TMW Workshop Day 4 Final-3

The Systematic Approach
to Tailings Management
CIM ESRS Online Workshop Series
June 3 through June 19, 2020
Workshop Series Sequence
June 3 Introduction & TSF Scope – DONE!
June 5 Tailings Management Systems & Role of Technology – DONE!
June 10 The People Side of Tailings Management Systems – DONE!
June 12 Risk Identification & Management Strategies
June 17 Risk Management Technologies – Field Applications
June 19 Risk Informed Decision Making, Panel & Series Close!
June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

Today’s Presentations
Risk Management Methods
David Willms
A TSF Portfolio Risk Evaluation Approach

Karen Chovan
Interactive at specific times… have you had your coffee yet?? 

Who should be involved with performing risk
assessments for TSF?

The Systematic Approach
to Tailings Management
Presented by ESRS
Tailings Working Group
Risk Assessment and
Credible Failure Modes
David Willms, P.Eng.
Klohn Crippen Berger
Agenda
• Risk assessment approach – 7 min
• Credible Failure Modes – 7 min
• Path Forward – 5 min
• Objectives
• Describe an approach to risk assessments
• Have discussion on credible failure modes

Risk Assessment Approach

Typical thought process for risk
assessment
(Based on MAC, ICMM and others)
• Identify Hazards
• Identify all Failure Modes
• Triggering mechanisms
• Can they occur?
• Risk of each failure mode
• Probability and Consequence
• Controls
• Preventative or Mitigative
• Bow-tie for critical controls
• Effectiveness, Human elements of controls
• Emergency planning
Johanna Barbaran, Hector Barriga and others are working on refining and
standardizing this for KCB.

Bow-Tie (MAC Tailings Guide, 2019)

Points of Interest
• Considering Use of valid and non-
valid nomenclature
• To be discussed a bit later
• Risk before and after controls can

be communicated on a risk heat
map.

Risk Heat Map Likelihood
Rating
Slight Minor Moderate Major Severe
Close to Non-
• Colours indicative of risk level. Credible
Varies by
Very Rare
• Two lower levels of likelihood
compared to typical H&S 5- Rare
point framework
Unlikely
Andy Small (KCB) uses this regularly and is
working on refining and standardizing this.
Possible
Likely
Almost Certain

What aspect of tailings dam risk assessment is the most
challenging or uncertain?

Uncertainty and Credible Failure Modes

Silva, F., Lambe, T. and Marr, W. 2008. Probability and Risk of Slope Failure. ASCE,
Jnl Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol. 134, No. 12.
Category I – facilities designed, built and operated with state-of-the-

practice engineering. Generally, these facilities have high failure
consequences
Category II – facilities designed, built and operated using standard
engineering practice. Many ordinary facilities fall into this category
Category III – faciities without site-specific design and sub-standard
construction or operation. Temporary facilities and those with low
failure consequences often fall into this category.
Category IV – facilities with little or no engineering
One way of looking at this, which conveys a

sobering message, is:
• Not all FoS’s of 1.5 are created equal
• APF can range from 10-6 to 10-1 depending

on Category
Slide from Bill Chin and Andy Small presentations

Uncertainty in assessing likelihood.
• Understanding conditions within dams can be a challenge:
• Loss of historic records
• Geologic uncertainty
• Insufficient instrumentation
• If the conditions are uncertain, it is difficult to estimate the
likelihood of failure.
• Floods and earthquake probabilities can be estimated based
on statistical datasets, but the probability of a dam failing
under design flood and earthquake is difficult to estimate.

Keep low likelyhoods in mind
• Just because failure modes are very unlikely, does not mean
they should be ignored.
• Most dam failures have an element of engineering failure,
where a failure mode was not anticipated or addressed.
• Our understanding of what can and cannot happen, and the
likelihoods are based on our incomplete understanding of the
conditions of the facility.

Dealing with Uncertainty
• Need to be humble in our assessment of our own
understanding.
• A fine line to walk – requires judgment and wisdom. Need to
protect the public and the environment without causing
unnecessary fear or economic impact.

Credible – Why does it matter?
• We want our emergency planning to reflect failure modes that
can actually occur
• This puts our energy and planning into real scenarios
• Most failure modes have a low likelihood, which can be difficult to
determine.
• It can also be difficult to define what is credible and what isn’t. The
answer may vary by individual.

Credible – Meaning
• Synonyms • Antonyms
• believable • far-fetched
• creditable • implausible
• likely • improbable
• plausible • incredible
• presumptive • unbelievable
• Probable • unlikely
• unplausible
Subject to interpretation.
Differs by individuals.
Better way to think of failure modes
• “Non-Credible?” (Or Non-Valid?)
• probability of 0
• Cannot happen
• “Credible?” (or Valid?)
• probability greater than 0
• Could happen, but may have a low probability
• Most failure modes are credible
• Most are also very unlikely

Valid Failure Modes - Examples
• Less Likely? Still Credible? • More likely?
• Failure due to PMF / MCE • Overtopping
• 1/10,000 year! • Foundation Failure
• Sabotage • Static Liquefaction of U/S Dam
• Flood induced, unrelated to • Piping
overtopping or external erosion • External Erosion
• Spillway erosion
• River erosion at the toe

Risk Heat Map Likelihood
Rating
Slight Minor Moderate Major Severe
Close to Non-
• Could we establish a low level Credible
of likelihood, where failure

modes are non-credible, but still Very Rare
valid?
Rare
Unlikely
Possible
Likely
Almost Certain

In general, how accurately (in orders of magnitude
probability) can the likelihood of a given mode of failure
be determined?

Non-Valid Failure Mode - Examples
• Overtopping of a higher dam, when a lower dam on the other
end of the impoundment will overtop first.
• Seismic failure of very stable dams such as those with large
rockfill buttresses and rock foundations.
• Liquefaction of unsaturated dams? – How sure are we that they

are unsaturated, and will remain so?

Emergency Plan – Simple Path Forward
• For most facilities, there is at least some possibility of a
catastrophic failure. In these cases, the emergency plan should
consider a potential dam failure where there is loss of a
significant quantity of the tailings.
• In cases where there is no potential for catastrophic tailings
release (i.e. open pits filled with tailings), the emergency plan
should not consider a catastrophic tailings runout
• For dams for which catastrophic release is believed to be non-
credible, engineering judgment must be applied, with soul-
searching consideration on what information could have been
missed or what unknown conditions could exist.

Should emergency plans address catastrophic failure,
even if that failure is very far-fetched?

Key Thoughts
• Traditional FMA type approach is good – simple and
generates a list of failure modes and uses a range of
probabilities to estimate risk – appropriate given the
uncertainty
• Use of credible (valid) failure modes to inform emergency
response
• The bar for being credible is so low that the emergency
response must often account for catastrophic failure
• Uncertainty in assessing likelihood – err on the side of
caution
Key Actions
• Assess consequence regardless of failure mode
• Assess risk for all failure modes
• Implement controls
• Plan for emergencies based on valid failure modes
• Keep the inherent uncertainties in mind.

Thank You

A TSF Portfolio Risk
Evaluation Approach
Karen Chovan
Enviro Integration Strategies
The Contributors
Agnico Eagle Mines Limited, Toronto, Ontario
• Michel R. Julien, VP, Environment and Critical Infrastructure
• Pascal Lavoie, Director, Environmental Management
• Édouard Masengo, Thomas Lépine & Michael James, Engineers of
Record
• Édouardine-Pascale Ingabire, Junior Geotechnical Engineer
Enviro Integration Strategies, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

• Karen M. Chovan, CEO
June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop - TSF Portfolio Risk Analyses
Agenda
• Objectives
• Basis for Probability of Failure
• Modifications & Additions to Basis
• Process of Evaluation
• Risk Assessment Results: TSF Sample
• Prioritization of Improvements
• Summary & Conclusions
Objectives
• Align with MAC TMS Guide - Risk-Based Approach:
• Ensure relative risks of infrastructure are well understood
• Compile / consolidate all relevant rating information regarding the risk
portfolio - for all Critical Infrastructure
• Align with MAC TSM Guide - Board-level Accountability:

• Risk information is internally well communicated
• Produce resource to support decision-making & prioritization of effort
and spend around addressing risks & safety for Critical Infrastructure
Probability of Failure
Original framework by Silva et al. (2008)
Category I: Best Practice

BEST I Category II: Above Average Practice
II Category III: Average Practice
Category IV: Poor Practice
III
IV In Investigation
In Design
POOR
In Construction
In Operation
Adapted from Silva et al. (2008)
Modified Relationships
Comparison between Silva Method and modified framework
APF Target
Performance Targets: APF vs. FS
Criteria & Ponderations
Modified framework for TSFs: performance criteria & ponderations
Design
Performance Operation and
Analysis and Construction
Category Investigation Testing Monitoring
Documentation
Original framework (Silva et al., 2008)
Section weight 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Number of 7 4 6 3 2
criteria
Modified framework for TSFs
Section weight 20% 13% 18% 18% 31%
Number of 9 6 8 8 14
criteria
Modified Criteria
Design - Investigation
1.1 Baseline and background information collected about infrastructure-specific siting
1.2 Investigation program development, and adjustments to fill gaps, in relation to design, construction and operation phases
1.3 Investigation QA/QC program
1.4 Current understanding of soil profile, stratigraphy, and geology for infrastructure-specific foundations and embankment conditions
1.5 Current understanding of foundational strength characteristics, particularly for weak and soft zones, and level of reliance on in situ information
1.6 Current understanding of tailings or other contained materials' mechanical behaviour, based on in situ characteristics and strength
1.7 Current understanding of groundwater conditions and piezometry, and basis on field data through time
1.8 Robustness of hydrology assessments, including catchment area and site water balance, and basis on relevant field data
1.9 Assessment of borrow resources (quantities and qualities) of construction materials over life of construction
Design - Laboratory Testing
2.1 Laboratory test program development, level of collaboration to date
2.2 Testing and verification between lab results and field investigations
2.3 Lab/Sampling QA/QC program
2.4 Current understanding of geochemistry and physical properties of tailings (or other contained material)
2.5 Current understanding of geochemistry and physical properties of materials used for construction
2.6 Reporting, completeness, accessibility, and security of information
Modified Criteria
Design - Analysis & Documentation
3.1 Site selection study (historical)
3.2 Design Basis Memorandum (DBM) development, collaborative review through the project life to date & alignment with current state of practice
3.3 Stability Analysis, based on current understanding from investigations, and failure modes
3.4 Flood routing (capacity and discharge, design storm events)
3.5 Hydrogeological analysis, based on current understanding from investigations and projections
3.6 Risk analysis, based on current understanding from investigations, and failure modes
3.7 Review process through every design phase, including raises
3.8 Reporting, completeness, accessibility, and security of information
Construction Management and QA/QC
4.1 Project management program
4.2 Supervision program through life of construction
4.3 Construction QA/QC program through life of construction
4.4 Monitoring of infrastructure and foundation performance through life of construction
4.5 Construction reports through life of construction
4.6 Construction meetings between Owner and Contractor. Involvement of Designer (or rep) and Engineer of Record (as applicable) for critical
aspects, through life of construction
4.7 Review process through life of construction
4.8 Management of change through life of construction
Modified Criteria
Operation and monitoring

5.1 Governance
5.2 Management system (e.g. TSM)
5.3 Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance Manual
5.4 Monitoring Program and System
5.5 Disclosure & External Consultation
5.6 Containment infilling / development planning (in consideration and respective of DBM)
5.7 Emergency preparedness program
5.8 Formal review process (internal and external)
5.9 Follow-up on all improvement recommendations and concerns
5.10 Management of Operational Risks
5.11 Geotechnical performance of infrastructure (movement, settlement, tension cracks, etc.)
5.12 Hydrogeological performance of infrastructure (seepage, piezometric levels, internal erosion, impact to groundwater)
5.13 Hydrological performance of infrastructure (inclusive of freeboard, beach and spillway management and operations)
5.14 Performance of foundation (movement &/or settlement)
Menti poll
In what design, construction, operating, monitoring or
management areas do you think points might be lost in the
evaluation?
i.e. What is often not done well?
www.menti.com
68 45 84
Traditional Risk Classification
X Probability
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High

Consequence
1 2 3 4 5
Medium Medium High Very High Very High

Extreme/Critical 5
(5) (10) (15) (20) (25)
Low Medium High High Very High

Major 4
(4) (8) (12) (16) (20)
Low Medium Medium High High

Moderate 3
(3) (6) (9) (12) (15)
Low Low Medium Medium Medium

Minor 2
(2) (4) (6) (8) (10)
Low Low Low Low Medium

Negligible 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Taken from AEM Risk Management & Monitoring System (2020)
Modified Risk Classification
Risk Evaluation Process
Per infrastructure section of interest
• Evaluate each criterion for LOP
• Select appropriate FS
• Determine Probability of Failure using APF-FS relationships
• Establish consequences of failure rating
• Determine Level of Risk
Risk Evaluation Development & Application
Implementation & Validation
• Initial assessment by EoRs & ”auditor”
• Alignment review of compiled results with EoRs & AEO
• Adjustments as required (for the criteria development, we
updated definitions to clarify or better differentiate levels)
• Review with sites & gathering of additional (missing!) information
• Case Study application
Risk Assessment
Data Set
• Sample TSF dataset included broad cross-section of tailings
infrastructure:
• Variable age, design & construction method

• Variable loading rates, foundation conditions & performance
• Well documented to poorly maintained historical records
Risk Assessment
Basis of analyses
• Ratings & preliminary results shown are based on:
• Review & evaluation of information about each infrastructure readily

available to raters
• Pre-site engagement / verification of ratings, provision of additional

information…
APF Review: Sample TSF
Results: annual probability of failure
Prioritizing – via Risk Levels
Prioritizing – via LOP Scores
Improvements to Ratings
Improvements ONLY by discovery & review of historical documentation
4.5 Construction reports through life of I - Accessible, robust as-built reports and drawings, daily construction reports, incluing photos, etc., strong
construction management/backup systems, to capture and maintain the history of the construction, for all construction
phases
II - Readily accessible and secure, good to solid reporting focused on as-built drawings and reports,
considered saistfactory for most construction phases
III - Reporting limited to site memos, or satisfactory for only some construction phases, moderately
organized and retained, access may be difficult for some
IV - Limited information, report &/or document control
Improvements by updating analyses or physical field upgrades/repairs

5.9 Follow-up on all improvement I - No recommendations for changes or all recommended changes have been implemented
recommendations and concerns II - Recommended changes to address critical issues have been implemented, additional measures under
consideration or being planned
III - Recommended changes to address critical issues are in progress
IV - No response to recommended changes
Summary & Conclusions
• Produced & validated a risk-based evaluation tool for TSF
• Aligned with MAC’s Tailings Management Guide (2019),
• Derived from the works of Silva et al. (2008),
• Integrates management systems and performance of infrastructures.
• Implemented the approach for AEM TSF
• Relevant information now compiled in one place, readily available for
reference, reviews, audits, and updates.
• Increased the corporate and sites’ understanding of:
• Potential improvement areas of all tailings infrastructures, and
• The differentiation of risks between different critical infrastructures.
Summary & Conclusions
The iterative assessment process and it’s built-in redundancy:
• Facilitated its rapid implementation - where information was lacking and
scores were preliminarily low, sites quickly provided any additional
documentation they could, removing assumptions and potential biases, to
improve the score. (In other words, operators typically dislike poor scores!!)
• Helped to produce reliable, repeatable assessment results – by
removing personal subjectivity or reliance on the perspectives of the persons
applying it, associated with any risk-based approach.
• Facilitated internal communication at corporate level and with non-
geotechnical experts – by integrating and consolidating the complexity of
risks associated with different phases of the life cycle on critical
infrastructures.
Menti poll
What tools or strategies have helped you to improve
communications, transparency and, UNDERSTANDING of
risks in tailings management?
www.menti.com
68 45 84
Feedback and
questions?
Closing
Next session, we will hear from Colleen Crystal and Greg Puro on the
topics of:
• KPIs and Critical Controls

• Implementation of Technology for Tailings Management
Thank you for your participation!
We look forward to seeing you again on Friday…

Afterthoughts…
www.menti.com
68 45 84
• What other concepts / definitions do you want to hear about as the series
goes on?
• What questions or uncertainties about risk assessment, credibility of
failure, and uncertainty in evaluations did it raise in your mind?
• How did we do?

How did we do?


TMW Workshop Day 4 Final-3

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

TMW Workshop Day 4 Final-3

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Systematic Approach

June 5 Tailings Management Systems & Role of Technology – DONE!

June 10 The People Side of Tailings Management Systems – DONE!

June 12 Risk Identification & Management Strategies

June 17 Risk Management Technologies – Field Applications

June 19 Risk Informed Decision Making, Panel & Series Close!

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

A TSF Portfolio Risk Evaluation Approach

Interactive at specific times… have you had your coffee yet?? 

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

• Risk before and after controls can

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

Category I – facilities designed, built and operated with state-of-the-

One way of looking at this, which conveys a

• APF can range from 10-6 to 10-1 depending

Slide from Bill Chin and Andy Small presentations

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2019 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2019 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

of likelihood, where failure

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

• Liquefaction of unsaturated dams? – How sure are we that they

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

Enviro Integration Strategies, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

• Align with MAC TSM Guide - Board-level Accountability:

Category I: Best Practice

Operation and monitoring

Very Low Low Moderate High Very High

Medium Medium High Very High Very High

Low Medium High High Very High

Low Medium Medium High High

Low Low Medium Medium Medium

Low Low Low Low Medium

• Variable age, design & construction method

• Review & evaluation of information about each infrastructure readily

• Pre-site engagement / verification of ratings, provision of additional

Improvements by updating analyses or physical field upgrades/repairs

• KPIs and Critical Controls

Thank you for your participation!

We look forward to seeing you again on Friday…

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

June 12, 2020 2020 Tailings Workshop

You might also like