Name: Renz Lyle H.

Laguitao
Subject: Special Proceedings (Weekday Class)

A. On Guardianship

VANCIL v. BELMES, G.R. No. 132223 (June 19, 2001)

FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of
the United States of America who died in the said country. During his lifetime, Reeder
had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes.

Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and
Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only
6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. Thereafter, Bonifacia Vancil was
appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and
Vincent Vancil Jr.

Meanwhile, Helen Balmes, the natural mother of the minors, submitted an opposition to
the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. Helen followed her
opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One,
asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia
was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A., being a naturalized American citizen.

The trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify
Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr.

The CA reversed the RTC decision for the reason that “our Civil Code considers
parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor
children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the
New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal
pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the
designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of
a court appointment and only for good reason may another person be named.”

Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
RULING:
The Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent,
being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to
be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which
provides:
"ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. . . ."

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding
natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held:

“Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that 'the
right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood,' a right supported by law and sound public
policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.”

Petitioner's claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of
substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:

“ARTICLE 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,

substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.“

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only
in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is
very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,
petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor's guardian, respondent's
unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that
respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent's)
live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no
longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities
of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much
difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are
not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory
requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts here.
 SINCO et. al. v. LONGA et. al., 51 Phil. 507

FACTS:
Hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don Rafael Sinco y Librado, the plaintiff’s
great grandfather, from whom it is passed to his son Escolastic Sinco who died during
the Spanishregime. The latter left a widow, Saturnina Lopez and 3 children, Sergio,
Maria Paz and Colomaall surnamed Sinco. Of these, Sergio and Maria Paz are still
living, but Coloma died leaving 3children who are the plaintiffs in this case, namely
Vicente, Pilar and Desemparados.

The estate of Escolastico appears to have been encumbered with debts

and in order to liquidate this indebtedness, the widow and three children leased the
property. The lease was continually extended until Saturnina died in 1904. After the
death of the mother, Sergio was hard pressed for money to sustain numerous family
and sold his undivided 1/3 share in the hacienda. The buyer, Longa insisted in acquiring
the whole property and subsequently the 1/3share of Maria Paz was included in the
sale.

In order to accomplish the said end, Emilio Tevez, the guardian of the then minor
plaintiffs petitioned for the approval of the sale alleging that the estate was heavily
encumbered and that the minors had no cash assets to meet their subsistence and
education. Subsequently, the court issued its order authorizing the guardian to make the
sale as requested.

After the minors attained majority age, they instituted this petition seeking to annul the
said sale pertaining to their 1/3 undivided interest in the hacienda alleging that the
subject sale was attended with fraud. Emilio Tevez, the guardian, was anxious for the
sale to obtain money for his own uses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale should be annulled.

RULING:
In passing upon controversies involving charges of fraud alleged to have been
committed many years before litigation was begun, the proof of such fraud, to be
accepted by the court, should be full and convincing. Experience teaches the danger of
lightly accepting charges of fraud made many years after the transaction which is the
subject of question was accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the
principal actors and changes effected by time may have given a totally different color to
the questioned transaction.

As to the irregularity in the guardianship proceedings, the jurisdiction of the court to

authorize the sale of the property of minors rests upon the averments of the petition
and adequate publication or appearance of the parties interested. The fact that the
statements of the petition may be untrue with respect to the existence of encumbrances
on the property and necessity of the sale, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court,
which rests upon the averments and not upon the truth of those averments.

Where the next of kin of minors appear before the court at the hearing of the petition
presented by the guardian for the sale of their property, the circumstance that the order
sanctioning the sale was made before the full period prescribed for publication of notice
does not invalidate the order.
 DINAH B. TONGOG v. CA, et. al., GR. No. 122906 (Feb. 7, 2002)

FACTS:
Dinah B. Tonog gave birth 2 to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter
with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while
private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with
private respondent's parents and sister in the latter's house in Quezon City where the
infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.

A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America
where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her
father (private respondent) and paternal grandparents.

On January 10, 1992, respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The trial court rendered judgment appointing
private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith.

Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, she filed
a petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution, the trial court set aside its original
judgment and allowed petitioner to file her opposition to private respondent's petition.
The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related incident, petitioner filed
a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.

The trial court issued a resolution denying private respondent's motion for
reconsideration and granting petitioner's motion for custody of their child, Gardin.
Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.

Edgar, respondent, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA let
Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged.

Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of
Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be
separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.

ISSUE:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship
proceeding?

RULING:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child. In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be
given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents.
In turn, the parents' right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of
the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental authority
over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights, "to keep them in
their company." In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child relationship
encompasses much more than the implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by
the other.

Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise,
Article 213 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the court 􀀺nds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of
the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be
recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We
are not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their
opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of
the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori,
her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should
have the custody over her person.

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor
should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of
the trial court.
 JOYCELYN P. GUALBERTO v. CRISANTO R. GUALBERTO V, GR. No. 156254
(June 28, 2005)

FACTS:
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Joycelyn, with prayer for custody of their four year old son.

Joycelyn took their child with her to San Jose, Mindoro. At that time, the child was
enrolled in Parañaque City. Joycelyn and her child are presently staying with her step
father residence in Mindoro.

Crisanto hired a Security to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn. And according to

findings, Joycelyn was having a lesbian relationship with one Noreen in Cebu City and
she does not taking care of the child as she is very often goes out of the house.

The Court of Appeals believes that Joycelyn had no reason to take the child with her.
Therefore, the court awards custody of the child to his father, Crisanto Rafaelito
Gualberto.

At the next instance, the Court of Appeal annulled the second court order on procedural
grounds and returned custody to Crisanto until Jocelyn’s motion was decided on again.
In the current case, both parties petitioned the Supreme Court against the Court of
Appeal's ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Joycelyn is right in claiming that she should have the custody of their
minor child?

RULING:
The Supreme Court said that the general rule that children under seven years of age
shall not be separated from their mother finds its reason in the basic need of minor
children for their mother’s loving care and that this rule is recommended in order to
avoid a tragedy where a mother has her baby torn away from her. Any exception to this
rule can only be made for ‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child, but such cases
must indeed be rare.

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling
reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. The mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a
compelling reason to deprive her of custody, but sexual preference or moral laxity alone
does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a
prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody
of her minor child.

It was held that in order to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly
establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or
have distracted her from exercising proper parental care. It was, therefore, not enough
for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian, but he had to also demonstrate
that she had carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the
presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral
development. However, in the current case, there was no evidence that the son was
exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result.
 B. On Escheat

LUIS B. MANASE et. al. v. Sps. VELASCO, and SYLVIA FLORES GR. No. 164024.
(Jan. 19, 2009)

FACTS:
The subject matter of the controversy is the alleged foreshore land fronting Tayabas
Bay in Guisguis, Sariaya, Quezon. Respondent Dioscoro Velasco was issued Original
Certificate of Title covering said property by the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province.
Velasco sold the property to respondent Sylvia Flores, and TCT No. T-160923 was
issued in her name. The property was sold by Flores to Mildred Christine Flores-
Tantoco and a TCT was issued in the latter's name. Later, the property was divided into
seven lots and TCTs were issued in the name of Mildred Christine Flores-Tantoco. The
lots covered by TCT Nos. T-177780 8 and T-177781 9 were sold back to Flores such
that TCT No. T-278112 10 and TCT No. 278110 11 were issued in her name.

Adjacent and contiguous to the alleged foreshore land is the agricultural land owned by
petitioners. Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages against
respondents before the RTC of Lucena City. They alleged that the issuance of the
homestead patent and the series of transfers involving the same property were null and
void. They further alleged that they applied for lease of the foreshore land and the
government had approved in their favor Foreshore, Reclaimed Land or Miscellaneous
Lease Application. Petitioners claimed that they were in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and use of said foreshore land since 1961.

Petitioners averred that Dioscoro Velasco was not qualified to become a grantee of a
homestead patent since he never occupied any portion nor introduced any because he
committed fraud, misrepresentation, and falsification in connivance with employees of
the Bureau of Lands. They argued that the sale between Velasco and Flores was invalid
because it was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
required under Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act".
Hence, they claimed that the sale by Flores to Tantoco was likewise invalid.

The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that petitioners do not
have the legal personality to file the complaint since the property forms part of the public
domain and only the Solicitor General could bring an action for reversion or any action
which may have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of
title issued on the basis of the patent.

The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that petitioners do not have the legal
personality to file the complaint. It held that the government, not petitioners, is the real
party in interest and, therefore, only the Solicitor General may bring the action in court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's Order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are real parties in interest with authority to file a complaint for
annulment of title of foreshore land.

RULING:
After due consideration of the submissions and arguments of the parties, we are in
agreement that the instant petition lacks merit.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.

It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of controversy is foreshore land,
which is defined as that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tides. It is that part of the land
adjacent to the sea, which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of
tides. It is part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only
by lease and not otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is
outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private appropriation.

In all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The
action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover, such action does not prescribe.
Prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its property
acquired through fraud by private individuals.
 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. HI-TRI DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and LUZ R. BAKUNAWA. (G.R. No. 192413. June 13, 2012.)

FACTS:
Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased, are registered owners of six
parcels of land. These lots were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan through her offered to buy
said lots with the promise that she will take care of clearing whatever preliminary
obstacles there may be to effect a completion of the sale. However, Millan was not able
to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and
offered to return to Millan her down payment to which Millan refused.

Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri Development Corporation a

Manager's Check from RCBC-Ermita payable to Millan's company Rosmil Realty and
Development Corporation c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of their basis for a
complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the RTC. Spouses
Bakunawa retained custody of RCBC Manager's Check and refrained from canceling or
negotiating it. All throughout the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-91-10719, especially
during negotiations for a possible settlement of the case, Millan was informed that the
Manager's Check was available for her withdrawal, she being the payee.

During the pendency of the abovementioned case and without the knowledge of Hi-Tri
and Spouses Bakunawa, RCBC reported the credit existing in favor of Rosmil to the
Bureau of Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances". Later on, Republic, through the
OSG filed with the RTC the action for Escheat. Subsequently, Spouses Bakunawa
settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and Millan. Spouses Bakunawa agreed to pay
Rosmil and Millan the amount of "P3,000,000.00", but Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri
inquired from RCBC-Ermita the availability of the amount under RCBC Manager's
Check. They were informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat
proceedings before the RTC. The escheat proceedings were continued and the trial
court declared the deposits, credits, and unclaimed balances escheated to the Republic.
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic

RULING:
NO.

The court find sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds allocated
for the payment of the Manager's Check in the escheat proceedings.

Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without
there being an interested person having a legal claim thereto. In the case of dormant
accounts, the state inquires into the status, custody, and ownership of the unclaimed
balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or
absence of or abandonment by the depositor. If after the proceedings the property
remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted to
the state "to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first comers." However, if
interested parties have come forward and lain claim to the property, the courts shall
determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in
favor of the state. The court emphasizes that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize
depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding
whereby the state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there
is substantial ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without
an owner.

The mere issuance of a manager's check does not ipso facto work as an automatic
transfer of funds to the account of the payee. Further, undisputed that there was no
effective delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete. They have not
abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated deposit, subject of the
Manager's Check, should be excluded from the escheat proceedings. We reiterate our
pronouncement that he objective of escheat proceedings is state forfeiture of unclaimed
balances.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY,
ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA YU-LEE. (G.R. No. 158230. July 16, 2008.)

FACTS:
Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 from Vicenta Arcenas, Francisco,
Carmen Ramon, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, and Manuel, all surnamed
Dinglasan. Lee Liong died intestate and was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his
sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. On 30 June 1947, the surviving heirs of Lee
Liong extrajudicially settled the estate of the deceased and partitioned among
themselves Lot No. 398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was
transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee.

Elizabeth and Pacita filed a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 because the
records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. Petitioner
through the OSG filed with the RTC of Roxas City a Complaint for Reversion of Title
against private respondents and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City. The trial court
ordered the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. Court of Appeals held that the trial
court erred in ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State.

ISSUE:
Whether reversion proceedings are still viable considering that Lot No. 398 has already
been transferred to Filipino citizens

RULING:
NO

In the reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the Philippines involving Lot No. 398,
this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of
lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the Constitution.
However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was already transferred to Filipinos
militates against escheat proceedings.

In the case at bar, when petitioner instituted the action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot
No. 398 had already been transferred by succession to private respondents who are
Filipino citizens. Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the
flaw in the original transaction is considered cured. Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has
already been transferred to private respondents who are Filipino citizens, the prior
invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Thus, the reversion proceedings will
no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and AMADA H.
SOLANO, G.R. No. 143483. (January 31, 2002.)

FACTS:
For more than three decades private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-
around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French
national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of
her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since
no close relative was available to tend to her needs.

In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her
favor two deeds of donation involving two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807
and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the
deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation were
missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins
before the RTC. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo
Solano, spouse of private respondent and Gaudencio Regosa, but the motion was
denied by the trial court for the reason that they miserably failed to show valid claim or
right to the properties in question. Since it was established that there were no known
heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of
donation she had been looking for a long time. Then, she filed a petition before the CA
for the annulment of the lower court's decision. The CA gave due course to the petition
for annulment of judgment and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the private
respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether herein private respondent, not being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the
personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules
of Court

RULING:
NO

The escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989
but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private
respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, the private respondent's
belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.

A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction

is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those
who are not parties or privies thereto.
With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost
her right to claim and the supposed discovery of the deeds of donation is not enough
justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality. Where a
person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such
intervenor to establish his title to the property and his right to intervene. In the absence
therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been
conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least
before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not
to assume otherwise.
 C. On Trustees

EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA v. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA and
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 58010. (March 31, 1993.)

FACTS:
This case involves half-sisters claiming ownership over a parcel of land. While petitioner
Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate of title covering the property
with private respondent O Lay Kia for safekeeping, the latter who is the former's older
sister insists that the title was in her possession because she and her husband bought
the property from their conjugal funds.

The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold a parcel of land, Lot No.
5, Block No. 10, Plan Psu-10038, situated at Oroquieta St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, with the
Deed of Absolute Sale naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee. Private respondent-spouses
Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Wa learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco
sold the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila for P230,000.00,
with assumption of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon.

Consequently, respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia sued

petitioner-spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to recover the purchase price of the
land before the then CFI. Meanwhile, they asked the trial court to garnish all the
amounts still due and payable to petitioner-spouses arising from the sale, which was
granted. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA set aside the trial court’s
decision and denied reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether there is a trust relation between the parties

RULING:
YES

Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts are
those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or
deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those
which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts
may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation of
law.

Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not
legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have
been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the
consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested
with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another.
On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order
to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to
intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the
legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

A resulting trust was indeed intended by the parties. The continued possession of the
documents, together with other corroborating evidence spread on record, strongly
suggests that Emilia O'Laco merely held the Oroquieta property in trust for respondent
spouses. Until the sale of the Oroquieta property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, petitioner Emilia O'Laco actually recognized the trust. Further, so long as the
trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition and ordinarily
will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. Furthermore, there
is no running of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting
trust. Hence, since the complaint for breach of trust was filed by respondent-spouses
two months after acquiring knowledge of the sale, the action therefore has not yet
prescribed.
 RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
MAGNO DABON, VICENTA DABON, TERESITA DABON, EUGENIA DABON, and
TOMAS DABON, G.R. No. L-46345 (January 30, 1990.)

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for recovery of their title to Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C against
private respondents in the CFI of Cebu which originally formed part of Hacienda de
Mandaue of the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. The property is in the name of
Vicente Dabon married to Marcela Ceniza. Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel
Ceniza while the private respondents are the descendants of his sister, Sofia Ceniza.
Sofia Ceniza was childless but she had an adopted daughter named Flaviana Ceniza,
who begot a daughter named Marced Ceniza and who in turn had a daughter named
Marcelina Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private respondents are the children of
this marriage and they are the great-great-grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza. On the other
hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two sons, Santiago and Jose
Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a certain Nemesia Ceniza-Albina
are their children and the great-grandchildren of Manuel Ceniza. When the Hacienda de
Mandaue was subdivided for resale to the occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente
Dabon jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience,
to have the land registered in the name of Dabon.

After Dabon died in 1954, his seven children, named Magno, Jacinta, Tomas, Flaviana,
Soledad, Teresita and Eugenia, succeeded to his possession of a portion of the land.
On November 4, 1961, a private land surveyor, Espiritu Bunagan, on the request of
Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza who jointly defrayed the cost, divided Lot 627 into
three parts. The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to
convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners and claimed that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627,
by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. The trial court ordered the
private respondents to execute deeds of conveyance of Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C in
favor of the plaintiffs, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza, respectively. The CA reversed the
trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a trust relation created

RULING:
YES

The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to
exist between the predecessors-in-interest of both petitioners and private respondents,
prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except from the time that they
repudiated the co-ownership and made the repudiation known to the other co-owners,
Restituto and Jesus Ceniza. The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente
Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs.
As ruled by the Court in several cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general
rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title by
prescription. The elements of adverse possession are not present here for the
petitioners co-owners have not been ousted from the land. They continue to possess
their respective shares of Lot 627 and they have been paying the realty taxes thereon.
Restituto's house stands on his portion of the Land.
 D. On Absentees

REPUBLIC v. CA, GR. No. 163604 (May 6, 2005)

FACTS:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P.
Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, granted the
petition on the basis of the Commissioner's Report 2 and accordingly declared the
absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively
dead. The court based its decision on Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article
provides that “for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect
of the reappearance of the absent spouse.”
The Republic, through the Solicitor General appealed the ruling by filing a notice of
appeal. The appellate court denied the contention declaring that the declaration of
presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death for purposes of remarriage is a
special proceeding.

RULING:
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored
its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse,
provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse.
By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the
petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead
had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition
for that purpose is a “summary proceeding,” following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph
2 of the Family Code.
 Republic vs. Yolanda Granada, GR.NO. 187512 (June 13, 2012)

FACTS:
Yolanda Granada and Cyrus Granada,who first met together as workmates married in
1991. In 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Since then, he never
communicated with Yolanda and his whereabouts were unknown . After nine (9) years
of waiting without any development as to the whereabouts or even if Cyrus is still alive,
she filed a Petition to have her husband declared presumptively dead which the RTC
granted. The Republic of the Philippine, through the Solicitor General, appealed from
the decision contending that Yolanda failed to prove earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and
thus, failed to prove well-founded belief that he was already dead.
Yolanda filed a motion to dismiss the appeal claiming that the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based under Art. 41, Family Code was a summary judicial
proceedings in which the judgment of the RTC is immediately final and executory and,
thus, not appealable. The CA granted the motion.

ISSUE:
Was the Dismissal of the appeal was proper

RULING:
Yes, judgment declaring a spouse presumptively dead is immediately final and
executory; thus not subject to ordinary appeal.

Since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the

judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. The appropriate
remedy is a special civil action for certiorari if there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By express provision of law, the
judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on
the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 CASE COMPARISONS

PARCO v. COURT OF APPEALS GR L-33152 January 30, 1982

FACTS:
This case stems from a previous Special proceedings for the guardianship of
incompetent Soriaya Rodriguez. The guardianship proceeding originally pertained to
Branch 1, CFI of Quezon. Subsequently, it was transferred to Branch IV-Calauag, CFI
of Quezon, where respondent judge Kayanan took cognizance of the case.

On December 20, 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon motion of
Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez the sale to Luis Parco and
Virginia Bautista, of 2 lots covered by TCT Nos. 16939 and 18035, respectively, for the
sum of P4,400.00 for the purpose of support, maintenance and medical treatment of
the ward Soledad Rodriguez. In another decision, on January 6, 1967, respondent
Judge again approved and authorized, upon motion of private respondent, the sale to
petitioners of another lot, more or less, for the same reason. All the sales of the three
(3) lots being absolute, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of
petitioner.

Almost two years after the guardianship court's approval of the 'sale', the private
respondent filed an urgent petition for the examination of the subject conveyance of the
lots to the petitioners, by virtue of the transfer of title to third parties. He argued that the
conveyance was actually a loan agreement with a right to recover while the spouses
alleged that there was an absolute sale of the lands in dispute.

In their answer, petitioners contended mainly, among others, that the three lots have
been conveyed to them by deeds of absolute sale which were duly approved by the
guardianship court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the
properties to the guardian of the ward?

RULING:
No, Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court specifically states that:

Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or concealing

property of the ward.— Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any
person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as
creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled,
concealed, or conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or a written
instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the
suspected person to appear for examination touching such money, goods,
 interests, or instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate
against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.

In Cui vs. Piccio et al, it was held that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship
proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information
which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right
of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction
cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed.

In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not,
on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the
ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels of land in question is clear and
undisputable. What is certain here is the fact that the sale of the properties in question
were duly approved by the respondent judge in accordance with the provisions on
selling and encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of
Court. The question regarding title must be resolved in a separate proceeding.
 PACIENTE v. DACUYCUY, GR L-58319, June 29, 1982.

FACTS:
In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and two
minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land.

On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the
persons and estate of the minors. The petition was granted on August 9, 1977. Lilia S.
Homeres took her oath as guardian on September 13, 1977. But before that, specifically
on September 9, 1976, Lilia sold the parcel of land inherited by her wards to Conchita
Dumdum who in turn sold it to petitioner Patricia Paciente. The latter mortgaged the
parcel of land to Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.

On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, filed a
manifestation informing respondent court that lot which is the subject of the
guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name of the petitioner.

Upon being informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court issued an order on
directing the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to appear before the court and show cause why the TCT covering a parcel
of land co-owned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should not be cancelled
for having been alienated without authority from the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court, acting as guardianship court has the jurisdiction to
order the cancellation and the issuance of new certificates of title.

RULING:
Yes, Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or
return of the property conveyed are concerned, We find the orders of the respondent
court valid. The petitioner's contentions in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited
cases relied upon do not support her argument. While it is true that in these two cases
We ruled that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed
is in question, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in
favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must
be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, We
also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and
indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.

In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and
indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale of
this land, where they are co-owners, by their mother without the authority of the
guardianship court is illegal.
 Comparative Analysis

In the case of Parco v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a
guardianship court cannot actually order the delivery of the property found embezzled or
concealed to the ward as a determination of said disputed title or right must be
determined in a separate ordinary action. The Supreme Court explains:

Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction

cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court,
only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where
his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its
delivery to the guardian (Cui vs . Piccio, et al., 91 Phil 712). In effect, there
can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed
property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate
ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.

Meanwhile, in Paciente v. Dacuycuy, “where the right or title of the two minors to the
property is clear and indisputable, the respondent court in issuing the order to the
Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the
issuance of a new title to include the minors as co-owners with the petitioner, did not
exceed its jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons under disability.”

One may notice that the two cases mentioned shares common problem and that
is re-conveyance of the properties of the ward where it is found embezzled, concealed
or conveyed. In the first instance, the Parco case, the court was barred to order the
delivery of the said property because legal title of the same were still in question, and
must first be determined in a separate ordinary action. However, in the second instance,
the Paciente case, the lower court was justified in “ordering the Register of Deeds to
cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the issuance of a new title
to include the minors as co-owners with the petitioner.” Hence, the re-conveyance was
allowed.

Here, the difference between the two cases mentioned above is that the former
contemplates a situation where there dispute on the legal title of the subject property.
While, the latter case shows that the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and
indisputable. That is why, in instances like this where there is an order of the lower court
to re-convey the property to the ward, it must be established first that the right or title of
the ward to the property is clear and indisputable.