LICO vs COMELEC

FACTS

Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the PartyList System of Representation for the May
2010 Elections. A list of its nominees was filed with the COMELEC, the list includes petitioner Atty. Lico. COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups which earned a seat in the HR. Lico took his oath of
office and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning partylist
organizations, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, Lico was to serve as Partylist Representative for the 1 st
year of the 3-year term Ating Koop introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. In effect, the
amendments cut short the 3-year term of the incumbent members of the Central Committee. The said Interim
Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group. Almost 1 year after petitioner Lico had
assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations
of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner's refusal to honor the term-sharing
agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws. Rimas Group lodged a petition with COMELEC against petitioner Lico and prayed that petitioner Lico.
be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC En Banc held that it
had no jurisdiction to expel Lico from the HR, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his
qualifications as member of the House of Representatives, and it is the HRET that had jurisdiction over the
Petition. However, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop

ISSUE

Whether the COMELEC is vested with jurisdiction to rule upon the validity of the expulsion of Atty. Lico from Ating
Koop.

RULING

While the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for
being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop -
a matter beyond its purview. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress.

In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and
subsequently, assumed office. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case. And the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico
from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue is without
legal basis. Also, these findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona
fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented. The rules on intra-party matters and on the
jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-
party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the
jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and
decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner. The Court held that it
was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
LOKIN v COMELEC
FACTS:
Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) applied for the partylist system during the 2007 elections. It submitted
5 nominees, with Joel Villanueva as the first, and Luis Lokin, Jr as second, etc. On May 7, 2007, Villanueva withdrew
Lokin et al and replaced them with Cruz-Gonzales and Borje, as 2nd and 3rd nominees, respectively. After election
day, CIBAC through its counsel filed a petition before the COMELEC asking that the old list be followed, but
Villanueva, the partylist president, opposed. The COMELEC eventually approved the new list:
1) Joel Villanueva
2) Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3) Armi Borje

Lokin comes to the court arguing that COMELEC added new rules that were not present in the Partylist Act, by
allowing substitution of nominees.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second
and fourth requisites were met.

HELD:
It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to
the COMELEC not later that 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than 5, from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.A person may be nominated in one
(1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change
its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the
nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has
intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other
meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit
declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.

The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list
organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees
of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed
by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people
vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still
have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of
the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to
make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees
through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list
of nominees circumvents the voters' demand for transparency. The lawmakers' exclusion of such arbitrary
withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. - A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his
nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his
acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list of nominees.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being when the
"nomination is withdrawn by the party." To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to
rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is
not altered.

However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it
established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-
list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by
the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the
deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to
save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to
the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.

Note: To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.

ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Estrella, filed before
RTC an election protest which consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared Estrella as the
duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the
COMELEC, raffled to the 2nd Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Lantion, but a Status
Quo Ante Order was issued.

However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute
him. The 2nd Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as
the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a MR which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time,
Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said
that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is
elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc
deliberation.
HELD:

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary
piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to
voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously
inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally
improper and absurd. Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
questioned order, thus leaving 3 members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of 4 or majority of the
members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary
for the pronouncement of a decision or order.

Sevilla vs. Commission on Elections

DOCTRINE: In order to ascertain and carry out such will, their ballots must be read and appreciated according to
the rule that every ballot is presumed valid, unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection.

The Neighborhood Rule states that, where the name of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot,
but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said
candidate.

The Intent Rule originates from the principle that, in the appreciation of the ballot, the objective should be to
ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty.

The Written by Two Rule states that ballots which clearly appeared to have been filled by two persons before
being deposited in the ballot box are null and void, in the absence of evidence aliunde that the 2nd handwriting was
placed on the ballot after it was deposited in the ballot box, since the presumption is that the entries on the ballot
were made prior to the casting of the vote.

FACTS:

Sevilla and Gupit were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Poblacion, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, during
the 2013 Barangay Elections. After the canvass of results, Sevilla was proclaimed the winning candidate. Sevilla
received 466 votes, while Gupit garnered 465 votes. Notably, there was a margin of only one vote. Gupit contested
his defeat by filing an election protest, which the MCTC granted. The Comelec in division and en banc affirmed the
MCTC’s ruling.

ISSUES:

 WoN the lower tribunals have properly appreciated the ballots in favor of Gupit
o YES. The will of the voters is embodied in the ballots. In order to ascertain and carry out such will,
their ballots must be read and appreciated according to the rule that every ballot is presumed
valid, unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection.
o Sevilla contends that the intention to vote for Gupit was absent in the ballot marked as Exhibit
"I" and hence, should be considered as a stray vote.
 The Court begs to differ. The COMELEC En Banc correctly credited the contested ballot
in favor of Gupit based on the Idem Sonans Rule. The aforesaid rule states that when a
name or surname incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound similar to the
name or surname of a candidate when correctly written shall be counted in such
 candidate's favor. The Idem Sonans Rule is particularly provided for under Section
211(7) of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
 “Section 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. - In the reading and
appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there
is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors
shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election
is to obtain the expression of the voter's will
 xxxx
 7. A name or surname incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound
similar to the name or surname of a candidate when correctly written shall be
counted in his favor.”
 The name "Nanie G" written on the space allotted for Punong Barangay in the
questioned ballot was validly credited to Gupit. "Nanie" undoubtedly sounds like the
name of Gupit, i.e., "Ranie". Moreover, the surname of Gupit, i.e., Gupit, starts with a G.
While the Court notes that there was a candidate for Barangay Kagawad under the
name of "Nanie" Ballangca y Gubat, such fact alone is insufficient to invalidate the
ballot. As pointed out by the COMELEC First Division, counting the questioned ballot in
favor of Gupit is in line more with the basic principle that the primary objective of ballot
appreciation is to discover and give effect to, rather than frustrate, the intention of the
voter.
o With respect to the ballot marked as Exhibit "F," Sevilla alleges that it should have been counted
in his favor based on the Neighborhood and Intent Rules.
 The Neighborhood Rule states that, where the name of a candidate is not written in the
proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a
candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said candidate."
 The Intent Rule originates from the principle that, in the appreciation of the ballot, the
objective should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it
could be determined with reasonable certainty.
 The COMELEC En Banc rightly ruled that both the Neighborhood and Intent Rules find
no application in the present case, considering that there was a name written in the
space provided for Punong Barangay and regardless of the fact that such name does not
belong to any candidate vying for the said position. Section 211(19) of the Omnibus
Election Code states that any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate
of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not present
himself shall be considered as a stray vote. Hence, the vote was properly considered by
the COMELEC En Banc as a stray vote.
o Sevilla alleges that the ballot marked as Exhibit "R-4" should have been appreciated in his favor,
because such was accomplished by only one person."
 The applicable rule, with respect to the contested ballot, is the Written by Two Rule.
According to the aforesaid rule, ballots which clearly appeared to have been filled by
two persons before being deposited in the ballot box are null and void, in the absence of
evidence aliunde that the 2nd handwriting was placed on the ballot after it was
deposited in the ballot box, since the presumption is that the entries on the ballot were
made prior to the casting of the vote. It further holds that, where it appears that there is
a marked disparity or dissimilarity between the handwriting in one part of the ballot and
 the handwriting in another part and that the votes had clearly not been written by the
same hand, the ballot will be rejected.
 Contrary to the stand of Sevilla, a review of the contested ballot clearly shows that
such was written by 2 different persons. As properly held by the COMELEC En Banc, the
penmanship for Punong Barangay was distinctly different from the penmanship of those
written for Barangay Kagawad. The COMELEC En Banc rightly ruled that such glaring
dissimilarity can be seen by the fact that the name of the candidate for Punong
Barangay was in all caps and straightly written, except for the last name, while those for
Barangay Kagawad was written in italics and not in all caps. Hence, the COMELEC En
Banc rightly did not credit the subject ballot in favor of Sevilla.

NOTES: Petition for certiorari DISMISSED.

IBRAHIM vs. COMELEC and BUAGAS

FACTS:

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO
assailing the resolutions of the COMELEC disqualifying petitioner from the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao were filed. Ibrahim filed his CoC for the May 2010 elections. Buagas (acting Election Officer) then
submitted names of 20 candidates who were not registered voters to the COMELEC’S Law Department – the list
included the name of Ibrahim. COMELEC en banc issued the resolution disqualifying Ibrahim for not being
registered voters

- Opposition of Ibrahim:
o Ibrahim had participated in the 2004 and 2007 elections
o Were permanent residents and domiciled in the place sought to be elected
- COMELEC denied the Petition/Opposition – Ibrahim was not a registered voter as certified by Buagas
- In the 2010 Elections, Ibrahim got majority vote but Buagas suspended Ibrahim’s proclamation

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the Resolutions.

DECISION

Yes. COMELEC resolutions set aside

The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Datu Unsay

Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

o Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
 - Garvida v. Salas Jr. – held that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not the COMELEC en banc which
has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy:
o Sec.78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the
time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than 15days before election. (Omnibus Rules)

o Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may
only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a
decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by
the COMELEC en banc.
- In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s
disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. A proper petition should
have been filed before the conduct of elections Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper
petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took
cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead
aptly pertains to one of its divisions.

JARAMILLA vs. COMELEC

HELD:
Election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard and decided by a division of the
COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is filed.

It must be noted however that this provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. Accordingly, when the
case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the correction of a
manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes, the COMELEC en
banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections. In
this case, the Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar alleges an erroneous copying of figures
from the election return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the results, which
merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands
only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, COMELEC En Banc properly assumed
original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.

CAGAS vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the 1st legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Bautista,
then representative of the 2nd legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill
creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as R.A. No. 10360, the Charter of the
Province of Davao Occidental. Sec. 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon
approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and
supervised by the COMELEC within 60 days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.

As early as 11/27/2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all
plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 5/13/2013 National and Local Elections.
During a meeting held on 7/31/2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao
Occidental simultaneously with the 10/28/2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.

Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify Sec.
46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending
the plebiscite is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Was COMELEC's act unconstitutional?

HELD:

The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."

The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. The text and intent of Section 2(1) of
Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."
The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. The tight time
frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 2/5/2013, coupled with the
subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 5/13/2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered
impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 4/6/2013
as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC's burden in the accreditation and
registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections. The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite
so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and
administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental to 10/28/2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.

To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner would have the
COMELEC hold off all of its tasks for the National and Local Elections. If COMELEC abandoned any of its tasks or
did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in serious
jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and
concentrate all its manpower and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013 National and Local
Elections, and to ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites including that of
R.A. No. 10360.