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DOCUMENT TITLE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 3
4 EQUIPMENT DETAILS........................................................................................................................ 3
4.1 HP COMPRESSOR MOTOR ...................................................................................................................... 3
4.2 LP COMPRESSOR MOTOR ....................................................................................................................... 4
4.3 SWITCH BOARD AND FEEDER DETAILS ................................................................................................... 5
8 OBSERVATION ................................................................................................................................ 15
9 ANNEXURE-1 .................................................................................................................................. 19
10 ANNEXURE-2 .................................................................................................................................. 24
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ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For Vedanta smelter plant-2, the root Cause analysis report has been analyzed based on the condition why
the HT compressor motor trips via SCADA operation.
During the analysis, it has been recorded that when closing of circuit breaker the over current measured in
the two phases L1 & L2. Hence there is no trip comment issued by the relay. During starting the overcurrent
protection will goes to block condition because of motor starting supervision.
As per the site status, the recorded breaker was tripped. It was happened based on SCADA trip. There is a
feedback taken from circuit breaker for CB status. In event log we did not find any trip event of breaker.
2 INTRODUCTION
This report covers the reasons why the HT compressor motor trips via SCADA operation while
starting. Also this report was prepared on the basis of study of electrical system aspects and not in
the basis of control and instrumentation.
3 STUDY SUMMARY
In Vedanta smelter plant-2, two compressor areas avail to full fill the plant compressed air
requirement. Compressor area-1 is rated as 11kV 1250A, 40KA/1s and it is Energized from the pot
line-1 and compressor area-2 is rated as 11kV 1250A, 40KA/1s and it is Energized the pot line-2.
There is a tie between the compressor area-1 & 2 in 11kV side to maintain the reliable power
supply.
4 EQUIPMENT DETAILS
TERMS DESCRIPTION
Rating 1750 KW
Voltage 11 KV
Page 3 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
TERMS DESCRIPTION
TERMS DESCRIPTION
Rating 1150 KW
Voltage 11 KV
Amp. 72 55 39
PF. % 88 87 82
9s 16s
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ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
TERMS DESCRIPTION
3 2
5 MOTOR PROTECTION
There are a wide range of A.C. motors and motor characteristics in existence, because of the
numerous duties for which they are used. All motors need protection, but fortunately, the more
fundamental problems affecting the choice of protection are independent of the type of motor and
the type of load to which it is connected.
Motor characteristics must be carefully considered when applying protection; while this may be
regarded as stating the obvious, it is emphasized because it applies more to motors than to other
items of power system plant. For example, the starting and stalling currents/times must be known
when applying overload protection, and furthermore the thermal withstand of the machine under
balanced and unbalanced loading must be clearly defined.
The conditions for which motor protection is required can be divided into two broad categories:
imposed external conditions and internal faults.
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ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
5.1 DESCRIPTION
The thermal overload protection is designed to prevent thermal overloads from damaging the
protected equipment. The protection function models a thermal profile of the object being
protected (overload protection with memory capability). Both the history of an overload and the
heat loss to the environment are taken into account.
APPLICATIONS
In particular, the thermal overload protection allows the thermal status of motors, to be
monitored.
If an additional thermal input is available, the thermal profile may take the actual ambient
or coolant temperature into consideration.
There are two protections for the motor protection, 1. Motor starting protection 2. Motor restart
inhabits.
In particular, rotor-critical high-voltage motors can quickly be heated above their thermal limits
when multiple starting attempts occur in a short period of time. If the durations of these starting
attempts are lengthened e.g. by excessive voltage dips during motor starting, by excessive load
torques, or by blocked rotor conditions, a tripping signal will be initiated by the device.
Motor starting is detected when a settable current threshold I MOTOR START is exceeded.
Calculation of the tripping time is then initiated. The protection function consists of one definite
time and one inverse time tripping element.
The inverse time overcurrent element is designed to operate only when the rotor is not blocked.
With decreased starting current resulting from voltage dips when starting the motor, prolonged
starting times are evaluated correctly and tripping with appropriate time delay. The tripping time is
calculated based on the following equation.
General time overcurrent protection is the main protective function of the relay. Each phase
current and the ground current is provided with three elements. All elements are independent of
each other and can be combined in any way. If it is desired in isolated or resonant-grounded
systems that three-phase devices should work together with two-phase protection equipment, the
time-overcurrent protection can be configured such that it allows two-phase operation besides
Page 6 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
three-phase mode High-current element 50-2 and overcurrent element 50-1 always operate with
definite tripping time, the third element 51, operates always with inverse tripping time.
APPLICATIONS
The non-directional time overcurrent protection is suited for networks that are radial and supplied
from a single source or open looped networks or for backup protection of differential protective
schemes of all types of motors
It may be necessary to dynamically increase the pickup values if, during starting, certain elements
of the system show an increased power consumption after a long period of zero voltage. Thus, a
general raise of pickup thresholds can be avoided taking such starting conditions into
Consideration. With the cold load pickup function, pickup and delay settings of directional and non-
directional time overcurrent protection can be changed over dynamically. As a further option the
pickup thresholds may be modified by an automatic reclosure function in accordance with its ready
or not ready state.
Depending on the variant, the fourth current input of the multi-functional protection relays
7SJ62/63/64 is equipped either with a sensitive input transformer or a standard transformer for
1/5 A.
In the first case, the active protective function is designed for ground fault detection in isolated or
compensated systems due to its high sensitivity. It is not very suited for ground fault detection with
large ground currents since the linear range is transcended at about 1.5 A at the sensitive ground
fault detection relay terminals.
If the relay is equipped with standard transformers for 1/5 A, also large currents can be detected
correctly.
APPLICATIONS
Sensitive ground fault detection may be used in isolated or compensated systems to detect ground
faults, to determine phases affected by ground faults, and to specify the direction of ground faults.
In solidly or low-resistance grounded systems, sensitive ground fault detection is used to detect
high impedance ground faults.
Page 7 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
5.1.6 UNBALANCE (NEGATIVE SEQ.) PROTECTION
The application of negative sequence protection to motors has a special significance. Unbalanced
loads create counter-rotating fields in three-phase induction motors, which act on the rotor at
double frequency. Eddy currents are induced on the rotor surface, which causes local overheating
in rotor end zones and the slot wedges. This especially goes for motors which are tripped via
vacuum contactors with fuses connected in series. With single phasing due to operation of a fuse,
the motor only generates small and pulsing torques such that it soon is thermally strained
assuming that the torque required by the machine remains unchanged. In addition, the unbalanced
supply voltage introduces the risk of thermal overload. Due to the small negative sequence
reactance even small voltage asymmetries lead to large negative sequence currents.
In addition, this protection function may be used to detect interruptions, faults, and polarity
problems with current transformers.
It is also useful in detecting 1 pole and 2 pole faults with fault current lower than the maximum
load current.
Page 8 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Page 9 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Page 10 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
6 INCOMER PROTECTION
Protection against excess current was naturally the earliest protection system to evolve. From this
basic principle, the graded overcurrent system, a discriminative fault protection, has been
developed. This should not be confused with ‘overload’ protection, which normally makes use of
relays that operate in a time related in some degree to the thermal capability of the plant to be
protected. Overcurrent protection, on the other hand, is directed entirely to the clearance of faults,
although with the settings usually adopted some measure of overload protection may be obtained.
Overcurrent protection
6.1 DESCRIPTION
General time overcurrent protection is the main protective function of the relay. Each phase
current and the ground current is provided with three elements. All elements are independent of
each other and can be combined in any way. If it is desired in isolated or resonant-grounded
systems that three-phase devices should work together with two-phase protection equipment, the
time-overcurrent protection can be configured such that it allows two-phase operation besides
three-phase mode (see Section 2.1.3.2). High-current element 50-2 and overcurrent element 50-1
always operate with definite tripping time, the third element 51, operates always with inverse
tripping time.
Page 11 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
APPLICATIONS
The non-directional time overcurrent protection is suited for networks that are radial and supplied
from a single source or open looped networks or for backup protection of differential protective
schemes of all types of lines, transformers, generators, motors, and bus-bars.
Depending on the variant, the fourth current input of the multi-functional protection relays
7SJ62/63/64 is equipped either with a sensitive input transformer or a standard transformer for
1/5 A.
In the first case, the active protective function is designed for ground fault detection in isolated or
compensated systems due to its high sensitivity. It is not very suited for ground fault detection with
large ground currents since the linear range is transcended at about 1.5 A at the sensitive ground
fault detection relay terminals.
If the relay is equipped with standard transformers for 1/5 A, also large currents can be detected
correctly.
APPLICATIONS
Sensitive ground fault detection may be used in isolated or compensated systems to detect ground
faults, to determine phases affected by ground faults, and to specify the direction of ground faults.
In solidly or low-resistance grounded systems, sensitive ground fault detection is used to detect
high impedance ground faults.
The under-voltage protection function detects voltage collapses on transmission lines and electrical
machines and prevents the persistence of inadmissible operating states and a possible loss of
stability.
Page 12 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
6.1.4 PROPOSED SETTING AND AVAILABLE SETTING
Page 13 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
7 HP-2 MOTOR WITH OPERATIONAL INTERLOCKS.
7.1 Introduction
Local control
Remote Control
1. Local Control
In this operation, the motor was started by manual operation (i.e closing the breaker manually).
The following conditions are checked by the relay.
Starting current
Duration of starting
No of start
CB Status to relay
VCB ON
VCB OFF
Page 14 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
2. Remote Control
In this operation, the motor was started by SCADA operation (i.e closing the breaker manually). The
following conditions are checked by the relay and the SCADA.
Starting current
Duration of starting
No of start
CB Status to relay
VCB ON
VCB OFF
8 OBSERVATION
Event-1
As per the trip log of relay, the details are extracted and mentioned below as per time. Also
annexure-1 has detailed record.
Page 15 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Date: 16.04.19 Time: 10.59.10
As per the above records, during closing of circuit breaker the over current measured in the two
phases L1 & L2. Hence there is no trip command issued by the relay. During starting the
overcurrent protection will go to block condition because of motor starting supervision.
As per the site status they recorded breaker of tripped. It is happened based on SCADA trip. There
is a feedback taken from circuit breaker for CB status. In event log we could not found any trip
event of breaker hence we conclude the two phases (L1 & L2) of circuit breaker was closed and L3
phase remains in open condition. Hence the status (closed) of circuit breaker was not extended to
SCADA input. It shows starter feedback trip in SCADA.
Recommendation
Event-2
As per the trip log of relay, the details are extracted and mentioned below as per time, also
annexure-1 has detailed record.
Page 16 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
As per the event log of relay, the details are extracted and mentioned below as per time, also
annexure-2 has detailed record.
Recommendation
Event-3
As per the trip log of relay, the details are extracted and mentioned below as per time. Also
annexure-1 has detailed record.
As per the event log of relay, the details are extracted and mentioned below as per time. Also
annexure-2 has detailed record
Page 17 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Recommendation
Page 18 of 27
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE-1
Page 19 of 27
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ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE-2
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