A Behavioral Change Model with Implications for Faculty Development

Author(s): Robert H. Davis

Source: Higher Education , Mar., 1979, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Mar., 1979), pp. 123-140
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3446263

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 123

Higher Education 8 (1979) 123-140

? Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in the Netherlands

A BEHAVIORAL CHANGE MODEL

WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR FACULTY
DEVELOPMENT

ROBERT H. DAVIS
Learning and Evaluation Service, Michigan State University, East Lansing,

ABSTRACT

A model of voluntary behavior change is developed and applied to faculty in

education and the process of instructional innovation. The model identifies indiv
and organizational variables that determine whether or not a faculty member wi
his instructional practices by adopting methods, techniques, or ideas that are n
him and the likelihood that he will succeed if he decides to try to innovate. Some
tions of the model for faculty development programs are discussed.

Introduction

All succesful faculty development efforts have as their ultimate objec-

tive changes in the performance of instructors who participate in them. For
this reason, experts in the area of faculty development may be thought of
as change agents who have as their primary goal the modification of instruc-
tional practices in the classroom. This article explores the variables that
influence changes in the instructional behavior of faculty members and
proposes a model that describes the way in which these variables interact.
Very often the change in behavior resulting from a faculty development
program involves the adoption of an instructional innovation. Following
the lead of Rogers and Shoemaker (1971), an innovation will be defined
here as any idea, practice or object which is perceived as new by a faculty
member. The words "change" and "innovation" are virtually synonymous
except for the direction of the change process: innovation is change in the
direction of new behaviors, whereas some change involves a reversion to old
behaviors.
Experts in the area of faculty development may attempt to bring

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about change in one of two ways. First, they may work directly with faculty
in workshops, consultations, seminars, etc.; and second, they may attempt
to modify the organizational context within which faculty work. In practice,
most faculty development agencies interact directly with faculty and leave
the control of organizational variables, such as salary and promotion, to
departments, colleges, standing committees, and other individuals and agen-
cies within the institution.
The model which is proposed in this article emphasizes the individual
faculty member and the variables that influence his decision to change and
the likelihood that change will be successful once the decision to change has
been made. The performance of the faculty member in this situation is
directly determined by three broad classes of individual variables:
1. Cognitive dissonance and individual differences among faculty
members in levels of achievement motivation which together will
be called, energizers of behavior;
2. his expectations with regard to the outcomes that will result from
change; and
3. the change-related skills that the faculty member brings to the
situation.
Three major classes of organizational variables, which are mediated by
the individual variables listed above, influence the actions of faculty indi-
rectly. These organizational variables are:
1.The motivators that are used by the organization to shape the
faculty members' expectations and perceptions;

LEARNING
(SKILLS) = PERFORMANCE

Fig. 1. Flow diagram illustrating the relationship among individual variable

rectangle) and organizational variables (in circles) and their influence on p
(innovation and change).

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2. the role expectations of the department and institution within which

the faculty member works; and
3. the resources that the organization makes available to facilitate
change.
The interrelationships among these six classes of variables is illustrated
in Fig. 1. In the following section, the individual or psychological variables
will be discussed. Next, organizational variables and their impact on the
performance of faculty members will be considered. The last section of the
paper briefly notes some differences within and across institutions and
cultures. The point is made in the closing section that the variables described
in this paper apply to all institutions, but that the way in which these vari-
ables operate is profoundly affected by the cultural context within which
the faculty member lives and works.

Individual Variables

As we have already observed, the major objective of all successful

faculty development programs is to change the overt behavior of instruc-
tors in the classroom. For this reason, from the outset we must focus our
attention on several important distinctions.
First, learning (skills) must be clearly differentiated from actual per-
formance. A faculty member may have learned that the lecture method is
less effective than discussion for teaching problem solving, but he may
nevertheless continue to use the lecture method to teach problem solving.
Similarly, knowledge of a social norm, e.g., teachers should devote as much
energy to instruction as to research, does not insure conformity to the
norm. The fact that one has learned something does not in any way guaran-
tee that the knowledge will manifest itself in a change in performance.
Second, in order to account for such discrepancies between perfor-
mance and learning, the concept of motivation is commonly introduced.
Thus, for example, if a faculty member is aware of ways of individualizing
his instruction and even recognizes a need to do so in order to improve
student learning, but continues to teach in his customary way, the failure
to change would commonly be attributed to a lack of motivation.
One of the best known equations in psychology describes the relation-
ship between learning and motivation as being multiplicative. The equation
was originally stated by Clark Hull (1943) who proposed that the strength
of the tendency to perform in a particular way (P) is a function of habits
(H) or past learning multiplied by drive level (D).
One of the most compelling criticisms of Hull's basic eqUation was the
fact that it neglected the role of incentives (or expectations) in determining
behavior. People are not just "pushed" into action by drives, they are also

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126

"pulled" by incentives. Consider the case of a faculty member who learns

about a new instructional innovation and, in the jargon of the younger
generation, is "turned on" by it. His motivation to change his instructional
practices is a joint function of a generalized arousal, i.e., D, and his expec-
tations regarding the payoffs for him if he adopts the innovation. Although
Hull preferred to talk about expectancies in more behavioral terms than
those used in this example, he nevertheless accepted the validity of the
criticism and introduced the notion of incentive value (I) into his equation
to take account of the tendency of people to approach situations that are
attractive to them and avoid those that are aversive.

Performance = (Drive X Incentives) X Habit (1)

Many contemporary psychologists (Atkinson, 1958, 19

1964) have stressed the role of expectation in the motiva
mance. By expectation, they generally mean the perceived
particular act will be followed by a particular outcome. T
member will adopt a new mode of instruction if he expect
will be successful and will lead to outcomes or payoffs th
valence or value for him. Naturally, any given action may
different outcomes and some psychologists assume that e
comes has a positive or negative valence associated with i
expectancies are summed cognitively.
The three classes of individual variables shown in the flow diagram in
Fig. 1 have obviously been drawn from existing theories of motivation.
Energizers, expectations and learning, for example, are analogous to Hull's
concepts of drive, incentives and habit respectively.
However, each of the three major classes (energizers, expectations and
learning) are influenced by a number of different variables drawn from a
wide range of theoretical positions in psychology. The balance of this section
will be devoted to a discussion of some of these different variables and their
affect on the decision of a faculty member to innovate and the success of his
efforts to change his instructional practices.

ENERGIZERS

At least two different types of variables arouse or energiz

member's search behavior and cause it to persist. They are: cog
nance and the achievement motive.
Numerous studies have been conducted in an effort to measure the
achievement motive (McClelland and Atkinson, 1948; McClelland et al.,
1963), which is generally defined as the striving to overcome obstacles,
to exercise power and to do something as well and as quickly as possible.

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A detailed analysis of the voluminous literature in this area is beyond the

scope of this article. The model proposed merely assumes that there are
substantial differences among faculty in the achievement motive and that
the motive leads to a non-specific, generalized arousal of behavior.
Cognitive dissonance is a condition in which the faculty member has
beliefs or knowledge that disagree with each other or with existing behavioral
tendencies. When cognitive dissonance arises, the faculty member is moti-
vated to reduce the dissonance through changes in his behavior, beliefs or
attitudes. A faculty member's tendency to innovate is often given a dramatic
boost when for some reason he becomes dissatisfied with himself and his
performance. For example when video feedback enables a teacher to see
himself as his students see him, he often experiences cognitive dissonance
that motivates behavioral change (Perlberg, 1976). Similarly, student evalua-
tions of faculty members often generate cognitive dissonance and are a
potential source of motivation for change.
On the other hand, as Festinger (1957) and others have observed,
decisions of any kind are almost invariably followed by dissonance. A
faculty member who, because of dissatisfaction with his present mode of
instruction, decides to adopt an instructional innovation, will almost cer-
tainly experience psychological discomfort as a result of the decision to
change the way he teaches. Three alternatives are open to him as the dis-
comfort from this dissonance rises: (1) he can change or revoke his decision
but this is relatively rare since faculty seldom make such decisions lightly
and retraction generally evokes a new form of dissonance; (2) he can magni-
fy the positive payoffs associated with the chosen alternative and emphasize
the negative aspects of the rejected choice; or (3) he can establish what
Festinger calls "cognitive overlap," i.e., he can note how the chosen alter-
native leads to all the outcomes that would have been achieved if the non-
chosen alternative had been adopted, and more. In this way, the faculty
member "has his cake and gets to eat it too".
Based on Festinger's analysis, after the decision to innovate has been
made, we would expect faculty to emphasize the attractiveness of an innova-
tion, to minimize its less attractive features, and to deemphasize or even
discredit alternative, but rejected, courses of action. In brief, the adopter
often becomes an advocate for change. From an organizational perspective,
an enthusiastic advocacy is essential to the institutionalization of an innova-
tion. As Selznik (1957) and House (1974) suggest, advocates defend the
integrity of an innovation, recruit allies and indoctrinate them, and most
important of all, secure the resources needed to maintain the change.

EXPECTATIONS

Contemporary organizational psychologists have developed

of the motivational process that has been tested with considerab

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128

in industrial settings (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973; Porter et al., 1975).

The model holds that the tendency of a worker to behave in a particular
way (to increase productivity, for example) depends largely on his expecta-
tions of the consequences of a voluntary change in his behavior. Thus, for
example, if we wish to predict whether or not a faculty member will adopt
an innovative approach to teaching, according to this model, it is necessary
to assess his expectations about the consequences of adopting the method.
The faculty member is assumed to evaluate his environment by posing
two different kinds of questions about it. First, he asks, "If I innovate, what
is the probability that I will succeed?" A faculty member considering an
innovation assesses the probability that if he adopts it, he will be successful.
This assessment influences his decision to go ahead with the innovation or
decide against it.
Second, the faculty member asks, "If I am successful with the innova-
tion, what are the likely outcomes?" In most cases, there are assumed to be
many possible consequences of innovating, some of which may be negative,
and each of which has a valence associated with it. Thus, for example, the
faculty member might ask, "If I am successful, will my students learn
better?" Or, "Will I be promoted?" Or, "Will my salary be increased?" And
so on. On the negative side, he might ask, "Will I have to sacrifice my re-
search?" Or, "Will it take time away from my family?" And so on. Attached
to each of these is a perceived valence that varies from individual to individ-
ual. Student learning, for example, is more important (the valence is higher)
for some faculty than others.
Some incentives are more salient for some faculty ranks than others.
Fenker (1977) recently studied the "incentive structure" of a private univer-
sity concerned with improving the quality of teaching. By "incentive struc-
ture," Fenker means an empirical framework that characterizes the relation-
ship between specific behavior of faculty members and the probabilities of
receiving various incentives. Fenker found great differences among faculty
ranks in the salience of different incentives. The incentive value of "univer-
sity research grants" decline, for example, with advancement in rank and
there is a similar relationship for a "two-week leave of absence for profes-
sional development". "Promotion," as one might expect, is a less effective
incentive for higher ranks than for lower ranks.
Faculty development agencies seldom control the types of incentives
included in the Fenker study; motivators of this type are under the control
of departments or colleges. Faculty development agencies are, however, in
a position to provide the faculty member with information that will help
him evaluate the probability of success if he adopts a new mode of instruc-
tion. Unfortunately, whenever methods of teaching are compared, the
results often fail to support one method consistently over another (Dubin
and Taveggia, 1968). Furthermore, faculty are aware of the fact that techno-

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logical devices are frequently oversold (see for example House, 1974 or
Oettinger, 1969). Indeed, more often than not, the evidence in support of
the effectiveness of new innovations is weak or nonexistent. Considering the
lack of convincing evidence in support of most innovations in instruction,
it is little wonder that many faculty members do not eagerly embrace them.
The implication of this analysis is that as faculty assess the probability
of success and the probability of payoffs, they justifiably bring to the
situation a healthy skepticism. Clearly, what is needed in such cases is
convincing data regarding the effectiveness of an innovation in order to
increase the expectation of success and payoffs. Instructors often turn to
faculty development agencies for data of this kind. The faculty development
change agent will not be in a position to offer much assistance unless he is at
least familiar enough with the area in question to link the potential inno-
vator with people who have the needed expertise. Furthermore, if the agency
cannot offer assistance, its credibility will be threatened. These considera-
tions highlight the importance of staffing faculty development programs
with people who are thoroughly trained in the area.
In the above analysis, we have treated the faculty member as if he were
considering only a single option (to innovate or not to innovate) and we
have assumed a relatively static state of affairs. The actual situation is
obviously a good deal more complicated than the one we have described.
All of us are in a continuous state of change. Our motivations fluctuate
from hour to hour and sometimes moment to moment. Similarly, we be-
come aware of new possibilities every day. Each of these possibilities is
assumed to have associated with it an approach or avoidance tendency and
the choice among tendencies is determined primarily by the faculty mem-
ber's perceptions of the success and payoff associated with each tendency.
The outcome of this implicit analysis or comparison among options
to do (or avoid) particular activities and objectives is assumed to be a hier-
archy of tendencies. Dramatic shifts in the position of a tendency in the
hierarchy may occur if a faculty member reorganizes the field and perceives
an interrelationship among tendencies that was not formerly recognized.
Two specific examples from personal experience come to mind. A learning
theorist decided to implement an innovation in teaching because it helped
him test hypotheses about learning. Another professor decided to innovate
when he discovered that his profession had a journal that reported new
methods of teaching and his department would recognize publications in
this journal when making decisions about promotion, tenure, and salary.
In both of these examples, the dominant tendency was not to innovate until
the relationship between the decision to innovate and relevant payoffs for
the individual was established. Thus, while faculty development change
agents do not control many important payoffs directly, they are often in a
position to influence faculty perceptions of the relationship between a
given behavior and payoffs that are important to them.

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LEARNING

Several individual-oriented models of the change process have

developed (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Klonglan and Coward,
Robertson, 1971). All of these models trace in a relatively linear
the cognitive steps that an innovator takes as he proceeds from an
of a need for change to a decision to adopt, or not adopt (purchas
an innovation. Without exception, the models cited pay little or n
tion to the implementation of the decision (Zaltman et al., 1977)
part, this is because much of the research with these models ha
changes that, once adopted, were relatively simple to implement,
types of seed or fertilizer, birth control or personal hygiene met
In higher education, the implementation of an instructional innovatio
requires a substantial investment of time, energy, and above all, new
on the part of the faculty member. To be useful, individual mo
faculty performance in the change process must recognize that learni
a central role in successful innovation.
Learning on the part of the faculty member influences final perfor-
mance in two ways: (1) indirectly by changing his expectations; and (2)
directly by providing the skills needed to successfully innovate.
Learning affects the tendency to innovate by modifying the perception
of outcomes and his expectations as described in the last section. In other
words, the more information a faculty member has about an innovation, the
more accurate his estimate of the probability of success and the probability
of various consequences of change will be.
Once the decision to innovate has been made, the faculty member must
generally learn specific implementation skills and these skills contribute
directly to the success of the innovation. The part played by learning at this
point is the one suggested by Hull (1943), i.e., Performance = Learning X
(Drive X Incentive). Learning does not just influence the perceptions of the
faculty member, sharpening his estimates of probable outcomes. His skills
(learning) directly influence the success or failure of the innovation.
Faculty development change agents often underestimate the amount
of time and energy required to acquire the skills needed to successfully
implement an innovation, sometimes with disastrous results. In the early
1970s, the National Science Foundation and other agencies of the U.S.
government decided to encourage several Illinois community colleges to
use PLATO (a very advanced computer-assisted instruction system). At a
cost of several million dollars, a number of community college teachers were
sent for one year to the University of Illinois (where PLATO was developed)
to learn to prepare instructional materials using the system. House (1974)
described the difficulty these community college innovators experienced
learning needed skills.

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Another major problem was learning TUTOR, the programming language. This
was considerably more difficult than anyone imagined. Although the community
college instructors who enrolled in the authoring classes were self-selected and
presumably better than average, about 40 percent dropped out of the class. Of the
60 percent who finished the course, only half succeeded in learning the language.
Within ten to fifty hours at the terminal, an author could learn ten commands
that would enable him to program a simple lesson with a minimum of branching.
One-sixth of the released-time authors reached only this minimum level of compe-
tence. Few authors without released time got beyond the minimum level. At this
level of competence, lessons were unimaginative and barely used the PLATO
potential.

Learning (or the failure to learn) always influences motivation. In the

case of the PLATO system, the difficulty experienced by the community
college teachers at the University of Illinois undoubtedly shifted their
expectations of success and probability of payoffs in a negative direction.
Learning may, also, enhance motivation. According to White's well-
known analysis, competencies are motivational (White, 1959). In other
words, as we learn new skills, we like to exercise them. Thus, if a faculty
member does acquire new instructional development skills, he will probably
be motivated to use them.
In summary, the performance of the faculty member is determined by
motivation and learning acting together. It is interesting to note that many
faculty development programs tend to emphasize one or the other of these
two variables, but not both. Some faculty development programs focus
primarily on skills development (instructional development) whereas other
programs emphasize changes in the faculty member's values, attitudes and
perceptions (personal developments).
Established programs that work primarily with faculty who are already
committed to change tend to emphasize skills development, whereas newer
programs that are trying to interest faculty in change often focus on mod-
ifying values and attitudes. Our analysis suggests that these two types of
activities are both essential but, in addition, that the faculty member's
behavior changes in two stages.
The first of these two stages is one in which the faculty member anal-
yzes and assesses an innovation. His awareness of the new possibility may
result from external stimulants, e.g., a news item, a discussion with a col-
league, etc., or the awareness may be the result of an original inspiration
on the part of the faculty member. The result of the analysis of the innova-
tion during this initial stage is a decision to proceed or not to proceed.
Information or learning about the innovation, in this stage, influences primar-
ily the assessment of probable outcomes.
During the second stage, the faculty member must learn specific imple-
mentation skills that will contribute directly to the success of his change
efforts.

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132

Faculty development programs must carry on activities appropriate to

both of these two stages described above. Prior to a faculty member's
commitment to change, it is obviously more important to emphasize activ-
ities that affect his perception of the probability of success and the advan-
tages to him of change. His value system, attitudes, and expectations for
personal development, etc., will profoundly influence his willingness to
embark on changes in the instructional process. On the other hand, once
the decision to adopt an innovation has been made, the greatest impact
can be achieved by focusing on the development of skills directly related
to the innovation in question. In other words, a shift from stage one to
stage two suggests that a change in programmatic emphasis is needed. Since
faculty members at most institutions are at different points in their readiness
to change, programs to encourage innovation must operate at both levels
simultaneously. For those teachers, who have not committed themselves
to teaching, the emphasis should be on modifying attitudes, values, and
perceptions. Once a teacher has decided to change, he needs to develop
the necessary skills to succeed.
Faculty development agencies should use different methods in their
work with faculty depending on the stage of a given individual's develop-
ment. An extensive body of research in group dynamics, for example,
suggests that a firm and lasting commitment to change one's behavior is
most apt to occur in group discussions or personal consultations (Lewin,
1947a; 1947b; Bennett, 1952; Bennis and Benne, 1976). On the other
hand, specific instructional improvement skills can often be developed
more efficiently in workshops, seminars, and lectures. Faculty, who have
not yet decided to change, should be encouraged to participate in small
group discussions, analyses, encounters, and individual consultations. On the
other hand, faculty who have made a decision to change and need only to
acquire skills may achieve such skills through lectures, independent readings,
and other less personal learning experiences which are known to be as
effective as small groups for the transmission of information (Eglash, 1954;
also see Dubin and Taveggia, 1968, for a summary of experiments comparing
group discussions and lectures).

Organizational Variables

The larger social context within which the faculty member operates,
particularly his department, controls a number of variables that influence
his performance. Three sets of organizational variables will be described in
this section: (1) motivators; (2) role expectations; and (3) resources and
constraints.

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MOTIVATORS

Motivators are of two general types: intrinsic and extrin

when we speak of intrinsic motivators, we are referring to
or satisfactions that arise directly from the adoption and
process and are not dependent on any evaluation by extern
innovator controls his own payoffs. Intrinsic motivators of
from a job well done, from a sense of accomplishment, and
of one's abilities. This kind of intrinsic payoff is genera
control of the organization, and those who derive their sat
marily from intrinsic payoffs of this type may not be con
organization they work for, so long as they are permitted t
skill.

When innovation involves a creative or development

intrinsic satisfactions are often the most crucial. The innov
sense of ownership that is based in part at least on the sat
arises from exercising skills or learning new things in the
process. Since intrinsic satisfactions arise, by definition, f
of accomplishment that goes with developmental or crea
subsequent users of an innovation cannot be motivated in t
sequently, innovations often fall into disuse when faculty m
than the original innovators, inherit them. Cases of this kind a
reported (see, for example, Friedman et al., 1976) but they a
far more frequent than the literature suggests. In his stud
instructional television (ITV) in universities, Evans (1967) f
was invariably championed by an advocate who viewed the
instrumental to the achievement of both intrinsic and ext
When the advocate left, however, the university generally
instructional television.
If the organization wants to encourage continued use of an innovation
after a faculty member leaves, it may employ one of two options to compen-
sate new users, for the loss of the intrinsic satisfactions that are derived from
creating a new technique. First, modifications to the innovation can be
encouraged and these modifications often result in intrinsic payoffs. And
second, extrinsic payoffs such as increases in salary and travel may be of-
fered to faculty for using the innovation.
A second type of intrinsic satisfaction arises as a result of faculty mem-
bers internalizing the goals and objectives of the university. When workers
identify with the purpose of an organization, the achievement of these goals
can be a powerful source of motivation.
Extrinsic rewards are, also, of two distinct types. On the one hand,
there are system rewards that are available to all members of an organization,
regardless of their performance. These include fringe benefits and perquisites

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134

given to employees without reference to merit, productivity, creativity,

etc. Obviously, this type of reinforcer provides little or no incentive for
innovation. By increasing organizational satisfaction, it may enhance in-
trinsic motivation, however.
Second, there are those extrinsic payoffs that are administered by
agents who evaluate the innovator's performance and decide whether or not
it should be rewarded. As a faculty member assesses the probability of
success and the likelihood of payoffs that are relevant to him if he decides
to innovate, he cannot ignore the fact that the organization controls signif-
icant extrinsic motivators. Whether or not one will be promoted, receive a
salary increase, or get tenure depends largely on the reactions of one's
colleagues to one's performance.
Faculty members in the various departments and colleges within a
university differ significantly in the relative importance they assign to
alternative extrinsic motivators. Fenker (1977) found in his study, for
example, that while for business a "two-week leave for professional devel-
opment" is a relatively poor incentive, this opportunity was more highly
regarded by divinity, fine arts, and nursing. The idiosyncratic nature of
organizational payoffs is illustrated by Fenker's data in which nursing
ranked a "free assigned parking space" higher than several other colleges
ranked a "two-week leave for professional development".

ROLE EXPECTATIONS

When an instructor joins a department, the other member

department inevitably acquire a stake in his performance. The
is judged in terms of the behavior of the individual and depend
perform his task so that others can perform theirs. Because o
dependence of faculty members on one another, they normall
beliefs and expectations about how they should or should not pe
various roles. These role expectations define how the faculty member
should behave in classroom and other situations, and may even prescribe his
life style.
Faculty are fully aware of the expectations of their colleagues and
university administrators. These expectations are communicated in a wide
variety of ways to individual faculty members. The university recognizes
and reinforces some behaviors and frowns on others. A university may
insist that it values good teaching, but if it rewards only research and publica-
tions, the faculty will get the message.
There is a substantial discrepancy between faculty members' percep-
tions of the "actual" and the "ideal" when it comes to the relationship be-
tween improving instruction and incentives such as salary increases, promo-
tion, etc. Fenker asked faculty at his institution to rate the following ques-
tion in terms of its likely impact on ten different incentives.

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If I were to design, develop, and teach an entirely new course for my department,
the effect this behavior would have on my chances of receiving the incentive.

Faculty rated the question in terms of the "actual" effect on receiving

the ten incentives and the "ideal" effect. In every case, the faculty judged
the actual impact of the behavior on receiving the incentive to be less than
the ideal. Indeed, in all but one of the 90 comparisons (nine behaviors X
ten incentives) the actual impact was significantly less than the ideal.
Over a decade ago, Katz and Kahn (1966) noted that "one of the
major errors in dealing with problems of organizational change, both at the
practical and theoretical levels, is to confuse individual change with modifi-
cations in organizational variables" (p. 390). Faculty development programs
often work with faculty totally outside of their departments in workshops,
seminars, or individual consultations. As a result of these "outside" experi-
ences, individual faculty members often decide to make a significant change
in their instructional practices. When the faculty member returns to his
department, however, the role expectations of his colleagues have not
changed. The same pressures to conform remain and, in many cases, the
returning faculty member soon loses his incentive to change.

RESOURCES

The typical faculty member, who sets out to implement a

tional change of some kind, generally discovers that his succes
the availability of new resources. The resources needed to bring change
about may include release time, supplies, equipment, services, money for
travel, etc. Such resources are generally under the control of the organiza-
tion, not the individual faculty member, and the way in which these re-
sources are managed has a profound impact on the motivation of faculty
and their ability to implement their ideas.
All institutions fund a substantial part of their instructional improve-
ment efforts through regular administrative channels. An alternative practice
is to establish a special fund for the improvement of instruction and to make
formal grants to faculty members for this purpose. Numerous institutions
have established special funds of this kind and they are commonly judged
to be successful. In his survey of 93 universities, Centra (1976) found that
91 of his respondents used grants for developing new or different approaches
to teaching and 72 percent of those who said they had a program of grants
felt it was either effective or very effective. A somewhat smaller percentage
of the community colleges and four-year colleges surveyed had a grant
program (78 percent and 85 percent respectively), and 75 percent of com-
munity college respondents and 65 percent of four-year college respondents
felt the program was effective or very effective.

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136

When a grants program is integrated with other faculty development

activities into a total educational development program, the impact on insti-
tution-wide efforts to improve instruction can be substantial (Davis, 1978).
A grants program that is integrated with other faculty development
activities can provide the impetus to use instructional expertise on campus
in a coordinated way. The request for funds legitimizes the involvement of
experts from appropriate areas, such as learning, evaluation, computer
science, media, etc. Specialists from such fields often have constructive
ideas that will facilitate the development of the faculty member's initial
concept. Those responsible for the grants program can play the role of
"honest broker" by linking the faculty members to others in the university
who can provide assistance, including colleagues who have tried a proposed
change and of whom the faculty member may not be aware.
A grants program can serve as a vehicle for faculty development. By
funding appropriate workshops and facilitating communication among
faculty and specialists in instructional development on campus, a grants
program encourages personal growth and learning on the part of everyone
involved in the process. Grants may be used more directly to fund faculty
participation in workshops and seminars or other learning experiences off
campus that help faculty to learn more about specialized methods and
techniques or clarify their own attitudes towards teaching.
Grants can be used to shape change in departments and colleges. For
whatever, reason, faculty in some disciplines are reluctant to become in-
volved with instructional change. In many cases, the concepts and techniques
in this area are not familiar to a faculty member and he may be uncomfor-
table with them. If criteria for making grants are flexibly applied, lower
demands can be made of faculty in departments and colleges that are reluc-
tant to experiment with new approaches to the learning/teaching process.
By adjusting funding criteria, grants can be made to faculty who would not
otherwise become involved and improve their teaching.
Whether integrated with other instructional activities or not, a grants
program can achieve three additional outcomes. First, grants reward faculty
members and recognize their efforts to improve teaching. The symbolic
significance to the faculty member of a grant to improve teaching should
never be underestimated. Second, grants are used to buy needed equipment,
software, or faculty time that are used directly to improve instruction. And
third, a grants program signals a message to the entire faculty that the
institution values good teaching and is commited to improving teaching.

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 137

Differences Within and Across Institutions and Cultures

It is widely recognized that there are great differences within and

among institutions of higher education. Since the organization defines the
role of participants and is one of the most important sources of extrinsic
payoffs, organizations that emphasize and recognize instruction should have
more innovative teaching than those that do not.
Some institutions insist that the primary role played by their faculty
is that of teacher and they claim to stress innovative instruction. In the
United States, four-year liberal arts colleges and community colleges are
often pictured in this way. There are limitations, however, on the power of
the institution to enforce role definitions on faculty and the emphasis on
uniformly distributed extrinsic payoffs has reduced the freedom of many
organizations to recognize and reward behaviors that are instrumental in
achieving organizational goals. For example, many community colleges
and four-year liberal arts institutions have hired young Ph.D.s to fill faculty
positions. Salary is frequently tied to contracts that largely ignore individual
merit. In addition, these young people often share the research values of the
university. In other words, their referent system, when it comes to evaluating
the payoffs of adopting an innovative approach to teaching, is the university
and not the organization for which they work. If the extrinsic rewards are
relatively uniform across the institution for some reason, e.g., a union
contract, the organization will be relatively powerless to influence perceived
payoffs of this type. In universities, the norm of one's department may call
for research and publication to take precedence over teaching, and the fa-
culty member may refuse to conform because the extrinsic payoffs available
to the department to motivate conformity do not have a valence for him.
Davis et al. (1976) found in their study of instructional innovators at Michi-
gan State University that a number of faculty consciously violated the role
expectations of their colleagues and played the part of "dissatisfied maver-
icks". Often, such faculty fall outside the departmental incentive structure,
in that they have reached their peak in the department, e.g., are full profes-
sors or are not apt to be promoted.
Any useful model of the change process must take account of individ-
ual differences among faculty in the perception of their life space. Different
types of organizations undoubtedly define different roles and offer different
incentives to their faculties. How a given faculty member reacts to these will
depend on his particular world view. Around the world, the individual and
organizational variables that affect change are essentially the same, but the
way in which variables operate is very different.
As anyone who has visited an institution of higher education outside
of his own country knows, there are dramatic differences among them as one
looks across cultures. For example, it is common practice in Latin America

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138

and other parts of the world for faculty members to divide their time over
several institutions or spend a substantial part of their time working at a
profession.
According to the model described, these competing tendencies fall
into a hierarchy and the tendency to innovate takes its place within the
hierarchy. Maslow (1970) suggests that some types of motives, such as
basic physical comfort and security needs for example, are more salient
in some situations than others such as the need to "realize one's potential".
Thus, when a person must work 10-12 hours a day to put food on the table
for his family, it is a little unrealistic to expect him to set aside time to
innovate in the classroom. One would certainly not expect the tendency to
innovate to be as salient for faculty members in societies where they have
very heavy teaching loads as tendencies that resulted in the satisfaction
of basic survival and security needs. Hence, on average, one would expect
faculty in such societies to be less inclined to adopt new modes of teaching
than their colleagues in other countries.
But these competing demands for a faculty member's energies are
not the only differences across cultures. As one moves from one culture
to another, role expectations with respect to research or teaching in particular
types of institutions also shift. In addition, there are marked differences
in the degree of control that an institution exercises (or is able to exercise)
over its faculty. In part, this depends upon alternative job opportunities
available to the faculty member, but it also relates to policies governing
promotion and tenure which, on average, for example, may be more restric-
tive in many European institutions than in comparable American colleges
and universities. In other words, there are enormous differences in the
leverage that institutions have to control the payoffs directly and the percep-
tions of faculty members indirectly. We would, therefore, expect faculty
from different countries to assign quite different probabilities to the same
lists of possible payoffs for instructional innovation and different valences
to these payoffs on the average.

A Concluding Observation

In most institutions of higher education around the world, individual

faculty members control directly instructional events in their classes. There-
fore, the model described in this paper focuses on voluntary change on the
part of individual faculty members. Since faculty development agencies
generally work with individual teachers, rather than departments or other
complete organizational units, the model developed here should prove to be
useful for understanding the decisions of faculty members to change their
instructional practices and for predicting the extent to which they will
succeed in their efforts to change.

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 139

But the reader should bear in mind that organizations also change.
Universities, for example, modify their curricula, develop new academic
programs, add new supporting facilities, etc. The decision of a university
to change is seldom, if ever, made by one individual acting entirely on his
own. Participants in organizational decisions undoubtedly analyze any
proposed change in personal terms, but organizational innovation is a col-
lective process that requires a different model from the one described in this
article. Some preliminary attempts have been made to develop organizational
models (Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, 1976), but an analysis of their possible
utility for faculty development programs is one of many unfinished tasks
in higher education.

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