The Soldier and the Sta/e
I 880's. The only officcr who continually exceeded a professional
role in foreign policy was Admira! von Tirpitz, and he was gener ally
vicwcd by thc othcr admirals as an csscntially political figure. On
r Germany and Japan
1he whole, however, the military were confincd to their own sphere
by thc horizontal conlrol of othcr vígorous officcs and officials
occupyíng thc arcas into which they might be tempted to expand their
power.
A second factor restricting military powcr was the relative
unity of civilian and military authority. Civilian power was
conccntrated in 1hc hands of the Kaiser and bis Chanccllor whilc
military author ity was divided among a multiplicity of officcs. Thc
Reichstag ncver played more than a mildly harassing role in
military affairs, and its efforts to incrcase parliamentary control
ovcr militnry poliey werc nevcr strong cnough to undenninc
civilian control. The officcr corps, morcovcr, was unconditionally
pledgcd to the Empcror, and, by so binding itselí, foresworc thc
possibilities of cnhancing its power by playing executivc off
againsl legislature. Military author ity, on thc other band, was
divided first between thc anny nnd navy and thcn further
subdivided within encb scrvice. Each had a tripartitc headquartcrs
organization consisting o[: ( 1) a ministry, normally headed by n
proícssional officcr, and concerned with the administrative,
political, and logistical aspccts oí thc servicc; (2) a cabinet, also
hended by an officer, and occupied with personncl matters; nnd (3)
a staff, devoted to the plnnning of military opcra tions. Nonc oí
thcse hcadquarters had command authority over the flcets and army
corps. Conscquently, lhe six chiefs of the hcad quarters offices,
plus thc commanding gencrals and commanding admirals, ali
rcportcd directly to the Kaiser, who was thus ablc to pick and
choose from the military advice offcred him. In addition, there wns
considerable rivalry in the anny nmong the War Minis try, the
Military Cabinct, and the General Stnff. The Ministry had inilially
beco thc dominant institution, but in the eour-se of the nineteenth
century, first thc Military Cabinet nnd then thc General Staff
acquircd preCminence. Eventually, of course, the General StalT
was to dominate completely. But, until World War J, an un casy
balance of authority existed among thesc three military officcs. The
effccts o[ the limitcd scope and rnultiplicity oí military authority
were counterbalanced by the higb lcvel of that authority.
102
Ali the top military lenders had the right of direct necess (lmm di
a1stellw1g) to the Kaiser as Suprcmc War Lord which wcakencd
vertical controls ovcr the rnilitary. Sincc thc Kaiser was de_pendent
upan their ndvice, the military chiefs, cxccpt to the extent that thcy
disagreed among thcmselves, possessed nlmost complete nutonomy
and could run their institutions without externa) interfcrence. While
the limited scopc oí rnilitary authority and tbc unity of civilion
power kcpt thc military out of politics, the direct access of thc
,nilitary to the Kaiser kept the politicians out of the military. AII
in ali, givcn lhe ideological climate of the times, thc entire pattcrn
of authorily wns uniqucly suited to mnximi:i:c civilian control and
military proíessionalism.
Politicol /11fluence. The politicnl influencc of thc imperial o[
fi.ccr corps had thrce significant aspccts: ( 1) the gradual weakening
of the affiliations of 1he corps wilh the Junker nristocracy: (2) the
temporary incursion oí military leaders into politics in the years
from 1888 to 1897; and (3) the widesprcad popularity oí thc mili•
tary !cadcrs and the prestigc of the milirnry career among the Gcr
man people.
In the decade of thc wars of unification, over lwo-tbirds of the
officer corps had been drawn from ·1hc aristocracy. The Empire wit
nessed a steady decline in this proportion as the middle classes suc
ccssfully nsserted thcir claim to the military carcer. 1n 1905, of 102
offi:ccrs serving with the General Staff, 44, including such futurc
lights as Ludcndorff and GrBner, were bourgeois in origin. By 1913
lhese elemenls furnished 70 pcr cent of the entirc officer corps.•
Thc tremcndous naval expansion underlaken aíter I 890 also in
creased the sizc nnd influence of thc naval officcr corps, which was
mucb more closely linked with bourgcois than aristocratic groups.
Thc weakcning of thc tics bctween the officer corps and the aristoc
racy aidcd professionalism, on the one hand, in thnt it reduced the
likclihood that the military interests would be subordinatcd to class
intercsts. On thc otbcr hand, the Junkcr outlook was highly con
servntivc and sympalhctic to the military vicwpoint, and the de crease
oí military affiliations with that group made thc militnry more
depcndcnt on general public opinion which was less definitely
conscrvative and more susceptible to chnnge.
During thc Empirc fcw individuals crossed thc line bctwccn
103 1
I

The Soldier and the State
the mililary profession and politics in cithcr dircction. The sig
nificant cxceptions to this occurred in lhe years from 1888 to 1897
when a vacuum of civilian political leadership developcd which
various military ligures moved in to fil!. This situation was causcd
by the coincidcnce of the death of the Kaiser in 1888, the retire
ment of Moltke in the samc year. and thc rctiremcnt of Bismarck
in 1890. Thc new young monarch had a prcdilcction for personal
rule, Hule rcspcct for thc rcsponsibilities and functions of his con.
stitutional advisers, and an intense personal fondncss far soldicrs
and military foldcrol. Moltkc's place was taken by Waldersee, one
soldier with political skills and political ambitions, and who, as a
favorite of the new monarch, was only too anxious to eic.crt his
influence in a variety of ficlds. He was instrumental in bringing
about Bisma,ck's fall in 1890 and his rcplacement by another gen
eral, Leo van Caprivi. Significantly, it was Waldersec, soldicr
tumed politician, who rejected the two fundamental elements of
the military ethic. He was the lending advocate of preventivc war
and he also cntcrtaincd thc idea of a military coup d'état. How•
ever, it was not long befare he lost favor with the Kaiser; he was
fired at the beginning of 1891. and retircd to nurture dreams of
returning to powcr as a militnry strong man. His thirty months as
Chief of Staff contrast with thc thirty-two ycars Moltke hcld the
job and the fourteen years oí his successor Schlicffcn. He was íun•
damentally out of place in the imperial officer corps, but he was
the forcrunner of military politicians such as Schkichcr, Reichenau,
and Blombc,g in the l 920's and 1930's, Caprivi, who activcly op-
posed mueh of Waldcrsee's wildness, was replaced as Chancellor
in 1894, aod by 1897 civilian statcsmen hnd resumed political
leadership. With Sehlieffen's exclusive concern with technical mat
ters the inílucncc of the military rctired withio profcssional bound
aries.
Dccreasing affiliation with thc aristocracy was more than com
pcnsated for in lhe ycars after 187.1 by the great popularity of the
military with thc people as a whole. This stcmmed from the great
victories of 1866 and 1870 which made Moltke a national hero
and pennitted a steady increase in militnry budgets down to World
War l. In no other modern western socicty for such an extended
_pcacetime period have the military carccr and the military officcr
104
Germany and Japan
had thc popular prestigc which thcy had in Wilhelminc Germnny.
Thc soldicr was "without any challenge, the first man in thc Statc,"
and the General Stafl was hcld in awe as the oraclc o( military wis
dom and guarantor of state security. "The military man now
secmcd to be a eonsecrated spirit - the lieutenant moved through
the world as n young god nnd the civilian reserve lieutenant ns a
dcmi god."
Popular A tritudes. The widcspread popularity of thc militnry
furnished a firm basis for military professionalism so long ns the
popular mind remaincd sympathetic to the military ethic. The mili•
mry werc ns popular in 1914 as they had been in 1880. Thc intel•
Jectual elimate of 1914, howevcr, difTercd significantly from that
of J 880. Subtle forces had drastically nltered !he value structurc of
the Ge.man nation. As a rcsult, military populadty bccame a thrcat
rather than an a.id to professionnlism. A limited nnd conservativc
ideology had given way to onc which was nationalistic and aggres
sivc. Materia.lism, bcllicosity, the glorificalion of violence and war,
worship of naked Macht superseded the more reasonablc, idcalistie,
and humane elemcnts in the Gcrman spirit. Mommsen, Droysen, Sy•
bel, Treitschke, Nietzsche supplanted Goethe, SchiUer, Kant - nnd
Clauscwitz. War and powcr became ends in themselves and the
man of powcr conscquently was viewed not as the scrvant oí the
state but rather as the cmbodimcnt of thc state. The state was
power, and power alone; war was, in Trcitschke's phrasc "political
scicnce par excellcncc," the mninspring of progress and national
rcalization. "Germany," as Paulscn observed, "has becn called thc
nation of poets and thinkcrs, but to--day it may be called thc nation
of masterful combatants, as it originally appeared in history." e.
The ideology of bellicosity was spawned by the univcrsities aod
embraced by the German pcople. lts influence wns felt in ali seg mcnts
of society. Only the intense adherence of the officers to the military
ethic rcndercd the corps rclatively immune down to World War l.
Nonetheless the new ideas did make tbemselves felt about the
fringes of thc military profession. The navy was a product of the
nge and susceptible to philosophies of nationalism and expan. sion.
Military officers tumed popular writers such ns van dcr Goltz and
Bernhardi catered to lhe bellicosc scntimcnts of the peoplc. They
found support with the hltter wbich they did not tind with
105
 The Soldier and the State
the General Staff, which rejected them and their views. Toe bul.k
of the anny officcr corps, however, was true to the military ethic and
rejected the power ethic. In the face of the intellectual and moral
deterioration of Germany, it adhered to the old ideas and, in
Rosinski's phrase, remained like a "monolithic block in a chang ing
landscape." 7 lt was in many respects the last social institution to
abandon the conservative morality. Yet the new popular idcology was
undermining that balance of power and professionalism which had
been the esscnce of its existence.
WORLD WAR 1: MILITARY DICTATORSHlP, 1914-1918. The
World War saw the complete destruction of the imperial balance in
civil-military relations. By the end of the war tbe General Staff
was running the German government. Coincidentally, the military
leaders abandoned their adherence to military ideals. This
Gennan experience wcll illustrated the difficulties which arise from
thc conduct of a major war by a nonconservative state. Battle
transforms generals into beroes; the heroes transform themselves
into politicians; and the rcsult is a loss of profcssional military
restraint and caution.
The involvemcnt of the General Staff in politics began during
van Falkenhayn's tenure as its chief from thc fall of 1914 to
August 1916. During this period a slow but continuous expansion
of military authority and influence took place. This was, however,
merely a prelude to the virtua!Iy absolute power which Hindenburg
and Ludendorff exercised in the last two years of the war when
the former replaced Falkenhayn and the latter became First Quar
termaster General. The fundamental element in this tremendous
expansion of military control was the unprecedented popularity
of the victor of Tannenberg with thc German people. He was a
national idol whom the Germans trusted implicitly to bring them
success. The Hindenburg adulation far surpassed that accorded
any other military or political figure in German history, including
Moltke and Bismarck. Consequently, he was the ideal fulcrum far
Ludendorff and the General Staff to use in increasing their power
throughout the government. The threat of resignation was sufficient
to control the Kaiser. By brandishing this weapon, Ludendorff was
able to force the Emperor to acquiesce to the military views in most
of the conflicts between the General Staff and civilian officials. In
106
r Germany and Japan
the sumrner of 1917_ he secured the ouster of Bethmann-Hollweg
as Chancellor. ?ºd bis replacement by Michaelis who was accept able
to the m1htary. A few months later Michaelis proved himself
incapable of functioning to the satisfaction of his military masters.
He was dropped and, upon the recommendation of the High Com
rnand, bis place was taken by Count von Hcrtling. Subsequently, in
January 1918 Hindenburg and LudendorfI were able to secure the
disrnissal of thc chief of the Emperor's Civil Cabinet. The other
military officcs were similarly subordinated to the will of the Gen eral
Staff.
First The mil_itary commanders expaoded their power into foreign
and domest1c policy. While the Kaiser refused in January 1918 to
give them complete authority over foreign affairs and peace nego
tiations, thcy were more or less ablc to manipulate the foreign office
through Count von Haeften, their representative there. 8 In Juiy
1918 they secured the dismissal of the Foreign Ministcr when he
opposed th i_r views _on the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. Previously
they had ut1hzcd thetr influence in foreign affairs to overrule civil
ian opinion in a number of important decisions. With the hope0- f
adding Polish divisions to the military forces of the Central Powers
they had in the fall of 1916 successfully insisted upon the creation
of an independent Polish kingdom. This prevented the irnmediate
conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia. In tbe winter of 1917
over Bethmann-Hollweg's opposition, they secured the introduc:
tion of unrestricted submarine warfare. By these two excursions
into policy the High Command achieved the continuation in the
war of one enemy and the entrance into the war of another.
Throughout 1917 they insisted upon the maintenance of annexa t!
onist war goals, thereby frustrating efforts to bring about a ncgo tiatcd
pcace. Military power was also asserted over the domestic economy.
he na ure of the war early required the expansion of
the econom1c sechons of the General Staff into the arcas of food
materi ls, labor, and munitions. Subsequently, virtually no fieJcÍ
of poltcy was beyond its interest. Industrial production was con
trolled and i_ncreased through the so-called Hindenburg Program.
"?-1! the prev1ously effective horizontal restraints upan military ac
hv1ty were removed as the authority of the generals penetrated into
tbe fartbest reaches of German life.
107
 The So/dier and tlze State
lt is impossiblc to say to what cxtcnt 1hc powcr of the High
Command affected thc thinking of thc bulk of lhe oílicer corps. The
vicws of the military leaders themselvcs, howcver, wcrc drasticnlly
changed by thc vision from the .heights of powcr. Thc old doctrine.e;.
of civilian control wcre abandoncd. lt mnkcs littlc differcncc who
is Chanccllor. Ludendorff is rcputcd to havc said, but "onc thing
is certain: thc _power must be in my hands.'' Expansionist goals
were adopted which contrastcd markedly with thc anti-imperialistic
nttitudes of thc prcwar General Staíf. Jn 1917 the wnr aims of the
military includcd acquisition of Po\and, Russia's Baltic provinccs,
castem Francc, and ali of Bclgium. And cvcn this was viewed as only
the nucleus of a vast Germanic realm which would eventually draw
into its systcm virtually ali of Europc north o[ thc Alps.
More significant than these immcdiatc policy goals was thc
fundamcn1al changc in values which thcy rcílected. These reccivcd
thcir most typical cxpression, not during the war, but in the litcra
turc produccd by thc gcncrals artcr thcir dcfcat. Blind to the cxtcnt
to which military dominance had contributcd to Gcrmany·s mis
fortunc, they nrgued that military power had not bccn given its
proper scope in wartimc Gennany. In its cffort to shiít responsi
bility to the civilian, this thcme was closely ticd in with the stab-in
thc-back lcgcnd. Thc most authoritativc statement of thc new doc
trine was containcd in General Ludendorff's own work, Der Totale
Krieg, publishcd in 1935. Ludcndorff flatly rejccted thc profes
sionnl military tradition: "Ali the theories of Clausewitz should
be thrown ovcrboard." Thc changcs in thc nature of war sincc thc
cighteenth ccntury havc made politics subscrvicnt to war rather
l'han war to politics. Thc troublc with Gcnnany in both thc Franco
Prussian War and World War 1 was thc division of nuthority among
Kaiser, Chanccllor. and Chicf o[ Sta!I. lnstead, at the outbrcak of
war the entire nation should be subordinatcd to the Commandcr
in Chicf. He supersedcs ali political leaders nnd his authority is
"all cmbracing.'' Such a man can ncvcr be produced by trnining and
expcrience. He is characterized by creative powcr. strength of
charactcr, willingness to acccpt rcsponsibility, and indomitable
wHI. He is an artist: he "js either bom to his position or he is not.'v'
Ludcndorff thus resurrccted the cightccnth-century concept of the
108
The Soldier and thc Statc
army support. That support, howevcr, was not something whicb
Germany and Japan
natural military genuis. His thcory, with its dclusions of omnipo tence,
its glorificntion of violcnce, its adulation o[ powcr, and its denial of
spccialized competcncc, was a rejcction of cverything that ninctcenth-
ccntury Gcrman military thought stood far. lt wns in decd thc
cmploymcnt of the more sordid clcmcnts of Treitschkc, Nietzsche, and
Spcngler to rationalizc absolutc military powcr. Jronically this thcory,
developed out of military dominancc in World War T, in thc end
achicved its íullcst rcalization in thc com plete subjcction of thc
military by an Austrian corporal in World
\\far II. The accuratc verdict upon the carlicr conílict was rcndcrcd
by anothcr soldier, General von Schoenaich, who, in 1924, con cluded
that "wc owe our ruin to thc suprcmacy of our military author:ities
over civilian authoritics; and that is the vcry esscncc of roilitarism. In
fact, Gcrman militarism simply committcd sui cide." ,o
WEIMAR: STATI:! WITHIN A STATE, 1918-1926. The inaugura
tion of thc Weimar Republic saw the role of che military changc
from complete dominance of thc state to essential support far the
state. Thc intellcctual and political climatc of thc Republic was
most unconducivc to the maintenance of professionalism. The Wei
mar governmcnt had a highly tenuous cxistcncc, lacking widc sprcad
acceptance and the support of many powerful social groups.
Consequcntly, it had to turn to thc army as the onc stnble and disci
plined institution which had survivcd dcfeat and revolution and rc
maincd a concrete center of powcr amidst political disintegration.
The govcrnment was thus nbsolutely dependen! upen the.support
oí the army. Yet this vcry fact, by confronting thc army with a
constitutional issuc, meant that the governmcnt could ncvcr be
nbsolutely ccrtain of receiving that suppc.irt. In 1918, Ebcrt, Presi
dent of the Rcpublic, in cffect ncgotiated n treaty with the military
lcaders rccciving thc support of thc army in cxchangc for thc sup
pression of thc extreme left. In 1920, during thc Kapp Putsch, thc
anny maintaincd a wait-and-sec ncutrality. Tbrce ycars latcr whcn
the govcrnmcnt was mcnaccd by the thrcat of uprisings írom both
the extreme right and extreme left, the army commai;id defended
rcpublican authority, and excrciscd emergency powcr in its behalf.
That the Wcimar govemment cxisted as long as it did is duc to
•••
T Germany and Jopan
could be commandcd by the government; it was somcthing which
was granted by the army.
Thc general political weakness oí the Rcpublic was supp1e
mentcd by new constitutional difficulties in establishing civilian
control. First, undcr the imperial rcgime, ali officers had sworn
obcdicnce to the Emperor. They had little opportunity íor doubt ns
to whcn and whom thcy should obcy. In thc Rcpublic, howevcr, they
sworc allegiancc to thc constitution, a lcngthy document not entirely
clear oí ambiguities. Thc officcrs might frcqucntly be called upen to
determine when obcdiencc to particular individuals con stitutcd
obcdicnce to the constitution. This problcm was aggravated by a
sccond factor: the division oí authority ovcr lhc military among a
largc number oí civilian institutions. Thc President was thc
Suprcmc Commandcr of the armcd forces, nppointing and dis
missing ali thc high officcrs. Thc Cbanccllor, howcver, was thc head
of thc govcrnment, and all-,.hc actions of thc Presiden! with rcspcct
to the military had to be approved eithcr by him or by the Minister
of Defense. Both Chanccllor and Minister of Dcfcnsc werc rcspon
sible to thc Rcichstag, which had full authority over military policy
in general and ihe military budgct in particular. In contrast, thirdly,
to this civilian disunity was thc ncw unity of the military. Not only
were thc nrmics of the various stntcs of the Gcrman Empire con
solidntcd into a single national force, but ali the headquarters or
gnnizations werc now brought undcr a single military chief. Tbis
furnishing of the military with a single spokesman contributcd,
!ourthly, to thc undermining of the efforts to reduce the leve! of
military authority. Theoretically, the cmbryonic general staff
(Truppenamt) was under thc Chicí of the Anny Command who was
under tbc Ministcr of Defense. Thus. presumably, thc right of
Jmmedialstellimg had been lost by thc military. In actuality, how
evcr, thc incrcased power of the army eommandcr brought about
through his complete control over the military mnchine made him
virtually indepcndcnt of the Minister of Dcfense. Thc first two
Ministers of Dcfense - Noske nnd Gessler - wcre spokesmen for
military interests, and the last two - GrOner and Schleichcr
- werc gencrals.
The officer corps in the Weimar Republic retreatcd from thc
110
ideology of military dictatorship in tbe direction of thc old imperial
military ethfo. Tbe dominant figure in the Reichswebr from J 91 9 until
1926 was General von Secckt who typified the profc. ional soldier nnd
who was thorough1y committed to a nonpolitical anny. Sceckt pieked bis
o.fficcrs aecording to their cnpabilities and traincd tbcm carefully so as to
dcvelop the highcst leve! o( profcssional compctence. Sceckt claimed to
have the profcssional hatred for war: '"The soldier, having expcriencc
of war, fears it far more than the doctrioaire wbo, bcing ignorant oí
war, talks only oí pcace." 11 In bis advice on policy to tbe
republican government, he was guided gencrally by a proper concern
for the military sccurity of thc stnte. Within thc anny he was adamant
in emphasizing thc military virtucs, in cxcluding adventurers and
opportunists, and in insisting upon correct, nonpolitical behavior. "As
for the soldier," he !iaid, "it is not for him to seek to know more or to
do bettcr than bis commanders: bis duty consists in obcdience ...
A Reicl,s
wehr into which thc canccr of political discord has cntered will
be sbattered in the hour of dangcr." ª
Thc one deficicnt element in Seeckt's formulation of the mili tary
ethic was a certain haziness as to whcre thc ultimatc loyalty of tbe
army lay. This rcflccted thc ambiguity of thc Weimar con s itution
and thc political wcakncss oí the republican govcmment. Sceckt's
dcscription oí the place of the army was contaioed in thc formula:
"The Army serves the State; it is abovc parties." Ac cordingly,
The .Army should bccome a State within thc Stnte, but it should be
mergcd 1n the State through scrvicc, in fact it should itself bccomc thc
purest imagc of the Stntc.H
This was_ ne as far as it went. But it lcft undcfined the rclationship oí
thc m1htary lo the governmcnl. It was a statc within a state not a
professional guild serving a governmcnt. lf tbc govcmment :.Vcre thc
rcprcsentativc or the embodiment oí the state, thcn thc army should
obcy the government and ali would be wcll. But if the istence of thc
govcrnmcnt and the nature of ilS constitution werc
s1 s es of party controversy, then presumably the army would
re mam nloof. In reality thc govemment oí the Wcimar Rcpublic
fittcd both thcse categories and so, consequently, thc attitude oí
111

The Soldier and the State
the militnry townrd it, ns dcfined by Sceckt, was a curiously dual
onc. What this meant in practicc was well illustrated during thc
1923 crisis when Ebcrt askcd Seeckt whcre the Reichswehr stood.
"Thc Reichswchr, Mr. Presidcnt," rcplicd the lntter, "stands bc hind
me."H And there wcre no general principies which defincd whcrc
Seeckt stood. At times he seriously considcrcd assuming sovcrcign
power himself. By rcfusing to accept the Wcimar Re public as thc
pcrmancnt embodiment of the Gennnn state, thc lcadcrs of the
Reichswehr were rcquired to make political judg rnents at any
momcnt of acule crisis.
WEtMAR: FACTJON AMONG FACTIONS, 1926-1933. After Seeckfs
rctirement, his succcssor, Colonel General Heye, and other gen erais
such as GrOner attempted to carry on his policies. This becnmc
increasingly difficult, however, and the last ycars of thc Wcimnr
Rcpublic saw quite a dificrent pnttcrn of civil-military relations from
that which had cxisted previously. Under Sceckt thc army hnd beco
cnlled upan to make political decisions only whcn thcrc was an acutc
constitutional crisis. After his departure it be carne more nnd more
involvcd in thc day to day afiairs and ma ncuvcrings oí pnrty politics.
This involvement was brought about not by any changc in thc
structure of authority but simply by thc willingncss of the military
leadcrship to apply the political power of the army to immcdiatc
political ends.
Thc two key figures in this changc wcrc Hindcnburg and Gen eral
Kurt von Schleicher. Thc former was elected Presidcnt of thc Rcpublic
in 1925. Thc army now defincd Ioyalty to the statc as loyalty to thc
field marshal and national hero. This would not have had serious
conscqucnccs if the Ptcsidcnt had becn above party politics as
Seeckt had beco. Such, however, was not the case. lnstead,
Hindcnburg as prcsident furnishcd a fulcrum for militnry politicinns
such as Schlcichcr, just as during the war as Chief of the General
Stnff he had Curnished a fulcrum for Ludcndorff. Schlcichcr had
been appointed head of the political dcpartment of the Dcícnse
Ministry in 1926. Trading upan bis influencc with Hindenburg and
ncgotiating and dcaling with party politicians of ali stripcs, he
bccnme a key figure in the government, making and unmaking
cabinctS with wanton abnndon. In 1927, Schlcicher eascd out the
Dcfense Minister, Gessler, who had nppointed him,
112
Germany and Japan
nnd had GrOner put in this post. Subscquently, in 1930,·he brought
about thc !all of the cabinct of Chancellor Müller and tite rcplacc ment
of the latter by Hcinrich Brüning. Two ycars latcr he tor pedoed
Brüning and GrOner and secured the appointmcnt of von Papen as
Chancellor. He bimself took ovcr the post of Dcfcnse Minister. Late
in autumn of 1932, Papen was disposed of; nnd in Dccembcr,
Schleichcr bccame Chanccllor. Generals now oc cupicd the two
highest posts in the government. His enemics soon combine against
Schleic er, however, and, at the cnd of Janunry 1933, Hitler
succcedcd h1m at the hcad of a cabinct of Nazis and na1ionalis1s.
Under Schleichcr thc Reichswchr had ceascd to be a stnte within the
statc and hnd becomc a faction among fnctions. The generals had
entered into lhc competition of politics nnd thcy
h d los - A ye?r ?ºd a lf later Schlcichcr paid thc price of fadure
m totalltanan pohtrcs whcn he was assassinated in thc Nazi purgc
of June 30, 1934.
THE THIRD REICH: CIVILIANISM TRIUMPHANT, 1933-1945. The
consolidntion of power by thc Nazis depended upan an informal
undcrstanding with the military. Thc Jattcr would withdraw
fro politics, !cave this field to the Nazis, and in return lbe
Naz.1s would push nn cxpanded rcarmamcnt program and guar a
tc tl c nrmy a monopoty. oí thc military function nnd autonomy w1thm
1ts own sphere. Th1s arrangement received cxplicit sanc
lion in the spring of 1934 whcn the anny agrced to support Hitler
Cor Presidcnt; lhe latter acquiesced in the supprcssion of ROhm nnd
thc S.A., wbo had dreams of replacing thc Reicbswehr with n
ma s, ideologicnlly orientcd, pcople's army. CivH-military relations
dunng thc first years of the Nazi rcgime borc ccrtain resemblanccs
to thosc of thc first ycnrs of the Weimar Rcpublic. Thc anny was e
e.mpted from m_uch of the Nazi legislation, the nuthority oí thc civil
co_urts over 1ts membcrs was abolishcd, thc inftucncc of the party
h1erarchy and the Gestapo was rigorously cxcluded. As one after
another of the majar institutions of German socicty suc cu bed
bcf_orc thc Nazi policy of Gleichsclialtung, the nnny rc mam7d an
1solated center of health, relatively uncontaminated by the virus of
National Socialism. Here lhe German who wished to apc fr m the
onslaught of thc totalitarian state might find rcfuge
m profcsstonal paucms of discipline, expcrtise, duty, and intcgrity.
113
 The Soldier and the State
lt is little wonder that there was rush of former officers back to
the colors in what came to be described as "the aristocratic way
of emigration."
Military Professionalism. The officer corps during these years
T1
was dominated by a professional military viewpoint. After the
giddy Schleicher episode about which the great bulk of the corps
had never been happy, much comfort was to be found in a purely
professional role. The officers welcomed the opportunity to eschew
politics and to concentrate upon the training and discipline of their
steadily growing forces. Military adherence to civilian control was
reaffirmed. For instance, in bis volume on The Art o/ Modern
Warfare, Colonel Foertsch restated the classical doctrine of the
subordination of war to politics and the soldier to the statesman,
and took Ludendorff to task for challenging Clausewitz. Luden
dorff's book itself was rejected by the General Staff "root and
branch.., 111 Despite the temporary coincidence of Nazi and mili tary
views with respect to rearming and civilian control in the early
thirties, a fundamental con:flict nonetbeless existed between the
values of the two groups. Eventually this conflict had to mani fest
itself. The Gennan military ideals of obe<lience, loyalty, honor,
intellectual integrity, realism, reason could bardly be further re
moved from the complete unscrupulousness, amorality, and irra
tionalism of the Nazis.* The latter had little use for the "accursed
objectivity" of the General Staff which Hitler described as "just a
club of intellectuals." 16
The conflict between the military approach and the Nazi ap
proach was most sharply focused ín foreign policy. The attitude
of the German generals was virtually a perfect expression of the
military ethic. They wanted to rebuild Germany's armed might,
but they wanted to do so slowly, and not in order to wage war
but to protect German security. It was necessary to expand the
annament industry, build up a trained reserve, equip the army
with modem weapons, construct defensive fortifications, and ac
complish many other things before Germany would be ready to
* A bd!l;ant restatement of the military ethic was made by General Ludwig
Beck, Chief of thc General Staff, in a speech at tbe reopening of the War
Academy in October 1935. Beck's theme was Moltke's dictum that "Genius is
work., and he vigorously attacked "sudden inspirations" and "wishful thinking."
The speech did no! make him any friends among the Nazis.
t
114
Germany and Japan
fight. This date in their calculations seemed to recede continuously
into the future. There were many who rhought that a war could
never be fought on terms favorable to Germany because of her
geographical vulnerability. If Germany started a war, they argued, she
would eventually be confronted by a coalition of powers which would
utterly destroy her. In contrast to the saber views of the military, the
Nazis wished to rush mobilization, ignore or brush aside obstacles,
and embark upon an adventuristic and aggressive foreign policy. The
fundamental opposition between the two out looks was well summed
up by one general after thc war:
Hitler taught and believed that reason and knowledge are nothing,
and that the unbending will to victory and the releotless pursuit of
the goal are everything. Mystical speculation replaced considerations of
time and space, and the careful calcu1ation of the strength of one's own
forces in relation to the enemy's.17
Step by step during the thirties the rnilitary opposed Hitlcr's
aggressive actions, and step by step they saw their wamings re jected
and Hitler successful. They opposed withdrawal from the League of
Nations because it would isolate Gerrnany. They wamed against the
repudiation of the Versailles Treaty and the reintro duction of
conscription in 1935; they were sure it would bring about
retaliatory action by the Allies. Fearing French intervention, they
protested against the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936.
Later in that year they opposed sending German forces to Spain. In
November 1937, when Hitler unveiled to the military leaders his
plans of expansion against Austria and Czechoslovakia, the generals
again argued that German military strength was not up to such
adventurous exploits. The Anschluss with Austria, how ever, was
carried out successfully in the following spring by an adroit
combination of interna! subversion, diplomatic maneuver ing, and
military bluff. Hitler's designs on Czechoslovakia aroused even
greater military consternation as they could easily embroil Germany in
a war with France, and possibly with England and Russia also. The
military opposition in the summer of 1938 was led by the Chief of
the General Staff, General Beck. Hitler, how ever, forced Beck to
resigo and replaced him with Halder. As Hitler's campaign against
Czechoslovakia mounted, a military
115
 The Soldier and thc Statc
group with Haldcr's coopcration plnnncd a coup d'élal to seiz.e
control of the government before Gcrmany bccamc involved in a
disastrous war. The officcrs, howcvcr, wcrc torn with indecision
and besitancy which was only finally resolved by the Allied con
ccssions at Munich. The coup d'étal was cancclled. Hitler had
again dcfcated hís generals. 18 This broke the military. Subse quently,
during the war the militnry objcctcd to thc more dnring of Hitlcr·s
schemes - such as his dcsirc to nttack in thc wcst in the fall of
1939, thc invasion of Russia, and proposals pushed by tbe S.S. to
attack Switzcrland in 1943. But Hitlcr's continucd suc cess in thc facc
of thcir continucd objections had undermined thcir sclf-confidencc
and thcir influcncc with thc government. Thc Nazis werc
contcmptuous of tbe timid and overcautious gcnerals. Hitler himself
found the military mind to be much diffcrcnt from what he
expcctcd, commcnting on onc occnsion,
Beforc I wns head o( the German Govcmment I thought the German
General Staff wns likc a butcher's dog - something to be held tight
by the coTlar because it thrcatened to attnck all and sundry. Since then
I have hn:I to recognizc that the General Staff is anything but that.
lt has consistently tricd to impede every action thnt I have 1hought
neccssary . . . lt is I who ahvays hnd to goad on this "butehcr's
dog." io
Toe clash of Na:ti nnd military valucs madc accommodation
bctwcen tbe two impossible. Thc situation in n sensc wns similar
to that of 1900-1918, cxccpt that the tension bctwecn the mil.i ta1y
ideology and thc popular idcology was incompnrably greater. An
"unpolitical army" is an intolernble anomaly in a completcly
politicizcd totalitarian socicty. Rcnsoned military caution is equally
alien to the rcvolutionary mind. In World War I the military had
rclinquished their views and cmbraccd thc popular enthusiasm. A
fcw were to follow lhat coursc again. Most did not. Conscquently,
the balance could only be rcstored by the destruction of the po
Jitical powcr of the army and thc íorcible convcrsion of thc mili
tary to the Nazi vicwpoint.
Governmental Authority. The destruction of the military was
carricd out by cvcry conccivablc tcehniquc. Thc authority of thc
military institutions was reduccd, dividcd, and Iimitcd. The leve!
116
The Soldier and the State
diately after the June 30th purge, began the expansion of the S.S.
Eventually the S.S. became in eflect a second anny numbering by
1944 twenty-five or thirty divisions, virtually all of them armored,
Germany and Japan
of tbe General Staff, which tended to be the ecnter of profcssional
ism, wns steadily lowcred. In 1935, Hitler assumed tbe position of
Supreme Commander and under him von Blomberg, an officer who
coopernted wilh the Nn7Js, became Minister of War and Com mander
in Chic( of the Wehrmacht. Undcr Blomberg wcre thc commanders of
thc threc scrviccs, and under each commandcr the service tnff.
Also created out of the Ministeramt (Schleiehcr's formcr office) was
an expandcd staff, thc Wehrmachlamt, subsc quently hended by Kcitel.
also a Nazi collaborator, and working directly under Blombcrg. Thus.
ali officcs at the ministerial leve! wcrc fillcd with either party
members or generals willing to work with the Nuis. ThcGeneral
StafT which had prcviously so jealously guardcd its right oí
lmmediatstellung was now down at thc fourth leve! in the military
hicrarchy.
In Fcbruary 1938 after Blombcrg and ven Fritsch, thc anny
commandcr, had bcen forced out, the War Ministry was in effect
nbolishcd. Hitler himself assumed Blombcrg's position as Com
mandcr in Chief o( the Wehrmacht, and transformcd the Wehr
machlamt into thc High Command of thc Wchnnacht (OKW)
undcr the direction of Keitel. Thc principal unit in the OKW was
the Operntions Staff- under another Nazi sympathizcr, Jodl which
now took ovcr many of thc planning functions previously cxerciscd by
the army General Staff. Subsequently, thc doctrine of the eo-
responsibility fer decisions of the Chie( oí Stafl together with thc
commanding officer was abandoncd and thc General Staff was thus
still furthcr reduccd in importance. This organi7..ation pcrsisted until
Deccmbcr 1941 when the army Commander in Chicí, von
Brauchitseh. was dismissed and Hitler assumed per sonal command
of thc army. He thus combined in bis own person thc politieal
officcs oí Chief o( Statc, pany Jeadcr, and War Min istcr wilh the
military offices of Suprcmc Commandcr of the Wehrmacht nnd
Commander in Chief of thc Anny. In e!Tect, this
meant lhat military functions o( the latter positions wcre no longer
pcrformcd.
Military authority was dividcd as weII as reduccd in leve).
The liquidation of thc S.A. leadership in 1934 was a Pyrrhie vie
tory for the army in its effort to protect its position as solc arms
bearcr of the Rcicb. The real winner was Himmler wbo, imme-
117
mechanized, or airborne. The Luftwaffe under GOring was also
independent of the normal chain of command. In 1935 it took
over the anti-aircraft units, thereby insuring that in the event of
trouble, the army would not be able to shoot down GOring's planes.
In 1942, Luftwafle Field Divisions, eventually numbering about
twenty and designed for ground fighting, were created from sur
plus Air Force personnel. Thus in efiect tbe Third Reich had three
armies: the regular army, Himmler's Waffen-SS., and GOring's
varied Luftwaffe units. Hitler also maintained a complicated set
of duplicate command relationships. Toe diminution of the army
General Staff's role in planning began in 1938 when Hitler as
signed to OKW responsibility for drafting plans for the complete
occupation of Czechoslovakia. In 1941, after the invasion of Rus
sia, OKWand OKH (the Anny High Command) were given com
pletely different spheres of autbority. Toe latter was responsible
for the conduct of the war on the Russian front, whereas the former
assumed direction of the military efiort elsewhere. The only con
nection between these two commands was Hitler bimself and bis
own personal staff. Even tbe transfer of a single regiment from
one front to the otber had to be approved by Hitler. Independent
Iines of command persisted out into the field. Numerous special
organizations and hierarchies were created for special missions.
Toe so-called Organisation Todt affiliated with the party and in
dependent of the army was responsible for military construction
work. In 1943, po1itical indoctrination officers (National Socia!
istische Führungsoffiziere-NSFO) were introduced into the armed
forces. These offi.cers were modeled upon the Russian political
commissars and had a chain of command independent of the mili
tary hierarchy. Competition among the intelligence services was
encouraged with disastrous results for the accuracy and efficiency
of German reporting.2º
The scope of military authority was also reduced. With respect
to the withdrawal from the League of Nations, rearmament, and
the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Hitler either did not inform
the military high command or told tbem of bis plans at tbe last
ll
B
Germany and Japan
moment. Efforts of Fritsch and Beck to assert the military right
to be consulted were devoid of effective result. Subsequently, not
only were tbe military excluded from foreign policy decisions, but
they were also not allowed to ma.ke purely military decisions.
Hitler first began to intervene in the preparation of military plans
in the fall of 1938. Once the war was on, however, and
particularly after it began to go badly for Germany, Hitler
extended hi.s range of decision down to the m·ost detailed tactical
level. Time and again the recommendations of tbe generals were
overridden and coun termanded by Hitler. He insisted upon a rigid
rather than a flexi ble system of defense, and no withdrawals were
allowed without his permission. He personally supervised the
movement of bat talions, and he neglected ]ong-range strategic
planning. "All free dom of action was eliminated. Even the
highest commanders were subjected to an unbearable tutelagc." 21
Political lnfluence. Tbe Nazis were not content merely to
eliminate the authority of the officer corps. lt was even more
neces sary to alter its fundamental character, to destroy itas an
autono mous group positing its own values and goals. This was
done through three principal techniques. First, efforts were made
to win over the high commanders to the Nazi cause througb
propa ganda, threats, and bribery with wealth and power.
Blomberg, KeiteI, and Jodl were undoubtedly in part persuaded
by the high office and honors wbich they received to cooperate
with the Nazis. Personal indiscretions might be forgiven by the
Filhrer jf the officer were loyal to the regime. Substantial gifts
were presented to officers who rendered special services to the
party or whose loyalty was thought to be wavering. With middle-
ranking officers, persuasion and promotion were employed. The
Nazis, of course, had little use for military ortbodoxy, and they
rapidly advanced military iconoclasts and dissenters such as
Guderian and Rommel whose
personalities and views were not of the traditional General Staff
variety.
More significant in the long run was the infiltration of Nazi
oriented younger offi.cers into the lower ranks. The very speed
hi h the Nazis demanded in tbe expansion of the army
made t ddficult, as Beck and others saw it would, for the anny to
digest 1ts new recruits and indoctrinate them in the code of the
corps.
ll
9

The Soldier and the State
Thc ncwer officcrs wcrc frcquently graduatcs of Nazi youth or.
ganizations. Although in the early years of the rcgime, tbe anny
tried to curb thc influx of subaltcrns from this sourcc, the necd
for leaders eventually forced it to give in. Consequently, a markcd
differcnce in outlook rose betwcen thc junior and thc senior ranks, and
by World War II thc lattcr could not be sure of thc obedience of
thcir ideologically oriented subordinatcs if thcy ordcrcd a mili tary
movc against Hitler.:: ln thc Navy and Air Force thc corps of
offi.cers had to be built up virtua11y from scratch; conscqucntly,
these services wcrc more prcdominantly Nazi fo outlook.
The final technique of the Nazis in altering the complcxion of
the officcr corps was simply thc rcmoval of thosc who adhcred to
the professional outlook and values. The first major purgc was
thc Blomberg•Fritsch Crisis of Fcbruary 1938. Both officcrs had
opposed Hitler's aggrcssive dcsigns revcaled at thc confercnce of
commanders on November 5, 1937. Blombcrg had also abandoncd
the soldier·s role, embarkcd upon politics, and arouscd thc cnmity
and jealousy of G0ring and Himmler. Jn January 1938, with the
Führcr's pennission, he marricd a woman beneath bis own social
level. Two wecks later G0ring presented to Hitler police docu•
ments proving that thc new Frau Blombcrg had becn a prostitute.
This insurcd Blomberg's dismissal ns Commandcr in Chicf of the
Wehnnacht. Tbe logicnl candidate to succeed him, however, was
Fritsch, thc Army Commandcr in Chicf and a professional soldicr
tbrough and through. To forestal! this appointment G5ring and
Himmlcr presented evidence that Fritsch was a homosexual. The
charges wcrc untrue, but thcy were enough to havc Fritsch re•
moved from his post pcnding investigation and to give thc Führer
opportunity to rcvamp thc officcr corps. Six other general officers
wcre rctired and a major shnkc•up of regimcntal commandcrs oc·
currcd.
The acquiescence of the officer corps to the rcmoval of Fritsch
on trumped up charges marked its end as an nutonomous organi•
zation. Against such machinations, the officer.; wcrc virtually help·
less. Instead of fighting back with the conspiratoria! and unscro•
pulous techniques of totalitarian politics, Fritsch submitted to
Gestapo intcrrogation and considcred challenging Himmler to a
ducl. 1n thc cnd a special court exoneratcd him. But by then he
120
Germany and Japan
was out of a job, nnd the long arm of thc sccrct policc had made
iL clf fclt in the army. Subscquently, Fritsch was made honorary coloncl
oí his cid regimcnt. He was, howcvcr, a brokcn, disillu• sioncd man.
Just bcforc war bcgan he joined bis rcgiment in Enst Prussia, writing:
"Far me thcrc is, ncither in peacc or war, any part in Herr Hitler's
Gcrmany. l shnll nccompany my rcgimcnt only as a tnrgct, bccause
J cannot stny nt home." 2ª On Scptcmbcr 22, 1939 he walked into
Polish mnchinc gun fire on thc outskirts of Warsaw and was killcd.
Fritsch did not know how to act as n politicinn in thc totalitarian statc.
But he did know how to die as a soldier on the battlcfield. With him
dicd thc mornl integrity nnd
profcssional spirit of thc Gcnnnn officer corps.
Jmmediately after Munich three more gcncrals werc rctircd.
Two, Dcck and Adnm, had bccn outspokcn in their opposition to
Hitler. Thc third, von Rundstcdt, was a Prussian profcssionnl of
the old school. From this point on through thc war, therc was a
stcady stream of dismissals and rctircments oí officcrs who dis•
plcased Hitler bccausc of lhcir militnry cnution or their doubtful
Joynlty. In thc fall of 1941, nftcr thc Gennans had bccn halted
in Russia, Brauchitsch, Rundstedt (who hnd bcen callcd bnck),
Bock, and Leeb lcft active scrvice. Finnlly, after the July 20th.
1944 attcmpt to ovcrthrow thc rcgime, in a mass purgc of the
high command, twenty gcnerals and ene admirnl were executed,
five other gcncrnls committed suicide, and approximatcly scvcn
hundrcd officcrs werc cither executed or dism issed. 2•
Milita'}' GOtterdiimmertmg. Thc rcactions of the military to
the Nazi pcnetration split thcm into three groups. Onc cliquc suc.
cumbcd to Nnzi tcmptations, abandoncd thc professional outlook.
adopted Nazi vicws, and wcrc suitably rcwarded by thc govcrn•
mcnt. Anothcr group, including Hammcrstcin•Equord, Canaris,
Bcck, Adam, Witzlcben, and most of thc July 20th conspirators,
also nssumed political roles nctively opposing Hitler and his poli•
cies. Since both thesc groups nbnndoned proíessionalism for
politics, it is appropriate to judgc them, not by profcssionnl, but
by political stnndards. The former shnre in the guilt of National
Socialism; thc latter wcrc usually motivatcd by the highest hu•
manitarinn and Christian ideals.
Thc grcat bulk of the officcr corps had no política) ycarnings
121
 The So/dier and the Stau
onewayOr the other and simply desired to follow the proper pro
fcssional course. In tbe eady days of the Nazi regimc this be·
havior was feasiblc. The generals did thc soldier's job, thcy issucd
the soldicr's warnings, and, whcn they wcre overruled, they did
T Germany and Japan
thc soldier's duty. After the ouster of Fritsch, howevcr, tbc mili.
tary role bccame impossible. Toe invasion of tbe aulhority of tbc
officer corps and thc destruction of its autonomy produccd an in•
soluble conflict. The military codc did not pennit either total obc.
dience or total resistancc. Professional duty to obcy thc leaders
o[ the state clashed irreconcilably wilh professional responsibility far
tbe security of the statc. "1 am a soldier; it is my duty to abey,"
argued Brauchitsch. Othcrs witb equally good military logic dis.
agrced: "The bighcst commandcrs in time of war," commented
Speidel, "bave not always been able to differcntiate between the
obedience due to God and conscience and the obedience due to
meo." 2 So the generals struggled along: obcying where there wcre
no grounds for complaint; sabotaging, where possible, impossible
policies; temporizing in one place and acquiescing in another; re
signing when the situation became intolerable and accepting again
the call of duty when it was even worse.
Therc was nothing politically glorious in this performance. But
then they were not trying to act as political figures; they werc
cscaping from politics, and it is not appropriate to judge thcm by
political standards. They were trying to behave like professional
soldicrs, and it is by the standards of soldicrs that they should
be judged. By these criteria they come off well. The evil was not
in them. lt was in the environment which would not pennit thcm
to live by thc soldier's creed. They could not destroy the evil in
the environment without violating that creed and destroying the
good in themselves. Their glory and their tragedy was that thcy
adhcred to their faitb until obliteratcd by thc holocaust.
THE FUTURE OF GERMAN CML·MlLlTARY RELATIONS. Thc
profcssional offi.cer corps which was created by Schamhorst and
Gncisenau, and carried to its highest peaks by Moltke, Schlieffen.
and Sceckt ceased to exist in World War II. lt was a victim of
Nazism and its destruction was one of the calamities of lhe war.
It had embodicd many of thc noblest and bcst elements of western
civilization. Boro of enlightened reform, it had bcen motivated by
122
thc ideals of integrity, scrvíce, competence, duty, and loyalty.
Whatever the uses to which it was put, in and of itself it was a
force far reason, realism, and peace. Neither Germany nor the
world is bctter off far its passing.
It rcmains to be sccn what pattern of civil•military rclations
will emerge in the Gennan Federal Republic. Early plans for the
West Gennan army called far a return to some elemcnts of thc
old tradition. The prevailing tendcncy, howcvcr, seemed to be in
a difierent direction. Thc Bundestag insisted upan sharing in thc
control of the military forces. It was strcsscd that the new army
would be basically civilian in character. The decisions of courts
martial wcre to be rcvicwed by independcnt boards of civilians.
Differentiation among the rnnks was to be minimizc..:d, the powers
of officers curtailed, saluting limitcd. More significantly, the Ger•
man government's defense adviser indicated that a commission of
civilians would supervise thc "inner order" of the army and that
ali soldiers would go through a special "citizenship course." ''De•
mocracy can be defended only by dcmocrats," Herr Blank was
quotcd as saying, "and frecdom only by those who experience it
themselves." ::,i
The effective implementation of these ideas would inaugurate
a third phase in Gennan civil•military relations. The aristocratic
army of Frcdcrick the Great was dcstroyed by Napolcon. Tbe
proíessional army created by Schamhorst and Gneisenau was de•
stroyed by Hitler. Now thc proposal was to create a democratic anny,
an idcologically motivated force embodying subjcctive rathcr than
objcctive civilian control. In part, this approach was a reac• tion
against the professionalism of thc past and the product of the false
idcntification of that professionalism with Hitler. Ironically, it was
also in part an imitation of the American conquerors of Hitler. But
the changes of the Bonn government were not far the better. They wcrc
a rctrogression to a more primitive form of civil military relations.
Inevitably they will foster the permanent em roilment of the Gennan
military in politics and rcdu1,.,e thc figbt· mg effectiveness of tbe
new army. Despitc what Herr Blank had to say, a democratic state
is better defended by a professional force than by a democratic force.
The Federal German Republic p0SSesses the confidence of its citizens
and strong central in•
123
 The Soldicr and the Statc
stitutions sucb as thc Wcimar Republic ncvcr had. Thc obstaclcs
to civilian control which cxistcd in the twenties no longer exist.
It would be tragic if thc ncw Gcnnan dcmocracy did not
seize thc opportunity to rccstablish an effective system o[ civilian
T Germany and Japan
control and a professional officcr corps. It could do far worsc
than to rcsurrcct thc tradition of Scharnhorst, Gneiscnau, and
Clauscwitz.
.JAPAN: THE CONTINUITY OF POLITICAL MILITARISM NATIONAL
IDEOLOGY: SHINTO AND BUSHIDO. Thc kcy factor
influcncing Japancsc civil-military relations was the pcrsistcnce of
feudalism through sevcn hundrcd ycars down to 1868. Undcr
feudalism thc ruling class in Japancsc society bad bcen composed
of the Empcror who was a figurchcad, the shogun who was the
real ruler of the country, tbe local lords or daimyo, and thc sa murai
or warriors who were the followcrs of the shogun and tbc dairnyo.
The mass of peoplc, ineluding tbe peasants and the small mercantile
class, wcrc cx.cludcd from political afiairs. The Rcs toration of 1867-
1868 cnded fcudalism. The shogunate was abol ished, the Emperor
brought out of seclusion and givcn an active role in the direction of
national afiairs, and power trnnsferrcd from the local lords to thc
national government. The samurai were the leadcrs in this rcassertion
of imperial control and in the fonna tion of the new institutions of
govemment.
The national ideology of Japan which set the basic frnmcwork
of Japancse thinking down to 1945 was esscntially a compound
of two intcrrclatcd systcms of tbougbt rcflecting imperial authority
and samurai rule. Thcsc were embodicd respcctively in State Shinto
and Bushido. Statc Shinto cxpresscd thc unity of govemmcnt and
religion in Japanesc lifc. It had three basic doctrines.'" The be
lief in "unbroken divine imperial sovereignty" was reflected in
Articles I and III of the Constitution of 1889, which providcd that
''iñe Empire of Japan shall be rcigncd over ·and govcrncd by a
line of Empcror.; unbrokcn for ages eternal" and that ''iñe Em
pcror is sacred and unviolable." The Emperor was a living god,
bis will was absolutc, and the highcst duty of thc subject was not
merely obedicnce to tbat will but identification with it: thc loss
of self in cnthusiasm for the Empcror. Shinto's sccond clcment
114
The Soldier and the State
samurai tradition. The national ideology served the military and
the military served the ideology. The Japanese Army thus, in con
was belicf fo the divine origin of the Japancse nation itsclf. Thc
Japanesc were a uniqucly gifted peoplc with divincly ordaincd
instilutions: "the national gods havc givcn to Japan a divine land,
a divine racial psychology, and a divincly estab\ished structurc in
thc state." Finally, thcre was the bclief in thc divine mission
o[ Japan. Each nation of the world must nssumc its rightful
place in thc hierarchy of thíngs. Japan's mission wns in the words
of onc admira! to makc "lhc boundlcss virtucs of thc Empcror prc
vail throughout thc whole world." Thc world was to be brought
undcr one roof through bencvolcnt Japanesc lcadership although
it might be ncccssary at times to use military force in fulfillins this
mission.
The othcr elcment in the Japanc.,i;c nationnl ideology was the
ancient cthic of the samurai, thc moral code of the military class
of Jnpanese feudalism. After the end of fcudalism this codc was
romantici7.ed and given thc nnmc of Bushido: the ways of thc
militnry knights. The Bushido codc had mnny rcscmblances to thc
standards of conduct of Europcan chivalry. Thc valucs of .Bushido
wcrc thc values oí lhc warrior, thc lovcr of violence far its own
sake. The sword was "the soul of the samurai" and thc "symbol
of God." Aftcr 1867 this bellicose codc which had bcen the prop
erty of a rclatively limited class bccamc thc ideology of the entire
people; Japan beco.me "incontestably a warlikc nation." 28 Toe
national ethic combining Statc Shinto and Bushido was thus a
synthesis of imperial nationalism and feudal militarism. It was
authoritarian, cthnoccntric, nationalistic, imperially orientcd (in
thc sense of botb Emperor•worship and glorificntion of thc Japa
nese cmpire), expansionist, nnd bcllicosc with high valuc assigned
to thc warrior and the warrior virtues.
THE JAPANESI¡ MILlTARY MINO. The Jopanesc military strongly
adhered to tbe national ideology. Thc reasons for this are simple.
The same forces which brought about the Rcscorntion of 1868
and stimulated thc risc of this nationnl idcology also created the
modero Japanc.,i;c anned scrvices. Thc armcd scrviccs, morcover,
occupicd a very peculiar place in the idcology. Thcy wcrc closcly
idcntified _with thc Emperor; thcy werc an csscntial if not preemi ncnt
reqmrcmcnt far the fulfillmcnt of tbe world mission of thc Yamato
racc; and thcy wcrc the continuing cmbodimcnt of tbc
125
trast with the German military, achieved Schleicher's ideal of aI
ways being in tune with the dominant spirit of the times. There was
no tension between military values and political values. Con
scquently, Japan had "the most political army" in the world.29 Given
the naturc of the national idcology and its strong associa tions with
the feudal tradition, it also made the Japanese officer corps the
majar military body in the world most lacking in pro fessional
spirit.
The impotence of the professional ethic in the Japanese mili
tary forces was all the more surprisíng because in the decades after
1868 the new leaders of the govemment consciously strove to
model their military institutions upon those of the West. French
and then German military advisers aided in the creation of the
Japanesc Army. Military colleges werc established. A naval
academy was set up in 1872, a naval engineering school in 1876,
and a naval staff college in 1888. Toe system of officer recruit ment
was very similar to that of Germany. The requirements for
promotion were such as might be found in any European officer
corps. But it was impossible to import the professional outlook
which in the West had developed along with these institutional
devices. Japan had the form, the externa! shell, of military pro
fessionalism, but not the substance. The Japanese military mind
remained dominated by the popular ideology. Only in the twentieth
century did something resembling the professional military ethic
gain a foothold in the officer corps and even then it was limited
to a relatively weak and distinctly minority group. The dominant
ideals of the Japanese military remained fundamentally opposed
to this ethic.
The most basic manifestation of this opposition concerned the
concept of the ideal officer. The professional military ethic draws
a distinction between the military virtues and the warrior virtues.
For the Japanese, however, the ideal officer was a warrior a
fightcr cngaging in violence himself rather than a manager direct
ing the employment of violence by others. This was a feudal, not
a professional, ideal. As one observer described the Japanese
officer, he was perhaps inferior technically to his western counter
126
Germany and Japan
part, but this was compensated for by "magnificent •nerve' and
úghting ardor."
The Japanese officer . . . is a magnificent 1eader of men. His weak
ness consists of his failing to remain master of a combat, as European
oflicers do. He goes through with a battle rather than directs it. His
courage and conception of honor are far more inspired by a warring
passion than by a real and realistic understanding of the necessities of
the craft of arms ... The Japanese is more of a warrior than a mili tary
man, and therein Jies his weakness. The difference may be a subtle onc,
but it does exist: the essential quality of the warrior is bravery; that of the
military man, discipline.ao
Officer indoctrination in the Japanese military forces stressed the
importance of courage under fue far more than scientific accom
plishment. Associated with this was the close bond which existed
between officers and meo in the Japanese Army. Ali were warriors
together. The officers did not constitute a fundamentally different
group with skills and abilities not possessed by the enlisted men.
Toe professional military man tends to focus upon the balance
of material strength between opposing nations. Japanese miJitary
tbought, bowever, minimized the role of material factors. Spírit
alone was decisive: this was a basic concept of Bushido. Superior
armaments were not responsible for Japanese victories:
No! Wbat won tbe battles on the Yalu, in Corea and Manchuria,
were the ghosts of our fathers, guiding our hands and beating in our
hearts. They are not dead, those ghosts, the spirits of our warlike an
cestors.81
Or as one officer put it: "The Imperial Army of Japan attaches
more importance to spiritual training than to the art of war. Moral
strength is greater than physical force." "2 General Araki, War
Minister during the l 930's, declared that the mission of Japan
was to
. . . spread and glorify the Imperial way to the end of the Four
Seas. Inadequacy of strength is not our worry. Why should we worry
about that which is material? as
War, consequently, was the test of faith. The nation with the
stronger faith not the stronger annaments would come out on top.
127
 The Soldier and the State
Bccause of thcir divincly ordaincd role, this must neccssarily be
thc Japanesc. For the western military thinker, God is a]most in
eviu1bly on thc side of thc biggcr bo.ttalions; for thc Japanesc, He
was on thc sidc of thc Yamato racc. Toe military had fcw objcc tions
T Germany and Japan
to war with the United Statcs bccausc, dcspitc our incom parably
grcater rcsourccs, our spirit was weaker than theirs. The Japancsc
mililary mind was thus subjective rather than objectivc, involved
rathcr than dctachcd. Bccnusc it was imbued with thc national
ideology it was difficult if not impossible fer it to analyze a military
situation in a coldly rcalistic, scicntific manncr.• Japa nesc military
training emphasized "spiritual mobilization" -
Seishin Kyoiku - as the most important aspcct of prcparing troops
fer battle. Essentially, this was indoctrination in the spirit nnd
principies of the Japanese national idcology: the idcntification of
the individual with thc nation and his subordination to thc will
of thc Emperor. It was thc continuation oí a process which had bcgun
much carlicr in thc schools. Onc rcason for conscription in Japan was
thc opportunity it prcsented for the military to trnin virtually thc cntire
male population in thc idcals of Bushido and the Kodo (the
Jmperial Way).
Thc minimizing of the intellect and the cxaltation oí the spirit
produced a notable lack of profcssional military writing in Japan.
Although from 1905 to 1945 Japan was a major naval powcr, no
Jnpancsc writcr evcr formulatcd n signifieant thcory on the nnture
and cmployment of scapower. Virtually their only writing upen
this subject before World War Il wns cithcr scnsationalist or highly
clcmentary. Scholarly analyses wcrc absent. Toe same was true
with rcspect to ]and operations. Japan "never produccd a stand
ard work on thc scicncc oí war." ª" Similarly, military history. thc
• NFrom a military stnndpoinl tbc lllpanesc mind may be de$<:ribed as being
subjcctivc ralhcr thnn objectivc. In pcaa:limc, ao Amcrienn writcr cnn lmpns•
sionntely discuss II war in thc Pacific Ju:rt as a British studcnt can composc a disqu!
sition upen commnnd of thc Mcditcrrancnn: nnd cithcr cnn discuss al lcng.th imnginary
camp:iigns wherein Frnncc Is op d toJtnly or Gcnnnny to RU$51n. Thc
Jnpnnesc, on the contrnry, !ne\: lntcrc.,1 in w1111crs which do not dircctly con ccrn
thcm. Wbcrcas thc western studcnt will proc:ecd nlong purc\y acndcmlc llnt'll,
conccntmting upon thc naval fnctors nlone, 1he Jnpnnese find difficulty in climinnt•
In& thc nntionnl-political nppronch. As n rule they hnvc becn unnblc to dlscuss Gunm
without stnting or lmplying thnt it wns n thrcnt lo thcir country which must be
removed." Alcxandcr Kiralfy, "Jnpancsc Naval Strntcgy," in Edward Mcnd Enrie
(cd.), Mabrs o/ Mo ürn Stral IIY (Prina:ton. 1952), p. 4S9.
128
core of proíessional study in the Wcst, was not studied anywhcre
in thc Japancse military cducational system cxccpt at thc Staff
Collegc. Only after World War I did military pcriodicals in a
significant numbcr and quality begin appearing in Japan, and so
far as naval affairs wcrc conccrncd thcsc too rcmaincd on a vcry
elementary Jcvel.
The discipline of thc Japanesc military forces was n holdover
from feudafom. Officer.; nnd soldiers had to be insiantly prepared
to sacrificc thcir lives far the Emperor. For the Jnpnnese military
man, therc was no highcr achicvcmcnt than to die in batt\c with
the cry of "Temio /leika Ba11zai" on his lips. Ali soldiers who
dicd in battlc werc deificd and thcir nnmcs inscribed in a nntional
shrine. Thc warrior codc, moreover, did not pcnnit retreat. Un
Jike realistic western professional military thought which rccog•
nizes that retrcat may wcll be a military ncccssity and that con
sequently it is dcsirnblc to prepare far it, Japanese doctrine rcfused
to considcr it nn admissiblc altemativc. Along with this was thc
tradilion of "death rather than surrender," the refusal to recognizc
that from a realistic military vicwpoint thc latter may be a lcgitimate
course of action. In the words of General Araki:
Retreat and surrender are not permissible in our Army ... To
bccome a captive of the cnemy by surrendering aftcr doing their best
is regarded by foreign soldiers as acceptable conduct. But according to
our traditional Bushido, rctrcat and surrcnder constitutc the greatcst
disgrace and are actions unbccoming to a Japancsc soldier. 8
In contrast to the profcssional military view that war is gen•
erally undcsirable nnd that it is thc lasl resort of national policy.
the Japanese feudal warrior tended to praisc violencc and gloriíy
war as an end in itsclf. Thc Japanesc Ministry of War dcclared that:
"War is the Father of Creation and thc Mothcr of Culture. Rivalry for
SuprcmaCy docs for thc state what struggling against advcrsity docs
far thc individual. lt is such impetus, in thc one case, as in thc
othcr, that prompts thc birth and development of Life and Cultural
Creation." 8 With this philosophy of war in general it is not
surprising that thc Japanesc military in specific circumstances fnvorcd
war as a mcans of achieving national goals. Thc army lead_crs in
particular werc bcllicosc; the admirals, who
129
 The Soldier and the State
played a Jesser role in politics, tended to be more conservative
and professionally oriented. The Japanese military were eager for
the 1894-1895 conflict with China. They urged the acquisition of
r Germany and Japan
reach the Emperor. Neither <lid the Chiefs of Staff nor the com
manding generals and admirals. The Emperor exercised military

1
command directly. The military were bis personal implements.
the Liaotung Peninsula at the end of that war. They favored a
This close identification of the forces with the Throne provided
strong policy against China during World War l. They wanted to
the objective basis for military adherence to State Shinto with its
expand Japanese influence through Siberia during the interven tion
glorification of the Emperor. It also placed the Japanese military
there after the war. They were responsible for the interven tion in
forces in a unique legal position. "Armies abroad," as one gen eral
China in 1928 and for the attack on Manchuria in 1931. Finally,
they initiated the China incident in 1937, and the army leaders at
least (the navy was more hesitant) advocated the at tacks upon
1 said, "exist on a legal basis, but the Imperial army is founded on
that which is in:finitely more precious than law." 37 The mili tary
exercise of their functions free from civilian interference was
American and British possessions in December 1941. This record
guaranteed by an imperial Ordinance of 1889 which provided
of consistent support for aggression by the politically oriented
that, "With the exception of questions of gunki (strategy) and
Japanese military leadcrs stands in marked contrast to the
gunrei (military command), which, having been reported directly
persistent warnings against adventurism offered to their gov
to the Emperor, may have been submitted to the cabinet for de
emment by the professionally inclined German generals. Whereas
liberation, the ministers of state for war and the navy shall report
in Gennany the military opposed withdrawal from the League of
to the minister president of the state." 38 Toe premier and the
Nations and remilitarization in violation of the Versailles Treaty, in
cabinet - the civil government of the state - were precluded
Japan they supported withdrawal and the denunciation of the
from rendering advice to the throne on mi!itary and naval opera
London Naval Treaty. The more extreme groups within the Japa
tions, strategy, and the interna! organization, education, and dis
nese officer corps were quite explicit in fonnulating a philosophy
cipline of the anned forces.
to justify Japanese dominance of East Asia.
The freedom of the military from civilian interference was
MILlTARY AUTHORITY: DUAL GOVERNMENT. The legal struc
further guaranteed by the prohibition against appointing civilians
ture of civil-military relations in the Japanese state was essentially to the posts of Minister of War and Minister of the Navy. In 1900 tbe
one of military independence. The government was divided into previously existing custom that only top officers could hold these
two spheres: miütary and civil. The theory was niju seifu: "dual posts was written into law. Only a general or Iieutenant general of
government." But, while civilians could exercise no authority the army on active service could be Minister of War. Only an
within the military arca, the military, on the other hand, by virtue admira} or vice admiral on active service could be Minister of the
of their political influence, could easily expand their power into Navy. In 1912 this restriction was limited so as to permit the
the civil area. appointment of reserve officers of comparable rank. This
Legal authority for tbis dual government stemmed from the libera1ization, however, only lasted until 1936 when the return
constitution and from custom. The Constitution of 1889 made was made to the 1900 procedure. It was frequently customary for the
the Emperor supreme commander of the military forces, gave him service ministers not to resigo when cabinets changed but to stay on
authority to determine their organization and peace standing, and through many governments, a fact which
authorized him to declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties. emphasized their distinct position compared to the civilian min isters.
Tbese clauses furnished the constitutional justification for the di
This complete division of authority between civil and military
rect relation between all top military leaders and the Emperor.
resulted, of course, in continuous friction between them. Since
Unlike the civilian members of the cabinet, the Ministers of War
there was no easy way of defining their respective spheres of re-
and the Navy <lid not have to go through the Prime Minister to
131
130

The Soldier and t11e State
sponsibility, thc support of both was neccssnry to carry on the
govcrnmcnt. The vagarics and vicissitudcs of civilian politics,
however, pul the military fo a superior position. As General Araki
once said: "A Minister of War is ablc to force the adoption of
any mcasure dcsírcd by the Cnmp or to block any mensure that
meets his disapproval." ªº This result was brought about simply by
thc 1hrcat to rcsign. Sincc the cnbinct had to hnve a Ministcr of
War and a Minister of the Navy, and since only military officcrs
could fill the c posts, ench service could bring about thc downfall
of thc cabincc by having its rcprcsentative resigo or could prevent
1he formation of a ncw cabinet until ils dcmands wcre met. Time
and ngain, this fonn of military pressure occurred in Japanese
history.• Dual government was further strengthened by thc mnn ncr
in which financcs wcrc handlcd. The Thronc - that is, the military
Jeaders in practice - had the authority to set the peacc- 1ime
strength of thc armed scrvice.,;. Approprintions had to be madc by
thc Dic1, but if the Diet refused to appropriate funds, the
prcvious year's budgct was automatically continucd. Thc esti mates
far the civilian departments were presente'1 to the Diet by the
Finance Minister while the Ministers of War and Navy de fended
thcir own budgcts befare the legislnture. Usually thc min isters
discouraged and frustrated any real parliamentary discussions oí
military po1icy.
Toe onc possible weak point which cxisted in the military
• In 1912. whcn 1he cnbinct of Princ;:c S:i.ionji rcjc,:tcd n dcmand ror an
incrc.Mc in nrmy strcngth. thc War Minlncr resigne<! and tbc cnblnct fcll. In 1914,
Viscount Kiyoura uttcmp!cd to form a cabinct but no ndmirnl would acrve ns
Navy Minislcr nnd he b11d to J;ivc up his cfforts. In 1936, whcn Hirota fonncd n
cnbincl. thc nrmy vetocd his proposcd 11ppointmcn1s to thc foreiga offiec, thc
colonial offiec. nnd tbc juslicc mlnlñry, nnd f=d the aclcclion of mcn more In
accord wi1h lis vicws. A yeflr Jntcr thc army brokc with Hlrota, the war ministcr
resigned. flnd thc cnbinet fcll. A Jlbcral offlc;:cr, Oencrul Uaaki, wus called upon to
bccomc prcmicr. The dominan! forces In lhc nrmy, howcvcr, h11d old scorcs to settlc
with Upki nnddcfcatcd him by rcfuslna to pcnnit any general, to join the cnblnc1.
Thc army was more lenient with General Hflynshl, who .succeeded whcre Ugakl
ínílcd. but thc nrmy dietatcd his choice of War Ministcr nnd bis cabinct progrnm.
In 1940 thc downfall of thc Yonnl cabinct was prccipitatcd by 1hc rcslgnal!on of
thc 11.rmy reprcsentntlvc, nnd Yonni WIIS replnccd by Kot'loyc who ndoptcd thc army
program nlmO!lt complctcly. Scc ChítO!lhl Yanngn "lñc Milllnry :i.nd thc
Govcmmcnl in Jnpan." Amu. Poi. Sel. Rev., XXXV (Junc 1941 ), S3S-S39; Hillls
Lory, Japan's Mlllrary Masurs (Ncw York, 1943), ch. S: Hugh Borton, Jopan
Slnct! J9J/ (Ncw York. 1940), pp. O-SS.
13%
Germany and Japan
structure oí authority was the division oí responsibility among a
large numbcr of military officcs. In this respccl Japancse organi-
1.ation rescmbled pre-World War I German organiz..1.1ion. The
army was hcaded by the "Big Three": thc Miniscer of War, the
Chieí of the Army Genera] Staff, and the Inspector Gcncrnl oí
Military Training. Naval organization culminatcd in the minister
and the Chief of thc Naval Staff. In addition, thcre was the Board
of Field Marshals and Flcct Admirnls created in 1898 which,
howcvcr, was primarily an honorific body. More significant was
the Supremc Military Council made up of ali thc lending generals
and admirals and rcsponsible far broad military policy. Ouring
war an Jmpcrial Headquarters carne into existence drawn from the
army and navy staffs. Thc potcntial rivalry of thesc various or
ganizations was curbed by thc mutual feeling that they could ali
increase their powcr by working togcther. In 1931, íor instance,
when thc political parties were incrcasing in importance, the Big
Thrcc oí thc nrmy reachcd an undcrstanding that all significam
personnel appointments would only be made with their mutual
concurrence. Subsequently, thc War Minister became mere power íul
and, in 1935, asscrted hfa authority ovcr thc Inspector General of
Military Training. The understanding of 1931 was abrogated, and
thc ministcr assumed full authority wi1h respcct to appoint mcnts.
The Ministcr oí War thus tended to bccome first among cquals.
Either coopcration among the military authorities, or thc
subordination of onc to another, prevcnted civilians from benefiting
by the profusion of military offices.•0
While, theoretically, thc two Japancse governments functioned
fo cntirely separatc sphercs, in practicc thc civilians remained ex
cluded from military affairs while the military playcd an active
role in civilian affairs. Both thc authority and thc influencc of the
military extended into foreign and domestic policy. One Minister
of War stated that, "While thc gencrally accepted limits oí the
delibcrations oí thc Suprcme Military Council are mancrs oí policy
pertaining to national deíencc. there are in fact no limitations or
qualifications to thc scopc of its delibcrations." .i Dual govemmcnt
incvitab]y produccd dual diplomacy. Thc actions taken by mili tary
commandcrs to safeguard their forces and mect the rcquire• ments oí
thc situation in the field were not subject to control by
133
 Germany and Japan
The Soldier and the State based popular support. Tbc political influencc o( lhc .military in
Japan had five kcy cJements.
the cabinct. In thc Manchurian crisis of 1931, for cxamplc, the
First, therc was the affiliation of thc military wilh thc power ful
military commanders in the field, supportcd by thc military lead
western clans of Japan, the Chosbu and thc Satsuma. Tbesc clans
crship in Tokyo, pursued an indepcndent Jine which frustratcd thc
had provided most o( the lcadcrsbip for thc Restoration o( 1868. la
Foreign Ministcr's cfforts to limit the eflects of the Scptember 18th
incident. The military ordcrcd Japancsc forces in Korea across the years aftcr thc Restoration the Choshu dominnted tbc anny
thc bordcr into Manchuria despite thc opposition of thc foreign and the Satsuma thc navy. Down to 1922 virtuaUy all thc bigh
officc nnd the cabinet. A few weeks later thc Foreign Ministcr officers of the scrviccs were drawn from onc or thc othcr of thesc
nssured thc Unitcd Statcs that thc Japanesc would not attack thc two clans. Since tbc rivalry betwccn tbe two pcrvaded thc
border town of Chinchow, but thc army wcnt right ahead and govemmcnt gcncraUy, this tended to draw thc military into
occupicd it anyway. Onc general expressed the military vicw with politics, but it also afl'ordcd each servicc a sccurc ba.<;is of political
support and lcadership. Jn 1909, for instancc, the Choshu clan
respcct to Manchuria when he wrote that "it would be very dan
includcd Marshnl Yamagata, thc most influentia'I cldcr statcsman
gerous to have trustcd our national diplomacy to the Ministry of
.in thc govcmmcnt, thc Prime Minister, thc Ministcr of War and
Forcign Affnirs, which is incapablc of visualizing our national des
the Chief oí thc Army Stafl'. Virtually all thc lending admirals (ex
tinics ... only thc army is ablc to conduct a national policy."
cept for thc Navy Minister) and a number o( gcncrals, on the
Thc military not only tended to pursuc thcir own foreign
othcr hand, were mcmbcrs o( thc Satsuma clan. The affilialions
policy, but also had no hcsitatiom; in pushing thc adoption of a
o[ the scrviccs with thcse samurai groups began to diminish about
dcfinitc domcstic economic program. General Araki once said, "Thc
thc time of thc First World War. Choshu influcncc was grcatly
army should be preparcd not only for military action but for
wcakened by the death of Yamagata in 1922. It bccamc physicaJly
solving economic, social and cultural problems, pursuing in
impossiblc for thc clans to maintain their monopoly .in the officer
foreign policy an indepcndcnt line foundcd on firm, sound and • corps. Rcprcscntntivcs oí lesser clans and of thc bourgcoisic be·
just premises."u The war ministry during the l 930's evolved an
gan to find thcir way inlO the military hicrarchy. By the end of
entirc cconomic philosophy of "Imperial Socialism" which more or
thc 1920's the officcr corps was drawing its rccruits predominantly
less amountcd to a military wclfare state. The principal opposition
from thc lowcr middle class: thc small landowaers, shopkccpcrs,
to thc military in domestic politics normally came (rom the uppcr
small fac1ory owncrs, and the like. This broadcning of thc base
bourgcoisic, and thc military economic program was anti-cnpitalist
of thc officer corps was in many respects similar to thc gradual
in spirit. h opposcd free Cnterprise, and favorcd rigid statc con trols
wcakcning of thc affilintions of the German military with the
over thc cconomy,·expanded social sccurity and unemploy• mcnt
Junker aris1ocracy. It tended to shift thc primary rcliancc of the
insuronce programs, and rcvision o( the tax system to pre• vcnt thc
military for support from a conccntratcd social.gcographic group
accumulation of great concentrations of wealth. Many of thc
to socicty at largc.
economic ideas of the military found thcir way into the Na tional
A second clement in the political iníluencc oí thc Japanesc
Mobilil.ation Law passed in 1938.
military was almost entirely missing in thc case of Germany. This
Mll.lTARY POLlTICAL INFLUENCB. The political influence of
was thc phcnomcnon of military mcn holding important nonmili
the military in Japanesc socicty remained constantly high through out
tary posts in govcrnment. In Germany thc political soldicr such
this period. Its only lapsc occurrcd during the ycars from 1922 to
as Caprivi nnd Schlcichcr was the exception; in Japan the soldier
1931 when thcrc sccmcd to be littlc likclihood of war aod Japan had
statesman was thc rule, the combination of military and nonmili-
its only real cxperiences with responsible party govemment. This
1ary functions in thc same pcrson being a continuation of the
low point in military influence also reflectcd a sbift in thc foundation
of military power from clan support to more widely 135

13 ◄
 The Soldier and the State
feudal tradition. In the early days of the Restoration military
leaders played an important role in codifying laWs, establishing
an education system, organizing the national bureaucracy, and
carrying out many other reforms. In the following years it bccamc
the accepted thing for military men to hold top posts in the gov
crnment. Their influence was felt in the cabinet, the Privy Coun cil,
and the Imperial Household.
From the inauguration of cabinet government in Dccember
1885 to the surrender in August 1945, Japan had thirty premicrs
heading forty-two cabinets. Fifteen of the prcmiers were generals
or admirals and thcy led ninetecn governments. Thrce Choshu
gcnerals, Yamagata, Katsura, and Ter:iuchi, occupied the premier ship
for more than half of the thirty ycars from 1889 to 1918. Military
participation in civil government- declined during the years of party
dominance in the l 920's. But even then Admirals Kato and
Yamamoto werc prcmiers in I 923 and 1924, and Gen eral Tanaka
from 1927 to 1929. After the Manchurian incident military influence
was agaln in thc ascendant. Admirals Saito and Okado held the
premicrship from May 1932 to February 1936, and, from that date
to the surrender in August 1945, Japan had nine premicrs, four of
whom were generals and two admirals. The Jongcst occupant of the
office was General Tojo who was in from October 1941 to Ju!y 1944.
Whether or not the cabinets wcrc hended by military men, officcrs
frequently occupied nonmilitary posts. Thc military held five of the
ten positions in the Yamagata cabinct of I 898-1900. Whcn he was
prcrnier from 1927 to 1929, General Tanaka also held the position of
Foreign Minister. At various times during the ! 930's military men
held the posts of Minister of Home Affairs, Foreign Minister, and
Minister of Edu cation.
Military influence also was felt in other branches of the gov
ernment. Marshal Yamagata was president of the Privy Council
from 1902 to 1922 and one of the most influential mcmbers of
the Genro, the body of elder statesmen who advised the Throne.
He was regarded "both in politics and in military affairs, as the
power behind the throne, the makcr or breaker of Cabinets, and
the man whose word was law." H Thc Council usually had a pro
military orientation; in 1930, for instance, it blocked for five
136
Germany and Japan
roonths ratification of the London Naval Trcaty. Traditionally the
military were also strong among the advisers lo the Emperor in
the Imperial Household. In the l 930's, howevcr, thcir influcnce
there was weakcncd by the appointment of a number of more
Iiberally minded statesmen to the court positions.
A third important e\ement in the political power of the mili tary
was the support which they received from patriotic, fascist, and
militaristic societies. These included small sccret socicties such as
the Black Occan and Black Dragan groups as wc!I as large mass
organizations such as the Ex-Servicemen's Association, the Pa
triotic Womcn's Socicty, and the Womcn's Society far National
Defense. The activities of these and other groups ranged from
tcrrorism to propaganda, Military officers frequently played an
important role in organizing, leading, and financing them, and the
groups invariably supported military foreign and domestic policies
of externa! expansion and internal reforms and control.
With the decline of clan influence the most significant political
support of the military carne from the people as a whole. The Anny
in particular went to great lengths to identify itself with the
common man. In the years immediately after the Restoration, military
service was required of all able-bodied males and the ranks of the
officer corps were open to ali on thc basis of mcrit. The Army
traditionally followed a highly paternalistic policy toward those
serving in its ranks and promotcd many schcmes for improving the
wclfare of the Japanese masses. Both major politi cal parties befare
World War II were closely tied in with the in terests of big business.
The Army frequently attackcd this "cor rupt" alliance of politicians,
industrialists, and bankers, and endeavored to identify itself as
standing for impartial, efficient, honest administration of national
affairs in the interests of the nation as a whole. It became the
embodiment of thc national in terests and national ideals. While the
popular support of the Army waned in the I 920's, the military never
lost thcir fundamental appeal to the average man of Japan.
A fifth and final aspect of military political influence was the
reversion in 1931 to terroristic methods of govcrnment in Japan.
In effect, this involved the superimposing of an extralegal system
of violence upon the formal system of constitutional govcrnment.
137
 The Soldier and the State Germany and Ja pan
Political leaders who opposed milítary demands ran the risk of
rhe contemporary ideology of Japan is strongly pacifist. Although
assassination. Premier Hamaguchi who put through the London
vastly different from the prewar bellicose nationalism, it is equally
Naval Treaty was attacked in November 1930 and died of bis
bostile to military professionalism. In addition, the absence of a
wounds. His successor, Inukai, was murdered in the military up
professional military tradition and the inftuence of American ideas
rising of May 15, 1932. The most elaborate plot was that of Feb
and practices are likely to complicate further the achievement of
ruary 26, 1936 in which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the
objective civilian control. The odds would appear to favor the
Inspector General of Military Education, and the Finance Min ister
emergence in Japan of a system of civil-military relations differing
were assassinated and most of the other high governmental
in appearance but not in essentials from that which prevailed
officials barely escapcd with their lives. The perpetrators of these
prior to 1945.
assassinations were young officers and cadets who felt that the
government was not taking strong enough measures to put through
the military program at home and abroad. While the relation be
tween these extremist younger officers and the top military leaders
was by no meaos clear, every outbreak of violence clearly re
dounded to thc benefit of the latter. Each of the majar assaults
was followed by a substantial increase in military influence and
concessions to military demands. After the February 26th inci dent,
the military virtually dictated the composition of the new cabinet
and secured a repeal of the 1912 ordinance which per mitted
reserve office:.s to become service ministers. The under cover
threat of violence was <_t. key component of military political
influence. The German officers were psychologically incapable of
carrying out even one assassination successfully; their Japanese
counterparts suffered from no such inhibitions nor lack of skills.
THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. The
pattern of sustained military involvement in politics ended with
the destruction of the Japanese officer corps in 1945. The slate
was wiped clean, and far eight years after her defeat the only civil-
military relations in Japan was between the American oc cupation
authorities and the Japanese civilian institutions. Imme diately after
Japan regained sovereignty, she still had no anned forces to speak
of, and, consequently, no real civil-military rela tions. This situation
could not continue indefinitely. Starting with a tabula rasa, Japan,
in a sense, possesses an unusual freedom in creating new military
institutions. An awareness among Japanese leaders of the political
character of the old officer corps and its disastrous consequences
could lead to an insistence upan the ab solute abstention of the new
one from politics. On the other hand,
138
139
 PART JI

MILITARY POWER IN AMERICA: THE HISTORICAL

EXPERIENCE, 1789-1940

l
 6

The ldeological Constant: The Liberal

Society versus Military Professionalism

THE HISTORICAL CONSTANTS OF AMERICAN

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATJONS

Libcralism has always been the dominant ideology in the

United States. The American Constítutíon, on the other hand, is
fundamentally conservative, the product of men who feared con
centrated political power and who provided for the widespread
dispersion of that power among numerous governmental units.
Yet, the outstanding historical fact of American civil-military re
lations has been thc extent to which liberal ideology and conserva tive
Constitution combined to dictate an inverse relation between political
power and military professionalism. From the birth of the Republic
through the Second World War Jiberalism· and the Con stitution
were the relatively unchanging environmental constants of
American civil-military relations. Together, they delayed the
profossionalization of officership in America until it had almost
been completed in Europe. Together, they made objective civilian
control depend upon the virtually total exclusion of the military
from political power.

THE PREVALENCE OF LIBERALISM JN THE UNITED STATES

On the first of June 1784 the American Army numbered seven

hundred men under the command of Major General Henry Knox.
Six months earlicr the Revolution had come to an end; Sir Guy
Carleton had evacuated New York; Washington had said farewell
to bis officers at Fraunces' Tavern. The seven hundred men were
143

. the only regular military force in the United States. the

T
last rem nant of the Continental Army. On June 2, 1784
the Continental Congress, agreeing with Elbridge Gerry
The Soldier and the State that "standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent
with the principles of republican Govemments, dangerous to
the libcrtics of a free people, and gen erally converted into
destructive cngincs for establishing dcspot ism," ordered the
disbanding of this remnant:
esolved, That the commanding officer be and he is hereby
dirccted to d1scharge t e troops now in the service of the United
States, except twcnty-fivc pnvates, to guard_ the stores at Fort
Pitt, and fifty-five to g.uard the stores at West Pomt and other
magazines, with a propor ttonate number of officers; no officer to
remain in service above the rank of a captain ...
Having thus reduced the regular anny to cighty caretakcrs,
the Coogress then requested the states to fumish it with
seven hun dred militia to garrison the western frontier.
A Jittle over 131 years later, in the autumn of 1915, the
Act ing Secretary of War, Henry Breckinridge, was summoned
to the presence of Woodrow Wilson. He found the President
"trcmbling and white with passion," holding in bis hands a
copy of the Balti more Sun. The President pointed to a story in
the paper reporting that th_e General Staff was prcparing
plans for the eventuality of war w1th Germany. When the
President asked him if this were true, Breckinridge replied
that he did not know. The Prcsident then directed him to
investigate, and, if he found that it was true, to relieve
every officer on the General Staff and order him out of Was
hington. 1
These incidents together illustrate two basic points
conceming the American political mind. First, liberalism
domínated American cbinking from the Revolution through
the first-half of the twentieth century. Second, liberalism does
not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the
military function.
The universality of liberalism in the United States and its
es sentially static quality contrast with the variety and
dynamism of ideologies in Europe. The Frenchman has had
firsthand experi ence with aristocratic conservatism,
revolutionary democracy, Bonapartism, clericalism,
monarchism, liberalism, socialism, com•
1 gest the proper course of conduct in international affairs? Not
4 only did every group in American society normally feel
4 economically secure but also American society as a wholc
The ldeological Constant
munism. Thc American knows only liberalism. The political
out look of the Englishman today, be he socialist or Tory, is
funda mentally different from that of tbe average Englishman
at the end of the eighteenth century. The political ideology of
Woodrow Wilson was essentially the same as that of Elbridge
Gerry. Lib eralism ín the Unitcd States has been unchanging,
monotonous, and all-embracing.
The American colonists inherited their liberal ideas from
the
English tradition of Locke. The dominance of liberalism in
Amer ica, howevcr, was the product not of inheritance but of
cconomic expansion and international iso\ation. Stcady
economic growth dilutcd class conflict. There werc few
struggles ovcr thc distribu tion of the pie becausc the pie was
always growing larger. No nasccnt group cver developed a
radical ideology challenging the established order: it was always
too quickly assimilated into that arder. Nor did any cstablished
group (with two exceptions) ever develop a conservative
ideology defending its interests against radical onslaught. The
oncoming wave always cvaporated short of the gates of the
castle. Radicalism and conservatism were equa\ly superfluous.
lncipient and cstablished groups both adhcred to liber alism. In
the absence of European feudalism, European classes, and a
European proletariat, political struggle in America was re
stricted to squabbles for Iimited objectives among interest
groups all of whom shared the same basic values. 2 The grcat
political con troversies of American history with a few
exceptions have been between two or more varieties of
liberalism. The isolation of the United States from world
politics in the ninetecnth century rein forced the dominance of
liberalism. National security was a simple given fact - the
starting point of politica\ analysis - not the end result of
conscious policy. What need was there for a philosophy to
explain Amcrica's relation with the rest of the world and to sug
normally felt politically secure. American awareness of _the
role of power in domcstic poli tics was dulled by thc absence of
class conflict. American awareness of the role of power in
forcign politics was dulled by the absence of external threats.
1
4
5
 The Soldier and the State ¡· The ldeological Constant
The pervasiveness of the liberal doctrine in the United States
has been commented upon by foreign observers from De Tocque 1 domestic source of Fede,ralist conservatism disappeared, however,
ville to Myrdal. Liberalism permeated American society and created 1 when the Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800 turned out to be a false
alarm. The diluting principie was already at work; there were no
a uniformity of belief among the American people which would be 1
the envy of a totalitarian dictator. Even those institutions which ¡ mobs in the streets, no confiscation of private property, no guil
lotines. Class distinctions blurred instead of hardening and eventu
inherently seem to be most illiberal capitulated befare its influence.
ally melted in the Era of Good Feelings. John Quincy Adams, of
Organized religion is normally a conservative force. In America,
impeccablc Federalist heritage, was elected President by the Jeffer
however, Protestantism was refashioned in the liberal image and
sonian party, thus fulfilling its founder's inaugural dictum that "We
1
even Catholicism was significantly influenced by the liberal
are all Federalists; we are ali Republicans." Extemally, the Treaty
environ
mcnt. More than a century separated Jonathan Edwards from Henry of Ghent marked the withdrawal of Europe from America and the
i beginning of eighty years of splendid continental isolation on the
Ward Beecher. While the conquest of religion was perhaps liberal
part of the United States. As the threats at home and abroad
ism's most significant victory ideologically, its acceptance by busi
disappeared, conservative Federalism vanished also.
ness was much more significant politically. Toe ideology of American
The second exception to liberal dominance was the ante-
business - that peculiar mixture of Enlightenment ra tionalism,
bellum South. The causes of Southern conservatism were primarily
liberalized Protestantism, Social Darwinism, and ortho dox economic
do mestic. The Southern social system was an illiberal island in a
individualism - was liberal to the core. Along with the other groups
liberal society. In sclf-defense the Southerners, like the Federalists
in American society, business never felt impelled to develop a
before them, demonstrated their conservatism by creative and
conservative ideology. It joined with the churches, the universities, the
origi nal political speculation. Paradoxically, America, the land of
professions, and the labor movement in adhering to the liberal
liberalism, never produced an outstanding liberal political theorist.
creed of individualism, rationalism, and progress.
Unchallenged at home and from abroad, American liberalism suf
Only two significant groups in American history failed to ad
fered from the absence of competition; liberal writers were con tent
here to the liberal ideology. Both were genuinely conservative and
to repeat eighteenth-century formulas. Conservatives, forced to
both existed befare the Civil War. The Federalists had their roots in
justify themselves in a hostile society, however, were driven to
the New England and Atlantic coast commercial and manufac
political theory, and the Old South produced notable conservative
turing interests in the period roughly from ·1789 to 1812. Their
expressions in the work of George Fitzhugh and John C. Calhoun.
conservatism derived from both internal and externa! challenges.
Unlike the Federalists, moreover, the Southerners had good
At home they believed themselves to be the party of the "rich and
grounds far their domestic fears. The slaveowners were the only
well born," and the more extreme Federalists feared a social
significant social group in the history of the United States ever to
revolu tion on the French model by the propertyless elements of the
be forcibly dispossessed of their property. The Civil War settled the
cities and the back country farmers of the frontier. The Federalists
fate of Southcrn conservatism. After 1865 1iberalism reigned un
were also responsible for the conduct of American foreign policy
challenged on the American scene.*
during the first twelve years of the Republic when European
The American liberal approach to military affairs was hostile,
interests still threatened the infant nation. The United States was
static, and dominant; the conservative approach of the Federalists
surrounded by French, English, and Spanish territory, and by the
and the South sympathetic, constructive, and thwarted. It is no
British fleet. They thus had a legitimate concern for the national
security. The conservative ideology of the Federa!ists was reflected * The Neo-Hamiltonians of the turn of the century -Theodore Roosevelt,
in the writing of Hamilton and John Adams, the general temper and Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Herbert Croly - were semi-conservative. See
below, Chapter 10.
attitudes of Washington, and the judicial statesmanship of Jobn
Marshall. The 147
146
 The Soldier and the State
coincidcnce that the two statesmen who displayed the most pene
trating insight into military policy and th deepest appreciation of
the military function were the two great spokesmen of the
conserva tive groups: Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun.
They stand in sharp contrast to liberal leaders not just in their
views on military policy but in their intercst in military affairs. In
more than a hundred and fifty years American Iiberalism never
produced a gov ernmental leader with comparable ability and
interest in military
matters. Hamilton and Calhoun, however, were isolated from the mainstream
of American intellectual and political development.
Their military policy, Iike their political philosophy, was never
popular with the American people. The avalanche of liberalism
brushed them aside into a discredited cranny of history.
TUE LIBERAL APPROACH TO MILITARY AFFAIRS
What I come to is a sense of suddenly being left in the lurch, of sud
denly finding that a philosophy upan which I relied to carry us through
no longer works . . . The contrast between what liberals ought to
be doing and saying if democratic values are to be conserved, and what
thc r al forces are imposing upon them, strikes too stemly on my intel
lectual senses.3
Tbese wocds of Randolpb Bourne six months after America's entry
into World War I poignantly expressed the futility experienced by a
sensitive and acute observer as he tried to apply the philosophy of
1iberalism to the problem of war. The stubborn fact facing Bourne
was simply that bis philosophy <lid not furnisb means to think
about war, peace, and international relations. These problems were,
to use the phrase of E. F. M. Durbin, "the greater, excluded qucs
tion" of liberalism. Magni:ficently varied and creative when limited
to domestic issues, liberalism faltered when applied to foreign
policy and defense. Tbis failure was characteristic of liberalism in
Europe as well as in tbe United States, but in Europe its implica tions
were not so obvious. Each European country bad other phi losophies
competing with liberalism which furnished more compe tent ways of
dealing with national security. Tbe dominance of the liberal mind in
the United States, however, meant, first, that the absence of a
conservative or other more useful philosophy on for eign affairs was
mucb more keenly felt in the conduct of American
148
The ldeological Constant
foreign and defense policies, and, secondly'. that Ame_rican
liberal ism unable to evade responsibility in this area, tned far
more ex nsively tban European liberalism to create a liberal
approach to interstate relations. On the other band, American
experience also tended to reinforce and magnify the principal
elements in liberal thought which contributed to its incapacity in
internat_ion_al -ela tions. These elements of American liberalism
¡
l were ( 1) 1ts md1ffer ence to international affairs, (2) its application
of domestic solu tions to international affairs, and (3) its search for
1 objectivity in intemational affairs.
Liberalism originated in the assertion of the rights of the indi
vidual against the state. Liberal tbought focused upon t?e e ation
of the individual to the state and the relations among md1v1duals
within a society. Liberalism never questioned the existence of tbe
state. Instead it presupposed the state's self-sufficiency and externa!
1 security. In bis classic work on European liberalism, for inst ce,
Ruggiero assigned three functions to the liberal state: tbe pohtJcal
function of adjusting and synthesizing tbe interests witbin society;
the legal function of gnaranteeing the rigbts of the individual; and
the economic and social function of broadening tbe opportunities
for individual self-development. He did not give the liberal state a
security function. It was presumed to exist in vacuo. Concerned
witb the defense of the individual against the state, liberalism was
ill-equipped to justify tbe defense of one state against another.
Liberal parties in both Europe and America typically neglected
foreign policy and defense problems. Few liberals atten:i-pted to
cultivate the diplomatic and military skills. The assumptlon of a
1
!
state in a vacuum was particularly relevant to American liberalism
because for almost a century American reality approximated the
liberal image. The applicability of the liberal assumption to the
1 United States settled it all the more firmly in tbe American mind
and created problems ali tbe more difficult to solve when the
vacuum began to break down.
A second aspect of liberalism in relation to security problems
was its application of domestic policies to international affairs. Toe
issues of foreign policy involve the distribution of power among
nations. Unable to tackle this problem directly, liberalism tried to
reduce foreign policy and defense issues to domestic terrns wbere
149

The Soldier and the State
it could deal with them effectively. This again was particularly
characteristic of American liberalism because of the tremendous
success of liberal solutions witbin American society. From the liberal
viewpoint, thc absence of serious social conflict in the United States
was lhe product of a distinctive legal system and a distinctive
economic system. In other countrics, where thc legal systcm was
not above controversy or where the economic system was not
so spectacularly successful, the tendency toward this approach was
not so strong as in the United States. But Americans succes sively
urged thc adoption of a whole series of domestic reforms as the
solution to international problems. The universal acceptance of the
republican form of government, intemational free trade, the
industrialization of backward areas, the elimination of poverty,
1 toward war has fluctuated widely and yet preserved an underlying
arbitration trcaties, the World Court, the outlawing of war, open
covenants opcnly arrived at, intensified cultural contacts among na
tions, were ali proposed at one time or another as essential to
American foreign policy. In advocating these reforms, American
liberalism attempted to transpose its dornestic successes to foreign
relations.
A third aspect of the difficulties of American liberalism in for
eign affairs was its search for objective standards and ideal goals.
Liberalism tended to judge nations by an absolute standard: the
extent to which they maximized freedom far the individual
The application of this standard to foreign policy tended to pro
duce a curious sense of detachment and objectivity. For the liberal,
to be consistent, had to judge bis own nation by the same stand ard
that he applied to others. Consequently, he normally felt alien ated
from the struggle for power among nations. Liberalism was not a
philosophy of involvement. It has always had an Aristotelian air
about it. It originated as the philosophy of the middle class, and
viewed itself as the rational mean between the extremes of arisfoc
racy and proletarianism. In the twentieth century the liberal carne
to think of himself as the vital centcr between communism and
fascism. Until recently, this aspect of liberalism was enhanced in
the United States by thc fáct that the United States was detacbed
from the operation of the European state system. The liberal phi
losophy of the middle of the road accurately described the position
of the United States in world politics. Toe immediate reaction of
150
The ldeological Constan/
ur first President to European war was a proclamation of
neutrality. nly when its neutral rights were violated or when its
position as the balancer was threatened did the United States
enter the wars of Europe in 1812, 1917, and 1941. Tbc position
of the liberal,
detached from society and judging it in tenns of ªf.l ideal standa.rd,
coincidcd with the position of the United States m world a:ffatrs.
Just as the liberals were willing to fight for their ideals but seldom
for thcir institutions, the United States by virtue of its noninvolve
ment in the balance of power was able to pursue foreign policy ob
jectives defined in terms of universal ideals rather than in terms
of national interests.
AMERICAN AMBIVALENCE TOWAR.D WAR. The American attitude
unity. The American tends to be an extremist on the subject of war:
he either embraces war wholeheartedly or rejects it completely.
This extremism is required by the nature of the liberal ideology.
Since liberalism deprecates the moral validity of the interests of the
state in security, war must be either condemned as incompatible
with liberal goals or justified as an ideological movement in sup
port of those goals. American thou.ght has not viewe war in .the
conservative-military sense as an mstrument of nat1onal poltcy.
When Clausewitz's dictum on war as the carrying out of state
policy by other means has been quoted by nonmilitary merica
writers, it has been to condemn it for coldblooded calculat1on and
tmmoral ity. Am.ericans have enshrined much of Washington's
Farewell A dress in the national ideology, but they bave never
accepted bis view, so similar to that of Clausewitz, that the nation
should be able to "choose peace or war as its interests guided by
justice sball coun sel" The relatively detached, realistic,
unemotional attitude toward war which this advice embodies has
been distinctly alien to the American mind.
The pacifist current in American thought has been strong. The
total rejection of war accords with the liberal view that meo are
rational and that consequently tbey should be able to arrive at a
peaceable solution of differences. Ali that is needed is either the
proper education - the elimination of nationalistic and bellicose
propaganda - or the proper institutions - intemational organiza
tion and arbitration treaties - to furnish the machinery for the
151
 The Soldier and the State
pacific scttlement of disputes. Organized pacifism in western civili
zation has normally been a middle-class movement and the United
Statcs, as the middlc-class country par cxccllcnce, has had its full
sharc of such thinking."
The crusading approach to war has not been incompatible with
pacifism. It is a common observation that American nationalism
has becn an idealistic nationalism, justified, not by the assertion of
the supcriority of the American people ovcr other peoplcs, but by
the assertion of the superiority of American ideals over othcr
ideals. " '[T]o be an American,'" as Carl J. Friedrich reminds us, ..is
an ideal, while to be a Frenchman is a fact." American idealism has
tended to make evcry war a crusade, fought, not far specific objec
tivcs of national security, but on behalf of universal principles such
as democracy, freedom of the seas, and self-dctermination. Jndeed,
far thc American a war is not a war unless it is a crusade. The
usual listing of American wars omits all mention of the ninetccnth-
cen tury Indian struggles, although many were longer and bloodier
than sorne of the seven wars which are normally recognized. The
Indian strugglcs did not have the ideological goals and popular
enthusiasm of a crusade; they were waged primarily by regular
troops not by special forces enlisted far that war alone. Thc British,
in contrast, have no hesitancy in classifying their border struggles
as wars when they were serious enough to warrant the appellation,
as, far exam ple, the First and Second Afghan Wars. Aside from the
Indian conflicts, however, it was not until June 1950 that the
American people were called upon to support a war rather than
to enlist in a crusade.
The tendency to swing from one extreme to another has a self
perpetuating quality. War aims phrased in sweeping ideological terms
are seldom capable of achievement. Consequently, war is normally
followed by a period of disillusionment with the teE:h niques of
violence as meaos for securing liberal goals. After the Spanish-
American War there was a wave of anti-imperialism. After World
War I there was the isolationist and revisionist reaction. Emphasis
was put upon eliminating war or finding a substitute far war. The
Hague Court and the arbitration treaties followed the Spanish-
American War; the Kellogg pact, disarmament confer ences, and
neutrality acts followed World War l. EventuaUy, when
152
r The Ideological Constan!
tbese techniques fail to safcguard the national interests, d illus on
ment with liberal pacifism sets in, national interests are rattonalized
in tenns of new ideological goals, and enthusiasm mounts for a
1 new crusade.
THE HOSTILE IMAGE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION. Liberalism
1 ·s divided in its views on war but it is united in ils hostility to thc
ilitary profcssion. The function of this profession is the_ military
security of the state, and the lcgitimacy of this conccrn IS recog•
1 nized by neither crusader nor pacifist. Both see the military pro
fession as an obstacle to the achievement of their own aims. The
pacifist views the professional military man as a armonger, plot•
ting to bring about conflicts so as to cnhancc_ h1s ow ank and
power. The crnsader views the profossional sold1er as a sm1ste drag
upon the conduct of war, uninterested and unarous ? by the 1deals
for which thc war is fought. The pacifist sees the m1latary man con
taminating bis peace; the crusader sees him contaminating bis cru-
sade. .
The pacifist view that thc professional mi\itary man desircs
war is a widespread one in western society. More peculiarly Ameri
can is the opposition to the professional military man in war. In
Great Britain, far instance, the military have traditionally suffered
in peace but have been rclied upon in war: the shifts of British
attitude are wcll reflected in Kipling's "Tommy Atkins." In Amcr•
ica, however, the regular has been rejected in both peace and war.
Crusades must be fought by peoples not by professiona1s. Those
most interested in the ideological objectives of the war have been
most vehement in denouncing the conservative, limited policies of
the professional military officcrs. This attitude :"'ªs well expre scd
with reference to the Mexican War by Nathamel Hawthome m a
campaign biography of Franklin Pierce:
The valor that wins our battles is not the trained hardihood of
veterans, but a native and spontaneous fire; and thcre is surely a
chivalrous beauty in the devotion of the citizen soldier to his country's
cause which the man who makes arms his profession and is but doing
his d ty cannot pretend to rival.11
In the Civil War the Radical Republicans, anxious to pursue a vigorous
and aggressive policy toward the South. were bitter in
1S3
 The Soldier and the State
their attacks on the cautious behavior of McCJellan and otber gen
erals. Tn a similar vein Woodrow Wilson, during World War I,
minimized the role of the professional on the grounds that:
This is an unprecedented war and, therefore, it is a war in one sense
for amateurs ... Toe experienced soldier, - experienced in previous
wars, - is a back number so far as his expericnce is concemed ...
America has always boasted that she could find men to do any thing.
She is the prize amateur nation of the world. Germany is the prize
professional nation of thc world. Now, when it comes to doing new
things and doing thcm well, I will back the amateur against the profes sional
every time.7
The essential conservatism of the military outlook has caused
American libcralism to identify its external and domestic enemies
with military professionalism. The Revolutionary War was de scribed
as a war of citizcn-soldiers against the standing armies and
mercenaries of Georgc III. The Civil War was against the West Point
directed armies of the South. President Wilson's words quoted above
reflect the American view that German militarism was the principal
encmy in World War l. In World War JI the American identification of
the German Anny with tbe Nazi regime frustrated the possibilities of
capitalizing on the opposition of the former to the latter. The
professionals, in other words, are always on the other side.
In domestic politics each liberal group tends to identify the
military with its own particular cnemies. Without any recognized
function in a liberal society and standing outside the American
ideological consensus, the mi!itary have been a universal target
group. The identification of the military with the political enemy
was initially valid because eighteenth-century military institutions
were fundamentally aristocratic and opposed to Iiberalism. This
pattern of thinking persisted, however, after the military had be•
come divorced from the aristocracy and had begun to be profes
sionalized. Each successive emergent liberal group identified the
military with the vested interests of the old arder. The Jeffersonian
Democrats saw the military as the aUy of monarchy and a threat
to liberty. The Jacksonians saw them as the foundation of aristoc
racy and a threat to democracy. Business saw the military as the
154
r 1
l
The Ideological Constan!
obsolete remnant of a past agrarian age, the refuge of parasites
from the competitive ardors of civilian life, and threat to produc tivity.
Labor and reform groups, on the othcr hand, have pictured a
sinister alliance of business and the military. Obviously, ali these
theories could not be true, and in actual fact, with the exception of
their affiliations with the South, the military have had no sig nificant
1 tics with any group in American society. Yet it is precisely this
isolation which makes them eligible to be everybody's cncmy. The
t identification of the military with the domestic enemy has a double
effcct. It enables each liberal group to cxaggerate the gap between it
and its· political opponent by identifying ítself with civilian control
and its opponent, who was normally within the liberal consensus, with
the military profession, which was outsidc that consensus. This use of
the military is thus one manifestation of the tendency of all groups in
American society to magnify their political differences by linking their
opponents with foreign or "un American" groups. At the same time,
however, this practicc also serves to reinforce the antimilitary
' attitudes already present in the
American mind.
LIBERAL MILITARY POLICY: CONFOI<.M OR DIE. These hostile
images have been the basis of the military policy of American
Iiberalism. The essence of this policy is sustaincd opposition to mili
tary values and military requirements. Liberalism's injunction to
the military has in effect been: conform or die. On the onc hand,
American liberalism has supported the virtual elimination of ali
institutions of violence and thus has attempted to do away with the
problem of civil-military relations entirely. This is a policy of cx
tirpation. On the other hand, when it has becn necessary to main tain
anned force, American liberalism has insisted upon a rigorous
subjcctive civilian control, the refashioning of the military institu
tions along liberal lines so that they lose thcir peculiarly military
characteristics. This is a policy of transmutation. Together these
two approaches represent the American solution to the problem of
civil-military relations. While difieren in meaos, both policies have
the same goal of the subordination of functional military impcra tives
and the professional military viewpoint.
The policy of extirpation has tended to prevail in peace when
security needs have not rcquired the maintenance of large armed
155
.,

The Soldier and the State
forces. lts most obvious manifestatíon has been the devotion to the
idea of "a small standing army." It is reflected in a number of
attitudes which havc been fairly constantly characteristic of the
American approach to military affairs.
( 1) Large military forces are a threat to liberty. This attitude was
particularly popular in the first years of the Republic and was directed
principally against thc Army. It was revived in somewhat diffcrent
form at the end of thc nineteenth century whcn it was asserted that
military forces tended to infringe upan the civil Iiber ties of citi7.cns.
The danger then was viewed not so much to liberty in the abstract as
it was to specific libcrties such as the right to strike, to refuse
military service, and to cngagc in pacifist propa ganda.
(2) Large military forces are a threat to democracy. This at
titude appcared with Jacksonianism. lt viewed the officer corps as
an "aristocratic caste" plotting to subvcrt popular government. It
was directed against both the Army and the Navy, although its most
typical expression was resentment at the "West Point dique."
(3) Large military forces are a threat to economic prosperity.
Sincc it was impossible to view the Navy as a danger to liberty,
the Jeffersonians attacked itas a danger to the economy. Aftcr the
Civil War, when the professionalization of the officcr corps de
prived the "danger to liberty" argument of much of its appeal
even against the Army, this "burden of armaments" argument was
applied to all military forces in general. It was popular both with
business groups and with radical groups, each of whom attacked
the unproductiveness of military force.
(4) Largc military forces are a threat to peace. The vicw that
armaments races lead to war and that the military are the principal
supporters of war was one element in Jeffersonian opposition to a
Navy and has, of course, been a consistent part of the pacifist atti
tude. It became most popular, however, about the beginning of the
twentieth century and, like the ''burden of annaments" argument,
has continued down to the present time.
The policy of transmutation has prevailed more in war when
large armed forces were recognized as necessary. Elements of it,
however, have also appeared in peace. lt is perhaps best symbolized
in the slogan that "primary reliance should be placed upon a mi-
156
The ldeological Constant
litia," and in Joscphus Danicls' declaration in 1915 with respcct
to the Navy tbat: "You cannot have an institution in Amcrica that is
not Americanized." Torce principal arguments bave been ad vanced
in support of this policy.
First, military defense is, like suffrage, the responsibility of
every citizen. It cannot be delcgated to a small exclusive group.
This view which originated in the colonies before the rise of mili
tary profcssionalism was pcrpetuated into the twentieth century in
the concepts of the "citizen-soldier" and the "nation in arms."
Second, a democratic country must have a dcmocratic military
force. This, too, has come down from colonial times, its most
extreme manifestation being the practice of electing officers. In its
milder fonns it emphasizcs thc desirability o( abolishing distinc tions
between officers and enlisted men, inculcating the dcmocratic Jiberal
ideology into the forces, and relying more on individual initiative than
upon discipline and coordination.
Third, the armed forces, if they must be maintaincd, should
be utilized to furthcr other socially desirable objectives. This has
been a pcrsistent element throughout American history from the
beginning of the public works activities of the Corps of Engineers
1 down to tbe present time. It contrasts with the Caihoun-Root view
tbat the only purpose of military forces is war.
THE MILITARY HERO IN LIBERAL POLlTICS
''
The American temper has been so strongly antimilitary that
the question inevitably arises: Why have military heroes been so
popular in the United States? How is it that ten of our thirty-three
presidents have been generals, and that military exploits have con
tributed so much to the popularity and success of others such as
Theodore Roosevelt? Why is it that careful analysis indicates that
the military hero by and large makes a more successful política!
candidate than thc man without military experience? Is not this a
peculiar anomaly in a society which has generally had little regard
for the military? In contrast, England since 1789 has only had one
prime minister, the Duke of Wellington, who was also a successful
general.8
The answer to these questions is, of course, that the popularity
of tbe military hero in America is the supreme example of liberal
157
 The Soldier and the State The Jdeological Constan!
transmutation. The successful military hero has been the man eitbcr
fifteen men is the extent to which the nonprofessionals had better far
who was a nonprofessional soldier or who, if he was a professional
tune than tbc professionals. Only one of the nine nonprofessionals,
soldier. abandoned hís military trnppings and adopted the guise
Frémont, failed to see the inside of the White House; on the other
of Iibcralism. The role of the military hero in America is indeed
hand, three of the six professionals werc unsuccessful. In terros of
conclusive proof that political power and military professionalism
campaigns, the score is more even: the nonprofessionals won ten out

!
are incompatible in the American climate. The American public has
of fifteen campaigns; the professionals, five out of eight. In two of the
never hesitated to make heroes out of those figures who for sake
three elections which regular officcrs lost, the víctor was a nonprofes
their military heritage. The military man qua military man, on the
sional military hero: Pierce defeated Scott in 1852 and Garficld
other hand, has ncver been popular. As Dixon Wecter has pointed
defeated Hancock in 1880. In both elections the issue of the citi zen
out, al! the great national heroes of American history, with the
amateur versus professional soldier played a significant role. Scott
possiblc exception of Washington, have been líberals, and thc
was attacked far bis military formality; bis war record and bis
professional soldier, consequently, has had little durable appeal.
fnstead, it has been the amateur or the defrocked professional, even 1 allegedly mcrcenary motives were contrasted unfavorably with the
simple idealism, patriotism, and valor of the citizen-soldier Pierce
the rnilitary iconoclast, who has gained tbe sympatby of the Ameri can
answering tbe call to duty. Twenty-eight years later, Scott's namcsake,
people.
Winfield Scott Hancock, suffered the same sort of at tacks. His
Fiftccn majar party presidential nominees may be classified as
military heroes. Nine were nonprofessional in the sense that the
military career was neither their exclusive nor even, in most in
1 cxclusively military career was claimed to have unsuited him for the
Presidency, and bis military adherence to civilian con trol during
Reconstruction was interpretcd as partiality to the South. Garfield's
stances, their primary occupation. These nine included Washing
ton, Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Pierce, Frémont, Hayes, 1 supporters strcssed bis variety of experience as Jawyer, teacher,
scholar, statesman, general, and Senator. While the American
Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, and Theodore Roosevelt. The six
professionals were Taylor, Scott, McClellan, Grant, Hancock, and ' people like their political candidates to be rni!itary heroes, they want

1
Eisenhowcr. * The outstanding fact of the political careers of these thcir military experience to be an interlude in, or a sideline to, an
otherwise civilian career. With the exception of military heroes
• Ali o the nonprofessionals cxcept Jackson, W. H. Hanison, and Frémont straight from the field of victory, they normally prefer a well-
mct lhe pr,mary test of the citizen-soldler: thcir military so,rvice was limited to
yo,ars of war or thc threat of war. Jackson entered tbc national military service rounded candidate who has been a success in law. politics, business, or
from the Tcnnesseo, mi!itia during the War of 1812 and remaim:d in the Army s;ven otber civil activity to one whose talents have been exclusivcly
years afte thecndof thewar. He had, bowever, already made a reputa- 1100 as
military. Tbe liberal hero is a versatile hcro. "Americans," as Dixon
lawyer, ¡udge, p!anter, and politician, befare bccoming a so\dier. W. H. Harr.j on was
a Regular Army officcr from 1791 to 1798 but bis reputation as a m1htary hero
was baso,d on his subsequent scrvicc as Governor of Indiana Territory andas a
major general in the War of 1812. Frémont servcd for about f?urteen rears in the Army
1 Wecter has said. "have a special affcction far the man of peace-
like Sergeant York in the World War wholeaves bis trade only
in, peace and war from 1834 to 1848 but bis peace lime serv1ce was almos! long enough to beat tbe military at tbeir own game." 11
exclus1vely devoted to exploration. Taylor aod Scott were not West Pointers, but each The popularity of the military professionals depended on the
spent virtua!ly atl his adult life in thc Army. Grant was seva::n years outs.idc the
servic bu! never bccame proficient al any other tradc. McClellan was a ra1l.road extent to which they became men of the people rather than men
cxccut,vc: for four years befare the Civil War, Eisen hower a collc:ge prc:s1dent for an of tbe military. The three professional officers who became Presi dent
even shortcr period. Hancock was ncver out of uniform. All thc professionals, c:xccpl
McC\ellan, were on active scrvice whc:n did so largely through tbe combination of military victory and
:'dvanced for thc Presi<;Jency. LeWis Cass, Dcmocratic nominec against Taylor
1n 18.48, :wa.s
a ge.neral m the War of 1812, but his military record playcd little as Prc:sident. Nolletheless, his Spanish-American War cxploits playc:d such a sig
role _m hi , campa1gn, and consequently he: caonot be da3scd as a "military hc:ro nifican! role in his political rise, that it scems legitimatc to classify him with the
cand1date: In a .sensc, heodorc: Roosevc:lt was only a mílitary hero eandidate nonprofc:ssional military heroes.

!l
for the v1ce-pres1deney; m 1904 he ran primarily on his record and personalíty
159
158

¡

The Soldier and the State
pleasing personality. Their military service enabled them to be pre
sented as the servants, not of party or faction, but of ali the people,
and this plus a homey, folksy sort of personality - "Rough and
Ready," "Uncle Sam," "Ike" - did the trick. These factors also
enabled them to avoid commitment upon most of the issues of the day.
They appealed to the public not because they had a dcfinite program,
roilitary or otherwise, but because they had so little pro gram. Tbose
professionals who were defeated - Scott, McClellan,
Hancock - either were too distinctly the military type, possessed
forbidding personalities, or demonstrated too clearly and too carly
their ineptness in the civilian world. Tbe failure of any naval officer
ever to win a presidcntial nomination or evcn, with thc exception
of Dewey, to be seriously considered for such a nominatíon also
reflects the more narrowly professional and isolated character of
the naval officer corps. Naval o:fficers, more than their Army col
leagucs, tended to live in a world apart from civilian society, and
consequently have found it difficult to establish a broad political
appeal.• That officer has also generally been unsuccessful who
has attempted to vindicate himself at the polls for rough treatment
accorded him while in the service by a hostile administration. The
American people want victorious generals not vengeful ones. Fré
mont's appeal in 1856 and bis abortive candidacy in 1864 reflected
bis uncereroonious exits from the Army in 1848 and 1862. Scott
wanted to justify himself against the Democrats for his removal
from coromand at the end of the Mexican War, and McOellan harbored
similar grudges against Lincoln. In the twentieth century Leonard
Wood was unable to win much support by claiming that be had been
unjustly denied a field command in World War I, and
General MacArthur's dramatic dismissal did not set up a counter
ing tidal wave of political support in his favor.
Professional officers who have become President bave con fonned
to the civilian pattem not only as canclidates but also in office. With
one possible exception, their policies as a whole have not
1
significantly differed from the policíes of those presidents with
out military experience. More passively, perhaps, than many civil-
• Tbe political disabilit:y of naval officers has extended to congressional elec
tions also. In 150 yean apparently only six former officers of the Regu)ar Navy
wcrc clcctcd to Con . U.S. Naval In.stitutc Pr,:,c,,,,dings, LXXVII (Dccembcr
1951), 1339-IJ.40.
•••
The Jdeological Constant
ian politicians, they have bcen the accuratc repr entatives and_ in
struroents of the dominant political forces of their day. In particu lar,
thcy have not tricd to iropose dcfinitc policy views on thc go
ernment, but have played it largely by ear and have usually pa1d great
deference to thc wishcs of Congress. "It's casy enou ,h to be
President," Admiral Dewey is reportcd to havc declared, ali you
have to do ... is to takc orders from Congress." 10 0nly with
respect to thc size of the military forces do thc po\icics of thc pro
fessional military presidents appcar to cliffer significantly from thosc
of the civilians. The administrations of Taylor, Grant, and Eisen hower
all saw substantial rcductions in the military establishment. In part,
i
this was due to postwar demobilization. In part, it was also certainly
due to an ovcr-adjustment to civilian valucs and thc fact tbat it is
much easier for a general to reduce the sizc of the Army than for
anyone else to do so.
Thc risc of military profcssionalism after thc Civil War tended
to sharpen thc line bctween the military and politics. Prior to that
time most politicians held militia commissions, and many moved in
and out of thc Regular Army. Five of the nine nonprofcssional can
didates ran for office before the Civil War and three made their mil
itary reputations in the Civil War. With the cxception of Theodore
Roosevelt's fling in the Spanish-American War, the War Bctween
the States was the last opportunity for the citizen-officer to make a
name for himself. America has fought its twentieth-century wars
under professional leadership. The nonprofessional military hero
!"
is probably a phcnomcnon of the past. Citizcn-soldiers h fu ture
will only be able to distinguish themselves by md1v1dual exploits
of valor - like Sergeant York - not by the command of victorious
armies.
What, howevcr, can be said about the professional military
¡ hero? Has he tended to become more or less important? Two of
the professionals, Taylor and Scott, were candidates in the pre-Civil
War years when, even for regulars, the line between military service
and politics was not very sharp. Three other professional can didates
made their reputations in the Civil War. From 1880 to 1952 no
professional military man was nominatcd for the Presidency.
Admira] Dewey and General Wood, the two professionals during
í these years who most obviously yearned for the Presidency, did
161