In the matter of adoption of Stephanie Astorga Garcia, GR. No.

148311 (March 31,

2005)

FACTS:
On August 2000, Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to “Garcia” (her mother’s surname), and that her surname Garcia
to “Catindig” (his surname).

On March 2001, the trial court granted his petition, thereby freeing Stephanie
from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother,
and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the FC, the minor shall be known as “Stephanie Nathy
Catindig”.

On April 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration,
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
“Garcia” as her middle name.

On May 2001, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that there is no law
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle
name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

RULING:
Yes, since there is no law also prohibiting Stephanie, being an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, to use her mother’s name, the Court finds no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so. The child should be permitted to use “Garcia” as
her middle name for the following reasons:
a. Use of surname is fixed by law – Art. 364-380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever
may be his status in life (legitimate, illegitimate, adopted, married, previously
married or a widow;
b. Law is silent as to the use of middle name – There is no law regulating the use of
a middle name, even the Art. 176 of the Family Code (as amended by RA 9255).
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
But as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the framers of the FC recognized the
Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name
as recorded in the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees.
c. The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child – Being a
legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
 provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and mother.
d. Liberal construction of adoption statues in favor of adoption – It is a settled rule
that adoption statues should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are primary
and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the
law. The Art. 10 of the Civil Code provides a necessary scale in favor of right and
justice when the law is doubtful or obscure.

Hence, the Court grants the petition and partly modifies the assailed decision, allowing
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname “Garcia” as her middle name.
 Lahom vs. Sibulo, GR. No. 143939 (July 14, 2003)

FACTS:
Petitioner Isabelita S. Lahom and her late husband legally adopted respondent
Jose Melvin Sibulo. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name “Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin Lahom.” However, in view of
respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship
between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after
all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over
the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his filing of a
civil case for partition against petitioner. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally that petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the provisions of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption
Act). The statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the
adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of
the Family Code. The trial court dismissed the petition. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
adopter’s action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of
the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552
had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested
when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time
before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always
for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
 Republic vs. Miller, GR. No. 125932 (April 21, 1999)

FACTS:
On July 29, 1988, spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both American
Citizens, filed with the RTC of Angeles City a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael
Madayag. The DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its
evaluation that respondents were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive
parents and that the adoption would be to the minor's best interest and welfare. On May
12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. In due time,
the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals which certified the case to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUE:
Whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the
prohibition under the family code, effective August 3, 1988 when the petition for
adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which allowed aliens to adopt.

RULING:
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was
in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently,
the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of
respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law
then in force.

“Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them
the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless
couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in
the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.”