avid v.

Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for cetiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5
implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and
protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws",
she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the
military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood
Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
“the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to
2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position
of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also
a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the
majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by
the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President
formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of
whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court hasjurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in theexercise of their
functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from

the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the
Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total. In effect, while theConstitution mandates that the President of
the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all
the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote
for him shall ipsofacto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the
minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President

and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art.
VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by the Court.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al . 402 SCRA

84(2003)

The PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares to elect the ETPI Board of Directors or
to amend the Articles of Incorporation for the purpose of increasing the authorized
capital stock unless there is a prima facie evidence showing that said shares are ill-
gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation.

Two sets of board and officers of Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)
were elected, one by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the
other by the registered ETPI stockholders.Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI filed a
petition for Certiorari before the Sandiganbayan alleging that the PCGG had been
“illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of the members of
the board of directors. The Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners, their
duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.
The PCGG filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition before the Court
which was granted. The Court referred the PCGG’s petition to hold the special
stockholders’ meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and resolution.
The Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG “authority to cause the holding of a special
stockholders’ meeting of ETPI and held that there was an urgent necessity to increase
ETPI’s authorized capital stock; there existed a prima facie factual foundation for the
issuance of the writ of sequestration covering the Class “A” shares of stock; and the
PCGG was entitled to vote the sequestered shares of stock. The PCGG-controlled
ETPI board of directors held a meeting and the increase in ETPI’s authorized
capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was “unanimously approved”. Africa filed
a motion to nullify the stockholders meeting, contending that only the Court, and not
the Sandiganbayan, has the power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders meeting
and vote the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan denied the motions for
reconsideration of prompting Africa to file before the Court a second petition,
challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions authorizing the holding of a stockholders
meeting and the one denying the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directorswithout first
setting in place, through the amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws
of ETPI 2. Whether the PCGG can vote the sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the
stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors.

HELD:

First Issue :
On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for
ordering the holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of
directors without first setting in place, through the amendment of the articles of
incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards prescribed in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Roxas. The Court laid down those safeguards because of the obvious need to reconcile
the rights of the stockholder whose shares have been sequestered and the duty of the
conservator to preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There is nothing in the
Cojuangco case that would suggest that the above measures should be incorporated in
the articles and by-laws before a stockholders meeting for the election of the board of
directors is held. The PCGG nonetheless insists that those measures should be written in
the articles and by-laws before such meeting, “otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will elect
themselves or their representatives, control the corporation, and for an appreciable
period of time, have every opportunity to disburse funds, destroy or alter corporate
records, and dissipate assets.” That could be a possibility, but the peculiar circumstances
of the case require that the election of the board of directors first be held before the
articles of incorporation are amended. Section 16 of the Corporation Code requires the
majority vote of the board of directorsto amend the articles of incorporation. At the time
Africa filed his motion for the holding of the annual stockholders meeting, there were
two sets of ETPI directors, one controlled by the PCGG and the other by
the registeredstockholders. Which of them is the legitimate board of directors? Which of
them may rightfully vote to amend the articles of incorporation and integrate the
safeguards laid down in Cojuangco? It is essential, therefore, to cure the aberration of
two boards of directors sitting in a single corporation before the articles of incorporation
are amended to set in place the Cojuangco safeguards. The danger of the so-called
Marcos cronies taking control of the corporation and dissipating its assets is, of course, a
legitimate concern of the PCGG, charged as it is with the duties of a conservator.
Nevertheless, such danger may be averted by the “substantially
contemporaneous” amendment of the articles after the election of the board.

Second Issue :
The principle laid down in Baseco vs. PCGG was further enhanced in the subsequent
cases of Cojuangco v. Calpo and Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Cojuangco, Jr., where the Court developed a “two-tiered” test in determining whether
the PCGG may vote sequestered shares. The issue of whether PCGG may vote the
sequestered shares in SMC necessitates a determination of at least two factual matters:
a.) whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and
thus belong to the state; and b.) whether there is an immediate danger of dissipation
thus necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the PCGG while the main
issue pends with the Sandiganbayan. The two-tiered test, however, does not apply
in cases involving funds of “public character.” In such cases, the government is granted
the authority to vote said shares, namely: (1) Where government shares are taken over
by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own names, and (2)
Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow
landed in private hands. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of
private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth,
then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name
of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally
government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public
interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. The rule in the jurisdiction is, therefore,
clear. The PCGG cannot perform acts of strict ownership of sequestered property. It is a
mere conservator. It may not vote the shares in a corporation and elect members of
the board of directors. The only conceivable exception is in a case of a takeover of a
business belonging to the government or whose capitalization comes from public funds,
but which landed in private hands as in BASECO. In short, the Sandiganbayan held that
the public character exception does not apply, in which case it should have proceeded to
apply the two-tiered test. This it failed to do. The questions thus remain if there is prima
facie evidence showing that the subject shares are ill- gotten and if there is imminent
danger of dissipation. The Court is not, however, a trier of facts, hence, it is not in a
position to rule on the correctness of the PCGG’s contention. Consequently, the issue
must be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for resolution.

1. The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual
and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before
the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded
to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in
effect during the interregnum.
2. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under
the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
3. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
 directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke
any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
4. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:A revolution
has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical
and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with
violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen’s book, General Theory of Law
and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order of a community
is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order
itself.
5. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as
contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
6. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration
during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter
and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as
part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper
subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
7. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not
exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives
and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this
case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the
warrant.
8. It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include
the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and
the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no
legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the
subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items.The seizure of these items was therefore void,
and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search
and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items
from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to
Dimaano.