mention has been made as to how petitioner came to possess the property and as to what acts
constituted tolerance on the part of respondents or their predecessors-in-interest to allow petitioner's
occupation. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession
must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff,
the acts of tolerance must be proved. Respondents failed to state when petitioner's possession was initially
lawful, and how and when their dispossession started. All that appears from the Complaint is that petitioner's
occupation "is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations with [respondents.]"
67
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
THE FACT OF TOLERANCE IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE IN AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
51. Javelosa v. Tapus
G.R. No. 204361, July 4, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA’s decision dismissing the case for unlawful detainer filed by
Javelosa before the lower court.
The subject property in Aklan is registered with the petitioner by a TCT. The property was originally covered by
an OCT which Javelosa acquired by donation from Tirol. It was occupied by Tapus and other respondents. The
respondents’ predecessor was assigned as a caretaker of the property, and therefore possessed and occupied a portion
thereof upon the tolerance and permission of Tirol. In 2003, petitioner’s daughter learned that a relative of Tapus
offered to sell the said property. After the parties failed to compromise, the petitioner sent a demand letter to
the respondents. The demand was unheeded which prompted petitioner to file for an unlawful detainer.
In their Answer, she and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying the subject property since time
immemorial. She emphasized that they are actual, adverse and exclusive possessors under a claim of
ownership. She further averred that they are indigenous occupants and tribal settlers of the land in dispute, and
hence their rights are protected by law.
The MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the which was affirmed by the RTC. The CA reversed the lower
court’s decision upon appeal ruling that the the petitioner failed to show that the respondents occupied the subject
property pursuant to her tolerance, and that such permission was present from the very start of their
occupation.
ISSUE:
Whether the all the requisites in filing an action for unlawful detainer was complied with?
HELD:
No, the complaint stated that (i) the respondents occupied the subject property upon the tolerance of the
petitioner; (ii) the petitioner sent the respondents a demand to vacate sometime in October 2003; (iii) the same
demand was unheeded; and (iv) the action for unlawful detainer was filed within one year from the date of the
demand.
The petitioner failed to adduce evidence to establish that the respondents' occupation of the subject property
was actually effected through her tolerance or permission. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to prove how and
when the respondents entered the subject lot, as well as how and when the permission to occupy was
purportedly given. In fact, she was conspicuously silent about the details on how the permission to enter was
given, save for her bare assertion that the respondents' occupied the premises as caretakers thereof.
It cannot be gainsaid that the fact of tolerance is of utmost importance in an action for unlawful detainer.
Without proof that the possession was legal at the outset, the logical conclusion would be that the defendant's
possession of the subject property will be deemed illegal from the very beginning, for which, the action for
unlawful detainer shall be dismissed. Tolerance cannot be presumed from the owner's failure to eject the
occupants from the land. Rather, "tolerance always carries with it 'permission' and not merely silence or
inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance."
68
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
THE OWNER OF A THING CANNOT MAKE USE THEREOF IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO INJURE THE
RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS; SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS
52. Spouses Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990
Fernan, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Spouses Andamo challenging the
order of the respondent IAC and the RTC suspending further hearings in a civil case until after judgment in the
related criminal case.
Petitioner spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to
that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land
of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners’ crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Thus, petitioners first instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors respondent corporation for
destruction by means of injunction under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. After one year, petitioners filed
another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, for damages with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
ISSUE:
Can a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its
land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, be held civilly liable for damages?
HELD:
Yes, a corporation which causes damage to another by the use of its property may be held liable for damages. It
must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an
owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
In this case, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
Thus, a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within
its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
69
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
IN THE CONTEXT OF EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, THE SOIL HAS NO VALUE SEPARATE FROM
THAT OF THE EXPROPRIATED LAND
THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND EXTENDS TO THE SURFACE AS WELL AS TO THE SUBSOIL UNDER IT
53. Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan
GR No. 185124, January 25, 2012
Sereno, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) seeking the reversal of the decision of CA affirming the judgement of the RTC.
Petitioner is a GOCC under R.A. 3601. It is primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in
the country. To carry out its purpose, petitioner was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the
power of eminent domain. As petitioner needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the
Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of 3 parcels of lands: Lot No. 3080, Lot No. 455, and Lot No. 3039.
The RTC created a committee to determine the fair market value of the expropriated properties to establish the
just compensation to be paid to the owners. The committee added to its computation the value of the earthfill
excavated from portions of Lot Nos. 3039 and 3080, to which the petitioners objected. The RTC ruled that the
inclusion of the value of the soil is correct. On the other hand, the CA deleted the inclusion of the value of the soil
excavated from the properties in the just compensation but affirmed RTC’s valuation of the improvements in the said
lands.
ISSUE:
Is excavated soil distinct and separate from the expropriated lands, therefore, it must be included in the
computation of just compensation?
HELD:
No, excavated soil is not distinct and separate from the expropriated lands, thus, it must not be inclyded in the
computation of just compensation. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate
from that of the expropriated land.
In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al, the SC held that rights over lands are indivisible. As stated in
ART. 437, “The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to
servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of
aerial navigation.” Thus, The ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
In the construction of irrigation projects, petitioner must necessarily make excavations in order to build the
canals. Indeed, it is preposterous that petitioner will be made to pay not only for the value of the land but also
for the soil excavated from such land when such excavation is a necessary phase in the building of irrigation
projects. That petitioner will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern to the
landowner who has been paid the fair market value of his land. As pointed out by the OSG, the law does not
limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area only. Further, petitioner, now being the owner of the
expropriated property, has the right to enjoy and make use of the property in accordance with its mandate and
objectives as provided by law. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to
recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the
damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public improvements.
Therefore, since in the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the
expropriated land, the excavated soil should not be included in the computation of just compensation.
70
OWNERSHIP
Concept of Ownership
A LAND CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED SIMULTANEOUSLY AS AN AGRICULTURAL LAND IN REGARDS TO
THE SURFACE LAND AND MINERAL LAND IN REGARDS TO ITS SUB-SURFACE
54. Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa
G.R. Nos. L-43938, L-44081, & L-44092, April 15, 1988
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by both petitioner Benguet and Atok from the judgment of the CA affirming that the
surface rights of respondents de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights
of petitioners Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. On the other hand, the Republic has filed its
own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining
companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.
Respondent Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo filed for an application for registration of a parcel of land. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet
Province, was divided into 9 lots. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots
6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. In support of the application,
both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription.
The application was separately opposed by petitioners Benguet Consolidated, Atok Big Wedge and by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
Both petitioners Benguet and Atok support their opposition from a mining claim they respectively own. On the
other hand, the Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to
be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The RTC denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and
ownership of the land sought to be registered. CA reversed the decision of the RTC and recognized the claims
of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. CA arrived in its decisions
by applying the Regalian doctrine.
ISSUE:
Can a land be classified as half agricultural and half mineral lands?
HELD:
No, a land cannot be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The Regalian doctrine
was misapplied in this case by the CA.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural
and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as
forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were
perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be
so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by
those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
In regard to the application of CA of the Regalian doctrine, the flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is
in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to
which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and
may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that
71
will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of
course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Therefore, a land cannot be classified as both agricultural in the surface and mineral land in the sub-soil.
72
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
A BONUS THAT BEARS NO IMMEDIATE, BUT ONLY A REMOTE ACCIDENTAL RELATION TO A LAND
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A CIVIL FRUIT OF THE SAID LAND
55. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 35223, September 17, 1931
Romualdez, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by intervenor-appellant Philippine National Bank (PNB) seeking the reversal of the
judgment of the trial court ruling that a bonus is not a civil fruit.
Defendant Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the PNB. To secure the payment of its debt, it
succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the
creditor bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property
under the mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution, undertook to credit the owners every year with the
payment of a bonus equal to two per centum of the debt secured according to yearly balance.
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against defendant Talisay-Silay Milling for the delivery of the amount
of P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on 30 June 1930, as bonus
in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma
might be entitled to from the defendant Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as bonus, because that would be civil fruits of
the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for the benefit of the central referred to, and by virtue of a deed
of assignment. Defencant Talisay-Silay answered the complaint that Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s credit (P7,500)
belonged to Cesar Ledesma, a purchaser in good faith. At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the
sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the P7,500 part of the credit in question. Upon conclusion of the
hearing, the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right over the bonus.
ISSUE:
Is bonus considered as a civil fruit of the mortgaged property?
HELD:
No, the bonus is not obtained from that land but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land, and the
bank's contention is untenable.
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second, the
proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources
of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context of the law, the phrase "u otras analogas" refers only
to rent or income, for the adjectives "otras" and "analogas" agree with the noun "rentas," as do also the other
adjectives "perpetuas" and "vitalicias." That is why we say that by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one
of three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
The said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to the land mentioned, having been
granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit
of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from said
risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger for the protection of
the central, but certainly it is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this case is
concerned, has nothing to do with it.
Therefore, the said bonus cannot be considered as civil fruits of the said mortgaged property.
73
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
RENT IS A CIVIL FRUIT THAT BELONGS TO THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY PRODUCING IT BY
RIGHT OF ACCESSION. OWNERSHIP OF THE THING SOLD IS ACQUIRED BY THE BUYER ONLY UPON
DELIVERY THEREOF, THAT IS, WHEN IT IS PLACED IN THE CONTROL AND POSSESSION OF THE
BUYER
56. Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc
G.R. No. 133879, November 21, 2001
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 filed by Petitioner Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. seeking the
reversal of the judgment of the RTC dismissing the claim of petitioner for unpaid back rentals.
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. ("Camelo") used to own two 2-storey buildings located at Claro M. Recto Avenue,
Manila. Carmelo entered into a two Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. ("Mayfair") for a period of 20
years. Both leases contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject
properties. However, in July 1978, within the 20-year-lease term, the subject properties were sold by Carmelo
to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. ("Equatorial") for the total sum of P11,300,000, without their first being
offered to Mayfair. Mayfair filed a Complaint with the RTC for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Carmelo and Equatorial. The RTC ruled in favor of Carmelo and Equatorial. On appeal, the CA
completely reversed and set aside the judgment of the lower court. The SC denied the Petition for Review and
ruled that the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioners Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. and Carmelo &
Bauermann, Inc. be rescinded. The Decision stated that "Equatorial has received rents from Mayfair during all
the years that this controversy has been litigated”.
Meanwhile, barely five months after Mayfair had submitted its Motion for Execution before the RTC, Equatorial
filed with the RTC, an action for the collection of a sum of money against Mayfair, claiming payment of rentals
or reasonable compensation for the defendant's use of the subject premises after its lease contracts had
expired.
ISSUE:
Is Equatorial entitled to back rentals?
HELD:
No, Equatorial is not entitled to back rentals because it was never put in actual and effective control or
possession of the property.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him "in
any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee." This right is transferred, not merely by contract, but
also by tradition or delivery. Non nudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum transferantur. There is said to be
delivery if and when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the vendee." Thus, it has been
held that while the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of
the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by the
failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. Consequently
and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission
by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that period. Under the factual environment
of this controversy, Equatorial was never put in actual and effective control or possession of the property
because of Mayfair's timely objection. The rental payments made by Mayfair should not be construed as a
recognition of Equatorial as the new owner. They were made merely to avoid imminent eviction.
Therefore, since there was no actual and effective control or possession of the property by Equitorial because
of the timely objection of Mayfair, it is not entitled to back rentals.
74
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THERE IS NO ACCRETION WITH ARTIFICIAL AND MAN-MADE DEPOSITS
57. Rex Daclison v. Eduardo Baytion
G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Baytion alleges that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land consisting of 1,500 square meters, a
portion of which was leased to one Leonida. When the lease expired, petitioner and other persons acting under
her took possession of the portion leased and occupied by Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of
respondent. Since then, petitioner had been occupying the contested portion. Upon learning of petitioner’s
unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the property, respondent demanded that he vacate it. Despite oral
and written demands to vacate, petitioner refused to do so. Hence, respondent filed a Complaint for Forcible
Entry and Damages against petitioner.
In his answer, petitioner averred that in 1978, respondent leased the subject portion to Antonio dela Cruz
(Antonio); that ten or fifteen years later, a stone walling, called a riprap, was erected at the creek lying beside
the subject property, leaving a deep down-sloping area; that Antonio acquired possession of the said down-
slope when he had the same filled up until it was leveled with the leased portion; that Antonio paid for the right
to possess the same, and respondent promised that he would no longer bother him if they would just transfer to
the filled-up and plane-leveled property; that on account of the said promise, Antonio and Ernanie vacated the
leased area and transferred their business to the filled-up portion; that despite the fact that they already
vacated the leased portion of the property, respondent still filed a complaint with the barangay claiming that the
filled-up portion was part of his property.
Petitioner insists that the filled-up portion between the riprap constructed by the government and the property of
respondent, which they possess, is outside of the land co-owned by the latter. Respondent basically posits that
although the disputed portion is outside the description of his property, it forms an integral part of the latter
because it is an accretion, construction, or improvement on the property and, under the law, any accretion or
anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-owners.
ISSUE:
Can the portion between the land co-owned by Baytion and the constructed riprap be owned through the right
of accretion?
HELD:
No, the respondent’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. In other words, the following
requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,(3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin with, the land came
about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-made and not
the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his property. Respondent failed to prove the
attendance of the indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the river or
creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
Hence, the deposits being man-made, there is no accretion.
75
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
NO RECOVERY OF BUILDINGS FOR GOVERNMENT PROJECTS UNDER ARTICLE 445 OF CIVIL CODE
58. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Perez
G.R. No. 166884, June 13, 2012
Brion, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial institution and the official depository of
the Philippines. Respondents are the officers and representatives of Asian Construction and Development
Corporation (ACDC), a corporation engaged in the construction business.
Petitioner extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of an Omnibus Credit Line
Agreement (Agreement) between LBP and ACDC. In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust
Receipts Facility of the Agreement to buy construction materials. The respondents, as officers and
representatives of ACDC, executed trust receipts in connection with the construction materials, with a total
principal amount of ₱52,344,096.32. The trust receipts matured, but ACDC failed to return to petitioner the proceeds
of the construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. Petitioner sent ACDC a
demand letter, dated May 4, 1999, for the payment of its debts, including those under the Trust Receipts Facility
in the amount of ₱66,425,924.39. ACDC failed to comply with the demand letter hence, petitioner filed a complaint
for estafa against the respondents. Respondents alleged that ACDC acted as a subcontractor for government
projects such as the Metro Rail Transit, the Clark Centennial Exposition and the Quezon Power Plant in
Mauban, Quezon. Its clients for the construction projects, which were the general contractors of these projects,
have not yet paid them; thus, ACDC had yet to receive the proceeds of the materials that were the subject of
the trust receipts and were allegedly used for these constructions. As there were no proceeds received from
these clients, no misappropriation thereof could have taken place.
ISSUE:
Can there be recovery of buildings or construction (to which the subject materials were used) despite knowing
that such are for government projects?
HELD:
No, the buildings or construction cannot be recovered.
Article 445 provides that: whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.
At the onset of these transactions, petitioner knew that ACDC was in the construction business and that the
materials that it sought to buy under the letters of credit were to be used for the following projects: the Metro
Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition Project. Petitioner had in fact authorized the delivery of
the materials on the construction sites for these projects, as seen in the letters of credit it attached to its
complaint. Clearly, they were aware of the fact that there was no way they could recover the buildings or
constructions for which the materials subject of the alleged trust receipts had been used.
The materials were used for the construction of an immovable property on a property of public domain. As an
immovable property, the ownership of whatever was constructed with those materials would presumably belong
to the owner of the land, under Article 445 of the Civil Code, which in this case, is the government.
76
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
REMOVAL OF STRUCTURES BY THE OWNER OF THE LAND IS AN OPTION ONLY WHEN AFTER THE
HE CHOOSES TO SELL HIS LAND, THE OTHER PARTY FAILS TO PAY FOR THE SAME
59. Ignacio v. Hilario
G.R. No. L-175, April 30, 1946
Moran, C.J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan between the
respondents Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the petitioners Damian, Francisco and
Luis, all surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and
partly residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal
owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses and granaries built by
them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with Article 361 of the
Civil Code.
The plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the
buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at
their own expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this motion
which, after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad.
ISSUE:
Is the removal of buildings from the land an option granted to builders, planters, or sowers in good faith if the
plaintiffs-respondents neither choose to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land?
HELD:
No, the removal of buildings from the land is not an option for the builders, planters, or sowers in good faith
should the landowners neither choose to pay for the same nor to sell the land.
Article 361 provides that: The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity
stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent.
Article 453 provides that: Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him. Useful expenses shall be refunded
to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which
the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession
of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other
hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the
building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and
compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion
only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case
before us.
Hence, not having chosen to pay for the building nor to sell the land, the landowners cannot order the builder in
good faith to remove the building from the land.
77
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES TO LAND HELD IN CO-OWNERSHIP
60. Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72876, January 18, 1991
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS:
Petitioner and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 534 square meters situated in Cavite. Pursuant to an action for partition filed by petitioner, the
then Court of First Instance of Cavite directed the partition of the land, alloting 133.5 square meters or 2/8
thereof to private respondents, and giving the remaining portion with a total area of 266.5 square meters to
petitioner. However, no actual partition was ever effected.
On July 17, 1978, petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real property against private
respondents before the Court of First Instance of Cavite. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that the area
occupied by the two (2) houses built by private respondents exceeded the 133.5 square meters previously
alloted to them by the trial court. Consequently, the lower court conducted an ocular inspection. It was found
that the houses of private respondents actually encroached upon a portion of the land belonging to petitioner.
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered a licensed geodetic engineer to conduct a survey to
determine the exact area occupied by the houses of private respondents. The survey subsequently disclosed
that the house of Juan occupied 42 square meters while that of Isidro occupied 59 square meters of Florencio's
land or a total of 101 square meters.
In its decision, the trial court ruled that although private respondents occupied a portion of petitioner's property,
they should be considered builders in good faith. Furthermore, the trial court stated that pursuant to Article 448
of the Civil Code, the owner of the land (Florencio) should have the choice to either appropriate that part of the
house standing on his land after payment of indemnity or oblige the builders in good faith (Juan and Isidro) to
pay the price of the land. However, the trial court observed that based on the facts of the case, it would be
useless and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise the first option since this would render the entire houses of
Juan and Isidro worthless. The trial court then applied the ruling in the similar case of Grana vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Supreme Court had advanced a more "workable solution". Thus, it ordered Florencio to sell
to Juan and Isidro those portions of his land respectively occupied by the latter. Petitioner Florencio Ignao
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 448 is applicable to land owned in common by the parties?
HELD:
Yes, Article 448 is applicable to land owned in common by the parties.
In Spouses del Campo vs. Abesia, the Court ruled that: “The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil
Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not
build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is
not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the home of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there is a
co-ownership if good faith has been established. In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a
partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to
another co-owner which was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to
determine the respective rights of the parties.
78
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
NO AUTOMATIC APPROPRIATION UPON THE FAILURE OF THE BUILDER TO PAY THE VALUE OF THE
LAND, WHEN SUCH IS DEMANDED BY THE LAND-OWNER, UNDER ARTICLE 445
61. Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Timbang
G.R. No. L-12812, September 29, 1959
Barrera, J.
FACTS:
In a case before the CA, it was declared that petitioner has acquired the rights of the respondent spouses in
and to lot No. 2- and in consideration thereof, the former was ordered to pay the spouses Timbang the amount
of P15,807.90. Meanwhile, Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of the school
building constructed on the lot in question and entitled to be paid the amount of P19,000.00 for the same.
Petitioner, purchaser of the said building, was ordered to deliver to Blas stock certificate for 108 shares of their
corporation with a par value of P10,800.00 and to pay Blas the sum of P8,200.00 of the house. In case Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the value of the land, petitioner would lose all its rights to the land and the
respondent spouses would then become the owners thereof. In that eventuality, the Timbangs would make
known to the court their option under Art. 448 of the Civil Code whether they would appropriate the building in
question, in which even they would have to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc. the sum of P19,000.00, or would
compel the latter to acquire the land and pay the price thereof.
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. having failed to pay within the time prescribed, the respondent spouses, in compliance
with the judgment of the Court of Appeals, made known to the court their decision that they had chosen not of
appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges, Inc., for the payment of the sum of P32,859,34. The
motion having been granted, a writ of execution was issued. Appellee Blas in turn filed a motion for execution
of her judgment of P8,200.00 representing the unpaid portion of the price of the house sold to Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. over the object of the Timbangs, the court granted the motion and the corresponding writ of
execution was issued. Levy having been made on the house in virtue of the writs of execution, the Sheriff sold
the building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang, as the highest bidders, in the amount of
P5,750.00. Personal properties of petitioner were also auctioned for P245.00 in favor of the respondent
spouses.
Respondent contended that because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the
owners thereof exercised their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder lost his right of retention
provided in Article 546 and by operation of Article 445, the appellants as owners of the land automatically
became the owners ipso facto, the execution sale of the house in their favor was superfluous.
ISSUE:
Upon failure of the builder to pay the value of the land under Arts. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, when such is
demanded by the land-owner, does the latter automatically become the owner of the improvement?
HELD:
No, the landowner does not automatically become the owner of the improvement upon failure of the buidler to
pay the value of the land.
Under the terms of these article, it is true that the owner of the land has the right to choose between
appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith
to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than
that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article 546
gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land.
There is nothing in the language of these two articles 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of
appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-
owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. The reliance by the
respondent on the case of Bernardo v. Bataclan is misplaced. Although it is true it was declared therein that in
the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this
79
alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said
that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building.
80
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THE OPTION GIVEN BY LAW EITHER TO RETAIN THE PREMISES AND PAY FOR THE IMPROVEMENTS
THEREON OR TO SELL THE SAID PREMISES TO THE BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH BELONGS TO THE
OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
62. Manotok Realty, Inc. v. Tecson
G.R. No. L-47475, August 19, 1988
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Mandamus, where petitioner questions the denial of his motion to exercise option and for
execution of judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, the exercise of option
belongs to the owner of the property, who is the petitioner herein, and that upon finality of judgment, the
prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to its execution which is only a ministerial act on the part of the
respondent judge.
Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Nilo Madlangawa for the recovery
of possession of a parcel of land, but the trial court declared the latter a builder and possessor in good faith.
Upon finality of the decision, the petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by respondent judge, a motion
for the approval of petitioner’s exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment, praying that the court issue an order:
a) approving the exercise of petitioner’s option to appropriate the improvements introduced by the private respondent
on the property; b) thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver possession of the property in question to
the petitioner.
The CFI denied the motion and held that under peculiar circumstances which intervened, such as the
construction of improvements, it thereby made the action not legally proper. After a denial of its motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus.
ISSUE:
Should the motion for the approval of the exercise of option be granted?
HELD:
Yes, the motion is proper and should be approved.
Under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, the exercise of option belongs to the owner of the property.
The respondent judge cannot deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private respondent was
adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of "peculiar circumstances which supervened after the
institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial
improvements..." because the option given by law either to retain the premises and pay for the improvements
thereon or to sell the said premises to the builder in good faith belongs to the owner of the property.
Moreover, the repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was filed
cannot be considered to have been built in good faith, much less justify the denial of the petitioner’s ex ercise of option.
Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent’s right to retain the
premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the
private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.
THE OWNER OF THE LAND SHOULD CHOOSE BETWEEN INDEMNIFYING THE OWNER OF THE
IMPROVEMENTS OR REQUIRING THE LATTER TO PAY FOR THE LAND
63. Bernardo v. Bataclan
G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938
Laurel, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner learned when he entered into the premises of the property purchased from Pastor Samonte, the
latter authorised respondent to make improvements thereon. In a civil case to secure possession, the court
ruled that respondent was a builder and possessor in good faith and was entitled to reimbursement for the
works and improvements,
The court gave the petitioner 30 days within which to choose between the sale of the land or to buy the works.
Petitioner decided to sell the land to the respondent but the latter informed the court that he is unable to pay the
sum required. The court then awarded the respondent 30 days to purchase the land or else the property will be
sold in a public auction.
In the auction sale, Toribio Teodoro was the highest bidder. The purchaser sought judicial remedy for the
possession of the property.
ISSUE:
Did defendant lose his right to retain the property pending payment for indemnity?
HELD:
Yes, the court ruled that the right to retain the property has already been lost.
The principle of accession provides that the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that
which is united to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and
the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where, however, the planter,
builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. The law
provides a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay
the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and
because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. In the case before
us, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to pay for
the land.
The petitioner expressed his desire to require the respondent to pay for the value of the land. The said
respondent could have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession thereof.
But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we have
already said, requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner
of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the
respondent lost his right of retention. 82
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION, IN THE CASE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY, REQUIRES
POSSESSION OF THE THING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH JUST TITLE, FOR A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS
64. Heirs of Durano, Sr. v. Spouses Uy
G.R. No. 136456, October 24, 2000
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA finding that the respondents are builders
in good faith.
In a case for damages against respondents, petitioners alleged that respondents filed complaints against the
former for invasion of the latter’s properties. As a counterclaim, the respondents demanded the return of their
properties claiming that in August 1970, they received mimeographed notices signed by Durano Sr. informing
them that the land they occupied was purchased by Durano & Co. from Cebu Portland Cement Company
(Cepoc); that at that time, they were already tilling and residing in the land in question. However, before many
of them could even receive the notice in 1970 that Durano & Co. bought the land from Cepoc, employees of
Durano & Co. proceeded to bulldoze the land, destroying plantings and improvements made therein.
On September 15, 1970, Durano & Co. sold the subject land to Durano III. On the other hand, petitioners
alleged that the property originally belonged to Cepoc and was sold to Durano & Co., and later on to Durano III.
But Durano III claimed that he only learned of the bulldozing when the respondents already filed complaints.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are builders in good faith and thereby acquired the said property through
ordinary acquisitive prescription?
HELD:
Yes, the court ruled that the respondents are builders in good faith and their possession has already ripened
into ownership by acquisitive prescription.
In the case at bar, the respondents acquired the properties by purchase or inheritance and ever since were in
actual, continuous, open, and adverse possession. They exercised rights of ownership over the lands, including
the regular payment of taxes and introduction of plantings and improvements. They were unaware of anyone
claiming to be the owner of these lands other than themselves until the notices of demolition in 1970— and at
the time each of them had already completed the ten-year prescriptive period either by their own possession or
by obtaining from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
The petitioners on the other hand cannot claim good faith. A purchaser of a parcel of land cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, such as when the property subject of the
purchase is in the possession of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could not have failed to know or
discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. Since
petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by the Court of Appeals to be
builders in bad faith.
Based on the provisions under the Civil Code, the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to
appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the
builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land. In any case, the
landowner is entitled to damages. The Court sustains the return of the properties to respondents and the
payment of indemnity as being in accord with the reliefs under the Civil Code. 83
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE BETWEEN APPROPRIATING THE IMPROVEMENT OR SELLING THE LAND ON
WHICH THE IMPROVEMENT STANDS TO THE BUILDER, PLANTER OR SOWER, IS GIVEN TO THE
OWNER OF THE LAND
65. Ballatan v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999
Puno, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, seeking the reversal of the
judgment rendered by the CA in finding the respondents as builders in good faith.
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that the
concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire
length of the eastern side of her property. Go, on the other hand, claims that the fence and pathway were built
within the parameters of his father’s lot and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose Quedding, the
authorized surveyor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA).
Ballatan made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and move their improvements and since the
latter did not answer, the petitioner filed an accion publiciana in court. The court found that Go encroached 42
square meters from the property of Ballatan and Yao encroached 37 square meters on Go’s property, all of
which were in good faith.
ISSUE:
May petitioner demand the dismantling of the improvements made by the respondents who were found to be
builders in good faith?
HELD:
No, the petitioner may not demand the dismantling of the improvements made by the respondents who were
found by the court to be builders in good faith.
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the
necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner
of the land may also oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner
chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the owner may remove
the improvements thereon
Applying Artice 448 of the Civil Code, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the
improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the
improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents
Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the
lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners,
however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of
their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, then
respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to
court to fix the same. 84
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
POSSESSORS IN GOOD FAITH ARE ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY FOR THE IMPROVEMENTS THEY
INTRODUCED INTO THE PROPERTY WITH A RIGHT OF RETENTION UNTIL THE REIMBURSEMENT IS
MADE; HOWEVER, SUBJECT TO THE OPTION OF THE LANDOWNER UNDER ARTICLE 448
66. Spouses Fuentes v. Roca
G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Abad, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA, seeking the reversal of its finding the sale of
the subject land void from the beginning and did not transfer ownership to the petitioners.
In 1988, Tarciano T. Roca offered to sell a lot to petitioners. The sale was to take effect in six months, and
within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his
estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the
sale. According to him, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
consent. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a
building on the lot. Then, Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months after.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, the respondents, filed an action for annulment
of sale and re-conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC, claiming that the sale to
the spouses was void since Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had
been forged.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner sustaining the validity of the sale. On appeal, the CA reversed. The CA
found sufficient evidence of forgery, but since the Fuentes spouses were builders in good faith, they were
entitled under Article 448 to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.
ISSUE:
Are the Fuentes entitled to the value of the improvements made on the land despite the sale being void?
HELD:
Yes, the Fuentes spouses entitled to the value of the improvements they made on the land despite the sale
being void. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano
and Rosario despite that sale. However, the Spouses Fuentes appear to have acted in good faith in entering
the land and building improvements on it. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that Atty. Plagata had
violated his commission and his oath.
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles
546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the property
prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. What is more, they are entitled under Article 448
to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the
reimbursement is made.
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, of indemnifying the
Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may
have acquired by reason of such improvements. 85
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THE RULE THAT ARTICLE 448 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS INAPPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS A
CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES ADMITS OF EXCEPTIONS
67. Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Spouses Nanol
G.R. No. 176791, November 14, 2012
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, Petitioner Communities Cagayan, Inc. (CCI) assails the
order of the RTC in ordering recovery of possession subject to its payment of the total monthly installments and
the value of the new house minus the cost of the original house to respondents Spouses Arsenio and Angeles
Nanol and anybody claiming rights under them (respondents).
Respondent spouses entered into a Contract to Sell with CCI whereby the latter agreed to sell the former a
house and two lots for the price of P368,000. The spouses obtained a loan, whereby the property was used as
the collateral, from Capitol Development Bank. Accordingly, the titles were transferred in the names of the latter
and submitted to Capitol Development Bank for loan processing. Unfortunately, the bank collapsed and closed
before it could release the loan.
The respondent spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with CCI over the same property and for the
same price. This time they availed of CCI’s in-house financing with the undertaking that the loan will be paid for
four years. In the interim, Arsenio Nanol demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house
allegedly valued at P3.5M. Arsenio died thereby leaving his wife to pay for monthly amortizations. She
eventually failed to pay the same, thus prompting CCI to send a Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of
Contract to Sell. CCI filed with the RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of Possession,
Reconveyance and Damages against respondents. The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale Void and
ordered the TCTs issued in favor of respondent spouses cancelled. Possession of the house and lots were also
ordered to be turned over to CCI subject to the latter’s payment of their total monthly installments and the value
of the new house minus the cost of the original house.
CCI seeks to delete the order of reimbursement on the ground that the respondent spouses were in bad faith
when they renovated and improved the house, which was not yet their own. On the other hand, Angeles Nanol,
instead of squarely answering the legal issues posited by CCI, maintained that the Deed of Absolute Sale is
valid.
ISSUE:
Should Article 448 of the New Civil Code be applied in the case at bar despite the existence of a Contract to
Sell between the parties?
HELD:
Yes, the instant case is an exception.
As a rule, Article 448 on builders on good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the
parties. Jurisprudence provides that the Supreme Court had already construed good faith beyond its limited
definition. It is important to point out that the parties failed to attach a copy of the Contract to Sell thus
constraining the court to apply the said provision. Moreover, the determination on whether respondents are
indeed builders in good faith or in bad faith is a factual question and is thus beyond the scope of a petition
under Rule 45.
For its failure to elevate the case to the CA and in directly appealing the case to the Supreme Court, CCI is
deemed to have waived all factual issues. As such, the court is again constrained to rely on the presumption of
good faith on the part of respondents. In addition, good faith is presumed on the part of the respondents and
CCI failed to rebut it. There was also no evidence that CCI opposed or objected to the improvements
introduced by respondents. In light of the foregoing, Article 448 is applicable in this case. 86
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE FINDING OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART
OF THE BUILDER AND THE RELIEFS GRANTED TO THE OWNER UNDER ARTICLE 448 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE
68. Angeles v. Pascual
G.R. No. 157150, September 21, 2011
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Neighbors Regidor Pascual and Pedro Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land whereby
the former owned Lot 4 while the latter owned Lot 5. Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing
all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, caused the relocation
survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascual’s house had encroached on Lot 3. As a
consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual. In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his
own lot and discovered that Angeles had encroached on his lot. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the
encroached area from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles’s house. Angeles refused the demand. Before the
RTC, Pascual sued Angeles for the recovery of possession and damages. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in
favor of Pascual. The CA, however, modified the ruling of the RTC by applying Article 448 of the New Civil
Code and ruling that Angeles is a builder in good faith. The CA laid down the following options for Pascual – (a)
to either buy the portion of Angeles’ house or (b) to sell to Angeles the portion of his land that was occupied.
Angeles argues that the said options were contrary to its finding of good faith.
ISSUE:
Was the application of Article 448 of the New Civil Code by the Court of Appeals correct and proper?
HELD:
Yes, the appellate court correctly and properly applied the provision.
Article 448 contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another. The
law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons. Good faith consists in
the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.
With the unassailable finding that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his
house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the
land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being the principal and the
building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between
appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the
insistence of Angeles, there is no inconsistency that exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the
grant of reliefs set forth in Article 448. 87
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
INTRODUCTION OF VALUABLE IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LEASED PREMISES DOES NOT GIVE A
LESSEE THE RIGHT OF RETENTION AND REIMBURSEMENT WHICH RIGHTFULLY BELONG TO A
BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH
69. Sulo Sa Nayon, Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino Foundation
G.R. No. 170923, January 20, 2009
Puno, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Nayong Pilipino Foundation is the owner Nayong Pilipino Complex. Petitioner Philippine Village
Hotel, Inc., formerly called Sulo sa Nayon, Inc., is a domestic corporation. Respondent leased a portion of the
Nayong Pilipino Complex to petitioner for the construction and operation of a hotel building, to be known as the
Philippine Village Hotel. The lease contract was for an initial period of 21 years, or until May 1996 and may be
renewed for another 25 years. On March 7, 1995, petitioner sent respondent a letter notifying the latter of their
intention to renew the contract for another 25 years, or until 2021. A voluntary addendum to the Lease
Agreement was executed, providing, in part, that the monthly rental shall be subject to an increase of 20% at
the end of every 3-year period. At the time of the renewal of the lease contract, the rent already amounted to
P725,780. Beginning 2001, petitioner defaulted in its payments thus pushing respondent to demand the former
to pay the arrears and vacate the premises. There is no question as to the liability of petitioner to respondent as
to the rentals. As computed by respondent, the arrears of petitioner as of July 31, 2001 already amounted to
P26,183,225.14. The problem lies with the improvements introduced by the lessee i.e. a first-class hotel with
complete facilities and other improvements.
Respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC which ruled in its favor. According to the
MeTC, the improvements made by a lessee on leased premises are not valid reasons for their retention
thereof. The court added that although the Contract of Lease stipulates that the building and all improvements
in the leased premises belong to herein petitioner, such will not defeat the right of herein respondent to its
property. Failure to pay rentals was in violation of their contract. It added that herein petitioner can invoke
Article 1678. Upon appeal, the RTC modified the ruling of the MeTC. The RTC considered the elements of
permanency of the construction and substantial value of the improvements as well as the undisputed
ownership over the land improvements of herein petitioner. The court applied Article 448, in relation to Article
546 of the New Civil Code. The CA ruled that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on accession, as found in
the said provisions. It stated that herein petitioner are mere lessees of the subject premises and as such,
cannot validly claim that they are builders in good faith in order to solicit the application of the provisions in their
favor.
ISSUE:
Should the rules on accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, apply to the instant
case?
HELD:
No, the provisions should not be applied.
A lessee is neither a builder in good faith or bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546
of the New Civil Code. His rights are governed by Article 1678. The introduction of valuable improvements on
the leased premises does not give the lessee the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs
to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily “improve” out the lessor
out of its property.
Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply to a case where one build, plants, or sows on land in which he
believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the only interest of the builder, planter, or sower
is that of a holder, such as a tenant. In fact, as lessees, they recognize that the respondent is the owner of the
land. Petitioner cannot be a considered a builder in good faith just because they introduced improvements to
the land which are of substantial value. Such a situation would allow a lessee to easily “improve” the lessor out
of its property. 88
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ARTICLE 448 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS INAPPLICABLE IN CASES INVOLVING CONTRACTS OF
SALE WITH RIGHT OF REPURCHASE
70. Spouses Narvaez v. Spouses Alciso
G.R. No. 165907, July 27, 2009
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to challenge the decision of the CA
affirming with modification the decision of the RTC.
The land in controversy is a 1,329-square meter parcel of land situated in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet. Larry
Ogas, the owner, sold the said property to his daughter, herein respondent, Rose Ogas Alciso. Respondent
entered into a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, selling the property to Jaime Sansano. After exercising
her right to repurchase, respondent entered into another Deed of Absolute Sale, this time to Celso Bate.
Thereafter, Bate entered into a Deed of Sale of Realty, selling the property to Spouses Dominador and Lilia
Narvaez, herein petitioners. The Spouses Narvaez built a commercial building on the property amounting to
P300,000. Alciso demanded that a stipulation be included in the Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to
repurchase the property from the Spouses Narvaez, to which Bate and the latter complied. Alciso alleged that
she informed Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the property. The spouses demanded Alciso to
pay them the amount of P300,000 but the latter was only willing to pay P150,000. The parties failed to reach an
agreement on the repurchase price.
The Court of Appeals held that Article 448 is applicable, therefore, Alciso could either (a) appropriate the
commercial building after the payment of indemnity or (b) oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the
land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the building. It further ruled that the Spouses having
built the improvement on the land they own and registered in their names, they are likened to builders in good
faith.
ISSUE:
Is Article 448 applicable in cases involving Contracts of Sale with a Right of Repurchase?
HELD:
No, it is not applicable
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. The provision applies only in cases where a person constructs
a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where
a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to the good or bad faith on
the part of the builder. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of the works on his own
land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
The Spouses Narvaez built the commercial building on the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy
the land, which they own, would be absurd. Alciso, however, may still exercise her right of redemption by
paying petitioners the price of the sale, the expenses of the contract, legitimate payments made by reason of
the sale, and the necessary and useful expenses made on the subject property. 89
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
IMMEDIATE REMOVAL OF THE STRUCTURES CANNOT BE GRANTED HENCE THE OWNER MUST
EXERCISE EITHER OF THE TWO OPTIONS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 448 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
71. Department of Education v. Tuliao
G.R. No. 205664, June 9, 2014
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Department of Education (DepEd) assails the
decision of the CA dismissing its petition for review.
Respondent Mariano Tuliao filed an action for recovery of possession and removal of structure with damages
against DepEd with the MTCC. He alleged that he was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land and
that a portion thereof was allowed by his predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary
School (AES) as an access road for the school children in going to and from the school. Upon discovering that
a structure was being constructed on the land, he demanded that the DepEd cease and desist and vacate the
property but the refused. Tuliao likewise demanded payment for reasonable rent but his demand was also
ignored. The MTCC ruled in favor of Tuliao. With respect to the structures constructed, the court ruled that
Tuliao may exercise either of the two options provided in Article 448 of the New Civil Code. The decision was
affirmed in the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE:
Is the ruling of the MTCC, in ordering respondent Tuliao to exercise either of his two options provided in Article
448, instead of granting his prayer for removal of structures, fair and proper?
HELD:
Yes, the MTCC was fair when it stated that it could not order the immediate removal of the structures and
directed Tuliao to exercise his option under Article 448.
Tuliao was the registered owner of the subject property and thus, had a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the said property. The Supreme Court remarked that the RTC, despite affirming the MTCC
decision, made an interesting suggestion. The RTC opined that that the case was impressed with public
interest and it was the paramount interest of the pupils who would be prejudiced by the finality and execution of
the appealed decision. It strongly suggested that the DepEd, or if unable, the City Government of Tuguegarao
City, be requested to pay Tuliao the just compensation of the land in question the amount of which to be
determined by a panel of three commissioners appointed by the court and whose determination was to be
approved by the said court. The Supreme Court added that if it would not be feasible or practical for DepEd, its
remedy is to file an action for expropriation. 90
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
TO BE DEEMED A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT A PERSON ASSERTS TITLE TO
THE LAND ON WHICH HE BUILDS, I.E., THAT HE BE A POSSESSOR IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER,
AND THAT HE BE UNAWARE THAT THERE EXISTS IN HIS TITLE OR MODE OF ACQUISITION ANY
FLAW WHICH INVALIDATES IT
72. Department of Education v. Casibang
G.R. No. 192268, January 27, 2016
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The 7,532 square meter portion of Lot 115 registered under the name of Juan Cepeda, the respondents' late
father, is the property in controversy. Cepeda allowed the construction and operation of Solana North Central
School under the supervision of DepEd upon the request of Mayor Caronan. Cepeda died in 1983 but
respondents and other descendants of Cepeda continued to tolerate the use and possession of the property by
the school.
Sometime between October 31, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the respondents entered and occupied a portion
of the property to which the school officials demanded for them to vacate the property but they refused and
asserted Cepeda's ownership of the lot.
DepEd filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages against respondents before the MCTC which ruled in
favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC. Responded demanded the
petitioner to either pay rent, purchase the area occupied, or vacate the premises but DepEd did not heed the
demand. Hence, on March 16, 2004, the respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of
Money against the DepEd. The latter alleged that it owned the subject property because it was purchased by
civic-minded residents of Solana, Cagayan from Cepeda and that contrary to respondents' claim that the
occupation is by mere tolerance, the property has always been occupied and used adversely, peacefully,
continuously and in the concept of owner for almost forty (40) years. It insisted that respondents lost their right
by laches.
RTC declared respondents as the owner thereof to which the CA affirmed. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Is DepEd is a builder in good faith despite being a possessor by mere tolerance?
HELD:
Yes, DepEd is a builder in good faith.
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds,
i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good faith, since Cepeda
permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on his property. Hence, Article 448
may be applied in the case at bar. Thus, the two options available to the respondents as landowners are: (a)
they may appropriate the improvements, after payment of indemnity representing the value of the
improvements introduced and the necessary and useful expenses defrayed on the subject lots; or (b) they may
oblige the DepEd to pay the price of the land. However, it is also provided under Article 448 that the builder
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the improvements and buildings.
If that is the case, the DepEd is not duty-bound to pay the price of the land should the value of the same be
considerably higher than the value of the improvement introduced by the DepEd on the subject property. In
which case, the law provides that the parties shall agree on the terms of the lease and, in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. 91
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THE BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH CAN COMPEL THE LANDOWNER TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN
APPROPRIATING THE BUILDING BY PAYING THE PROPER INDEMNITY OR OBLIGING THE BUILDER
TO PAY THE PRICE OF THE LAND
73. Briones v. Macabagdal
G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse the decision of the CA affirming
the decision of the RTC ordering petitioners to remove the improvements they have made on the disputed
property or to pay respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal the prevailing price of the land as
compensation.
Respondent-spouses purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a 325-
square-meter land located in Vergonville Subdivision No. 10 at Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. On the other
hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is adjacent to Lot No. 2-R. Petitioners constructed a
house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S. After being informed of the mix up by Vergon’s
manager, respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the
property. Petitioners, however, refused to heed their demand.
Respondent-spouses filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the
RTC of Makati City. Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which
was consistently pointed to them as theirs by Vergon’s agents over the seven (7)-year period they were paying
for the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded Vergon as third-party
defendant claiming that because of the warranty against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon
in case the suit is decided against them. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses and found that
petitioners’ house was undoubtedly built on Lot No. 2-R. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners considered as builders in good faith in constructing a house on Lot No. 2-R which they
thought was Lot No. 2-S?
HELD:
Yes, they are builders in good faith.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs, which
provides that “the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.”
The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner
of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and
not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless,
is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the
building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and
the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that
the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when,
after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. 92
Therefore, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land after payment
to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is
considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent. 93
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ARTICLE 448 COVERS ONLY CASES IN WHICH THE BUILDERS, SOWERS OR PLANTERS BELIEVE
THEMSELVES TO BE THE OWNERS OF THE LAND OR, AT LEAST, TO HAVE A CLAIM OF TITLE
THERETO
74. Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet
G.R. Nos. 154391-92, September 30, 2004
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA in sustaining the finding of the
MTCC and RTC that petitioners Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance
of respondents Vicente and Rosario. Thus, possession of the subject lots by petitioners became illegal upon
their receipt of respondents’ letter to vacate it.
Petitioners and Respondents are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his
wife. On December 10, 1997, the respondents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against their
children. Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-78521
and T-103141, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, petitioners
occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction
business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.
Petitioners denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited
them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near one
other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the problems of the family. They added that it
was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their
children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as
advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to petitioners
as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house.
ISSUE:
Is Article 448 providing for the rights of a builder in good faith applicable if the possession of the lot is not by
mere tolerance but by invitation?
HELD:
Yes, Art. 448 is applicable.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable provision is Article 448, which
provides that “the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.”
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not apply when the
interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent, or usufructuary. From these pronouncements,
good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned or that, by some title, one has the right to build, plant,
or sow thereon.
The established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements introduced by
petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and
approved of the construction of the improvements introduced thereon. Therefore, petitioners may be deemed to
have been in good faith when they built the structures on those lots. 94
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ONE IS CONSIDERED IN GOOD FAITH IF HE IS NOT AWARE THAT THERE EXISTS IN HIS TITLE OR
MODE OF ACQUISITION ANY FLAW WHICH INVALIDATES IT
75. Spouses Aquino v. Spouses Aguilar
G.R. No. 182754, June 29, 2015
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court wherein petitioner-spouses
Crispin and Teresa Aquino assails the decision of the CA modifying the decisions of both the MeTC and the
RTC ordering the respondents to vacate the property. The CA ruled that although respondent-spouses Eusebio
and Josefina Aguilar cannot be considered builders in good faith, they should still be reimbursed for the
improvements they have introduced on petitioners’ property.
Petitioner-spouses Aquino, are the owners of a house and lot. Since 1981, this property has been occupied by
Teresa's sister, respondent Josefina Vela Aguilar with her husband Eusebio and their family, who stayed on the
property with the consent and approval of petitioners. While respondents were in possession of the property,
the house previously constructed therein was demolished, and a three-storey building built in its place.
Respondents occupied half of the third floor of this new building for the 20 years without payment of rental. On
2003, petitioners sent a letter to respondents demanding the surrender of the property. Respondents failed to
heed this demand, prompting petitioners to file a Complaint for ejectment against them before the office of the
barangay captain of Guadalupe Viejo. Failing to amicably settle the case, petitioners filed a complaint with the
MeTC praying for the respondents to vacate the portion of the building they were occupying and to pay a
reasonable amount for the use and enjoyment of the premises.
Respondents claimed that they had contributed to the improvement of the property and the construction of the
building, both in terms of money and management/supervision services. Petitioners purportedly agreed to let
them contribute to the costs of construction in exchange for the exclusive use of a portion of the building.
According to the appellate court, respondents were aware that their right to possess the property had a
limitation, because they were not the owners thereof. They knew that their occupation of the building was by
mere tolerance or permission of petitioners, who were the registered owners of the property.
ISSUE:
Can petitioners be considered as builders in good faith if they are aware that there is a limitation to their right to
possess the property?
HELD:
No, they are not builders in good faith.
The term "builder in good faith" as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not
being the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the land,
builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of
acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
In this case, the Spouses Aguilar cannot be considered as builders in good faith on account of their admission
that the subject lot belonged to the Spouses Aquino when they constructed the building. At the onset,
petitioners were aware of a flaw in their title and a limit to their right to possess the property. By law, one is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
Hence, they are not considered as builders in good faith. 95
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
PERSONS WHOSE OCCUPATION OF A REALTY IS BY SHEER TOLERANCE OF ITS OWNERS ARE NOT
POSSESSORS IN GOOD FAITH
76. Spouses Esmaquel v. Coprada
G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the decision of the CA affirming
the ruling of the MCTC dismissing the case by reason of laches, which was reversed by the RTC ruling that
respondent's occupation of the subject property was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and permission.
Petitioner-spouses Esmaquel are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Laguna. In 1945,
respondent Coprada was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and her family to use and occupy the
land for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate the premises should petitioners need to use
the same. Respondent and her family were allowed to construct their residential house. Petitioners then
verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land, but the latter refused. Thus, petitioners sent a
letter to respondents demanding to vacate the subject premises. However, respondent still ignored said
demand prompting petitioners to bring a complaint before the barangay authorities. As no settlement was
reached, petitioners filed an ejectment case before the MCTC.
Respondent admitted that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject land. However, she averred that
in 1945, it was Emiliana Coprada, petitioner Victoria Sordevilla's mother and original owner of the subject land,
who gave permission to her late husband Brigido Coprada and his family o occupy the lot as their permanent
abode. Thereafter, Brigido and his family cleared the area and built therein a nipa hut to dwell in. When
Emiliana died, the ownership of the property was inherited by her only child, petitioner Victoria Sordevilla.
Respondent alleged that sometime in the early 1960s, petitioner Victoria offered the said lot for sale to
respondent, who readily agreed. The purchase price was fully paid in 1962 however the agreement was never
reduced to writing. After the sale, respondent built on the subject land a semi-concrete structure. Respondent
stated that petitioners' claim is barred by laches. Even granting, without admitting, that respondent's claim of
ownership over the property is improper because petitioners are the registered owners thereof, respondent
argued that she is a builder in good faith, because she was able to build the structure on the subject lot with the
prior permission of the owner.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent a possesor in good faith, hence, has the right to retain the property?
HELD:
No, respondent cannot be considered as a possesor in good faith, hence, no right to retain the property.
It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.
In the present case, respondent failed to present evidence to substantiate her allegation that a portion of the
land was sold to her in 1962. In fact, when petitioners sent a letter to the respondent, demanding her to vacate
the subject property, the respondent, in reply to the said letter, never mentioned that she purchased the subject
land in 1962. Since respondent's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no right to
retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated possession may be
terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good faith. At the time respondent built the
improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance
of the petitioners.
Hence, respondent is not entitled to the retention of the land since she is deemed to be a builder in bad faith.
96
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ONE IS CONSIDERED IN GOOD FAITH IF HE IS NOT AWARE THAT THERE EXISTS IN HIS TITLE OR
MODE OF ACQUISITION ANY FLAW WHICH INVALIDATES IT
77. Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga
G.R. No. 197743, March 12, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the amended decision rendered by the CA which
reconsidered its Decision, annulling the Decision of the RTC of Naga City and reinstating the decision of the
MTC of Naga City dismissing the ejectment case instituted by petitioners on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In 1954, the officers of the City Heights Subdivision, wrote to Monico Imperial, the mayor of the City of Naga,
offering to construct the Naga City Hall within the premises of the Subdivision. The City's Municipal Board
subsequently passed Resolution No. 75 asking the Subdivision for a bigger area, hence, the Subdivision
amended its offer and agreed to donate five hectares of land registered in the names of Macario Mariano and
Jose A. Gimenez. Thereafter, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89 accepting the Subdivision's offer
of donation and its proposed contract.
According to the City, the City Mayor of Naga and the registered landowners, executed a Deed of Donation of
the parcel of land to be used as the City Hall site, public plaza and public market. By virtue of said Deed, the
City entered the property and began construction of the government center. It also declared the five-hectare
property in its name for tax purposes. Thereafter, LTO, NBI, DOLE, PPC, the Fire Department and other
government agencies and instrumentalities entered the same property and built their offices thereon. In
contrast, petitioners averred that the landowners' plan to donate five hectares to the City did not materialize as
the contract to build the City Hall was not awarded to the Subdivision. Petitioners claimed that Macario and
officers of the Subdivision met with Mayor Imperial to demand the return of the land as the condition for the
donation that the subdivision shall undertake the construction of the City Hall therein, was not complied with,
when the City eventually awarded the construction contract to a local contractor, Francisco O. Sabaria. Mayor
Imperial assured them that the City would buy the property from them, however, it did not materialize. Macario
then wrote to the Subdivision's General Manager Lopez Jr., demanding for the City's payment for the subject
lot. When the City did not comply, petitioners, as the heirs, filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE:
Is the City of Naga considered a builder in good faith in constructing the government center when the Deed of
Donation was not executed?
HELD:
No, City of Naga is not considered a builder in good faith.
By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
In this case, it shows that the City knew of a substantial flaw in its claim over the subject property. The
proposed donation was conditioned on the award of the construction contract to the Subdivision. By its
Resolution No. 89, the City accepted the proposal with all its conditions. Thus, the City could not have been
unaware that by awarding the same construction contract to Sabaria, it no longer had any cause to continue
occupying the subject property as the condition for the proposed donation had not been satisfied. Accordingly,
it should have vacated the subject property. However, it stayed on and allowed Sabaria to undertake the
construction.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the City was of an honest belief that it had a valid right to the subject property
or that its actions had not overreached the landowners. Accordingly, it cannot be considered to have acted in
good faith. 97
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE MAY APPLY EVEN WHEN THERE WAS CO-OWNERSHIP IF GOOD
FAITH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
78. Spouses del v. Abesia
G.R. No. L-49219, April 15, 1988
Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
In this appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cebu, certified to this Court by CA on account of the question of
law involved, the sole issue is the applicability of the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code relating to a
builder in good faith when the property involved is owned in common.
Plaintiff-spouses Del Campo and defendant Bernarda Abesia are co-owners pro indiviso of a parcel of land in
Cebu. An action for partition was filed by the plaintiffs. The houses of plaintiffs and defendants were surveyed
and shown on the sketch plan. The house of defendants occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters
of the land pertaining to plaintiffs.
Defendants argue that the rights of a builder in good faith under art. 448 of the New Civil Code should apply to
them with respect to that part of their house occupying a portion of the lot assigned to plaintiffs-appellees.
ISSUE:
Will Art. 448 apply when the part of the house of the defendants occupied a portion of the lot of the plaintiffs
after the termination of co-ownership?
HELD:
Yes. Art. 448 of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership, if good faith has been
established.
Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in
common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is
a co-owner. However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that
the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs
which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code
should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even
when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon
payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs
may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for
is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter
cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiffs upon such
terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of
course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so
decide. 98
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THE APPLICATION BY ANALOGY OF THE RULES OF ACCESSION UNDER ARTICLE 447
79. Pacific Farms, Inc. v. Esguerra
G.R. No. L-21783, November 29,1969
Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant Carried Lumber Company (Company) from the decision of the CFI
of Pangasinan, annulling the levy and certificate of sale covering six buildings owned by the plaintiff-appellee
Pacific Farms, Inc., to satisfy a money judgment against the Insular Farms, Inc., the plaintiff's predecessor-in-
interest over the buildings.
Defendant-appellee Company furnished lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. which the
latter used in the construction of the six buildings in its compound. Out of the total procurement price of
P15,000, the amount of P4,710.18 remains outstanding and unpaid. Thus, the Company instituted civil case D-
775 with the CFI of Pangasinan to recover the balance. The trial court sustained the Company’s claim and
thereafter issued a writ of execution.
Asserting absolute and exclusive ownership of the buildings in question, herein appellee Pacific Farms, Inc.
filed a complaint against the appellant Company and the sheriff with the court a quo, praying that judgment be
rendered, declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of the six buildings. The trial court annulled the levy
and the Certificate of Sale.
ISSUE:
Will Article 447, which contemplates a principal and an accessory, apply by analogy in the case at bar with
respect to the construction of buildings through the use of materials owned by another person
HELD:
Yes. Article 447 applies by analogy in the case at bar.
Art. 447 of the New Civil Code contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being considered the
principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good faith -
whether personally or through another - makes constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging to
somebody else, becomes the owner of the said materials with the obligation however of paying for their value.
The owner of the materials, on the other hand, is entitled to remove them, provided no substantial injury is
caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right only to reimbursement for the value of his materials.
The appellee claims that it owns the six buildings constructed out of the lumber and construction materials
furnished by the appellant is indubitable. Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the
buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the
accessory. Thus the appellee Pacific Farms, Inc., if it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to
pay for the value of the said materials. On the other hand, the appellant Company, which apparently has no
desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily
damaging the buildings, has the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction
materials.
Therefore, the appellee who benefited from the lumber and materials that went into the construction of the six
buildings should shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials. 99
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
THE PROVISION ON ARTICLES 448 AND 546 ON INDEMNITY MAY BE APPLIED BY ANALOGY
80. Pecson v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA affirming in part the
order of the RTC citing Article 448 of the Civil Code, stating that private respondent opted to appropriate the
improvement introduced by petitioner on the subject lot, giving rise to the right of petitioner to be reimbursed of
the cost of constructing under Article 546, and of the right to retain the improvements until he is reimbursed of
the cost of the improvements
Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon City, on which
he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to P12,000.00,
the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn
sold it to the private respondents, the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid. Petitioner challenged the
validity of the auction sale. Both the CA and the trial court agreed that the apartment building was not included
in the auction sale of the commercial lot.
Thereafter, the private respondents moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building,
citing Article 546 of the Civil Code. The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the
apartment building on the theory that he constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the lot.
ISSUE:
Will Articles 448 and 526 apply by analogy where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who
then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation?
HELD:
Yes, Articles 448 and 526 apply by analogy in the case at bar.
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of
whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been
made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be
applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. Article 448 does not apply to
a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land
by sale or donation. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the
issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus, in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the
case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership.
Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to
the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the
portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the
improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the
land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain
ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom. 100
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH CONTINUES TO BE ENJOYED BY THE SUCCESSOR, UNTIL THE
CONTRARY IS PROVED
81. Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA that petitioner cannot be considered in good faith because as a
land owner, it is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his own property, especially if the same are
reflected in a properly issued certificate of title.
The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Parañaque. When petitioner Tecnogas Philippines
Manufacturing Corporation purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were
already in existence. Private respondent Eduardo Uy was unaware that a portion of the building of petitioner
encroached into a portion of his property until after 1971 when he hired a surveyor, following his purchase of
another adjoining lot, to survey all his newly acquired lots. Upon being apprised of the encroachment, petitioner
immediately offered to buy the area occupied by its building but respondent refused the offer.
Private respondent insists on the removal of the encroaching structures. Whereas, petitioner prays that private
respondent be ordered to sell the land.
ISSUE:
1) Can petitioner invoke good faith in order to enjoy the benefit granted under Article 448 even if it is not the
builder of the offending structures but possesses them as buyer.
2) What, then, is the benefit granted under Article 448?

HELD:
1. Yes, petitioner can invoke good faith, hence, may enjoy the beneift granted under Articles 448.
It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the
contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith.
The record is not clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be assumed that petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a
narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent’s land was done in bad faith by the builder of the
encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. Hence, such good faith,
by law, passed on to Pariz’s successor, petitioner in this case.
2. The obvious benefit to the builder under Article 448 is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land,
he can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by
paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to
exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
In the present case, the private respondent’s insistence on the removal of the encroaching structures cannot be
granted. This is not one of the remedies bestowed upon him by law. It would be available only if and when he
chooses to compel the petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable price but the latter fails to pay such price. This
has not taken place. Hence, his options are limited to: (1) appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioner’s
building after payment of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot occupied by the structure. He
cannot exercise a remedy of his own liking. 101
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
GOOD FAITH OF THE BUILDER IS DETERMINED BY HIS STATE OF MIND AT THE TIME HE BUILT THE
IMPROVEMENTS
82. Pleasantville Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA reversing the ruling of the RTC that
respondent Kee was a builder in bad faith.
Respondent Wilson Kee bought on installment Lot 8, Phase II of Pleasantville Subdivision from C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida
Octaviano, accompanied Kee’s wife, Donabelle, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by
Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, respondent Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair
shop and other improvements on the Lot 9, believing that it was his lot. After discovering that Lot 9 was
occupied by Kee, Jardinico (owner of Lot 9) confronted him and demanded that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. Kee refused to vacate. Thus, a complaint for ejectment was filed against him.
Petitioner contends that respondent Kee was a builder in bad faith.
ISSUE:
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent,
a builder in good faith?
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Kee is a builder in good faith.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any
defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the
part of Kee.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He
was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Upon Kee’s receipt of the map, his wife went to the
subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI’s employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she
was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of
the company’s positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a
misdelivery. Hence, respondent Kee is a builder in good faith as the petitioner failed to prove otherwise. 102
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
LESSEES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS POSSESSORS OR BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH. BEING MERE
LESSEES, THEY KNEW THAT THEIR POSSESSION WOULD CONTINUE ONLY FOR THE LIFE OF THE
LEASE
83. Geminiano v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120303, July 24, 1996
Davide Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the RTC ruling ordering the
petitioners Geminiano to reimburse the private respondents of the value of the house in question and other
improvements and allowed the latter to retain the premises until reimbursement was made.
The lot in question was originally owned by the petitioners’ mother, Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a
12-square-meter portion of that lot stood the petitioners’ unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold to the
private respondents Dominador and Mary Nicolas. Subsequently, the petitioners’ mother executed a contract of
lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the
private respondents. The latter then introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their
names. The lot in question was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition previously by one Lee,
who sold the lot to Salcedo, who in turn sold it the spouses Dionisio. Subsequently, the lot was registered in the
petitioners’ name by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by spouses Dionisio. The petitioners sent a letter to
private respondents demanding that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears. Upon failure to
heed the demand, the petitioners filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. The
MTCC ruled that Articles 448 and 546, which allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of
improvements and retain the premises until reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the private respondents,
because the latter knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only during the life of the lease.
The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith, hence, Article 448 should apply. They rely on the
lack of title of the petitioners' mother at the time of the execution of the contract of lease, as well as the alleged
assurance made by the petitioners that the lot on which the house stood would be sold to them.
ISSUE:
Can the private respondent, as mere lessees, be considered as builders in good faith?
HELD:
No, the private respondent, as mere lessees, cannot be considered as builders in good faith.
The private respondents, as lessees, who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are
estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third
person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the
landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee
was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.
It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession of a 126 square-meter portion of the said lot
by virtue of a contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother in their favor. The juridical relation between
the petitioners' mother as lessor, and the private respondents as lessees, is therefore well established, and
carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. Therefore, being mere lessees, the private respondents knew
that their occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be
considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.
Also, there is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson
vs. Court of Appeals, because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application of that
provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced co-ownership" would not be created
between the petitioners and the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rights
of the private respondents as lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows
reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements. 103
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ONE IS CONSIDERED IN GOOD FAITH IF HE IS NOT AWARE THAT THERE EXISTS IN HIS TITLE OR
MODE OF ACQUISITION ANY FLAW WHICH INVALIDATES IT
84. Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga
G.R. No. 197743, March 12, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the amended decision rendered by the CA which
reconsidered its Decision, annulling the Decision of the RTC of Naga City and reinstating the decision of the
MTC of Naga City dismissing the ejectment case instituted by petitioners on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In 1954, the officers of the City Heights Subdivision, wrote to Monico Imperial, the mayor of the City of Naga,
offering to construct the Naga City Hall within the premises of the Subdivision. The City's Municipal Board
subsequently passed Resolution No. 75 asking the Subdivision for a bigger area, hence, the Subdivision
amended its offer and agreed to donate five hectares of land registered in the names of Macario Mariano and
Jose A. Gimenez. Thereafter, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89 accepting the Subdivision's offer
of donation and its proposed contract.
According to the City, the City Mayor of Naga and the registered landowners, executed a Deed of Donation of
the parcel of land to be used as the City Hall site, public plaza and public market. By virtue of said Deed, the
City entered the property and began construction of the government center. It also declared the five-hectare
property in its name for tax purposes. Thereafter, LTO, NBI, DOLE, PPC, the Fire Department and other
government agencies and instrumentalities entered the same property and built their offices thereon. In
contrast, petitioners averred that the landowners' plan to donate five hectares to the City did not materialize as
the contract to build the City Hall was not awarded to the Subdivision. Petitioners claimed that Macario and
officers of the Subdivision met with Mayor Imperial to demand the return of the land as the condition for the
donation that the subdivision shall undertake the construction of the City Hall therein, was not complied with,
when the City eventually awarded the construction contract to a local contractor, Francisco O. Sabaria. Mayor
Imperial assured them that the City would buy the property from them, however, it did not materialize. Macario
then wrote to the Subdivision's General Manager Lopez Jr., demanding for the City's payment for the subject
lot. When the City did not comply, petitioners, as the heirs, filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE:
Is the City of Naga considered a builder in good faith in constructing the government center when the Deed of
Donation was not executed?
HELD:
No, City of Naga is not considered a builder in good faith.
By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
In this case, it shows that the City knew of a substantial flaw in its claim over the subject property. The
proposed donation was conditioned on the award of the construction contract to the Subdivision. By its
Resolution No. 89, the City accepted the proposal with all its conditions. Thus, the City could not have been
unaware that by awarding the same construction contract to Sabaria, it no longer had any cause to continue
occupying the subject property as the condition for the proposed donation had not been satisfied. Accordingly,
it should have vacated the subject property. However, it stayed on and allowed Sabaria to undertake the
construction.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the City was of an honest belief that it had a valid right to the subject property
or that its actions had not overreached the landowners. Accordingly, it cannot be considered to have acted in
good faith. 104
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
AS A GENERAL RULE, ARTICLE 448 ON BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THERE
IS A CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES
85. Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc.
G.R. No. 199353, April 4, 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition under Rule 45, assailing the decision of the CA affirming the ruling of the RTC that Article 448
is applicable, thus, ordering respondent Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. (Legaspi Towers) to exercise its option to
appropriate the additional structure constructed by the petitioner Leviste Management System, Inc. (LEMANS)
or if the option to appropriate is not exercised, for the parties to agree upon the terms of the lease.
Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de Roxas, Makati City consisting of seven (7)
floors, with a unit on the roof deck and two levels above said unit called Concession 2 and Concession 3. The
use and occupancy of the condominium building is governed by the Master Deed. Petitioner LEMANS bought
Concession 3 where he subsequently decided to build another unit called Concession 4 of which, he was able
to secure a building permit for its construction. Despite respondent Legaspi Corporation’s notice that the
construction of Concession 4 was illegal, petitioner LEMANS refused to stop its construction. Due to this,
respondent Legaspi Corporation forbade the entry of LEMANS’ construction materials to be used in
Concession 4 in the condominium. The petitioner LEMANS filed a complaint with the RTC, praying among
others that a writ of mandatory injunction be issued to allow the completion of the construction of Concession 4.
The RTC issued the writ prayed for by Lemans.
ISSUE:
Is Article 448 on builders in good faith applicable where there is a contractual relation between the parties?
HELD:
No, as a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation
between the parties.
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by
the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on
the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the
condominium corporation). This Court has ruled that upon acquisition of a condominium unit, the purchaser not
only affixes his conformity to the sale; he also binds himself to a contract with other unit owners.
In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as a unit
owner, is considered a stockholder or member in accordance with Section 10 of the Condominium Act. The
builder is therefore already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the Condominium Act.
Therefore, the application of Article 448 to the present situation is highly iniquitous, in that an owner, also found
to be in good faith, will be forced to either appropriate the illegal structure (and impliedly be burdened with the
cost of its demolition) or to allow the continuance of such an illegal structure that violates the law and the
Master Deed, and threatens the structural integrity of the condominium building upon the payment of rent. 105
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ACCRETIONS BELONG TO THE RIPARIAN OWNERS UPON WHOSE LANDS THE ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS
WERE MADE
86. Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990
Grino-Aquino, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the IAC affirming the decision of the RTC in awarding the
lot and its accretions to private respondents.
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of
Cagayan. In 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, An original
certificate of title was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. As the
years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank continuing
until1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying
lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were private respondents. Through the years, the Cagayan River
eroded lands of the Tuguerarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was petitioner’s lot depositing the
alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by private respondent on the western bank. However, in 1968,
after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut
across the lands of private respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of
the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river. In April, 1969, while the private respondents and
their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and
drove away the private respondents from the premises. Private respondents filed a complaint to recover their
lot and their accretions.
ISSUE:
1. Does the private respondent own the accretion?
2. If yes, does such ownership of private respondents over the accretion not affected by the sudden and abrupt
change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed?
HELD:
Yes, the private respondents own the accretion and such ownership was not affected by the sudden and abrupt
change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed.
1. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” Accretion benefits a
riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of a river.
As found by the trial court, Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years.
Within this period, the alluviun deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands
of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it
but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. Also, the appellate court confirmed that the accretion on
the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It
was gradual and imperceptible.
2. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply in the case at bar.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof
isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the
estate by the current. 106
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968
caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be separated from the estate by the current. The
private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other
side of the river. 107
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ACCRETION DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY BECOME REGISTERED LAND JUST BECAUSE THE LOT
WHICH RECEIVES SUCH ACCRETION IS COVERED BY TORRENS TITLE
87. Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73465, September 7, 1989
Medialdea, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the decision of the IAC declaring
private respondent the absolute owner of a parcel of land.
Private respondents Domingo Apostol and others filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners. The complaint alleged that private respondents are the
successors-in-interest of the late Francisco Gerardo, and that since time immemorial, together with his
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide
claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of their motherland, situated in Cabagan, Isabela. Said
land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Francisco Gerardo. Upon the latter’s death, the
ownership and possession of the motherland was succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who,
together with three (3) legal or forced heirs, one of private respondents herein have also been in actual, open,
peaceful and continuous possession of the same. Thereafter, respondents verbally sold the motherland to one
of the co-respondents which verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who
executed an Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance. About the time of the execution of the Extra-
Judicial Partition, their motherland already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3) hectares on
the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River. On September 15, 1982, private
respondent subsequently declared the motherland and its accretion for tax purposes. Private respondents also
alleged that sometime about the last week of September and/or the first week of October 1982, when they were
about to cultivate their motherland together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened petitioners
from continuing to do so. Petitioners' answer alleged that the subject land is an accretion to their registered
land and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the accretion for many years now.
ISSUE:
Does the subject land or “accretion” (which is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River) belong to the
private respondents and not to the petitioners when the petitioners’ Original Certificate of Title states clearly
that the petitioners’ land is bounded on its north by the Cagayan River?
HELD:
No, the subject land or “accretion” belong to the petioners.
The allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the "motherland" through their
predecessors-in-interest had not been proved by substantial evidence. The assailed decision of the respondent
court, stated that since the "motherland" exists, it is also presumed that private respondents were in possession
of the "subject land" through their predecessors-in-interest since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied on
the testimony one of the private respondents in this case, an interested and biased witness, regarding their
possession of the "motherland." The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged “motherland”
claimed by private respondents is nonexistent. The “subject land” is an alluvial deposit left by the northward
movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code: “To the owners of land
adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.”
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four thousand five hundred
eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said land is approximately five and a half (5.5)
hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners’ land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the
northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As such, it must also be placed under the operation
of the Torrens System. 108
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
REGISTRATION DOES NOT PROTECT THE RIPARIAN OWNER FROM ACCRETION
88. Viajar v. Court of Appelas
G.R. No. 77294, December 12, 1988
Medialdea, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of CFI declaring
defendant-appellees Leonor Ladrido, et. al. as owner of the parcel of land.
The spouses Ricardo Ladrido and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511 situated in Pototan, Iloilo
which contained an area of 154,267 square meters and was registered in the names of the spouses under TCT
No. T-21940. Spouses Rosendo Te and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described
in their title as Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan. Spouses Te sold this lot to plaintiffs-appelants
Angelica Viajar and Celso Viajar. A Torrens title was later issued in their names. Later, Angelica had Lot No.
7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she
demanded its return but Ladrido refused. Plaintiffs-appellants instituted a civil action for recovery of possession
and damages against Ricardo Ladrido. The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece
of real property which used to be Lot No. 7340 consisted of 20,089 square meters and that at the time of the
cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River.
Petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion mentioned
therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus,
the lot in question having remained the registered land of the petitioners, then the private respondents cannot
acquire title there in derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a
Torrens Title.
ISSUE:
Does the registration under the Torrens system protects the riparian owner against the dimunition of area of his
land due to accretion?
HELD:
No, registration under the Torrens system protects the riparian owner against the dimunition of area of his land
due to accretion.
In Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, the court ruled that Art. 366 provides that "any accretions
which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of the
estates bordering thereon." Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
Also, in the case of C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, the court ruled that “It clearly appearing that the land in question
has become part of defendant's estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The
fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of
Title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such accretions are
natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are
not affected by the Registration Act.
The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and this finding was
affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot
No. 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940
to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received
deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511
due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and 109
planted the same with corn and tobacco. The Court does not find any valid reason to disturb this finding of fact.
110
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ALLUVION MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE WORK OF NATURE
89. Vda. de Nazareno v. Court of Appels
G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996
Romero, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review challenging the decision of the CA affirming ruling of the RTC in dismissing
complaint filed by the petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia.
A parcel of land situated in Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been formed as a result of sawdust dumped
into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan River. Private respondents Jose
Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno,
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. Private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated
with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan
could be released to the applicant, the private respondents protested it before the Bureau of Lands. The report
of the Land Investigator, made in compliance with the order of the District Land Officer, recommended the
Survey Plan, in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file
appropriate public application. Based on the report, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a
decision ordering an amendment to the survey plan of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied
by the private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of
Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands, which was denied. Petitioners claim that the subject land is
private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Can the subject land formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river be considered as accretion belonging to the petitioner?
HELD:
No, the subject land cannot be considered as an accretion belonging to the petitioner.
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that “to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” In the case of Meneses v.
CA, it was held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of waters.
In Hilario v. City of Manila, it was held that the word “current” indicate the participation of the body of water in
the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. And, in Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement
that the deposit should due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Article
457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by
the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct
and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public
domain.
The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case as the first and second
requirements of the rules were not met. The subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the
Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. By the petitioners’ own admission, the accretion
was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the 111
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno’s
labor, the same would still be part of the public domain. 112
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ACCRETION IS NOT APPLICABLE ON SEA BANK
90. Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997
Hermosisima, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition assaling the decision of IAC in reversing the ruling of the lower court that the subject property
is a foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration
proceedings.
Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Bataan. His
registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the
north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as
boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west. This application was denied.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Bataan.
Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is
an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the
Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on his property resulting in an accretion thereon. He claimed the
accretion as the riparian owner.
The Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same
being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On the other
hand, anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the
disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run
their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioners rightfully claim the accretion on a sea bank under the principle of accretion?
HELD:
No, the petitioner’s cannot claim the accretion on a sea bank under the principle of accretion.
The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article
457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used
to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such,
the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such,
the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As
part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in
litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated
by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority.
Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or
for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.
Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the
disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of
petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto. 113
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
DRYING UP OF RIVER IS NOT ACCRETION HENCE BELONGS TO THE STATE
91. Republic v. Santos III
G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal assailing the decision of the CA affirming the ruling of the RTC in declaring the respondents
Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr. as true and absolute owner of the subject land which was
previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up.
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan Santos III
applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B RTC in Parañaque City. The property was located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio
Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. Respondent Arcadio Ivan amended his
application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership
of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the
property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the
river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property
could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried
up and had not resulted from accretion.
ISSUE:
Can the subject land, which was previously a part of the Parañaque River that became an orchard after it dried
up, be acquired through the process of accretion?
HELD:
No, the subject land, which was a dried-up riverbed cannot be acquired through the process of accretion
By law, accretion, the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water,
belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not
accretion. Hence, the dried-up riverbed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up riverbed as an accretion that became respondents'
property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of
drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the
dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the
river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less
maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision
only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. The State
exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code
expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river
beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless
there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person. 114
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ALLUVION MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE WORK OF NATURE
92. Daclison v. Baytion
G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Baytion filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against petitioner Daclison. Respondent alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of
land consisting of 1,500 sq.m where he inherited and his siblings from their parents, and as agreed upon, it was
to be administered by him. As administrator, he leased portions of the property to third persons. Erected on the
property was a one-story building divided into seven units or stalls. One stall was occupied by Leonida Dela
Cruz who used it for selling rocks, pebbles and similar construction materials.
According to Baytion, Leonida’s lease expired. Daclison took possession of the portion leased and occupied by
Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of Baytion. Oral and written demands to vacate were given.
Daclison refused prompting Baytion to file the abovementioned complaint.
According to Daclison, Baytion leased the subject portion to Antonio Dela Cruz where the latter started a
business. 10 or 15 years later, a stone walling called a riprap, was erected at the creek lying beside Baytion’s
property, leaving a deep down-sloping area; and that Antonio negotiated with an engineer so he could be in
possession of the said down-slope; and that Antonio had it filled up until it was leveled with the lease portion
and he paid for the right to possess the same.
Both the RTC and the C.A. ruled in favor of respondent. Baytion basically posits that although the disputed
portion is outside the description of the property covered by TCT No. 221507, it forms an integral part of the
latter because it is an accretion, construction, or improvement on the property and, under the law, any accretion
or anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-owners.
ISSUE:
Is the constructed down-slope an accretion?
HELD:
No, Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. Article 457 of the New
Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered (1) that the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin with, the land came about not by reason of
a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of
the current from the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable
requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention. 115
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession
ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS ALONG THE BANKS OF A CREEK OR A RIVER AUTOMATICALLY BELONGS TO
THE OWNER OF THE ESTATE TO WHICH IT MAY HAVE BEEN ADDED
93. Heirs of Narvasa, Sr. v. Imbornal
G.R. No. 182908, August 6, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA which reversed and set aside the Decision of
the RTC declaring (a) the descendants of Ciriaco Abrio as the exclusive owners of the Motherland (b) the
descendants of respondent Victoriano Imbornal (respondent Victoriano) as the exclusive owners of the first
accretion (First Accretion) and (c) the descendants of Pablo Imbornal (Pablo) as the exclusive owners of the
second accretion (Second Accretion).
Basilia Imbornal (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo. Petitioners are
the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, son of Alejandra. On the other hand, respondents Victoriano
et al., all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo. During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land
which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters. Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied
for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq.m. riparian land (Motherland) and was later issued a
certificate of title over the said land. Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the
Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion. Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion adjoined
the southern portion of the Motherland. A certificate of title was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano
covering the First Accretion. In 1971, the Second Accretion, more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its
southern portion. A certificate of title was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second
Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance. They anchored their
claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the
Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then pending homestead patent
application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will
be deemed to be holding the Motherland — which now included both accretions — in trust for the Imbornal
sisters. In other words, petitioners are alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for their
predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners entitled to the Motherland and by extension the First and Second Accretion?
HELD:
No. The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must
be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. In this case, it cannot be said,
merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by petitioners that the Motherland had been either mistakenly
or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. As the CA had aptly pointed out, a homestead patent award
requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the homestead. It must be
presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary
for the grant of his homestead patent application. As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been
acquired and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied trust between the Imbornal
sisters and Ciriaco. Hence, when an OCT covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to a
Homestead Patent, Ciriaco’s title to the Motherland had become indefeasible.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been
added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the
same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.