OETJEN v. CENTRAL LEATHER CO.

289. Syllabus.

Arkansas v. Tennessee, it is a misapplication of this doc-

trine to treat it as forming an exception to the established
rule respecting the effect of erosion, accretion, and avul-
sion upon the course of a boundary stream.
We conclude, therefore, that the court erred in awarding
to the State of Tennessee a recovery of any land or dam-
ages for cutting and removing timber from any land
lying without the limits of the State as defined in our
opinion in Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra,being a line drawn
along the middle of the main channel of navigation of the
Mississippi River (as distinguished from a line midway
between the visible and fixed banks of the stream) as
it was at the time when the current ceased to flow therein
as a result of the avulsion of 1876, and without regard
to changes in the banks or channel that had occurred
through the natural and gradual processes of erosion and
accretion prior to the avulsion.
It results that the judgment of the state court must be
Reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

OETJEN v. CENTRAL LEATHER COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HUDSON COUNTY, STATE

OF NEW JERSEY.

Nos. 268, 269. Argued January 3, 4, 1918.-Decided March 11, 1918.

The court notices judicially that the Government of the United States
recognized the Government of Carranza as the de facto government
of the Republic of Mexico, on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure
government on August 31, 1917.
Semble, that the Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and inter-
national character, do not apply to a civil war, and that the regula-
 OCTOBER TERM, 1917.

Counsel for Plaintiff in Error. 246 U. S.

tions annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a mil-

itary seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this case.
The conduct of our foreign relations is committed by the Constitu-
tion to the executive and legislative-the political-departments
of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.
Who is the sovereign de jure or defacto of a foreign territory is a political
question the determination of which by the political departments
of the Government conclusively binds the judges.
When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recog-
nized by the political department of our Government as the &ijure
government of the country in which it is established, such recognition
is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of
the government so recognized from the commencement of its exist-
ence.
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must
be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot
be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to
a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of
a court as to claims for damages based upon acts done in a foreign
country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of in-
ternational comity and expediency.
In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting independ-
ent operations as a duly commissioned military commander of the
Carranza Government, which had then made much progress in its
revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution and, in enforcing
it, seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen
of Mexico. Held, that the act could not be reexamined and modified
by a New Jersey court in replevin.
87 N. J. L. 552, 704, affirmed.

Tnm cases are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John M. Enright,with whom Mr. Oscar R. Houston
and Mr. James D. Carpenter, Jr., were on the brief, for
plaintiff in error.
 OETJEN v. CENTRAL LEATHER CO.
297. Opinion of the Court.
Mr. Eli J. Blair,with whom Mr. Frank H. Platt was on
the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. JuSTicE CLznmx delivered the opinion of the court,

These two cases involving the same question, were

argued and will be decided together. They are suits in
replevin and involve the title to two large consignments
of hides, which the plaintiff in error claims to own as
assignee of Martinez & Company, a partnership engaged
in business in the city of Torreon, Mexico, but which the
defendant in error claims to own by purchase from the
Finnegan-Brown Company, a Texas corporation, which
it is alleged purchased the hides in Mexico from General
Francisco Villa, on January 3, 1914.
The cases were commenced in a Circuit Court cf New
Jersey, in which judgments were rendered for the defend-
ants, wich were affirmed by the Court, of Errors and
Appeals, and they are brought to this court on the theory,
that the claim of title to the hides by the defendant in
error is invalid because based upon a purchase from Gen-
eral Villa, who, it is urged, confiscated them contrary to
the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting
the laws and customs of war on land; that the judgment
of the state court denied to the plaintiff in error this right
which he "set up and claimed" under the Hague Conven-
tion or treaty; and that this denial gives him the right of
review in this court.
P7A somewhat detailed description will be necessary of
the political conditions in Mexico prior to and at the
time of the seizure of the property in controversy by the
military authorities. It appears in the record, and is a
matter of general history, that on February 23, 1913,
Madero, President of the Republic of Mexico, was assas-
sinated; that immediately thereafter General Huerta
declared himself Provisional President of the Republic
 OCTOBER TERM, 1917.

Opinion of the Court. 246 U. S.

and took the oath of office as such; that on the twenty-

sixth day of March following General Carranza, who was
then Governor of the State of Coahuila, inaugurated a
revolution against the claimed authority of Huerta and
in a "Manifesto addressed to the Mexican Nation" pM.7
claimed the organization of a constitutional government
under "The Plan of Guadalupe," and that civil war was
at once entered upon between the followers and forces of
the two leaders. When General Carranza assumed the
leadership of what were called the Constitutionalist forces
he commissioned General Villa his representative, as
"Commander of the North," and assigned him to an in-
dependent command in that part of the country. Such
progress was made by the Carranza forces that in the
autumn of 1913 they were in military possession, as the
record shows, of approximately two-thirds of the area of'
the entire country, with the exc~pfion of a few scattered
towns and cities, and after a battle lasting several days
the City of Torreon in the State of Coahuila was captured
by General Villa on October I of that year. Immediately
after the capture of Torreon, Villa proposed levying a
military contribution on the inhabitants, for the support
of his army, and thereupon influential citizens, preferring
to provide the required money by an assessment upon the
community to having their property forcibly seized,
called together a largely attended meeting and, after
negotiations with General Villa as to the amount to be
paid, an assessment was made on the men of property of
the city, which was in large part promptly paid. Wartinez,
the owner from whom the plaintiff in error claims title to
the property involved in this case, was a wealthy resident
of Torreon and was a dealer in hides in a large way.
Being an adherent of Huerta, when Torreon was captured
Martinez A the city and failed to pay the assessment
imposed upon him, and it was to satisfy this assessment
that, by order of General Villa, the hides in controversy
 OETJEN v. CENTRAL LEATHER CO.
297. Opinion of the Court.

were seized and on January 3, 1914, were sold in Mexico

to the Finnegan-Brown Company. They were paid for
in Mexico, and were thereafter shipped into the United
States and were replevied, as stated.
This court will take judicial notice of the fact that, since
the transactions thus detailed and since the trial of this
case in the lower courts, the Government of the United
States recognized the Government of Carranza as the de
facto government of the Republic of Mexico, on October 19,
1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917.
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202; Underhillv. Her-
nandez, 168 U. S. 250.
On this state of fact the plaintiff in error argues that the
"Regulations" annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907
"Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land" con-
stitute a treaty between the United States and Mexico;
that these "Regulations" forbid such seizure and sale of
property as we are considering in this case; and that, there-
fore, somewhat vaguely, no title passed by the sale made
by General Villa and the property may be recovered by
the Mexican owner or his assignees when found in this
country.
It would, perhaps, be sufficient answer to this conten-
tion to say that the Hague Conventions are international
in character, designed and adapted to regulate interna-
t'onal warfare, and that they do not, in terms or in pur-
pose, apply to a civil war. Were it otherwise, however,
it might be effectively argued that the declaration relied
upon that "private property cannot be confiscated" con-
tained in Article 46 of the Regulations does not have the
scope claimed for it, since Article 49 provides that "money
contributions" . . . "for the needs of the army" may be
levied upon occupied territory, and Article 52 provides that
"Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded
. .except for the needs of the army of occupation,"
and that contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be
 302 OCTOBER TERM, 1917.

Opinion of the Court. 246 U. S.

paid for in cash, and when not so paid for a receipt shall
be given and payment of the amount due shall be made
as soon as possible. And also for the reason that the
"Convention" to which the "Regulations" are annexed,
recognizing the incomplete character of the results ar-
rived at, expressly provides that until a more complete
code is agreed upon, cases not provided for in the "Regu-
lations" shall be governed by the principles of the law of
nations.
But, since claims similar to the one before us are being
made in many cases in this and in other courts, we prefer
to place our decision upon the application of three clearly
settled principles of law to the facts of this case as we
have stated them.
The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government
is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative-" the political"--Departments of the Gov-
ernment, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat.
610; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309; Garciav. Lee,
12 Pet. 511, 517, 520; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13
Pet. 415, 420; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 499. It has
been specifically decided that "Who is the sovereign, do
jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a
political question, the determination of which by the
legislative and executive departments of any govern-
ment conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of that government. This
principle has always been upheld by this court, and has
been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances."
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212.
CIt is also the result of the interpretation by this court
of the principles of international law that when a govern-
ment which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized
by the political department of our government as the de
 OETJEN v. CENTRAL LEATHER CO.
297. Opinion of the Court.
jure government of the country in.which it is established,
such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all
the actions and conduct of the government so r ecogmzed
from the commencement of its existence. Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 186; Underhillv. Hernandez, 168 U. S.
250, 253. See s. c. 65 Fed. Rep. 577.
To these principles we must add that: "Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves." Underhil v. Hernandez, 168 U. S.250, 253;
American Banana Co. v. United FruitCo., 213 U. S.347.
Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we
have a duly commissioned military commander of what
must be accepted as the legitimate government of Mexico,
in the progress of a revolution, and when conducting
active independent operations, seizing and selling in
Mexico, as a military contribution, the property in con-
troversy, at the time owned and in the possession of a
citizen of Mexico, the assignor of the plaintiff in error.
Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the legitimate
Mexican government when dealing with a Mexican
citizen, and, as we have seen, for the soundest reasons,
and upon repeated decisions of this court such action is not
subject to redxamination and modification by the courts
of this country.
The principle that the conduct of one independent
government cannot be successfully questioned in the
courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the
title to property brought within the custody of a court,
such as we have here, as it was held to be to the cases cited,
in which claims for damages were based upon acts done
in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest
 OCTOBER TERM, 1917.
Syllabus. 246 U. S.

considerations of international comity and expediency.

rTo permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State
to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts
of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of na-
tions.
It is not necessary to consider, as the New Jersey court
did, the validity of the levy of the contribution made by
the Mexican commanding general, under rules of inter-
national law applicable to the situation, since the subject
is not open to reexamination by this or any other Amer-
ican court.
The remedy of the former owner, or of the purchaser
from him, of the property in controversy, if either has any
remedy, must be found in the courts of Mexico or through
the diplomatic agencies of the political department of
our Government. The judgments of the Court of Errors
aniid -Appeals of New Jersey must be
Affirmed.

RICAUD ET AL. v. AMERICAN METAL COMPANY,

LIMITED.

CERTIFICATE FROM T 2 CIRCUIr COUT OF APPEALS FOR

TE FIrTm CIRCUIT.

No. 119. Submitted January 3, 1918.-Decided March 11, 1918.

The requirement that a certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals

shall contain a "proper statement of the facts on which the questions
and propositions of law arise," (Rule 37) is not complied with by a
statement of what is "alleged and denied" by the parties in their
pleadings, supplemented by a statement that there was evidence
tending to establish the facts as claimed by each party; nor should
the questions be based upon an "assumed" statement of facts.