Case digesting

A case digest or a case brief is a written summary of the case. A case sometimes involves several
issues. Digesting the same would help the student in separating one issue from another and
understanding how the Court resolved the issues in the case.
The purpose of case digesting is to simplify and organize learnings from decided cases in order
to easily remember the cases for the purpose of citing it. A case digest may also serve as a useful
study aid for class discussions and exams. A student who has a case digest does not need to go
back to the case in order to remember what he has read
Format of the Case Digest
I. Caption. A simple title of the case its type of action (civil. criminal or administrative) its GR
number and the date released
II. Facts. There is no need to include all the facts. Just include those that are relevant to the
subject. To find out what is relevant relate it to the law subject and the topic being discussed or
assigned. It is also helpful to look at the issue being resolved. 2 to 4 sentences will suffice so long
as the facts would be relevant to the issue/s being resolved
III. Issues. Include only those that are relevant to the subject and to the assigned topic. Issues
are usually framed in the form of questions that are answerable by "yes" or "no," for example, "Is
the contract void?" Sometimes, students frame the question by starting it with the word
"whether," for example, "Whether the contract is void" or "Whether or not the contract is void."
The answer to the question has to be answered in the ruling.
IV. Ruling. This is how the Court decided, It must also explain why the court decided the way it
does. In some instances must be further explained in cases where the court decided in general or
pro hac vice as the latter limits its application.
V. Learning/s - is the summary of the case and should include the hows and why the court
decided the way it did and its basis.
Cases for digesting
1. Pp vs que GR no. 120365Dec 17 1996
FACTS:
Accused Que was discovered to be in possession of 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest
Products -chainsawn Tanguile lumber - in his truck, without necessary permit, license or
authority to do so from the proper authorities. Hence, accused was convicted by the trial court
for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree P.D.705.
However, accused contended that he is not guilty since he acquired the tanguile lumber from a
legal source as evidenced by private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the (DENR) to Cayosa
and Sabal which the latter gave to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty.
HELD:
YES. Accused is guilty.
There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by
the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from
a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.

2. PEOPLE v. VICENTE DE LEON [ GR Nos. 25375, Oct 08, 1926 ]

Facts:
Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente
Magat's house... and without violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things,
took, with intent to gain, two... game roosters which were in the yard
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft, one the
theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas.
The trial court found the accused guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the theft of the two
roosters constituted but one crime,
Issues:
The question, then, to determine is whether or not the fact that the... accused, with intent to
gain, on the same occasion and in the same place, took the two roosters, one belonging to
Vicente Magat and the other to Ignacio Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.
Ruling:
The act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose
on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by... the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully taken belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the
accomplishment of different purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and
on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their
own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that... characterize
two separate crimes.
What constitutes the crime of theft is the taking of another's property with intent to gain,
without the consent of the owner, so that after the unlawful act of taking another's property is
proven, it is evident that all the elements mentioned in the first paragraph of article 517 of the
Penal
Code exist. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing
belonging to another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only
one crime of theft; and the fact that the things taken... belong to different persons does not
produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished separately.
Principles:
That the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the
same place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and the fact that the things
taken... belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be
punished separately.
----------------------------------------------
The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two
crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct
appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging to
another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of
theft; and fact that the things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity
of crimes, which must be punished separately.
3. Pp vs Alayay GR no 94310 june 30 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
VIRGILIO ALAY-AY, ALIAS "COT," accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Virgilio Alay-Ay was found guilty for Robbery with Homicide and the Trial Court
sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and its accessory penalties as defined and punished
under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

ISSUE: Whether the right penalty imposed on the accused-appellant?

HELD:
No,
The Court, however, disagrees with the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
appellant for the crime of robbery with homicide. Incidentally, the proper penalty here
is reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment. 

To sustain conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it must be
established with certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the
main purpose and objective of the criminals. It contemplates a situation where the homicide
resulted by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said with moral certainty that accused appellant's intention was
to steal the radio and money and that the killing of the victim was a mere incident to the
robbery.
There is testimony  by Saldy Guela that the accused-appellant had been frequently drinking at
the store tended by the victim for about three (3) months prior to the killing. There is also
testimony by Mila Pineda that accused-appellant had always been quarreling with the victim
and it could have been due in part to the fact that accused-appellant had been enamored of her.
That there is a dearth of evidence to show that the accused-appellant had the intention to steal
cash and other valuables in the store and that he killed the victim on occasion of the robbery. As
such he cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide but of two specific crimes,
that of homicide and theft.

The appealed judgment is VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new one is entered finding the
accused-appellant Virgilio Alay-ay guilty of the crimes of Homicide and Theft. For the crime of
Homicide, he is sentenced to Six Years and One Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
Fourteen Years, Eight Months and One Day of Reclusion Temporal medium, as maximum, and
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50.000.00) Pesos. For
the crime of Theft, he is sentenced to a straight penalty of Six (6) Months of Arresto
Mayor maximum, and to return the Sanyo transistor radio to the heirs of the victim, and the
P100 peso bill, or the amount of P200.00 if the Sanyo transistor radio can no longer be
returned.

4. People vs Bustinera (2004)

G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.
THIRD DIVISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Cipriano who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father, hired Bustinera as a
taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer. It was agreed that Bustinera would drive
the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transport’s garage
and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per day. However, Bustinera failed to
return the taxi on the same day. Cipriano sued Bustinera for qualified theft. During the trial,
Bustinera argued that his intent to gain was not present because he merely failed to return the
car because he was short of the P780 boundary imposed by Cipriano. He further argued that he
returned the car when he already had the money to pay Cipriano. Bustinera was found guilty by
the trial court of qualified theft for his failure to return the taxi to its garage. He appealed to the
SC.

Issue: WON intent to gain is present when he failed to return the taxi to its garage.

Ruling: Yes.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the
motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The
term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any
other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of
the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.

Issue: WON Bustinera is liable for Qualified Theft.

Ruling: No.
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later
case of People v. Lobitania which involved the taking of Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court
held that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law
and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.

The elements of carnapping are (Republic Act No. 6539):

(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;
(2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and
(3) the taking is done with intent to gain.

5. People vs Salonga GR no 131131 june 21 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. ABELARDO SALONGA, accused-appellant.
Facts:
This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from
a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR NO. 18551 which modified the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by
increasing the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua. Abelardo Salonga,
Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of Qualified
Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document in an information alleging that on or
before 23 October 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding one another,
and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company
(Metrobank), with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to
sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and
Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such transaction between
Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a simulated check
described as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and
authorized, through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for
themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust
Company in the total amount of P36,480.30. On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision
finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of
Commercial Document.
Issues: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft?
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper?

Held:
The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accused-appellant in
the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank
Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano of the
spot audit group testified that the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected
in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check
was issued without any transaction. Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in
the signature of bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other
specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing therein was
not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing in the cashiers
check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty.
Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in his extra-
judicial confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00. The crime charged is
Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. Since the value of the check is
P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and 1 year of each additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309,
paragraph 1 of the RPC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specified in
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition,
forging the signatures of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was
resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. Falsification
of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of qualified theft
resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that, where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified
Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under
Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum period, the correct
penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

6. Coriaga vs CA june 2001

7. Hizon vs CA GR no 1196 19 Dec 13 1996

FACTS:
Petitioners Hizon, et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the
use of a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by
"muro ami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were
present. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat) directed the
boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial results
tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against
Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium
cyanide. The RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture
of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now
question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of
the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant
are admissible in evidence. YES.
(2) Whether or not et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. NO.
HELD:
As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and
seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been
the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same
exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704.
These provisions create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous
substances. However, this presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to
present evidence to rebut this presumption. In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing
with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens.
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide
nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the
possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case,
however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B
Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.

Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. "Muro
ami", as what was reported the fishermen were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with
sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This
method of fishing needs approximately two hundred fishermen to execute. What the
apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight fishermen in their sampans fishing
by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form
of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after
the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were
charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

8. People vs Mejia GR nos 118940 to 41 july 7 1997

Facts:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked
the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds.
Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the
attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle of
the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the
injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter-affidavits, accused Mejia,
Benito, Paraan, and Fabito did not submit their counter-affidavits., Judge Lilia C. Espanol
issued an order declaring the accused "to have waived their right to be heard in preliminary
investigation"; finding a prima facie case against the accused; recommending that they be
charged with and prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A.
No. 6539, as amended; and ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph
Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another
unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken into police custody a few hours after the
incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead three
days after the incident in question, while the others have remained at large. Three separate
criminal complaints for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti
Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended) were filed against them
Issue:
WON they committed RA 6759
Held:
The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingin's jeepney that fateful
evening of 10 March 1994, but denied having committed the crimes. They claimed that it was
Romulo Calimquim and his companions who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and drove away
the jeepney.
The latter makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by
way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely
qualifies the crime of carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as
qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form . In short, considering the
phraseology of the amended Section 14, the carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be
considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin — whether it be homicide or
murder — cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should only be considered to qualify the
crime of carnapping.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed "in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof," then it must be deemed to fall under the clause (of
Section 14) "when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person."
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the
carnapping of Teofilo Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a motor vehicle under the
definition in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539. The passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of gain,
from Landingin by means of violence against him which caused his death and against a
passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical injuries.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters of the
police stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the appellants had
declared in court is not conclusive evidence that they did not report the incident to the police
authorities. They had no participation in the preparation of the entries. Entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are normally
incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion of for want of suggestion or
inquiries.
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the prosecution
had to rely solely on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. The totality of his testimony in the cases
before the LARON court leaves much to be desired. The prosecutor who conducted the direct
examination was unable to propound sensible questions to elicit clear answers bound to
reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the commission of the alleged crimes.
Accused-appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are
ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt therefor has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt or with moral certainty. Their immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless
other lawful and valid grounds for their further detention exist.
9. Amando Izon vs People GR no L 51370 august 31 1981
Facts:
Petitioners were charged, together with Pedro Divino... with Robbery with Violence Against
Person... above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another and by means of violence and... intimidation applied upon the person of Reynaldo
Togorio committed by the accused Jimmy Milla y Castillo and Pedro Divino y Batero who were
armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio and used in stabbing
him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who... helped in mauling him thereby inflicting upon
said Reynaldo T gorio the following physical injuries... which injuries shall require medical
attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days... petitioners were sentenced to the penalty
provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
Issues:
The principal issue thus raised is whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the
definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
Ruling:
We perceive no reason not to accord full validity of the Solicitor General's argument, not even on
the petitioner's submission that a motorized tricycle, not having licensed to use a public
highway, is not a motor vehicle under the provision of the anti-carnapping act.
There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a
"motor... vehicle" within the definition given the anti-carnapping law.
If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the
protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets
or... highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it
is devoted.
A tricycle which is not included... in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor
vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby dismissed.  No costs.

10. Dunlao vs CA GR no 111343 august 22, 1996

FACTS
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the
business name "Dunlao Enterprise."
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunate Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees
of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioner's
premises together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify
information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes Farms were
to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioner's compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the
compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in petitioner's shop
and another pile outside the shop but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms
and had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken
to the police station.
On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 9, accusing petitioner of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
ISSUE
WON the accused violated Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing
Law
HELD/COURT’S RULING
Under Presidential Decree 1612,5 "fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft."
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything
of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of
fencing.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered to pay Lourdes
Farms, Inc., represented by Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value of the
recovered pipes and farrowing crates, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

11. Pp v salfeche jr july 1992 211 scra

G.R. No. 102070

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. DAVID A. ALFECHE, JR.
July 23, 1992
FACTS:
A complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property was filed against Ruperto
Dimalata and Norberto Fuentes, and after the appropriate preliminary investigation, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Juliana C. Azarraga of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz
handed down a Resolution, duly approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, finding prima
facie evidence of guilt for the crime charged.[1] The complainants are co-owners of the parcel of
land allegedly usurped.

On 5 July 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga filed the corresponding

Information[2] for "Usurpation of Real Rights In Property defined and penalized under Article
312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code" with the Regional Trial Court of Capiz.
It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3386 and was raffled to Branch 15 thereof.

On 17 July 1991, respondent Judge, as Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the court below,
dismissed the case motu proprio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering that "the crime
committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and the violence or
intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere incident in its commission,
hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged," and considering that "the impossable (sic)
fine as penalty is from P200.00 to P500.00" because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained. 

Assistant Prosecutor Azarraga filed a motion to reconsider the above order[4] alleging therein that
it is true that the crime charged is not a complex crime and if mention is made of Article 282, it
is because "the penalty of the crime defined under Article 312 is dependent on Article 282.
Article 312 'borrows' the pertinent provision on penalty from Article 282, because Article 312
does not provide a penalty" as "Article 312 expressly provides that the penalty for the violence
shall likewise be imposed in addition to the fine."

ISSUE:

WON the RTC of Capiz has jurisdiction over cases involving a violation of Article 312 of the
Revised Penal Code where the intimidation employed by the accused consists of a threat to kill

HELD:
Yes. Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code is not as simple as it appears to be. What is meant by
the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" and the clause "in addition
to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him"? What penalty should be made
the basis for determining which court shall acquire jurisdiction over a case involving a violation
of the said Article?

Respondent Judge was wrong in his two (2) inconsistent propositions.

This Court cannot agree with the first which postulates that the threat was the means employed to
occupy the land and is therefore absorbed in the crime defined and penalized in Article 312. The
peculiar theory of absorption would result in an absurdity whereby a grave or less grave felony
defined in paragraph 1 of Article 282 and punished by an afflictive correctional penalty
consisting of the deprivation of liberty, would be absorbed by a crime (Article 312) penalized
only by a fine. Neither can this Court accept his second proposition that Article 282 and Article
312 refer to two (2) separate crimes, both of which "are simple crimes where only one juridical
right or interest is violated." As already stated, the crime of occupation of real right in property is
a single, special and indivisible crime upon which is imposed a two-tiered penalty. Also, such a
proposition obfuscates the first proposition and ignores the distinction between the two Articles.
Article 286 is a crime against personal security while Article 312 is a crime against real property
or real rights thereon.

It does not necessarily mean that the petitioner is correct. This Court finds the proposition of
petitioner similarly erroneous and untenable.

The tenant has, at the very least, a real right over the property -- that of possession -- which both
accused were alleged to have usurped through the threat to kill. Tenant is, therefore, the offended
party who was directly threatened by the accused; while the information expressly states this
fact, the tenant is not, most unfortunately, made the offended party. But since both accused have
not yet been arraigned, the information may be accordingly amended to include the tenant as the
offended party. 

The Orders of respondent Judge of 17 July 1991 and 24 July 1991 in Criminal Case No. 3386 are
hereby SET ASIDE. The petitioner may amend the information as suggested above; otherwise, it
should be dismissed because it does not charge an offense.

12. Pp vs benemerito GR no 120389 nov 21 1996

13. Ressureccion vs Sayson Dec 1998

14. Barrameda vs Ca GR no 96428 sep 2 1999

15. Lee vs people GR no 157781 april 11 2005
16. Lim vs CA GR no 192784april 7 1997
17. P vs Moreno GR no 130067sep 16 1989
18. Montano vs people GR no 141980 dec 2001
19. Pp vs balasa GR no 106357 sept 1998
20. Castro vs Mendoza GR no 50173 sep 21 1993