Robert Desrosiers

North Carolina Health Seminar

August 21, 2015
Introduction
3 parts

Part 1: Transmission

Part 2: The past

Part 3: The future

Part 1: Transmission
Direct vs indirect
Direct contact → most important
Left source herd infected

Reality often different

Indirect transmission XXXX frequent
 Pathogen Number of cases Indirect
transmission
FMD 1847 95%
(Gibbens, 2001)

CSF 429 97%

(Elbers, 1999)

PRRS 44 100%
(Desrosiers, 2004)

MH 18 100%
(Desrosiers, 2004)

PED in Quebec 9 89%

Transmission: Two types of pathogens
Mainly direct
Mange
Progressive atrophic rhinitis (PAR)
Swine dysentery (SD)

2) Frequently indirect
MH
PRRS
FMD
How to determine?
Remain negative in
Hog dense
Many herds infected

History tells us possible

Mange, PAR & SD
Quebec, 1979
Virtually disappeared
US situation
∼ Quebec, mange & PAR

SD, more cases late vs early 2000s

August 2014, 8 US practitioners

6 ≠ issue
1 minor
1 significant
Swine Dysentery
Animals & basic biosecurity (transport)

Difficulty determine status

Serological test
Low %

Duff, 2014
5 infected farms, 150 sows
0%, 0%, 0.67%, 0.67% and 1.33%
Danish SPF system (Desrosiers, 2011)
Year Swine Atrophic Mycoplasma PRRSV
Dysentery rhinitis hyopneu.
2004-2005 4 7 171 269

2005-2006 7 4 161 297

2006-2007 11 8 163 235

2007-2008 0 5 196 305

2008-2009 3 6 160 226

Average 5 6 170.2 266.4

Hypothetical classification (?)

More easily indirectly = collective

approach

Individual appoach = Mange, PAR & SD

Individual approach ≠ MH, PRRS & FMD

MH in Switzerland, Finland & Norway

Pathogens easily indirectly
Collective approach
Existing, emerging or reportable
Centralized entity

If not government

Quebec EQSP ∼ $150,000
US National Swine Health Inf Center
‘Insanity is doing the same thing over
and over again and expecting different
results.’
40
35
30
25
20
%
15
10
5
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
# PRRS abortion diagnoses ISU
(Madson, personal communication, 2015)
SHMP – August 14, 2015
1,2 million sows, PRRS cumulative incidence
July 1 to June 30
2009-2010 29%
2010-2011 35%
2011-2012 42%
2012-2013 29%
2013-2014 23%
2014-2015 25%
Importance of time
Collective control program
Immediately; before first case

Quebec, every week

∼ 20,000 market hogs From Ontario
∼ 12,000 pigs From Ontario
∼ 1,000-1500 sows To Ontario &
US

Efforts before 1st PED case

Conclusions for Part 1

Today, many pathogens → indirect

↑ easily indirectly → ↓ individual efforts

Collective approach, coordinated

True for existing, emerging, reportable

Countries got rid of FMD, HC, PRV

Part 2: The past
Quotes

Bohr
‘Prediction is very difficult, especially about
the future.’

Desrosiers
‘If you don’t look behind, your behind may
suffer.’
Learn from the past
4 pathogens - 40 years
APP, PRRS, PCV2 & PED

2 questions
How infected?
Avoid infection, reduce spread?
 PRRS & PED
How infected with APP?
1st report 1957 UK → 1959 US

Late 70s (Canada & US)

Don’t know
From UK or elsewhere?
Already here?

Present ∼ 20 years before

How infected with PRRS?
NA, Mystery Swine Disease → 1987

Ontario
1979 2/51
1982 10/56

US
Late 70s

Present before, evolved, became problem

How infected with PCV2?
Clark & Harding, 1996

Canada (Magar, 2000)

1985 sows 13.6%
1989 sows 72.4%

Two waves
PCV2a Present before, evolved
PCV2b From Europe (Vidigal,
How infected with PED?

China, major losses late 2010, new genotype

US, April 16, 2013

China, but don’t know

Canada, Jan 22, 2014 SDPP

Avoid infection, reduce spread of
PRRS?

Avoid infection
Not much

Reduce spread
5 years Prevention
20 years Aerosol transmission
PRRS – Can we get rid of it?
Chili, Sweden, Switzerland
US → $664 millions ($15 billions)
Nothing wrong reconsidering

How?
Collective, global approach
Elimination field strains first
Then decide on vaccines
Avoid infection, reduce spread of PED?
Avoid infection
Canada, no US SDPP (Ontario & PEI →
Quebec)
US, no import from China, but

Reduce spread
US → > 50%
Canada → < 2%
Quebec → 0.15% & no PDC
 PED: Quebec vs US
Quebec US

Central entity at time Yes No

of first case
Was initial source of Yes No
infection identified
Were few herds Yes No
initially infected
Diagnostic test at Yes No
time of first case
Start testing before Yes No
first case
Quebec vs US
Quebec
Benefited XXX from US & Ontario research
Some, before first Quebec case
Efforts triggered proximity
≠ thousands kms away

If Canada first…

Conclusions for Part 2
Emerging present way before → difficult

Prevention strategy ≠ great

Don’t know how any, or why
Have not gotten rid of any (APP, PCV2)
Adding diseases without

PED → Canada so far

Part 3: The future
Emerging: 4 different
categories
1) Known pathogens not here

2) Known pathogens, here, get worse

3) Harmless organisms, not here, become pathogens

4) Harmless organisms, here, become pathogens

1) Known pathogens not here
PED
3 ways
Stop introducing
Continue, but make sure (products & processes)
Sterilize products
Diagnostic test available 1st case or before
Mandatory reporting to central entity

Closed herds (All 4 categories pathogens)

2) Known pathogens, here, get worse

SIV

H1N1 from 1930s to 1980s; then 1998

Huge potential impact

Disease in pigs vs humans (pH1N1)

Surveillance, but control plan if?

3) Harmless organisms, not here,
become pathogens
Harmless organism, foreign country, introduced
here & become pathogens

Costly retrospective studies

2 ways
Forbid introduction
Sterilize products
4) Harmless organisms, here, become
pathogens
PRRS
Rapidly
Realize & identify
Develop diagnostic & apply control

Even best scenario, months or years

≠ prevent emergence

Can we reduce diffusion?

Multiple site system (?)
≥ 90%
↑↑↑ geographic spread (states or countries)

Davies, 2012
Minnesota
∼10,000 pigs /day
> 30 states & Canada

If new bug in the US (humans)

Multiple site system (?)
↑↑↑ transmission opportunities
Quebec → 9/10 PED → 1 transport

Weaning 2 or 3 times/week 104 or 156

days

Gilt introductions, culled removals, nursery to

finishers, market hogs to slaughter

∼ 150 to > 200 days

Consider hypothetical alternative
FF on one site, 4 week batch farrowing

Closed herd

Empty finishing units 1 day

Culled animals same day

13 days (MS with WTF = 13 + 13)

Reasons
FF operation → Multiple site

Maintain health

Difficult to eliminate

Others
Examples of FF → Healthy
(Paboeuf F, personal comunication, 2014)

Ploufragan, populated 1979

25 sows, research

HEPA filters, heated feed, etc.
No antibiotics
∼ no mortality
After 36 years, negative most swine pathogens
SIV & PCV2
Size of sow herds
Early 90s, 369 herds ∼ 400 sows
Goede 2014, 2.1 million sows ∼ 2,700
sows
In 20 years ∼ 18,000 sows

Larger herds more likely to

Become infected
Infect other
Size of sow herds

Wei, 2014 pH1N1 9 passages

Norway (50-80 vs 18,000 sows)

12 years SIV-free
∼ Salmonella-free
∼ lowest ABC

Harding, IPVS 2014 → Sustainability

 Sustainability
1. Producers, decent living
2. Consistently, safe/healthy food
3. Minimal antibiotics
4. High consideration welfare
5. Least negative environmental impact
6. Reduce contamination/spread pathogens
7. Economically get rid pathogens
8. Reduce risk harmless organisms →
pathogens
9. Reduce risk swine bugs → humans
Sustainability
Basis for discussion

Experts: veterinarians, physicians, economists,

welfare specialists, environmentalists, producers,
packers, retailers, consumers

∼ 75% emerging human diseases are zoonotic

Define which points, grade

8 veterinarians – Vast experience

No pigs in the US

110,000,000 pigs

Optimal production system vs sustainability

Consideration 9 points
 8 questions
1. Which system
2. How ‘clean’ animals
1. A. suis, H. parasuis, S. suis, M. hyosynoviae,
M. hyorhinis
3. Size sow herd
4. How frequently wean
5. AI-AO by room, building, site
6. Closed herd
7. Minimal distance
8. Other comments
Questions Answers

What system 6/8, Multi, wean-finish

How ‘clean’ animals 7/8 ‘cleaner’

Size sow herd 1,200 to 5,000

How frequently wean Twice/week to 4 weeks

AI-AO, room, building, site 5/7 by site

Closed herd 5/8

Minimal distance 1.6 to 50 km

Other comments Many

Start with sow herd - New
Well located/protected → Laws/directives
‘Cleaner’ animals
More robust animals
Nielsen,2006
∼1,000 pigs/boar 2% vs 10%
Closed, batch farrowing
Wean-to-finish, AI-AO by site

Still weaknesses
Start with sow herd - Existing
Increase cost-effectiveness air filtration
HEPA vs current

Consider other ways

EPI → ↓ SIV & PRRS
Mass vaccination → 4 vs 21 & 6 vs 36d
Filtering exhaust air, etc.

Once aerosol taken care of

Consider depopulation, cleaner, more robust
Réseau Cristal
(Marchand D, personal communication, 2014)

Depopulation/repopulation SPF
10 years
2 years before vs 2 years after
Pregnant females
∼ $21/pig
∼ 2 years

1/3 antibiotic-free
↓ 16.8Kg CO2 eq
North America is vulnerable
2 or 3 PED strains, porcine deltacoronavirus,
mutant PCV2
Asia (China)

China
PRV, CSF, FMD, Japanese encephalitis
ASF, Highly Virulent AIV

FMD revenue losses (10 years) → $57 billion

We, also, are a danger!
Singh Brar, 2014
PRRS North America → China (Mid 90s)

US PED → South Korea & Taiwan (Late 2013)

US PED → Canada (Early 2014)

Not only vulnerable, making others vulnerable

Time to reconsider
Summary comments
1) NA - Persistent vulnerability

2) Will be more – Already here

3) ↓ diffusion - Reconsider

4) Indirect transmission – Collective approach (or)

5) LT sustainability vs ST profitability