The Soldier and the State

not get very far. And Wood, who entered the Army as a physician and
made his military reputation as a volunteer officer in the Span ish-
American War, was really only a "semi-pro." The sevcnty-two
r! 7
year break bctween J-lancock and Eisenhower thus reflected the
heighcened professionalism of the post-1865 military. Nonprofcs
'
sional soldiers (except for Theodore Roosevelt) did not becomc
military hero candidates because they <lid not become military
The Structural Constant,,
heroes. Professional soldiers did not become military hero candi
dates because they wcre professional: thcy were dubious about ven
The Conservative Constitution
turing into politics and the politicians wcre dubious about seeking
aftcr them. The election of Eisenhower in 1952, on the other
versus Civilian Control
hand, signalized the entrancc of the military professional into poli
tics in the drastically changcd conditions prevailing aftcr 1940.
THE CONSTITVTIONAL ABSENCE OF OBJECTIYE CIVILJAN CONTROL

The United States Constitution, despite the widespread bclief

to the contrary, docs not provide for civilian control. That is, it
does not permit the objective civilian control compatible with a high
Ievel of military professionalism. The essence of civilian control in
this sense is a clear distinction bctween political and military re
sponsibilities and the institutional subordination of the latter to the
formcr. These are unknown to the Constitution, which mixes politi cal
and military functions, interjecting politics into military atfairs and
military affairs into politics. Prcsent in the minds of the Fram ers
when they wrote it and perpetuated in its provisions was an essentially
subjective approach to civil-military relations. Civilian control has at
times existed in the United States, but it has emerged despite rather
than because of constitutional provisions.
The very aspects of the Constitution which are frequently cited
as cstablishing civi!ian control are those which make it difficult to
achieve. Civilian control would be maximized if the military were
limited in scope and relegatcd to a subordinate position in a pyra mid
of authority culminating in a single civilian head. The military clauses
of the Constitution, however, provide far almost exactly the opposite.
They divide civilian responsibility for military affairs and foster the
direct access of the military authorities to the highest levels of

1¡ government:
163

162
 The Soldier and the State
( 1) Within the total federal system of government, the militia
clauses divide control over the militia bctween the state and na tional
governments.
.. (2) Within the national government, the separation of powers
divides control of the national military forces bctwcen Congress
and the President.
(3) Within the executive branch of the national government, the
Commander in Chief clause tends to divide control ovcr the military
betwecn the President and departmental secretarics.
These lattcr two provisions reflect the distribution of military
P_º"'.'ers. in the British government in the eighteenth centmy. The
s1milanty, however, turned into a fundamental difference in the course
of a century and a half. The evolution of British govemment centralized
ali authority over thc military in the Cabinet, and the British
constitution today provides for extremely effective civilian control. The
American Constitution, however, remains frozen in the eighteenth-
century pattern. The centrifugal politics of this coun try and the
written, inflexible character of the Constitution com bined to obstruct
changes similar to those i.J. Great Britain. Ameri can lack of cancero
with military aITairs, furthennore, Ieft the con stitutional structure
almost unsupplemented by statutory enact ments. Prior to the
twentieth century the on1y significant additions were the office of the
Sccretary of War crcated in 1789 and the office of the Secretary of
the Navy created in 1798. Far most of American history, the
Constitution and little else determincd the legal structure of American
civil-military relations.
THE FRAMERS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL
The spceches and writings of the Framers of thc Constitution
abound with statements that the military should be subordinated
to.the civil power. If this is the case, how is it that they apparently
fatled so completely to carry out their intention? The answer is,
of course, that military professionalism and civilian control as the
subordination of that profession to political institutions were sim ply
unknown to the eighteenth century. In tenns of providing far ivil an
control, the Constitution was draftcd at just the wrong time m
history. It was a product of the last years of preprofessional
officership. If it had been framed twenty-five years Iater, its clauses
164
The Structural Constant
with respect to military power might well have been significantly
differcnt. But, as it was, Cor all thcir political wisdom and insight,
the Framcrs did not, with a few exceptions, forescc the emergence
of military professionalism and objective civilian control. It is no
criticism of them that they did not providc far something which
did not exist when they werc drafting thc Constitution. Their approach
to civi\ian control was reílected in their ideas on military officership,
military forces, and governmental organization.
Military O{Jicership. The Constitution does not envisage a
separatc class of persons exclusivcly devotcd to military leadership.
"1 am not acquainted with the military profession," Gcorgc Masan
proclaimed at the Virginia convention and, except far Hamilton,
Pinckney, and a few others, he spoke for all thc Framers. They knew
ncither military profession nor separate military skil!s. Mili tary
officership was thc attribute of any man of affairs. Many mem bers of
the Federal Convention had held military rank during the Revolution;
Washington was only the most obvious of the soldier statesmen. They
combined in their own persons military and politi cal talents much as
the samurai founders of modero Japan also combined them a hundred
years later. Following Blackstone, they believed that in a free state the
citizen did not cease to be a citizen when he became a soldier but
rather became a soldier because he was a citize n. 1
Such views were clearly revealed in the ineligibility and in
compatibility clauses of Article I, Section 6:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the Authority of the
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person
holding any Office under the United States shall be a Mcmber of either
House during his Continuance in Office.
Toe Convention almost unanimously supported the second clause
of this paragraph making Jegislative office incompatible with judi
cial or executive (including military) office. This was required by
the separation of powers. It reflected the necessity of keeping the
legislature distinct from the executive rather than the desirability
of keeping the political distinct from the military. Attention at the
165
 The Soldier and the State
Convention centered on the first dause of the paragraph. As re ported
from the Committee oí Det:iil, this clause proposed to make members
of the legislature ineligible for appointmcnt to any na tional office
during the time for which they were elected. Opinions on the
desirability of permitting legislators to assume civil office varied and
were finally resolved by compromise. There was, how evcr, a
universal belief that Senators and Representativcs should be eligible
for appointment to a military office. "Exclude the officers of thc
anny & navy," said Gouveneur Morris, "and you forma band having a
diffcrent intcrest from & opposed to the civil power: you stimu!atc
them_ to despise & reproach those 'talking Lords who dare not face
the foe.' " What would occur, he inquired, in the
... case of a war, and the Citizen the most capable of conducting it,
happening to be a member of the Legislaturc. What might have beco
the conscquence of such a regulation at the commenccment, ar even in
the Coursc of the late contest far our liberties?
Others, such as Edmund Randolph, who favored the general ineligi
bility of legislators for executive office also recognized that military
talent might well exist in Congress and supported an cxception with
respect to military office. Consequently, the final draft applied in
compatibility to both civil and military office but the eligibility
limitations only to civil office. Subsequently, in the Virginia con
vention Madison defended the eligibility provisions concerning civil
office by citing the absence of any such restrictions upan ap pointment
to military office. His argument plus the lack of any opposition to
legislative eligibility to military office in the ratifica tion debates
indicates how widespread was thc acceptance of this Cincinnatus
theory of military lea de rsh ip. 2
Mi!itary Forces. The Framcrs' concept of nonprofessional of
ficership could have been embodied in either of the two forms of
military organization familiar to eighteenth-century America: the
standing army and the citizen militia. These forms, however, were
essentially the extension into the rnilitary realm of difierent political
beliefs. The standing anny with its upper-class officers and lower
class enlisted men was basically an aristocratic institution. It was
associated with the British Crown and with European despotism. 1t
was also quite unnecessary in the eyes of many Americans. The
166
The Soldier and the State
professional officers wcre just as rare in standing armies as they
were in citizen militias. The former, howcver, becausc thcy were
composcd of full-time soldiers, could cventually evolve into a
r
'
The Structural Constant
distance of the Unitcd States from Eur pe meant t.hat it required no
p ..rmanent military force with the poss1ble except1on of small fron
ti;r garrisons to <leal with t e lndians. Consequently, i.t .was g e.r-
t 1! agreed that primary rehance must be put upon a c1t1zen m1htia
o posed of part-time officers and enlisted men. s was the !Y
i1
form of rnilitary force suitable for the new repubhc. The m1ht1a
ernbodied the democratic principle that defense of the nation was the
responsibility of every citizen. The distinction between officers and
enlisted men was mínimized, and the line between them did not
correspond to any sharp cleavage in thc social structure.
Preference for the militia was almost universal throughout the
states. "There wasnota member in the federal Convention," Edmund
Randolph remarked with only slight exaggeration, "who did not
feel indignation" at the prospect of a standing army. The ratifying
conventions were even more strongly opposcd to regular military
forces. Nonetheless, they approved a Constitution which, while bar
ring standing armies to the states, gave the national government
unlimited power to maintain a military force, the only restriction
being that no appropriations far this purpose could be made for rnore
than two years. The reasons far this apparent anomaly were twofold.
First, it was generally recognized that the national govern ment would
havc to maintain sorne sort of permanent force along thc frontier.
Secondly, there was always the possibility that a stand ing army might
be necessary in an emergency. But the hope and expectation were that
this emergency would never occur and that the power would never
be utilized. Few provisions in the Constitu tion were agreed to with
more reluctance, and sorne delegates most vehemently opposed to
standing forces refused to sign the Constitu tion. Cr: icism of this
unrestricted congressional power was wide spread in the state
conventions. A number of statcs proposed requiring an extraordinary
majority in Congress for the mainte nance of such a force or
suggested amendments declaring the militia to be "the natural defence
of a free state" and standing armies in peace "dangerous to liberty.'' 3
Preference for the militia had two important results for future
civilian control. First, it assigned a majar place in the American
military scheme to a force which could never be professionally
officered or subjected to civilian control. At the time, of course.
167
disciplined body of professionals. This was impossible in a part time
militia force. Secondly, the cxpectation that the militia would be the
main reliance for defense madc the framers relatively un concerned
with dcvising institutional techniques to control military forces in
being. In part, this was the result of the fecling that such devices
could never be successful. To a largcr extcnt, it refl.ected the view
that such deviccs werc unnecessary. The republic would be
defended by its loyal citizen-soldiers. Civilian supremacy would be
maintained by eliminating a distinct military force.
Governmental Organizarían. The Framcrs' concept of civilian
control was to control thc uses to which civilians might put military
force rather than to control the military themselves. Tbey werc
more afraid of military power in the hands of political officials than
of political power in the hands of military officers. Unable to
visualize a distinct military class, they could not fear such a class.
But there was need to fear the concentration of authority over the
military in any single governmcntal institution. As conscrvatives,
they wanted to divide power, including power over the armed
forces. The national government if it monopolized military power
would be a threat to the states; the President if he had sale control
over the armed forces would be a threat to the Congress. Consc
quently, the Framers identified civilian control with the fragmen
tation of authority over the military. Concem far the indepcndence
of Congress from executive control, rather than an understanding
of the distinct nature of the political and military functions, caused
thcm to make legislative and military office incompatible. The
issue of the relative desirability of a militia versus a standing army
was subordinate to the issues of the relative power of the states
and the nation, thc executive and the legislature, over the military
forces, whatevcr their character. Those who wished a strong na
tional government had no hesitancy in arguing: ( 1) that continua
tion of the Articles of Confederation would mean standing armies
in every state; (2) that the proposed national government neces
sarily bad to have the power to raise a standing anny; and (3) tbat
to avoid the necessity of exercising this power, the national govem-
168
The Structural Constan!
ment should also organize and discipline the militia. Supporters
of states rights, on the other hand, argued that it was unnecessary
for the national government to have a standing army and that, in
any case, the states ought to have exclusive control over the militia
in order to protect themsclves against the standing army of the
national government.4
THE MILITIA CLAUSES AND MILITARY FEDERALISM:
THE .EMPIRE WITHIN AN EMPIRE
The rnilitia clauscs of the Constitution hamper civilian con trol
in two ways. First, they give constitutional sanction to a semi
military force which can never be completcly subordinated to
military discipline nor completely removed from political entangle
ments. Secondly, thcy give constitutional sanction to a division of
control over the militia bctween state and national governments
which necessarily involves the militia in the conflicting interests of
the federal system. This unique combination of characteristics -
part civilian and part military, part state and part national - tends
to make the militia independent of the policy-making institutions
of govemment.
The Framers had good reasons to prefer a militia force to a
regular anny. But there was little rational justification for splitting
up the control of this force. As Madison said, this control "did not
seem in its nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities."
Politics if not logic, however, forced the Framers, Madison in
duded, to sup_port dual control. Sorne, such as Hamilton; wanted
complete control in the United States. Others wished the national
govemment to be completely excluded from authority over the
militi . The clas_h of these viewpoints produccd a variety of com
prom1se suggestmns. In thc cnd, the balance of political forces
resulted in the following militia clauses:
The Congress shall have Power . . .
. To providc for calling forth the Militia to cxecute the Laws of thc
Umon, supprcss Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To pro_vide for organizing, arming, and disciplining thc Militia, and
for gov_errung such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
thc Uruted States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appoinbnent
of Officers, and thc Authority of training thc Militia according to thc
•••
 The Soldier and the State The Struc.-ural Constant
discipline prescribed by Congress ... The President shall be Com mander-
in-Chief ... of the Militia of the severa! States, when called into the - ,· militia officers to higher rank than the regular officers
appom ing · · I •h
actual service of the United States ... to h om' tl e m;litia
'. ' also
1 units were theoret1
' states cally
· subord
• the reg1mental mate. n - e h"I
· officers fh h
- ·1 Wa.,. the appomted ote
C1 v t dthe enational volunteers ass1 gned to the statcs, w e t
• · ·
n11htia an · 1 898
In addition, of coursc, Congress also has thc authority to "raise Presidcnt appointed the general officers. The Act. ohf AApnl _22, lW
and support annies" under the anny elause. The exercise of these -d · g for the. .V.olunteer Army, for the Span1s - meneanar
produced· th1s
prOVI 1 0
authorities can be divided into two periods. From 1792 to 1903, •. d1v1ston of authonty.6
the militia was under state control in time of peace and dual control re Dual control in war did not survive the nineteenth.ccntury.. The
in time of war. After 1903 the militia was under dual control in mililia has fought twentieth-century wars as an exclus1vely nation l
time of peace and nationaI control in time of war.* under the army clause. Nor did the system of
fstate
orce contro l m time of peacc extend past 1903. Dual contraI
State control existcd in peacetime throughout the nineteenth h T.
century because Congress, in the Militia Act of 1792, which was un er t e m1 1t1a
the basic legislation in this field until 1903, refuscd to exercise its s became a reality when Congress passed the D1ck Act of that
e Id Th ·¡ ·
powers under the militia clauscs and provided far neither effectivc year. The effccts of these changes were twofo . e m1 1 .tary
federal supervision nor cffective federal support. Consequently, the .
1 m- portance of the militia in time of war was e hanc because 1t
militia remained exclusively state forces when not in the active now
service of the United States. When they were in such scrvice, how had the wherewithal to become an effective mihtary body. The
ever, the dual control under the militia clauses resulted in constant political power of the militia in time of eace was hanc:d. e cause
confusion and bickering over the purposes for which the militia it was placed bctween two competmg authont1es. C1v1han control
tr..ight be used and the appointment of oflicers. In 1812, for in of the militia - difficult in time of war in the nineteenth century -
stance, when the President called out the militia, the govemors of bccame in the twentieth century difficult in time of peace. Thus the
Massachusetts and Connecticut asserted that they and not he had mililia clames :1re the constitutional base for a potent politi al
the right to decide whether the circumstances justified the call. organization - the National Guard, and it spokesman, the
Later in the war militia on the Niagara frontier refused on consti National Guard Association. It is generally recogruzed that con
tutional grounds to enter Canada to support regular American stitutions are created by political forces. lt is also true, however,
troops fighting there. In the Spanish-American War, militia units that constitutions may themselves create or impel the creation of
likewise refused to serve outside the United States. The President political interests. This is the case with the militia clauses and the
was constitucional Commander in Chief of the militia while it was National Guard. Were it not for these clauses, the Guard and the
in federal service. Yet how could he function in this capacity when National Guard Association would not exist with the influence
bis officers in war as well as peace were appointed by state gov which they have today.
emors? In the War of 1812 state governors challenged the authority The National Guard Association was formed in 1878 by a
of the President to subordinate militia units to the command of Reg group of militia officcrs for thc primary purpose of getting Con grcss
ular Army general officers. State officials removed their troops from to exercise its responsibilities under the militia clauses. 1t was
national service as they saw fit and upset the lines of command by designed to "present a united front" for joint contro l.7 Its founders
wished the national government to supply money, instruc tion,
• The problcms raised by the militia clauses have not chaoged fundameotally standards, and a certain measure of supervision to the state militia.
in more recent years, and this discussion of the militia will include events after The Regular Army was opposed because it did not think the militia
1940. In contras!, lhe discussion of tbe separation of powers and the Commander
in Chicf clause in this chapter will be Iimited to 1he period previous to 1940; the could be an effective national force. The dual control advocates,
special problems arising after 1940 will be lreated separately in Part III. however, won their first victory in 1903 and subse quently
170 strengthened and maintained their position despite the con-
171

The Soldier and the State The Structural Constant

tinuing hostility of the Regular Army. Throughout its existence the
Guard has recognized its dependence upon the militia clauses and
has stoutly defended its dual status. Guard officers maintain that
thesc clauscs embody the true sentiments of thc Framers on mili
tary policy. Constitutional "dual control" is opposed to central
control and to exclusive. state control. Toe Iatter is impossible be
cause it is not economically feasible for thc states to carry the en
tire cost of the Guard; the former is unconstitutional because, ac
cording to the Guard, the army clause gives Congress the power
only to rnaintain a standing army not to keep a federal militia. For
the Guard, dual control in peace means that the national govern
ment should supply the funds and the knoW-how while the states
supply the command and direction. The Association has consist
ently sought more federal money for Guard activities but resolutely
opposed any cxtcnsion of federal control. In 1949, for instance, it
demanded increased federal aid far armories and construction, a
uniform clothing allowance for National Guard officers, and the
franking privilegc for National Guard mail. At the same time it
vigorously condcmned further federal control over the Guard, de
scribing the 1948 Gray Board recommendation for a single
national reserve force as "unconstitutional, un-American ...
contrary to our concept and philosophy of life ... ill-advised and
illegal." Upon thc constitutional base of the militia clauses, the
National Guard has created a political force of formidable
proportions. As the president of the Associ::ition frankly and
accurately proclaimed, the Guard is an "empire within an empire."
8
Within its spherc of interest its word is law, or becomes law very
quickly. The extent of tbis power, and the ways in which the
militia clauscs contribute to it, may be seen in: (1) its legal status;
(2) its constitutional symbolism; (3) its official represcntation in
state and national govemments; ( 4) the peculiar position of thc
National Guard As sociation; and (5) the influence of the Guard
with Congress.
Legal Status. The efforts of the Association to enhance the
Guard's dual status bave put the latter in a unique legal position.
The National Guard is a single organization with a double exist
ence. As tbe "National Guard of the severa! states and territories,"
it is organized under the militia clause and has the mission of pre
serving law and arder within the states under the orders of the
172
state authorities. In this capacity it may be "called forth" by he
Presidcnt under the appropriate authority of Congress for the I_1m
·ted constitutional purposes of executing the laws of the Umtcd
tates, supprcssing insurrection, and repelling invasions. If this were
its only status, the Guard would be constitutionally incapable. of
participating, as a rganization, in fo eign war. In 191?, w1th
out authority perrmttmg overseas serv1cc, 1ts mcmbers went into
the national army as groups of individuals, and Guard organization
was disrupted. As a result, the Association in 1933 secured the
passage of an act which makcs the Guard as the "National Guard of
the United Statcs" a reserve component of the Army of the Unitcd
States under the army clause. In this capacity, its mission is to
fumish units far all types of military operations anywhcre in thc
world. As the National Guard of thc United States, it may be
"ordered" to active scrvice by thc President after Congrcss has de
clared the existence of a national emergency. The Guard has the
best of two worlds. Its status under the militia clause protects it
against federal control in pcacetime. Its status under the army
clause insures it of a promincnt role in wartime.
Constitutional Symbolism. As a militia under dual control, the
Guard identifies itself with two venerated constitutional symbols:
the citizen-soldier and states' rights. Guardsmen are "amateur
soldiers," citizens first and soldiers second in the Minute Man
tradition. "In the future as in the past," thc Association declared
in 1944, "and based upan sound tradition, long experience, and
this Nation's fundamental law, the citizen-soldier must be thc
major dependence of the Nation in time of war." The federal re
serves, however, can likewise claim to be citizen-soldiers. But only
the Guard can also invoke the banner of states' rights. Our "or
ganizations," claimed President Walsh, "belong to the States and
are merely loaned to the Federal Government in wartime." The
Guard wants the "Federal system adhered to" in the military es
tablishment. The Guard can thus expcct the support of the state
governments against the national government. In 1943, far in
stance, the Conference of Govemors urged continucd dual status
far the Guard in the postwar period, and in 1948 the Executivc
Committee of the Conferem;e joined the Guard in denouncing the
Gr y Board report. Its state affiliations enhance the political in-
173
 The Soldier and the State
íluence of the Guard relative to that of the reserve associations of
the national forces. In 1954 the Reserve Officcrs Association had
60,000 members and thc NGA had 34,000. The ROA nonnally has
had more money and a larger staff than thc NGA. Nonethe less,
without a sccure base of operations in thc statcs, thc ROA has not
cqualed thc NGA in political influence. In 1946 the presi dent of thc
ROA described his organization as the "younger brother'' of thc
National Guard Association and admitted that "The National
Guard has much of what we the Reserves have not had." 9
State and National Representation. The position of the Guard
is strengthened by its official foothold in both the state and national
governments. Thc heads of the Guard in the states are the ad jutants
general appointed by the governors. Thcsc officials repre scnt the
Guard within the state governments and are linked na tionally through
the Adjutants General Association which is a "corollary" organization
of the NGA. The Guard is represented in thc Department of the
Army by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, who under the
National Defense Act of 1920 must be a Guardsman, and by the
National Guard members of the joint General Staff committees
which, under the same act, must con sidcr aH policies affecting the
Guard. These national representa tives keep the NGA well informed
of what transpires within the Anny and the War Department. The
Guard has regularly insisted that jt be included at an early stage in
the prcparation of War Departmcnt policies which might affect it.
Exclusion of the Guard ín the development of policy generally
means opposition by the NGA when the programs are submitted to
10
Cong ress.
The National Guard Association. The NGA, like so many
other powcrful groups, occupies an ambiguous position on the
borderlinc between a private associatíon and a public body. Le gally
it is simply a voluntary organization of National Guard officers.
Nonetheless, ít considers itself to be "the authorized Rep resentative
of the National Guard of the United States." It is also closely tied in
with the official state and national representation of the Guard. In
t 948, when only 42 per cent of Guard officers belonged to the
NGA, the Association declared it to be the re sponsibility of the
adjutants general "to insist that every National
174
r
!
'''
The Structural Constan!
Guard Officer be a member of the National Guard Assoeiation."
To this end it urged the states to require each new Guard officer
to fill out an NGA membersbip application prior to appearing befare
the official examining board. Through such techniques, the NGA
by 1953 achieved a 99 per cent membership among Guard officers.
As a prívate association the NGA carries on public relations activities,
publishes the monthly National Guardsman, and rcpresents the
Guard with respect to a wide variety of Iegisla tion. At one point in the
¡ debate over the Selective Service Act of 1948, far example, whcn it
1ooked as if the Guard viewpoint would not prevail, thc Association
t brought members from thirty-four states to Washington to lobby
with their congressmen. In two days they were emincntly successful in
getting Congress to adopt the National Guard position. In Presídent
t Walsh's words, thc great virtue of the NGA is that it is
í ... the only agency on which the National Guard can rely to protect
its intcrests, for the Association is free and untrammelcd and it does
not have to conform to any particular pattem nor is it bound within
the narrow limits of channels of communication or the chain of com
mand.u
Infiuence with Congress. In the final analysis the influence of
the Guard boils down to its influencc with Congress. The fate of
the militia is in the bands of Congress. Conccivably, Congress could
destroy the dual status of the Guard and undermine its political
power by refusing to exercíse its functions under the militia clause
and by returning to the pre-1903 sítuation. Conversely, Congress
could federalize the Guard an<l make it an exclusively national
instrumentality under the arr,,y clause. NGA officers, however, assert
that "We should settle rite futurc of the National Guard." If the
NGA is going to "settle" the fate of the Guard, it must settle the
actions of Congress on National úuard affairs. For half a century
it has been astoundingly successful in doing cxactly this. The local
roots of the Guard, its appeals to states' rights and the itizen-soldier,
its support from the state governments, its lobby mg and pressure
tactics, have made it a power on Capital Hill. "Congress," in the words
of President Walsh, "has ever been our refuge and our strength."
175
 The Soldier and rhe State
The record of National Guard success with Congress begins
with the Dick Act of 1903. Rcpresentative Dick himself was a
'
l
former president of tbe National Guard Association. In 1908 the
Association secured the passage of the second Dick Act strength
ening federal support of the Guard. In 1916 the Guard "threw
every cunee of its energy into an effort to dcfeat" the Continental
Army plan of thc General StafL It was succcssful, and the National
Defensc Act of that year was in line with its views. The position
of thc Guard was greatly strengthened four years later by the Na
tional Defense Act of 1920, which the Guard described as "a
great achievement and a great victory." In passing the 1933 act
rnaking the Guanl a reserve componcnt of the Army in peace as
well as war "Congress saw eye to eye with the proposals submitted
by the National Guard." Throughout the twenties and thirties, the
NGA successfully dcvotcd its efforts to increasing the appropria
tions of thc Guard from $13,000,000 in 1920 to $72,000,000 in
194l. In 1940 when the original Selective Training and Service
Bill as proposed in Congrcss did not secure the interests of the
Guard, the Association had inserted into it the "National Guard
protective clause., which declarcd it to be "essential that the
strength and organization of the National Guard as an integral
part of the first 1ine of dcfense of this nation be at all times main
taincd and assurcd." In 1946 the Guard fought efforts by the War
Department to set up a large Organized Reserve Corps which the
Guard viewed as a "competing" and "parallel" organization. A
War Department recommendation far a $40,000,000 appropri ation
for the ORC was eliminated by Congress at the insistence of the
Nacional Guard. The Guard had no difficulty, howcver, in getting
funds far itself. For Fiscal Year 1949 the Budget Bureau
recommended $195,000,000 for the Guard. The NGA did not
think this cnough and got the economy minded Eightieth Congress
to appropriate $290,000,000. In 1948 the Association was also
successful in getting its views written into the Selective Service
Act and in blocking the legislative recommendations of the Gray
Board. In 1954 when an Assistant Secretary of Defense suggested
that the Guard should be used only far Home Guard and civil
defense functions, President Walsh confidently picked up the chal
lenge: "If they want war, let it begin here." 1
176
r The Structural Constant
The record shows that Congress has indeed givcn, in Walsh's
words, "generous support" to thc Guard. Continuing bis rcflcctions
on the Eightieth Congress, the president went on to wonder if
! ... any organization has been so successful in the lcgislativc .ficld in
so brief a period as thc National Guard Associ<1lion. It is indccd a grcat
accomplishmcnt to have attained ali thc majar legislative objectives of
this Association.
Two years 1atcr the NGA Legislativc Committce rcported that thc
Association had "beco phcnomcnally succcssful in obtaining che
enactment of 1egislation cssential to its well-being and develop ment."
13
So long as the Guard retains its jealously protected dual status, this
will continue to be the situation. Ensconccd behind the militia clauses
as an "empire within an cmpirc," this premicr military lobby
effcctively dominates those congrcssional proceed ings which intcrest
it. Jt is a Frankenstcin monster created by thc Constitution of the
Unitcd States. That document undeiwrites its slogan that "There will
1
always be a National Guard."
'
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: ;:)UAL CONTROL OVER THE
NATIONAL FORCES
In many respects the most significant aspect of the separation
of powers is not thc relative division of power between President
and Congress, but the effects which this division has upan the
power of other groups. The existence of two coordinatc bodics means
that the power of each of these bodies vis-ñ-vis other groups is less
than it would be if either possessed full sovercign authority. The
principal beneficiarles of this sprcading of power have been organized
interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and the military serviccs. The
separation of powcrs is a perpetua} invitation, if not an irresistible
force, drawing military Jeaders into political con flicts.
Consequently, it has been a major hindrance to the develop ment of
military professionalism and civilian control in the Unitcd States.
With only minor modifications the Framers reproduced in the
C nstit.ution the division of authority over thc military which pre•
vatled m England and the colonies in the middle of the eighteenth
century. "The purse & the sword," said George Mason, "ought
177
 The So/dier and the State
never to get into the same hands [whether legislative or execu
tive]." The President inherited thc powers of the English king,
Congress the powers of the English Parliament. The executivc au
thoriry of the President; Hamilton stated in The Federalist, "will
resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the gov
r The
ernor of New York." The Framers did, howcver, make one major
adjustment in favor of the legislature. In giving Congress the war
powcr, they altered British practice and cstablished a significant
precedent in thc evolution of representative government. Thc re sult
was that Congress was given the power
To dedarc War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use sha11 be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces ... And
To make ali Iaws which shall be necessary and proper far carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Offi.cer thereof.
And the President was made "Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States." u
The general intent of this division of power is clear. Further
problems arise, however, from the nature of the grant of presi
dential power. This clause is uniquc in the Constitution in that it
grants authority in the form of an office rather than in the form
of a /une/ion. The President is not given the function "to com mand
the Army and Navy"; he is given the office of "Commander in
Chief." This difference in form is of considerable importance. By
dcfining the presidentíal power as an office, the Framers left
undefined its specific powcrs and functions. This eased the ap
proval of the Constitution in the ratifying conventions, but it gave
subsequent generations something to cogitate about and argue
about. What, after all, are the powers of the Commander in Chief?
They might range from the extremely broad power to conduct war
to a narrowly restricted power of military command. They cer tainly
exclude all powers specifically assigned to Congress or the
178
Structural Constan!
states, and they probably include ali purely military powers not
so assigned. But <loes the offi.ce possess nonmilitary powcrs as well?
The Framers themselves seemed to hold conflicting opinions on
tbis point. The Supreme Court in I 850, howcver, dcclared that the
duty and power of the President as Commandcr in Chief were
"purely military," and denied the similarity betwcen thc presiden tial
authority and the royal prero ga ti ve.15 So long as the Com mander in
Chief powcr is interpreted as purely military, it really adds Jittle
authority to the presidential office. Indeed, down to the Civil War it
was, in Professor Corwin's phrase, "the forgotten clause" of the
Constitution. ]n the Civil War and in World War II, however,
Lincoln and Roosevelt uscd thc clausc to justiíy an extraordinarily
broad rangc of nonmilitary presidential actions largely Iegislative in
nature. The justification of these actions by the Commander in
Chief clause was pcrsuasive, howevcr, only be cause John Rutlcdge
defined that power as an office rathcr than a function. It may be
argued that the office of Commander in Chief possesses authority to
seize a strike-bound war plant. It would be impossible to argue that
the function of commanding the Army and Navy implied :.uch
authority. In other words, the clause has been of relatively little
direct use in securing civilian control over the military. lndeed, in
one respect it has been directly detrimcntal to such control. But
because it was phrased as an office rather than a function, it has
been of great use to the President in cxpanding bis power at the
expense of Congress. This, in turn, has broadened the arca of
conflict bctween these two institutions and, conse quently, has
indirectly further impeded civilian control by incrcas ing the
likelihood that military leaders will be drawn into this political
controve rsy.1 8
The meaos through which the President has cxerciscd bis
powers with respect to military affairs include the appointment
of military pcrsonnel, the issuance of executive orders and com
mands, and reliance upan the instrumentality of thc civilian sec retary.
Congressional weapons includc statutes, appropriations, and
investigations. These weapons have normally been wielded on behalf
of Congress by the military and naval affairs committees, the
appropriations committees, and special wartime investigating
committees. On occasion both sides have found it necessary or
179
 The Soldier and the State
expedient to appeal to the military for support of their plans or
to seize upon and push military plans for purposes of their own.
Thc involvement of the national ofliccr corps in politics has, con
sequently, bccn less consistcnt and more sporadic in nature tban
the involvement of the militia officcr corps. The division of au
thority betwcen two separate govcrnments demanded a permanent
political spokcsman for the intcrests of the militia. The division
of authority between two branches of the same government lcd to
the transitory involvement of individuals and cliques of officcrs in
controversies over military strength, military strategy, military or
ganization, and military appointments. Until 1940 these issues
generally were not of great importancc in nacional politics. Con
sequently, the separation of powers was primarily a passive, latent
obstacle to the emergence of military professional.ism. Its implica
tions for civilian control were not clearly obvious because military
policy was of relativcly minor concern to both Congress and
President.
Military Strength. The patlem of national politics rcspccting
the strength of military forces tended to obscure thc extent of
military participation in politics. Prior to 1940 the cxecutive was
generally more favorably inclined toward a larger military estab
lishment than was Congress. Congrcss had less immediate contact
with foreign dangers and was under greater popular pressure to
cut spending. In addition, the easiest way to assert congressional
authority in the budgct process was simply to reduce executive
requcsts. Thus, the institutional jcalousy of the two branchcs, cven
apart from constituent pressure, tended to make Congress less
favorable to military appropriations. The result was that military
leadcrs were gcnerally on the side o{ the President; they appeared
befare congressiona] committces to support his program. Military'
involvement in politics on the side of Congress tends to be con '
spicuous and dramatic. Military involvement in politics on the side
of the Presidcnt tcnds to be subtle and less obvious. Undoubtedly,
sorne administrations did use popular officers to rally
congressional support for their military ·prnposals. But it is
extremely difficult to draw the line between the soldier giving
professional advice to Congress as to what the country needs for
its defense and the soldier lobbying with Congress for the
administration. Thc two
180
The Structural Constant
roles are distinct in theory but blended in practice. In tbe period
following World War II on the other ltand, a number of significant
variations from this pattern have occurred, with Congrcss taking
a more sympathetic view to military requests than the Prcsident.
l
Military Strategy. It is more difficult to idcntify continuing executive
and legislativc positions on strategy than on military strength. To the
1t extent that there wcrc per.sistent patterns, Con gress generally
favorcd a more aggressive and offensively minded strategy, while the
1 President supported caution and restraint. When thc issue was joined,
l both have been able to find elcmcnts in the officer corps favorable to
their positions. Officcrs who did not find support for their stratcgic
vicws in the top lcvcls of the executive branch had no trouble in
locating congressmcn willing to push their strategy. Similarly,
congressmen who wanted to attack the administration with respect to
its strategy were usually able to find officers willing to Icnd an air of
1 criticism.
profcssional rcspectability to their
The most extreme examplc of the mixing of politics and
strategy occurrcd in the Civil War. The purposc of the congres sional
Committee on the Conduct of the War was defined by one of its
founders as "to keep an anxious, watchful eye over ali the executive
agents who are carrying on thc war at the direction of the
people ... Wc are not under thc command of the military of
this country. They are under ours as a Congress." 17 Thc Com mittee
favored a "radical" policy involving stringent opposition to slavery and
an aggressive "On to Richmond" strategy. The Presi dent and General
McClellan were for going slow on both counts. Consequently, the
Committee had little hesitancy in using its power to undermine
McClellan and force bis withdrawal from command. Its members
! were certain that their own capabilities with respcct to military
strategy made them at least the equal of the generals. In opposing
McClellan, they were assisted by many Army oflicers who sbared
thcir views and who actively subverted "Little Mac's" authority. On the
other hand, generals such as Hooker and Bum side, who wcrc
sympathetic to the Committee's position, were ham strung by the
1 conspiratoria} activities of more conservative sub ordinates.
Military Organization. With respect to military organization
1 181
 The Soldier and the State
a natural coincidence of viewpoints Ied military officers to side
with Congress against President. Congress normally tried to en hance
its own power against thc executive by detailed legislative
prcscription of military organization. Military officers generally sup
r The Structural Constant
ported this as tending to strengthen their position against the Presi
dent and civilian secretaries. Consequently, military organization
issues present many more obvious cxamples of military involvc ment
in politics than do those with respect to stcategy.
During thc Civil War, Congress undertook to lay out the de
tails of military organization, and forced Lincoln to divide thc
army into corps so as to reduce the number of troops under
McClellan's command. After the war, thc Army Appropriation Act
in 1867 directed the President to issuc all orders and instruc tions
relative to military operations through the General of the Army
(Grant). It also provided that the General of thc Army should not
be removed or assigned to command elscwhere than at
Washington, except at bis own request or with the approval of the
Senate. This effort to transfer sorne of the Presidenfs authority as
Commander in Chief to a military subordinate was undoubtedly
unconstitutional, but it is not the only instancc in American his tory
where it has been attempted.
Congress has generally supported military officers in thc War
Department opposed to the centraHzation of authority in the Sec retary
of War or in the General Staff. The independent position of the
Corps of Engineers with respect to its civil functions is only the most
extreme example of this tcndency to combine military and
legislative power against executive power. In 1901, four staff chiefs -
the quartcrmaster general, the surgeon general, the pay master general,
and the chief of engineers - got Congress to strengthen their position
despite the opposition of the Secretary of War. Subsequently, in the
controversy over the relative powers of the Chief of Staff and the
adjutant general, the Secretary of War successfully backed the
former, but the latter received vin dication at the hands of a
congressional committee. In thc anny organization act of 1920,
Congress required the Secretary of War to submit the comments of
the General Staff, pro and con, with any proposed legislation
unless this was "incompatible with the public interese• The effect of
this provision was to invite general
182
1;
'
í
staff officcrs "to try their controversy with their chief befare a
Congrcssional committee." In 1914 and 1915 naval officers under
the Jeadership of Admira! Fiske worked with congrcssional sym
pathiz.ers to secure the creation of the office of the Chief of Naval
Opcrations despite the opposition of the President and Sccretary
Daniels. 18
Military Appointments. No single pattern of military involve
ment in politics prevails with respect to pcrsonncl appointments.
The extent to which individuals become involvcd and tbe sidc they
choose are functions of their views on policy and their political
affiliations. Both Congress and the President, however, usually
tried to maximize their own influence by securing the appointment
of officers gcnerally sympathetic to their views on military affairs
and by blocking the appointment of those who were hostilc. In the
Mexican War, for instance, the two senior gcnerals in the Army,
Majar Generals Scott and Taylor, were Whigs. President Polk, a
Democrat, fcared that he could not trust thcse officcrs and did not
wish them to become popular military idols. Hence he askcd Con
gress to create tbe position of lieutenant general whose occupant
would outrank Scott and Taylor. To this position he planned to
appoint a Democratic scnator. Thomas Hart Benton. But Con gress
refused to go along with the idea, and in 1848 Taylor was elected
President. During the Civil War, the Committee on the Conduct of
the War actively tried to advancc its favorite gcnerals and get rid of
those who opposed its polici s. A routine, if unusu ally important,
exercise of congressional influence occurred in the appointment of
Dewey to the command of the Asiatic Squadron prior to the
outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Secretary of the Navy
Long was opposed to Dewey; Assistant Secretary Theo dore
Roosevelt supported him. T. R. called in Dewcy and asked him if
he knew any Senators. When the naval officer admitted to knowing
Senator Proctor of Vennont, that legislator was induced to
approach President McKinley, and the appointment went th ro
ugh. 1Q
The differing interests of Congress and the President thus de
termined the side which military officers supported. On issues of
military strength they were normally with the President, on or
ganizational issues they were with Congress, on strategy they were
183
 The Soldier and the State
divided, and on personnel issues they followcd thcir own best in
terests. Whenever significant qucstions of military policy arose, the
national officers were drawn into the legislativc-cxecutive struggle
r1
on one side or the other. The separation of powers made it im possible
for American officers ever to be at ease in their profes ¡ p
sionalism.
¡ cctation of the Framers and of the people was that t 1e rcsi-
THE COMMANDER JN CHIEF CLAUSE: THE
POLITICAL-MILITARY HIERARCHY
¡1
e_ommandedJamesthc
One major function of the Commander in Chief clause has
been to justify the exercise of broad Prcsidential powers in times 1
of national emergency. A second principal function has been to
complicate the achicvcment of civilian control in the executive
branch. Just as the separation of powers is a standing invitation
to military leaders to bypass the President and go directly to Con
gress, the Commander in Chief clausc is a standing invitation to
bypass the civilian secretary and go to the Presidcnt.
T.he Commander in Chief clause is the outstanding example of
the Framers' mixing of political and military functions. The same
thinking which permitted them to cnvision Senators becom ing
generals in war also permitted them to accept a civilian Presi dent
as military commander in chief. In most socicties, from primi tive
nomadic tribes down to their own time, it had been customary for
the chief of state also to be the chief military commander. This had
been true of the Greek city state, the Roman republic, and the
European national monarchies; it was to be true of Napoleonic
France. Virtually ali the state constitutions at the time made the
governor commander in chief of the militia. Military command
was as much a function of the chief executive as the appointment
of administrative officials or the negotiation of alliances. It was
only natural for this role to be assigned to the President. He was
to be a republican Soldier-President pattemed upan the Royal
Warrior of the European states.
The extent to which the Framers expected the Prcsident to
exercise military funetions may be seen in their failure to curb bis
authority personally to lead troops on the field of battle. Such a
restriction was contained in the New Jersey plan and had the sup port
of Hamilton. The Convention, however, explicitly rejected
184
en rc,
the LC I.,
too, e
The Structural Constant
thcsc attempts to limit bis authority to command in_ person. Sorne
-,· · ms of this powcr were voiced in state conv entmn s but
ffor ts to curtail it wcre unsuccessful. The • mtentton
•
:
d h ¡
a n t e
·
could, if he so dcsired, assume personal command in the field.
t=
Early presidents did not hesitate to do this. Washingto?- personally
l defense
tual
mílitia called
ofMadison
Washingtontook out to suppress
in a1814.
direct theorganizing
handthein
During
Wh1skcy Rebcl•
Mexican_ war,
the ineffec-
Prcsident Polk, although he did not command the army m the
field nonethclcss pcrsonally formulated the military strategy of the
war ':.md participated in a wide range of exclusively military_ at tcrs.
The last instancc of a Prcsidcnt directly exercising mil1t ry functions
waS Lincoln's participation in the dircction of the U 1on armies in thc
spring of 1862. The Prcsident personally determmed the plan of
operations, and, through his War Orders, direc ed t?e movement of
troop units. It was not until Grant took over rn Vir ginia that
presidenlial participation in military_ aff irs carne .t an end. No
subsequent Presidcnt cssayed the d1rect10n of md1tary operations,
although Theodore Roosevelt in World War argu d conversely that his
previous experience as Commandcr m Chie[ proved his competence
to command a division in France. o. .
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, no real d1sttnct1on
existcd betwcen political and nülitary competcnce. Any ma_n of
affairs was capable of command, and the exercise by the Pr 1dent
of his military functions creatcd no difficulties. There was a s1 gle,
clear politica!-military hicrarchy running from the P es1dent
through the Secretaries of War and thc Navy to the umfo ':" d
commanders. Political and military responsibilities and ab1hties
were mixed ali along the line. The President frequently had pre
vious military cxpericnce; the Secretary of War almost always had.
The top gencrals, on the other hand, were usually involved in
politics. The organization of thc service departments, consequently,
was little different from that of any other department.
This unified hierarchy began to break up as the military fun
tion became professionalized. The Prcsident was no longer quah
fied to exercise military command, and even if he were quali ed
by previous training, he could not devote time to this function
185
 The Soldier and the State
without abandoning bis political responsibilities. The political
functions of the Presidency became incompatible with the military
functions of the Commander in Chief. Nor were the civilian poli
ticians appointed Secretaries of War and the Navy competent to
exercise military command. On the other hand, the emergence of
the military profession produced officers whose expericnce had
been exclusively military, who were quite different types from the
politician secretaries, and who werc technically qualified to com
mand. The constitutional presumption that the President cxercised
command still remaincd, however, and complicatcd the relations
among Presidcnt, secretary, and military chief. Under the Con
stitution the military chief was milíiary, the secretary political,
and the Presidcnt political and military. Nonnally, one would as
sumel that the secretary, with bis duty to rcprescnt the interests
of bis department, would be more military in outlook, if not in
capability, than the President with bis broader interests and rc
sponsibilities. The Constitution, however, reversed this rclation
ship, and obscured the cleamess of the hicrarchy. Did the chain of
command go up through the secretary, a ci-,,ilian politician, to the
President? Or were there two lines of authority emanating from the
Presidency: a political-administrative line to thc secretary and a
military command line directly to the highest professional officer?
These issues have befogged American military organization down
to the present day.
THE BALANCEO, COORDINATE, ANO VERTICAL TYPES OF EX
ECUTIVE CIYIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. It is possible to conceive of three
different types of executive civil-military relations among the
President, secrefary, and military chief."' The balanced pattern
assigns to the Presidenta purely political function: the decision of
the highest policy issues and the general supervision of the military
establishment. Beneath him is the secretary, also a purely political
figure, reponsible for the entire military organizatíon. Below the
* There are, of course, other possible structures of executive civil-mi\itary rela
tions, such as ooe making a military officer departrnental secretary. This analysis,
however, will be confined to the thrce ideal typcs relevant to Amcrican experience.
Although profcssional military men bave occasionally been appointed Secretary of
War, this is unusual and contrary to acccptcd practice. The only plan seriously
advanced to put tni!itary men in the place of the secretary was the unsucccssful
1815 proposal to substitute a board of three naval officers for the Secr..,tary of the
Navy.
186
The Soldier and the State
as Commander in Chief to atrophy. These remain efficient and not
r The Structural Constant
secretary, the hierarchy divides into mililary and administrative
componcnts. The highcst professional officer is the leading mi!itary
adviser to thc sccretary and normally has command of the mili tary
forces. The military chicf Is subordinate to the secretary who is
subordinate to the President, bue neithcr of the two civilian officials
exercise military command. Military conunand stops at the Jevel of
the mi!itary chief. Also subordinate to the secretary are
administrative officials (civilian or military) who direct the
nonmilitary supply, logistical, and financial activities of the de
partmcnt.
This balanced pattern of organization tends to maximize mili
tary professionalism and civilian contro l.::1 Civilian and military
responsibilities are clearly distinguished, and thc latter are sub
ordinatcd to the former. The President and the secretary handle
political matters; the military chief military matters; and the staff
or burcau chicfs adm.inistrative mattcrs. The scope of the authority
of the profcssional mi!itary chief is limited to thc military realm
by the administrative bureaus, and the leve! of his authority, sub
ordinate to the secretary, does not involve him in political decisions.
1 Administrative and military interests are balanced by the secretary
under the authorily of the President. English civil-military rela tions
have becn organized along comparable lincs since the Jast balf of
the nineteenth ccntury. Between 1794 and 1870 the War Office
administered the civilian affairs of the army, and the Com mander in
Chief, directly under the sovcreign, was responsible for mi!itary
command and discipline. In 1870, however, the Cabi net insisted that
the military chief be subordinated to the Secretary of State for War. A
.fully balanced scheme was achieved with the abolition of thc post of
Commander in Chief in 1895 and the sub sequent creation of the
office of Chie[ of the Imperial General Staff. The same systcm also
cxisted at the Admiralty. This organization was possible only because
the sovereign consented, howcver reluctantly, to have his role as first
general and admira! become, in Bagehot's phrase, a "dignified" part of
the constitution. The "efficient" hier• archy of control ran from
Parliament to Cabinet to Prime Minister to Sccretary of State for
! War and then to the military chief and the administrative bureaus
of the War Office. In thc United States however, no President has
permitted bis constitutional function¡
187
1
digni the balanced pattem of organization has been diflicult to achieve and
fied. even more difficult to maintain. American civil-military relations
Cons almost incvitably gravitate in the direction of other arrangements
eque which tend to weaken rnilitary professionalism and civi.lian control.
ntly,
 e co rdinate s heme involves the scparation of military and
admm1stratwc funct10ns immediately below thc President. Toe
secretary is limited to nonmilitary administrative duties, and the
·r :
. ..
military chief discharges his military functions directly under the
President. The chain of administration goes from Prcsidcnt to
;'
Secretary to bureau chiefs; thc chain of command from President
to military chief to the military forces. This accords with consti
tutional thcory and keeps civilians, cxcept thc President, out of
the military hierarchy. It tends, however, to undenninc civilian contr:'!
· The scope of the authority of the military chicf is limited to m1!
1¡
l
Jtary matters, but the level of hiS authority with direct ac cess to the
President involves him in political issues. The Presi dent is
normally too busy with other affairs to devotc sufficient attenti?? to
the.intcnelation of political and military policies, and the m1htary
ch1ef consequently has to make political decisions. is direct
acce_s to the President also encouragcs the Iatter to try h1s hand
at m1htary affairs and to intervene in professional mili tary planning
and command where he has no special competence.
The vertical pattern salves the problem of the Commander in
Chie clause_ in ?i_fferent manner, but one which is equally in
cons1stent w1th c1vdmn control. In this scheme the secretary and the
military chicf have identical responsibilities. The administra tive
bureau heads are subordinated to the professional military chief,
and the professional military chief is subordinated to the secretary
who is in turn responsible to the President. Since the President is still ' lead him to scek both direct access to the President and over-all
Commander in Chief, and sorne connection must exist between him
and the rest of the military hierarchy, the sec retary is given a place in
the military chain of command and is described as the President's
-deputy commander in chief oc in sorne similar tenns. The military
chief, however, is given control over a the ac ities of the
department under the secretary, the spe cdically mthtary command
and planning functions being delegated
188
The Structura/ Constan!
down the hicrarchy to a subordinate of the military chief's on the
same level as the administrative chiefs of bureaus. This prevents
the military chicf from achieving direct access to the President
because bis responsibilities are identical with those of the secre tary.
Conscquently, he can claim no peculiar relation to the Presi dent and
must be subordinate to the secrctary. On the othcr hand. he
supervises ali the activities of the department bclow the secre tary
and, consequently, may be able to reduce the secrctary to a
figurchead. By combining in bis own person political and admin
istrative responsibilities, as well as functions of military command,
the military chief transgrcsses bis competence. He sacrifices
bigher level for broader scope, which is equally dam'aging to
his professional status. Also, the extension of the constitutional
myth so that not only the President but also the secrctary is as sumed
to cxercise military command violates the facts of reality.
The American constitutional system thus <loes not facilitate
the stable cxistence of a balanced pattern of executive civil-mili tary
relations. The President's power as Commander in Chicf in evitably
tends to push the executive structure in the direction of eíther the
coordinate or the vertical pattem. Tbc intcrests of the military chief
supcrvision of both the military and administrative aspccts of his
department. The secretary, on the other hand, at tempts both to
maintain exclusive access to the President and to have a multiplicity
of subordinates reporting to him. Neither sec retary nor military
chief ever completely achicve their two objec tives. The leve! and
scopc of military authority tend to be inversely related. Inevitably,
the secretary tends to get cut off from his de partmcnt by a military
head who oversees both military and ad ministratíve aspects, or he
tcnds to sunender the military aspect to the professional chief who
maintains a dircct command rela tionship with the President.
CIVILIAN CONTROL AND CONSTITUTlONAL GOVERNMENT
Objective civilian control has existed in the United States but
it has been the product of geographical isolation and the
intemational balance of power, which permitted the virtual elimi
nation of standing military forces and the exclusion of the mili-
•••
 The Soldier and the State
tary from political power. Civilian control in this sense has been
so effective that Americans have callcd it a fundamental principlc
of their system of government. But they have been deluding them
r The Structural Conslant
selves. They have as;cribed to thc Constitution a virtuc of geog
raphy. Objective civilian control has been extraconstitutional, a
part of our political tradition but not of our constitutional tradi tion.
Civilian control has, in a sense, been like thc party systcm. The
Framers did not foresec the rise of popular democracy; con•
scquently, they did not providc far politica1 partics. Tbey did not
foresee the rise of the military profcssion; conscquently, they did
not provide far civilian control. Neither is contemplatcd in the Con
stitution, yet both have becn called into existence by nonconstitu
tional forces. The Constitution has contributed its share to ob•
structing the growth of a strong party system such as exists in
Great Britain. 1t has also contributed its share to obstructing effec
tive civilian control such as cxists in Great Britain. The restraints
of a writtcn constitution have proved effective against sorne of the
most powerfuI functional imperatives.
The qi.::estion thus arises: to what extent is it possible, short
of amending thc Constitution, to provide for civilian control in
the existing framework? The difficulties are constant but they are
not ali of equal strength. Thc extent to which the Commander in
Chief clause operates to damage civilian control depends largely
upon the individuals who _occupy that office. It adds nothing and
detracts much from military professionalism and civilian control.
The British Prime Minister who is not commandcr in chief and has
no military functions has more effective control over his mili tary
forces than does the American President. The principal posi tivc
use of the clause has been to expand presidential powcr against
Congress in nonmilitary arcas. If the clause can come to be viewed
primarily in this nonmilitary sense, and if. the presidents can ex
ercise constitutional self•restraint so as to make their military
command of the armed forces as honorific as that of the king of
England, this obstacle to civilian control would be removed, and
a balanced pattcrn of executive organization be made workable.
The militia clauses only directly hamper the development of
military professionalism in one segment of the armed forces. Con
ceivably, of course, Congress could abolish dual control over the
190
militia. But in the face of the political strength of the National
Guard this hardly seems possible. And, given the existing situation,
it probably would not evcn be desirable. The more appropriate
course is to make thc best of the situation of military federalism.
The existence of the Guard will necessarily prevent the develop ment
of a strong and ready national reserve organization. The Constitution
has made the Guard into a powerful politica1 force, and it is not
inconceivable that this political strcngth may makc thc Guard
into an effective military organization. At the end of J 954, the
Anny and Air National Guard had almost 400,000 men on drill
pay status - twice the numbcr of the Army and Air Force Reserves.
At the beginning of 1956 Guard ground forces consistcd of 21 infantry
divisions, 6 armored divisions, 9 regi mental combat teams, 9
armored cavalry regiments, 123 antiair craft battalions, 74 field
artillery battalions, and miscellaneous other units. The Air Nalional
Guard was organized into 27 com bat wings. Thc readiness of the
Guard was at a higher level than ever before in its history. Many of
the antiaircraft units and inter ceptor squadrons were participating in
the air defense of the na tion on a semiactive alert sta tus. 2 By its
very nature the National Guard can never be brought fully within
objective civilian con trol. But it may still be possible to create a
respectable reserve force within the existing constitutional and
political framework.
The real constitutional stumbling block to objective civilian
control is the separation of powers. This is the essence of the
American system of government, and its impact is felt throughout
the armed forces. Short of fundamental constitutional change, the
separation of powers cannot be altered. Indeed, it is highly ques
tionable whether, even if such change wcre possible, it would be
worth the price. There are values other than civilian control and
military professionalism, and these were thc values the Framers
had in mind when they wrotc the Constitution. Foreign countries
may have more effective systems of civilian control but no country
has as effectivc a system of restraints upon arbitrary political
power or such a unique balance of executive unity and legislative
diver sity. Inevitably, both military officers attempting to adbere to
pro fessional standards and civilian secrctaries attempting to
exercise civilian control look with envy to the cabinet system.
Such a sys-
191
 1'he Soldier and the State
tem, howevcr, is not for the United States. Within the framework
of the separation of powers, institutional adjustments can be made
which wj\l reduce its deleterious efiects upon civilian control. But
it will never be possible to climinate these effects complctely. A lesser
r! 8
measure of civilian control and lower standards of military p
ofessionalism are the continuing priccs the American people

1
w1ll have to pay for the othcr benefits of their constitutional system.
' The Roots of the American Military Tradition

i
before the Civil War

THE THREE STRANDS OF AMERICAN MILITARISM

Technicism, popularism, and professionalism are the three strands

of the American military tradition. All originatcd prior to the
Civil War. The technical element emphasized the mechani cal crafts
and specialized sciences which contributed to the trade c,f the
soldier; the good military officer was expcrt in a technical skill such
as civil engineering, ship design, cartography, or hy drography. The
roots of military technicism were widespread in American culture in
the first part of the nineteenth century, but primarily they were found in
the Jeffersonian contributions to American militarism. The technical
influence was heaviest in mili tary education and in staff organization,
particularly in the Navy. The popular strand of the American military
tradition stressed the general capability of ali Americans, irrespective
of knowledge or training, to excel in the military art; the military
officcr was the citizen-soldier inspired by the ideals of democracy and
liberty. The popular element was derived principally from Jacksonian
Democ racy. Its institutional manifestations were most notable in the
sys tems of entry and advancement in the officer corps and in the
Anny organization which crystallized during the Jacksonian pe riod.
Finally, the idea of a science of war and of a military pro fession
expert in that science - the Southern contribution to the military
tradition - a1so existed by the middle of the century. Unlike the
technical and popular strands, however, which were outgrowtbs of the
dominant strains of American Jiberalism, mili-
103
192

The Soldier and the State
tary profcssionalism was identified with a conservative sectional
minority which during the course of the ccntury became increas ingly
isolated from the mainstream of American development. The
Southem support which pennitted rnilitary profcssionalism to be
expressed as an idea, also condemned it to defeat in practice.
Unlike technicism and popularism, it lacked institutional mani
festations. Prior to the Civj¡ War no significant professional mili tary
institutions existcd in the United States.
THE FAILURE OF FEDERALISM'. HAMILTON'S ABORTIVE
PROFESSIONALISM
The failure of rnilitary professionalism to make institutionat
headway in the United States was also intimatcly connccted with the
failurc of Federalism. The Fedcralists werc almost classícally
conscrvative; their basic valucs closely rcsemblcd those of the
military ethic. Rcsponsible for thc preservation of American se curity
during the difficult first years, thcy had the conservative's intcrest in
military affairs. "Hamilton's hobby was the Army," wrote John
Adams, and the sccond president himself averred that national
dcfensc "has always becn near to my heart." 1 They stresscd thc
need far military force and the primacy of national defonse among the
functions of government. The Federalists did not condemn nor
eschew power politics; they played the game with sorne en1oyment
and considerable finesse. Washington's Farewell Addrcss advice that
the nation should be strong enough and sen sible enough so that it
could "choosc peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall
counsel" even reflected the professional military concept of war as
thc rational instrument of state policy. If Federalist conservatism
had maintained its vitality as an intellectual current and political
force into the ninetcenth cen tury, it would have been a fertile
source of military professionalism.
Instead, thc Federalists disappeared befare the science of war and
the military profession became functionatly feasible in America.
As a resu!t, whilc they stressed the need far militacy force, they
were not c1ear as to the need for prnfessíonal direction of that
force. Their two Jeaders, Washington and Hamilton, were indeed
the antitheses of the professional type, moving with ease from
military to political office and back agaín. They likewise had little
194
The Roots of the Military Tradition
derstanding of objcctive civilian control. Washington obeyed
u:e Continental Congress not as a soldier but as a citizen. Hamil on
alone among the Federalists anticipated important elements of
military pro!essionalism. He saw that the prolonged and expert
·nstruction oí a small group of military leaders in the essentials
1
f the art of war was a necessary result of the division of labor,
nd he urged the creation of an claborate military university to
school officers in the "principles of war, the exerciscs it requires,
and the sciences upon which they are founded." 2 Hamilton's views
were the most advanced application of the Fedcralist philosophy
to military affairs, but they were, howevcr, not even acceptable to
most Fcderalists. And, more significantly, the conservative Fed
eralist philosophy was not acceptable to most Americans. lis po
Iitical eclipse in 1800 made Jeflersonian technicism rather than
Hamilton's incipient professionalism thc starting point of the
American military tradition.
TECHNICISM
JEFFERSONIAN SOURCES: THE PRINClPLE OF SPECIALIZATION.
Tbe American officer of the pre-Civil War years was frequcntly
highly trained and scientifically educated but his training was not
in a military skill sharcd with all bis fellow officers and distingu h ing
them from the rest of society. Instead, the officer was expert in
one of severa! technical specialities, competence in which sepa rated
him from other officers trained in different specialities and at thc
same time fostered clase bonds with civilians practicing bis speciality
outside the military forces. The officer corps, in other words, was
divided into subgroups, sorne more important than the rest, but each
likely to be more closely tied with a scgment of civilian socicty than
with other segments of the corps. The Army officer was frequently
more engineering-minded than military minded, and the naval officer
more seamanship-minded than naval minded. There was as yet in
America no distinctive military science which, developing out of the
various technical spccialities, could modify them, subordinate them,
and integrate them into a separate suQ}o:i::t directed to the exclusively
military purpose of war. Tech nicism remained a strong force in
American militarism after it had been generally superseded by
professionalism in Europe. It
105
 r
.

The Soldier and the State The Roots of the Military Tradition
derivcd its strength from thc many pragmatic, empirical, material Toe Jeffersonian approach to military science and military
istic, practica! aspects of American culture, equally hostile to the
generalizations of theory and to teleological definitions of purpose. 1 leadershlp mirrored its theory of military force. Just as the Jcficr
Insofar as it had its roots in any distinctive political-intellectual
current, military technicism was primarily the product of the Jef
1 soníans rccognized the need far sorne form of military force, thcy
also recognized the need for sorne form of military knowledgc and
education. But just as they identified military force with the civic
fersonian influence upon American military institutions.
Like other liberals, Jefferson had little interest in or use far
regular military forces, and he had no recognition of the emerging
1 population, so also they drew no distinction between civil and
military skills. Quantitatively, military force was indistinguishahlc

1¡ from the whole of society; qualitativcly, military science was in

character of profcssional military officership. Jefferson had no use distinguishable from the wholc of science. "We must train and
for objcctive civilian control, condemning the distinction "between classify the whole of our malc citizcns," Jcfferson declared. "And
the civil and military, which it is for the happiness of botb to make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education."
obliteratc." Unlike most subscquent liberals, howcver, he did have The diffusion of military instruction throughout society was only
a definitc plan for national defense. Jefferson did not scout the possible because the skills required for thc military vocation wcre
continuing thrcats to the United States nor the persistent possi bility
the same as those required for a variety of civilian vocations.
of war. His military policy had its roots in the same unstable statc of
Technical subjects figured much more prominently than military
international relations as did Hamilton's. But in substance it was
ones in the sparse literature produced by American military and
vastly different, representing an effort to develop a liberal alternative
naval officers prior to the 1830's. Jcffcrsonian respect went to the
to the Hamiltonian program which would embody the extreme of
Enlightenment man of science; the good military officer was ex pcrt
transmutation based on the "military sovereignty of the people." Far
in sorne special scientific skill.
from wishing to disarm the United States, Jefferson desircd to turn the
The tendency toward technicism in the Army officer corps
nation into an armed camp. "None but an anned nation can
was strengthened by the French iníluence on American militarism.
dispense with a standing army; to keep ours armed and disciplined
This, too, was fostered by Jeffersonian sympathies for Frcnch in
is, therefore, at ali times important . . " 3 The militia should be
stitutions and culture. The Americans imitatcd the French in
universal in scope - "every citizen a sol dier" is a Jeffersonian
stressing fortificatíons, artillery, and engineering. Sylvanus Thaycr,
motto - and well-organized, classified, dis ciplined, and equipped. In
the dominating genius of West Point during its carly years, studied
the end, Jefferson's military policy was no more successful than
French education carefully and was convinced that France was
Hamilton's. To universalize the military obligation was in effect to
the "repository of military science." He consciously strove to pat
abolish it. Instead of substituting a liberal force for a regular force,
tem bis school along French lines, following thc great model of
Congress preferred to limit the regular force to an inconsequential
the Ecole Polytechnique, and utilizing French instructors and
size. Extirpatio□ triumphed over transmutation. Instead of
French textbooks. Outstanding Academy graduales in the first half
maintaining a militia in peace to deal with emergencies and
of the nineteenth century, such as Halleck and Mahan, were sent
creating a regular anny in war, as recommended by Jefferson, the
to France not Prussia to continuc thcir cducation. Jomini was
United States maintained a regular army in peace to deal with
viewed as the final word on the Jarger aspects of military opera
emergencies and enlisted the militia after the outbreak of war. The
tions, and American infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics imi tated
Hamiltonian program was i□feasible in a liberal society because it those of the French Army. The Frcnch influence upon the Academy
was contrary to the principies of liberalism; the Jeffersonian program and the Army at large helped to produce a high leve] of
was infeasible because it was contrary to the principles of society.
technical and scienti.fic achievement, but it detracted from cm
196 phasis upan the Army's military purposes.4
197
 EDUCATION:
The Soldier and the State
THE ENGINEERING SCHOOL AT WEST POINT.
American military education was almost entirely technical in pur
pose and content until after the Civil War. There was littlc or no
r The
instruction in highcr military science and stratcgy, and there werc
no American educational institutions comparable to the Prussian
preliminary schools or the Bcrlin Kricgsakademíe. Thc most no
table and lasting manífestation of thc Jeffersonian ímpact upan
American militarism was in the military academy at West Point.
Hamilton's rccommendations of 1799 had proposed thc creation
of five schools: a Fundamental School in which students rcceived
instruction for two years in "all the sciences necessary to a perfect
knowledge of the dificrent branches of the military art"; and faur
advanced engineering and artillery, cavalry, infantry, and naval
schools, to one of which students would go far spccialized study
after completing the fundamental courses. This would have been
a true professional academy teaching thc essence of military science
as a whole as well as elements of íts more specialized branches.!'.1
In contrast, the institution which Jefferson established at West
Point in 1802 was only one-fifth of the military university urged
by Hamilton. It was creatcd almost incidental to the creation of
the Corps of Enginecrs. Its principal objcct was to produce engi
neers for military and civil employmcnt. It was the equivalent of
the Ecole Polytechnique, not of St. Cyr: a technical institute de
signed to serve the entire nation as a practica! scientific school,
not a professional academy for the military vocation. As its first
superintendent, Jefferson appointed Jonathan Williams, who had
no military experience prior to his appointment but had worked
on the construction of fartifications and made a reputation as a
practicing scientist. Jefferson's intercst was always in the scientific
rather than the military activities of the Acadcmy.
The Jeffersonian origins of West Point· had tremendous ím
pact upon American military education, initiating a technologi cal
e p asis, remnants of which long persisted. The principal
ontnbutions of the Academy in the pre-Civil War years were, as
tnte?ded by Jefferson, in the .fields of engineering and science.
Until a ter the Civil War, the school remained a part of the Corps
of Engmeers, and its superintendent had to be appointed from
that branch. Engineering dominated the curriculum. A
Department
198
Roots of the Military Tradition
of Engineering was established in 1812, but it was not until 1858
that Congress created a Department of Tactics. Miiitary subjects
were taught as a sideline to military engineering, and the military
engineering course itsclf was subordinated to civil engineering. As
one observer commented, at the time of the Civil War there was
"no instruction in strategy or grand tactics, in military history, or
in what is called the Art of War." 6 Graduates of thc Academy
were much in demand by private. employers and were utilized by
the govcrnment in topographical surveys, railroad building, and
the construction of other interna! improvements. Throughout the
years preceding the Civil War its alumni distinguished themselves
to a greater extent in civil occupations than in the military service.
West Point produced more railroad presidcnts than generals. Many
students entered the Academy far the explicit purposc of becom ing
scientists or engineers rather than Army officers, and the Academy
was justified to the country in terms of its contributions to science,
exploration, and interna! development. Prior to 1835, Wesc Point
exercised a formative influence over the development of technícal
education in America. A majority of the nineteen engineering schools
establishcd befare 1870, including those at Harvard and Yale, had
direct pedagogical affiliations with the Military Academy. Thus,
befare the Civil War West Point was deficient in the two components
of a preliminary professional military education. lt did not give its
students a broad grounding in the liberal arts; neither did it furnish
them with the first essen tials of military science.
Befare the 1860's, technicism was even more pervading in
many respects in naval education than in the Anny. Its causes,
howcvcr, were ]ess imrnediately traceable to Jeffersonian sources. In
the early days the emphasis was upan seamanship, and naval officers
were frequently commissioned directly from the merchant marine.
Subsequently, coincidental with the introduction of steam, a shift in
concern occurred to marine engineering. Prior to 1845 the
education of officers was practica! and haphazard. The only
examinations required of midshipmen were in navigation and sea
manship, and a strong tradition existed in the Navy that the only
place for the education of an officer was the deck of a ship. Even
tually the desirabílíty of securing legislative establishment of a
199
 r
.
The Soldier and the State
shore school comparable to West Point was generally recognized. The
nature of this school, however, was still conceived of in tech nical
terms. In 1814, for instance, Secretary Joncs advocated in struction in
purcly tcchnical subjects, which alone he considercd
1 military interests in the Na.vy, and consequently it did not rcsemble
l
·•neccssary to thc accomplishment of the naval officer." In 1841,
Sccrctary Upshur argued that thc introduction of stcam vessels
requircd a high order of scientific knowledge among officc rs .7
When the Naval Academy was eventually established in 1845, its
curriculum closcly rescmblcd that of West Point except for the
substitution of marine technology for civil engineering. For decadcs
¡
afterward, opposi!ion to theoretical instruction still remained strong
t civil and military. After the War of 1812, the demand for a larger
in the Nllvy.
STAFF ORGANlZATION: JEF.FERSONIAN NAVAL TECHNIClSM,
1815-1885. The prevalence of technicism was also rcfiectcd in
the key role assigned the administrative stafI service:. in Army and
Navy organization. Neithcr the War Departmcnt nor the Navy
Department during this period possessed a true general staff de voted
to the application of professiona\ knowledge to military operations
and war. An Army "General Staff" created in 1813 consisted of the
adjutant general, quartennaster general, commis sary general of
ordnance, paymaster, assistant topographical cn gineer, and their
assistants. Their influence in thc Army structure was balanced
somewhat by the position of the Commanding Gen eral, who
theoretically represented the military interests of the Anny but who
actually became deeply involved in political con troversy. The
technical arms enjoyed a favored status. Engineering was defined by
the Articles of War as "the most elevated branch of mititary
science." 8 Throughout the years 1eading to the Civil War much of
the encrgy of the Army aml the Navy was devoted to the
essentially civilian pursuits of exploration, scientific rescarch, and
interna! development.
The most notable instance of the influencc of Jcffersonian
technicism in military organization was in the Navy Department,
the organization of which was given a lasting character during
Madison's administration immediately after the War of 1812. In the
pattern of organization which was then established and which
prevailed until the twentieth century, rnilitary expertise was ex
plicitly identified with technical expertise, and the necessity of
200
The Roots of the Military Tradition
professional knowledge for the broad conduct of naval opcrations
in war was equaUy explicitly dcnied. Nav2! organization thus made
no provision whatsoever for the representation of the professional
any of thc thrce ideal types of cxecutive civil-miliLary relations. Jt
was instead a strictly preprofessional fonn of organization.
From 1798 to 1815 the Navy Departmcnt consistcd only of a
Secretary and a fcw clerks who transactcd ali dcpartmcntal busi ness,
staff acose and Congrcss established a Board of Navy Commissioners
composed of three captains. The Board was placed under the
Secretary, and its responsibilities wcre made coextensive with bis.
Civil dutics - procuremcnt and construction - and mi!itary duties -
thc employment of vessels - were assigned equally to both Board
and Secretary. Clearly the intention of Congress was to cstablish a
vertical system of organization. This, however, was not the view of the
Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Crowninshicld. In one of its first
actions, the Board demanded that the Sccretary inform it as to thc
destination of a squadron. Crowninshield refused this request,
claiming that the Board should deal only with civil-industrial matters.
The President sustained this interpretation of the law, and thereafter
down to 1842 the three naval officers constituting the Navy
Commissioners directed the civil activities of the Department, while
the civilian secretary di rected the military activities.
This system seems absurdly paradoxical on the surface. Actu
ally, logic was behind it. Toe civil activities of the Navy wcre
c_h more highly specialized and technical than its military ac
ttv1ties. Tbe dcsign, construction, and equipment of naval vesscls
and the operation of the Navy yards were jobs far expcrts. Corn
pared to these, discipline, the assignment of personnel, and the
employment of vessels were relatively simple matters. The man
of aflairs might still direct the latter; it was impossiblc for him
to manage the fonner. The idea that the Secretary was competcnt to
handle the military affairs of the Navy was cnhanced by the
custom, which prevailed down to the I 820's, of appointing to
that post meo with maritime experience. The rationale beh-ind
naval organization was explicitly stated by Secretary Paulding in
201
 The Soldier and the State
I 839. The duties of thc Department, he said, divide naturally into two
classes. The first class "comprises those connectcd with the more
general and comprehensive interests of the state" - the size and
distribution of naval forces, and the direction, employment, and
discipline of naval personnel. The seéond class includes "every thing
r¡ The Roots of the Military Tradition
chiefs of bureaus. Just as the technical emphasis at West Point
hampered the emergence of military prnfcssionalism in the Army,
the technical interests entrencbed in naval organization were a
majar obstacle to the Navy professional refonners at the end of thc
ninetcenth century.
connccted with the construction, equipment and maintenance of the
naval force." The first class of duties, according to the Sec retary, POPULARISM
"requircs no special technical or professional knowledgc or
JACKSONIAN SOURCES: THE PRINCIPLE OF AMALGAMATION.
experience ... " Consequently, these dutics may be directly discharged
While the absence of a distinctive rnilitary science drew the
by the Secretary. The performance of the second class of duties,
officer, on the one hand, into tcchnical specialization, it could, on
however, "calls for long professional expcrience, and it is be!ieved
the other hand, lead to the conclusion that no specializcd
can be more completely attained under the ministration of competent
competence of any sort was necessary for officershlp. The lack of
naval officers." The replacement of the Navy Com missioners by thc
professional standards of judgment invited tbc use of popular
bureau system in 1842 did not alter this Jeffer sonian pattcrn. The
standards. Inevitably, the military service, like the civil servicc,
duties which had been previously collectively exercised by the Board
was utilized to serve the ul terior ends, honorable or not, of tbe
of Navy Commissioners simply devolved on to the heads of the five
political leaders of the govern ment. The division of thc o:fficer
bureaus for Yards and Docks; Con struction, Equipmcnt and Repairs;
corps into technical specialitics built individual bridges between
Provisions and Clothing; Or dnance and Hydrography; and Medicine
the segments of the corps and their counterparts in civil activity;
and Surgery. No pro vision was .nade for the representation of the
tbe intrusion of popular politics into the corps created a broad
professional military viewpoint .in the Navy structure, and the
connection with the mainstream of American life. This connection
Secretary still attempted to discharge this function.
reflected what was popular, ama teur, democratic, and idealistic in
Inevitably, as the nlilitary activities of the Navy became in
American culture. It was primar ily the product of Jacksonian
creasingly complicated, the Secretaries became less competent to
Democracy.
administer them. This was painfully obvious in war. In tbe Civil
Jacksonian Democracy began the period of liberal indifference
War it was necessary to appoint a former naval captain as assistant'
to military affairs. After 1815 there were, aside from the Indians,
secretary to act as professional military head of the Navy and to
no significant threats to American security. A liberal p]an for military
direct its strategy and operations. 'This official also dealt directly
defense was no ]onger necessacy. Thc disappearance of foreign
with Lincoln, and during the war years naval organization thus
dangers, plus the emerging imperatíves of military pro fessionalism,
briefly approximated the coordinate pattern. In 1869, however, the
caused a shift from a positive emphasis upan the citi zen militia and
post of assistant secretary was abolished, and the Navy reverted
technical expertise to negative opposition to a\l rnili tary institutions.
to its prewar preprofessional organization. At various times in the
The Jacksonians repeated the clichés of Jeffer sonian policy but made
next tbirty years, whenever a war threatened, the Navy was forced
no effort to rea\ize them in practice. Warn ing of the dangcrs of a
hastily to establish án ad hoc professional board for military plan
standing army and hailing the militia as the bulwark of liberty, they
ning. During the Spanish-American War, a Naval Strategy Board
neither abolished the Regular Army nor madc an effective military
was created to direct military operations. In peace, however, these
force out of the militia. During the thirty years befare the Civil War,
re mained the immediate responsibility of the civilian secretary, and
the militia companies degenerated into almost purely social
the highest military leadership of the Navy was in the tecbnical
organizations lacking military discipline and military skill.1º
202 Jefferson wished to educate ali citizens to be so1- diers; the
Jacksonians assumed that all citizens could be soldiers
203
 The Soldier and the State
without training. Technical competence was required of the good
Jeffersonian officer; militant enthusiasm of his Jacksonian counter
part. In conlrast to Jeffersonian technicism, the Jacksonian ap proach
to military of.ficersbip was distinctly i:lnti-intcllectual.
The distinguishing aspect of the Jacksonian attitude on mili tary
T The Roots of the Military Tradition
affairs was its opposition to the officer corps as an aristocratic
institution. This hostility was rooted both in the security of the nation
and in the spirit of the times. The Jacksonian concept of the people -
united and homogeneous - was incompatible with so cial
diffcrentiations of any sort. The drive for equality bccame, as De
Tocqueville saw, the drive for uniformity. Yet uniformity was also
linked with versatility. All citizens were alike because thcy ali could
do everything. While Jefferson looked to an armed peoplc expressed
in the slogan "evcry citizen a soldicr," the Jacksonians looked to a
united people expressed in "the principie of amalgama tion." The
American nation, as one congressional cornmittec put it, was
founded "upon the great principle of amalgamating ali orders of
society." Ali professionalism was viewed with suspicion. The military
profession which was just beginning was virtually strangled at birth.
"In a free State, it was most impolitic and un safe for the army to be
separated in habits, intercsts, and feelings from the othcr orders of
society." 11
PERSONNEL: CONGRESSIONAL APPOINTMENT AND LATERAL EN
TRANCE. The Jacksonian impact upon the American military tradi tion
was most pronounced with respect to the systems of entry and
advancement. Wcst Point was the principal target of Jacksonian
hostility, the criticism centering not upon the curriculum and
methods of the Academy but rather upon the manner in which
cadcts were appointed and the extent to which Academy graduates
preempted junior officer positions in the Army. In Jacksonian eyes,
not only was specialized skill unnecessary for a military officer, but
also every man had a natural right to pursue the vocation of his
choice. Even Jackson's Secretary of War denounced the "exclu sive
privilege of entering the army" and cited the example of revolu
tionary France as justi:fication for extensive promotions from the
ranks. Jackson himself had an undisguised antipathy for the
Academy which symbolized such a different conception of officer
ship from that which he himself embodied. During bis administra-
204
tion discipline faltered at West Point, and eventually Sylvanus
Thayer, tbe superintendent and molder of the West Point educ tional
methods, resigned in disgust at the intrusion of the spods systcm. The
Jacksonian attack reachcd its peak i.n 1837 when_ a select
congressional committee appointcd to invest1gate West Pomt
recommendcd its abolition. In thc opinion of the committee, the
Academy contravcned the principles of the founding fathers and
monopolizcd commissions in the Regular Army, which ought to be kept
open to "all citizens, like cvery other department of govern ment." The
basic trouble was the assumption that "educa'tion and discipline" were
"everything." The military caste produced by West Point was incapable
of lcading frecborn American citizcns. Success in war carne to thosé.
"qualified to do so by nature." Blasting away at the "tinsels of
scholarship" the committce restated in eloquent terms the eighteenth-
century concept of military genius. The rich were preferred to the
poor in the selection of cadets, the committee declared, although it
admitted it had no spccific cvidence on this point. While Congress did
not follow up its committce's suggest!ons and do away with West Point,
the hostility which the comm1ttee reflected remained prevalent, state
legislatures condcmning the "aristocratical institution" in New York as
"wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genuis of our liberal
institutions." 12
The most permanent legacy of Jacksonian opposition was the
congrcssional systcm of appointment to the Academy. In the first
decades of the century, cadets were appointed by the military au
thorities. In the 1820's and 1830's, however, as the number of can
didates began to exceed the number of appointments, and, as the
attacks upan the supposedly aristocratic and plutocratic nature of
the Academy mounted, the custom developed of distributing ap
pointments among the congressional districts. By the early 1840's
appointments were made on the recommendation of the Represen
tatives, and congressmen had come to look upon them as a normal
part of their patronage. The system was formalizcd in 1843 when
Congress required that cadets be distributed equally among the
congressional districts with each cadet actually being a resident of
the district from which he received his appointment. Just prior to
the establishment of the Naval Academy in 1845, Congress also re
quired that the appointment of midshipmen in the Navy should be
205

The Soldier and the State
distributed among the states and territories in proportion to the
number of Representatives and Delegates. As each appointee had
to be a resident of the state from which he was appointed, the Navy
Department carne to rely upon the recommendations of the con
gressman from the candidate's district. In 1852, Congress fonnal ized
this system requiring congressional nomination as a prereq uisitc to
selection as a midship man. 13 Thc congressional system of
The Roots of the Military Tradition
tury, Congress insisted upon maintaining seniority as the formal
system of advancement. The result was that able officers spent
decades in thc lower ranks, and all offi.ccrs who had normal ar
supernormal longevity were assurcd of reaching thc highcr ranks.
Seniority, Iike politics, was also attacked by those who wanted rank
to reflcct merit. Even the British system of purchase, sorne felt, was
superior to thc American reliance upan seniority, especially since
¡ the lattcr failed in its ostensible purposc of minimizing politics.

¡
appointment to the military academies was a crude effort at popu lar
subjcctive civilian control but it was to havc a lasting effect on
American military institutions.
Latera] entry directly from civilian life into the higher ranks of
the officer corps was also a common phenomenon prior to the Civil
War. It was in sorne respects an ancient practice, but it became
much more widespread under the Jacksonians. In 1836, for instance,
when four additional regimcnts of dragoons were formed, thirty
officers were appointed directly from civil Iife and four from West
t1
Point graduates. Of the Army's thirty-sevcn generals from 1802 to
1861, not one was a West Pointer; twenty-three were virtually with
out military experience aTJ.d eleven others entered the scrvice at the
grade of captain or higher. Army regulations at the time of the
Mexican War encouraged the appointment of officers from civil
Iife. Regular officers frequemly quit the servicc, entered civilian
occupa tions, then, in time of war, reCntercd the Army as militia or
volun teer officers at higher grades than those of the oflicers who
had stayed with the service. Officers were frequently elected in the
militia and also in the lower ranks of the Civil War vo1unteers.
Until thc last years of the Civil War, politics not merit dictated ap
pointments to the highest Army posts. lnfluence was equally im
portant in the Navy and Marine Corps, although in these services
it was more personal in nature, with nepotism not uncommon. "The
most important factor in the selection of midshipmen," writes Paul
lin of thc years from 1815 to 1842, "was political and personal
influence; and many statesmen of the olden times left memorials
of their families in the navy list by making midshipmen of sundry
sons, grandsons, nephews, and cousins." 14
Many opposed political appointment, but the most generally ac
ccpted substitute, the seniority system, was, jf anything, a cure
worse than the disease. During the first half of the nineteenth cen-
206
"Our army," one officer complained, "is much more open to this
kind of favoritism and political partiality, than that of almost any
of the governmcnts of Europe, which we have been accustomed to
regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendly to real merit." 15 Effons
to substitutc a more profcssional system of advancement failed of
success in both the Army and the Navy. Lacking general!y accepted
criteria far judging professional competence, it was impossible to
develop standards for promotion by merit. The absence of a retire
ment system in the Army and the Navy caused officers to hang on
to their posts until they died in their boots, holding up thc advance
mcnt of juniors. The Navy received a limited retirement system in
1855, but the Army had to wait until after the Civil War. In addi tion,
the Navy ha hardly a hierarchy of professional grades, there
being only the three officer ranks of lieutenant, commander, and
captain. With only two promotions in a lifetime, there was little in
centive to distinguished effort and professional improvement.
The influence of popularism in the officer corps encouraged the
officers to be active in politics. The pattern was set by the Com
manding Generals of the Army. Gcnera]s Jacob Brown and Scott were
active political figures, and the latter campaigned far the Presidency
while commanding the Army. The majority of the officers favored
military participation in politics. In a discussion of the issue in the
Army and Navy Chronicle in 1836, the prevailing opinion was that
the Founding Fathers had set the proper example. Every officer in the
Revolutionary Army, it was argued, was also a politician. "The
feeling and the opinion that an oflicer should take no part in
politics are conceived in the most servile spirit, and inculcated by
heartless military aristocrats, whose interest it is to hold the minds of
their subordinates in entire subjection to their domineering
propcnsities." 16 The rights of an officer to speak and
207
 The Soldier and the State
act politica\ly were no diffcrent, it was agreed, than thosc of any
other American citizen.
ARMYORGANIZATION: THE COORDINATE PATTERN, 1836-1903. Tbe
ninetecnth-century pattern of naval organization had been fixed
r The Roots of the Military Tradition
along Jeffersonian lines during Madison's administration. The
system of Army organization which was to prevail until the first
years of the twenticth century was fonnalized in 1836 and reflected
distinctly Jacksonian influcnces. Prior to 1821 the Army, Iike the
Navy, had no single professional head. The Secretary of War ad
ministcred thc Army through generals commanding geographical
districts and superviscd the operation of thc staff agencies in Wash
ington. He could, if he wished and as Sccretary Armstrong did in
1813, exercise direct command of the troops in the field. He thus
had complete control ovcr his department; the political and military
functions werc as yet undifferentiated. In 1821, howevcr, Secretary
of War John C. Calhoun ordered the sale remaining majar general
to Washington so as to bring "the military administration of the
army, as well as its pecuniary, through the severa} subordinate
branches, undcr the immediate inspcction and control of the Gov
crnment." 17 Calhoun's intcntion was to establish a balanccd systcm
of organization. On the one hand, the Secrctary would supervise
the "General Staff" officcrs in clrnrge of the technical departments
of medicin!!, subsistence, quartennaster, pay, the adjutant general,
and thc Corps of Enginecrs. On the other hand, through the Com
manding General, the Seci.-etary would dircct the military opera
tions of the Army. Calhoun, however, soon left office, and the sys tem
began to function in a manner quite different from that which he
had intended. Particularly after Jackson bccamc Presider.t, his
previous military cxperience, the constitutional role of the Presidcnt
as Commandcr in Chief, the personalities of the Presidcnt, the
Commanding General, and the Secretaries, and the pulls of politics
and interest, combincd to warp Calhoun's organization into a co
ordinate pattcm. The Commanding General became independent
of the Sccretary and directly responsible to the President on military
matters. The authority of the Secretary was limited to fiscal and
administrative affairs including the supervision of the technical
bureaus. Lewis Cass, Jackson's Secretary of War, endorsed tbis
development, declaring that it was the function of the Commanding
108
General ..to superintend and direct those parts of the
administration of tbe army which are strictly military in thcir
character, and which, to be properly conducted, require not only
the advantage of military experience, but of a military connexion
with the army." ia The co ordinate systcm of dual control by the
Secretary and Commanding General was formally written into
Army Regulations at the clase of Jackson's administration in
1836:
The military establishment is placed under the ordcrs of the Majar
General Commanding-in-Chief, in all that regards its discipline and mili
tary control. lts fiscal arrangements propcrly belong to the administra tive
departments of the staff, and to the Treasury Department under the
direction of the Secretary of War.10
With the cxception of a few years befare and after the Civil War, this
provision remained in the Regulations until Root's reorganiza tion of
the WarDepartment in 1903.
The coordinate Army organization was justified on the grounds
that the Commanding General represented the pennanent military
interests of the Army and that the Secretary of War as an untutored
civilian could n:::,t interpose himself on military matters between
the Commanding General and the constitutional Commander in
Chief. Within the military establishment the function of the
Command ing General was command, that of the Secretary
administration. As a civilian it was impossible far the Iatter to
exercise military command. "In all matters strictly military,"
declared James A: Gar field, "the General of the Anny is second in
command under the President." 20 Nor could the President delegate
bis command au thority over the Army to the Secretary because the
latter was not part of the Army and, hence, could not be authorized
to dircct it. The Army and War Department were distinct agencies. 21
The corollary to the responsibility of the Commanding General to
the President was the responsibility of the bureau chiefs to the
Secre tary. After the 1820's the bureau heads reported directly to the
Secretary, and ali Secretaries insisted upan issuing direct orders to
the bureaus without the intervention of the Commanding Gen eral.
Legislation establishing bureaus virtually always placed them under
the "direction" or "supervision" of the Secretary. War De partment
organization under the coordinate plan was in part a
109
 The Soldier and the State
conscious imitation of the similar British system prevailing between
1795 and 1870. The division of rcsponsibilities between the Englísh
Secretary of State for War and the Commander in Cbief was hailed in
T '
American military writing as the wisest form of military organi
zation.
1 unique in the history of American public administration. Other majar
}
i1
While in theory the Commanding General embodied the pro
fessional military intcrests of the Army and was divorced from
' individual. Thc War Department, however, far sixty five years
politics, in actual practicc, quite the reverse was generally true.
The direct acccss of the General to the President and the ill-defined
allocation of rcsponsibilities betwcen him and the Secretary kept
the Arrny's top rnilitary officer continually involved in political con
troversy. The biggest eruption was in 1855 whcn General Scott and
Secretary Davis engagcd in one of thc most vitriolic exchanges ever
to enliven American public adrninistration. This struggle became a
continuing characteristic of mi!itary affairs. McClellan fought
Secretary Stanton during the Civil War; Sherrnan fought Secrctary
Belknap dudng the Grant administration; Shcridan quarreled with
Secretary Endicott in the 1880's; and General Miles and Secretary
Alger wcre openly at swords' points during the Spanish-American
War. Scott moved bis headquarters from Washington to New York
because he could not get along with the Taylor administration.
Sherrnan shifted bis command to St. Louis as a result of bis disa
grcemen1s with the civilian authorities. 1n addition, just as the
Secretary strovc to extend his authority over the Commanding Gen
eral, thc latter also attempted to exert control ovcr the bureaus. In
1829 the adjutant general protested to the Secrctary that the Com
manding General was meddling in affairs which did not properly
concern him, and two years later the General in turn complained
that the "staff departments hardly seemed to belong to the same
scrvice." Throughout the remainder of the century the political
struggle of thc bureaus versus the General and the General versus
the Secrctary successfully prcvented the General from functioning
as a true professional mi!itary Ieader. "Constant discord" was the
inevitable result of the coordinate system. 22
The coordinate organization established by the Jacksonians was
the .first attempt to reconcile the constitutional provisions making
the President Commander in Chief with the existence of a spccial
izcd profession devoted to military command and planning. lts
210
The Roots of the Military Tradition
history deroonstrates the virtual impossibility of achieving objcctive
civilian control through this form of organization. The prolonged
war Department experience with the coordinate pattern is probably
departments and agencies have virtually always been headed by a
single individual or a board or commission acting as a single
operated under a system of dual control, the peculiar result of con
stitutional forms and of initial Jacksonian unwillingness to permit
a balanced pattern of executive civil-military relations.
PROFESSIONALISM
SOUTHERN SOURCES: THE TRADITION OF MILlTARY JNTEREST.
Thc South gave military professionalism its only significant
support in thc pre-Civil War years. A "Southcrn military tradition"
existed in a way in which there was nevera NewEngland, Middlc
Western, or Rocky Mountain military tradition. The sources of
Southern in terest in military affairs were varied. First, the South
had peculiar sectional nccds for military force. On the western
frontier the In dian threat was ever moving westward with the
advancing linc of settlements. No locality felt the need of military
protection far more than a few decades, and there was no basis for
a continuing pro military group. In the South, however, the frontier
was more static. Three generations of Southerners were troubled by
the depredations of the Seminoles and Creeks, and the threat was
not finally removed until the end of the exhausting six-ycar Florida
War in 1842. The active Indian threat was also supplemented by
the potential danger of a slave revolt, the two not being entirely
unrelated since escaped slaves often teamed up with the Indian
tribes. As a result of these two threats, strong military forces and
the widespread dissemination of military knowledge and skill were
held necessary to the security of the plantation system. A second
source of Southern militarism was the romantic cult which infused
antcbellum Southem culture. Thls stemmed in large part from the
agricultura! nature of the South, the admiration of Southerners far
the English ideal of the "gentleman," and the desire, fanned by the
novels of Seott, to ape the manners and customs of medieval
knighthood. All these con tributed to the glorification of violence,
chivalry, and the martial
211
 23
The Soldier and the State
idea l. Thirdly, the agradan character of the section and the
rclative absence of commercial and industrial opportunitics present
in other parts of the country naturally stimulated Southern intercst
r The Roots of the Military Tradition
the policics of the Union government in 1860 and 1861 pcrmitted
them to resigo thcir commissions ·'without violating their profes•
sional trust. Even so, 40 to 50 pcr cent of the Southern Wcst Point

1
in the military career.
graduates on active duty in 1860 held to their posts and remained
Scctional self-intcrcst, an atavic allegiance to feudal romanti
loyal to the Union. The course of thc conflict, however,_ revealed
cism, and an agrarian cconomy - all nurturcd Southern militarism.
even more strongly the different attitudes of thc two scct1ons. Pro
These sourccs, however, were not in themselvcs sufficient to lead
fessional officers were pushed aside and passed over in the Union,
to an appn:ciation of military profcssionalism. In fact, in many
thc higher commissions going, in the ílrst stages of thc war at le s ,
respects thcy rcflcctcd motivations incompatible with profcssional
to oflicers called back into service or directly appointed from c1v1l
ideals. Transcending these sources, howevcr, was the conscrvative
Iife many of them "politica\" appointees. Tn contrast, the South
cast of Southern society and Southem thinking, the product of the
weÍcomed its professionals and capitalized upan their talents. Sixty four
South's defen!-iive position as an illiberal island in a liberal society.
pcr cent of the Regular Army officers who went South beca?1e gcnerals;
This conservatism furnished a sympathetic environment for the
Jess than 30 per cent of thosc who stayed with the Umon achieved that
growth of the professional ideal and channeled the military concern
rank.25
aroused by the other aspects of Southern life into an active recogni
Throughout the half century befare the Civil War Southerners
tion of the nature of thc military profession and a preference for
preempted the principal positions of lcadership in military ffairs.
that profession as a career. The attraction of this conservative en
While the leadership oí the entire governmcnt was predommantly
vironment was manifest at the outbrcak of the Civil War. The
Southern in the first three decades of thc nineteenth century, the
Southern professional officer in 1861 was confrontcd with a cruel
military departments had an even more pronounced Southern com
choice symbolized in Lce's anguished pacing at Arlington. On the
p!exion. The gradual displaccment of Southem personnel in the
one hand, the Southern officer's political allcgiances drew him to
civil sirle of government which occurrcd toward the middle of the
the Confederacy; on thc other, his professional responsibility was to
century also had no counterpart on the mi!itary side. Instead,
the Union. Thc decision, however, was not simply a clear cut one
Southern influence tended to become more concentrated in the
between political and professional valucs. For the South itself was
military departments. Despite the congressional system of appoint•
more sympathetic to the military profcssion than the North. As one
ments, the South furnished a heavily disproportionate share of the
Northem officer declared during the war, "For many years previ•
cadets at West Point. The ideals and atmosphere of the Military
ous to secession, the profession of anns had, at the North fallen
Academy became more markedly Southern toward the middle of
from disrepute to contcmpt . . . To be an officer of the Regular
the century, and the Naval Academy also was characterized by the
Army was, popularly, to be an idle gentleman, well paid for doing
"prevalence of a Southern flavor." On the Army list of 1837, three
nothing, scarcely worthy of respect, and assuredly not of esteem."
of the four active generals wcre from Virginia, and nine of the
A Southern Marine captain exclaimed to Alfred Mahan that of
thirteen colonels of the line were Southern, six of them Virginians.
course Mahan's fathcr, a Virginian anda professor at West Point,
Ten of the twenty-two highest ranking officcrs of the Arrny were
would come South: "AII your father's antecedents are military;
from the Old Dominion. Many of the officers who held the top
there is no military spirit in the North; he must come to us." 2·1
posts over long periods of time carne from the South. Winfield
Thus, setting aside political considerations, the Southem officer
Scott, Commanding General from 1841 to 1861, Coloncl Roger
faced a strange paradox: his professional duty demanded that he
Jones, adjutant general from 1825 to 1852, and Brigadier Gen eral
support the society which rejected his profession and fight the so
T. S. Jessup, quartcrmastcr general from 1818 to 1850, were all
ciety which had given it birth. Fortunately for the Southern officers,
Virginians. The geograpbical centcr of the naval officer corps
112
213
 The Soldier and the State
also moved South. In the early years of the Republic, New England
had predominated in the Navy. Subsequently, in the first quarter of
the nineteenth century, the "naval clans" of the Middle Atlantic
seaports were the principal .source of naval officcrs. By I 842, how
ever, 44 pcr cent of the midshipmen appointments were going to
the Maryland-Virginia arca. Northem concem about this concen tr
tio wasoneof the factors leading Congress to distribute the
1 h1pmen appointments among the congressional districts. The
c1v1han Sccretarics of War - including the two most vigorous, Cal
houn and Jefferson Davis - and Secretaries of the Navy, as well
as the congressional leaders in military affairs - were frequently
Southe rne rs.26
Southem support both aided and obstructed military profcs
sionalization. The identification of military institutions and ideals
with that portian of American society which was distinctly "differ ent"
from the dominant elements in American culture strengthened the
tendcncy in the north and west to view military professionalism as s
methi g inhercntly alien and aristocratic. Southem support was
msuffic1ent to enable military professionalism to prevail against the
predominant Jeffersonian and Jacksonian attitudes. ll was not until
the South was defeated in the Civil War that American liberal sm,
instead of fighting professional development, simply ignored Jt.
But if Southern support was a short-term political Iiability, it was
also a long-term intellectual asset. While the institutions of military
organization, education, cntry, and advancement were shaped along
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian lines, the ideas deriving
fr i_n Southern sources wcre capturing the mind of the American
m1htary man. Southern interest sparked the emergence of military
profcssionalism as a concept and paved the way for the institutional
reforms of the post-Civil War era. The roots of American military
professionalism go back to mid-nineteenth-century Southern con
servatism.
JOHN C. CALI-IOUN: THE FRUSTRATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN MIL
ITARY STATESMAN. The problems inherent in the relationship be
tween Southern military professionalism and the rest of American
society were well illustrated by John C. Calhoun's career as Secre
tary of War onde,; James Monroe from 1817 to 1825. Calhoun
was in many respects the model Secretary of War, energetically
214
The So/dier and the State
arms thcir profession," and upan the extent to which the anncd
forces perpctuate "military skill and experiencc" in peacetime.
West Point, Calhoun believed, should be separated from the Corps
The Roots of the Military Tradition
concerned with both the administrative and mi\itary aspects of bis
responsibilities. He initiated numerous lasting institutional reforms
in the administration and management of the War Department. He
rationalized thc Anny supply system and placed procurcment upan
a responsible and efficicnt basis. He vitalizcd thc office of the In
spector General as the Sccretary's instrument for checking upon the
activities of the military establishment. He created a Medica! De
partment and persuaded Congress to reorganize and strengthcn the
General Staff departments, laying down the essentials of their or
ganization which were to persist for most of the nineteenth century.
' He overhauled the Army accounting system and instituted a new
centralized method of fiscal responsibility and control. He had the
Anny Regulations rewritten and codified. He improvcd the sub
sistence of the Army and reduced its cost. He appointed ablc and
respected men to head the various staff bureaus and divisio ns. 7
When he Jeft office the Army's smoothly functioning administrative
organization bore Iittle rcsemblance to the chaos which had pre vailed
at the close of the War of 1812. Under bis dircction the War
Department became the most efficient agency in the gove,rn ment. For
decades aftcrward, its clerks aspired to handle Army business as "Mr.
Calhoun would have done it."
In the realm of administration and management - the house
keeping functions of the Army - Calhoun was thus a great suc cess.
But he was also concerned with the Army as a military organ
ization and with the issues of military policy. His views on these
mattcrs reflccted an essentially conservative outlook. They were
based on a Hamiltonian pessimism with re pect to human nature
and the inevitability of war. Military preparations were essential,
and most important among these was the maintenance of a profes
sional officer corps. More clearly than any othcr American of his
time, Calhoun appreciated the changing character of the military
vocation. The "rapid progress of military science," he argued, had
professionalized officership while leaving unchanged the duties
of the enlisted man. In words worthy of von Moltke, Calhoun re
jected the eighteenth-century and Jacksonian idea that natural
rnili tary genius would suffice and emphasized the neccssity of
trained collective competence. The survival of the nation depended
upan the extent to which citizens of "talents and character ... make
215
of Engincers, because the divcrse duties of thc Corps had "little
refer ence to the cxisting military establishment." Tbe Academy
should be transformed from a technical institute into a professional
school and thus given a "character and importance" which had not
"been contemplated in its original institution." With West Point and
pos sibly an additional academy devoted to the elementary study of
the "art of war," advanccd schools of application should then be
estab lishcd far the topographical corps, the artillery, and the
engineers. Basica!ly, Calhoun wantcd to rcorganize American
military educa tion from the Jeffersonian to the Hamiltonian
pattem. Calhoun's military policy proposed to organize the Anny on
a skelcton basis, sufficient to pcrfonn its pcacetime duties of
garrisoning the Atlantic forts and lndian posts, yet by expansion
and multiplication capablc of rapidly increasing to the sizc
necessary far war. Inherent in this plan far an "expansible standing
army" was the premise that those professional officers who
commanded the small Regular Army in peace would also command
thc expanded Army in war: recruits would be siphoned into
Regular Army regiments; the militia would play a secondary role.
While Congress supported and approved Calhoun's improve
ments in War Department administration and efficiency, it frus
trated his conservative proposals far military education and mili
tary policy. The dominant Jeffersonian-Jacksonian liberals in Con
gress and the public denounced the Anny as a drain on the econ
omy and a threat to republican government. Calhoun fought back.
No "arrangement can be ca1led economical," he warned, "which,
in ordcr that our military establishment in peace should be rather
less expensive, would . . . render it unfit-to meet the dangers inci
dent to a state of war." The spirit of the Regular Army was indeed,
he conceded, different from the spirit of liberalism. But in tbe
United Statcs the danger was not that the military spirit would
overwhelm the civil, but rather the reverse: "that both offi.cers and
soldiers will lose their military habits and feelings, by sliding
gradu ally into those purely civil." In thís insight, Calhoun
described both the fundamental problem of American civil-
military relations far
216
The Soldier and the State
lation. It was singularly void of lasting institutional reforms. The
ideas of the Enlightenment, however, molded the form wbich pro
fessionalism in practice was to take after the Civil War.
The causes of the Enlightenment were complicated. The
natural course of military development induced officers incrcasingly
to rccognize a "military science" distinct from technical specialities
and civil pursuits. The initial, embryonic institutions of military
The Roots of the Military Tradition
a century and a half and thc reason for the failure of bis own
policies. Despite bis efforts, tbe Army was reduced in size. The
expansible army plan was rejected. It ran counter to the basic tenet
of American liberalism that profcssional military officers are per
m:issible only when they command small military forces and that
Jarge military forces are permissible only when they are
commanded by nonprofcssional officers. Calhoun's proposals to
develop the Army educational system were ignorcd, and the
tcchnical empha sis at West Point was continucd. The one new
school which he was able to establish, the Artíllery School at Fort
Monroe, Virginia, was closed down by the Jacksonians in 1835.
His efforts to create a balanced pattern of civil-military relations in
thc War Depart ment were warped into quite a different system.
Even bis recom mendations to Congress on coastal defense werc
brushed aside. Thus, whilc his administrai.i-..· reforms determined
the pattern of War Department operation far half a century, his
military policies found life only in a series of masterly state papers.
More than any other ninetcenth-century Secretary of War, Calhoun
understood the rcquircments of military professionalism. Yct,
paradoxically, the unsympathetic atmosphere in which he worked
determined that bis lasting contributions to the War Department
wcre in the civil administrative arca. The hostile American
environment ovcrwhelmed and dissipated the drive and the genios
which he brought to the cause of professional military rcform.
THE MILITARY ENLIGHTENMENT ANO THE SOUTH, 1832-1846. The
fifteen years from tbe end of Jackson's first administration to
the beginning of the Mexican War saw an outpouring of military
thought and writing which was, in many respects, unique in Ameri
can history. Military societies sprang into being; military journals
led brief but active Jives; military oflicers published significant
andoriginal -books; theidea of a military profcssion was ex
pounded and defended. This eruption may be appropriately termed
thc American Military Enlightenment. Many factors contributed to
its appearance, but thc intcllectual wclls from which it was fed were
predominantly Southem. Peculiarly enough, the Enlighten mcnt
ceased almost as abruptly as it had bcgun. The 1850's were as
barren of significant military thought as the 1820's. Morcover, lhis
military flowering was exclus:ively one of awarcness and articu-
117
professionalism, particularly West Point, also contributcd. The
Military Academy had only begun to function effectively in 1817;
consequently, it did not become capable of reproducing its kind
until a couple of decadcs later. Dennis Hart Mahan, the leading fig ure
of the Enlightenment, for instance, was graduated in 1824 and,
returning to teach in 1830, expounded the gospcl of professional ism
to successive generations of cadets for forty years. The thinking of thc
Enlightenment was also stimulated by the developing inter est in
science which spread through Europc and America in the 1830's and
1840's. In this respect, the Enlightenment was noten tirely divorced
from tcchnicism and, unlike the professional move ment after the
Civil War, was rather closely linked to the intellec tual currents of
the day. Significantly, both Mahan and Matthew Fontaine Maury, the
leading naval figure, made their initial repu tations as technical
specialists, the former as an engineer and the latter as an
oceanographer. The military journals genera!ly had more technical
articles than professional ones on the art of war. A military society,
such as the United States Naval Lyceum founded by officers at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1833, sponsored scientific and technical
researches and, at times, seemed more preoccupied with
metcorology, zoology, botany, and mineralogy, than with more
strictly naval subjec,ts 8
The political conditions of the time also
tended to stimulate profossional activity. The Jacksonian attack
on rnilitary institutions forced the officer .to produce an apologia
pro vita sua. The advanced outpouring of military thought was thus
not unrelated to the backward state of military institutions. The
same blanket hostility of a liberal society which stimulated Feder
alists and Southerners to political theory drove the ad,,ocates of
military professionalism to sophisticated thought and pungent ex
pression.
The principal positive impetus to the Military Enlightenment
21
8
The Roots of the Mi/itary Tradition
carne from Southern conservatism. Southcrncrs dominated the seri
ousthought and discussion of military affairs. Military periodicals
flourished during the 1830's and 1840's as they had nevcr done
befare andas they were not to do again until the 1890's. Thc Mili
tary and Naval Magazine was published from 1833 to 1836, the
Army and Navy Chronicle from 1835 to 1844, and the Military
Magazine from 1839 to 1842. PreCminent among the joumals in
terested in military affairs, however, was the great magazine of the
South, the Southern Literary Messenger. The Messenger consist
ently devoted extensive attention to military and naval matters. By
1844 it had "becomc a sort of organ of the United States Army and
Navy" - the closest thing the country had to an anny and navy
journ al. 2 11 The two outstanding military writcrs and thinkers of
the Enlightenmcnt, Mahan and Maury, werc both Virginians;
Maury went South in the Civil War and Mahan was sorely tempted
to do so. Southern interest in the study of the military art was also
mani fest in the creation of local military schools. Virginia Military
In stitute was established in 1839, the Citadcl and thc Arsenal set
up in South Carolina in 1842, Kentucky Military Institute in
1845. By 1860, every Southern state, except Florida and Texas,
had its own state-supported military academy patterned on the
models of West Point and VMI. With thc notable exccptions of
VMI and the Citadel, most of the Southern schools, Jikc the
military joumals, did not survive thc Civil War. Nonetheless while
they existed, they gave the South a unique sectiona\ system of
military education which was absent in the north and west.
The most notable critic of the preprofessional institutions of the
American Navy during the Enlightenment period was Matthew
Fontaine Maury. His views on naval organization and education,
expressed in the pages of the Southern Literary Messenger and the
Richmond Whig and Public Adverriser, reflected a truly profes sional
concept of the officer's function. Like Calhoun, he recog nized a
sharp distinction bctween the training required for officers and mcn.
The Jatter could be recruited in a day from thc merchant marine.
Officers, on the other hand, "must undergo a peculiar sys tem of
previous training, that involves no inconsiderable expense, and
requires a period of severa! years to complete the course." Naval
officership shou\d be accorded dignity and training com•
21
9
 r
The Soldier and the State
parable to thosc of the legal and medica} professions. Thc emer
gence of professional standards required the differentiation of a
greater numbcr of professional ranks in the naval hierarchy. A reg
ularized system of appointment and promotion by merit was
needcd. Naval officers should receive thc "benefit of a professional
education" which would be "broad, salid, and comprehensivc," and
which would combine literary and technical instruction. Maury
also deplored the lack of profcssional writing in the Navy.3 º
The most outstanding military thinker of these years was Den nis
Hart Mahan. Appointed Professor of Civil and Military Engi neering
at West Point in 1832, Mahan insisted that thc words "and of the Art
of War" be added to bis title. Teaching at the Acadcmy until his death
in 1871, Mahan was the author of technical works on engineering
and professional works on strategy, teacher and inspirer of the military
lcaders of thc Civil War and of the postwar generation that was to
make military professionalism a reality in thc United States, and
father of the Navy's most distinguishcd writer and publicist. In his
Notes on the Composition of Armies and Strategy and his
Advanced Guard, Out Post, and Detachment Service of Troops which
were used as texts at the Academy from 1841 ntil th _Civil War,
Dennis Hart exprcssed a thoroughly professmnal mihtary outlook. As
his son correctly obscrved: "The spirit of the profession was strong in
him." He was a Virginian at heart with "strict and lofty military
ideals." 31
Mahan's greatest contribution to American military profes
sionalism was, in ali probability, bis stress upan the Iessons to be
Iearned from history. Without "historical knowledge of the rise and
progress" of the military art, he argued, it is impossible to get even
"tolerably clea elementary notions" beyond "those furnishcd by
the mere techmcal language.... t i military history that
we ar _to loo farthesource of ali military science." His emphasis
on m1htary h1story led Mahan to abandon the prevailing
distinction between strategy and tactics in terms of the scale of
operations. He carne to see .that strategy, involving fundamental,
invariable princi les, embod1ed what was permanent in military
science, while tac t.tcs concerned what was temporary. History was
essential to a mastery of strategy, but it had no relevance to tactics.
The line which distinguishes the one from the other is "that which
separates
220
The Roots of thc Military Tradition
the science from thc art." This scientific component, Mahan de
clared, distinguished the warfare of his day from the military art
of previous eras. Only after the breakdown of the feudal arder was
it possiblc to "raise the profession of arms to its proper leve}, in
which mind and its achievements have the first rank, and brute
force combined with mere mechanical skill a very subordinatc
onc." Only study and experience alone produce the successful
general, he argucd, protesting the prcvailing Jacksonian view: "Let
no man be so rash as to suppose that, in donning a general's
uniform, he is forthwith compctent to perform a gcneral's function;
as reasonably might he assumc that in putting on the robes of a
judge he was ready to decide any point of Iaw." Mahan also
dcfined the relation of the military profession to war and the
distinction between the military spirit and the bellicosc spirit. The
trouble with thc United States as a country was that "we are
perhaps thc lcast military, though not behind the foremost as a
warlike one." The object of war was always to "gain an
advantageous peace," which can only be achieved by applying
superior forces at the dccisive point.
The influence of Mahan's teachings may be seen in the work
of his most intcllectually distinguished pupil, H. Wager Hallcck,
"Old Brains," graduated from the Academy in 1839. Although not
a Southcrner, Halleck absorbed completely the conservative mili
tary outlook. His Elements of Military Art and Science, published
in 1846, was the most sophisticated volume written by an American
military man prior to the Civil War. In it and in his 1845 report to
Congress on national defense, Halleck presentcd a virtually com
plete expression of the professional military ethic in ali its particu
lars. Hallcck was the most outspoken defender of military institu
tions against their Jacksonian critics, pleading eloquently far "a
body of men who shall dcvote themselves to the cultivation of mili
tary science" and the substitution of Prussian methods of educa tion
and advanccment far the twin evils of politics and seniority. "If we
deem professional instruction requisite far the care of our individual
property and hea1th," he inquired, "shaU we require 1ess far
guarding the honor and safety of our country, the reputation of
our anns, and the lives of our citizens?" 32 It was a question which
the officers of the Enlightenment might raise but which their
countrymen did not choose to answer.
221