CIBSE Guide E Fire Safety Engineering

Fire safety engineering
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CIBSE Guide E

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CIBSE Guide E
ISBN 978-1-912034-29-1
2019
9 781912 034291
CIBSE Guide E
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© Fourth edition June 2019 The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers
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Note from the publisher

This publication is primarily intended to provide guidance to those responsible for the
design, installation, commissioning, operation and maintenance of building services. It
is not intended to be exhaustive or definitive and it will be necessary for users of the
guidance given to exercise their own professional judgement when deciding whether to
abide by or depart from it.
Any commercial products depicted or described within this publication are included for
the purposes of illustration only and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement or
recommendation by the Institution.
Foreword from the Institution of Fire Engineers
As officers of the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) we welcome this guide – the fourth
revision of CIBSE Guide E for Fire Safety Engineering.
We believe that this guide provides a thorough and complete introduction to, and
summary of, fire safety engineering for those for whom fire engineering is not their
primary activity but who have to work with, or have dealings with, fire engineers or fire
engineered buildings, either during construction or in use.
The guide also provides a useful concise handbook of fire safety engineering which we
know is of proven value to professional fire engineers. It is largely based on existing codes
and guidance that professional fire engineers will be familiar with, although additional
original material has been included where appropriate. The guide necessarily has a strong
UK focus, but is intended for a global readership.
Many of the chapters in this guide have been written by Fellows and Members of the
IFE who are Chartered Engineers. The IFE is committed to making the world safer from
fire, mainly by seeking to ensure that those working in the fire industry, or in conjunction
with the fire industry, have the appropriate competency and ethics.
On behalf of the IFE we commend this guide as a significant contribution towards that goal.
Martin Shipp BSc (Physics) CEng FIFireE CPhys MInstP

IFE International President 2017/18
Dr Peter Wilkinson BEng (Hons) MSc EngD CEng FIFireE PMSFPE SIRM
IFE Chair of the Board of Trustees 2017
Preface
This fourth edition of CIBSE Guide E: Fire safety engineering is a fully updated version
of the third edition which was published in 2010. The entire text of every chapter has
been carefully reviewed.
As with the third edition a concerted effort has been made to provide information that
can be used internationally. These references include codes, standards and guidance from
the USA that are frequently used in the Middle East and Asia.
Fire safety engineering can mean many things to many people and covers a wide range
of levels of knowledge and competence as well as a diverse range of activities of which
developing a package of measures having the objective of reducing the potential for
injury, death, property and financial loss to an acceptable level is the area for which this
Guide is produced.
At the time this guide was going through the final stages of publication the devastating
fire at Grenfell tower in Kensington, London occurred. CIBSE considered that it should
provide guidance on the design of building facades for tall buildings using the expertise
of fire safety consultants and specialist facade engineers within CIBSE. A new chapter on
facade fire safety is included in this guide.
Fire safety engineering is a continually developing art and science and users are advised
to maintain a personal regime of professional development and to make use of new
standards and techniques that will be introduced after the publication of this Guide.
Finally, I wish to extend my thanks to the authors of the various chapters, all of whom
are experienced fire engineers who were at the time practising with well-respected
engineering consultancy firms or major organisations internationally. Without their
dedication, and the time and expertise they have freely given, this edition of Guide E
would not have been produced.
Martin J. Kealy CEng BSc (Hons) FIFireE MSFPE MCIBSE

Chairman, CIBSE Guide E Steering Committee
Guide E Steering Committee

Martin J. Kealy (Chairman), MKA Fire
John Barnfield, Tenos Fire Safety Engineering
Gary Daniels, Hoare Lea
Chris George, Falck
Roger Harrison, AECOM
Sam Liptrott, Olsson Fire
Andrew Nicholson, The Fire Surgery
Benjamin O’Regan, Qatar Rail
Martin Shipp, BRE
Brent Sutherland, AMEC
Nick Troth, Arup
Martin Weller, Atkins
Peter Wilkinson, Pyrology
Principal authors and contributors (fourth edition)
Chapter 1: Introduction
Principal author:
Martin J. Kealy (Chairman) (MKA Fire)
Chapter 2: Legislation
Principal author:
Nick Troth (Arup)
Contributor:
Philip Close (Arup)
Chapter 3: Building designation

Principal authors:
Sam Liptrott and James Perry (Olsson Fire)
Chapter 4: Performance-based design principles

Principal authors:
John Barnfield and Andrew Foolkes (Tenos Fire Safety Engineering)
Chapter 5: Application of risk assessment to fire engineering

designs
Principal authors:
Martin Weller (Atkins) and Russell Kirby (FM Global)
Chapter 6: Fire dynamics

Principal authors:
Roger Harrison (AECOM), Gary Daniels and Chris Hallam (Hoare Lea)
Chapter 7: Means of escape and human factors

Principal authors:
John Barnfield and Andrew Foolkes (Tenos Fire Safety Engineering)
Contributor:
Steven Porter (Tenos Fire Safety Engineering)
Chapter 8: Fire detection and alarm

Principal author:
Benjamin O’Regan (Qatar Rail)
Chapter 9: Emergency lighting

Principal author:
Benjamin O’Regan (Qatar Rail)
Chapter 10: Smoke ventilation

Principal authors:
Gary Daniels and Chris Hallam (Hoare Lea)
Chapter 11: Fire suppression

Principal authors:
Chris George and Paul Watkins (Falck) and Dr Tim Nichols (Tyco Fire Protection)
Chapter 12: Fire resistance, structural robustness in fire and
fire spread
Principal authors:
Peter Wilkinson (Pyrology)
Danny Hopkin (OFR Consultants)
Contributor:
Ben McColl (OFR Consultants)
Chapter 13: Firefighting

Principal authors:
Andrew Nicholson and Matt Ryan (The Fire Surgery)
Chapter 14: Fire safety management

Principal author:
Martin Shipp (BRE)
Chapter 15: Fire safety on construction sites

Principal author:
Brent Sutherland (AMEC)
Chapter 16: Fire safety of building facades

Principal authors:
Martin J. Kealy (MKA Fire)
Hywel Davies (CIBSE)
Principal authors and contributors (first, second and third editions)

Guide E is a continuing publication and each edition relies on material provided for
previous editions. The Institution acknowledges the material provided by previous
authors and contributors, including: David Boughen, Peter Bressington, Gordon Butcher,
Anna Cockayne, Geoffrey Cox, Mike Dennett, Graham Faulkner, Mick Green, Miller
Hannah, Graeme Hansell, John Hopkinson, Harry Hosker, Martin Kealy, John Klote,
Margaret Law, Kathryn Lewis, Rodrigo Machado, Hugh Mahoney, Steve Marshall, Frank
Mills, Bob Nixon, Su Peace, Alan Porter, Andy Riley, Colin J. Roberts, Linton Rodney,
Gerard Sheridan, Jonathan D. Sime, David B. Smith, Shane Tate, Philip Thomas, Chris
Trott, Terry M. Watson, Peter Warren, Bob Whiteley, Corinne Williams.
Acknowledgements
Permission to reproduce extracts from British Standards is granted by BSI. British
Standards can be obtained in PDF or hard copy formats from the BSI online shop:
www.bsigroup.com/Shop or by contacting BSI Customer Services for hardcopies only:
Tel: +44 (0)20 8996 9001, Email: cservices@bsigroup.com
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
The Institution is grateful to Lynsey Seal (London Fire Brigade), Paul McLaughlin
(Chapman BDSP) and Andy Passingham (Buro Happold FEDRA) for kindly reviewing
the entire draft prior to publication.
Project manager: Sanaz Agha

Editor: Alasdair Deas
Editorial Manager: Ken Butcher
CIBSE Head of Knowledge: Nicholas Peake
CIBSE Technical Director: Hywel Davies
Contents
1 Introduction 1-1
2 Legislation 2-1
3 Building designation 3-1
4 Performance-based design principles 4-1
5 Application of risk assessment to fire engineering designs 5-1
6 Fire dynamics 6-1
7 Means of escape and human factors 7-1
8 Fire detection and alarm 8-1
9 Emergency lighting 9-1
10 Smoke ventilation 10-1
11 Fire suppression 11-1
12 Fire resistance, structural robustness in fire and fire spread 12-1
13 Firefighting 13-1
14 Fire safety management 14-1
15 Fire safety on construction sites 15-1
16 Fire safety of building facades 16-1
Index I-1
Important note: potential changes to fire safety legislation
Legislation and guidance relating to fire safety is currently undergoing significant

changes in the UK and in several other jurisdictions following recent fire events and,
in the UK, publication of the Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire
Safety*. Users of this Guide are responsible for ensuring that they are aware of changes
in guidance and legislation that may relate to their work in any jurisdiction, including
proposed changes that may have a significant effect on designs currently under
development.
* Hackitt J (2018) Building a Safer Future: Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety (London:
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government)
1-1
1 Introduction
1.1 About this Guide 1.3 Use and benefits of a
fire safety engineering
CIBSE Guide E: Fire engineering was first published in
1997, and was revised in 2003 and in 2010 to reflect the approach
development of fire safety engineering as a discipline. It
has been further updated to take into account the latest There are generally two ways of demonstrating compliance
fire safety engineering knowledge and techniques. with statutory building codes and regulations. One is to
follow the prescriptive guidance given in codes of practice
As with the previous editions, the Guide has been updated and statutory guidance, and the other is to use a fire safety
by experienced fire engineers, all of whom were at the time engineering approach.
practising with well-respected engineering consultancy
firms or major organisations in the UK and overseas. This is recognised, for example, in the formal guidance
that accompanies the Building Regulations in England
The Guide is intended to be the ‘go to’ document that and Wales. Approved Document B (HM Government,
provides building services engineers and fire life safety 2013; Welsh Government, 2015) makes the following very
consultants with guidance on a broad range of fire engi- clear statement:
neering issues.
Fire safety engineering can provide an alternative approach to
This Guide aims to give practical advice on fire safety
fire safety. It may be the only practical way to achieve a satis-
engineering. Since publication of the first edition, Guide E factory standard of fire safety in some large and complex build-
has been widely used and is referred to in British Stand- ings containing different uses, e.g. airport terminals. Fire safety
ards as an authoritative guidance document. engineering may also be suitable for solving a problem with an
aspect of the building design which otherwise follows the pro-
The extent of modification to the sections has varied visions in this [Approved] document.
according to need. The committee decided to keep the
same structure as the 2010 version. Some sections have had Formal guidance documents, published standards (such as
a light update and others have been substantially amended. British Standards, National Fire Protection Association
Codes, etc.) and industry codes of practice cannot take into
account the peculiarities of every single building design.
The larger and more complex the design, the more difficult
1.2 What is fire engineering? and more costly it is to ensure that the design meets the
requirements of the prescriptive codes. As an example,
The term ‘fire engineering’ continues to be widely misused prescriptive guidance will usually specify maximum travel
and not well understood. It is worth noting at this point distances to exits, a situation that could be very difficult to
that there are two main types of fire engineering: achieve in buildings such as airport terminals and other
large buildings without imposing restrictions on building
—— fire protection engineering, where the engineer is usage and design. A fire safety engineering alternative
responsible for the design of fire systems, such as method would look at the time taken to escape and compare
automatic fire suppression and fire detection that with the time for conditions to become untenable. This
systems Guide will assist engineers to calculate escape times and
tenability criteria, and to make judgments regarding
—— fire safety engineering, where the engineer is respon- whether the performance criteria required by the locally
sible for the design of fire strategies, including the applicable codes or regulations have been satisfied.
location and number of stairs, design of smoke
control regimes and designed structural fire pro-
There are three main fire safety engineering approaches,
tection measures. The term ‘fire and life safety’ is
as follows:
also commonly used to describe this type of fire
engineering
(a) Equivalency (or comparative approach): whereby it is
demonstrated that the design provides a level of
This Guide deals with both types of fire engineering. safety equivalent to that which would have been
BS 7974: 2001 Application of fire safety engineering principles obtained by applying prescriptive codes.
to the design of buildings. Code of practice (BSI, 2001) and
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (ABCB, 2005) both (b) Deterministic approach: in which the objective is to
address fire safety engineering and both provide a frame- show that, on the basis of the initial (usually ‘worst
work for an engineering approach to the achievement of credible case’) assumptions, some defined set
fire safety in buildings. Guide E can be used as a set of of conditions will not occur. Where there is any
methodologies within these frameworks. doubt regarding the reliability of the input data, a
1-2 Fire safety engineering
conservative approach should be adopted. This

may require the use of explicit safety factors to
1.6 Contents of this Guide
compensate for uncertainties in the assumptions.
(c) Probabilistic approach: the objective of which is to 1.6.1 Chapter 1: Introduction
show that the likelihood of a given event occurring
is acceptably small. This is usually expressed in Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the Guide, gives
terms of the annual probability of occurrence of the some history about the publication, discusses what fire
unwanted event (e.g. a probability of an individual safety engineering is and the benefits that it offers to
death through fire of 10−6, or one per million). It designers, provides an overview of its structure and
must be recognised that, whatever measures are contents, and highlights changes from and additions to
taken, risks can never be reduced to zero. the previous edition.
The main benefits that fire safety engineering alternatives

can bring are the following: 1.6.2 Chapter 2: Legislation
—— increased design flexibility This renamed chapter has changed substantially and
provides further information on the concept of fire safety
—— reduction in construction and/or running costs
engineering with a focus on that fact that responsibility
—— measures more suited to the building use. for a fire safety engineering approach lies with the designer
and not the ahj.
1.4 The authority having The chapter considers the high-level overview, early consul-
tation and generic procedures that need to be followed by a
jurisdiction (AHJ) designer responsible for the design. Although every ahj is
different and it is not possible to cover all ahjs within the
The ahj is the governmental agency or sub-agency that Guide, some major geographic regions are addressed. The
regulates the construction process and is usually in the chapter also details the legislation that applies to a build-
municipality where the building is located. Where a fire ing from design to post-completion.
safety engineering approach is being considered, early
consultation with the ahj is essential.
1.6.3 Chapter 3: Building designation
Many ahjs will accept a fire safety engineering approach
and for large and complex buildings the ahj will frequently This chapter addresses the manner in which buildings are
expect such an approach to be adopted. However, certain classified in the context of fire precautions. It includes
ahjs will not accept a fire safety engineering approach. extracts from published data and identifies factors that
The likelihood of acceptance will be a function of: have implications for building types, together with a
checklist of items to be considered following purpose
—— the type of building group classification. Some additional information is added
regarding care homes and risk assessments.
—— the perceived competence of the design team
—— the ahj’s level of experience
1.6.4 Chapter 4: Performance-based
—— individual personalities within the ahj
design principles
—— the client/owner’s previous behaviour and history.
This chapter provides information on basic principles and
draws attention to the need for design to be entrusted to
1.5 Purpose of this Guide suitably qualified and experienced persons.
Design objectives and design scenarios are covered and

It is intended that this Guide will be used in conjunction references made to ‘what if ’ events. The fire safety design
with established codes and standards to provide guidance process is described and reference is made to both UK and
to practitioners. It will also be of interest to designers and international framework documents, including those of
ahjs who, while not directly concerned with fire safety
the USA and Australia.
engineering, need to understand the advice offered to them
by specialists. The Guide will be of value to students
embarking on careers in the professions related to fire safety 1.6.5 Chapter 5: Application of risk
and to practising designers who wish to enhance their
knowledge through continuing professional development. assessment to fire safety
engineering designs
Previous editions of this guide were UK-centric; however,
this edition has been written by fire safety engineers with This chapter provides a detailed introduction to this
international experience or who have international offices complex subject, followed by comprehensive information
or overseas headquarters. on the various techniques available. This chapter has been
substantially modified and now also addresses business
This Guide is intended for use worldwide and, where resilience and insurance. Societal concerns and risks to
applicable, local statutes, regulations and guidance should firefighters are considered, and the chapter concludes with
be used in place of the quoted UK documentation. guidance on risk assessment pitfalls.
Introduction 1-3
1.6.6 Chapter 6: Fire dynamics 1.6.10 Chapter 10: Smoke ventilation
This new leaner chapter aims to impart a basic understand- This chapter is renamed simply Smoke ventilation, reflect-
ing of the processes which govern fire and smoke ing a substantial rewrite that simplifies the entire chapter
development and to guide the reader through the available to both bring it up to date and make it more ‘relevant’ to
techniques for calculating the important parameters, its audience. Elements of the old chapter 6: Fire dynamics
including design fires and smoke production rates. have been moved to this section.
There is a section on flame calculations that addresses Chapter 10 describes the objectives of smoke ventilation
flame height, flame projection, radiant heat flux calcula- systems. It then addresses system considerations, tenabil-
tions and fire resistance. ity criteria, design of systems and the components of the
systems.
The old sections on smoke visibility/toxicity and smoke
modelling have been moved to chapter 10: Smoke ventila- 1.6.11 Chapter 11: Fire suppression
tion. Chapter 6 has also been simplified with new diagrams
added and smoke control equations updated to reflect
This chapter considers the principal fixed systems for fire
current research on smoke control design.
suppression within buildings. It has been substantially
rewritten and updated. The chapter covers design guid-
ance for automatic sprinkler systems, foam systems,
1.6.7 Chapter 7: Means of escape gaseous systems and water mist systems.
and human factors
The chapter contains more detail on the use and value of
This chapter covers the basic principles of designing for various systems, makes reference to a wider range of
escape by using the established prescriptive design codes international codes and introduces new or revised guid-
or an alternative fire safety engineering approach. ance, especially on mist, gaseous and foam systems.
The chapter gives guidance on means of escape design,

including information on escape strategies, occupancy 1.6.12 Chapter 12: Fire resistance,
capacities, exit widths, occupant loads, response times, structural robustness in fire
travel speeds and distances, capacities of escape routes, and fire spread
escape for people with disabilities, lifts, escalators and
information systems. This chapter, originally titled Compartmentation, has been
renamed and extensively rewritten and restructured. It
Additional graphical material has been incorporated on provides general guidance on the use and value of fire
performance-based design using evacuation simulation separation in reducing the potential for fire spread. It
models. describes the purpose of compartmentation, the measure-
ment of fire resistance and the need for good maintenance
of all fire-resisting barriers.
1.6.8 Chapter 8: Fire detection and
alarm Additional text has been added on the practical fire sepa-
ration methods, including fire and smoke dampers, that
This chapter covers both manual fire alarm systems and aligns with the new BS 9999: 2017 code (BSI, 2017).
automatic fire detection systems, and details the basic
requirements for the design and application of fire detec- There is also a new section on structural design for fire
tion and alarm systems. It has been updated and includes safety. While this section does not provide detailed calcu-
additional advice on managing false alarms. lation techniques, it does set the framework and points the
reader to more detailed structural fire safety engineering
codes and guides.
The chapter defines the intentions of the systems in terms
of both property protection and life safety, and guidelines
are given with respect to types of systems and equipment, 1.6.13 Chapter 13: Firefighting
together with descriptions of specialist systems, zoning,
location and selection of detectors.
This chapter has been substantially revised in close
consultation with the London Fire Brigade and includes
references to international practices and codes.
1.6.9 Chapter 9: Emergency lighting
The chapter defines common terms in firefighting and
This chapter has been lightly updated with additional stresses the need to include the fire department as a key
references to International Code Council (ICC) and stakeholder in the building design. It describes general
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes. principles of firefighting, equipment (both traditional and
state-of-the-art), fire department response to fires, vehicle
It provides detailed practical guidance on the design of access and water supplies. It also addresses firefighting
emergency escape lighting. Material detailing types of system timelines and a fire engineered approach as well as first-
and modes of operation has been removed, as these aspects aid firefighting by the building occupants prior to fire
are covered in other referenced CIBSE publications. department arrival.
1.6.14 Chapter 14: Fire safety legislation. It also removes the potential for erroneous
management guidance on these matters to be available in a more dura-
ble and persistent printed form.
This chapter reflects the importance that is attached to the
proper management of a building with respect to fire
safety. It addresses legal obligations, design, maintenance,
fire prevention and planning. It has been updated to reflect 1.7 Other sources of
changes in BS 9999, which was revised in 2017. information
1.6.15 Chapter 15: Fire safety on The aim of this Guide is to provide an invaluable reference
construction sites source for those involved in the design, installation,
commissioning, operation and maintenance of buildings
This chapter has been updated to reflect new industry when considering fire precautions. However, it does not
guidance, current issues and regulations both in the UK claim to be exhaustive. It contains many references to
and internationally. other sources of information, which should all be carefully
consulted in conjunction with Guide E.
The chapter addresses fire precaution methods and the
responsibilities of designers with respect to fire safety on
construction sites. A new section has been added that
addresses the use of timber products and timber-framed References
building structures, which has significantly increased
since the last edition. ABCB (2005) International Fire Engineering Guidelines. Edition 2005
(Canberra: Australian Building Codes Board)
1.6.16 Chapter 16: Fire safety of BSI (2001) BS 7974: 2001 Application of fire safety engineering principles to
building facades the design of buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards
Institution) (Note: BS 7974: 2012 has been replaced by BS 7974: 2019)
This new chapter has been added as a result of the devas- BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
tating fire at Grenfell Tower in Kensington, London and buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
other large scale international fires involving external
facades that have occurred in the last seven years. HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
B: Fire Safety. Vols 1 and 2 (2006 edition, incorporating 2007, 2010 and
2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon Tyne: NBS) (Note: further
However, as a result of the significant regulatory uncer-
amendments published as a separate document, April 2019)
tainty at the time of publication of this Guide, the decision
has been taken to publish chapter 16 in online form only. Welsh Government (2015) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved
This will allow it to be updated in line with anticipated Document B: Fire Safety. Vols 1 and 2 (2006 edition, incorporating 2007,
ongoing government announcements and changes to 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon Tyne: NBS)
2-1
2 Legislation
2.1 Introduction Safety Executive. Her report, Building a Safer Future: Inde-
pendent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety
(Hakitt, 2018), was published in May 2018. It identified
systemic problems in construction in England, and called
2.1.1 Disaster-led regulations for significant changes to the construction sector. At the
time of publication, the Public Inquiry is still in progress
Although the birth of fire safety engineering as a technical and the government’s response to Dame Judith’s report is
design discipline is relatively recent compared to other still being developed.
areas of engineering, UK fire safety regulations stem from
as far back as the seventeenth century.
In December 2018, the government introduced changes to
The majority of UK fire safety legislation has evolved as a Regulation 7 of the Building Regulations, which prohibits
response to specific fire disasters. This still continues to be the use of combustible materials in the external walls of
the case, with legislators reacting to major fire incidents. high-rise buildings at least 18 m above ground level,
The Great Fire of London in 1666, involving rapid fire containing one or more dwellings.
spread between buildings and, ultimately, the destruction
of a large part of the city, led to an early ‘building regula-
tions’ requirement to control the types of construction In its response to Dame Judith Hackitt’s review in Decem-
materials used in buildings and define minimum separa- ber 2018, the government also announced a full technical
tion distances between buildings to limit the spread of review of Part B of the Building Regulations and
fire. As urbanisation and industrialisation increased over announced an initial call for evidence, which closed in
the centuries in many countries, so too did the number of March 2019. The outcome is almost certain to result in
fire incidents, prompting the development of either local further changes to fire safety and building control legisla-
or national fire safety legislation, codes and standards. In tion. In the meantime, work to more clearly define
the UK, the first national building regulations which professional competencies is already underway under the
prescribed fire safety measures, among other aspects of auspices of the Industry Response Group, a body estab-
building design, did not come into effect until the 1970s. lished by the government to compliment the work of the
These were administered by local authority building Independent Expert Advisory Panel established in June
control. Prior to this there were piecemeal regional bye- 2017, and relevant professional bodies in the UK.
laws which covered some aspects of fire safety.
The Rose and Crown Hotel fire in Saffron Walden in The Grenfell Tower disaster will inevitably have a signifi-
December 1969 prompted the creation of the Fire Precau- cant impact on construction in the UK and around the
tions Act 1971 in the UK. This legislation required those world, but at the time of publication it would be prema-
with a duty of care to implement fire safety measures and ture to predict the changes that it may bring about.
controls in certain ‘designated’ premises. However, it did not
cover all types of premises. The Fire Precautions Act was
administered by the fire and rescue authorities in the UK.
2.1.2 The advent of performance-
In 2004, the Fire and Rescue Services Act came into force. based regulations
This paved the way for a radical reform of fire safety legis-
lation in the UK. This Act enabled the drafting and
implementation of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) In 1985, the first performance-based building regulations
Order 2005 (SI 2005/1541), which repealed and consoli- were issued in England and Wales. Prior to this, building
dated several pieces of earlier and historical fire safety and fire safety regulations were prescribed. The introduc-
legislation and regulations. The most important aspect of tion of these performance-based requirements formally
this Order was the requirement for all premises to have a opened up the opportunity for designers to utilise fire
valid fire risk assessment, thus moving away from prescrip- engineering as a way of demonstrating compliance with
tive regulations towards the adoption of a performance-based the functional performance requirements. This move
approach. prompted the introduction of British Standard DD 240:
1997 Fire safety engineering in buildings: Guide to the applica-
The recent disastrous fire at Grenfell Tower, London, on tion of fire safety engineering principles (BSI, 1997) and the
14 June 2017 resulted in the loss of 72 lives. This prompted first edition of CIBSE Guide E, which set out a method-
the UK government to hold a public inquiry into the fire ology and approaches to undertaking performance-based
and also establish an independent review of building regu- fire safety design. A number of other countries also intro-
lations and fire safety in England, led by Dame Judith duced performance-based requirements, while others still
Hackitt DBE FREng, former Chair of the Health and retain prescriptive requirements.
2.1.3 Guidance documents (UK) architect) with assistance from the design team, of which
the fire engineer forms an important part.
With the introduction of performance requirements came
the need for supporting guidance. In England and Wales, The only reliable way to demonstrate that a fire engineer
the Approved Documents, in Scotland, the Technical is competent is to ensure that they are a Chartered or
Handbooks and the Technical Booklets in Northern Incorporated Engineer with a relevant professional engi-
Ireland are published to provide guidance on some of the neering institution, such as the Institution of Fire
more common building situations. In 2009, the Welsh Engineers (IFE). The IFE, as is the case with all profes-
Assembly was granted devolved responsibility for build- sional engineering institutions licensed by the Engineering
ing regulations, and as such the Approved Documents Council in the UK, is required to base its assessment of
issued by the Welsh Government are now separate from applicants for Chartered or Incorporated Engineer on a
those issued in England. standardised set of competency and commitment criteria.
This ensures that a consistent definition of competency
These documents make it clear that alternative ways of can be applied to all applicants.
demonstrating compliance can be adopted. One such
method is to utilise fire engineering based on guidance Outside the UK, the broadly equivalent professional regis-
such as CIBSE Guide E. trations are Professional Engineer (PE in the USA or
PEng. in Canada), Chartered Professional Engineer
In 2008, in the UK, the British Standards Institution first (CPEng in Australia) and Eur Ing (in Europe, adminis-
published BS 9999 Code of practice for fire safety in the design, tered by FEANI). There are numerous technician level
management and use of buildings (the current version being accreditations that can be sought through industry bodies,
the 2017 revision (BSI, 2017)). It should be noted that for example Certified Fire Protection Specialist (CFPS in
BS 9999 is not a fire engineering guide, unlike CIBSE Guide the USA, administered by the National Fire Protection
E. Association (NFPA)).
The fire engineer may have specialist expertise in a

The concept behind BS 9999 is that it sits between the
particular aspect of fire engineering (for example, struc-
general prescriptive guidance, such as Approved Docu-
tural fire engineering, smoke movement or human
ments and Technical Handbooks, and performance-based
behaviour), but must have a sound knowledge and under-
fire engineering guides, such as CIBSE Guide E and
standing of the fundamentals of all aspects of fire safety
BS 7974: 2001 (BSI, 2001). This effectively offers a fire
science and design and be technically competent and
safety designer in the UK the choice of three methods to
rigorous in applying this knowledge.
adopt in terms of fire safety design:
(a) generic or simplified approach (Approved Docu- 2.1.5 The need for an integrated
ments and Technical Handbooks)
approach
(b) advanced approach (BS 9999)
Fire safety legislation and guidance thus far has been
(c) performance-based engineering approach. primarily driven by disasters and architectural trends, and
has arguably been playing catch-up for a number of years.
It is the last of these approaches that this Guide explores The growth and consolidation of fire engineering as a
in greater detail. However, it is vital that anyone tasked profession, fuelled by the demand for more complex build-
with developing the fire safety design of a building is ing and the use of modern construction methods and
competent to do so. materials, has led to a need for the fire engineer to adopt
a more holistic, considered approach to design, rather
than simply providing specific technical solutions.
2.1.4 Competency
It is important that, in developing the fire safety design
It is essential that the fire engineer clearly understands the for a building, the fire engineer gives due consideration to
background of the guidance which they are adopting. This how the building will be constructed and how it will be
is important to ensure that the guidance and the assump- occupied and operated, as well as how it will be managed
tions made in the guidance are applicable and relevant to and maintained once completed. The assumptions about
the particular design that they are progressing. all of these factors should be documented in the fire safety
strategy that the fire engineer delivers.
The responsibility for the fire safety design rests with the
person providing that fire safety design advice. It is impor- At the design stage it is important that the fire engineer,
tant to recognise that authorities having jurisdiction in developing a fire strategy for a building, is cognisant of
(ahjs) do not carry any design responsibility. So a fire the potential occupiers and end users and how they will
engineer developing the fire strategy for a building assumes use the building. This can have a fundamental impact on
full responsibility for the elements of design on which the fire strategy. It is therefore important that during the
they are advising others. Consequently, they must be design stage onerous restrictions on the end user are not
competent to provide such advice. This applies even if the imposed or required by the fire strategy.
fire safety design is following the generic or simplified
approach referred to above. It is essential that the fire While the fire engineer may not have overall responsibil-
safety designer understands the background to and the ity for design coordination, it is important that the fire
reasons for the prescribed solutions. The overall responsi- engineer ensures that the fire safety solutions which they
bility for a design rests with the lead designer (usually the are proposing can actually be built. This is reflected in the
Legislation 2-3
regulatory approach in the UK, i.e. that the fire safety The objectives outline how the goals will be achieved. For
design should meet the functional building regulations example, the goals may be achieved simply by following
requirements and give due consideration to fire safety at code recommendations. All the requirements may be met
the construction stage and throughout the building’s use. by using a performance-based design approach. It may be
that the goals can be accomplished by utilising a combi-
Another important factor is that the fire engineer should nation of code-based approach and performance-based
understand the potential materials and components to be design to verify departures from codes. Whatever method-
used in the building in terms of their fire risk. It is inev- ology is to be adopted, it should be clearly documented.
itable that fire safety guidance will fall out of date,
particularly in relation to the development of modern
materials and building products, and these new materials When using code-based approaches it is important that
may need careful consideration and assessment to under- the fire engineer has detailed knowledge of the code to
stand how they will perform in a fire. ensure that the use of a given code is valid for the particu-
lar building for which the strategy is being developed.
The fire engineer should also ensure that the fire safety
design does not assume or require onerous or unsafe fire When using performance-based approaches it is important
safety management or maintenance procedures once the that the fire engineer is suitably qualified and competent
building is occupied, Construction (Design and to undertake the fire engineering design. The fire safety
Management) Regulations 2015 for the design to be safely strategy should be robust enough to stand up to any neces-
maintainable in use. It is also important for the fire engi- sary third-party validation.
neer to clearly document any relevant fire safety
management or maintenance procedures required as part
of the fire strategy that they develop, and for these to be It should also be recognised that prescriptive codes are
handed over to the client. In England and Wales, for usually intended for more common, generic types of
example, this is required to comply with Regulation 38 of buildings. In buildings that require a fire engineered
the Building Regulations. approach or performance-based design, a more rigorous
audit trail may often be required to document the fire
The advent of Building Information Modelling (bim) and safety solution and the decision-making process that was
3D models can greatly assist the fire engineer in under- undertaken to arrive at the solution.
standing the detailing of fire compartmentation and
fire-resisting lines and help them to gain an understanding
Where those tasked with approving the design do not have
of voids and connections between floors and buildings.
sufficient competence to check the fire engineering strat-
Such tools can also enable the fire engineer to gain a better
egy then third-party validation through a competent fire
understanding of how people can potentially navigate
engineer should be sought.
through the building, especially in an emergency situation.
It is only after considering all of these elements or phases

that a truly integrated fire safety design can be achieved.
2.2 Regulatory approvals
2.1.6 Fire engineer responsibilities
The approvals process for the fire safety design of build-
The first stage in developing a fire strategy is for the fire ings varies significantly from country to country and even,
engineer, in conjunction with all relevant design team in many cases, between regions within a single country. To
members and stakeholders, to clearly define and under- demonstrate the range of approaches, the approvals
stand the objectives and goals of the fire strategy. In the processes for a selection of countries are summarised
UK, this is defined in BS 7974 as a qualitative design review below. A fire engineer should fully understand the approv-
(qdr); in the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (for als process applicable to their project prior to undertaking
Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Canada) this is any fire safety design.
defined as a fire engineering brief (ABCB, 2005).
The fire safety goals are the high-level target that the fire
strategy is aiming to meet. They could be life safety goals,
2.2.1 UK
but may also include other stakeholder goals, such as
providing property, heritage, asset and content protection In the UK, the approval and enforcement process for fire
and business resilience. It is part of the fire engineer’s remit safety in buildings is effectively split into three distinct
to develop solutions which take into consideration how parts, with three separate ahjs:
they can be applied during the construction phase (refer to
chapter 15), how they will be implemented during building
operation (refer to chapter 14) and how they contribute to (a) Design and implementation: the ahj for design
sustainable development; requirements which apply to all approval for compliance with the Building
engineers registered with the Engineering Council. There Regulations and enforcement of design implemen-
may also be contractual goals, such as those as outlined in tation on site may be normally either a private
the employer’s requirements, or specific stakeholder goals, approved inspector (in England and Wales) or the
which may be dictated by interested parties. Again, these local building control authority, with the fire and
should all be established in conjunction with the project rescue service acting as a statutory consultee in
stakeholders and clearly documented. both cases.
(b) Construction: the ahj for enforcing construction provincial or national level fire authority, which will
site fire safety legislation is the Health and Safety commission an expert panel review. The review findings
Executive (HSE). will then be sent to the local fire officer for implementa-
tion. The local officer must also inspect to determine
(c) Occupation and use: post-completion, the ahj for
whether all requirements raised by the expert panel have
enforcing compliance with operational fire safety been met.
legislation is the fire and rescue authorities.
2.2.2 Central Europe 2.2.6 USA

In mainland Europe, the building approval process varies
between countries and often within federal or municipal
states within each country, therefore checking local regu- In the USA, the regulatory system for building fire safety
lations prior to submitting a design is essential. In France, is fairly complex. The codes and standards, which are
Germany and Italy, building permits are controlled developed by numerous organisations in the USA, are
through local municipal bodies, who require adherence to adopted on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. The build-
a compliance certification process in order to meet the ing codes and standards that become a model are developed
local building regulations. This process requires the utilising a consensus system of development to minimise
builder to provide technical information at certain bench- the influence of any single constituency.
mark points throughout the construction process, and
allows the relevant authority to undertake inspections. The actual adoption of these codes and standards is
However, in each case it is the responsibility of the through legislation developed at the State or local jurisdic-
appointed architect or engineer to meet the technical tion level. The legislation adopts specific codes and
requirements of the local laws. standards, but often with local amendments.
In Germany and Italy, an independent engineer may be
engaged to undertake technical checks on the project on Some States require local jurisdictions (cities and coun-
behalf of the local authority. ties) to adopt the State-adopted codes without further
amendments, while others allow local jurisdictions to
make local amendments. There are also entities that are
2.2.3 Middle East (Gulf States) recognised by the Government as exempt from State regu-
lations. These entities typically establish their own
In the Middle Eastern states, notably Bahrain, United regulations.
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the local munici-
pal bodies are responsible for providing a coordinating
role in reviewing applications and building plans and All of the model codes allow for alternative means and
undertaking inspections; however, the Civil Defense methods of design and construction, provided that the
Department (the fire department) must grant permission alternative can be shown to be equivalent in terms of
for the building fire safety design. The Civil Defense safety to the prescriptive criteria of the code. These
Department will undertake a detailed technical review of approaches (code modifications) can be developed utilis-
the fire safety design; thus early engagement and agreeing performance-based engineering methods.
ment of the fire safety standards to be adopted for the
project (whether NFPA, IBC or British Standards) is
essential. Alternative designs are required to be submitted for
approval with accompanying justification and are subject
to the review of the approving authority. Some States
2.2.4 Australia require modifications to be reviewed by a Board of Appeals
that is made up of independent individuals. Others allow
In Australia, a prescriptive approach is provided as a code modifications to be reviewed and approved by the
‘deemed to satisfy’ solution. The ahjs are normally private Building or Fire Officials of the jurisdiction.
certifiers, but council certifiers can also be used. A fire
engineer is not needed on a project if a ‘deemed to satisfy’ Facilities owned by the federal government are not subject
solution is adopted. However, non-standard approaches to local requirements and are typically bound by the
can be used, in which case a fire engineer would submit a requirements of the specific government agency involved
design to demonstrate how the performance requirements in the project. For example, the Department of Defense
have been achieved, often using comparison to the has its Unified Facilities Criteria, which specify require-
prescriptive solution as a benchmark. One fundamental ments for building design.
aspect in Australia is that a fire engineer is required to
carry out a final site inspection to confirm that the solu-
tion constructed fulfils the requirements. The ahj is typically the building and fire department
within the jurisdiction of the project or, in the case of a
Government-owned project, the authority will be a desig-
2.2.5 China nated individual or department within the agency.
China adopts a prescriptive design approach, with code
guidance specifying fire safety requirements and the local It is critical to understand the applicable requirements,
fire officer as the ahj. Exceptions to the prescriptive codes based on the location of the project and knowledge of the
can be made for the more unusual building situations, in enforcement mechanisms within the jurisdiction, prior to
which case the ahj will file an application to the starting a design project.
Legislation 2-5
2.3 Legislation throughout to use competency as a selection criterion for those that
they employ to undertake construction and design work.
the building life cycle
A person who is responsible for appointing others is
legally responsible for ensuring that the designer or
2.3.1 During design and contractor appointed is competent to fulfil that role. This
duty, in turn, means that a contractor or designer appoint-
construction ing another party is therefore responsible for undertaking
due diligence to ensure that the performance of the fire
It is important that the fire engineer does not rely solely safety products or systems is tested to appropriate stand-
on approval of the fire strategy by the ahj to demonstrate ards and that their manufacturers can supply sufficient
that their design is adequate. It is imperative that a compe- documentation to validate their products’ compliance
tent professional fire engineer ensures that anything that with those standards.
they are submitting for approval passes their own test of
adequacy. It is also important to note that, in many juris-
dictions, the ahjs have no design responsibility; the 2.3.2 Handover
design responsibility for the fire strategy will rest entirely
with the fire safety engineer. The building handover phase is critical to ensuring that
the fire safety information generated during the design and
In the UK, the responsibility for regulatory compliance construction stages is fully completed and provided to the
does not rest with the ahj but with the designer. The ahj building operators, such that the building can be safely
has no liability in relation to the design and, while they operated and maintained within the constraints of the fire
check for compliance, they are not ultimately responsible strategy. In England and Wales, Regulation 38 of the Build-
for it. ing Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/2214) requires the person
carrying out the work (the contractor) to provide this
Within the UK, the person carrying out the work, i.e. the information to the person responsible for fire safety under
client, is responsible for ensuring that it is carried out in the operational legislation (the Regulatory Reform (Fire
accordance with the Building Regulations. Similarly, the Safety) Order 2005). In general terms, this would include:
building contractor (builder) is responsible for ensuring
that the works undertaken comply with the Building —— an as-built fire strategy report
Regulations. The quality of the build to meet the design
intent and the objectives of the fire strategy are the respon- —— as-built fire safety plans, showing fire escapes, fire-
sibility of the building contractor. resisting construction, firefighting provisions and
all other pertinent fire safety information
It is also important that all of the relevant information —— cause and effect descriptions/matrix
relating to the fire safety design of the building is passed
on to the end user of the building, particularly to those —— fire safety systems information
responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the
—— verification documentation for installed fire safety
building.
systems
During the design stage, the responsibility for designing —— operation and maintenance instructions.
in accordance with statutory regulations usually rests with
the lead designer. In terms of fire safety design on more This information can then be incorporated into the fire
complex buildings, they will usually be supported by a fire safety manual for the building in the operational phase.
engineer. The remit of the fire engineer is defined on a
project-by-project basis. More often than not, the fire
engineer will define a minimum performance requirement 2.3.3 Post-completion
in the fire strategy to be implemented by others on site;
however, due to the increasing complexity of fire safety Within England and Wales, the Regulatory Reform (Fire
systems and modern construction solutions that can be Safety) Order 2005 places a clear responsibility for ensur-
adopted in buildings, there is an increasing reliance on the ing general and process fire precautions in occupied
fire engineer during the construction stage to provide buildings on a nominated person or persons, defined as
assistance to ensure that their design is implemented the ‘Responsible Person’ (or the ‘Duty Holder’ under the
appropriately. Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 in Scotland). The Responsible
Person has a duty to ensure that any occupants and visi-
During the construction phase, on-site fire safety is the tors within or around the building are protected from the
responsibility of the building contractor; again, they may effects of fire, and is required to implement specific
be assisted and supported by a fire engineer. Further infor- actions, as defined in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
mation on fire safety on construction sites can be found in Order 2005 for England and Wales and the Fire Safety
chapter 15. (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (SSI 2006/456) in Scotland.
In the UK, designers, including fire engineers, are respon- In order to coordinate their actions and comply with their
sible for complying with the Construction (Design and various duties under operational fire safety legislation, the
Management) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/51). This includes Responsible Person will often use a fire safety manual as
identifying and eliminating risks through their design a general umbrella document for organising their different
process, and also a duty to take steps to assist others in duties, including fire policy and procedures, staff fire
meeting duties under those Regulations by providing suit- safety training, building fire safety information, testing
able information about their design. Clients are required and maintenance regimes and operational records.
The operational legislation in the UK requires the Respon-

sible Person to have a valid fire risk assessment for the
References
premises. The fire risk assessment has to be undertaken
ABCB (2005) International Fire Engineering Guidelines (Canberra:
by a competent person and is updated regularly (or when Australian Building Codes Board)
there is a need to review due to any changes being made
to the fire safety arrangements) to take account of the fire BSI (1997) DD 240: 1997 Fire safety engineering in buildings: Guide to the
hazards in the building and the occupants exposed to application of fire safety engineering principles (London: British Standards
those hazards. This legislation therefore places a legal Institution)
duty on the building operators themselves to manage their BSI (2001) BS 7974: 2001 Application of fire safety engineering principles to
responsibilities and is enforced by the fire and rescue the design of buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards
authorities. This is in contrast to the previous framework Institution) (Note: BS 7974: 2012 has been replaced by BS 7974: 2019)
under the Fire Precautions Act 1971, in which the fire BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Code of practice for fire safety in the design,
service would undertake the inspection and certification management and use of buildings (London: British Standards Institution)
of premises.
Hackitt J (2018) Building a Safer Future: Independent Review of Building
Further information on the fire safety management Regulations and Fire Safety (London: Ministry of Housing, Communities
and Local Government) [online] https://www.gov.uk/government/
processes required in operational buildings can be found
publications/independent-review-of-building-regulations-and-fire-safety-
in chapter 14. One of the recommendations of Dame final-report (accessed April 2019)
Judith Hackitt’s Review (HM Government, 2018) was for
information about the building, including the fire safety
information, to form part of a ‘golden thread’ of informa-
tion that is passed down through the life of the building
or asset. At the time of publication, the government is
considering how this recommendation could be addressed.
3-1
3 Building designation
3.1 Introduction Oversimplifying a building into a specific occupancy type
is often only truly valid for simple buildings, but for larger
Fire precautions in buildings can address several aspects, or more complex schemes, some assessment of the validity
including life safety, contents damage and avoidance of of the occupancy grouping should be carried out.
business disruption. The use to which a building or a part
thereof is put (i.e. its designation or classification) has
implications for all of these aspects.
3.2 Common factors
The most important implications for life safety arise from
building population and the risk to which the people are There are a number of factors that have implications for
exposed, usually related to fire load and ignition risk. The most building types. In general, the extremes of these factors
majority of recognised building design guides across the call for greater protection and increased fire precautions.
world differentiate fire safety expectations by the occupancy
type. For example, in the UK, the Building Regulations
2010 are supported by supplementary documentation (HM
3.2.1 Building height
Government, 2013) in which buildings are classified accord-
The fire engineering implications of building height are:
ing to specific ‘purpose groups’, see Table 3.1.
—— greater vertical distances through which persons
Different fire precautions may be required for the differ- must travel to escape
ent purpose groups. The means of detecting, controlling
and extinguishing a fire, the provisions for evacuating the —— increased challenges for firefighting
building, the means of limiting the spread of fire and
smoke within the building and their impact on adjacent —— a longer escape period and increased interaction
compartments and structures, as well as the facilities for between evacuees and firefighters
firefighting, will all be influenced by the building’s use. In —— greater implications of building collapse and
essence, building designation is a recognition of the level consequential damage.
of risk.
The height of a building alone does not result in an
Authorities apply different criteria for building designa- increased probability of fire occurring, and therefore the
tion but, in the context of fire precautions, the main height alone should not preclude a building accommodat-
authorities are those concerned with building certification ing certain occupancies. However, the level of risk
(including firefighting) and building insurance (including associated with the increased height of a building is higher
business disruption and contents). Examples of systems of when compared to low-rise buildings of a similar occu-
building classification in England and Wales are given in pancy type, as the consequences of a fire occurring will be
Table 3.1, and for sprinklers in Europe in Table 3.2 (BSI, more severe unless suitable mitigation is introduced.
2015). Section 2 of BS 9999: 2017 outlines a means of
establishing building designation based on risk profiles In buildings over a certain height, phased evacuation
(BSI, 2017). It gives basic factors, occupancy characteris- (evacuating certain floors in sequence) can be more prac-
tics and fire growth rates, enabling a risk profile to be tical than simultaneous evacuation (full decant of the
established. It then gives nearly 70 examples of application whole building). It allows for more efficient staircase
of its principles. width, and may reduce the need for total evacuation. It
may not be necessary to fully evacuate a building, subject
It is often the case that a single building accommodates to the provision of adequate fire precautions to provide a
more than one occupancy type, and therefore can house place of relative safety within the building.
numerous risk profiles. The majority of recognised fire
design guidance offers advice on how to separate those Where firefighter activities are not possible from the
occupancies, or to not separate and design to the higher building perimeter due to building height, access within
risk. This balance is increasingly a feature of the fire safety the building can be provided by firefighting shafts. These
design, as mixed-use buildings are becoming more common. provide protection for firefighters because they offer safe
access, a forward attack point from which to carry out
New occupancy types can emerge, such as apart-hotels and operations and a safe escape route for firefighters. They
extra-care accommodation, and guidance documents are also include water supply outlets which, in tall buildings,
an inadequate means of keeping up with the realities of are permanently charged.
commercial developments. The BS 9999 approach goes
some way towards addressing this problem by introducing The interaction between firefighters accessing the building
risk categories and fitting occupancy types to those cate- and occupants evacuating is one that needs consideration
gories based on their characteristics. in high-rise buildings. The provision of firefighting shafts,
Table 3.1 Classification by purpose group (HM Government, 2013: 140)
Title Group Purpose for which the building or compartment of a building is intended to be used
Residential (dwellings) 1(a)* Flat.
1(b)† Dwellinghouse which contains a habitable storey with a floor level which is more than 4.5 m above
ground level.
1(c)†+ Dwellinghouse which does not contain a habitable storey with a floor level which is more than 4.5 m
above ground level.
Residential (Institutional) 2(a) Hospital, home, school or other similar establishment used as living accommodation for, or for the
treatment, care or maintenance of persons suffering from disabilities due to illness or old age or other
physical or mental incapacity, or under the age of 5 years, or place of lawful detention, where such
persons sleep on the premises.
(Other) 2(b) Hotel, boarding house, residential college, hall of residence, hostel and any other residential purpose
not described above.
Office 3 Offices or premises used for the purpose of administration, clerical work (including writing, book
keeping, sorting papers, filing, typing, duplicating, machine calculating, drawing and the editorial
preparation of matter for publication, police and fire and rescue service work), handling money
(including banking and building society work), and communications (including postal, telegraph and
radio communications) or radio, television, film, audio or video recording, or performance (not open to
the public) and their control.
Shop and commercial 4 Shops or premises used for a retail trade or business (including the sale to members of the public of
food or drink for immediate consumption and retail by auction, self-selection and over-the-counter
wholesale trading, the business of lending books or periodicals for gain and the business of a barber or
hairdresser and the rental of storage space to the public) and premises to which the public is invited to
deliver or collect goods in connection with their hire repair or other treatment, or (except in the case of
repair of motor vehicles) where they themselves may carry out such repairs or other treatments.
Assembly and recreation 5 Place of assembly, entertainment or recreation; including bingo halls, broadcasting, recording and film
studios open to the public, casinos, dance halls; entertainment, conference, exhibition and leisure
centres; funfairs and amusement arcades; museums and art galleries; non-residential clubs, theatres,
cinemas and concert halls; educational establishments, dancing schools, gymnasia, swimming pool
buildings, riding schools, skating rinks, sports pavilions, sports stadia; law courts; churches and other
buildings of worship, crematoria; libraries open to the public, non-residential day centres, clinics,
health centres and surgeries; passenger stations and termini for air, rail, road or sea travel; public
toilets; zoos and menageries.
Industrial 6 Factories and other premises used for manufacturing, altering, repairing, cleaning, washing, breaking-
up, adapting or processing any article; generating power or slaughtering livestock.
Storage and other non- 7(a) Place for the storage or deposit of goods or materials (other than described under 7(b)) and any
residential+ building not within any of the Purpose Groups 1 to 6.
7(b) Car parks designed to admit and accommodate only cars, motorcycles and passenger or light goods
vehicles weighing no more than 2500 kg gross.
Notes:
This table only applies to Part B.
* Includes live/work units that meet the provisions of paragraph 2.52.
† Includes any surgeries, consulting rooms, offices or other accommodation, not exceeding 50 m2 in total, forming part of a dwellinghouse and
used by an occupant of the dwellinghouse in a professional or business capacity.
+ A detached garage not more than 40 m2 in area is included in purpose group 1(c); as is a detached open carport of not more than 40 m2, or a
detached building which consists of a garage and open carport where neither the garage nor the open carport exceeds 40 m2 in area.
Table 3.2 Classification according to hazard for sprinkler installations (reproduced from BS EN 12845:2015 by permission of BSI.)
(a) Light hazard occupancies

Schools and other educational institutions (certain areas)
Offices (certain areas)
Prisons
(b) Ordinary hazard occupancies
Occupancy Ordinary hazard group
OH1 OH2 OH3 OH4

Glass and ceramics Glass factories
Chemicals Cement works Photographic film Dyers works, soap factories, photographic
factories laboratories, paint applicaton shops with
water based paint
Continued
Building designation 3-3
Table 3.2 (b) continued
Occupancy OH1 OH2 OH3 OH4

Engineering Sheet metal product Metal working Electronics factories, radio equipment
factories factories, washing machine factories, car
workshops
Food and beverages Abattoirs, meat factories, Animal fodder factories, corn mills, Alcohol distilleries
bakeries, biscuit factories, dehydrated vegetable and soup factories,
breweries, chocolate sugar factories
factories, confectionery
factories, dairies
Miscellaneous Hospitals, hotels, libraries Laboratories (physical), Broadcasting studios (small), railway Cinemas and theatres,
(excluding book stores), laundries, car parks, stations, plant (technical) rooms, farm concert halls, tobacco
restaurants, schools, offices museums buildings factories, film and TV
production studios
Paper Book binding factories, cardboard Waste paper processing
factories, paper factories
Shops and offices Data processing (computer Department stores, shopping centres Exhibition halls*
room, excluding tape
storage), offices
Textiles and clothing Leather goods factories Carpet factories (excluding rubber and Cotton mills, flax
foam plastics), cloth and clothing preparation plants, hemp
factories, fibre board factories, footwear preparation plants
factories (excluding plastics and rubber),
knitting factories, linen factories,
mattress factories (excluding foam
plastics), sewing factories, weaving mills,
woollen and worsted mills
Timber and wood Woodworking factories, furniture Saw mills, plywood
factories (without foam plastics), factories
furniture showrooms, upholstery
(without foam plastics) factories
Note: Where there is painting or other similar high fire load areas in a OH1 or OH2 occupancy, they should be treated as OH3.
*Excessive clearance shall be taken into consideration
(c) High hazard process occupancies
HHP1 HHP2 HHP3 HHP4

Floor cloth and linoleum manufacture Fire lighter manufacture Cellulose nitrate manufacture Firework manufacture
Resin, lamp black and turpentine Tar distilling Rubber tyres for cars and lorries
manufacture
Depots for buses, un-laden lorries and Manufacture of material factor M3
Rubber substitute manufacture railway carriages (see table b.1) foam plastics, foam
rubber and foam rubber goods
Wood wool manufacture Candle wax and paraffin manufacturers
manufacture (excluding M4 see
Match manufacturers Paper machine halls table b.1)
Paint application shops with solvent Carpet factories including rubber and
foam plastics
Refrigerator factories
Saw mill
Printing works
Chipboard manufacturing
Cable factories for PP/PE/PS or similar
burning characteristics other than OH3 Paint, colour and varnish manufacture
Injection moulding (plastics) for PP/PE/
PS or similar burning characteristics
other than OH3
Plastics factories and plastic goods
(excluding foam plastics) for PP/PE/PS or
similar burinig characteristics other than
OH3
Rubber goods factories, synthetic fibre
factories (excluding acrylic)
Rope factories
Carpet factories including unexpanded
plastics
Footwear factories including plastics and
rubber
Note: Additional object projection might be necessary.
coupled with phased evacuation regimes, or partial evacu- The potential increased risk to occupants and firefighters
ation of the building, is part of this consideration. below ground can be addressed by provision of smoke and
Firefighting shafts can also be used by those with mobility heat ventilation, coupled with fire suppression, as well as
impairment as refuge locations. Other aspects that could be sub-compartmentation of basement floors.
considered are evacuation using lifts, creating refuge floors
within the building and managing smoke via pressure The movement of people and fire products should ideally
differential or smoke extract systems. be separated, perhaps by smoke and heat venting at source,
to keep escape routes clear. People using escape routes in
Engineering of fire safety in high-rise buildings continues case of fire from upper floors should not have to go below
to go beyond the well-established lines of assuming a ground level to reach an exit. Separation of some escape
single genuine ‘accidental’ fire outbreak. Tall building fire stairs at access level, and otherwise suitable signage at exit
safety should properly consider the risks arising from the level, assists safe exit.
potential for multiple fire seats or multiple floors to be
involved. The principle adopted is that any increase in Basement areas should be separated from the upper floors
risk arises from the vertical stacking of usable space and by suitable fire-resisting structure.
hence the focus in tall buildings is on preventing the
vertical movement of fire and smoke, therefore overcom- Additional facilities to support access for firefighting,
ing this risk variation. including by firefighting shafts (with lifts) in deep base-
ments, may be required in certain circumstances.
The result of fire engineering analysis in tall buildings is
generally the provision of phased evacuation via protected
stairs, voice alarms, sprinkler protection, firefighting 3.2.3 Building area
access, compartment floors and increased fire resistance.
The implications of increased building area are:
3.2.2 Depth below ground —— greater aggregate fire loads

—— greater horizontal distances through which persons
The implications of depth below ground are: may be required to travel to escape
—— the possibility of products of combustion, escaping —— increased firefighting challenges, such as poten-
occupants and firefighters using the same route tially greater distance to a point of safety, a large
area to search and the inability to reach all areas of
—— the fire hazard traditionally housed below ground a floor plate from outside.
is often considered to be greater, with associated
increase in risk Strict adherence to maximum travel distances could be a
determining factor for floor area. Where extended distances
—— increased difficulty for firefighters accessing the
are preferred, smoke control or other compensating features
fire location
may need to be provided. These may include internal
—— increased physiological stress during upwards protected corridors.
escape
Sub-compartmentation will divide fire loads but fire
—— under-ventilated fires leading to backdrafts and control (e.g. venting, fire suppression) may provide an
unpredictable fire behaviours. alternative solution. Limitation of firefighting hose lengths
may have a bearing on floor area and the practical limit of
The fact that a floor is below ground level does not, of laying out of hoses is usually taken as the maximum length
itself, necessarily increase the risk of a fire occurring for design purposes.
within it, nor does it directly affect the consequences of a
fire. Traditionally, basements have often been put to uses Guidance for England limits compartment size by area
which have a different risk to above-ground floors, such only (except for storage) (HM Government, 2013).
as storage and plant, and access to them may have also
been irregular. However, this is not always the case and in Some modern buildings, such as commercial use ‘land-
many situations the costs of building basements and the scrapers’, are producing floor plate areas which are many
need to maximise use of a site mean that basements may times larger than conventional new build developments.
well be put to the same uses as above-ground spaces. Such large areas of floor plate, particularly where open
plan, are not adequately addressed by guidance documents
The overall use of the building needs to be taken into in relation to designation of fire size and type.
account, as there are many good reasons for locating
certain things in basements: in laboratories, for example, Most guidance documents assume fully involved compart-
basements provide a much higher floor loading capacity ment fires, with uniform temperature generation and
and hence can be used for heavy equipment; in scenarios limited ventilation. In reality, large floor areas are likely
where a lecture space is required, the lack of windows is a to generate localised fires with relatively unrestrained
benefit; similarly, many arts buildings use basements for ventilation, which will move along the floor plate, main-
acoustically sensitive uses. These uses would offer a signif- taining a largely stable rate of fire load consumption. Such
icantly different risk to a more traditional basement use, travelling fires will produce different heating regimes to
such as storage, and therefore the specific risk of the base- the standard temperature–time model and will therefore
ment being reviewed should be used to define the fire elicit non-standard structural responses. Consideration of
safety recommendations, as much as the physical location their properties is therefore particularly relevant when
below ground. undertaking structural fire engineering assessments.
Suitable consideration should therefore be given to the equivalent provision can be achieved by sprinkler protec-
area of the compartment and the likely associated fire tion, since this restricts the fire size. With a sprinkler
types. system, more refined calculations of fire size can be made
and the subsequent benefit to the boundary condition can
be anticipated.
3.2.4 Building volume
The approach above is a simple one and takes very little
The main effect of building volume is that, with the pres- account of the actual size to which a fire may grow. It
ence of sufficient fire load, larger compartments can assumes a fully developed fire throughout the entire
sustain larger fires, and in some uses extended uncompart- compartment volume, and takes only cursory account of
mented volumes may result in increased total fire load. In the fire load but none of its distribution and potential to
these cases, fire development and spread can be controlled result in such a fire. This simplified approach was devel-
by early detection, smoke venting, oxygen depletion and oped at a time during which building construction types
water suppression. and fire load distributions more closely matched the
assumptions of the guidance. The approach was captured
Increased volumes do not, however, necessarily imply in the 1991 BRE publication BR187, which has subse-
increased fire load or risk. Increased volume may, in fact, quently been updated in a second volume, released in 2014
extend the smoke filling time with the resulting benefit of (Chitty, 2014); however, the approach in the updated
potentially increased escape times. document remains largely the same.
The implications for means of escape and firefighting are
Modern buildings typically present fire loads, materials
very different in large volume buildings, which is related
and methods of construction which sit in stark contrast to
to the timing of egress versus the entry of firefighters. An
those built 25 years ago. The guidance should therefore be
increased risk to escape is sometimes considered an
applied in the context of these changes and rational
increased risk to firefighters, but in the case of large
conclusions drawn from the results of the analyses.
volume buildings this is not necessarily the case.
In particular circumstances, the fire load may not be A performance-based approach to boundary separation
commensurate with the volume (e.g. places of assembly, requires looking at the effect of any active systems present,
transport terminals) and lower standards of fire resistance actual fire load density, its distribution and any hazard
may be appropriate, perhaps coupled with fire contain- arising from it.
ment and smoke control.
3.2.6 Fire load
3.2.5 Proximity to site boundary
and adjacent buildings The characteristics that contribute to fire hazard include
the quantity of combustible materials, their distribution,
The proximity of a building to the site boundary or to flammability, smoke production and surface flame spread
adjacent buildings affects the risk of fire spread from one rates.
building to another and, to reduce that possibility, may
require: Traditionally, various occupancies have identifiable fire
loads. The full fire development of these loads results in
—— increased controls on compartmentation the standards of fire resistance and limits of compartmen-
tation. Therefore, other measures provided to control fire
—— restrictions on unprotected (i.e. non-fire-resisting development and spread should reduce the need for
and combustible) areas of the facade compartmentation while at the same time protecting
—— firefighting access via firefighting shafts rather against losses.
than by perimeter access
Standards of enclosure and separation may differ for life
UK regulations (the Building Regulations 2010, as safety and property protection purposes, the latter gener-
amended by the Building (Amendment) Regulations 2018, ally being higher when it is assumed that the occupants
for England and Wales and the corresponding regulations will have vacated the building during the early stages of a
for Scotland and Northern Ireland) require the external fire. Clearly, the successful action of fire suppression
walls of a building to adequately resist the spread of fire systems dramatically modifies the impact of fire load on
over the walls and from one building to another. The design. Suppression systems include conventional sprin-
proportion of unprotected areas of the façade, provided in klers, water mist (high and low pressure), gaseous
the guidance contained in Approved Document B (HM suppression, oxygen depletion and foam, not all of which
Government, 2013) is determined by proximity to the are applicable for all conditions (see chapter 11).
boundary and, broadly, by the nature of the occupancy
based on the fire load.
3.2.7 Numbers of people
In circumstances where a high life risk is involved, this
guidance also requires fire resistance to be provided Large numbers of people may require more emphasis on
between buildings on the same site and between certain management to achieve means of escape. There are
uses within a single building. The division of buildings currently moves to provide more reliable information to
into compartments provides a means of restricting the assist people to make the correct decisions in making their
area of radiation at the boundary of the building. Where exit. This can be achieved by voice alarms or informative
such compartmentation conflicts with building occupancy, displays. Fire engineering provides for accommodating
‘over-occupancy’ and extended travel distances by identi- detail with the challenges that each could present. It is,
fying the risk and managing fire development. however, the actual, rather than perceived, problems that
arise as a result of the inclusion of special features which
need to be examined carefully to provide life safety protec-
3.2.8 Sleeping accommodation
tion. Fire engineering identifies the issues and addresses
them to ensure that an acceptable level of risk is achieved.
With sleeping accommodation, there is the possibility that
occupants become disorientated on hearing the fire alarm,
especially when outside their own homes (e.g. in hotels). 3.2.12 Life safety and property
protection
The response to alarms is affected by the alertness of the
occupants at the time that the alarm is sounded and by Life safety protection — which includes both occupants
their knowledge of the building. Therefore, increased and firefighting personnel — requires different levels of
detection, protection or fire control can be justified for fire precautions from those appropriate to property protec-
sleeping accommodation. For example, fire alarms can be tion and avoidance of business disruption.
suitably located and sufficiently loud to alert sleeping
people (see chapter 8). The reliability of an alarm system Property protection (including avoidance of business
has a direct bearing on people’s response to it, and more disruption) generally requires higher standards of fire
complex systems can be justified in critical circumstances. precautions since it addresses fire behaviour beyond the
Increased levels of compartmentation and control of fire time required for occupants to vacate the building. This is
development and spread are also justified. often reflected in the call for fire suppression, smoke
management and higher standards of fire resistance. In
3.2.9 Disadvantaged occupants providing for life safety, the issues of property protection
are often addressed to a significant degree.
Consideration must be given to the needs of disadvantaged
occupants. These include those with physical or learning
disabilities, young or aged persons, and the infirm. It is
3.2.13 Fire precautions during
recommended that means of escape for disabled people construction
should receive special attention. Guidance on access and
exit provision for people with health conditions or impair- The fire loads, and the associated risks, can be higher
ments is given in Approved Document M (HM Government, during construction than in the completed building (refer
2015) and throughout BS 9999 as inclusive design. to chapter 15). This is especially the case when a building
is constructed from combustible material. The conse-
Proactive consultation with facilities management teams quences can be particularly severe when construction is
during the design stages is highly recommended. Doing occurring in part of an operational building.
so allows the specific practicalities of the evacuation of
disadvantaged occupants to be properly assessed on a case- Fires at buildings under construction have emphasised the
by-case basis. From these consultations, the need to need to minimise the hazard and for increased vigilance.
provide enhanced features, such as evacuation lifts or
chairs, can be fully understood and any changes which are A code of site fire precautions has been produced by the
necessary during the design process can be captured Fire Protection Association (FPA) (FPA, 2015) and other
effectively. codes of practice include appropriate information (HSE,
2010; Standing Committee on Fire Precautions, 1995).
Standards of construction are also covered by the FPA
3.2.10 Multi-tenancy/multi-occupancy code (FPA, 2015).
Where the whole population of a building is not under the
same management, there is the possibility of varying
standards of care and attention to fire precautions. It may
be necessary to ensure that the other occupancies are
3.3 Risk profiles
warned in the event of a fire being detected.
The alternative way of defining the risk to persons in
The combination of different purpose groups within the buildings, as opposed to the purpose group approach
same building may call for additional provisions, including outlined in section 3.2, is to adopt the risk profile approach.
better fire separation and separate means of escape, particu- The risk to which occupants may be exposed is a combina-
larly where the purpose groups include sleeping risks. tion of their occupancy group and the likely fire
development; for example, a sleeping risk in a hotel is
greater than one where persons are awake and familiar with
3.2.11 Special building features the building. This approach is presented more fully in BS
9999. In summary, it divides occupancy into seven life risk
Such special features include, inter alia, atria, environmen- categories and fire development into four well-established
tal flues, single-stair conditions, open spatial planning and growth scenarios. From these divisions, most occupancies
extensive underground spaces. can be profiled. In terms of building design, more flexibil-
ity should be expected from the lower risk categories.
This is a broad categorisation, and each of the examples
highlighted above presents its own unique challenges, It should be noted that some types of occupancy are not
which will vary across building types. As a result, the addressed at all by the BS 9999 approach, for example trans-
scope of this document is not sufficiently wide to deal in port infrastructure (although some elements will fit into
other occupancy types). Unless alternative codes of practice 3.4.1.2 Scotland

can be adopted, the risk profile in these types of premises
should be carefully considered and the adoption of a perfor- The criteria for compliance with the Building (Scotland)
mance-based design approach is usually necessary. Regulations 2004 are set out in the Technical Handbook –
Domestic and Technical Handbook – Non-Domestic (Scottish
The standard of management in a building should also be Government, 2017a, 2017b). These documents are highly
considered, as highly managed environments with regular prescriptive. However, the Regulations state that compli-
maintenance of fire precautions, including critical systems, ance may also be achieved by the alternative approaches
can be considered a lower risk than facilities in which explained in Section 2.0.7 of both Handbooks.
little or no management is present.
3.4.1.3 Northern Ireland
Approvers may have concerns over change of risk profile
during the life of the building. The potential impacts of a The functional requirements are set down in the Building
change of risk should be identified and considered in the Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2012. The associated Tech-
design. nical Booklet E: Fire Safety provides ‘deemed-to-satisfy’
measures which, if followed, will ensure compliance with
the Regulations (DFPNI, 2012).
3.4 Designing the fire 3.4.1.4 Alternative approaches

precautions In all three of the above legislative areas, there is provision
for the consideration of departures from prescriptive
solutions.
3.4.1 Fire precautions standards in
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland such departures
the UK for life safety are allowed with the agreement of the local building
control officer or by a ‘determination’ by the Department
For life safety purposes, fire precautions to an appropriate for Communities and Local Government. In Scotland,
standard are a requirement of the fire design guidance of departures from prescriptive guidance can be agreed with
most building design code regimes. The means of achiev- the local building control officer. A ‘relaxation’ from the
ing them are broadly common, but the specific details on Regulation in their entirety can also be gained and is
how to achieve them vary. Most building codes have sought through the Scottish Ministers.
developed over a considerable period of time, informed by
fire incidents within the geographies to which they apply. 3.4.1.5 Fire brigades’ requirements
The codes inform firefighting practices, and are recipro-
cally informed by established firefighting practices and Local fire brigades are concerned with fire precautions in
procedures within that region. As a result, standards are buildings and the approvals process includes provisions
not consistent between one country/region and another. for their consultation. In England and Wales, for example,
For example, even within the UK there are four systems: their responsibilities for fire precautions result mainly
from the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005
(a) England (SI 2005/1541), which deals with occupied buildings (refer
to chapter 2). However, they also have consultative respon-
(b) Wales sibilities for many issues under the extensive legislation
concerning the various occupancies. In the UK, the extent
(c) Scotland of this legislation is set down in various publications
(Home Office, 2012) and the consultation procedure is
(d) Northern Ireland. outlined in national procedural guidance (DCLG, 2007).
In all cases, the building control department of the local

It is necessary to contact the appropriate building or fire authority, an approved inspector (England and Wales
authority to obtain details of the requirements within a only) or the fire prevention department of the fire brigade
particular country. will advise on these issues. Generally, the building control
authority should be consulted initially for new buildings
3.4.1.1 England and Wales and the fire authority for occupied buildings. The proce-
dural guidance for England requires either authority to
alert the applicant of the need to consult the other, and to
The requirements of the Building Regulations 2010, as distinguish between ‘recommendation’ and ‘requirement’
amended, may be satisfied by observing the recommenda- (DCLG, 2007).
tions contained in Approved Document B: Fire Safety
(HM Government, 2013; Welsh Government, 2015).
However, the Building Regulations requirements may be 3.4.2 Fire precautions standards for
met in other ways, such as by observing the recommenda- life safety outside the UK
tions of British Standards, particularly BS 9999, or by
adopting a fire safety engineering approach, as explained Standards and consultation processes vary considerably
in Approved Document B: Volume 2, paragraphs 0.30 to outside the UK but, in general, the fire authorities have
0.34 (England) or 0.28 to 0.32 (Wales). greater powers of approval than they do in the UK (refer
to chapter 2). Some nations do not have the UK equiva- —— additional risk associated with uncontrolled
lent of building control; therefore, the fire authority is ignition sources, including cooking, smoking and
always the best starting point for consultation on require- portable electrical appliances.
ments and procedures. Enquiries should be made
concerning the need to also consult other bodies. Dwellings can be divided into three sub-groups, which
also separates high-rise from low-rise dwellings, including
It should also be noted that the phenomenon of regional houses in multiple occupation:
differences, which is pervasive within the UK, also applies
in other nations, and the acceptance of fire engineering (a) flat and maisonette
often varies according to region. Furthermore, local
authorities may not be familiar with the use of fire safety (b) dwelling which contains a habitable storey with a
engineering, and they may have adopted particular floor level more than 4.5 m above ground level
national code systems that make less or no room for it.
The approach to successfully applying fire safety engineer- (c) dwelling which does not contain a habitable storey
ing outside the UK usually includes the demonstration with a floor level more than 7.5 m above ground
that an equivalent level of safety, or an appropriate level, level.
is achieved to that implied by adoption of local codes.
Some codes include emphasis beyond life safety. Except for houses in multiple occupation, controls over
low-rise dwellings are minimal and are mainly confined to
Where necessary, and possible, the particular insurance the separation of dwellings from each other, to control fire
company should be consulted in the early stages of the spread between them, and the need for smoke detection.
design process. However, this may not be possible for
speculative developments, since the insurer of the Individual dwellings with a habitable storey above 4.5 m
completed property may not have been nominated. and 7.5 m require further control by the provision of a
protected escape route (unless there is an alternative exit),
The fire insurance industry increasingly accommodates a escape windows and automatic fire suppression systems.
fire engineered approach; as with other authorities, early
consultation is recommended. The benefits of the inclu- Approved Document B and BS 5839-6: 2013 (BSI, 2013),
sion of water suppression and fire spread control for for example, provide guidance on detection and alarm
insurance purposes can be realised in the overall fire systems relevant to a wide range of residential buildings,
precautions package for life safety purposes. including large houses, houses in multiple occupation and
sheltered housing.
There is scope for fire safety engineering in unconven-

3.5 Implications of tional dwellings where protected routes are compromised
classification by purpose by an open-plan layout. Provisions may include water
suppression and enhanced smoke control; smoke detec-
group tion is recommended in Approved Document B. Such
provisions might also be considered during refurbishment
The aim of this section is to provide a checklist of items or major alterations.
that should be considered for particular occupancies. UK
guidance to which this section refers often includes back- Where dwellings are grouped together, as in flats and
ground information in support of the recommendations; maisonettes, a ‘stay put’ or ‘defend in place’ strategy is
the principles can therefore be applied outside the UK. generally implemented, where only the flat of fire origin
evacuates and the remainder of the dwellings in the facil-
As a typical source of building designation, reference will ity remain in place. This approach calls for increased
be made to the classifications given in Table D1 of controls, particularly with respect to vertical and horizon-
Approved Document B, reproduced here as in Table 3.1, tal fire separation (compartmentation) in order to contain
and in Table 4.3.4 of BS 9999. a fire within one dwelling and prevent it from spreading
to others. Maintaining this separation is important in the
provision of common services and has implications for
3.5.1 Residential (dwellings) ductwork and fire stopping.
In private dwellings, ongoing control under fire safety Protected stairs and firefighting shafts take on increased
legislation is minimal due to a societal desire to maintain importance with increased building height, a higher
the privacy of the individual. The main factors relevant to standard being required in single-stair situations. The
dwellings are as follows: venting of common areas is required as a means of keep-
ing escape and rescue routes clear. To accommodate
—— most deaths by fire occur in dwellings increased travel distances to a storey exit, custom designed
—— lack of ongoing control by fire authorities means of controlling smoke in common areas are often
installed. These include natural, mechanical and hybrid
—— need for separation of dwellings by fire-resisting systems, designed specifically for the building.
compartmentation
—— well-established and consistent fire load There are controls over wall and ceiling surfaces for
common areas, and limits on the fire risks opening onto
—— additional risk associated with sleeping accom- such areas. There are also controls on the spread of flame
modation over the external walls and in the sub-division of cavities.
Unconventional designs, particularly in the manner of information in support of the recommendations, the prin-
grouping the dwellings, offer opportunities for fire safety ciples can be applied outside the UK.
engineering. For example, tall residential blocks in an
atrium setting would call for special provisions to offset In the UK, water suppression protection (i.e. active fire
the loss of physical compartmentation. control) is not yet widely adopted for this occupancy cate-
gory, although the benefits are now more forcefully
For all three groups, the fire load is generally predictable. encouraged in guidance. In NFPA domains, sprinklers are
Also, the maximum fire size can be estimated due to the more common. Where this approach is adopted there are
provision of compartmentation. Life safety in tall blocks clear advantages in the control of fire spread and, as a
of flats is further enhanced by the introduction of auto- result, increased opportunities for fire safety engineering.
matic fire suppression for residential buildings over 18 m There are also areas where damage to the contents would
high (Scotland) and 30 m high (England and Wales). have serious implications, and increased controls are
therefore justified. Also, the loss of medical facilities can
have serious repercussions.
3.5.2 Residential (institutional)
Fire precautions legislation in existing buildings arose
For residential (institutional) buildings, the key factors largely as a result of multiple-fatality fires within group (b),
are as follows: which includes hotels and boarding houses. Statutory
controls for group (b) are lower than those for group (a),
—— high life risk mainly falling within the areas of compartmentation and
detection. Means of escape are more conventional, with clear
—— occupants may be asleep advantages if the normal circulation routes are also those
which lead to emergency exits. There is increased interest in
—— occupants may be infirm or in other ways disad- providing an appropriate level of emergency lighting.
vantaged, such as mobility or sensory impaired
—— compartmentation is recommended The provision of an atrium would require additional
controls to offset the loss of passive compartmentation.
—— clear advantage of fire detection (subject to reli- BS 9999, Annex C includes prescriptive guidance for this
ability) occupancy but also allows an engineered approach.
—— well-established and consistent fire load Guidance for fire precautions in existing buildings is
—— trained staff may be present. available from the Department for Communities and
Local Government (DCLG, 2006). For new premises in
the UK, appropriate guidance is available (HM Govern-
Subdivision within this purpose group separates premises
ment, 2013; Scottish Government, 2017a, 2017b; Welsh
intended to house the infirm (group (a), which includes
Government, 2015; DFPNI, 2012; BAFSA, 2012). Since
health-care premises) from those intended to house the
the guidance includes background information in support
able-bodied (group (b), which includes hotels and guest
of the recommendations, the principles can be applied
houses).
outside the UK.
Greater controls are recommended for purpose group (a)
and these are mainly concerned with progressive horizon- 3.5.3 Offices
tal evacuation procedures, compartmentation and fire
detection, which should be designed to minimise the The key factors are as follows:
number of false alarms. Health-care premises invariably
incorporate an abundance of piped and wired services, and —— historically low occurrence of fires, and low inci-
the risk of fire affecting more than one compartment has dence of loss of life
particular repercussions in these premises. It is therefore
of critical importance to maintain the integrity of the —— desire to maximise design flexibility
compartmentation, both internally and in any external —— well-understood and consistent fire load.
cavities.
This purpose group offers the greatest flexibility for design
The historical record of fire incidents in health-care prem- in that the risk to life is understood to be low. However,
ises is generally good, but there is concern over the the protection of contents and the avoidance of business
potential for loss of life. In the upgrading of existing disruption take on a greater significance. Smoke spread in
premises, there is a strong case for active fire control and the early stages of fire development via ventilation and air
informative detection systems. The major fires have conditioning distribution ductwork, although a valid
occurred in premises catering for the mobility impaired concern, has not resulted in fire casualties. Nevertheless,
and learning disabled and extra provision should be guidance in Approved Document B and BS 9999, for
considered for such buildings. example, recommends that good design should address
smoke movement via these systems using smoke detector-
Fatalities and extensive damage have occurred in premises operated fire/smoke dampers.
where undivided cavities have resulted in hidden fire
spread. Guidance on fire precautions design for health- Occupants can be expected to be familiar with the prem-
care premises is contained in the series of Health Technical ises and the fire load is well understood. The main
Memoranda: Firecodes, produced by the Department of emphasis on controls concerns the means of escape. The
Health’s Estates and Facilities Division (e.g. NHS Estates, introduction of an atrium is not always seen as increasing
1996). Since the guidance includes background risk, subject to reasonable additional provisions. BS 9999,
Annex C is a helpful starting point for design. Note that 3.5.5 Assembly and recreational
Approved Document B recommends that the guidance on buildings
atria in BS 5588-7: 1997 (BSI, 1997) only applies where an
atrium traverses compartment floors. BS 9999 recom- The key factors are:
mends that the guidance is relevant where a void traverses
any floor, whether a compartment floor or not.
—— significant serious fires historically
—— high occupancy capacity potentially resulting in
3.5.4 Shops and other commercial high life loss
premises
—— designs may call for large volumes and long travel
distances
The key factors are as follows:
—— occupants are likely to be unfamiliar with the
—— historically low incidence of life loss layout of the premises
—— potentially high life loss —— some high fire loads
—— potentially high contents value —— extensive controls based on investigations of

historical fires
—— high occupancy capacity
—— problems with extended height
—— high fire load
—— increased risk in underground conditions.
—— designs often involve large volumes and long travel
distances In the educational sector of this group, extensive fire
damage has been caused by arson; there are strong links
—— occupants potentially unfamiliar with the layout of between security and arson prevention. The inclusion of
the premises water suppression largely addresses the concerns. Undiv-
ided cavities have also resulted in extensive damage, but
—— significant historic fires.
these are now restricted by the Building Regulations and
associated guidance (HM Government, 2013; Scottish
The above key factors indicate the clear benefits of sprin- Government, 2017a, 2017b; DFPNI, 2012).
kler protection (or alternative suppression) with the
corresponding scope for fire safety engineering. In the fire precautions design of this purpose group, the
fire development characteristics should be considered,
This group includes shopping malls and complexes, for along with their implications for the standard of active
which specific guidance is available, although designers measures. Large room volumes should not necessarily
are not obliged to adopt the principles they contain (BSI, imply increased life or property risk, as the fire load may
2017; Morgan and Gardner, 1990). However, it would be be relatively low. Compartmentation limits can be exceeded
prudent to address the items raised. without increased risk, and extended travel distances
should be possible by the provision of compensating
Considerable emphasis is now placed on premises manage- features, including smoke control and sprinklers.
ment pertaining both to the means of escape regime and
also the general housekeeping (BSI, 2017). Although More so than with other purpose groups, the occupancies
controls can be placed on occupancies, it is generally in of these facilities can be a function of their operation.
the interest of the building to maximise the number of During the design it is necessary to look in detail at how
occupants. It is therefore important to design for times of a facility will be used and managed in order to calculate
maximum footfall, and not to rely on management controls the design occupancy. It is also necessary to carefully
to limit occupancies. consider how the operation of the facility may change over
time, to ensure that the means of escape facilities allow the
The benefits of automatic fire suppression systems have building’s operation to evolve.
been well demonstrated. In shop design, consideration
must be given to the fire characteristics: Considerable emphasis is now placed on premises manage-
ment, and how that can help during means of escape (BSI,
—— size, growth rate and the effects of selected sprinkler/ 2017). Staffing levels can be higher than in other purpose
nozzle response groups, and the benefit of that can be realised in the means
of escape design.
—— the implications of suppression systems on other
active measures, such as smoke control. The provision of roof-mounted sprinklers in high areas
(i.e. over 15 m) will be ineffective in controlling fire. Intel-
The provision of sprinklers in high areas (i.e. over 15 m) ligent side-wall systems mounted on both sides can
will be ineffective in controlling fire. However, fire control effectively control fire over areas up to 16 m wide.
for these areas is possible by the application of systems
designed for atrium base protection, either sidewall- or There may also be scope for alternative water suppression
canopy-mounted. Lateral fire spread can now be controlled systems, such as water mist, provided that these systems
by fire-resisting curtains and by the combination of are demonstrated to be suitable for this type of application
window-wetting sprinklers on toughened or laminated through testing and compliance with applicable standards
glazing that is otherwise not fire-rated. (BSI, 2016).
3.5.6 Industrial buildings In car parks, both above and below ground, a fire safety
engineering examination of the actual risks may result in
The key factors for industrial buildings are as follows: a lowering of the traditionally adopted standards, includ-
ing the likely omission of sprinklers. Their omission, even
—— significant historic fires in underground car parks, is permitted under the Approved
Document B guidance (HM Government, 2013). Some fire
—— high life risk (but often low number of occupants authorities point out the increased risk where sleeping
and few mobility-impaired occupants) accommodation is located above car parking. The inclu-
—— hazardous processes requiring special provisions sion of water suppression can allay their concerns,
especially in car parks with car stacker systems. Some
—— high fire loads, often situated in close proximity to recognition of the possible increase in fire load/risk asso-
each other ciated with car fuels should be made, and reference to the
BRE research may be advisable (BRE, 2010a, 2010b). The
—— firefighting difficulties
use of jet fans is an alternative to the more conventional
—— potentially high commercial losses use of ducted smoke control.
—— potential environmental damage from smoke and
fire products.
Special controls and requirements appropriate to indus-

References
trial processes are available in, for example, BS 5908: 2012
(BSI, 2012). The development of technologies and BAFSA (2012) Sprinklers for Safer Living: Residential and domestic
applications (Aberfeldy: British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association)
processes generally out-paces the development of Building
Regulations, so a fire engineering review of the risks BRE (2010a) BRE Project: Fires in enclosed car parks [online] (Garston:
presented by the particular function of the building should Building Research Establishment)
be the main focus in design. Designers should not expect
the recommendations in the current guidance to apply in BRE (2010b) Fire Spread in Car Parks BD 2552 (London: Department for
Communities and Local Government)
isolation (e.g. HM Government, 2013; Scottish Govern-
ment, 2017a, 2017b; DFPNI, 2012). BSI (1997) BS 5588-7: 1997 Fire precautions in the design, construction and
use of buildings. Code of practice for the incorporation of atria in buildings
The fire characteristics should be considered in the design (London: British Standards Institution)
of buildings in this group, with implications for the stand-
BSI (2012) BS 5908: 2012 Fire and explosion precautions at premises handling
ard of active measures. The provision of roof-mounted flammable gases, liquids and dusts (London: British Standards Institution)
sprinklers in high areas (over 15 m) will be ineffective in
controlling fires but fast-response, in-rack systems are BSI (2013) BS 5839-6: 2013 Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings.
available. Care should be taken regarding the differences Code of practice for the design, installation, commissioning and maintenance of
between approval for shell and core under the Building fire detection and alarm systems in domestic premises (London: British
Regulations and when fitting out. Approving authorities Standards Institution)
and building insurers have different terms of reference, BSI (2015) BS EN 12845: 2015 Fixed firefighting systems. Automatic sprinkler
which can lead to conflicts of interest. Consultation with systems. Design, installation and maintenance (London: British Standards
all relevant stakeholders, including authorities having Institution)
jurisdiction, is recommended.
BSI (2016) BS 8489-1: 2016 Fixed fire protection systems. Industrial and
commercial watermist systems. Code of practice for design and installation
(London: British Standards Institution)
3.5.7 Storage and other
non-residential buildings BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
The key factors are: Chitty R (2014) BR187: External Fire Spread: Building separation and
boundary distances (Watford: BRE Fire Research Stations)
—— high contents and commercial losses
DCLG (2006) Building Safety Risk Assessment: Residential care premises
—— high fire loads (London: Department for Communities and Local Government)
—— low occupancy DCLG (2007) Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Procedural guidance
(London: Department for Communities and Local Government)
—— significant historic fires
DFPNI (2012) Technical Booklet E: Fire Safety (Belfast: Department of
—— designs may call for large volumes and long travel Finance and Personnel)
distances
FPA (2015) Fire Prevention on Construction Sites: The joint code of practice
—— underground accommodation may be involved on the protection from fire of construction sites and buildings undergoing
renovation (London: Fire Protection Association)
—— firefighting difficulties.
HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
Purpose-designed water suppression systems are available B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006 edition
to cope with densely stacked goods on high racks. incorporating the 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon
Tyne: NBS) (Note: further amendments published as a separate document,
Compartmentation may be disruptive or difficult to
April 2019)
provide but is seen as a means of limiting fire damage. In
many cases, fire spread may be limited by the combination HM Government (2015) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
of fire suppression and smoke venting. M: Access to and use of buildings (Newcastle upon Tyne: NBS)
Home Office (2012) Fire safety law and guidance documents for business Scottish Government (2017a) Technical Handbook — Domestic (Livingston:
[online] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fire-safety-law-and- Building Standards Division)
guidance-documents-for-business (accessed January 2018)
Scottish Government (2017b) Technical Handbook — Non-Domestic
(Livingston: Building Standards Division)
HSE (2010) Fire Safety in Construction HSG 168 (London: Health and
Safety Executive) Standing Committee on Fire Precautions (1995) Standard Fire Precautions
for Contractors Engaged on Crown Works. Applicable to contractors engaged on
works for Crown civil and defence estates (London: HMSO/Standing
Morgan HP and Gardner JP (1990) Design Principles for Smoke Ventilation
Committee on Fire Precautions)
in Enclosed Shopping Centres BRE Research Report 186 (Garston: Building
Research Establishment) Welsh Government (2015) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved
Document B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses
NHS Estates (1996) Health Technical Memorandum 81: Firecode. Fire (2006 edition incorporating the 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments)
precautions in new hospitals (HMSO: London) (Cardiff)
4-1
4 Performance-based design principles
4.1 Introduction In some large and complex buildings, fire safety engineer-
ing may be the only practical way to achieve the required
standard of safety, but in other cases it may just be used
Statutory requirements for fire safety are primarily to vary a single aspect of a design that otherwise follows
concerned with the protection of people from death or standard guidance.
injury, although in some jurisdictions an element of prop-
erty protection is also implicit within the requirements. Indeed, with regard to UK fire safety design guidance for
Historically, fire safety measures to meet the life safety healthcare premises, in Health Technical Memorandum
requirements have been specified by reference to fire safety 05-02: Firecode (DoH, 2015) it is recommended that a
design codes that provide ‘deemed to satisfy’ solutions for qualitative design review (qdr), be carried out for very
more typical building types. However, international design large and complex healthcare buildings by a study team
codes, such as the National Fire Protection Association’s involving one or more fire safety engineers, other members
NFPA 101® Life Safety Code® (NFPA, 2018)1 and of the design team and the client user group. It also
BS 7974: 2001 (BSI, 2001) now explicitly recognise the use suggests that, if appropriate, representatives of approval
of fire safety engineering as an alternative means of satis- bodies or the insurers be included to ensure that their
fying statutory requirements. views can be taken into account.
The assessment of risk has a fundamental part to play in Theoretically, it might be possible to establish a design
the development of designs that provide adequate fire that is based wholly on risk assessment and fire safety
safety (whether in terms of life safety, business continuity engineering techniques without reference to the recom-
or asset protection). Guidance on the risk assessment mendations of established fire safety design codes.
process is given in chapter 5. However, these codes embody many years of experience
and the most common and practical approach is to use fire
The inclusion of fire safety engineering in the risk assess- engineering techniques to evaluate the effects of one or
ment process provides the flexibility to address a range of more departures from these established code(s).
design objectives, such as:
The complexity of the interactions between people, build-
—— protection of people ings and fire is such that no single approach or set of
—— prevention of conflagration calculation procedures can be applied to all building types
in all circumstances. Fire safety engineering thus requires
—— limiting damage to building structure more care, responsibility and experience from the designer
than the application of standard guidance documents.
—— limiting damage to building contents
—— maintaining business continuity It is essential that fire safety engineering design is entrusted
to suitably qualified and experienced personnel. Appropri-
—— protection of the environment ate professional qualifications and experience of fire safety
—— protection of animals. engineering on projects of similar scale and complexity
should be considered when appointing a fire engineer. Suit-
The fire safety engineer will also need to consider a range able qualifications include Chartered Membership of the
of other factors that can have a significant influence on the Institution of Fire Engineers (CEng, MIFireE) or, in the
design solution, such as: USA, the Professional Licensure of Fire Protection Engi-
neers by the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (P.E.).
—— security requirements
—— cost
—— aesthetics
4.2 Design objectives
—— building function
—— management capabilities
4.2.1 Life safety
—— sustainability NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (NFPA, 2018) sets the follow-
ing life safety goals, which provide a good starting point
—— legal framework for any life safety design:
—— approach adopted by approvals bodies.
A goal of this Code is to provide an environment for the occu-
1 Life Safety Code® and 101® are registered trademarks of the pants that is reasonably safe from fire and similar emergencies
National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. by the following means:
(1) Protection of occupants not intimate with the initial fire not be expected to access or work in a mechanical plant
development room).
(2) Improvement of the survivability of occupants intimate
with the initial fire development.
4.3.2 Fire scenarios
This approach recognises that it may not always be possi-
The number of possible fire scenarios in even a relatively
ble to prevent injury to an individual who is located close
simple building is very large and it is not feasible (or
to the source of fire (e.g. a person falling asleep while
necessary) to assess the effects of them all. Therefore, it is
smoking in bed) but requires that people who are not in
usual to identify one or more worst case scenarios for
the immediate proximity of the initial seat of the fire are
detailed evaluation.
suitably protected and can leave the building in safety.
In some cases (e.g. a single compartment building), it will
4.2.2 Other design objectives be feasible to identify one scenario that clearly represents
the worst case. However, in a complex building, it might
The life safety requirements set down in legislation will be necessary to establish several scenarios for detailed
often also provide a degree of property protection. assessment. It is prudent and good practice to agree the
However, the fire safety engineer should work with the design scenarios with the approvals bodies before embark-
client to establish whether it would be appropriate to ing on extensive and potentially expensive modelling.
consider other objectives, such as the protection of high-
value building contents or the safeguarding of essential Design fire scenarios should be chosen to reflect credible
electronic data to maintain business continuity. worst case conditions, taking account of:
—— the initial location of the fire

4.2.2.1 Loss prevention
—— the materials on fire
The effects of a fire on the continuing viability of a busi-
—— the rate of fire growth and/or severity
ness can be substantial and consideration should be given
to protecting: —— smoke generation potential.
—— the building fabric

4.3.3 Multiple safeguards
—— the building contents
—— business continuity. Any fire safety design that is intended for the protection
of people should not normally be wholly dependent on
any one fire safety measure. The failure of any single
4.2.2.2 Environmental impact system should not have the potential to lead to a cata-
strophic event.
A conflagration involving several buildings or the release
of hazardous materials, e.g. fire on a waste site or in a Care should be taken to ensure that a common mode fail-
chemical process plant, can have a significant environ- ure will not lead to loss of multiple fire safety systems. In
mental impact and consideration should be given to the some instances, the failure of one system will have an
need to limit: adverse effect on the efficiency of another fire protection
measure. For instance, an open fire door will not only be
—— the effects of fire on adjacent buildings or facilities an ineffective barrier to fire spread but could also under-
—— the release of hazardous materials into the mine the performance of a gaseous extinguishing system
environment due to escape of the extinguishing agent.
—— methods of firefighting (e.g. avoidance of water- The impact of a system failure should be assessed as part
course pollution). of a ‘what if ’ assessment.
4.3.3.1 ‘What if’ events

4.3 Design scenarios An important part of any fire safety design is to carry out
a ‘what if ’ assessment to identify system failures or other
foreseeable events that might have a significant influence
4.3.1 Occupancy on the outcome of the study.
The escape design should be based on the maximum An example would be ‘what if ’ a fire-resisting roller shut-
number of people that a room, area or building is likely to ter between compartments were to fail to operate. The
contain and should take account of their likely distribu- answer could be that it has no impact on life safety but it
tion and response characteristics (mobility, wakefulness, would lead to increased property damage.
familiarity with their surroundings etc.).
Some examples of typical ‘what if ’ events are:
The design should assume that a proportion of the occu-
pants may have mobility, sensory or cognitive disabilities, —— fire door propped open
except in situations where it would not be practical for disa-
bled people to enter or work (e.g. wheelchair users would —— combustible materials introduced into sterile areas
Performance-based design principles 4-3
—— compartment walls penetrated and not made good

Start
—— use of materials of greater than specified flam-
mability
—— power supply to smoke vents fails Qualitative
design review
—— sprinklers ineffective due to poor maintenance (QDR)
—— detection systems adversely affected by ventilation

system
Quantitative
—— the fire is located where it will block an exit analysis
—— management fails to adequately implement fire

safety procedures
—— fire risk is increased by lack of awareness of fire
Assessment
safety issues. against criteria Unsatisfactory
4.3.3.2 Uncertainty
Any significant uncertainty in the design data should be Satisfactory

addressed by choosing suitably conservative design
assumptions, applying safety factors or carrying out sensi-
tivity analyses. To assist in the approval process and any
future building changes, these should be clearly recorded
Reporting of
and referred to in the fire safety strategy report. results
The objective of a sensitivity analysis is to check the

robustness of the results and to investigate the criticality
of individual input parameters. End
Common sources of uncertainty that might need to be

Figure 4.1 The fire safety design process
addressed are:
—— input parameters
During the qdr process, the scope and objectives of the
—— necessary simplifications in the modelling fire safety design are defined, performance criteria are
techniques established and one or more potential design solutions
(trial designs) are proposed. Key information is also gath-
—— limitations of empirical relationships ered to enable detailed evaluation of the design solutions
—— human response. in a quantitative analysis.
The building occupancy and design fire scenarios should

also be established during the qdr process.
4.4 Fire safety design process It is important to ensure that the fire safety design provides
for reasonable future flexibility of use and any constraints
BS 7974: 2001 (BSI, 2001) and the International Fire Engi- arising from the design should be reviewed with the client
neering Guidelines (ABCB, 2005) both set out very similar (e.g. unrealistic management procedures should not be
processes for carrying out a fire safety engineering design, imposed on the building operator and the fire engineer
which broadly comprise the four main stages illustrated in should not accept management requests that will be diffi-
Figure 4.1: cult to achieve or maintain).
—— qualitative design review (qdr) The main stages in the qdr can be summarised as:
—— quantitative analysis —— review architectural design and occupant char-

acteristics
—— assessment against criteria
—— establish fire safety objectives
—— reporting of results.
—— identify fire hazards and possible consequences
(see also chapter 5)
4.4.1 Qualitative design review (QDR) —— establish trial fire safety designs
The first stage in the design process is to establish the —— carry out ‘what if ’ assessment
basic parameters of the project. This includes a review of —— identify acceptance criteria and methods of analysis
the scheme, identification of any overriding constraints
and definition of the design objectives. —— establish fire scenarios for analysis.
4.4.2 Quantitative analysis been used to support the design. A comprehensive report
will also enable the inputs and design of the building to
Following the qdr, a quantified analysis can be carried be evaluated.
out, if necessary. Various quantitative methods are availa-
ble, such as those presented in other chapters of this The report should set out clearly the basis of the design,
Guide. However, in many cases the qdr process may the calculation procedures used and any assumptions
generate a satisfactory design solution without the need made during the study.
for quantification.
The format of the report will depend on the nature and
scope of the fire engineering study and the house style of
4.4.3 Assessment against criteria the particular fire safety engineer, but it would typically
contain the following information:
The suitability of the fire safety design needs to be assessed
against the objectives and design criteria identified during (a) objectives of the study
the qdr process.
(b) building description
Three basic approaches are available against which the (c) results of the qdr
acceptability of a design can be judged:
(d) design assumptions
—— comparative (e) proposed fire safety strategy
—— deterministic —— escape provisions
—— probabilistic. —— internal linings and fire spread
—— compartmentation
4.4.3.1 Comparative criteria
—— structural fire resistance
It can often be difficult to establish the level of safety —— fire spread to adjacent buildings
achieved in absolute terms. However, it can be relatively
straightforward to demonstrate that the design provides a —— fire service access and facilities
level of safety equivalent to that in a building that complies —— active and passive fire safety measures
with recognised fire safety design codes.
(f) quantified analysis
4.4.3.2 Deterministic criteria (g) comparison with acceptance criteria
(h) management requirements
In a deterministic study, the objective is to show that, based
on the initial (worst case scenario) assumptions, a defined (i) restrictions on use or change of use
set of conditions will not occur (e.g. the smoke layer will (j) conclusions
not fall below head height during the evacuation period).
(k) references
4.4.3.3 Probabilistic criteria (l) qualifications and experience of the fire safety
engineer(s).
In a probabilistic study, criteria are set to ensure that the It is important that the report draws a clear distinction
probability of a given event occurring is acceptably low. between life safety, property protection and environmental
The risk criteria are usually expressed in terms of the protection so that the building owner, manager and
annual probability of the unwanted event occurring (e.g. approval body can clearly identify the purpose of the
the probability of death in fire is less than 10–6 per proposed measures.
annum). Further guidance on quantified risk assessment
is given in Part 7 of PD 7974-7: 2003 Probabilistic risk
assessment (BSI, 2003).
References
4.4.4 Reporting of results ABCB (2005) International Fire Engineering Guidelines. Edition 2005
(Canberra: Australian Building Codes Board)
Most buildings designed using fire engineering principles BSI (2001) BS 7974: 2001 Application of fire safety engineering principles to
will be subject to review by approvals bodies and other the design of buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards
parties that may not be specialists in fire safety engineer- Institution) (Note: BS 7479: 2012 has been replaced by BS 7479: 2019)
ing. It is therefore essential that the findings of the fire
safety engineering study are clearly recorded so that the BSI (2003) PD 7974-7: 2003 Application of fire safety engineering principles
to the design of buildings. Probabilistic risk assessment (London: British
philosophy and underlying assumptions of the study are
Standards Institution) (Note: PD 7974-7: 2003 has been replaced by PD
clear and are presented in a form that can be easily reviewed 7974-7: 2019)
by a third party. This information should, ultimately, be
included in the fire safety strategy for the premises. DoH (2015) Health Technical Memorandum 05-02: Firecode. Guidance in
support of functional provisions (Fire safety in the design of healthcare premises)
2015 edition (London: Department of Health)
It is also important to provide sufficient information for
another fire engineer to be able to assess (and if necessary NFPA (2018) NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (Quincy, MA: National Fire
repeat) any calculations and computer modelling that have Protection Association)
5-1
5 Application of risk assessment to

fire engineering designs
5.1 Introduction The techniques used to assess risk vary from very simple
qualitative analyses to sophisticated quantitative risk
analysis (qra) techniques of the type commonly found in
Risk assessment often has a fundamental part to play in the nuclear, transport and chemical processing industries.
the development of fire engineering designs, enabling No single approach is correct for all applications. For exam-
them to describe how adequate fire safety will be achieved ple, qra may be inappropriate for cases where straightforward
in terms of life safety, business resilience and/or asset adherence to good industry practice is reasonable. On the
protection. Used properly, it is a tool that enables the other hand, in more complex environments simple check-
designer to optimise their fire protection solutions while lists (e.g. ‘tick box’ techniques) are likely to be inappropriate
maintaining levels of safety at (or even above) those which for assessing fire risks.
could be achieved by straightforward compliance with
codes and standards. While risk assessment methodologies vary, they are likely
to include the following steps:
Legislation generally requires that designers and manag-
ers of non-domestic premises assess the life safety risk (1) Identify the hazards.
posed by fire in those premises and that they take suitable
measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. This (2) Identify the possible consequences and estimate
can be achieved by: their likelihood.
(3) Evaluate the risk.
—— incorporating fire protection in the design of the
premises (4) Take action to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
—— implementing and maintaining effective and (5) Record the findings.
appropriate management controls. (6) Monitor and review as appropriate.
In some countries, the assessment of life safety fire risk is Before a risk assessment is undertaken, it is important to
an ongoing legal obligation that continues throughout a determine the scope and purpose of that assessment and,
building’s occupation — this type of routine risk assess- if appropriate, agree that scope with those who will refer
ment is outside the scope of this Guide. This chapter to it – this may include clients, managers, premises owners,
addresses the role and use of fire risk assessment in the regulators and insurers.
building design process to analyse design solutions,
compare design options or justify variations from published Almost all risk assessment includes an element of judg-
codes and standards. ment, either in identifying the hazards, analysing the
possible consequences or estimating their likelihood. For
Non-life-safety fire risk may also be an important consid- this reason, it is important that the risk assessment is
eration. For example, insurers may advise on fire risk undertaken by persons with skills and experience appro-
reduction measures as part of a wider risk management priate to the fire risks being assessed. In cases where the
strategy, in order to control financial losses for both client assessment involves a straightforward and unvarying
and insurer, or to limit large potential loss exposures. application of good industry practice (e.g. government
Clients may also require designers to incorporate measures guidance), the assessor might not require detailed knowl-
to protect assets in case of fire, as a means of ensuring edge of fire behaviour.
business continuity, enhancing overall business resilience,
improving supply chain security and to protect their over- However, where the assessment uses techniques that may
all brand. Such measures will augment (but must not result in solutions that depart significantly from guidance,
reduce) those required for life safety purposes. it will be necessary for the assessors to have the relevant
competence in fire safety engineering and/or fire safety
The findings from a risk assessment can be used to inform management to appreciate the consequences of those depar-
decisions regarding whether fire precautions and fire tures on fire risk in the premises. This will require an
safety management procedures are sufficient to control fire understanding of the fire hazards or fire risks that the guid-
risks to a satisfactory level, or whether additional risk ance addresses and the reasons why the guidance recommends
reduction measures are required. Risk assessment can also a particular controlling measure. It is only with this knowl-
be used to perform a systematic comparison of different edge that the assessor can make informed decisions regarding
risk control/reduction options, so that the optimal design the significance of variation from that measure.
or management solution can be selected. It is not, however,
appropriate to carry out a risk assessment to justify a deci- If considering resilience, rather than safety, then prior to
sion that has already been made. Risk assessment is input the risk assessment being undertaken the key stakeholders
to the decision-making process, not output from that should establish their risk tolerance in terms of how much
process (Gadd et al., 2003). risk to accept, mitigate or insure against.
It may not be possible for a fire engineer alone to assess

the fire risks associated with certain hazards (e.g. in deter-
5.3 Hazard, risk and risk
mining whether certain equipment is ‘critical’ if assessing assessment
fire risk to business or process continuity). In this case, it
will be both necessary and appropriate to draw on the A number of definitions are available for hazard, risk and
skills and experience of others in order to undertake an risk assessment, and these concepts are fundamental to
adequate assessment of fire risk. any risk assessment process. It is therefore essential to
define what is meant by these terms:
In the context of the built environment it is not usual for
the design of premises to be based solely on the results of —— A hazard is that which has the potential to cause
risk assessment. It is more often used either to address harm or loss.
specific risks not foreseen by the good practice guidance
or to justify variations from particular recommendations —— Risk is a function of both the likelihood of a
in that guidance, where their application would result in specific hazard being realised and the consequence
a non-optimum design. of that realisation.
—— Risk assessment is the process by which reasonably
foreseeable hazards are identified, the likelihood of
5.2 Risk assessment process occurrence of specific undesirable events (the real-
isation of the identified hazards) is estimated, and
the severity of the harm or loss caused is assessed.
Where the risk assessment input is simple and straightfor- This may be coupled with a judgment concerning
ward, it may not be necessary to consider it as an activity the significance of the results.
separate from the normal design, review and acceptance/
approval process for the project, especially where the risk In other words, it is through the risk assessment
of non-approval is judged to be low. that the risk will be evaluated (using either a qual-
itative or a quantitative approach).
For more complex risk assessment, it is good practice to
establish and agree how the risk assessment will be Where the word ‘loss’ is used above, it should be inter-
conducted and its acceptability criteria before embarking preted as describing a non-safety-related consequence of a
on any significant activity. This reduces the risk of carry- fire, which is harmful to the business, individual(s) or
ing out work that may later prove to be wasted. The concern that occupies the premises. The loss normally
following outline process may be applied, to a level appro- results in exposure to increased cost and/or risk to the
priate to the complexity of the particular assessment being continuance of the activities based within (or supported
undertaken: from) that location. It may also include the loss or damage
of items of historic or aesthetic importance.
(1) Establish the need for risk assessment.
(2) Gain approval to use risk assessment (if necessary). It is essential that all reasonably foreseeable fire risks are
identified and considered in the risk assessment process.
(3) Define the scope. It is not always necessary to carry out a detailed assess-
(4) Agree the methodology. ment of all of those risks but exactly which fire risks have
been considered, and have been found to be acceptable by
(5) Define the key stakeholders and establish roles – all key stakeholders, should be recorded. It is important
especially those who will approve and/or accept the to note that the fact that a specific fire risk was not fore-
outcome of the analysis. seen does not automatically mean that it was not
(6) Research and review any applicable good practice. ‘reasonably foreseeable’. Those undertaking the hazard
analysis should have the competence and knowledge to
(7) Agree the acceptability criteria for the risk identify the fire risks that need to be assessed, whether
assessment. they had been foreseen up to that point in time or not.
(8) Undertake the analysis, consulting with key stake-
holders as required. It is also relevant to point out that a hazard may always
exist, but it is usually possible to substantially reduce the
(9) Present the analysis, either physically or as a risk associated with that hazard. Reducing the risk from
document. fire to zero is almost impossible. However, to moderate it
to an acceptable level is possible and, in fact, this should
(10) Review, revise and gain approval/acceptance.
be the aim of a risk assessment.
(11) Communicate the results to any affected design
disciplines and record the outcome in the project
fire safety strategy (if this exists).
5.4 Defining the scope of
In practice, many of the above activities will not be under-
taken as separate exercises and will be the natural outcome the risk assessment
of a well-managed design process. The precise order may
be varied according to need, but it is strongly recom- In some cases, it may be straightforward to define the
mended that commencement of the analysis itself does not purpose and scope of the risk assessment, such as where
proceed until all the activities prior to it in the above list the assessment is aimed only at satisfying fire safety legis-
have been completed, to the satisfaction of the key lation in simple premises. In other cases, the scope may
stakeholders. need more careful definition, especially:
Application of risk assessment to fire engineering designs 5-3
—— when the purpose of the risk assessment is to national guidance. Adherence to such guidance (where
support the acceptability of the design of complex relevant and appropriate) is likely to demonstrate that the
or novel buildings life safety risks from fire are acceptably controlled. Where
duty holders wish to depart from that guidance, then the
—— where fire risks to assets or business continuity are
normal expectation is that they use alternative risk control
being assessed. measures which achieve the same level of safety by other
means (HSE, 2001).
In simple terms, the questions that need to be asked may
include the following: When considering business resilience, continuity and
asset protection, then risk appetite or tolerance will vary
—— Risk ‘of what’ (e.g. fatality, major injury, loss of on a case-by-case basis, depending on the level of self-
assets, loss of business, reputation, supply chain insured retentions, actual client loss history, criticality,
interruption etc.)? values at risk and any potential maximum loss scenario. It
—— Risk ‘to what/whom’ (e.g. employees, visitors, is by no means the case that such matters will always need
members of the public, firefighters, assets or to be considered, but where this is necessary it will be
premises)? crucially important to establish a means of defining an
acceptable level of fire risk at the outset of the process.
—— Risks ‘from what’ (e.g. accidental ignition, the This is often achieved by means of adopting published
nature and distribution of potential fire load, guidance on loss prevention (e.g. BS EN 16893: 2018 (BSI,
construction materials, arson, occupancy or process 2018), BS 4971: 2017 (BSI, 2017a), the LPC Design Guide
hazards etc.)? for the Fire Protection of Buildings (LPC, 2000) or more
general loss prevention guidance) and applying this in a
Once the scope and purpose of the risk assessment is very similar way to the guidance on life safety (i.e. by
defined, this will inform the decision about the most either demonstrating compliance or achieving an equiva-
appropriate technique (or combinations of techniques) for lent level of fire risk by other means).
undertaking the assessment.
5.6 Assessment techniques

5.5 Acceptability criteria
5.6.1 Application of good industry
5.5.1 General
practice
When undertaking fire risk assessments, it is important to
understand what can be regarded as an acceptable level of In many cases, it is possible to assess fire risk using an
risk from fire. uncomplicated approach by reference to relevant good
industry practice. Indeed, it should be the case that, before
As mentioned previously, it is practically impossible to any risk assessment is carried out, the assessor should
achieve zero fire risk and, in reality, society neither expects review whether relevant good industry practice exists and,
nor requires such a high level of safety. However, fire risk if so, whether it can be straightforwardly applied. It is
does have to be acceptable to those who have an interest normally accepted that if good practice can reasonably be
in controlling it. In the case of life safety, it will normally applied, it should be adhered to (Gadd et al., 2003). The
be legislation that defines acceptable levels of risk. In the following would be possible exceptions:
case of insurance requirements, it will be the insurers or
their representatives. In terms of risk to business continu- —— If it were to be applied to existing premises, the
ity, it will be the management and/or owners of the cost of compliance with the guidance would be
relevant organisation. In most cases, the objective will be grossly disproportionate to the fire risk reduction
to reduce risks to a level that is ‘as low as is reasonably achieved.
practicable’ (alarp). —— The situation under consideration has inherently
and significantly lower or greater fire risk than
An alarp assessment involves analysing fire risk against that for which the good practice was developed.
the effort, time and cost of controlling it. Thus, alarp
describes the level to which it is expected that fire risks —— The operations or works include alternative means
are controlled. If the fire risk reduction benefit is propor- of controlling the risks to a comparable or better
tionate to the time, effort and expenditure necessary to level.
implement the relevant risk reduction measure, then that
risk reduction measure must usually be implemented. Good practice encompasses industry and regulatory codes,
Another term for a very similar process is ‘so far as is ‘approved codes of practice’ (acops), and regulatory
reasonably practicable’ (sfairp). Care should be taken to guides, as well as practices and guidance adopted success-
select and use the process relevant to the particular fully by similar organisations.
circumstances of the project being worked on, as in some
parts of the world the terms are freely interchangeable, Where life safety is concerned, relevant good practice is
whereas elsewhere the processes are different and the likely to reflect the minimum expectations of society and
terms are not. is therefore of use both to those who will use it directly to
assess risk and also to those who will assess risk in other
In fire safety, the practical definition of the level of fire ways (whether by quantitative or qualitative methods). As
risk that can be regarded as alarp tends to be set by long as it is possible to demonstrate a level of risk
equivalent to that represented by the application of good Good industry practice sometimes gives guidance on how
practice (in premises typical of the type being examined), to assess risk and how to apply that risk assessment in
then that should be acceptable. If it is found that a design order to influence the design in a qualitative but structured
or management solution results in a situation where fire manner. For example, BS 7974: 2001 (BSI, 2001) and the
risk is higher than would be delivered by the application more recent BS 9999: 2017 (BSI, 2017b) introduce the
of good practice, then it is questionable whether that solu- concept of ‘risk profiling’ as a tool to inform the design of
tion could be regarded as acceptable. such aspects as means of escape and structural fire resist-
ance. They utilise the concept of ‘occupancy characteristics’,
In practice, if relevant good practice exists and is adopted considering whether the occupants are likely to be awake
for all reasonably foreseeable hazards, further detailed and aware of their environment, and whether they will be
evaluation of risk is not usually necessary; the risk assess- familiar with it or not. Risk profiling also considers the
ment duty is discharged by the appropriate adoption of probable fire growth rate in the premises (this will neces-
that good practice. It is therefore very important to ensure sarily be a matter of judgment) and combines the two to
that the good practice is: produce a ranking of risk. That ranking is used to indicate
recommended design criteria (such as maximum means of
—— appropriate to the activities being considered escape distance, structural fire resistance etc.). In the case
of BS 9999, it is important to note that it is the fire growth
—— up to date rate that is the important factor, and this is not the same
—— both relevant to and able to cover all significant as the fire load or ultimate fire size. It is entirely possible
fire risks from the circumstances being considered. to have a high fire growth rate in a space with a relatively
low fire load, and vice versa.
5.6.2 Qualitative risk assessment Variation of the risk profile is possible by the application
of certain risk reduction measures (such as automatic
Qualitative risk assessment (or analysis) can be defined as
sprinkler systems or enhanced fire detection and alarm
the assessment of risk using methods that might be analyt-
systems), which allows more flexibility in the design of
ical, but are predominantly non-numerical. This includes
other risk reduction measures. In some cases, this allows
designers using judgment and experience to argue that
risk to be controlled by less costly and/or less intrusive
non-compliance with a particular standard recommendation
engineering measures than would be demanded by a
does not unacceptably increase fire risk. Similarly, qualita-
wholly prescriptive solution.
tive risk assessment can include the offering of alternative
design solutions using qualitative arguments for equiva-
lence (in terms of fire risk). The application of methods for For more details of this approach, reference should be
ranking the identified risks according to their potential made to the current version of BS 9999.
consequences sometimes forms part of this process.
Another example of a qualitative risk assessment is the
This type of risk assessment relies on the training and ‘risk matrix’ technique (commonly called a qualitative
experience of the assessor(s) to: risks assessment/analysis matrix). The risk matrix is a
comparative table in which the likelihood and the conse-
—— identify the relevant hazards quence(s) are related to each other according to a qualitative
ranking. This will provide a comparative estimation of the
—— make a judgment as to the likelihood of that hazard level of risk. Table 5.1 shows an example of a risk matrix.
resulting in harm
The level of risk will be represented in each cell of the
—— assess whether the resultant risk is acceptable.
matrix and can be expressed by using a colour, code or
scale, such as:
Such risk evaluation processes often use a set of work-
sheets or questionnaires that incorporate all items that
E: extreme risk
could affect fire risk, such as ignition sources, presence
and quantity of combustible materials, flammable liquids H: high risk
and gases, structural features, people at risk, means of
escape, fire detection and warning, fire suppression, main- M: moderate risk
tenance and safety management practices. In addition, the L: low risk.
likelihood of fire occurrence and potential damage to life
and property, and limiting factors, should be considered. The risk matrix can also be used in a semi-quantitative
sense by assigning nominal values to both likelihood (L)
The categories described above may be evaluated by a and consequence (C), where the risk factor (R) is the
series of questions requiring ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or ‘acceptable’/ multiple (or sum) of L and C.
‘unacceptable’ responses, then ranked or scored within a
matrix (an example of which is outlined below). Although frequently adopted as a technique in the assess-
ment of risks for fire safety management purposes, the
This process will normally be used in conjunction with application of risk matrices to design risk assessment
relevant good industry practice, which the assessor will tends to be less useful because of the inevitable subjectiv-
apply where it is reasonable to do so. Where this is either ity involved and the difficulty of agreeing the acceptability
impracticable, or where alternative solutions offer the criteria (for example: Are ‘medium’ risks ever acceptable?;
same or a better level of safety at lower cost or in a manner Are ‘low’ risks always acceptable?). alarp assessment
more suited to the premises, the assessor should use their requires more than simply rendering risks ‘low’, and
judgment to determine the acceptability of those varia- therefore the risk matrix is not appropriate as the sole
tions from good practice. method of defining design solutions. If fire risk is analysed
Table 5.1 A hypothetical example of a risk matrix Fire detection Sprinkler Manual Scenario
operation operation extinguishment
Likelihood Consequences
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic Yes
1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A M H H E E Yes
(almost
certain) Yes
2
B M M H H E No
(likely) Fire No
occurs 3
C L M M H E
(possible)
Yes
D L M M M H 4
(unlikely) No
E L L M M M No
5
(rare)
Figure 5.1 Time-dependent event tree for probable fire scenario
as being ‘low’, but it can be further reduced in a straight-

forward manner and at little or no cost, then that potential Activation of
improvement in fire risk cannot be easily dismissed. It is the alarm
therefore more useful as a technique for comparing risks
than for determining absolute acceptability.
In addition to standard and well-known risk matrices,

alternative methodologies are starting to be used for the The occupants heard The occupants did not
same purpose, such as multi-criteria decision-making the alarm hear the alarm
models (Tavares et al., 2008).
Whichever technique is used, these analyses should be

documented in a manner that records how the assessment
has been undertaken and which includes the rationale for
The occupants The occupants did not
concluding that risks are acceptable. Where the risk recognised the alarm recognise the alarm
assessment forms part of the design solution for a build-
ing, it should be included in the Fire Safety Strategy
document (BSI, 2001).
5.6.3 Quantitative risk assessment The occupants The occupants did

(QRA) and cost–benefit accepted the alarm not accept the alarm
as being a true fire as being a true fire
analysis (CBA) alarm alarm
Quantitative risk assessment (qra) is a technique whereby

risks are evaluated by assigning numerical values to hazard
(e.g. cases of death or serious injury, damage area or finan-
cial loss), to the probability that the hazard will be realised,
and to the resultant fire risk. This enables the assessor to The occupants had a The occupants did not
either compare risk reduction measures on a ‘like-for-like’ response to the alarm have a response to the
basis or to ascertain whether risks are tolerable in absolute alarm
terms. The qra process is well-established and models are
essentially non-deterministic (i.e. statistical, probabilistic, Figure 5.2 Continuum net-value work diagram for a generic fire
stochastic or reliability techniques). These techniques are emergency situation
commonly used in industries such as nuclear power gener-
ation and transportation to assess all safety risks in a
structured and rigorous way. qra is often used in such
cases to determine if it is reasonably practicable to make and the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
safety improvements under existing or altered conditions, (AIChE) provide good guidance documents for using such
or to define safety objectives for new works. techniques. Figure 5.1 shows an example of an event tree
used for describing possible fire scenarios if a fire occurs.
There are several qra techniques, such as: hazards and Figure 5.2 shows an example of a continuum net-value
operability study (hazops); standard logical trees, such as work diagram, which describes the complexity of human
fault tree analysis (fta) and event tree analysis (eta); and behaviour within fire emergency situations.
new logical trees (such as the continuum net-value work
diagram). The Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the The two examples shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) graphically how qra techniques can be used. For each
event represented in each diagram, there would be an or have a higher vpf in order to recognise that society is
associated probability and, therefore, as mentioned above, less tolerant of multiple fatalities than it is of single events.
the assessor will need to use their prior knowledge and/or Society also expects lower levels of risk exposure for
historical data as a basis for estimating the probabilities. members of the public than for employees. A further value
For more complex scenarios, such as large spaces, high multiplier is often applied to the cost part of the analysis
population density environments etc., the assessor might to define the level at which the risk reduction measures
use numerical optimisation techniques (Tavares and Galea, are deemed ‘grossly disproportionate’. Typically, costs (for
2009). It is also relevant to mention that, when using the risk reduction measures) of less than three times the value
qra techniques, the assessor can also perform a cba, if of risk reduction achieved are regarded as indicating that
necessary and/or requested. it is reasonably practicable to implement that risk reduc-
tion measure. However, this does not mean that if cost is
Both qra and cba need not be restricted to safety-related greater than three times the value of risk reduction that
decision making; they may be usefully applied to deci- would be achieved, then it is justifiable under the alarp
sions concerning property and asset protection as well. approach not to implement that measure – other criteria
For example, using knowledge regarding the probability (such as societal concern or comparison to relevant good
of a significant fire during a relevant period of time, its practice) might apply.
consequences and the potential financial loss (both in
terms of assets damaged or destroyed or lost revenue), an Guidance on the application of probabilistic risk assess-
informed judgment can be made as to the practicability ment is given in PD 7974-7. This document advises that
and desirability of fire protection as a loss control meas- it is most straightforward to apply qra and cba where
ure. It may commonly be found that the case for inclusion comparisons are being made of alternative risk reduction
of such engineering is far stronger as protection for assets measures (e.g. a fire engineered solution compared to a
rather than as a life-safety measure. ‘code-compliant’ one); but that establishing ‘absolute’
quantified values for acceptability is far less straightfor-
As an example, increasing fire resistance may reduce the ward. If contemplating the use of such an analysis, it is
probability of fire spreading beyond a compartment bound- therefore important that the techniques to be used and the
ary, which may reduce the probable damage area. The input data (including the vpf and application of all rele-
additional cost of fire resistance can therefore be offset vant ‘value multipliers’) are agreed with all those with an
against the reduction in probable damage. PD 7974-7: interest in controlling fire risk (including the relevant
2003 provides a model based on statistical studies for regulators) before embarking upon the analysis.
calculating the probability of a fire starting that has a
‘power’ relationship with building area (BSI, 2003); simi- Where cba is being used to assess whether it is reasonably
larly, the probable damaged area can be calculated based practicable to implement measures to reduce risk to busi-
on building area and ‘power’ constants derived from real ness, assets or property, it may be more straightforward to
fire statistics and data. The constants are modified for quantify the negative benefit of the loss of that property
compartments with or without sprinklers. or functionality. However, it is no less important to agree
with all stakeholders the input data to be used and the
In high-value commercial or industrial premises, the cost ‘success criteria’ for what residual risk is regarded as being
of the potential maximum loss scenario can far outweigh tolerable before embarking upon the analysis.
the cost of a sprinkler system, especially when factored in
to the early design/specification stage of a new building. A cba on its own:
Factoring in the likelihood of that scenario being realised
might make the case for the installation of sprinklers —— does not constitute an alarp case
compelling. —— cannot be used to argue against statutory duties
qra may use statistical or historical data to inform judg- —— cannot justify risks that are intolerable
ment on probability, or expert judgment may be used to —— cannot justify what is evidently poor engineering
estimate probabilities for the occurrence of hazards. The design.
resultant risk can be expressed as the likelihood that an
unwanted and harmful event occurs in a particular period If carrying out a cba, it is crucial that the same level of
of time; e.g. the probability of a fatality per year of oper- discipline is used in estimating costs as is used in assessing
ation might be 1 × 10–7. the risk. Only costs directly related to safety can be used
in the analysis — costs associated with non-safety require-
In some industries (e.g. transport), guidance exists on the ments (e.g. aesthetic appearance or potential loss of revenue)
value that society is willing to place on the prevention of cannot be considered in a safety-related cba. It is, however,
a fatality as a result of the operations of that industry acceptable to include installation, training and any addi-
(DfT, 2007). It is important to note that this does not tional maintenance costs, and any business losses that
constitute the ‘value’ of a life – that is unquantifiable – but would follow from assets being taken out of service solely
it gives an indication of the cost that society is willing to for the purpose of putting the measure into place. The
pay to secure an assessed reduction in risk to life, with corollary of this is that any cost savings that result from
regard to that industry. This is called the ‘value of prevent- the implementation of the risk reduction measure should
ing a fatality’ (vpf). It can be used in a cba whereby the also be considered — these might include improved avail-
cost of the risk reduction measure is assessed against the ability of assets, for example. These should be offset against
risk reduction it achieves. the cost of the risk reduction measure(s) in the cba.
Events that could result in multiple fatalities (e.g. death in In terms of life safety, the cost used must be that for the
fire) typically have value multipliers assigned to the vpf, minimum safe solution. Any associated non-safety
requirements may be entirely legitimate, but they are premises, or where those persons might be regarded as
subject to a different cost–benefit case, unrelated to safety, particularly ‘vulnerable’ in case of fire, consideration
and the cost of these cannot influence the decision as to should be given to possible societal concern about the risk
whether or not the measure is alarp. Only costs that fall or the measures proposed to reduce the risk. The factors
on the duty holder should be used — costs to third parties to be considered within this determination should include
(e.g. members of the public) should not be used. those where:
While qra is a useful and respected tool, there are known —— the risk arises from a potential failure that could
pitfalls to its use: result in a major accident, which society would be
unaware of or would assume was already well
—— qra is not always appropriate; it should not be used controlled
where established good industry practice exists, is
relevant and is straightforwardly applicable. —— there might be public aversion to the scale of the
injuries should the risk be realised
—— It should be used with caution when considering
low frequency and/or serious consequence events —— public disquiet and loss of confidence would arise
(such as a significant fire, in most premises). from a key failure occurring within the accident
sequence, even if not leading to serious conse-
—— ‘Historical’ data should be used with caution and quence (e.g. a near miss)
statistics based on limited sample periods should
be used with care. History shows that, even where —— the risk is inequitably shared, particularly where a
many years have passed without significant inci- vulnerable group (such as children or persons with
dent, this does not necessarily indicate that risk is a disability) may be involved
acceptable. Indeed, fire safety legislation is often —— the decision may lead to loss of public trust in the
driven by public reaction to infrequent events that duty holder’s ability to learn from serious inci-
would not necessarily have been predicted before- dents and/or adopt good practice
hand using probabilistic assessment techniques.
—— the adoption of the risk reduction measure would
—— qra should not be used to justify removal of risk have a significant adverse effect on the duty
reduction measures on the basis of cost saving holder’s operations, which the public may perceive
alone, unless it can be demonstrated that fire risk as being disproportionate to the safety risks.
is maintained at equivalent or lower levels by other
risk reduction measures. The above will be particularly relevant for public bodies
—— Numerical levels of probability might mistakenly (e.g. health authorities, transport infrastructure providers,
be regarded as predictive ‘fact’ and be given undue education authorities) or those offering access to large
prominence in the judgment of acceptable risk. numbers of members of the public (managers of sporting
This will be especially relevant if it is viewed that and entertainment venues, duty holders in shopping malls
their precision implies that they are accurate, etc.). The Villaggio Shopping Mall fire in Doha, Qatar in
whereas in most cases there will be significant May 2012, in which 19 people (including 13 young chil-
uncertainty in the probabilities generated during dren) were killed, was a tragic incident that serves as an
the assessment process. example of where one of the circumstances described
above manifested itself. It has resulted in the attitude to
—— The quantified ‘success criteria’ for determining fire safety in an entire country (arguably, throughout the
whether fire risk is tolerable or not may be difficult entire Gulf region) being re-evaluated, and lengthy prison
to establish. sentences for those convicted of being at fault.
The last point is particularly relevant where fire risk is

being assessed. While general levels of ‘tolerability’ for 5.6.5 Risk to firefighters
risk to individuals are reasonably well defined numerically
in guidance and standards, where multiple fatalities in fire It is expected that firefighters are likely to be exposed to
are concerned, society tends to be much less tolerant of risk (when carrying out their fire and rescue duties) that
risk. There is a greater than normal expectation of safety would be intolerable for members of the public.
from that particular hazard. This is generally known as
‘societal concern’ and is not straightforward to quantify. Fire and rescue operations are normally undertaken on
the basis of a dynamic risk assessment made upon arrival
There is no widely agreed and quantified maximum level at the incident (based on the type of premises, severity of
of risk that satisfies societal concern – the ‘benchmark’ the fire and whether it is believed that there are persons
level can be regarded as being equivalent to that set by at risk from the fire). That risk assessment is regularly
means of legislation and the recommendations in national updated as the incident unfolds and takes into considera-
and/or governmental guidance. Therefore, qra should tion the high levels of training and appropriate personal
normally only be used to demonstrate acceptable fire protective equipment (ppe), such as heat-resistant clothing
safety by comparison with accepted levels of risk against and/or breathing apparatus that enables firefighters to
established relevant good practice. tolerate severe conditions. It is not, therefore, either prac-
ticable or necessary to control risk to firefighters during
their fire and rescue activities to levels equivalent to those
5.6.4 Societal concern applicable to other occupants.
Where a significant number of persons could be affected Having said the above, risk to firefighters undertaking
by the consequences of a particular fire hazard in the their duties during a fire should be considered when
designing a building. It is not acceptable to ignore the fact 5.7.2 Considering only the
that their duties under law are likely to include doing all probability of fire
that is reasonable to protect both life and property in case
of fire, and the fire protection provided should be such
It is unlikely to be legitimate to conclude that fire hazard
that these duties can be undertaken without exposing the
firefighters to unnecessary risks. In practice, this will is so low that the probability of having a fire that can cause
usually mean ensuring that works either comply with harm is negligible. It is expected that, where a low frequency
good industry practice or will represent an equivalent but serious consequence event such as a large fire is
level of fire risk (to the firefighters) by incorporating alter- concerned, it should be assumed that a fire could occur and
native design solutions. the risk should be assessed on that basis. The management
controls that would be required to reduce to negligible the
probability of a significant fire starting are so demanding
Within this perspective, some technological tools can be
that, in most industries, it is not sensible to rely on them
useful when assessing the fire risks to firefighters within
being applied throughout the life of a premises.
buildings. For instance, the use of evacuation models as
well as fire models can assist an assessor when undertak-
ing a risk assessment (Tavares et al., 2008; FSEG, 2017a, 5.7.3 ‘Reverse ALARP’
2017b).
The removal of existing fire protection measures might be
5.6.6 Business resilience and attempted, justified on the basis that the cost of ongoing
maintenance or renewal is grossly disproportionate to the
insurance considerations risk reduction benefit achieved. This is not acceptable
because there is a responsibility to maintain existing fire
Designing to meet a code or minimum life safety standard protection measures (which is usually enshrined in law)
is clearly the first consideration for risk assessment. and those existing measures reduce risk to what must have
However, within the commercial and industrial world been regarded (when they were implemented) as an accept-
there could be broader considerations around maximum able level. By providing those measures, the duty holder
loss potential that may be a low probability/high conse- has demonstrated that it is reasonably practicable to do so,
quence scenario. Analysis of this normally takes into and by so doing has established a particular level of fire
account the largest possible loss based on an understand- risk. Increasing that level of risk can therefore not be
ing of the overall hazard and associated business impact alarp. This unacceptable form of argument is commonly
(FM Global, 2015). known as ‘reverse alarp’.
Such analyses may assume that certain active fire protec- This does not mean that fire protection can never be
tion systems (such as sprinklers) are impaired so that the removed; if one can reasonably argue that fire risk has not
only limiting factors considered are physical barriers or been increased at all by that removal, then it may be
space separation that will adequately prevent fire spread. acceptable to do so. This might be accomplished by apply-
Credit for a physical barrier is typically only given for ing one or more of the following criteria:
specifically engineered fire-resisting structures, which
comply with established and agreed technical criteria.
—— the risk reduction measure to be removed or modi-
fied addressed a hazard that is no longer present
The largest loss scenario and values at risk should be
considered at the earliest stages of design and during the —— alternative risk reduction measures, no less effec-
establishment of project objectives, and an assessment tive than the measure being removed, will be
made as to whether the risk is simply too big not to sepa- applied and maintained, so resulting in risk not
rate (e.g. a warehouse from manufacturing). Such decisions being increased
will usually be driven by the client’s appetite for risk,
their business impact analysis, resilience needs and busi- —— in all cases the removal of the risk reduction
ness continuity strategy. measure does not increase risk beyond that which
would be achieved by the application of relevant
and current good practice.
5.7 Risk assessment pitfalls

5.7.4 Using the cost of remedial
works in a CBA
5.7.1 General
It might be the case that works have been designed and
It is possible that risk assessment could be viewed as an implemented in an unacceptable or inappropriate manner;
opportunity to dispense completely with ‘prescriptive’ e.g. it might be discovered that they do not comply with
standards and to reduce costs by assessing out established good industry practice or that they fail to offer an equiv-
risk reduction measures. If properly applied, risk assess- alent level of safety. In this case, it has been known for cba
ment does allow targeted risk reduction, perhaps resulting to be used (in either a qualitative or quantitative risk
in lower risk than the prescriptive solution or the same assessment) to justify why it is acceptable for those varia-
level of risk at lower cost. However, care should be taken tions from acceptable risk to remain. Frequently, those
when using risk assessment techniques to depart from making the case argue that the ‘trouble’ (i.e. cost, disrup-
established prescriptive codes and some examples of poor tion or impact on programme) of correcting the issue is
practice in risk assessment (taken from Gadd et al., 2003) the measure against which the risk reduction benefits are
are included in the following sections. to be judged.
This is not good practice and should be avoided. When There is no such hierarchy — the need for compliance
using cba either qualitatively or quantitatively, the judg- with one item of legislation has no bearing on the require-
ment should be made against the cost of the relevant ment to comply with any other. The designer has to
works when they have been competently and correctly consider and comply with all legislation equally. Having
designed, supplied and installed, not against the cost of said this, where non-legislative project requirements are
correcting works designed, supplied or installed incor- being analysed and there is genuine conflict, then safe-
rectly. To put it simply, one cannot use the consequences ty-related issues must take precedence.
of a mistake or deliberate failure to observe good industry
practice as input to a cba. The above necessarily calls for a sensitive approach to be
applied to the design process, with due regard being paid
to any aspects (such as heritage issues) that are somewhat
5.7.5 Confusion between cost and subordinate to fire safety. This may require the application
affordability of sector-specific fire safety solutions to those premises, so
that the acceptable level of fire risk is achieved without
While cost is, undoubtedly, a legitimate factor in some unnecessary alteration to the historic fabric. Examples
forms of risk assessment analysis, affordability is not. might be the use of radio-linked fire detection systems to
Some examples of the latter include the following: avoid the need for cables, or the reversible upgrading of
the fire resistance of heritage structures.
—— It is sometimes claimed that it is not practicable to
implement a risk reduction measure because there
has been no allowance for it in the budget. 5.7.7 Incorrect reference to good
practice
—— The argument is sometimes made that unforeseen
risk reduction measures are so expensive that their Some attempts to justify departure from relevant good
cost may threaten the viability of the project. practice refer to inappropriate guidance (e.g. standards
written to address fire risk in premises with less signifi-
These are not acceptable reasons for failing to implement cant fire hazards than those in question). For example, it
reasonably practicable risk reduction measures. This is may be the case that a duty holder in a hotel refers to
because there is a reasonable presumption that before a guidance on offices, instead of guidance that addresses the
duty holder embarks upon an activity, they will have risks commonly encountered in hotels (e.g. in offices occu-
determined that they can afford to undertake that activity pants are usually awake and both familiar with and aware
safely. Failure to do so (for example, by not foreseeing and of their surroundings; in the case of hotels, occupants may
allowing for the necessary risk reduction measures in a be asleep, sensory impaired and/or unfamiliar with their
project’s budget) cannot therefore be accepted as a reason surroundings). It is important that those assessing risk are
for tolerating higher levels of risk. mindful that the guidance they use, either directly or as a
‘benchmark’, is appropriate to the environment that they
If this situation arises, it is sometimes possible to address are considering.
the consequences by reducing spend on non-safety-related
project requirements, such as certain fixtures, fittings and Another example might be to make reference to design
finishes provided only for aesthetic reasons. Similarly, the solutions used elsewhere, but where the context is differ-
enhancement of management procedures is sometimes ent in crucial ways. An example might be a railway rolling
proposed as a mitigation measure in these circumstances. stock manufacturer who wishes to offer vehicles to the
While this approach may indeed enable acceptable levels operator of an underground railway system. That rail
of fire risk to be achieved, it is strongly recommended that system has been in operation for many years and the infra-
the practicability of reliably maintaining those procedures structure is built to standards which are long superseded.
(perhaps for many years) is very carefully reviewed in While the vehicles might be entirely satisfactory when
conjunction with the users, occupiers and/or managers of used on modern infrastructure, compliant with current
the premises, to ensure that they are satisfied that this is standards, it may be necessary to compensate for the
achievable. The ‘whole-life’ operational cost of those higher risk inherent in operating on much older infra-
measures should also be considered as, if more staff structure by reducing the fire risk associated with the
resources are required, then the cost (over the whole life rolling stock. In this case, comparison of the risk posed by
of the assets) may significantly exceed the capital cost of a part of the system, rather than the whole system itself,
the physical risk reduction measures themselves. is of questionable validity.
5.7.6 Citing conflicting and 5.7.8 Not considering risk to

contradictory legislative particularly vulnerable
requirements occupants
Other technical or legislative requirements are sometimes When assessing fire risk, those undertaking the analysis
advanced as reasons why fire risk reduction measures should be fully aware of the occupancy profile of the
cannot be implemented. For example, heritage concerns premises. They should ensure that the assessment consid-
are sometimes offered as justification for avoiding the ers whether any occupants are likely to be present whose
alteration of properties of historic interest. The question response to a fire emergency in the premises might be
is sometimes asked whether there is a hierarchy of legis- delayed, or whose ability to make good their escape might
lative requirements, whereby fire safety may be considered be impaired, by a sensory or physical impairment (whether
subordinate to other factors. permanent or temporary). Examples might include:
—— young children claimed that individual risk is low or not, this approach is
unlikely to satisfy the test of societal concern, which
—— the elderly
makes its acceptability highly questionable.
—— persons with a sight and/or hearing impairment
By making their premises accessible to those vulnerable
—— persons with restricted mobility (e.g. wheelchair
groups, it is expected that the duty holder will take steps
users)
to reduce their risk from fire to a level comparable to that
—— persons who are bed-ridden. of the other occupants of the premises.
In all cases, it will be important for the risk assessment to

consider the risk to each individual type of occupant and
to conclude whether the existing or proposed risk reduc- References
tion measures adequately control risk to an acceptable level.
BSI (2001) BS 7974: 2001 Application of fire safety engineering principles to
It is normally very important to consider whether relevant the design of buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards
good practice exists and it would be appropriate to apply Institution) (Note: BS 7974: 2012 has been replaced by BS 7974: 2019)
that good practice wherever it is reasonable to do so. If vari-
ation from that guidance is being considered, it is strongly BSI (2003) PD 7974-7: 2003 Application of fire safety engineering principles
recommended that those undertaking the risk assessment to the design of buildings. Probabilistic risk assessment (London: British
are able to construct a robust case for the proposed risk Standards Institution) (Note: PD 7974-7: 2003 has been replaced by PD
7974-7: 2019)
reduction measures being equivalent to that good practice.
BSI (2017a) BS 4971: 2017 Conservation and care of archive and library
It is recommended that the assessors do not base the collections (London: British Standards Institution)
assessment only on the current occupants of the premises;
one should also consider whether it is foreseeable that BSI (2017b) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
vulnerable occupants might be in the premises, even if buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
they are not currently present. For example, if a building BSI (2018) BS EN 16893: 2018 Conservation of cultural heritage.
has step-free access to all or part of it, then it should be Specifications for location, construction and modification of buildings or rooms
considered that wheelchair users might be found in all intended for the storage or use of heritage collections (London: British
accessible parts of those premises, even if it is not intended Standards Institution)
(or evident) that they are, or if there is no particular reason
for them to be in that part of the premises, or even if there DfT (2007) Highways Economics Note No. 1: 2005 Valuation of the
Benefits of Prevention of Road Accidents and Casualties (London:
is a claim that management procedures will prevent them
Department for Transport)
from being present in those locations.
FM Global (2015) Property Loss Prevention data sheet 1-22: Maximum
Accessibility is growing in prominence as a key design foreseeable loss (Johnston, RI)
consideration, and where accessibility is provided it
should be assumed that it will be utilised. The risk assess- FSEG (2017a) EXODUS introduction. Available at http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/
exodus/index.html
ment should therefore take into account the potential
presence of persons with restricted mobility (including FSEG (2017b) SMARTFIRE introduction. Available at http://fseg.gre.
wheelchair users) and appropriate procedures and/or phys- ac.uk/smartfire/index.html
ical protection measures should be provided to ensure that
they can be safely evacuated. It is unlikely to be acceptable Gadd S, Keeley D and Balmforth H (2003) Good Practice and Pitfalls in
to argue that, because few vulnerable people are likely to Risk Assessment Health & Safety Laboratory Research Report 151
be in the premises, the probability of simultaneously: (Sudbury: HSE Books)
HSE (2001) Reducing Risks, Protecting People: HSE’s decision-making

—— having a fire of significant size and process (Sudbury: HSE Books)
—— having a vulnerable person in the premises LPC (2000) LPC Design Guide for the Fire Protection of Buildings
(Borehamwood: Loss Prevention Council)
is so small as to render the cost of any fire risk reduction
measure aimed solely at that group grossly disproportion- Tavares RM and Galea ER (2009) ‘Evacuation modelling analysis within
the operational research context: A combined approach for improving
ate to the risk reduction achieved. This is not viewed as
enclosure designs Building and Environment 44 (5) 1005–1016
good practice, because it may place a vulnerable group at
a significantly higher individual risk than other building Tavares RM, Tavares JML and Parry-Jones SL (2008) ‘The use of a
occupants, and it fails to maintain risk at levels equal to mathematical multicriteria decision-making model for selecting the fire
or better than relevant good practice. Whether it can be origin’ Building and Environment 43 (12) 2090–2100
6-1
6 Fire dynamics
6.1 Introduction in the construction/building environment, it has been
found by experiment that the critical radiant heat flux for
ignition where there is already a flame present (i.e. pilot
Fire dynamics describes the complex subject of fire behav- ignition) is in the range 10–30 kW · m–2. For spontaneous
iour and encompasses chemistry, physics, heat transfer ignition, where there is no flame present, critical heat
and fluid dynamics. With knowledge of fire dynamics, a fluxes are higher, at about 40 kW · m–2. In both cases the
more fundamental approach to fire safety engineering can actual values depend on the fuel.
be applied at the design stage. It can also be used in
response to an incident that has highlighted a fire hazard
with a view to investigation and research.
Fire is a chemical reaction between combustible species

6.3 Fire growth
and oxygen from the air, which produces heat, the mode
of burning depending more upon the physical state and For sustained combustion to occur, oxygen, heat and a fuel
distribution of the fuel and its environment than on the source must all be present. The removal of any one of
chemistry. An example often quoted is that a wooden log these will terminate the reaction. The burning process in
is difficult to ignite but thin sticks can be ignited easily fires involves pyrolysis (i.e. thermal decomposition) of
and will burn fiercely when piled together. fresh fuel. This pyrolysis will produce volatiles from the
surface of the fuel and these gases will oxidise in the flam-
This section aims to present a basic understanding of the ing region, generating combustion products and releasing
processes which govern fire and smoke development and heat. If there are no control measures present, and both air
to guide the reader in the available techniques for calcu- and fuel are available, it must be assumed that the fire will
lating the important parameters. It is not exhaustive and continue to grow in a manner that may be predictable,
much use will be made of references to more detailed based on experimental or other evidence. However, the
publications, which should be consulted for further infor- calculation of flame spread or fire growth rates from first
mation. Important references include Drysdale’s An principles is not easy. Characteristic fire growth rates are
Introduction to Fire Dynamics (2011) and Karlson and Quin- given in section 6.5.3.1.
tiere’s Enclosure Fire Dynamics (2000).
It should be noted that most fire safety engineering calcu-

lations are based upon experiment and testing. Therefore, 6.4 Compartment fires
the validity of such calculations will be limited and extrap-
olation beyond these limits may not be appropriate. It may
be prudent to carry out further testing or modelling to 6.4.1 General
validate the design parameters used, if considered neces-
sary by designers or approvers. This can be in the form of A distinction may be made between fires arising in the
physical testing or computational simulation. open, where radiated heat is lost to the surroundings, and
fires which occur in confined spaces or compartments. In
the latter, heat is transferred to the compartment walls by
radiation from the fire and also by convection from the
6.2 Ignition hot gases that accumulate within the compartment. Re-
radiation from these hot boundaries can significantly
Ignition is the process whereby a material passes from a increase the heating of combustibles in the room.
relatively inert state to one where a reaction takes place that
can produce temperatures significantly in excess of ambi- If there are openings to the compartment to permit the
ent. Ignition of most materials requires the application of inflow of air, and if there is sufficient fuel, the fire will
an external source of heat, the incident heat flux causing continue to grow and the temperature of the hot gas layer
the surface temperature of the fuel to rise. In the case of at ceiling level will rise. Ultimately, the point may be
flammable liquids, this liberates vapour; solid materials reached where the downward radiation from this layer is
decompose to release flammable volatiles. Combustion so intense that all of the remaining fuel in the compart-
takes place in the gas phase above the fuel surface. ment becomes involved. This occurs at layer temperatures
of 500–600 °C (see section 6.8.4). The transition from
Whether or not ignition occurs, and whether the reaction growing to fully developed fire happens very rapidly, and
then becomes self-propagating, depends on a complex heat the event is often referred to as ‘flashover’.
balance between the incident heat flux, the convective and
radiative heat gains by the fuel, and the heat losses to the Following flashover, the rate of heat release of the fire
surroundings. For the types of materials commonly found increases rapidly and the oxygen content decreases.
Flashover is unlikely to occur in large or tall compart-

ments with small fire loads, such as airport concourses,
multistorey malls and atria protected from fire in an adja-
cent enclosure. There is the potential for fire spread
beyond the initial fire source by radiative heat transfer,
and therefore the risk of fire spread within large or tall
compartments cannot be discounted. Therefore, the siting
Temperature
of combustibles in such spaces should be considered as

Flashover part of the design process, and further guidance on this
issue is given in Annex B of BS 9999: 2017 (BSI, 2017).
However, given sufficiently high fire loads, such as in high
bay warehouses, fire development may reach flashover
conditions.
Fuel bed-controlled fires have excess air available and

Initiation Growth Steady-state Decay their combustion rate, heat output and growth are limited
by the fuel being burnt. All the burning takes place within
the fire compartment.
Time
Figure 6.1 Stages of development of a fire
Anyone remaining in a compartment which has under- 6.5 Calculation of fire

gone flashover is unlikely to survive. The risk of fire
spread from the compartment to adjacent areas increases
parameters
greatly and the structure becomes heated.
Because radiation from the smoke layer is the driving 6.5.1 General
force in initiating flashover, any factors that promote loss
of heat from the layer will tend to reduce the risk of its The expressions given in the following sections have
occurrence. In particular, in compartments that are high previously been published in the technical literature of
or wide and where there is limited material to burn, the the fire safety industry. They are the result of experiment
smoke will be unlikely to reach temperatures that would and observation and therefore each has its limitations.
result in flashover. Flashover is unlikely to occur where
sprinklers are operating.
6.5.2 Design fires
A useful way of showing the development of a compart-
ment fire is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The stages are: The design fire is characterised by the variation of heat
output with time. In the initial stages of fire growth it is
—— Initiation: the fire will grow only slowly as a result assumed that the fire is well ventilated, its rate of burning
of flame spread over the item first ignited. being characterised by the type, amount and configuration
of the fuel. The fire is assumed to be confined initially to
—— Growth: the fire will grow more quickly and begin to a single object or group of objects.
spread to other items, but remain effectively local.
—— Fully developed steady-state or post-flashover: all the If unchecked, the fire may spread to adjacent objects and,
combustibles are involved and flames appear to fill once flames reach the ceiling, flashover may occur and the
the entire volume; the average temperature is very whole room or compartment becomes involved in a fully
high. developed fire. After flashover, the rate of smoke production
can be so great that smoke control becomes impracticable.
—— Decay: at this stage, the average temperature of the However, if there is a post-flashover fire in a small room, it
fire has fallen considerably from its peak value. may be possible to design a smoke control system that
protects an adjacent large-volume space, such as an atrium,
6.4.2 Limiting fire development when smoke emerges from a window or doorway of the
room. Types of smoke control system and their practical
Once flashover has occurred, the development of the fire application are considered in chapter 10: Smoke ventilation.
in a compartment will be limited by the in-flow rate of air
(i.e. ventilation-controlled fires) or combustible material The parameter that governs most strongly the way in
(i.e. fuel bed-controlled fires), or by firefighting. which a fire and its products behave is its rate of heat
release, commonly termed ‘fire size’. In order to carry out
Ventilation-controlled fires have their combustion and a fire engineering design, it is essential to define at the
heat output controlled by the amount of air reaching the outset a series of design fires that represent the worst fire
fire, which is governed by the openings to the fire compart- situations likely to arise in the building under considera-
ment. A ventilation-controlled fire usually means that the tion. Information is available, both experimental and
whole compartment is involved and flashover has occurred. theoretical, that may be used by the designer in selecting
Flames may project from the openings of the compart- suitable design fires.
ment, and significant combustion of heated fuel gases may
take place outside, where they first come into contact with Pre-flashover fires are considered in section 6.5.3;
sufficient oxygen. post-flashover fires are dealt with in section 6.5.4.
Fire dynamics 6-3
6.5.3 Pre-flashover fires 2016). Many of the measurements relate to heat release
rates from goods such as those which might be stored in
The design fire size will depend on the characteristics of warehouses. There is also a significant body of data on
the type and arrangement of the fuel and may be catego- foam-filled furniture (Babrauskas, 1986).
rised for design purposes as one of the following:
As a result of measurements, it has been found possible to
—— a growing fire characterise fire growth rates in different ways:
—— a fire having a fixed size for a finite time —— t-squared fires (UK and USA)
—— a steady-state fire. —— t-cubed fires
Fixed size or steady-state fires will usually have grown to —— standard fires, types 1, 2 and 3 (Japan)
some limit, further extension being restricted by one or —— growing fires (Australia).
more of the following:
—— fire control activities, such as automatic (or man- This Guide concentrates on the method of determining
ual) fire suppression fire growth rates used in the UK and USA. Fire growth
rates for various types of fire have been compared by
—— sufficient space separation to neighbouring combust- Bukowski (1993) (see Figure 6.2).
ibles
—— for hydrocarbon pool fires, the leakage versus 6.5.3.1 Fire growth rate
burning rate or, if bunded, the extent of the bund.
Much experimental work has been carried out in the USA
A fixed design fire size applicable to all situations is not on heat release rates in fires as a function of time. Some
feasible, especially when designing for means of escape or of the results are summarised in NFPA 92 (NFPA, 2015).
estimating the activation time of automatic detectors. Additional data on real fires are available from the National
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) (www.nist.
It is more realistic to design based on a growing fire, using gov) and BRE (www.bre.co.uk).
the widely accepted t-squared growth rates, and a maxi-
mum heat release rate. It is not possible to predict the These large-scale tests show fire growth and decay for a
length of the incubation period (see Figure 6.3), and there- series of objects and groups of objects. These data show
fore it is recommended that this period is ignored in this that fire curves are closer to spikes, with rapid growth and
approach. This provides inherent conservatism to the rapid decay. The fact that heat release rate peaks may be
design calculation. very high but last for a limited time should be taken into
account when designing fire systems and allowing for
A great deal of experimental work has been carried out on appropriate safety factors.
rates of heat release from different materials when burned
in fire tests. Much of this information is summarised in In many instances, building fires go through an initial
the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (SFPE, incubation period, when the growth rate is significantly
30 US slow
★ US medium
25      
✻ US fast
★

★ US ultra-fast
20
Heat release rate / MW
★
 Australia <1140 MJ·m–2
★
15  Australia 1140 – 2280 MJ·m–2
★
Australia 1140 – 4560 MJ·m–2

10 ★ ✻
✻ Japan (t2)
 ★ ✻
✻ Japan (No. 1)
★ ✻
5 ✻

★ ✻
✻  Japan (No. 2)
★ ✻
✻
★ ✻ ✻
★
 
✻ 
✻
0★

✻ 
★
✻ ✻
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Time / s
Figure 6.2 Bukowski’s comparison of idealised fire growth curves (Bukowski, 1993)
slower than the t-squared rates, such as the initial period Table 6.1 Characteristic growth time for various classes of fire
in small or smouldering fires. This period (see Figure 6.3) Fire class Characteristic growth time, tg / s Constant a / kW · s–2
is of indeterminate length and is ignored for design
purposes, although the fire may be detected during this Ultra-fast 75 0.1876
period by the occupants or by an automatic detector, if Fast 150 0.0469
adjacent to the source.
Medium 300 0.0117
It has been found that, after this incubation period, the Slow 600 0.0029
heat release rate grows approximately as the square of the
time (NFPA, 2015), i.e.
Qt = at2 (6.1)
Table 6.2 Growth rates for growing fires
where Qt is the total heat release rate of the fire (kW), a is Building area providing fuel Growth rate
a constant (kW · s–2) and t is time (s).
Dwelling Medium
Figure 6.3 illustrates t-squared fire growth. The growth Office Medium
parameter for a t-squared fire is defined by the time taken Shop Fast
for the heat output to reach 1055 kW (i.e. approximately
Warehouse Ultra-fast*
1 MW). This is known as the characteristic growth time.
It has been suggested that fires may be conveniently clas- Hotel bedroom Medium
sified as ‘slow’, ‘medium’, ‘fast’ and ‘ultra-fast’, depending Hotel reception Medium
on the characteristic growth time.
Assembly hall seating Medium–fast
Table 6.1 gives the characteristic growth time, tg, and the Picture gallery Slow
corresponding values of constant a for the various classes of Display area Slow–medium
fire. The fastest burning upholstered sofas and plastic goods
stacked to a height of about 4.5 m give ‘ultra-fast’ growth * Depends on fire load
rates, while other upholstered furniture and lower piles of
plastic goods give ‘fast’ rates. Tightly rolled paper produces
a ‘slow’ growth rate. Experiments on burning computer
workstations suggest ‘medium’ to ‘fast’ growth rates.
Fire growth depends on the type of fuel and its arrange-

ment, but some growth rates are suggested in Table 6.2,
based on the experimental evidence available.
3 Figure 6.3 Illustration of

t-squared fire growth. (Reprinted
with permission from NFPA
92-2018 Standard for smoke control
systems, Copyright © 2017,
Continuously
National Fire Protection, Quincy,
growing fire
MA. This reprinted material is
not the complete and official
position of the NFPA on the
2
Heat release rate / MW
referenced subject, which is

represented only by the standard
in its entirety.) (Original in
Imperial units.)
Incubation period
0
Time Growth time
Effective ignition time

Fire dynamics 6-5
Research suggests that for a high rack warehouse (fire in However, it should be noted that the validity of this
the flue) the growth rate can be modelled as a ‘t-cubed’ assumption is the subject of some considerable debate in
fire, given by (Ingason, 1993) as fire engineering circles and may be potentially open to
some criticism. From the agreed value, it is assumed that
Qt = 0.045 t3 (6.2)
no further items of fuel ignite, and the value of mass flow
in the plume is calculated accordingly. After operation, it
For this rapid fire growth, the incipient stage is significant may be assumed that the sprinklers cool most of the smoke
and the curve is valid up to 10 MW for a 10 m high rack layer to a temperature less than the operating temperature
(there are no data for fires greater than 10 MW). For a fire of the sprinklers. For calculation purposes, an average
in the racking flue, the amount of entrainment of fresh air smoke layer temperature of 100 °C may be assumed with
in the rack plume is restricted, compared to that for a fire conventional sprinkler heads, while the sprinklers are
on the face of the rack. For a typical cellulosic fire, racking operating.
flue entrainment can be estimated as
mflue = Q1.08 # 10-4V t3

6.5.3.5 Transient fires
(6.3)
where mflue is the mass of smoke produced prior to sprin- To simplify calculations of smoke filling during the tran-
kler operation for a fire in a racking flue (kg · s–1) and t is sient phase (see section 6.8), an average value of Q may be
time (s) (CIBSE, 2010: appendix 6.A1). used:
Equations 6.2 and 6.3 are to be used together. #0 t Qt dt

Qt, ave = (6.5)
t
6.5.3.2 Unit heat release rate
where Qt, ave is the average total heat output of the fire
(kW) and t is time (s).
Estimates of heat release rates per unit floor area or per
unit fuel area for various commodities and materials can For t-squared fires:
be gained from the SFPE Handbook (SFPE, 2016) and
NFPA 92 (NFPA, 2015). Survey data from actual occupan-
Qave = 333 Qt tgV2 (6.6)
cies in use have also been published (BSI, 2002a).
Measured survey loads, q, are given in MJ per square where tg is the characteristic growth time (s). Values of tg
metre of floor area. By assuming a conservative burn-out are given in Table 6.1.
time of 20 minutes (i.e. 1200 s), the unit heat release rate
can be estimated for well-ventilated compartment fires: 6.5.4 Post-flashover fires
Qu = q 1200 (6.4)
6.5.4.1 Condition for flashover
where QU is the unit heat release rate (kW · m–2) and q is the
measured survey load (kJ · m–2). Note that the measured For design purposes, it may be assumed that flashover
survey load is usually given in MJ · m–2 and must be converted does not occur if the smoke layer at ceiling level is at a
to kJ · m–2 for use with equation 6.4. Some commonly used temperature of less than 600 °C (McCaffrey et al., 1981). A
values of heat release rate are shown in Table 6.3. method for calculating this temperature is given in section
6.7.5. Note that in the plume above a fire the temperature
6.5.3.3 Steady-state fires: not sprinklered at the tip of intermittent flames is about 350 °C and at the
tip of sustained flames is about 550 °C.
Once the fire has spread from item to item until all the
If a correctly designed and maintained sprinkler system
available fuel is burning, the heat output will reach a
(or other approved fire suppression system designed to
steady value, eventually declining as the fuel decays. The
achieve fire control) operates, it may be assumed that flash-
estimation of the steady value is given in section 6.5.4.
over will not occur, since sprinklers are designed to operate
while the smoke layer is at a temperature much lower than
6.5.3.4 Steady-state fires: sprinklered the generally accepted flashover temperature of 600 °C.
For design purposes, the value of Q may be assumed as Because flashover is such a serious event, a great deal of
steady after operation of the first sprinkler (see section research effort has been invested in methods to predict the
6.6.3 regarding sprinkler response and activation). conditions which give rise to it. A presentation and
comparison of the different correlations which are availa-
ble are given in the SFPE Handbook (SFPE, 2016). The
Table 6.3 Commonly used values of heat release rate (NFPA, 2015) simplest of these relates the heat release rate required for
Occupancy Unit heat release rate, QU / flashover, Qf (kW), to — what has become known as the
kW · m–2 ventilation factor (Avo √ ho), such that
Offices 290
Qf = 600 Avo ho (6.7)
Shops 550
Industrial 260 where Qf is the heat release rate required for flashover
(kW), Avo is the area of the opening to the compartment
Hotel rooms 249
(m2) and ho is the height of the opening (m).
The total heat release rate is given by 6.6 Effect of sprinklers

Qt = Hc # R (6.8)
The following paragraphs deal with the effect of sprinklers
on fire growth. Sprinkler design is considered in detail in
where Hc is the heat of combustion (kJ · kg–1) and R is the
mass rate of burning (kg · s–1). (The heat of combustion, chapter 11: Fire suppression.
Hc, is discussed in chapter 10: Smoke ventilation, and
values for various materials are given in PD 7974-1: 2003
(BSI, 2003a) or the SFPE Handbook (SFPE, 2016). The 6.6.1 General principles
rate of burning, R, is considered in sections 6.5.4.2 and
6.5.4.3.) The plume of hot smoky gases from a fire rises as a result
of its buoyancy. When it hits the ceiling the plume turns
6.5.4.2 Ventilation-controlled fires and spreads laterally, where it may interact with sprin-
klers, eventually causing them to operate. The time to
sprinkler operation depends on:
The mass rate of burning is given by
R = 0.02 !Ao ho1/2 QAt - AoVQw / dV$ (6.9) —— fire growth rate
1/2

—— sprinkler location
where R is the mass rate of burning (kg · s–1), Ao is the area
of ventilation opening (door, window etc.) (m2), ho is the —— sprinkler sensitivity.
height of ventilation opening (m), At is the area of room
surface (wall, floor, ceiling) (m2), w is the width of wall
containing the opening (m) and d is the depth of room 6.6.2 Sprinkler location
behind the opening (m) (Thomas et al., 1963).
As the smoke plume rises from a fire, it draws in air from
Effective values for these parameters for rooms with more the surroundings, which causes it to cool. Therefore, the
than one opening are beyond the scope of this document higher the ceiling, the lower will be the temperature of the
but can be derived using the procedures given in the smoke that reaches the sprinklers. Additional cooling then
Appendix to this chapter. occurs as the smoke spreads laterally. Clearly, the hotter
the smoke, the more rapidly the sprinkler will operate.
Equation 6.9 has been derived from experiments with
wood cribs and can be used for most types of fire load
found in houses, offices and shops. Conventionally, fire 6.6.3 Sprinkler and smoke detector
load may be expressed in terms of the equivalent weight sensitivity
of wood. If expressed in MJ or MJ · m–2, the fire load may
be converted to kg or kg · m–2 of wood by dividing by
18  MJ · kg–1; for example, 360 MJ · m–2 is equivalent to In order to operate and release water onto a fire, a sprin-
20  kg · m–2 of wood. kler must be heated to its operating temperature, usually
about 70 °C, at which point a temperature-sensitive
element is designed to fail, e.g. a solder link melts or a
6.5.4.3 Fuel bed-controlled fires glass bulb breaks. The rate at which the element heats up
when exposed to hot smoke depends on its shape and
With low values of fire load, equation 6.9 overestimates mass. A heavy, short bulb will take longer to reach a given
the mass rate of burning by a factor of 2 or 3. temperature than a light, slim bulb. The parameter used
to describe sprinkler sensitivity is known as the response
An effective fire duration of 20 minutes may be assumed, time index (RTI), see chapter 11: Fire suppression. Sprin-
with R then being given by klers with RTI values below 50 m1/2 · s1/2 are described as
having a quick response, while those with values up to
R = L 1200 (6.10) 350 m1/2 · s1/2 are regarded as having a standard response
(BSI, 1999).
where R is the mass rate of burning (kg · s–1) and L is the
total fire load (kg), or Concealed sprinkler heads are not designated a thermal
L = QL AfV Af (6.11)
sensitivity response rating by manufacturers due to the
nature of the sprinkler assembly. However, work by Anna-
ble (2006) determined rti values for the overall assembly
where Af is the floor area (m2) (Law, 1978). arrangement for a limited number of concealed sprinkler
head types. This work demonstrated that for a concealed
Values of L / Af (kg · m–2) are derived from surveys or design sprinkler with a temperature-sensing element with a quick
data. Where such data are expressed in MJ · m–2, they may response, the rti of the overall arrangement was not quick
be converted by dividing by 18 (see section 6.5.4.2). response, but was within the expected range of a standard
response head. Common practice assumed in design is that
For design purposes, R should be calculated from equa- the rti of the concealed sprinkler head temperature-
tions 6.9 and 6.10 and the lower value adopted. sensing element should be quick response, but with the
overall assembly arrangement assumed to be a standard
If the heat release rate is needed for the approving author- response head, and the value of rti used for any concealed
ity, this can easily be calculated by multiplying R by the sprinkler activation calculation should be discussed and
heat of combustion of the fuel. agreed with the approving authorities.
Fire dynamics 6-7
Note that a smoke detector can be considered as an equiv- to grow but at a slower rate. Whether or not such an
alent heat detector having an RTI of 0.5 m1/2 · s1/2 and a assumption is made, the fire may continue to burn until
fixed temperature rise of 13 °C (Evans and Stroup, 1985). all the fuel is consumed.
It is possible to use computer software to assess the effect
of fire growth, sprinkler location and sprinkler sensitivity
on sprinkler activation as an alternative to hand calcula- 6.7 Smoke plumes
tion. One such computer zone model is B-RISK (Wade et
al., 2013), which can be used to predict sprinkler activa-
tion times and corresponding fire sizes at sprinkler 6.7.1 Introduction to smoke
activation. B-RISK utilises the differential equation
describing the temperature of the sprinkler sensing ventilation calculations
element based on the rti concept of Heskestad and Bill
(1988), incorporating the gas temperature and velocity in For most smoke ventilation calculations (see chapter 10:
the vicinity of the sprinkler sensing element, using the Smoke ventilation), it is essential to know:
unconfined ceiling jet correlation by Alpert in chapter 14
of the SFPE Handbook (SFPE, 2016). (a) the plume type; for example, an axisymmetric
plume (see section 6.7.3) or a plume flow from an
opening (see section 6.7.4) — the entrainment
6.6.4 Effect on fire size equations associated with different plume types cal-
culate the mass flow rate of smoke produced (msmoke)
Real fire tests are rarely performed. However, should a
series of tests be carried out on the intended typical layout (b) the temperature of the hot gases (see section 6.7.5)
(i.e. room dimensions, fuel type etc.) and if these tests show and
that a fire will be quickly suppressed with the installed (c) the volume flow rate of smoke (see section 6.7.6).
sprinkler system, then it seems reasonable to assume that
combustion effectively ceases when the sprinklers operate. By using this methodology, the effectiveness or perfor-
mance of a smoke ventilation system can be determined.
In a room equipped with sprinklers, a fire may grow until
the heat in the plume sets off the first sprinkler heads. The Section 6.7.7 provides information on the flowing layer
effect of the sprinklers on the design fire size can be taken depth, which can be used in conjunction with the guid-
into account by assuming that the fire stops growing when ance given in chapter 10: Smoke ventilation to calculate the
the sprinklers are activated. The design fire is then esti- depth of channelling screens etc.
mated as the size the fire has grown to at the moment of
sprinkler actuation unless there is reason to suspect that The proportion of the total heat release rate in the plume
the fire will continue to spread after the sprinklers have varies with the type of combustible material and the char-
been actuated. Since the sprinklers will cool most of the acteristics of the compartment (for flow out of an opening).
smoke layer to below 100 °C, flashover is not likely to For the purposes of design, the convective portion (Qp)
occur where they are installed. It can then be assumed can be assumed to be 66% of the total heat output of the
conservatively that the fire will have a constant rate of fire (Qt) (SFPE, 2016).
heat release (see Figure 6.4).
Alternatively, it could be assumed that, after sprinkler 6.7.2 Entrainment

activation, the heat output will slowly decrease. Experi-
ments in small compartments have suggested that fire It is assumed that the volume of smoke produced is equal
heat release rates will fall by 50% over a period of a few to the amount of air entrained into the plume. The concen-
minutes (Madrzykowski and Vettori, 1991). In some tration of smoke particles and toxic products depends on
circumstances, it may be assumed that the fire continues the type of fuel and ventilation rate.
Figure 6.4 Typical fire model
Steady-state fire
t2 growth period Decay period

Fire growth
Design fire
Natural fire
It may be assumed that decay occurs

after sprinkler activation or after a period
of steady-state burning; conservatively,
it may be assumed that there is no decay
Time
At a given height, entrainment depends on the heat output where msmoke is the mass flow of smoke in the plume
and, at small plume heights, on the geometry of the source. (kg · s–1), p is the perimeter of the source (m) and z is the
At large plume heights, entrainment is equivalent to that height of the plume above the fuel surface (m) (Thomas et
above a point source. The plume itself may be in the room al., 1963).
of fire origin (e.g. axisymmetric plume directly above the
source) or it may be outside the room, having emerged
from an open door or window (e.g. a spill plume). 6.7.4 Flow from an opening
For the purposes of smoke ventilation design, the zone of This Guide recommends that the following equations be
interest is above the flame tip height. used to calculate flow from an opening. It is, however,
acknowledged that there are alternative calculation meth-
ods (Morgan et al., 1999; Kumar et al., 2008; NFPA, 2015).
6.7.3 Axisymmetric plume
Spill plumes occur when the flow of gases leaving a fire
An axisymmetric plume is expected for a fire originating compartment opening rotate around and vertically rise
on the floor away from the walls. It has a virtual point from the opening or balcony edge into the adjacent space.
source. Air is entrained from all sides and along the entire The ascending spill plume entrains air as it rises. The total
height of the plume until the plume becomes submerged flow in the spill plume depends on the size of the opening,
in the smoke layer beneath the ceiling. the convective enthalpy of the gases flowing through the
opening, the presence of a balcony, downstand or other
The choice of calculation depends on the height of the construction element that affects either the flow through
plume above the fuel surface (z) and the linear dimension the opening or the subsequent entrainment into the rising
of the source (Ds) (BSI, 2002b). Typically, the fuel surface spill plume, and the vertical height between the spill edge
is taken as the finished floor level and the linear dimen- and the smoke layer interface in the adjacent space.
sion is taken as the diameter of the fire, unless otherwise
specified by the designer. 6.7.4.1 Flow from an opening of a room
The interface between the ‘far field’ and the ‘near field’ is The horizontal mass flow from an opening of a room
often assumed to be at the flame tip height, with the ‘far containing a fire (see Figure 6.5) is given by
field’ above the flame height and the ‘near field’ below it.
See section 6.9.3 for further guidance on calculating the mo = 0.09 Qp1/3 Wo2/3 ho (6.16)
flame height of the plume.
where mo is the horizontal mass flow of smoke from the
6.7.3.1 Far field room opening (kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat output of
fire (kW), Wo is the width of the opening (m) and ho is the
In the ‘far field’, height of the room opening (m).
msmoke = 0.071 Q1p/3 Qz - z0V5/3 (6.12) The smoke layer depth below the compartment opening,
do (m) (see Figure 6.5), is given by
where msmoke is the mass flow of smoke in the plume
# & (6.17)
1 mo 2/3
(kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat output of the fire (kW), do =
Cd 2Wo
z is the height of the plume above the fuel surface (m) (see
Figure 6.8) and z0 is the height of the virtual source above where mo is the horizontal mass flow of smoke from the
the fuel surface (m), room opening (kg · s–1), Wo is the width of the room open-
ing (m) and Cd is 1.0 for a flat ceiling below the spill edge
z0 =- 1.02 Ds + 1.38 Q* 5/3 D s (6.13) or 0.6 for a downstand below the spill edge (BSI, 2003b).
where Ds is the linear dimension of the source (typically
diameter) (m), and 6.7.4.2 The adhered spill plume
Qt Qt Adhered spill plumes are applicable where there is a wall

Q* = = (6.14) or solid construction directly above the spill edge, prevent-
t0 T0 cp g1/2 D 5s /2 1110 D 5s /2
ing entrainment from one side and leading to the plume
where Q* is a dimensionless heat release rate, Q is the total adhering to the wall. Adhered plumes are also known as
heat output of the fire (kW), g is acceleration due to grav- single-sided plumes, since entrainment occurring above the
ity (typically 9.81) (m · s–2), t0 is the ambient air density spill edge occurs only on one face (see Figure 6.6).
(typically 1.204 at 20 °C) (kg · m–3), T0 is the ambient air
temperature (K) and cp is the specific heat of air at constant Calculating total flow (Ws / ds ≤ 13)
pressure (typically 1.006) (kJ · kg–1 · K–1) (Zukoski et al.,
1981). Where Ws / ds ≤ 13, the entrainment for the adhered plume
is given by
6.7.3.2 Near field msmoke = 0.3 Q1p/3 Ws1/6 d1s /2 zs + 1.34 ms (6.18)
In the ‘near field’, where msmoke is the mass flow of smoke in the plume
(kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat output of fire (kW), Ws
msmoke = 0.19 p z3/2 (6.15) is the width of the flow at the spill edge (m), ds is the
Fire dynamics 6-9
Rising plume
mo, do
Wo Qp
Compartment ho
Fire compartment
tment opening Figure 6.5 Plume from a room
opening
Front view Section
msmoke
Adhered
spill plume
zs
Rising
gpplume
Wall
Spill edge ms, ds, hs

Ws Qp
Fire compartment
parrtment
Figure 6.6 Adhered spill plume
Front view Section
smoke layer depth below the spill edge (see equation 6.19) spill edge (see equation 6.20) (kg · s–1) (Harrison and Spear-
(m), zs is the height of rise from the spill edge to the point, 2010a).
underside of the smoke layer over which entrainment can
occur (m) and ms is the mass flow of smoke in the smoke Large entrainment heights
layer below the spill edge (see equation 6.20) (kg · s–1),
For large entrainment heights, where zs > ztrans, the plume
# & (6.19)
1 ms 2/3 flow becomes axisymmetric in nature, and the total mass
ds =
Cd 2Ws flow in the adhered spill plume is given by equation 6.12,
with z0 taken to be zero.
where Cd is 1.0 for a flat ceiling below the spill edge or 0.6
for a downstand below the spill edge, and The transition height ztrans is calculated as (Harrison and
Spearpoint, 2010b)
ztrans = 3.4 QWs2/3 + 1.56 ds2/3V (6.22)

ms = 0.09 Q1p/3 Ws2/3 hs (6.20) 3/2

where hs is the height of the spill edge above the level of
the fire (m) (Harrison and Spearpoint, 2010a). 6.7.4.3 The balcony spill plume
Calculating total flow (Ws / ds > 13) Balcony spill plumes are applicable where a balcony
projects beyond the compartment opening and there is no
Where Ws / ds > 13, the entrainment for the adhered wall or solid construction directly above the spill edge,
plume is given by therefore allowing entrainment to occur from both sides
of the rising plume. Balcony plumes are also known as
msmoke = 0.08 Qp1/3 Ws2/3 zs + 1.34 ms (6.21) double-sided plumes, as entrainment occurring above the
spill edge occurs on both faces (see Figure 6.7).
(kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat output of fire (kW), Ws Channelling screens (or side walls) below the level of the
is the width of the flow at the spill edge (m), zs is the spill edge and extending from the compartment opening
height of rise from the spill edge to the underside of the can be used to reduce the lateral spread of the spill plume,
smoke layer over which entrainment can occur (m) and ms thereby reducing the amount of entrainment above the
is the mass flow of smoke in the smoke layer below the spill edge.
msmoke
Balcony spill plume
b
zs
Rising plu
plume
me
Balcony Balcony
Room opening
Spill edge ms, ds, hs

Ws Qp
Channelling Channelling
elling
screen screen
en
Figure 6.7 Channelled
balcony spill plume
Front view Section
Channelled balcony spill plume 6.7.5 Smoke temperature

The total flow in a channelled balcony spill plume is given The excess average temperature of the hot gases can be
by calculated using the following equation:
msmoke = 0.16 Q1p/3 QWs2/3 + 1.56 d2s /3V zs + 1.34 ms (6.23) Qp

i=
msmoke cp (6.25)
(kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat output of the fire (kW),
Ws is the width of the flow at the spill edge (i.e. separation where msmoke is the mass flow of the smoke (kg · s–1), Qp is
between channelling screens) (m), ds is the smoke layer the convective heat output of the fire (kW), cp is the
depth below the spill edge (see equation 6.19) (m), zs is the specific heat of air at constant pressure (kJ · kg–1 · K–1) and
height of rise from the spill edge to the underside of the i is the excess average temperature (°C).
smoke layer over which entrainment can occur (m) and ms
is the mass flow of smoke in the smoke layer below the Smoke temperature can be found by adding the ambient
spill edge (see equation 6.20) (kg · s–1) (Harrison and Spear- temperature of the air to the excess temperature (i).
point, 2008).
The axial plume temperature is given by
Note that for large entrainment heights, where zs> ztrans,
(see equation 6.22) the plume flow becomes axisymmetric Tc = 2i + T0 (6.26)
in nature and the total mass flow in the adhered spill
plume is given by equation 6.12, with zo taken to be zero. where Tc is (absolute) axial temperature (K) and T0 is
ambient air temperature (K).
No channelling screens below balcony
6.7.6 Volume flow rate of smoke
Where there are no channelling screens below the balcony,
the entrainment in the vertical plume is given by
The volume flow rate of smoke is
msmoke = 0.16 Q1p/3 Q!Wo + b$2/3 + 1.56 d2o/3V zs + 1.34 mo (6.24)
T
V = msmoke
where msmoke is the mass flow of smoke in the plume t0 T0 (6.27)
(kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat output of fire (kW), Wo
is the width of the flow at the compartment opening (m), where msmoke is the mass flow of smoke (kg · s–1), t0 is the
b is the breadth of the balcony (m), do is the smoke layer ambient air density (typically 1.204 at 20 °C) (kg · m–3), T0
depth below the compartment opening (see equation 6.17) is ambient air temperature (K) and T is smoke temperature
(m), zs is the height of rise from the spill edge to the (K).
underside of the smoke layer over which entrainment can
occur (m) and mo is the mass flow of smoke in the smoke
layer below the compartment opening (see equation 6.16) 6.7.7 Ceiling flow
(kg · s–1) (Harrison and Spearpoint, 2010c).
Smoke will flow along the ceiling towards the vents or
This equation is limited to cases where Wo ≥ 2b. It has not fans. This flow is driven by the buoyancy of the smoke.
been verified for cases where a downstand exists prior to Irrespective of the reservoir or ventilation area, this flow-
the spill edge, so should not be applied in that situation. ing layer would still have a depth related to:
Fire dynamics 6-11
—— the width of the reservoir

—— the temperature of the smoke, and
—— the mass flow rate of smoke. h
z
This depth (dl) can be calculated as zf
dl = T Y (6.28)
Ml Tl 2/3
Figure 6.8 Axisymmetric smoke filling a room with a low-level opening
ci l0.5 Wl
where dl is the depth of the flowing layer (m), Ml is the Calculation routines for simple smoke filling can easily be
mass flow of smoke entering the layer (kg · s–1), Tl is the written. A specified growth curve (e.g. fast, medium or
smoke layer temperature, c is the downstand factor, i is slow) is subdivided into time elements and the entrain-
the excess temperature (e.g. rise of the smoke layer above ment equations are applied to each successive element.
ambient) (°C) and Wl is the width of the reservoir or the The layer depth in the reservoir at the end of each time
distance between channelling screens etc. (m) (BSI, element can then be taken as the starting point for the
2003b). next element. The smoke layer will therefore consist of a
number of elemental thin layers. In addition to adding
The downstand factor (c) is equal to 36 if a deep down- elemental layers, elemental smoke extract may be
stand is present at right angles to the flow, or 78 if no subtracted, depending on what type of smoke control (if
downstand is present at right angles to the flow. any) is applied. The output of the program can show, as a
function of time, the following:
Ml would usually be taken to be the mass of smoke
(msmoke), while Tl is taken to be the average temperature —— clear layer position
of the smoke plume as it enters the layer. —— average temperatures
—— average visibilities.
6.8 Accumulated ceiling

6.8.3 Smoke filling: rooms with
layer low-level ventilation openings
In such rooms, there is no smoke flow out of the low-level
6.8.1 General opening in the wall (see Figure 6.8). Heat loss to the room
surfaces, which would result in slightly smaller fire devel-
The simplest zone model postulates that smoke rises to opment, is neglected.
form a smoke layer of uniform depth and temperature
with a substantially smoke-free layer below it. Smoke
control systems are frequently required to maintain a 6.8.3.1 Axisymmetric plume
minimum height for the smoke-free layer for a specified
time (see chapter 10: Smoke ventilation). The elapsed time at which the smoke-free layer is at a
height z (m) is obtained by solving the differential
equation
6.8.2 Smoke filling times
dz Qp
t0 Af + msmoke + = 0 (6.29)
For steady-state smoke control design, the entrainment dt T0 cp
equations may be used to calculate the smoke exhaust
required. where Af is the floor area of the room (m2), msmoke is the
mass flow of smoke (kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat
However, in some large spaces the volume of the smoke output of the fire (kW), cp is the specific heat of air at
reservoir is so large that the size itself is a form of smoke constant pressure (kJ · kg–1 · K–1), t0 is the ambient air
control, since any smoke reservoir will take a finite time density (typically 1.204 at 20 °C) (kg · m–3), T0 is the ambi-
to become full. This time may be calculated by a number ent air temperature (K), z is the height of the plume above
of methods, as follows: the fuel surface (m) and t is time (s).
—— by using a computer program to integrate calcu- The variation of msmoke with z is described in section 6.7.
lated smoke volumes produced at small time
intervals (e.g. the ‘available safe egress time’ (aset) Solutions to equation 6.29 are given in Figure 6.9 for an
model) axisymmetric plume (equation 6.12) and constant Qp,
using dimensionless parameters as follows:
—— by integrating various relationships mathemati-
cally, using simplifying assumptions, to derive a Z=z h
formula (see below).
Q* = Qp "t0 T0 cp QghV1/2 h2% = Qp Q1100h5/2V
The latter method, being more approximate in nature, will
usually produce a conservative figure. x = t Qg hV1/2 Qh2 AfV = Q3.13th3/2V Af
where h is the floor-to-ceiling height of the room or the where Hc is the heat of combustion (kJ · kg–1), YCO is the
height of the ceiling above the base of the fire (m) (see mass yield of carbon monoxide per unit mass of fuel
Figure 6.8) and g is acceleration due to gravity (m · s–2). decomposed (kg · kg–1), R is the rate of burning (kg · s–1)
and Q is the total heat output of the fire (kW).
Figure 6.9 solves the following integral:
6.8.3.2 Spill plume
dZ
#z
1
0.195 QQ*V1/3 Z 5/3 + Q*

x= (6.30)
For a spill plume, such as given by equation 6.18, 6.21,
6.23 or 6.24, i.e.
Where the ceiling area and the smoke base area are both
equal to Af , the average density of the smoke layer (ts) is msmoke = aQp1/3 Ws2/3 zs (6.36)
given by
ts t0 = 1 - Q* x Q1 - ZV (6.31)
where a is a numerical factor, Ws is the width of the flow
at the spill edge (m), msmoke is the mass flow of smoke in
the plume (kg · s–1), Qp is the convective heat output of the
The average temperature of the smoke layer Ts (K) is fire (kW), zs is the height of the rise from the spill edge to
given by the underside of the smoke layer over which entrainment
QTs - T0V T0 = 1 !1 - Q* x Q1 - ZV$ (6.32)
can occur (m), the differential equation is

dzs Qp
Where an impurity such as carbon monoxide can be t0 Af + aQ1p/3 Ws2/3 zs + = 0 (6.37)
dt T0 cp
related to Qp by the expression
mCO = C QQp cp T0V (6.33)

where Af is the floor area of the room (m2), cp is the
specific heat of air at constant pressure (kJ · kg–1 · K–1), t0
is the ambient air density (typically 1.204 at 20 °C)
where mCO is the mass rate of generation of carbon (kg · m–3), T0 is ambient air temperature (K) and t is time
monoxide (kg · s–1), the mass fraction in the ceiling layer (s).
(fm) is given by
fm = CQ* x Q1 - ZV (6.34)
The solution to this equation, with constant Qp, is

a + QQ*V2/3
QQ*V1/3 x = ln U 2 Z (6.38)
1
a2 Z + QQ*V2/3
where C is given by equation 6.35b below. Note that
a2
mCO = YCO R = YCO Qt Hc (6.35a) where
C = YCO cp T0 Hc (6.35b) Q* = Qp "t0 T0 cp QghV1/2 QhWsV% = Q Q1100 h3/2 WsV
1.0 Figure 6.9 Solutions of equation

6.29 for an axisymmetric plume
0.8
0.6
Value of Z
0.4
0.2
0.002
Q* = 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01
0.0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Value of [(Q*)1/3 τ ]
Fire dynamics 6-13
x = t Qg hV1/2 QhWs AfV = 3.13 th1/2 Ws Af the negative pressure zone, and the extract air is taken
from the positive pressure zone. The height of the neutral
a2 = a QT0 cp t20V / = 2.72 a plane, therefore, must be known. If h1 and h2 are the
13
distances from the neutral plane to the lower and upper
openings, respectively, then
Z = zs h
QQ*V1/3 x = 0.303 QQWs2V1/3 t Af

h1 A2 T
= 22 1 (6.43)
h2 A1 T0

where A1 and A2 are the areas of the lower and upper
where h is the floor-to-ceiling height of the room or the openings, respectively, and T0 and T1 are the lower and
height of the ceiling above the base of the fire (m) and g upper temperatures, respectively (Thomas et al., 1963).
is acceleration due to gravity (m · s–2). The sum of h1 and h2 must always equal the total distance
between the upper and lower openings, and therefore the
Equations 6.31, 6.32 and 6.34 can be used to calculate the location of the neutral plane can be determined.
average temperature, density and mass fraction by insert-
ing the above values.
6.8.4 Smoke filling: open rooms
This solution can be used where smoke flows from a
communicating space into a large volume space, such as a
approaching flashover
shopping mall or atrium, by entering equation 6.18, 6.21,
6.23 or 6.24 and the dimensions Af and h of the large The calculations given in section 6.8.3 are not suitable
volume. where flames are approaching ceiling height or where
smoke flows out of the wall opening. Under these circum-
stances, the following equation may be used:
Ts - T0 = 9.15 !QQ2p QAo h1o/2 ak AtVV$ (6.44)

6.8.3.3 Room filling with smoke extract 1/3
from layer
where Qp is the convective heat output of the fire (kW),

A critical height of the smoke layer may be dictated by the
Ao is the area of ventilation opening (door, window etc.)
need to keep it above eye level, inside a reservoir or, if
(m2), ho is the height of the ventilation opening (m), ak is
otherwise too hot, well above head level. This is covered
the effective heat transfer coefficient (kW · m–2 · K–1) and
in further detail in chapter 10: Smoke ventilation.
At is the area of the room surface (wall, floor, ceiling) (m2)
(McCaffrey et al., 1981).
If the critical ‘clear layer’ height zc (m) would be reached
before the occupants have escaped, then extract from the
smoke layer can be provided, under steady-state condi- Equation 6.44 was derived for At / (Ao ho1/2) values between
tions, as follows: 16 and 530 m–1/2.
Mout = Mc (6.39) By substituting (Ts – T0) = 580 K in equation 6.44, the

value of Q at flashover is given by
Qf = 505 QAo h1o/2 ak AtV (6.45)

where Mout is the mass flow rate of the vented smoke
(kg · s–1) and Mc is the mass flow rate in the plume (kg · s–1) 1/2
at height zc (m).
where Qf is the convective heat output of the fire at flash-
The temperature of the vented smoke, Ts (K), under over (kW).
steady-state conditions will be given by
For [Anet / (Avo ho1/2)] < 10  m–1/2, the following value for Qf
Ts - T0 = Qp QMout cpV (6.40) is recommended (Thomas, 1981):
and the volume flow rate, v (m3 · s–1), by Qf = 5.2 Anet + 252 Ao h1o/2 (6.46)
v = QMout t0V + Qp Qt0 T0 cpV (6.41) where
With natural ventilation, the mass flow rate of the vented Anet = At + Ao (6.47)
smoke is given by
The effective heat transfer coefficient is derived from
Cd Avo t0 !2gQh - zVQTs - T0V T0$1/2
ak = Qmw tw cw tcV1/2 (6.48)
Ts1/2 "Ts + QAvo AviV T0%
Mout = 2 1/2 (6.42)
where Avo is the outlet ventilation area (m2), Avi is the where mw is the thermal conductivity of the wall material
ventilation inlet area (m2) and Cd is the discharge coeffi- (kW · m–1 · K–1), tw is the density of the wall material
cient (BSI, 2002b). Values for discharge coefficients (kg · m–3), cw is the specific heat capacity of the wall mate-
(between 0.6 and 0.9) are provided by the vent rial (kJ · kg–1 · K–1) and tc is the characteristic burn time (s)
manufacturer. (Drysdale, 2011).
The location of the extract points is determined by the Table 6.4 gives values of ak for a characteristic burn time
location of the neutral plane, so that inlet air enters within of 900 s.
Table 6.4 Effective heat transfer coefficient to 6.8.7 Stratification

the surfaces of a room or compartment
Material of surface ak / When the ambient temperature at ceiling level is signifi-

kW · m–2 · K–1 cantly higher than at the level where the fire starts, the
Concrete 55 × 10–3 upward movement of the smoke plume may cease, due to
lack of buoyancy, and stratification may occur.
Brick 36 × 10–3
Plaster 21 × 10–3 The maximum height of rise of an axisymmetric plume is
Plasterboard 13 × 10–3
given by
Fibre insulating board 5.2 × 10–3 zm = 5.54 Q1p/4 QdT/dzV-3/8 (6.53)
Flashover is not expected until there are sustained flames where zm is the maximum height of smoke rise above the
at ceiling level. For axisymmetric sources of base dimen- base of the fire (m), Qp is the convective heat release rate
sion less than the ceiling height, the minimum condition (kW) and dT / dz is the rate of change of ambient temper-
for flashover is given by ature with respect to height (assumed to be linear) (K · m–1)
(NFPA, 2015).
hf 1 0.094 Q2p/5 (6.49)
where hf is the height of the ceiling above the base of fire

for flashover (m) (Cox and Chitty, 1980). 6.9 Flame calculations
For extended area sources, the minimum condition for
flashover is given by 6.9.1 General
hf 1 0.035 Q2p/3 Qd1 + 0.074 Q2p/5V (6.50)
2/3
Various methods are available to calculate flame heights
for both hydrocarbon and cellulosic fires, and for
where dl is the longer dimension of the source (m). post-flashover fires. These are mainly used to estimate
radiant heating or radiant and convective heating of
combustible materials and elements of the structure,
6.8.5 Heat transfer to building although it may be necessary to assess radiant effects on
surfaces personnel, such as firefighters. Calculating flame height
can show where flame impingement is likely to occur. For
In the simple room filling model considered in 6.8.3, heat example, if it can be shown that a steel member is not
transfer to the ceiling and wall surfaces is neglected. This engulfed in flame, it may be possible to use materials
is a conservative assumption in that the volume of smoke which that shorter fire resistance periods.
is overestimated. However, if low-temperature smoke is
filling a large reservoir, then cooling may lead to loss of
buoyancy, which should be taken into account. In the 6.9.2 Heat flux calculation
absence of experimental data, it is suggested that cooling
effects should be allowed for where the area of the reser- By assuming flame heights and areas of burning, it is
voir is greater than 2000 m2, and/or the average layer possible to calculate the radiation due to a fire which
temperature is less than 10 K above ambient when calcu- impinges on a separate fuel package.
lated by neglecting cooling. Further guidance is given in
chapter 10: Smoke ventilation. In areas not equipped with sprinklers, fires will tend to
grow until limited by lack of fuel or air. In compartments
where items of fuel are very widely spaced, it is possible
6.8.6 Heat transfer from smoke to predict whether fire spread will occur from item to
layer by radiation item. This is done by calculating the radiative heat flux
originating from the fire and which falls on the target
The radiation emitted from a hot smoke layer is given by item:
Ir = fs v Ts4 (6.51) Ir = zff v Tf4 (6.54)
where Ir is the intensity of the emitted radiation (kW · m–2), where Ir is the radiative heat flux (kW · m–2), z is a configu-
fs is the emissivity of the smoke layer, v is the Stefan– ration factor (see below), ff is the flame emissivity, v is the
Boltzmann constant (5.67 × 10–11) (kW · m–2 · K–4) and Ts is Stefan–Boltzmann constant (5.67 × 10–11) (kW · m–2 · K–4)
the average (absolute) smoke layer temperature (K). and Tf is the flame temperature (K) (SFPE, 2016).
As a conservative assumption, fs may be taken as unity. The configuration factor, z, represents the geometrical
Alternatively, it may be estimated for a ceiling layer from relationship between the source and target. The above is a
fs = 1 - exp !- Q0.33 + 470 mfVQh - zV$ (6.52)

very general method for calculating radiative heat flux. A
more detailed analysis, including techniques for calculat-
ing z, is given in the SFPE Handbook (SFPE, 2016).
where h is the height of the ceiling (m), z is the height of
the layer interface (m) and mf is the mass concentration of The heat flux impinging on combustible material will
smoke aerosol (kg · m–3) (SFPE, 2016). cause it to heat up. Whether this heating results in
Fire dynamics 6-15
ignition depends on the intensity of the incident flux. drawn to the SFPE Handbook (SFPE, 2016). Hydrocarbon
Experimental work by Babrauskas (1981) suggests that for fires in the open are likely to be influenced strongly by the
very thin materials, such as curtains, the heat flux required wind, and this should be taken into account.
for ignition could be relatively low, at around 10 kW · m–2.
For thick materials, the value may be higher, i.e. about
40  kW · m–2. BR187 (Chitty, 2014) gives a conservative 6.9.4 Flame projection (post-
value of 12.6  kW · m–2 to be used in design, based on the flashover)
piloted ignition of unprotected dry wood; although, spon-
taneous ignition and the effects of paint and moisture can On occasions it may be necessary to calculate the flame
further increase the critical radiation intensity required to projection from openings in a compartment that is
cause ignition. The Ignition Handbook (Babrauskas, 2003) involved in a fully developed fire (see Figure 6.10). Flame
provides ignition conditions for a range of materials. It is projection from the windows or doors in a compartment
suggested that a value of 20 kW · m–2 be taken as appropri- can be estimated from the work of Law and O’Brien, as
ate for most materials. This figure is the same as that contained in Eurocode 1 (BSI, 2002a: annex B). The
found by Thomas and Bullen (1979) as the critical heat height of the flame above the top of the opening, zfo , is
flux for flashover in a room. given by
zfo + ho = 12.8 QR wV
2/3
(6.57)
6.9.3 Calculation of flame height
where zfo is the flame height above the top of the opening
The larger the flame or the surface that is radiating heat, (m), ho is the height of the opening (m), R is the rate of
the larger will be the total heat that is emitted. This fuel combustion (kg · s–1) and w is the width of compart-
implies that larger flames give larger values of z. There- ment openings (m).
fore, the estimation of flame heights is a crucial part of the
calculation process. For cellulosic fires, the ventilation-controlled rate of burn-
ing, R, may be calculated from Thomas’s correlation
For most fires away from walls, the plume can be consid- (Thomas, 1973) as follows:
ered to be axisymmetric. The mean flame height of
luminous flames for fires is given by R = 0.02 "QAt - AoVQAo ho VQw dV%
1/2
(6.58)
zf = 0.2 Q2t /5 (6.55) where R is the rate of fuel combustion (kg · s–1), At is the
area of enclosing walls (m2), Ao is the area of the opening
where Qt is the total heat output of the fire (kW) and zf is (m2), ho is the height of the opening (m), w is the width
the mean flame height of the luminous flame (m) (Cox and of the wall containing an opening (m) and d is the depth
Chitty, 1980) (see Figure 6.8). of the room behind an opening (m).
As an alternative to equation 6.55, the mean flame height The heat output of the fire is given earlier by equation 6.8.
is also given by
zf = 0.235 Q2t /5 - 1.02 D f (6.56) 6.9.5 Fire resistance assessment

where Df is the fire diameter (m) (SFPE, 2016). If The fire resistance value is based, for example, on a furnace
unknown, the fire diameter may be estimated from the test specified in ISO 834-1: 1999 (ISO, 1999), BS 476-20:
heat output by assuming an average fire load density and 1987 (BSI, 1987) or BS EN 1363-1: 2012 (BSI, 2012) (or
then calculating the area of burning. from conditions for fire resistance testing for specific
applications). A real fire may be shown to be less or more
As equations 6.55 and 6.56 do not perfectly agree, the more severe (see Figure 6.11), in which case the fire resistance
conservative choice should be made if there is any doubt. period may be reduced (Butcher and Parnell, 1983) or may
need to be increased. In Figure 6.11, curves 60(1/4) and
The above relationships do not apply to hydrocarbon fires. 60(1/2) are typical of shop fires (60 kg · m–2), and curves
The calculation of such fires is complex and attention is 30(1/4) and 30(1/2) are typical of office fires (20–30 kg · m–2).
Flame projection Figure 6.10 Flame projection

Flame projection
Fla from an opening
zfo zfo d
Ao = ho w
ho ho
Co
Compartment
op
opening
w Compartment
opening
Front view Section

1200 (a) Simple case
1000 Furnace curve

(BS 476)
Average temperature / °C
800
600
60(1/4)
60(1/2)
400 30(1/4)
30(1/2)
15(1/4)
200
15(1/2) Af = w1 w2 Ao = wo ho
7.5(1/4)
7.5(1/2)
0 Anet = 2 Af + 2 h Qw1 + w2V - Ao
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time / minutes
d w = w2 w1
Note: 60(1/2) means fire load 60 kg·m–2 of floor area and ventilation
50% of one wall
Figure 6.11 Effect on fire temperature of fire load and ventilation.

(b) More than one window
(Reproduced from Designing for Fire Safety by EG Butcher and AC
Parnell, by permission of David Fulton Publishers Ltd.)
Methods for calculating compartment temperatures are

beyond the scope of this section. However, detailed calcu- ho3
lation procedures are given by Law and O’Brien in
Eurocode 1 (BSI, 2002a: annex B), in the SFPE Handbook ho2
wo3
(SFPE, 2016) and by Thomas (1986). ho1 wo2
wo1
Appendix: Dimensions of a room

or compartment
Ao1 = wo1 ho1 Ao2 = wo2 ho2 etc.
The following dimensions and areas should be Ao = A1 + A2 + etc. wo = wo1 + wo2 + etc.
calculated:
Ao1 + Ao2 + etc.
h=
Ao
Af Floor area (m2)
Ao Area of opening (window or doorway) of room (c) Windows in more than one wall
(m2)
Wall 3 Wall 4
Anet Internal surface area of room minus area of open-
ings (m2)
c Core dimension (m)
d Depth of opening (m)
h Floor-to-ceiling height of room or height above

base of fire (m)
ho Height of opening (window or doorway)
w Width of wall containing an opening (m)
wo Width of an opening or doorway (m) (Wall 1 contains the greatest window area)
Fire dynamics 6-17
Aow1 = window area on wall 1 BSI (2003b) BS 7346-4: 2003 Components for smoke and heat control systems.
Functional recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat
exhaust ventilation systems, employing steady-state design fires. Code of practice
Aow2 = window area on wall 2 etc. (London: British Standards Institution) (2003)
BSI (2012) BS EN 1363-1: 2012 Fire resistance tests. General requirements
Ao = Aow1 + Aow2 + etc.
w2 Aow1 BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
d w=
w1 Ao buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
Bukowski RW (1993) ‘A review of international fire risk prediction

(d) Compartment with core methods’ Proceedings of the 6th International Fire Conference (Interflam ’93)
(Oxford: Interscience Communications)
Butcher EG and Parnell AC (1983) Designing for Fire Safety (London:

David Fulton Publishers)
Chitty R (2014) External Fire Spread: Building separation and boundary

distances BR 187 (2nd edition) (Garston, Watford: IHS BRE Press)
CIBSE (2010) CIBSE Guide E (3rd edition) (London: Chartered

Institution of Building Services Engineers)
Cox G and Chitty R (1980) ‘A study of the deterministic properties of

unbound fire plumes’ Combustion and Flame 39 191–209
c2 c1 Drysdale DD (2011) An Introduction to Fire Dynamics (2nd edition)
(Chichester: Wiley)
Evans DD and Stroup DW (1985) Methods to Calculate the Response of

Heat and Smoke Detectors Installed Below Large Unobstructed Ceilings
Af = w1 w2 - c1 c2 NBSIR 85-3167 (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Standards)
Harrison R and Spearpoint M (2008) ‘Characterisation of balcony spill

Anet = 2 Af + 2 h Qw1 + w2 + c1 + c2V - Ao plume entrainment using physical scale modelling’ Proceedings of the 9th
Symposium of the International Association for Fire Safety Science (London:
Qw2 - c2V Aow1 IAFSS) 727–738
d w=
Qw1 - c1V Ao
Harrison R and Spearpoint M (2010a) ‘Physical scale modelling of
adhered spill plume entrainment’ Fire Safety Joural 45 (3) 149–158
Harrison R and Spearpoint M (2010b) ‘A simple approximation to predict

the transition from a balcony spill plume to an axisymmetric plume’
References Journal of Fire Protection Engineering 20 (4) 273–289
Harrison R and Spearpoint M (2010c) ‘A comparison of channelled and

Annable K (2006) Effectiveness of Sprinklers in Residential Premises – An
unchannelled balcony spill plumes’ Journal of Building Services Engineering
Evaluation of Concealed and Recessed Pattern Sprinkler Products. Section 5:
Research and Technology 31 (3) 265–277
Thermal sensitivity BRE Report 218113 (Watford: BRE Ltd)
Heskestad G and Bill RG (1988) ‘Quantification of thermal responsiveness
Babrauskas V (1981) Will the Second Item Ignite? Report NBSIR 81-2271
of automatic sprinklers including conduction effects’ Fire Safety Journal
(Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute for Standards and Technology)
14 113–125
Babrauskas V (1986) ‘Free burning fires’ Fire Safety Journal 11 33–51
Ingason H (1993) Fire Experiments in a Two-dimensional Rack Storage
Babrauskas V (2003) Ignition Handbook (Issaquah, WA: Fire Science (Brandforsk project 701-917) SP Report 1993:56 (Borås, Sweden: Swedish
Publishers/SFPE) National Testing and Research Institute (SP))
BSI (1987) BS 476-20: 1987 Fire tests on building materials and structures. ISO (1999) ISO 834-1:1999 Fire-resistance tests. Elements of building
Method for determination of the fire resistance of elements of construction construction. Part 1: General requirements (Geneva: International
(general principles) (London: British Standards Institution) Organization for Standardization)
BSI (1999) BS EN 12259-1: 1999 Fixed firefighting systems. Components for Karlson B and Quintiere JG (2000) Enclosure Fire Dynamics (Boca Raton,
sprinkler and water spray systems. Sprinklers (London: British Standards FL: CRC Press)
Institution)
Kumar S, Thomas PH and Cox G (2008) ‘A novel analytical approach for
BSI (2002a) BS EN 1991-1-2: 2002 Eurocode 1: Actions on structures Part characterising air entrainment into a balcony spill plume’ Proceedings of
1–2 General actions – Actions on structures exposed to fire (London: British the 9th Symposium of the International Association for Fire Safety Science
Standards Institution) (2002) (London: IAFSS) 739–750
BSI (2002b) PD 7974-2: 2002 The application of fire safety engineering Law M (1978) ‘Fire safety of external building elements – the design
principles to fire safety design of buildings - Part 2: Spread of smoke and toxic approach’ Engineering Journal 15 59–74
gases within and beyond the enclosure of origin (Sub-system 2). (London:
British Standards Institution) (Note: PD 7974-2: 2002 has been replaced McCaffrey BJ, Quintiere JG and Harkleroad MF (1981) ‘Estimating
by PD 7974-2: 2019) room temperatures and the likelihood of flashover using fire test data
correlations’ Fire Technology 17 (2) 98–119 and 18 (1) 122
BSI (2003a) PD 7974-1: 2003 The application of fire safety engineering principles
to fire safety design of buildings. Initiation and development of fire within the Madrzykowski D and Vettori RL (1991) A Sprinklered Fire Suppression
enclosure of origin (Sub-system 1) (London: British Standards Institution) Algorithm for the GSA Engineering Fire Assessment System (Gaithersburg,
(Note: PD 7974-1: 2003 has been replaced by PD 7974-1: 2019) MD: National Institute for Standards and Technology)
Morgan HP, Ghosh BK, Garrad G, Pamlitschka R, De Smedt J-C and Thomas PH (1986) ‘Design guide – structural fire safety’ (CIB W14
Schoonbaert LR (1999) Design Methodologies for Smoke and Heat Exhaust Workshop) Fire Safety Journal 10 (2) 77–137
Systems BRE Report 368 (Garston, Watford: BRE Press)
Thomas PH and Bullen ML (1979) ‘On the role of KtC of room limiting
NFPA (2015) NFPA 92 Standard for smoke control systems (2015 edition) materials in the growth of room fires’ Fire and Materials 3 (2) 68–73
(Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association) Thomas PH, Hinkley PL, Theobald CR and Simms DL (1963)
Investigations into the Flow of Hot Gases in Roof Venting Fire Research
SFPE (2016) SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (5th edition)
Technical Paper No. 7 (London: The Stationery Office)
(Boston, MA: SFPE; Quincy, MA: NFPA)
Wade C, Baker G, Frank K, Robbins A, Harrison R, Spearpoint M and
Thomas PH (1973) Behavior of Fires in Enclosures – Some recent progress Fleischmann C (2013) B-RISK User Guide and Technical Manual BRANZ
(Pittsburgh, PA: Combustion Institute) Study Report 28 (Judgeford, Porirua City: BRANZ Ltd)
Thomas PH (1981) ‘Testing products and materials for their contribution Zukoski EE, Kubota T and Cetegen B (1981) ‘Entrainment in fire
to flashover in rooms’ Fire and Materials 5 (3) 103–111 plumes’ Fire Safety Journal 3 (3) 107–121
7-1
7 Means of escape and human factors
7.1 Introduction the primary objective of the document is to ‘ensure that
an adequate standard of life safety can be achieved in the
event of fire in the building’.
7.1.1 General
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (NFPA, 2018) sets the following
This section covers the basic principles of designing for goals in relation to fire:
escape by using the established fire safety design codes or
an alternative fire safety engineering approach. A goal of this Code is to provide an environment for the
occupants that is reasonably safe from fire and similar
emergencies by the following means:
This Guide is not intended to replace existing codes of
practice, and reference to them will still be necessary.
(1) Protection of occupants not intimate with the initial fire
However, it is intended that this chapter will assist design- development
ers in applying best practice and provide an understanding
of some of the underlying principles of means of escape (2) Improvement of the survivability of occupants intimate
design. with the initial fire development.
The code then sets the following objectives:

7.1.2 Requirements of building
regulations —— Occupant protection: A structure shall be designed
and constructed and maintained to protect occu-
As described in Chapter 2, most countries have introduced pants not intimate with the initial fire development
legislation to ensure the safe design of buildings. These for the time needed to evacuate, relocate or defend
regulations are generally supported by guidance documents, in place.
which describe how adequate provision for escape can be
achieved. These guidance documents often provide ‘deemed —— Structural integrity: Structural integrity shall be
to satisfy’ solutions and set limits on maximum travel maintained for the time needed to evacuate, relo-
distances, prescribe exit widths, specify fire resistance cate, or defend in place occupants who are not
requirements etc. intimate with the initial fire development.
—— Systems effectiveness: Systems utilised to achieve the
However, increasingly, the regulations allow for other goals set out by the Code shall be effective in
solutions, provided it can be demonstrated that the occu- mitigating the hazard or condition for which they
pants of a building are ultimately able to reach a place of are being used, shall be reliable, shall be maintained
safety outside the building. This can be done by means of to the level at which they were designed to operate,
a fire engineering assessment, which should be entrusted and shall remain operational.
to suitably qualified and experienced persons.
The objectives of these codes should be achieved without
the need for outside assistance, e.g. from the fire service,
whose arrival may be delayed. Both UK and international
7.2 Objectives of escape guidance assume a single fire source and therefore do not
design take account of the potential impact of an arson attack
involving multiple ignition locations.
7.2.1 General
7.2.2 Evacuation strategies
The objectives of any escape design are similar and are
typified by the requirements of the Building Regulations The simplest escape strategy is to ensure that, as soon as
2010 for England and Wales, for example, which state: a fire has been confirmed, all the occupants proceed to
leave the building simultaneously. However, some situa-
The building shall be designed and constructed so that there tions require variations from this strategy of simultaneous
are appropriate provisions for the early warning of fire and evacuation, for example:
appropriate means of escape in case of fire from the building to
a place of safety outside the building capable of being safely and
—— the provision of protected refuges where disabled
effectively used at all material times.
people can await assistance in relative safety, i.e.
protected from the effects of fire and smoke
The guidance in support of these regulations – Approved
Document B (HM Government, 2013) – provides recom- —— apartment buildings where a defend-in-place strategy
mendations to control or mitigate the effects of fire and is adopted by providing a high degree of fire
protection, such as fire-resisting separation Identify the maximum number of

between individual dwellings occupants in each part of the building
(occupant capacity)
—— hospitals where escape involves progressive horizon-
tal evacuation from the fire-affected area into
adjoining fire compartments Determine the number and width
of exits required to accommodate
—— tall buildings where phased evacuation is adopted the occupants (usually after
and only the fire floor (and sometimes the one discounting the widest exit)
above) is evacuated in the first instance
—— very high rise buildings where escape down stairs Establish the degree of protection
can be prolonged and tiring and protected refuge required to stairs, escape corridors
and refuge areas (if any)
levels are provided where people can wait in safety
before being evacuated using the lifts or stairs
—— facilities where the immediate interruption of Ensure that the distance of travel to
the nearest exit is acceptable (from
some function could cause major problems (e.g. air
all points)
traffic control centres or hazardous process plants)
and the evacuation of key personnel must be delayed
Specify other measures required to
—— prisons or mental health facilities where escape assist in the use of escapte routes:
may be into adjoining secure areas or into a secure ● fire detection
compound. ● fire alarm
● emergency lighting
● signage
● release of security doors etc.
7.3 Design codes

Figure 7.1 Escape design: key steps
The guidance document used for design of the means of
escape will largely depend on the type of building involved.
Guidance is provided in various documents, such as:
auditoria, where a fixed number of seats are provided, the
maximum number of occupants can be readily and accu-
—— Approved Document B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Build-
rately established. However, in many situations it is
ings other than dwellinghouses (Section B1: Means of
necessary to estimate the likely maximum occupancy
warning and escape) (HM Government, 2013)
based on floor space factors.
—— Technical Handbook — Non-Domestic (Scottish
Government, 2017) Floor space factors are given in terms of the likely mini-
mum area occupied by each person (m2 per person) and
—— BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management are usually very conservative (i.e. they are likely to signif-
and use of buildings. Code of practice (BSI, 2017) icantly overestimate the building population). The
—— BS 9991: 2015 Fire safety in the design, management population can then be determined by dividing the area of
and use of residential buildings. Code of practice (BSI, the room or storey by the floor space factor. Some typical
2015) floor space factors given in various guidance documents
are summarised in Table 7.1.
—— Health Technical Memorandum 05-02: Firecode.
Guidance in support of functional provisions (Fire safety The population of a room can be determined as follows:
in the design of healthcare premises) (DoH, 2015)
—— NFPA 101: Life Safety Code (NFPA, 2018) area of room
occupant capacity = (7.1)
—— Australian Building Code Board: National Construc- floor space factor
tion Code (ABCB, 2016) In calculating the occupant capacity based on British
—— New Zealand Building Code. codes, toilets, stair shafts, voids and fixed elements of
structure (but not counters and display units etc. in retail
The British and NFPA codes are internationally recog- premises) can generally be discounted from the floor area
nised and are widely used beyond their respective countries calculation. However, in most cases (except assembly use)
of origin. In certain parts of the world, designers will have NFPA codes utilise the gross floor area.
the option of using NFPA or British Standards, perhaps
in some instances supplemented by local codes. Where specific data are available to demonstrate the actual
maximum occupancies (e.g. a retailer’s own trading figures
The key steps involved in escape design using traditional or number of covers in a restaurant), British codes recog-
prescriptive codes are illustrated in Figure 7.1. nise that these may be used instead of the standard floor
space factors.
7.3.1 Occupant capacity A common example is the acceptance of a floor space

factor of 10 m2 per person in office buildings, where guid-
The occupant capacity of a room, storey or other part of a ance such as Approved Document B (ADB), Volume 2
building is the maximum number of persons that it is suggests 6 m2 per person (BSI, 2013). However, if the use
designed or expected to hold. In theatres and cinema changes from a traditional office to a call centre with a
Means of escape and human factors 7-3
Table 7.1 Floor space factors recommended in British and US Table 7.2 Capacities for narrow exits
guidance documents
Maximum number of persons Minimum clear width of exit / mm
Type of accommodation Floor space factor / m2 per person
60 750
ADB Volume 2 NFPA 101
110 850
Bars, standing spectator areas
220 1050
(concentrated use without fixed 0.3 0.65
seating)
Amusement arcade, assembly hall,
bingo hall (less concentrated use 0.5 1.4
without fixed seating) less than 1050 mm wide will have a proportionately lower
Exhibition hall 1.5 1.4 capacity than a larger exit and the exit capacities given in
Restaurant, committee room, Table 7.2 are widely adopted.
1.0 1.4
staffroom etc.
Shop sales area 2.0–7.0 2.8–5.6 A different approach is adopted in NFPA 101, where it is
not necessary to discount an exit or to adopt reduced capac-
Office 6.0 9.3
ities for door openings between 810 and 1050 mm wide.
Library 7.0 4.6–9.3
Kitchen 7.0 9.3 In some fire safety codes, the main entrance/exit of the
Art gallery or museum 5.0 –
building must be larger than other exits. For example, in
NFPA 101, the main entrance/exit of assembly occupan-
Industrial production 5.0 9.3 cies must be able to accommodate at least one-half of the
Airport terminals:
– 9.3
total occupant load. In dance halls, discotheques, night-
Concourse
– 1.4 clubs and assembly occupancies with festival seating, the
Waiting areas main entrance/exit must be able to accommodate at least
– 1.9
Baggage claim two-thirds of the total occupant load.
– 27.9
Baggage handling
BS 9999 outlines a risk-based approach to designing means

of escape and can accommodate narrow exit widths based
more densely packed seating arrangement, the exit provi- on the design of the building and level of building manage-
sion based on 10  m2 per person may prove to be inadequate. ment. It is important that BS 9999 is used in its entirety
It is therefore important that any reduction in exit capac- and that the escape provisions are not cherry-picked.
ity that may restrict the future flexibility of use is agreed
with the client and recorded in a fire safety management
plan (see chapter 14: Fire safety management). 7.3.3 Stair capacities
However, it should be noted that the NFPA codes do not 7.3.3.1 Simultaneous evacuation
allow any relaxation of the specified floor space factors.
A protected stair enclosure can be considered as a place of
In some escape designs, it may be necessary to hold people relative safety. The capacity of a stair is therefore depend-
in a protected refuge area before they ultimately leave the ent on the rate at which people can leave by the final exit
building. When estimating the holding capacity of a and the number of people that can be accommodated
protected refuge area, a figure of 2 persons per m2 is (stacking capacity) in the enclosure.
suggested as a reasonable maximum occupant density.
Following British codes, the capacity of a stair designed
7.3.2 Exit widths for simultaneous evacuation can be derived from the
following equation (subject to minimum stair widths,
When the occupant capacity has been established, the which depend on the occupancy type):
P = 200 w + 50 Qw - 0.3VQn - 1V (7.2)

required width of exits can be determined. The minimum
recommended exit width can vary depending on the guid-
ance fire safety code used. As an example, the clear exit
width per person in BS 9999 can be as low as 2.4 mm per where P = the number of people that can be served by the
person, while in NFPA 101 it can be as high as 7.6 mm stair, w = the width of the stair (m) and n = the number
per person (subject to overall minimum width constraints). of storeys served.
The route to any one exit may be blocked by fire and it is Equation 7.2 can be rewritten to give the required width
therefore usual practice in British codes to discount the (w) of the stair, as follows:
largest exit from the calculations.
P + 15 n - 15
w= (7.3)
Therefore, if three equally sized exits are available and 150 + 50 n
these need to accommodate 500 people, the required width
would be (500 × 5 mm) = 2500 mm. Since it is necessary NFPA 101 adopts a simpler approach, where multiple
to discount one exit, the required minimum clear width of levels are evacuated simultaneously. The stair width is
each of the remaining two exits would be (2500 / 2) = calculated by multiplying the total number of people
1250 mm. The third discounted exit should also be at least needing to evacuate at one time by the required width per
1250 mm clear width. ADB Volume 2 assumes that an exit person.
7.3.3.2 Phased evacuation British guidance recommends that alternative escape

routes should be provided in directions which are at least
In high-rise buildings, it is common practice to design the 45° apart or be separated by fire-resisting construction
stairways based on phased evacuation, i.e. a process in (see Figure 7.2). US codes, such as NFPA 101, recom-
which the fire floor only (or the fire floor and the one mend that alternative exits should be separated by a
above) is initially evacuated, the remaining floors being distance equal to at least one-half the diagonal drawn
evacuated as and when necessary. This requires adequate across the room, or one-third in sprinklered buildings
fire compartmentation between levels to protect those (see Figure 7.3).
levels that are not evacuated immediately.
In British guidance, where the maximum occupancy of a
Most British codes recommend a stair width of 5 mm per room or storey exceeds 600 people, at least three adequately
person (i.e. the same width criterion as for horizontal separated exits should be provided. NFPA 101 generally
travel). However, to take account of the slower speed of requires a minimum of three exits for 500 to 1000 occu-
travel down stairs, NFPA 101 typically recommends the pants and a minimum of four exits where the occupant
provision of 7.6 mm per person (subject to minimum stair load is more than 1000 persons.
widths). It should be noted that in NFPA 101 the mini-
mum stair width can increase to 18 mm per person,
depending on the occupancy type. 7.3.5 Travel distances
To ensure that a phased evacuation can be managed effec- Traditional fire safety design codes place limitations on
tively, additional fire protection measures may be necessary, the maximum distance that can be travelled to an exit.
such as an increased level of compartmentation, a public
address system, fire telephones and an automatic detection The travel distances should be measured along the route
system. which will be travelled and not the direct (straight line)
distance. However, where the final layout of the building
is not known, a good rule of thumb is to assume that the
7.3.4 Alternative exits travel distance will be approximately 1.5 times the direct
distance.
A basic principle of designing for escape is that escape
routes should be available in at least two directions, unless The recommended maximum travel distances for a selec-
the distance to be travelled is short (between 6 m and tion of different occupancies as given in British and US fire
30 m depending on building use, level of fire protection safety design codes are summarised in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
and jurisdiction) and the number of occupants is limited
(typically to a maximum of 50 to 60 people in the dead- BS 9999 outlines a risk-based approach to designing means
end area). of escape and the document may permit longer travel
distances (compared to ADB Volume 2) based on the
A choice of escape routes is of little value if they are all geometry of the building and level of building
likely to be obstructed by fire at the same time. Therefore, management.
Room or area
A
al
on
ag
al
on
di
ag
of
C Di
½
=
ce
an
st
di
um
A
im
in
M
≥ 45°
Figure 7.3 Separation of exit routes. (Reprinted with permission from

B C NFPA 101®-2018, Life Safety Code®, Copyright © 2017, National Fire
Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
Figure 7.2 Separation of exit routes which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.)
Table 7.3 Maximum recommended travel distances where escape is Table 7.4 Maximum recommended travel distances where escape is
available in one direction only available in more than one direction
Building use Maximum single direction Building use Maximum travel distance where escape is
travel distance / m available in more than one direction / m
ADB Technical NFPA 101* ADB Technical NFPA 101*
Volume 2 Handbook — Volume 2 Handbook —
Non-Domestic Non-Domestic
Office 18 18 23 (30) Office 45 45 60 (91)

Shop and commercial 18 15 23 (30) Shop and commercial 45 32 30 (60)
Assembly buildings 18 15 6.1 (6.1) Assembly buildings 45 32 45 (60)
Assembly buildings with 15 15 6.1 (6.1) Assembly buildings with 32 32 45 (60)
fixed seating in rows fixed seating in rows
Industrial 25 18 15 (30) Industrial 45 45 60 (75)
Plant rooms (within room) 9 18 15 (30) Plant rooms (within room) 35 45 60 (75)
High fire hazard 9 15 – High fire hazard 18 32 23 (23)
* Figures in parentheses indicate the allowable travel distance where * Figures in parentheses indicate the allowable travel distance where
sprinklers are installed sprinklers are installed
7.3.6 Fire protection to escape routes If lobby protection is not provided to all escape stairs, it
is normally necessary to discount one whole stair from the
exit calculations. However, if lobbies are provided it can
7.3.6.1 General
be assumed that all protected stairways will be available
for escape. (Note: it is still necessary to discount one storey
Escape stairs and, in certain cases, escape corridors need to exit on the fire floor.)
be enclosed with fire-resisting construction to prevent the
ingress of fire and smoke. For escape purposes, a minimum
fire resistance of 30 minutes is normally recommended, 7.3.7 Facilities for disabled people
although this may be increased if the stair also acts as a
protected shaft providing separation between levels. To ensure the safe escape of disabled people from build-
ings it is essential to consider both management and
It is important to prevent substantial smoke infiltration design issues. The design of disabled egress routes should
into protected escape routes and therefore all elements of be coordinated with the access strategy for the building.
the enclosing structure should be adequately sealed against
smoke ingress and doors should be provided with smoke Provisions should be made to ensure that disabled people
seals. can be evacuated from the building to a place of safety. It
is not appropriate for the designer or management to rely
7.3.6.2 Protected lobbies on the fire service to facilitate their escape – the fire service
should only be considered as a back-up.
Additional protection against the ingress of smoke into a
stairway can be achieved by the provision of a protected Where step-free access to a place of safety outside the
lobby (see Figure 7.4) and/or pressurisation of the stair building is not available, fire protected refuges should be
enclosure. provided. These are usually provided within a protected
stair or lobby but can be a separate fire compartment with
British guidance normally recommends protected lobbies
to stairs when:
—— only one escape stair is available

Landing
—— the escape capacity of one of the stairs is not to be Fire door
discounted
—— the height of the top storey is greater than 18 m
—— the building is designed for phased evacuation Protected lobby
—— the stair is designated as a firefighting stair
—— the stair serves basement levels.
Stair
When following NFPA guidance, it is usual to provide

smoke-proof enclosures to stairs in high-rise buildings
Fire-resisting
(>23 m in height), which involves the provision of venti- construction
Fire door
lated lobbies or pressurisation of the stairs. (Lobbies are
not necessary under NFPA guidance if the stairs are
pressurised.) Figure 7.4 Protected lobby to staircase enclosure
direct access to a stair. Refuges should be used in conjunc- 7.3.8 Lifts

tion with a pre-prepared escape plan. Fire marshals should
be designated to assist disabled people in their descent It has long been standard practice to recommend that lifts
down the stairs. In sprinkler-protected buildings, NFPA are not used for evacuation in a fire emergency. This is
codes do not generally recommend the provision of sepa- because of the potential dangers of smoke ingress into the
rate refuges, as a sprinkler-protected level is considered to lift, loss of power and the possibility of doors opening and
provide a reasonably safe refuge. discharging at the fire floor.
Where provided, each refuge should be accessible to a However, in certain types of building (e.g. very high rise
wheelchair and provide an area of at least 900 mm × and deep basements) it will be advantageous to use suita-
1400 mm in which a wheelchair user can await assistance. bly designed and constructed lifts in the evacuation of the
A suitable means of two-way voice communication should less physically able members of the population.
be provided within the refuge so that the occupants can
indicate their need for assistance and be kept informed of The use of lifts for evacuation should only be under build-
forthcoming assistance. ing management or fire service control and it is essential
that clear procedures are developed for their use. Guidance
It may be appropriate to utilise the lift(s) for the evacua- on the use of lifts for evacuation may be found in NFPA
tion of disabled people. It is important that evacuation 101, BS 9999, HTM 05-03 Part E: Escape lifts in healthcare
using protected lifts is only carried out under manage- buildings (DoH, 2006) and CIBSE Guide D: Transportation
ment or fire service control, in accordance with clearly systems in buildings 2015. Human factors in the use of lifts
defined procedures. for egress are considered by Pauls et al. (1991).
Often the focus of provision for escape for disabled people is

7.3.8.1 Evacuation lifts
directed towards wheelchair users. However, there are many
other groups of people who find it difficult to escape, and
Passenger lifts should be in fire-resisting shafts with
their needs should be considered in both the design and the
enclosed fire-resisting lift lobbies. The lifts should be
management of a building. These groups and the facilities
designed in accordance with code recommendations for
which can be used to assist them include the following:
evacuation lifts, for example, Annex G of BS 9999. Standby
power to each designated evacuation lift should be
(a) Mobility-impaired people and people able to man- provided. Other features, such as the protection of electri-
age only a few steps in an emergency: cal equipment against the ingress of firefighting water,
—— suitable continuous handrails on steps should be considered.
—— suitable goings and risers of stairs Fixed emergency communications systems (fire/emer-
—— suitable places to rest along the escape route gency telephones) in the lift cars and lift lobbies (and also
at each floor level of exit stairs) should also be provided.
—— early warning
—— knowledge of the most appropriate direc- Under emergency conditions, the lift should only be capa-
tion to travel ble of being operated by designated persons (i.e. management
or fire service personnel using an override key).
—— evacuation lifts (under management/fire
service control). 7.3.8.2 Lift lobbies enclosed in fire-resisting
(b) Blind and partially sighted people: construction
—— suitable continuous handrails on steps The passenger lift lobbies should be enclosed in fire-
—— tactile and visual markings resisting construction. The doors forming the enclosed
lobbies can be ‘held-open’ by automatic door release
—— clear information mechanisms so that they do not present an obstruction in
—— wide escape routes to facilitate assistance. normal operation and only close upon operation of the fire
alarm system on the floor concerned. The lift lobbies
(c) Hearing-impaired and deaf people: should be large enough to accommodate the number of
—— visual indication that there is an emergency people likely to need to use the lifts to evacuate the fire
floor (i.e. they should accommodate the anticipated
—— clear written information. number of disabled people and their helpers).
(d) People with mobility impairments resulting from
asthma, heart disease, pregnancy etc.: 7.3.8.3 Closed circuit TV to lift lobbies
—— smoke-free protected routes The provision of cctv to passenger lift lobbies will assist
—— places to rest en route both building management and the fire service to deter-
mine the most appropriate floor(s) to which to dispatch
—— wide escape routes to facilitate assistance. the evacuation lifts.
(e) People with learning difficulties and cognitive
disabilities: 7.3.8.4 Real-time signs in lift lobbies
—— identification of escape routes
Signs should be provided in evacuation lift lobbies to
—— clear information. report system status in real time and provide an indication
of the likely time before cars would be expected to arrive 7.3.11 Other measures
to evacuate a floor.
When designing for means of escape, consideration should
7.3.8.5 Refuge floors be given to the provision of other supporting measures
that are described more fully in other sections of this
Guide:
In very high rise buildings it may be difficult for many of
the occupants (who would not be classified as disabled) to —— fire alarms
descend the full height of the building using the stairs.
The designation of selected refuge floors, where people —— exit and directional signage
can transfer to lift evacuation under building manage-
—— emergency escape lighting
ment/fire service control can be of benefit.
—— automatic fire detection
As the refuge floors will need to accommodate occupants
from a number of floors they could become crowded. —— automatic suppression systems (e.g. sprinklers)
Therefore, the maximum potential numbers using them —— automatic release of security locks and door hold-
will need to be established to determine how many refuge open devices
floors will be needed.
—— wayfinding.
Typically, refuge floors would be provided at every 20
floors. Appropriate signage should be provided within the
stairs to direct people to the designated refuge floors.
7.4 Fire safety engineering
7.3.9 Escalators design approaches
For some facilities (e.g. underground stations), escalators The recommendations presented previously in this chap-
provide the primary means of escape and there may be ter reflect the recommendations of guidance documents
other situations where the use of escalators would be of that have historically proved to be effective in ensuring
assistance in the evacuation process. However, it is essen- the safety of building occupants. However, many of these
tial to ensure that escalators (or open stairways) used for recommendations do not have a firm scientific basis and
means of escape will not discharge people into an area do not necessarily provide the optimum solution.
likely to be affected by fire, nor that they may be closed
off, in the early stages of a fire, by a shutter operated by a The guidance documents prescribe travel distances and
fire alarm or smoke detector. exit widths etc. but make no mention of the time required
to escape. However, the escape process is strongly time
Current UK codes, i.e. ADB Volume 2 or BS 9999, do not related.
recognise the use of escalators as part of the means of
escape, but if an escalator discharges to an area containing For an escape design to be successful, the time available
only a very limited fire load (e.g. a well-controlled entrance before untenable conditions occur must be greater than
lobby), then it may be feasible to accept an escalator as an the time required for escape. This can be written as:
exit route. This is advantageous as people will, in any case,
tend to use routes, such as these, with which they are aset > rset (7.4)
familiar. In these circumstances, the escalators leading to
the exit could be maintained in operation. When assessing where aset is the available safe escape time (i.e. the time
the capacity of an escalator, it should be assumed that, from ignition to the onset of untenable conditions) and
unless a secure power supply is provided, the mechanism rset is the required safe escape time (i.e. the time follow-
will be stationary. ing ignition after which all the occupants can leave the
fire-affected space and reach a place of safety).
The riser and tread dimensions of escalators are not the
same as for stairs, and movement is not as easy. However, The evaluation of aset is covered in other sections of this
they are often used in the stationary mode and, in these guide. A method for estimating rset is described below.
circumstances, the flow capacity may be taken as 56 persons
per minute per metre width (measured between the inner- The basic equation used to describe the escape from a
most part of the handrails). (This figure is derived from building or space is as follows:
NFPA 130 Standard for fixed guideway transit and passenger
rail systems (NFPA, 2017).) tdet + ta + tpre + ttrav = tesc (7.5)
where tdet is the time from ignition to detection by an

7.3.10 Mechanised walkways automatic system or the first occupant, ta is the time from
detection to a general alarm being given, tpre is the
Mechanised walkways are generally accepted for means of pre-movement time of the occupants (this may be expressed
escape but their capacity is normally assessed on the as a distribution of times for the population or may be
assumption that they are stationary. It is not recommended represented by a single representative value) and ttrav is the
that travellators with magnetic locking systems for trol- travel time of the occupants (this may be represented by a
leys (e.g. in supermarkets) are used for means of escape as distribution of individual times or a single value that is
the locked trolleys may impede escaping occupants. representative of the whole population).
Available safe escape time (ASET)
Required safe escape time (RSET) (tesc) Margin of safety
Evacuation time
Pre-movement time (tpre) Travel time (ttrav)
Recognition time Response time
Alarm time (ta)
Detection
time (tdet)
Figure 7.5 Factors involved in assessing the total escape time
This general approach is illustrated in Figure 7.5. The (a) Maintain a layer of air that is relatively clear of
calculation of tdet and ta represents the delay (if any) smoke above eye level. Typical design values are
between activation of a fire detector and the alarm being 2–3.5 m above floor level, depending on building
broadcast. The factors influencing, and the methods of geometry and smoke modelling technique. (Note
estimating, tenability limits, pre-movement times (tpre) that the temperature of the smoke layer should not
and travel times (ttrav) are described below. exceed 200 °C to limit the downward radiant heat
flux to less than 2.5 kW · m–2, at which severe skin
pain can occur (BSI, 2004).)
7.4.1 Tenability limits for design
(b) Ensure that the visibility through any smoke will
be sufficient for exits to be identified and reached
While escaping from a fire-affected building, the occu- without undue hindrance. (Generally, people are
pants should not be subjected to undue hazard because of reluctant to proceed through smoke if the visibility
smoke or heat. Escape routes can be protected from the distance is less than 10 m (BSI, 2004).)
effects of fire by passive measures (e.g. enclosure of corri-
dors or stairs with fire-resisting construction) or active Where there is a clearly defined escape route, a visibility
systems (e.g. smoke control) or a combination of passive of 10 m (equivalent to an optical density of 0.1 dB · m–1) is
and active systems. normally considered reasonable. The visibility distance is
roughly doubled if back-illuminated signs (i.e. integrally
The following subsections give suggested design limits for lit escape signage) are provided.
short-term exposure (i.e. before the occupants can enter a
protected route or escape to open air). Conditions within In public buildings and large spaces where wayfinding
protected routes and refuge areas should not approach may be difficult, greater visibility distances may be
these values. required to ensure that exit routes can be identified.
7.4.2 Smoke 7.4.3 Heat

The smoke produced from typical building contents will The maximum temperature of dry inhaled air that can be
normally cause loss of adequate visibility before debilitat- tolerated for a short period is 120 °C. Note that under the
ing toxic conditions occur. It is therefore usual to design conditions of high humidity, that may result from fire-
to ensure that adequate visibility is maintained and the fighting activities (including sprinkler operation), the
toxic impact of smoke can be neglected for many typical maximum survivable temperatures will be considerably
building types. However, the impact of combustion prod- lower (approximately 60 °C) and this temperature should
ucts from any highly toxic materials should be checked be adopted as a maximum for design purposes.
(e.g. in buildings used for the storage or processing of
toxic chemicals). Excessive levels of heat radiation can induce severe burns
and skin pain. Prolonged exposure to a radiant heat flux
While travelling within a fire-affected space and before exceeding 2.5  kW · m–2 can cause severe pain and this
reaching a protected escape route or other place of relative figure is the maximum recommended design value for
safety, the occupants should not be subject to conditions short-term exposure (BSI, 2004). A black-body radiator
that will result in a loss of visibility. The following design at a temperature of 200 °C will emit a radiant heat flux
limits are suggested: of approximately 2.5  kW · m–2 and therefore people
should not be expected to escape below a smoke layer at (a) occupants predominantly familiar with the build-
a temperature greater than this. ing and awake (e.g. offices, schools and industrial
premises etc.)
(b) occupants possibly unfamiliar with the building
but awake (e.g. shops, exhibition halls, museums,
7.5 Pre-movement times leisure centres and other assembly buildings)
(c) occupants possibly sleeping but predominantly
7.5.1 Behaviour of people familiar with the building (e.g. dwellings)
(d) occupants possibly sleeping and unfamiliar with
Studies of behaviour in fires indicate that, generally, the building (hotels etc.)
people do not panic nor do they act in an irrational way
when judged from their perspective of the situation (Sime, (e) significant number of occupants requiring assis-
1994). Their actions are, however, not always what the tance (e.g. hospitals and nursing homes)
designer had in mind and this may result in a significant
delay (pre-movement time) between an alarm being broad- (f) occupants held in custody (e.g. prisons).
cast and the commencement of movement towards an exit.
Similar categorisation of occupancy characteristics is
presented in the initial chapters of BS 9999 (BSI, 2017).
The behavioural tendencies of people should be consid-
ered as part of the fire safety design, e.g. as indicated below.
Access to buildings for disabled people is now required in
nearly all new buildings and, as far as reasonably practica-
—— Deaths in large-scale fires attributed to ‘panic’ are
ble, in existing buildings. Therefore, when designing for
far more likely to have been caused by delays in
escape, an appropriate proportion of disabled people should
people receiving information about a fire.
be assumed to be present in all the above-listed categories.
—— Traditional fire alarm sounders cannot always be
relied upon to prompt people to move immediately In multiple-use buildings, the effect of one use on another
to safety. must be considered to ensure that means of escape from
one use will not be prejudiced by another, e.g. where one
—— The pre-movement time (i.e. people’s response to use will be closed outside trading hours, independent
an alarm) can be more important than the time it means of escape may have to be provided for another,
takes to physically reach an exit. more continuous use. Similarly, where security require-
—— Much of the movement in the early stages of fires ments might compromise the availability of exits, suitable
is characterised by activities such as investigation measures must be taken to ensure that exits are available
rather than escape. to all occupants under emergency conditions.
—— If an exit is not seriously obstructed, people tend
to move in a familiar direction, even if the route is
longer, rather than use an unfamiliar fire escape 7.6 Evaluation of total
route.
pre-movement time
—— Individuals often move towards and with group
members and maintain proximity as far as possible
Pre-movement time can be at least as important as the
with individuals to whom they have emotional ties.
time that it takes to travel to and through an exit.
—— Fire exit signs are not always noticed (or recalled)
and may not overcome difficulties in orientation For each occupant, the time taken from the first cue indi-
and wayfinding in a complex architectural layout. cating the presence of fire to the start of movement towards
an exit represents the total pre-movement time for the
—— People are often prepared, if necessary, to try to occupant and will be influenced by factors such as:
move through smoke despite the dangers that this
may present. —— the spatial location of the occupant
—— People’s ability to move towards exits may vary —— the location of the fire and the pattern of fire growth
considerably (e.g. a young, fit adult as opposed to
a person who is elderly or who has a disability). —— the visibility of the fire by the occupant (i.e. those
nearest to the fire with clear visual access are more
—— Reversal of direction, e.g. after moving towards an likely to respond quickly)
initially unseen fire.
—— the type of cue or warning received (voice alarm,
bells, smell of smoke etc.).
7.5.2 Occupancy types
This pre-movement time can be subdivided into two parts:
The mobility of occupants, their familiarity with their recognition time and response time (see also Figure 7.5).
surroundings and the ease of wayfinding allowed by the
setting can influence the time required to evacuate a
building. 7.6.1 Recognition time
When considering the effect of different types of occu- The recognition time is the period after an alarm or other
pancy, the following characteristics can be significant: cue is evident but before the occupants begin to respond.
During the recognition period, the occupants continue 7.6.4 Pre-movement time of the
with their current activities. The length of the recognition first few occupants
period can be extremely variable, depending on factors
such as the type of building, the nature of the occupants,
The time at which the first few occupants start to move
their familiarity with the alarm system (training), the type
towards an exit is particularly important because the evac-
of alarm and fire safety management procedures.
uation process does not begin until this time is reached.
The duration of the pre-movement stage will be highly
The recognition time ends when the occupants accept that dependent on the occupancy type, the nature of the warn-
there is a need to respond and take some action (e.g. ing system and the implementation of the emergency
putting on a coat before leaving). management procedures.
7.6.2 Response time In situations where occupants are awake and familiar with
a building, and well trained in the emergency procedures
The response time is the period after the occupants recog- (e.g. a well-managed office), then the pre-movement time
nise the alarms or cues and begin to respond to them, but of the first occupants to respond should be very short (less
before they begin to move towards an exit. As with the than 20 seconds). In occupancies such as shops or assembly
recognition period, the response time may range from a buildings (where the occupants are awake but unfamiliar
few seconds to many minutes, depending on the with their surroundings) this phase of pre-movement time
circumstances. can also be very short, provided that staff are well trained
and take action to direct customers to the exits. A voice
During the response period, the occupants cease their alarm can significantly reduce the pre-movement time in
normal activities and may engage in a variety of activities settings where the occupants are unfamiliar with the emer-
in response to the potential emergency. gency procedures and may be unsure as to the meaning of
a bell or klaxon. The reduction in pre-movement time
provided by a voice alarm is recognised in the design
Examples of activities undertaken during the response
approach used in BS 9999 (BSI, 2017).
period include:
—— investigation to determine the source, reality or Very short times to first response are typical of evacuations
importance of a fire alarm observed in a range of occupancies in these categories.
Where fire safety management is not of a high standard,
—— stopping machinery/production then the pre-movement time can be much longer and is
unpredictable. Good fire safety management is therefore
—— securing money an essential requirement whether the escape provisions
—— searching for children and other family members have been designed based on fire safety design codes or
fire safety engineering principles. In Great Britain, the
—— putting on coats implementation of adequate evacuation procedures is
a requirement of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
—— collecting ‘essential’ belongings (personal effects
Order 2005 (SI 2005/1541) (for England and Wales) and
and keys etc.)
the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005.
—— first-aid firefighting etc.
In situations where occupants may be asleep, the pre-
movement time is likely to be much longer, irrespective of
7.6.3 Design approach the warning and fire safety management system used.
Even for very well-designed and well-managed hotels,
It is feasible to introduce both recognition time and pre-movement times for some individuals may extend
response behaviour into an evacuation model to estimate towards 30 minutes (for example, guests who may have
the total pre-movement time, but there is a lack of availa- taken sleeping pills or be under the influence of alcohol).
ble data on recognition time and the range of possible
behaviours are difficult to quantify.
7.6.5 Pre-movement time distribution
The most practical approach is therefore to derive distri-
butions for total pre-movement time from staged Once the first few occupants have begun to move, the
evacuations or the investigation of real incidents. pre-movement times for the remainder of the occupants in
an enclosure tend to follow a log-normal frequency–time
Pre-movement times may vary considerably for different distribution (BSI, 2004).
individuals or groups of individuals. An important factor
is the degree of visual access afforded. For example, in an Figure 7.6 illustrates typical pre-movement time distribu-
open-plan setting such as a theatre auditorium, the distri- tions in well-managed open-plan occupancies. The delay
bution of pre-movement times is likely to be narrow and period before the first few occupants begin to move is typi-
everyone will start to move at about the same time, cally followed by a rapid increase in the proportion of the
particularly if instructions are given from the stage. In a population entering their travel phase. There is then typi-
multiple enclosure setting, such as a hotel, there is likely cally an extended ‘tail’, during which the last few occupants
to be a wide distribution of pre-movement times charac- begin to travel.
terised by a ‘head’ of early and a ‘tail’ of late starters.
Those in the enclosure containing the fire may complete Pre-movement time distributions are likely to be much
the evacuation process before those in other enclosures wider in multiple enclosure buildings than in single enclo-
even recognise the need for action. sures and will be influenced by the type of warning and
0.25 (a) High occupancy (e.g. shop)
0.2
Pre-movement phase
Frequency
0.15
Approach phase
0.1
Exit flow phase

0.05
Time
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Time / seconds (b) Low occupancy (e.g. warehouse)
Figure 7.6 Pre-movement distributions from a number of studies (BSI,
2004)
Pre-movement phase
management system in place. Generally, short and narrow
pre-movement time distributions occur where the occu- Approach phase
pants are awake and familiar with their surroundings. In
well-managed single enclosures, the pre-movement time
Exit flow phase
should be less than one minute. In multiple occupancy
sleeping scenarios, the pre-movement time distribution is
likely to be much wider (e.g. 10 to 30 minutes). Time
Figure 7.7 Overlap between phases of the evacuation process

It is important to recognise that, while the total pre-
movement time can constitute a large proportion of the
total evacuation time, it is not appropriate to simply add
total pre-movement and total travel times as this will over- Table 7.5 Suggested guide values of pre-movement times (well-
estimate the total evacuation time. managed environment)
Building type Occupancy type Pre-movement

For spaces with a high occupant density, the initial period
time / minutes
before the first individuals start to move is the important
pre-movement factor as after this period the travel time is Residential Dwellings 5
likely to dominate. Hotel bedrooms 20
University hall of residence 20
Where occupant densities are low, the total evacuation time
will be equivalent to the sum of the total pre-movement Institutional and Day centre, surgery, clinic 2
time and the travel time. health
Education School, college, university 1
This overlap between pre-movement and travel times is Offices Office 1
illustrated by the timelines in Figure 7.7.
Bank 2
Table 7.5 provides guide values for pre-movement times Retail Shop or department store 3
where a good standard of fire safety management is Shopping complex 3
implemented.
Further information on pre-movement times is given in

PD 7974-6 (BSI, 2004).
An analysis of these factors can provide an indication of

7.7 Travel time the minimum time in which a room, floor or building
could be evacuated if the occupants were to react immedi-
The travel time is the time (after commencement of move- ately and appropriately in response to a warning of fire.
ment) required to reach and pass through an exit into a
place of safety. Calculations will indicate whether it is the distance to be
travelled or the width of the escape route that is the limit-
Once the population of a space have begun to move ing factor in determining the travel time. The number and
towards the exits, the travel time can be estimated, taking distribution of occupants will usually be evaluated in a
account of the following parameters: similar manner, whether adopting fire safety design codes
or a fire safety engineering approach to escape route
—— number and distribution of occupants design. Typically, in sparsely occupancy buildings (e.g.
—— speed of travel towards exit warehouses) the distance to be traversed will dominate the
travel time, whereas in buildings with a high occupant
—— rate of flow through restrictions (doorways, stairs density (e.g. shops) queuing at exits is likely to dominate
etc.). the travel time.
7.7.1 Time of travel to an exit also be necessary to provide exits more frequently than in
large open areas to ensure that the occupants can readily
The speed of travel and the crowd density are related – at locate the exit route. The use of wayfinding systems incor-
high crowd densities the ability to walk freely is restricted porating illuminated floor tracks may be of considerable
and hence the speed of travel will be reduced. At densities assistance in guiding people to the nearest exit.
of approximately 4 persons per m2, movement can become
very slow, leading to anxiety and discomfort. Where occu- Where stairs must be negotiated prior to reaching a storey
pant density is relatively low (i.e. 2 m2 per person or exit, allowance should be made for the slower speed of
more), 1.2 m · s–1 can be taken as an average walking speed travel on stairs and the effect on any disabled people, e.g.
for design purposes. wheelchair users.
When descending stairways, the typical free movement As a fire could occur adjacent to an exit, when estimating
speed is reduced to 1.1 m · s–1, giving a vertical component the time required to reach a storey exit, one of the exit
of velocity of the order of 0.75 m · s–1. routes should be assumed to be unavailable. This means
that distances to be travelled (and hence estimates of
On the flat, provided adequate space and accessible doors travel times) need to be measured using a different method
are provided, wheelchair users can evacuate quickly with- to that stipulated in fire safety design codes, which always
out causing obstruction (Shields, 1993). However, persons measure travel distance to the nearest exit.
using walking aids require much more time. This varies
widely, but for design purposes it is reasonable to assume Figure 7.8 illustrates the traditional method of measuring
that they can move at about half the speed of the average travel distances (route 1) and the method that should be
person, say 0.6 m · s–1. used in a fire engineering assessment of travel time (route
2). When designing in accordance with the traditional fire
Once people start to evacuate, the time taken for them to safety design codes, the travel distance is measured along
reach a place of safety will usually be dominated by the the shortest route of travel to the nearest exit (taking
time taken to pass through restrictions such as doorways, account of any obstructions). From point C, the shortest
which are traditionally designed to accommodate all the route to exit B is route 1. With the exception of hospitals,
occupants in a nominal period of 2½ minutes. As it will fire safety design codes usually place no limit on the
rarely take as long as 2½ minutes to travel to an exit, the distance of travel to an alternative exit (exit A in this
rate of arrival is likely to be greater than the doorway can instance).
accommodate and a queue will form (except in cases where
the occupancy numbers are very low). This is implicit in When carrying out a fire safety engineering assessment, it
the established fire safety design codes. is necessary to establish the time required to travel to an
exit. In a sparsely occupied warehouse, where the fire loca-
In most buildings with a high occupant density, the occu- tion is obscured (e.g. by high racking or shelving), some
pants will be distributed throughout the accommodation of the occupants may move towards the nearest exit, which
and those people located nearest to an exit will have a very may prove to be blocked by the fire. In these circum-
short travel time of only a few seconds. Individuals who stances, the calculation of travel time should take account
are located some distance from an exit will clearly take of the actual route that may be taken before the fire
longer. However, unless the time taken to move to the exit becomes visible. Route 2 illustrates this concept, where an
exceeds the notional evacuation time (typically 2½ occupant initially moves towards the nearest exit (exit B)
minutes), the individuals may still have to queue on but, on reaching point D, realises that the exit is blocked
arrival at the exit doorway. Therefore, in many cases, by fire. It is then necessary to retrace part of the route
unless the distance to be travelled exceeds 150 m, travel before leaving through exit A.
distance is unlikely to have a dominant effect on the over-
all evacuation time, i.e. 150 m can be travelled in about The measurement of travel distances or calculation of
2 minutes at a speed of 1.2 m · s–1. Even at 0.6 m · s–1, over travel times should either be based on the worst-case
70 m can be traversed in 2 minutes. condition or take account of all the possible occupant
locations.
For buildings with very low occupant density, there will be
no queuing at storey exits and the total evacuation time will
largely be determined by the longest travel distance. Route 2 (used to calculate travel time)
However, it may be desirable to restrict travel distances so
that the location of exits can be readily identified and so that D
those who are only able to walk slowly are not put at risk.
Exit A
In the case of buildings over a certain height and floor
area, provision for access and facilities for firefighting may C Exit B
dictate the maximum distance between stairs.
In large open areas, travel distances substantially in excess

of those specified in fire safety design codes may be accept-
able, provided that the exits are clearly visible and
accessible.
Route 1 (travel distance
as used in prescriptive codes)
In areas where the route to an exit is unavoidably tortu-
ous, a good wayfinding system should be provided. It may Figure 7.8 Measurement of travel distance
7.7.2 Exit widths Despite the considerable time that the complete evacua-
tion may take, a stair must have sufficient capacity to
enable all of the occupants of a fire-affected floor to enter
7.7.2.1 General
within a relatively short period of time.
Traditional fire safety design codes set exit width require- The maximum number of people who can be physically
ments based on the anticipated population of the building. accommodated by an escape stair in a given time depends
The time required to pass through the exits is not explic- on three main factors:
itly stated but is normally based on a notional evacuation
time. This notional time does not take account of the (a) the width of the storey exits at each level
delays that are likely to occur before people respond to an
alarm (pre-movement time). The notional time implicit in (b) the width of the stair and its final exit
most guidance is 2½ minutes, although this may be (c) the number of persons who may be accommodated
extended to up to 8 minutes for the design of open-air within the stair enclosure (stacking capacity).
sports stadia.
The doors opening into the stair (see (a) above) should be
While fire safety design guidance on exit widths has sized to accommodate the anticipated number of people at
historically proved to be adequate, there is no scientific each level. However, if the stair is congested with large
basis for the original choice of 2½ minutes. numbers of people descending from the floors above, it
may not be possible to enter the stair, even if the individ-
In many cases, where smoke filling times are prolonged ual storey exits are of adequate width.
(due to a high ceiling or the provision of smoke ventila-
tion etc.), exit widths based on longer evacuation times During the evacuation process, people will be entering the
may be acceptable. For example, the maximum notional stair at a number of different levels and some will be leav-
exit time adopted by British Standards for shopping ing through the final exit. Therefore, the stair must have
centres is 5 minutes, which is justified in terms of the sufficient floor space to accommodate those persons who
smoke control and sprinkler protection provision in large are remaining within the stair enclosure (i.e. the differ-
shopping centres. However, it is essential to realise that, ence between the number who have entered and the
due to the characteristic delay before people start to move number who have left the stair).
and deviations in movement from the optimum escape
route, the notional exit time can be much less than the The maximum number of people that can be accommo-
actual time required to evacuate a space. dated within a stairway at any one time is given by:
7.7.2.2 Exit flows Nc(max) = pAS (7.7)
Once evacuation has started towards the exits, the main where Nc(max) is the maximum number of people that can
physical constraint on the time taken to evacuate will be accommodated within a stairway at any one time, p is
usually be the width of doorway openings, corridors and the maximum occupant density of the stair (person · m–2),
stairs. For design purposes, it may be assumed that the A is the horizontal area of the stair and landings per storey
maximum flow rate of persons through a doorway or level (m2) and S is the number of storeys.
corridor is given by equation 7.6. For openings and corri-
dors of width 1.1 m and greater: The maximum density of people who can be accommo-
dated on stairs and landings without suffering extreme
Fp = 1.333 w (7.6) discomfort is approximately 3.5 person · m–2. The number
of persons leaving the stair is limited primarily by the
where Fp is the number of persons passing through the width of the final exit and can be obtained using the calcu-
opening in 1 second (person · s–1) and w is the width of the lation described in equation 7.6.
opening or corridor in metres, after allowing for any
obstructions. The exit capacity of a stairway can therefore be estimated
as follows:
Nin (max) = 1.333Ws t + 3.5A QS - 1V (7.8)

Assuming a notional exit time of 2½ minutes, equation 7.6
is equivalent to the method of determining exit widths
given in British codes and NFPA guidance, i.e. that the
capacity of an exit is 1 person per 5 mm of exit width where Nin(max) is the maximum number of people able to
(subject to minimum width criteria). enter the stair within a specified period, Ws is the width
of the stair (m), t is the time available for escape (s), A is
It should be noted that the flow rate through an exit may the horizontal area of stair and landings per storey (m2)
be reduced if there is downstream congestion (i.e. if the and S is the number of storeys served.
occupant density significantly exceeds 2 person · m–2).
Equation 7.8 gives similar (but not necessarily identical)
results to those given in Table 7 of Approved Document
7.7.2.3 Stairway capacity B, Volume 2 (HM Government, 2013). This table gives
stairway capacities that are based on the same general
It is generally assumed that a protected exit stair provides principle but using a simplified calculation procedure (see
a place of relative safety where people may remain for the equations 7.2 and 7.3 in section 7.3.3.1).
duration of the evacuation process. However, in very tall
buildings it may take over an hour for all of the occupants It is important to have an accurate assessment of the total
to descend the stairway and reach open air. number of persons that a stairway can accommodate in a
specified period. A simple approach, like the one given in design) may be assessed – although work is being under-
equation 7.9, may be used to calculate this, assuming the taken towards achieving this aim (for example, NIST
following conditions: Technical Note 1822 (Ronchi et al., 2013)). Each model
therefore represents only its developer’s validation/verifi-
—— an occupant density (p) in the stair of 2 person · m–2 cation efforts and consequent assumptions regarding
human behaviour. It is therefore important that the
—— a flow of 1.2 person · s–1 · m–1 of effective stair width approach that has been taken towards validating/verifying
(where the effective stair width, We, is 0.3 metres an evacuation model is clearly set out by the developer,
narrower than the actual width due to the natural along with any subsequent limitations of its application.
tendency of people to keep a distance from walls However, as with any engineering tool, it is ultimately
and handrails). incumbent upon the user to make every effort to under-
stand such limitations, and take steps to ensure that their
The acceptance capacity of the stair may then be given by chosen model is appropriate for a particular use. In order
the following equation: to achieve this, further validation specific to the proposed
Nin (max) = 1.2 tWe + pA QS - 1V (7.9)

application may be necessary. Indeed, where practicable,
and particularly for existing buildings, it is often desirable
to calibrate the computational model against people move-
where A is the horizontal area of stair and landings per ment data gathered by observations on site.
storey (m2), S is the number of storeys served, t is the
available exiting time (s) and We is the effective stairway It is also important to recognise that many computational
width (m). evacuation models incorporate numerous user-adjustable
parameters, which can significantly influence the results
Note that equation 7.9 gives the maximum acceptance of a simulation in ways which may not always be apparent
capacity of the stair. The actual flow into the stair may be to the viewer. The default parameters supplied with a
constrained if the storey exits are too narrow. given model do not necessarily represent the developer’s
recommendations and will almost certainly not be suitable
Note that stairs which extend vertically more than 30 m for all evacuation scenarios. Careful consideration should
should not exceed a width of 1.4 m unless they are be given to the appropriateness of the parameters chosen
provided with a central handrail, in which case they for any given simulation.
should be at least 1.8 m wide. This is because, in very tall
buildings, people prefer to stay within reach of a handrail When the above points are taken into account, computa-
when making prolonged descent, hence the central part of tional evacuation modelling can be an effective design tool
a wide stair is little used and could be hazardous. if used with care. The facilities for graphical presentation
included in most models can allow users to improve many
aspects of a design using the visual outputs.
7.7.3 Evacuation simulation models
The types of output available from different evacuation
Computational evacuation modelling can enable the psycho- models are illustrated in Figures 7.9 to 7.11.
logical response and movement of people under emergency
conditions to be explored, as well as providing a dynamic
assessment of people flows and crowd movement. 7.7.4 Design safety margin
There are many models commercially available, with Calculation procedures and design assumptions should be
differing methodologies, capabilities and aims. The most chosen on a conservative basis (worst credible case) and,
prominent inputs can be broken down into the following if this is done, an additional safety margin should not be
common elements: necessary.
—— a representation of the building geometry
—— occupants’ physical characteristics (e.g. size, walking
speed etc., which may vary across the population)
7.8 Information and
—— occupant behaviour (e.g. exit selection and response
times)
wayfinding systems
—— occupant dynamics (i.e. occupants’ movements
and interactions with one another). 7.8.1 General
The consequent outputs will vary from model to model, It is important to emphasise the role played by effective
but typically include a visualisation of people movement information, warning and wayfinding systems, including
within the building spaces. Time histories for variables the architectural design of a setting, in achieving an
such as occupant density, walking speed, door flow rates, adequate level of life safety.
door usage etc. are also usually available. Some evacuation
models are also able to incorporate the effects of fire and
smoke on the occupants by importing data from separate 7.8.2 Informative fire warning
computational fluid dynamics software packages. systems
To date, there is no formal standard by which building fire Informative fire warning (ifw) systems have electronic
evacuation models (or their application in fire engineering visual displays to supplement other forms of alarm, and such
Figure 7.9 Pathfinder (Thunderhead Engineering Consultants Inc): simulation of a football stadium
Figure 7.10 FDS+Evac (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland): simulation of a
supermarket
Figure 7.11 buildingEXODUS (University of Greenwich): simulation of an office

7.8.4 Emergency wayfinding systems

In situations where wayfinding could be difficult, serious
consideration should be given to the advantages offered by
continuous luminous wayfinding systems and directional
markers instead of conventional high-level emergency
lighting (Webber and Aizelwood, 1993, 1994).
Emergency wayfinding lighting systems consist of

low-mounted tracks of light and marking of doorways on
exit routes in conjunction with standard exit and direc-
tional signs (see Figure 7.12). The systems come into
operation when power to the normal lighting fails or when
the alarm system is activated. Systems can be powered or
photoluminescent.
In corridors, a lighting system mounted on the walls on

each side of the corridor at 250 mm or less above the floor
level provides direct illumination of the floor and high-
lights the path to be followed. The lighting should be as
continuous as possible and recommended colours are
white or green.
Floor marking systems can be effective in highlighting a

route through wide areas, such as plant rooms where wall
mounting is not feasible.
Figure 7.12 Emergency wayfinding system (Reproduced by permission References

of LumAware, http://www.lumawaresafety.com.)
ABCB (2016) National Construction Code 2016 (Canberra: Australian
Building Code Board)
BSI (2004) PD 7974-6: 2004 The application of fire safety engineering

principles to fire safety design of buildings. Human factors. Life safety strategies.
systems can significantly reduce pre-movement time. A Occupant evacuation, behaviour and condition (Sub-system 6) (London:
Technical Note produced by Ramachandran (1991) presents British Standards Institution) (Note: PD 7974-6: 2004 has been replaced
basic features desirable in such fire warning systems. by PD 7974-6: 2019)
BSI (2011a) BS ISO 3864-1: 2011 Graphical symbols. Safety colours and
7.8.3 Marking of means of egress safety signs. Design principles for safety signs and safety markings (London:
British Standards Institution)
British fire safety design codes recommend that exits are BSI (2011b) BS EN ISO 7010: 2012+A7: 2017 Graphical symbols. Safety
marked with pictographic exit signs depicting a running colours and safety signs. Registered safety signs (London: British Standards
person. The design and construction of fire safety signs Institution)
are detailed in the current British Standards (BSI, 2011a–c,
BSI (2011c) BS ISO 20712-1: 2008 Water safety signs and beach safety flags.
2013, 2014) and in section 7.10 of NFPA 101 (NFPA, Specifications for water safety signs used in workplaces and public areas
2018). (London: British Standards Institution)
In certain circumstances, for example where direct line of BSI (2013) BS 5499-4: 2013 Safety signs. Code of practice for escape route
signing (London: British Standards Institution)
sight of an exit is not possible and doubt may exist as to
its position, a direction sign (or series of signs) should be BSI (2014) BS 5499-10: 2014 Guidance for the selection and use of safety signs
provided. There are also requirements for other notices, and fire safety notices (London: British Standards Institution)
e.g. ‘FIRE DOOR— KEEP SHUT’ on doors.
BSI (2015) BS 9991: 2015 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
residential buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards
Where escape lighting is required, all exit and exit routes Institution)
signs should be illuminated in the event of failure of the
normal lighting. This may be achieved by one of the BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
following: buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
CIBSE (2015) GVD/15 CIBSE Guide D Transportation systems in buildings

—— externally illuminated signs (London: Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers)
—— internally illuminated signs DoH (2006) Health Technical Memorandum 05-03: Firecode. Fire safety
in the NHS. Part E: Escape lifts in healthcase premises (London: Department
—— self-luminous signs. of Health)
DoH (2015) Health Technical Memorandum 05-02: Firecode. Guidance in Ronchi R, Kuligowski ED, Reneke PA, Peacock RD and Nilsson D
support of functional provisions (Fire safety design in the design of healthcare (2013) NIST Technical Note 1822 The process of verification and validation
premises) (London: Department of Health) of building fire evacuation models (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of
Standards and Technology)
HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006 edition Scottish Government (2017) Technical Handbook – Non-Domestic
incorporating the 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon (Livingston: Building Standards Division)
Tyne: NBS) (Note: further amendments published as a separate document,
April 2019) Shields TJ (1993) Fire and Disabled People in Buildings BRE Report
BR 231 (Garston: Building Research Establishment)
NFPA (2017) NFPA 130 Standard for fixed guideway transit and passenger
rail systems (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association) Sime JD (1994) ‘Escape behaviour in fires and evacuations’ in Stollard P
and Johnson L (eds) Design Against Fire – An Introduction to Fire Safety
NFPA (2018) NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (Quincy, MA: National Fire Engineering Design (London: Chapman and Hall)
Protection Association)
Webber GMB and Aizelwood CE (1993) Emergency Wayfinding Lighting
Pauls J, Gatfield A and Juillet E (1991) ‘Elevator use for egress: The Systems BRE Information Paper 1/93 (Garston: Building Research
human-factors problems and prospects’ Proc. Symp. Elevators and Fire, Establishment)
New York, February 1991 (American Society of Mechanical Engineers)
Webber GMB and Aizelwood CE (1994) Emergency Wayfinding Lighting
Ramachandran G (1991) ‘Informative fire warning systems’ Fire Systems in Smoke BRE Information Paper 17/94 (Garston: Building
Technology 27 (1) 66–68 Research Establishment)
8-1
8 Fire detection and alarm
8.1 Introduction position that non-residential buildings require an auto-
matic fire detection system including smoke detectors,
although these are often provided as their life safety bene-
Fire alarm systems were once considered to be a stand-
fit is universally recognised, and they can also be used as
alone requirement for early warning of a fire situation, but
a compensatory feature from some other variation from
increasingly they are being used as part of a fire engineered
general fire safety guidance.
solution for a given building.
To ensure that an adequate and appropriate system is
In addition to local planning or building regulation considered from a project’s inception, some initial consid-
requirements, fire alarm design is usually undertaken in erations must be borne in mind.
accordance with one of two principal standards, depending
on where in the world the building is located.
8.1.1 Identifying the need and level
—— The British Standards Institution (BSI) publishes of coverage for a fire alarm
a number of documents that are commonly used
standards within the Commonwealth as well as the system
Middle and Far East.
First, it is necessary to determine if a fire alarm system is
—— The alternative standard commonly used through- required at all. If one is, it will then be necessary to deter-
out the world is the National Fire Protection mine the level of coverage/protection that will need to
Association (NFPA) standard. be provided. This will depend upon the size, complexity
and use of the building, in addition to any local code, fire
This Guide explains the application of fire alarm design in strategy, insurance or client requirements.
countries that adopt both BSI and NFPA standards, as
well as seeking to highlight the differences between the Relevant considerations include the following:
two approaches.
—— Are there any local codes or standards that define
The first thing to establish is the actual need for a fire minimum life safety requirements?
alarm system. Initially, this need can be determined —— Does the size or complexity of the building warrant
through reference to local regulations and associated guid- a fire alarm system?
ance documents, consultation with the approving
authorities, consultation with the client and insurer (e.g. —— Are any unusual hazards present?
for business continuity and property protection) and, —— Does a sleeping risk exist?
where necessary, with reference to any fire safety risk
assessment for the building. However, buildings that adopt —— Is the building mixed-use or multi-tenancy?
a fire engineered strategy may have different requirements. —— Is the protection for life or property?
This could require more comprehensive protection than
the minimum ‘code’ requirements, but may, on occasion, —— If provided for property protection/business conti-
require a lower level of protection based on a lower risk. nuity, are there any specific client or insurance
requirements?
Each country will have its own specific recommendations —— Has a fire strategy (or fire engineering strategy)
or requirements. While either BSI or NFPA standards been prepared for the building that defines fire
may apply, a good understanding of local recommenda- alarm requirements?
tions or requirements is essential. As an example, within
England and Wales, Part B of Schedule 1 to the Building —— Does any automatic fire safety system require
Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/2214) requires that strategies be detection to operate effectively?
put in place within all new buildings to notify occupants
of a fire. This requirement can be satisfied in small Local codes and standards may explicitly describe the
commercial premises simply by someone shouting ‘Fire!’. requirement (or otherwise) for a fire alarm system.
However, in larger premises, it may be necessary to provide However, it should always be borne in mind that these
an electrically operated fire alarm system. In residential should generally be considered as minimum requirements,
buildings, it will be necessary to provide a system of auto- and will normally only be required to achieve a minimum
matic fire detection (e.g. via smoke detection), and in level of life safety in an otherwise ‘compliant’ building
non-residential buildings a system consisting of manual design. Other factors may require an increase (or varia-
call points may be adequate. Larger multi-tenanted tion) from the minimum requirements of local codes and
non-residential buildings may require a sophisticated standards. Some regulatory systems may also require that
analogue addressable fire alarm system. So, for example, consideration be given to an automatic fire detection and
within England and Wales, it is not necessarily the default alarm system as part of an overall risk assessment of a
building (e.g. the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order considerations may apply to many fire-safety-related
2005 (SI 2005/1541) in England). building services provisions, such as automatic fire and
smoke dampers, pre-action sprinkler systems, automatic
The principal guidance documents (provided in support fire and smoke curtains, and devices to release fire doors
of the functional objectives of the relevant fire safety legis- that are otherwise held open by electromagnets.
lation) covering the need for fire protection in various
types of premises within the United Kingdom are as BS 5839: Parts 1, 6 and 8 (BSI, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) and
follows: BS 9999 (BSI, 2017a) recognise the use of fire alarm
systems to provide signals to initiate other fire protection
—— Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document systems, such as smoke control or sprinkler systems. The
B: Fire Safety (England) (HM Government, 2013) standards do not, however, apply to such systems or the
ancillary circuits that interface with them.
—— Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 — Technical
Handbook – Non-Domestic, Section 2: Fire (Scottish
Government, 2017) NFPA 72 (NFPA, 2016) makes reference to fire safety
function control. This is covered by section 6.15 of
—— Building Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2012: NFPA 72 and is more specific about the control of other
Technical Booklet E: Fire Safety (DFPNI, 2012) life safety systems by the fire alarm control panel.
—— Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
Should it be decided that a fire alarm system is required,
B: Fire Safety (Wales) (Welsh Government, 2015)
then the following types need to be considered:
—— BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management
and use of buildings. Code of practice (BSI, 2017a) —— manual fire systems
—— BS 9991: 2015 Fire safety in the design, management —— automatic fire detection systems.
and use of residential buildings. Code of practice (BSI,
2015a) Manual alarm systems, which consist of fire alarm boxes
—— various risk assessment guides provided in support (either manual break-glass, call-point or pull-station type)
of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and alarm sounders connected to a control panel, can only
(however, these are not normally used for fire be operated and the alarm raised when activated by an
alarm selection in new buildings). individual having detected a fire incident. Automatic
systems, which typically consist of smoke and heat detec-
There may be particular aspects of the building design tors (although other types of detection are available), in
(such as size, complexity, mixed uses, sleeping risks, addition to fire alarm boxes and alarm sounders connected
multiple tenancies or areas of high fire risk) that may to a control panel, are designed to raise the alarm whether
warrant a fire detection system. If, for example, the build- or not personnel are present at the time, thus giving early
ing under consideration is a single-storey workshop with warning of a fire incident. Hence, where the term ‘auto-
a handful of small rooms and no public access, then there matic fire detection’ (afd) is used, this generally refers to
may be no need to provide a fire alarm system. However, systems that include an automatic detector, rather than
a large shopping centre or hotel may require comprehen- simply manual call points.
sive automatic fire detection coverage.
BS 5839 categorises automatic fire alarm systems as being
Local codes and standards are generally developed to either ‘P’ systems, which are designed to protect property,
address life safety needs within a building. However, there or ‘L’ systems, which are primarily designed for the protec-
can be a need for a fire alarm system for property protection of life. A category P system may be used where a
tion or business continuity. This may be to protect building has valuable contents but is seldom occupied by
unoccupied areas, high-value assets or business-critical people. A category L system may be used in a highly
infrastructure. Any such requirements may be explicitly populated building, such as a hotel.
defined directly by the client, owner or occupier, or by
their insurers. Further subdivision is identified in BS 5839 by classifying
category P and L systems as either P1 or P2, and L1, L2,
The building design may have included input from a life L3, L4 or L5. These types of system are described in
safety code consultant or a fire engineer. It is important to further detail in section 8.2. The type of system required
ensure that any fire detection and alarm system design should be identified at the outset.
aligns with their requirements. This can be particularly
important in countries where fire engineered or performance- Codes of practice for fire alarm and detection systems for
based design solutions are commonplace. Such solutions buildings are given in BS 5839. Part 1 (BSI, 2013a) deals
can routinely require a specific level of fire detection and with system design, installation and servicing, and Part 6
alarm to achieve the required level of fire safety (BSI, 2013b) provides a code of practice for detection and
performance. alarm systems in domestic buildings. BS EN 54 (BSI,
1997, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2015b, 2015c, 2017b) covers the
It is also important to remember that a particular level of design of control and indicating equipment, detection
fire alarm/fire detection may be necessary to ensure other devices, sounders and power supplies.
fire safety systems can perform as required. For example,
while certain countries may not require automatic fire In addition to the recommendations applicable to British
detection in enclosed car parks to provide early warning Standards, this Guide also provides information on the
to occupants, such detection may be required in any event recommendations of NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and
to operate a mechanical smoke ventilation system. Similar Signaling Code (NFPA, 2016).
Fire detection and alarm 8-3
This chapter provides some basic recommendations for or alarm systems being deactivated. False alarms can also
the design, installation and application of fire alarm have a significant impact on business continuity, for exam-
systems and equipment, and it is not intended as an alter- ple if a stadium or airport terminal needs to be partially
native to any parts of standards such as BS 5839 or (or even completely) evacuated, or if a production line
NFPA 72. needs to be shut down. It is therefore critical that careful
consideration is given to means by which the rate of false
alarms can be reduced.
8.1.2 Need for consultation
A simple cause of false alarm is the incorrect specification
The fire detection and alarm requirements for most build- of detector head for the given environment. The use of
ing types are covered by national and local legislation and smoke detection in kitchens, which may be regularly
its supporting guidance and codes. It is always advisable subject to burning toast, for example, is a classic example.
to consult the approving authority or authority having Similarly, the use of beam detectors in areas where the
jurisdiction regarding the applicable legislation covering beam may be obscured by forklift trucks or affected by
particular premises and for guidance on the type of system building movement can result in false alarms.
that may be required.
Similar issues can arise due to the incorrect specification
To ensure that the requirements of all stakeholders are and location of manual call points. Manual call points can
adequately captured, during the initial stages of the design be subject to accidental or malicious activation in certain
of a fire alarm system it is important to consult with all circumstances. Hence, call points may need to be located
interested parties, which may include: away from areas where they may be accidentally knocked or
hit and/or provided with a cover. In some instances, it may
—— building owner even be appropriate to completely omit manual call points
—— building occupier/tenant where the risk of false activation is unacceptably high.
—— authority having jurisdiction (e.g. building control, A simple form of fire engineered solution that has been
fire service etc.) used for many years is ‘alarm filtering’, with protocols
—— architectural and engineering consultants such as ‘alarm verification’. In situations where false
alarms would cause significant disruption, it is common
—— building insurers (where possible) practice to commission the fire detection system such that
two detectors must operate independently to identify the
—— system installers
presence of a fire before the system activates an audible
—— government health and safety departments alarm. This is often referred to as ‘coincidence detection’.
Such systems usually provide a local warning to the build-
—— government heritage departments (where buildings ing manager as soon as the first detector identifies a fire.
are protected from alteration due to their historic This gives prior warning of an alarm, allows an investiga-
value). tion of the alarm to be carried out, reduces the risk of a
faulty detector causing the unnecessary evacuation of a
building and, if the alarm is genuine, gives warning of an
8.1.3 Cause and effect imminent building evacuation.
Fire alarm design, especially when integrated into a fire
Typical examples where alarm filtering may be beneficial
engineered solution, can become complex. The interrela-
are hospitals, theatres, shopping malls, cinemas and stadia.
tionship with other systems can become critical, and a
Where coincidence detection is used, it is common prac-
method of checking the operation in all known conditions
tice to provide an upper time limit to the investigation
is an important design tool for describing the operation of
period. Hence, if building management has not cancelled
a fire alarm system.
the alarm within a set time frame after the first detector
head has activated, the fire alarm system would typically
The development of a table or chart that cross-references progress to full evacuation.
a set of known events with the outcome (or consequences)
of each event can be an important part of the design
process, not only during design, to ensure that nothing is Another example of alarm filtering is cross-zoning. This
missed, but also as a commissioning tool and, ultimately, uses multiple detection loops with redundant detectors,
as a prediction tool for building managers. This cause and and typically is used in systems with automatic discharge
effect schedule should include fault events that are reason- (such as deluge or clean agent). In this case, alarm filtering
ably likely over the life of the system, and should cover all is used to manage the financial risk of an accidental
foreseeable eventualities, single points of failure and discharge.
linked operations. This will draw the designer’s attention
to any situations that might not immediately be apparent, Temporary building works can also result in false alarms
but which could occur on the failure of seemingly uncon- — this is particularly true in the case of dusty or ‘hot’
nected events. works. It may be necessary for temporary measures to
be taken to minimise the risks associated with these
activities.
8.1.4 Managing false alarms
False alarms can also result from inadequate maintenance
Unacceptable rates of false alarm can result in significant of a system. This is an important reason for ensuring that
difficulty in managing fire safety in buildings effectively. all fire detection and alarm systems are provided with
Frequent false alarms can result in alarms being ignored adequate maintenance and servicing regimes.
8.2 Classification of alarm without detection should be separated by a

fire-resisting construction.
systems
BS 5839-1 requires that voids with depths greater than
1.5 m should be treated as rooms. This requirement will
The approaches taken by BSI and NFPA differ in their apply regardless of which type of system is selected.
classification of systems. While British Standards classify
systems as being for the protection of property or of life,
and there is a separate standard for dwellings, BS 5839-6: 8.2.2.2 NFPA 72 classification
2013 (BSI, 2013b), NFPA 72 (NFPA, 2016) splits system
classification into those designed for households, those The NFPA does not identify such system types. Designers
designed for protected premises and those requiring are required to use their judgment and experience to
supervising station cover. The following paragraphs determine the level of coverage required. However, once
explain the type of categories identified in each standard. this decision has been made, guidance is provided. The
following gives an overview of the areas to be covered.
NFPA 72 should be consulted for specific details.
8.2.1 Household systems
Total (complete) coverage
NFPA 72 identifies systems for household protection as
one of three main types, whereas under British Standards, Total coverage refers to all rooms, storage areas, lofts,
domestic systems and non-domestic systems are covered attics, ceiling voids and other subdivisions and accessible
by separate standards. spaces with the following exceptions:
—— where inaccessible areas do not contain combusti-

8.2.2 Systems for property ble materials
protection —— where there are small concealed spaces over rooms,
provided they do not exceed 4.6 m2 (50 ft2) in area
Fire alarm systems intended for the protection of property —— detectors shall not be required below an open grid
(referred to as category P systems under British Stand- ceiling subject to specific recommendations
ards) will automatically detect a fire at an early stage,
indicate its location and raise an effective alarm in time to —— detectors shall not be required in concealed acces-
summon the firefighting forces (i.e. both the ‘in house’ sible spaces above suspended ceilings that are used
firefighting team and the fire brigade). A key difference as a return air plenum meeting the recommenda-
between a category P system and one that is provided for tions of NFPA 90A (NFPA, 2015)
life safety only (category L) is the requirement for the
alarm to be transmitted to a receiving centre, to allow the —— detectors shall not be required beneath open
fire service and any additional relevant persons to be loading docks or platforms subject to specific
alerted. However, because category P systems are not recommendations.
necessarily provided for life safety, there may be a reduced
requirement for audible alarms to instigate evacuation Partial coverage
throughout the premises.
Detection shall be provided in all common areas and work
NFPA 72 does not differentiate between systems designed spaces such as corridors, lobbies, storage rooms and other
for the protection of property or life and covers all aspects tenantless spaces.
under the protected premises system type.
Selective coverage
8.2.2.1 BS 5839: Part 1 classification Where local codes, standards or legislation require the
protection of selected areas.
British Standard BS 5839-1: 2013 (BSI, 2013a) subdivides
category P systems as follows: No required coverage
P1 systems All areas should be covered by detectors, Where detection is not required by code, law or standard,
with a few exceptions. Such exceptions may yet is a specific requirement of the client.
include certain voids (typically less than
800 mm in height, unless the spread of fire
between rooms can take place through 8.2.3 Systems for life protection
such voids, also noting that floor voids in
data processing rooms are conventionally BS 5839-1 gives clear guidance on systems designed for
protected irrespective of depth), small life protection and this is detailed below. As stated in
(<1 m2) cupboards, toilets and bathrooms section 8.2.2.2, the NFPA does not identify such system
and some small lobbies. types. Designers are required to use their judgment and
experience to determine the level of coverage required.
P2 systems Detectors are required in defined areas in a
building which have a high fire risk, e.g. Under BS 5839-1, fire alarm systems for the protection of
areas containing the presence of ignition life (category L) can be relied upon to sound a fire alarm
sources and easily ignitable materials, or to ensure that occupants are alerted to a fire and can
areas with a high consequence of fire. Areas commence escape at an early stage.
Category L systems are subdivided as follows: 8.2.4 Supervising station fire alarms
L1 systems Detection coverage is as for P1 systems (see This type of system is identified by NFPA 72 and is not
above) (i.e. essentially comprehensive cover- mentioned specifically in BS 5839. Supervising station fire
age with a limited number of permitted alarms are networked systems where one building is used
exceptions). as the main control point for a fire alarm system covering
a number of buildings. An example would be a college
L2 systems Essentially for the protection of escape
campus, where a central control building holds the main
routes and rooms that directly open onto
control panel under the supervision of a site management
escape routes (which is an L3 level of cover-
team. The other buildings then have individual systems
age, see below), and also for specified areas
that are networked to the main control system.
where a fire could lead to a high risk to life
safety (this could include areas where the Such systems can also aid the fire brigade by allowing
probability of fire is high, the combustible them to establish an information point at a safe distance
inventory is high or the risk to life is high). from the location of the fire.
The onus on defining these ‘additional’
high-risk areas remains with the designer,
therefore L2 systems are those that include 8.2.5 Manual fire alarm systems
all L3 areas and additional (designer defined)
areas of risk. BS 5839-1 defines systems that include manual call points
only, with no additional automatic fire detection systems,
L3 systems For the protection of escape routes and as category M systems. These manual call points are
rooms opening on to escape routes. This distributed at strategic locations within the building. As
includes stairways, corridors and other areas discussed above, it is normally necessary for category L
that form parts of a common escape route, systems to fulfil the requirements for category M systems.
and also all of the room spaces that open
onto these defined escape routes. Again, Again, as stated in section 8.2.2.2, the NFPA does not
there is a limited number of areas where identify such system types. Designers are required to use
detection coverage may not be required for their judgment and experience to determine the level of
escape routes or rooms that open onto escape cover required.
routes. Areas covered by L3 systems should
always include those appropriate to L4.
8.2.6 Systems for domestic dwellings
L4 systems For the protection of escape routes, includ-
ing stairways, corridors and other parts that BS 5839-6 covers the recommendations for fire detection
form part of a common escape route. within dwellings. The recommendations are quite complex
and have been broken down into six grades:
L5 systems For the protection of selected rooms and
areas only. This type of system is normally
Grade A A fire alarm system that conforms to certain
provided to achieve a specific fire safety goal.
specific recommendations of BS EN 54-2:
1997 (BSI, 1997) (for control and indicating
Category L5 systems could include one or two detectors
equipment) and BS EN 54-4: 1998 (BSI,
only, but they might also include detection to an L2, L3
1998) (for power supply) and having been
or L4 standard. For example, as part of a fire engineering
designed and installed in accordance with
strategy, an airport terminal may be provided with compre-
specific sections of BS 5839-1.
hensive fire detection coverage (essentially to an L1
standard) in many areas of the building, but detection Grade B A fire alarm system that conforms to certain
could be omitted in very large and sterile concourses, specific recommendations of BS EN 54 (fire
where it would not be appropriate. Some variation in detectors, fire alarm sounders and control
manual call point locations could also form part of the and indicating equipment, power supply).
strategy. While reasonably comprehensive, the overall
system would not satisfy L1, L2, L3 or L4, so the system Grade C A system of fire detectors and sounders
would be classified as L5. connected to a central control panel with
mains power supply and battery back-up.
Category L systems would typically also be required to
provide manual call points, in accordance with the require- Grade D A system of mains-powered smoke alarms
ment for a category M system (see below). However, such with battery back-up.
manual call point coverage might not be required in
certain circumstances, or where it is not considered neces- Grade E A system of mains-powered smoke alarms
sary as part of the fire safety goals of a category L5 system. without battery back-up.
Where it can be identified that only certain areas of a Grade F A system of battery-powered smoke alarms.
building present an unacceptable risk from fire, then it
may be appropriate to install automatic detection in these Where systems to grades D, E or F are installed with more
rooms only (which could result in an L5 or P2 standard than one smoke detector, these should be interlinked
of coverage). within the same dwelling.
BS 5839-1 gives further details on the system categories Once the appropriate grade for a system has been deter-
and requirements for coverage. mined, a category needs to be established. Categories largely
follow the convention in BS 5839-1 and are summarised the circuits are constantly monitored, wiring does not
below (noting that ‘D’ is included in the ‘L’ and ‘P’ desig- technically need to be fire rated, as a circuit break will
nation to reflect domestic application): immediately be notified to the panel as a change in the
steady state. If a detector is activated by a fire, then its
LD1 A system installed throughout the dwelling, other operation will also alter the steady-state resistance of the
than toilets and bathrooms. circuit to which it is connected and the fire alarm panel
will raise the alarm. As each radial circuit from the control
LD2 A system installed in escape routes and areas that panel will have a number of detectors connected to it,
may present a high fire risk or where the risk to identification of the location of a fire is limited to the
life safety is high. knowledge of the affected circuit. It is common practice to
allocate one radial circuit to one fire zone, and therefore
LD3 A system installed in the escape routes (e.g. internal activation of a detector will be registered at the control
entrance hallways or stairs). panel as being within the zone covered by that circuit.
Figure 8.1 shows a diagram of this type of system. Follow-
PD1 A system installed throughout the dwelling, other ing activation of a device, the zone in which the device is
than toilets and bathrooms. located must be searched to identify the precise location
of the alarm. No other information about the zone can be
PD2 A system installed in defined rooms or areas of the obtained at the control panel.
dwelling.
Sounders on this type of system are wired on separate
The choice of grade and category of system will again circuits in fire-resisting cable, as they are not monitored
depend on the relevant codes and standards, local regula- and must continue to operate in the event of a fire.
tions, the use and size of the building and the nature of
the occupants (e.g. owner-occupiers, students in halls of
residence or short-let temporary tenants) and should be 8.3.2 Addressable systems (including
confirmed with all relevant stakeholders. analogue addressable)
NFPA 72 also addresses the use of fire alarm systems in While detectors connected to addressable systems operate
private dwellings. The recommendations are given in in the same basic way as for conventional monitored
chapter 11 of the code, and while similar levels of detec- systems, they are connected to ‘loops’ rather than radial
tion to those given in BS 5839-6 are covered, they are circuits. Each detector is allocated a unique identification
more prescriptive and categorised into building types or ‘address’ during the commissioning process. This
rather than into grades and categories. This makes selec- allows the control panel to recognise the change in the
tion of appropriate systems easier. steady state of individual detectors, as opposed to changes
in circuit steady state with conventional monitored
Power supply requirements to detectors are also similar to systems. The benefit of connecting to loop rather than
those in BS 5839-6. radial circuits is that damage to part of the circuit can be
isolated, allowing the system to continue in operation. In
order to achieve this, zone isolator units are placed in the
loop between zones.
8.3 Types of fire detection
Analogue addressable systems are the most common type
systems of system being installed at present. They use detectors
that constantly relay information on their operating condi-
All fire detection systems use the same principle to detect tion to the control panel. This type of information will
a fire situation — a fire or combustion product causes a allow the control panel to determine if a particular detec-
disturbance in the steady-state signal within the detection tor is being subjected to an abnormally high ambient level
device. The differences between types of systems relate to of smoke in normal use, and hence compensation can be
what products the devices are designed to detect and the made. In addition, the control panel can monitor the
way that the disturbance signal is processed by the fire contamination levels on each of the system’s detectors and
alarm control panel. Most fire detection systems fall into report when maintenance is required.
one of two main categories:
In some buildings it may be desirable for the detectors to
—— conventional monitored systems be less sensitive during the daytime, when the building is
—— addressable systems (including analogue address- occupied, than at night, when the building is unoccupied.
able).
Analogue addressable systems can be programmed to
operate in this way. Zones of conventional detectors and
8.3.1 Conventional monitored call points may be connected to an analogue system by
systems means of suitable interfacing devices.
Conventional monitored systems use a basic method of

detecting a fire. The detection points (either smoke or
heat) are wired in radial circuits from the control panel. 8.4 Detection zoning
At the end of each circuit, a resistor or semiconductor
device is used to create a known resistance across the To ensure rapid and unambiguous identification of the fire
circuit and hence provide a steady-state reference. Because source, the protected area should be divided into detection
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Detector

EOL EOL EOL EOL
Call point
EOL End of line
resistor
+ – + – + – + –
Detection Detection Detection Detection
zone 1 zone 2 zone 3 zone 4
Fire alarm control panel
Note: a wiring fault in one detection zone will not cause a fault in another detection zone
Figure 8.1 Wiring of detectors and call points within a detection zone
zones. When determining the area to be covered by a zone, —— The zoning arrangements should complement the
consideration should be given to accessibility, size, the fire fire strategy. This is particularly important for
management strategy determined for the premises and, large buildings with complex fire strategies (e.g.
particularly in occupied premises, to the need for each which include phased evacuation).
detection zone to be accessible from the main circulation
routes leading from where the control panel is situated. —— Detection zone limits can be relaxed only for
Addressable systems are able to give far more accurate certain category M systems.
information on the location of a fire source. —— Following a fire incident, a person escaping from
the source of the fire may activate a manual call
NFPA 72 (NFPA, 2016) does not give formal recommen- point on the escape route but in a different zone to
dations for zoning, except for wireless systems. In such that in which the fire is located. Therefore, it may
systems, each detector position has to be individually be an advantage to have manual call points within
identifiable. The recommendations of BS 5839-1 (BSI, separate zones to those of the detectors. This will
2013a), however, are quite specific. avoid misleading information regarding the posi-
tion of fire, particularly on staircase landings.
In general, the following BS 5839 recommendations relat-
ing to the size of a zone should be observed: —— The wiring of the detectors should be arranged
such that a fault on one detection zone does not
—— If the total floor area (i.e. the total of the floor areas prevent the operation of detectors in another zone;
for all storeys) of the building is not greater than for compliance, detectors are normally wired on a
300 m2, then the building may be treated as a conventional panel as shown in Figure 8.1.
single zone, no matter how many storeys it may
have. Otherwise, each zone should not extend over Where fire alarm systems are being designed for buildings
more than one storey. outside British Standards recommendations, care should
be taken to ensure the system is zoned with a view to
—— The total floor area for a zone should not exceed satisfying the following points:
2000 m2 (where non-addressable detection is used).
—— The search distance (i.e. the distance that has to be —— Search areas within a zone should be minimised by
travelled by a searcher inside a zone to determine limiting their geographic area.
visually the position of a fire) should not exceed —— Fire zones that pass through building features,
60 m (unless addressable detection is used). The such as staircases, should be individual zones.
use of remote indicator lamps outside doors may
reduce the number of zones required. —— Areas of high risk should be individually zoned.
—— Where stairwells or similar structures extend —— There should be a logical sequence to the layout
beyond one floor but are in one fire compartment, and numbering of zones.
this should be treated as a separate fire zone (unless
addressable detection is used). With addressable or analogue addressable systems, each
device (e.g. detector or call point) is given a numerical
When planning zones, the following points should also be address code. Devices are wired in a loop arrangement.
considered: The manufacturer should be consulted as to the maximum
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Detector
Call point
Short circuit
isolator
+ – + –
Detection Detection
loop 1 OUT loop 1 IN
Fire alarm control panel
Note 1: short-circuit isolators are fitted between each zone so that a wiring fault in one detection zone will
not cause a fault in another detection zone.
Note 2: short-circuit isolators are also fitted between loop OUT and the first detection device, and loop IN
and the last detection device; in many cases these are built into the control panel circuitry.
Figure 8.2 Wiring of detectors and call points on a detection loop
number of devices that can be accommodated on a loop, —— Manual call points should be located so that no
and the length of one loop. One loop can cover several person needs to travel more than 45 m from any
detection zones. position within the premises in order to operate
one. This distance may need to be reduced in
Short-circuit isolators are placed between zones, as shown certain circumstances (e.g. where there is a risk of
in Figure 8.2, so that a fault in one zone does not affect rapid fire spread, a high number of mobility
devices in another zone. With addressable systems, devices impaired occupants etc.).
can be assigned into separate zones by programming of
the panel software. —— Generally, call points should be located at a height
of 1.4 m above the floor at easily accessible, well-
With addressable or analogue addressable systems, the illuminated and conspicuous positions, free from
detector or manual call point in alarm can be shown by obstructions.
the use of an alphanumeric display. However, this on its —— The method of operation of all call points in an
own will not be acceptable and the zone in which the installation should be identical, unless there is a
detector or manual call point has operated should also be particular reason for differentiation.
displayed, e.g. by means of an led indicator.
Where manual call points are located on the landing of an
The zonal identification diagram or chart may be mounted enclosed staircase (except the final exit call point), they
adjacent to the control panel and, as BS 5839-1 also requires shall be included within the zone that serves adjacent
a plan of the building to be displayed, the use of a mimic accommodation on that level.
diagram provides a suitable means for zone identification.
Manual and automatic devices may be installed on the
same system. However, it may be advisable to install the
manual call points on separate zones for speed of identifi-
8.5 Manual call points cation (see section 8.4).
The manual call point (often referred to as a manual
break-glass unit) is a device to enable personnel to raise
the alarm, in the event of a fire, by simply breaking a
frangible element and thus activating the alarm system.
8.6 Types of fire detection
devices
BS 5838-1 provides guidance for the correct siting and posi-
tioning of manual call points. This includes the following:
8.6.1 General
—— Manual call points should be located on all storey
exits (e.g. exits into stairs) and all exits to the open Detectors are designed to identify the presence of by-
air. products of a fire. These are primarily smoke or heat, but
can also include other combustion products (e.g. carbon 8.6.4 Combined or multi-sensor
monoxide) or radiation. For each of these fire by-products, heat and smoke detectors
a number of types of detector are available:
In combined detectors, the benefits of both heat and
—— Smoke detection: types of detector include point smoke detection are gained. This type of detector gener-
ionisation smoke detectors, point optical smoke ally uses the optical method of smoke detection along with
detectors, optical beam detectors and aspirating a flat-response heat detector. Modern multi-sensor units
systems. Video detection can also be used to iden- can use a number of inputs, including heat, smoke and
tify the presence of smoke. combustion gases, to determine the alarm state.
—— Heat detection: detector types include point fixed
heat detectors, point rate of heat rise detectors and
linear heat detectors.
8.6.5 Point-type heat detectors
—— Flame detection: detector types include ultraviolet Point-type heat detectors respond to temperatures
and infrared flame detectors. surrounding a particular spot. All point-type heat detec-
tors should include a fixed temperature element operating
It is common for detector units to analyse for multiple at a predetermined temperature. Some may also include a
phenomena, for example combined heat and smoke rate of rise element designed to operate in response to a
detection. rapid rise in temperature.
When choosing the type of detector to be used in a particu- In general, heat detectors are less sensitive than other
lar area, it is important to remember that the detector types of detector, and therefore they should be used where
must be able to discriminate between fire and the normal background smoke or particulate matter would render
environment within the building, e.g. smoking in hotel smoke detectors unsuitable.
bedrooms, fumes from forklift trucks in warehouses, steam
from bathrooms, smoky cooking in kitchens etc.
8.6.6 Linear heat detectors
Many common methods of detection use ‘point-type’
A linear heat detector consists of a special cable that is
detectors, where each detector serves a specific point in
able to detect changes in temperature along its length.
the protected space. Most traditional types of smoke and
Two types are available. The simple metallic cable type
heat detector are point detectors. Detectors may alterna-
utilises two steel cores twisted together, each insulated
tively be ‘line-type’, or ‘linear’, where the detector analyses
with a temperature-sensitive polymer. If any section of the
for a phenomenon occurring at some point along its
cable is heated to above the preset alarm value, the poly-
length. This includes linear heat detection and optical
mer insulation melts and the two wires are allowed to
beam detection.
touch, generating an alarm condition.
8.6.2 Ionisation chamber smoke Fibre optic linear heat detection is more sophisticated, in
that it continuously monitors the temperature along its
detectors length, typically at 1 m intervals. This allows the control-
ling system some degree of self-learning and permits the
In ionisation chamber detectors, an electrical current analysis of unusual temperature events.
flows between two electrodes. The current is reduced by
the presence of smoke. Ionisation detectors are particu-
larly sensitive to small-particle smoke, such as that 8.6.7 Beam detectors
produced by rapidly burning fires, but are relatively insen-
sitive to large smoke particles in dense smoke or In many installations, point-type heat detectors or smoke
smouldering fires, such that those produced by overheated detectors will be satisfactory. However, in buildings with
pvc or smouldering polyurethane foam. very high ceilings, these types of detectors are difficult to
access and detection might not occur until the fire is well
When used in an incorrect location, ionisation detectors established (especially in the case of heat detectors). In
can be responsible for a higher frequency of false alarms these situations, dedicated optical beam detectors are more
than optical types. Care should be taken when disposing suitable. Optical beam detection may also be suited to the
of ionisation detectors due to their radioactive content. protection of very large and open spaces.
Local restrictions on disposal need to be observed.
Figure 8.3 shows the general arrangement of a beam detec-
tor. The transmitter propagates an infrared beam, which
8.6.3 Optical chamber smoke travels across the protected area to the receiver. In the
detectors event of a fire, the amount of infrared light that will be
received by the receiver is reduced due to the presence of
In optical chamber detectors, light is scattered or, in some smoke.
cases, absorbed by smoke particles. They are sensitive to
large particles found in optically dense smoke, but are less The receiver can be located at the opposite side of the
sensitive to smaller smoke particles. Optical detectors are protected space from the transmitter. Alternatively, the
the most common type in use due to their better perfor- transmitter and receiver may be located together, with a
mance in terms of lower frequency of false alarms and mirror located at the opposite side of the space, designed
their ability to detect smouldering fires. to reflect the transmitter signal back to the combined unit.
—— one or more pipes, drilled at regular intervals,

Transmitter Smoke Receiver installed throughout the area to be protected and
connected to the detector (the holes serve as indi-
vidual smoke detectors)
—— a pump that draws air through the pipes to the
detector, where it is analysed for the presence of
smoke
—— an optional filter to remove dust particles etc.,
which may have been drawn into the pipes
—— appropriate electronic equipment to indicate the
presence of smoke and control the operation of
output relays etc.
Fire
Aspirating systems have an advantage over other types of

Figure 8.3 Operation of a beam detector fire detection systems in that the pipework can be hidden
in the ceiling or behind walls. In addition, they are unaf-
fected by high air flows. Unlike point detectors, which
Beam detectors are normally sited just below the ceiling, wait for smoke to reach them, air is drawn to the detector.
and can be used in areas with high ceilings and areas Therefore, they can be used in areas where smoke detec-
where the installation and/or maintenance of point detection would otherwise prove difficult, such as in atria,
tors may prove difficult (such as in warehouses), may be stadia, gymnasia and large function rooms with high ceil-
too expensive or may interfere with the decor of the buildings. They are also suitable for use in dusty environments,
ing. They are particularly suited to warehouses, aircraft such as car parks.
hangers, historic buildings, art galleries, atria, shopping
centres and loft spaces. As with beam detectors, care should also be taken with
unusually high spaces, where a smoke layer is likely to form
However, care must be taken to ensure that any possible below the ceiling (stratify). In such a situation, the aspirat-
flexing of the building is taken into account when choosing system pipework needs to be placed below this level.
ing the locations of the units. Care should also be taken
with unusually high spaces, where a smoke layer is likely Detection equipment of this type may be marginally more
to form below the ceiling (e.g. due to stratification of costly than a conventional fire detection system and
smoke). In such a situation, the detectors need to be placed control system. However, the benefits in terms of reduced
below this level. maintenance costs cannot be dismissed.
See chapter 6 for fire size and temperature gradients for Normally, the control panels can be configured to give
smoke behaviour. three levels of response, depending on the level of smoke
detected, for example:
8.6.8 Aspirating systems Level 1 Notify responsible personnel that smoke has
been detected.
In some premises where expensive equipment is housed,
such as computer rooms and telephone exchanges, it is Level 2 Switch off air vents and/or switch off power
important to detect smoke before the outbreak of flaming supplies to certain areas to prevent the fire
combustion. In such situations, an aspirating system from igniting.
should be considered. In addition to this, it is becoming
more popular to use aspirating systems in areas where Level 3 Indicate a general fire alarm condition and
access for maintenance would be difficult to arrange, such signal that a fire has been detected to other
as enclosed public areas. In some heritage buildings, the systems and communication centres.
ability to conceal the detection pipework is a considera-
tion for the use of this type of device. The ability to locate Recommendations for the design and installation of aspi-
the sensing unit away from the area being protected is also rating systems are given in BS 5839-1 (BSI, 2013a).
leading to new applications being found for these systems,
such as in cold stores.
8.6.9 Flame detectors
The accuracy of aspirating systems has increased over the
past few years, and they are now more resilient to false Flame detection is now mostly limited to specialist appli-
alarm. Their cost has also been falling. As a result, these cations requiring very quick detection of flames and where
systems can now offer alternatives to traditional systems high-value assets are being protected, such as aircraft
in general use. hangars. They can generally be used in areas that contain
materials that are likely to produce rapidly spreading
Aspirating systems generally consist of the following flaming fires, such as flammable liquids.
component parts:
There are two main types of flame detector:
—— an extremely sensitive detector (approximately
10–200 times more sensitive than a typical point —— ultraviolet flame detectors, which detect the ultra-
detector) housed in a control unit violet radiation within a flame
—— infrared detectors, which respond to the flickering water vapour. One advantage of using the cctv system is
component of the infrared radiation from a fire. that cost can be shared and, as most vsds can monitor a
number of cameras at once, processing equipment costs
Flame detectors are unable to detect smoke from smoul- can be minimised.
dering fires and are therefore used in specialised
applications or to supplement heat or smoke detectors. vsd is particularly useful in large open areas, where smoke
They are not used as general-purpose detectors and in paths cannot be predicted. The systems do not rely on
many applications have been superseded by video smoke reaching particular detection heads and therefore
detection. give a much wider coverage per detector. Typical applica-
tions would be areas where the installation of traditional
detection would be unsightly or where valuable equip-
8.6.10 Gas combustion detectors ment is stored over a large area and a fire situation needs
to be detected quickly.
This type of device is capable of detecting some of the
gaseous products of combustion rather than the smoke or As with most software-based systems, the trigger thresh-
heat that is generated. The most common type is the olds can be set to work at varying levels in order to
carbon monoxide detector, which are particularly good at minimise false alarms.
detecting a fire where the oxygen supply to that fire is
restricted. This makes them very effective at detecting
It should be noted that cabling systems will have to be
smouldering fires where the lack of heat or oxygen can
carefully considered if they need to operate during a fire
hinder fire development. It also makes them suitable for
situation. It should also be noted that vsd requires the
use in residential properties as monitoring devices where
cameras to be able to ‘see’, which will require lighting to
gas-fired heating equipment is present and there is a risk
be maintained at all times. Some cameras are designed to
of the air supply to that equipment being restricted or the
work in infrared lighting and, again, this will need to be
flue being blocked. They can also be less affected by other
maintained at all times. Building maintainers will need to
common causes of false alarms, such as dust and steam.
understand the relationship between the vsd and the
lighting installation so that future development within a
Although carbon monoxide detectors have advantages
building does not compromise the vsd.
over other types, there are some disadvantages that should
be borne in mind. These include the following:
—— Carbon monoxide will diffuse within the atmo-

sphere. If it is contained within a building, it can 8.7 Siting and spacing of
travel a significant distance from the source of the detectors
fire. This means that a detector responding to the
gas may not be the nearest to the source of the fire,
The recommendations of BS 5839-1 (BSI, 2013a) and
and may not even be in the same zone or floor
NFPA 72 (NFPA, 2016) differ significantly in this area.
level.
While very specific guidance is provided in BS 5839-1,
—— Because they are designed to detect gases rather based on permissible distances, the NFPA 72 guidance is
than particles of smoke or rises in temperature, based on statements as to where detectors should or should
carbon monoxide detectors might not respond to a not be placed, along with general spacing information (to
fire that generates a high level of smoke and has a be confirmed by the equipment manufacturer).
good oxygen supply.
—— The sensing element within commonplace carbon 8.7.1 Heat and smoke detectors
monoxide detectors has a finite life, and so
replacement must become part of the maintenance In a building, the greatest concentration of smoke and
regime for the system in which they are installed. heat will generally occur at the highest parts of enclosed
Longer life alternatives are available which use areas, and therefore detectors should normally be sited at
infrared detection methods. However, these are not these locations.
widely used in the construction industry, being
prohibitively expensive. BS 5839-1 includes the following recommendations:
Careful thought should be given to the placing and spac- (a) Heat detectors should be sited so that the heat-
ing of these detectors, and their use alongside smoke and sensitive element is not less than 25 mm nor more
heat detectors rather than instead of them. than 150 mm below the ceiling or roof. This
increases to 600 mm for smoke detectors. If a pro-
8.6.11 Video smoke detection tected space has a pitched or north-light roof,
detectors should be installed in each apex.
Video smoke detection (vsd) is a system based on the use (b) The maximum horizontal distance between any
of conventional closed-circuit television (cctv). A process- point in the area and the nearest detector is as fol-
ing unit is connected to the cctv system, which is lows for point type heat and smoke detectors:
preprogrammed with known smoke characteristics (algo-
rithms). By monitoring the live images offered by the —— under flat horizontal ceilings and in corri-
cctv system, smoke patterns can be identified early and dors more than 2 m wide (Figure 8.4(a)),
the alarm raised. These systems are sophisticated to the 5.3 m for point-type heat detectors and
level of being able to distinguish between smoke and 7.5 m for point-type smoke detectors
—— for square-type arrays (Figure 8.4(b)), (d) Detection above a perforated ceiling may be used
maximum spacing between smoke detec- to protect the space below, provided that at least
tors is typically 10 m, and for heat detectors 40% of the ceiling is ‘open’, perforations are uni-
the maximum distance is typically 7 m formly distributed, with a minimum dimension of
10 mm, and the ceiling thickness is not more than
—— in corridors of width not exceeding 2 m, three times the perforation diameter.
detectors only need to be installed on the
centre line. Smoke detectors may be (e) Detectors should not be located within 1000 mm
mounted at intervals of 15 m and heat of a ventilation supply point.
detectors at intervals of 10.6 m, provided
that the maximum dimension from end The guidance in NFPA 72 differs, as follows:
walls is 7.5 m and 5.3 m for smoke and heat
detectors, respectively
(a) Point-type smoke detectors should not be installed
—— in the apex of a pitched or north-light roof, closer than 100 mm (4 inches) from the edge of the
add to the maximum horizontal distance ceiling and, if mounted on a side wall, should be
1% for each degree of slope to a maximum in a band between 100 mm (4 inches) and 300 mm
increase of 25% (Figure 8.4(c)). For exam- (12 inches) from the ceiling.
ple, for a point smoke detector at the apex
of a 20° slope, 20% of 7.5 m is 1.5 m. There- (b) A spacing of 9.1 m (30 feet) can be used as a guide-
fore, the maximum distance of travel is line for detector spacing. However, this needs to be
9 m; the maximum area of coverage may confirmed with the specific detector manufacturer.
also be increased proportionally.
The spacing for heat detection is not so specific, referring
(c) Where the passage of smoke or hot gases towards the engineer to manufacturers for information. However,
a detector is likely to be disturbed by a ceiling certain provisos are made. Detectors should be no more
obstruction (such as a beam), further allowances than half the manufacturer’s listed spacing from walls or
should be made, as follows: partitions, and all points of the ceiling should have a
detector with 0.7 times the listed spacing. BS 5839-1 is
—— for an obstruction having a depth greater
easier to understand in its guidance on this issue, giving
than 10% of the height of the ceiling (e.g.
diagrammatic assistance to convey the point.
beams), the obstruction should be consid-
ered as a wall
Depending on the type of ceiling, NFPA 72 gives different
—— detectors should generally be avoided spacing recommendations based on multipliers of the
within 500 mm of a wall or obstruction. listed spacing.
10 m
7.5 m
10 m
(a)
(b)
Apex of pitched roof
North-light roof
7.5 m
(c)
Figure 8.4 Siting and spacing of heat and smoke detectors: (a) maximum distance between any point and a smoke detector under a flat ceiling (5.3 m for
heat detectors); (b) maximum spacing for smoke detectors in a square array (7 m for heat detectors); and (c) under apex of a pitched or north-light roof
8.7.2 Beam detectors In deciding where the control panel is to be sited, two
factors should be considered:
Generally, the beam should not pass closer than within
500 mm of a wall, partition or duct (excluding within —— Availability of staff: the control panel needs to be
500 mm of the transmitter and receiver or reflector(s)). If located in a position where staff on duty can easily
there is a possibility of people walking in the area of the see the indications being given by the panel.
beam, then the beam detector should be installed at least
—— Accessibility by the fire brigade: the control panel
2.7 m above the floor. Additional consideration should be
should preferably be located on the ground floor
given to any interaction with frequently moving objects that
and in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to
may affect the beam, such as vehicles and forklift trucks.
the building likely to be used by the fire brigade.
A number of specific requirements for point detector
coverage, including proximity to ceilings and obstruc- Adjacent to the control unit should be a zone designation
tions, apply equally to beam detector coverage. chart or, better still, a diagrammatic plan showing zone
locations.
NFPA guidance refers the engineer to manufacturers’
instructions with regard to beam detectors. 8.8.2 Audible and visual alarm
8.7.3 Flame detectors An important component of any fire alarm system is the
alarm sounder, normally a bell or electronic sounder, which
Flame detectors operate by monitoring the frequency of should be audible throughout the building in order to alert
light in the protected area. Types are available to monitor the occupants of the building. Where the fire alarm system
infrared and ultraviolet light. If a flame detector ‘sees’ the forms part of a fire engineered strategy, a voice alarm (va)
particular frequencies of light that correspond to a fire, may be used in place of traditional sounders. BS 5839-1
then the alarm is raised. Flame detectors do not depend (BSI, 2013a) and NFPA 72 (NFPA, 2016) have different
on smoke or heat being transported to them. Therefore, recommendations on the subject of alarm sounders.
they do not need to be ceiling mounted. They should be
installed strictly in accordance with the manufacturer’s 8.8.2.1 BS 5839: Part 1 recommendations
recommendations. More than one flame detector can be
used to cover a single area to ensure that the flame is
For the UK and where BS 5839-1 is the prevalent stand-
detected in the shortest possible time.
ard, the following notes provide guidance on the correct
use of alarm sounders.
8.7.4 Ceiling height limits
—— A sounder should produce a minimum sound level
BS 5839-1 provides guidance regarding the maximum ceil- of either 65 dBA or 5 dBA above any background
ing height that may be protected for a given detector type. noise likely to persist for a period longer than 30
The general maximum heights applicable are summarised seconds, whichever is greater, at any occupiable
as follows: point in the building. Note that single doors could
reduce the sound level by 20 dBA, or 30 dBA in
—— heat detection (to BS EN 54-5: 2017) (BSI, 2017b): the case of fire doors. During commissioning of
7.5 m to 9.0 m (depending on the classification) the system, it is common to find areas of the build-
ing in which the sound level falls slightly below
—— point smoke detection (to BS EN 54-7: 2001) (BSI, 65 dBA due to the furnishings and fit-out items
2001): 10.5 m absorbing and attenuating the sound. This gener-
—— carbon monoxide detection (to BS EN 54-26: 2015) ally results in the subsequent installation of
(BSI, 2015c): 10.5 m additional sounders. If the area in question is a
small confined area or small room, then a measured
—— optical beam detection (to BS EN 54-12: 2015) level 2 or 3 dBA below that set out in BS 5839 may
(BSI, 2015b): 25 m to 40 m (depending on sensi- be acceptable, as this difference would be imper-
tivity and risk of stratification) ceptible to the human ear.
—— aspirating detectors (to BS EN 54-20: 2006) (BSI, —— If the alarm system is to be used in premises such as
2006): 10.5 m to 40 m (depending on class and risk hotels, boarding houses etc., where it is required to
of stratification). wake sleeping persons, then the sound level should
be 75 dBA minimum at the bed-head. This may
require the installation of a sounder in each
bedroom.
8.8 Control equipment
—— If the alarm system is to be used in premises such
as a nightclub, where the background sound can be
8.8.1 Siting of control panel at such a high level as to limit the effectiveness of
the sounders, provision should be made to discon-
The control and indicating panel — which identifies the nect the music equipment on activation of the fire
location of a fire, indicates faults and controls the opera- alarm system.
tion of alarm sounders and other signalling devices
— should comply with the recommendations of BS EN —— In cases where one or more of the occupants are
54-2 (BSI, 1997) or the applicable recommendations in deaf, there are a number of ways of alerting the
countries applying other standards. person(s) of a fire. In many instances, there will
be enough people about to ensure that any deaf requiring different levels or ‘modes’. These modes are
occupants are made aware of the fire alarm sound- broken down as follows:
ing. In situations where a deaf occupant is working
alone or undertakes an activity that results in their —— Public mode: sounders should produce a level of
location being difficult to pinpoint, then radio 75 dBA at 10 ft, 15 dBA above average ambient
paging may be an option to consider. sound or 5 dBA above the maximum sound level,
with duration of at least 60 seconds.
—— In cases where persons who need to be alerted of a
fire alarm include people who are deaf, then —— Private mode: sounders should produce a level of
flashing beacons can be wired into the sounder 45 dBA at 10 ft, 10 dBA above average ambient
circuits. In situations such as nursing homes, a sound or 5 dBA above the maximum sound level,
vibrating disc may be used, placed under a mattress with duration of at least 60 seconds.
or pillow. In the UK, the Equality Act 2010 and —— Sleeping mode: sounders should produce a level of
Building Regulations Approved Document M 70 dBA at 10 ft, 15 dBA above average ambient
(HM Government, 2015) should be consulted with sound or 5 dBA above the maximum sound level,
regard to provision in this area. with duration of at least 60 seconds.
When using a voice alarm system (typically designed to The maximum sound levels should not exceed 120 dBA
BS 5839-8: 2013) (BSI, 2013c), care will be required to for any type of system.
ensure the message is clearly audible at the elevated
volume levels needed to ensure the alarm can be heard In addition to the above, mechanical equipment rooms
throughout the building. In addition, the zoning of audi- should be designed with a level of 85 dBA.
ble warnings when using voice alarm systems will need to
be matched to the evacuation zones. NFPA 72 requires the use of temporal audible signals so
there is a clear definition of the fire alarm signal across
Visual signal devices should be red or white (unless installations.
conflicting with other warning devices), with flash rates
suitable to avoid triggering seizures in those with photo- The level of visual alarm (or alternatives) should be deter-
sensitive epilepsy. mined locally where NFPA 72 is applied. In the USA, this
aspect is governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act
All audible warning devices used in the same system 1990, which gives stringent guidelines depending on the
should have a similar sound and should be distinct from type and use of the building.
any alarm sounder that is used for other purposes. Ideally,
the frequency should lie in the range 500–1000 Hz for fire
alarm sounders. 8.8.3 Activating other safety
measures
Modern electronic sounders offer a choice of sound tones
(fluctuating or constant). While the sound power level In addition to controlling alarm sounders, fire alarm
(spl) will not change within a particular sounder, experi- panels may also be used to activate other safety measures.
mentation with different tones can result in a more These include disabling lifts, providing fire signals to fire
distinctive sound against the background noise. A large suppression control panels, activating public address
number of quieter sounders, rather than a small number announcements, closing smoke and fire doors, shutting
of very loud sounders, may be preferable to prevent noise down plant, activating smoke control systems etc.
levels in some areas from becoming too loud.
In some circumstances, it may prove economical to have
more than one fire alarm panel in a building to avoid
At least one sounder per fire compartment will be neces-
having to bring the cabling required for smoke detectors,
sary. It is unlikely that sounder noise levels in a room will
call points, sounders etc., back to one central point. In
be satisfactory if more than one dividing wall or door
such cases, it may be necessary for one fire alarm panel to
separates it from the nearest sounder. The level of sound
send signals to other alarm panels. Fire alarm panels may
provided should not be so high as to cause damage to
also be used to send signals to building management
hearing. The number of fire alarm sounders used inside a
systems, radio paging systems, communications monitor-
building should be sufficient to produce the sound level
ing systems or to an off-site monitoring station.
recommended, but should in any case be at least two.
Many systems have the capability to communicate with
For category P systems, an external sounder or visual computer systems whereby graphical and textual informa-
warning device may be required, coloured red and marked tion may be displayed on a computer screen. Events such
‘FIRE ALARM’. as device activations, silencing of alarm sounders etc., may
be stored by the computer and in the control panel’s event
Where mains-powered sounders are used to supplement log and a print-out obtained.
24 V dc sounders then the 240 V ac supply should be
monitored.
8.8.4 Cables
8.8.2.2 NFPA 72 recommendations The type of cable used in fire alarm systems can be divided
into two main types: those that need to continue to func-
Where NFPA 72 is the relevant standard, the require- tion during a fire condition, and those that can fail, having
ments are different. NFPA 72 identifies different areas as already served their purpose.
Cables which need to continue operating during a fire —— Since only a minimal amount of wiring is involved
condition include power supply cables and links to sound- during installation, damage to existing surfaces is
ers and remote communication centres. Those which do kept to a minimum.
not need to continue to operate, having served their
—— Individual detectors can be identified.
purpose, include cables to detectors and failsafe cables to
auxiliary devices such as door release devices. —— Radio-based systems can continue to operate
during a fire condition. Hence the need for fire-
Suitable cables can include mineral-insulated copper- resistant cable is reduced.
sheathed cable (MICC) complying with BS EN 60702-2:
2015 (BSI, 2015d) and ‘soft skin’ types complying with —— Temporary fire cover for special risks, e.g. a
BS 7629-1 (BSI, 2015e) with respect to their construction. marquee or an exhibition, can be easily arranged.
However, the performance of the latter types when
subjected to fire should be verified with the cable manu- The disadvantages of radio-based systems include the
facturer prior to their use. Other types of cable can be used following:
and the standards to which they should comply are given
in section 26 of BS 5839-1 (BSI, 2013a). —— Each detector, call point or other device that is not
wired to the control panel will require a local
Cables are normally required to be ‘standard’ fire resistant power source.
for general use, or ‘enhanced’ fire resistant for situations
where they are expected to continue to perform for —— There is a possibility that the receiver may be
extended periods in a fire (e.g. longer than an initial evac- affected by interference signals from other sources
uation period). Standard cables typically need to meet a or that the transmission path could be temporarily
PH30 classification to BS EN 50400: 2015 (BSI, 2015f), or permanently blocked.
and additionally meet a 30-minute survival time. These —— There are limitations on the allowed frequency
tests include the requirement that the cable continues to spectrum, which could lead to interference between
maintain signal integrity if subjected to a propane burner simultaneous signals. Therefore, it is considered
at 850 °C and subjected to impact tests for a period of 30 unwise to send monitoring signals at frequent
minutes, in addition to a test that includes the application intervals. Hence for some (but not all) faults there
of water spray. may be a significant delay (possibly hours) before
the occurrence of a fault is registered on the control
Enhanced cables may be necessary, for example, in certain panel.
multi-phased evacuation, unsprinklered buildings, in
unsprinklered buildings greater than 30 m in height, or The installation of a radio-based system should, as with
where a fire in one area does not instigate evacuation of other fire alarms systems, comply with the recommenda-
other areas (e.g. hospitals). Enhanced cables typically need tions of BS 5839-1, section 27 of which deals with
to meet a PH120 classification to BS EN 50400, and addi- radio-based systems.
tionally meet a 120-minute survival time to BS 8434-2:
2003 (BSI, 2003). The BS 8434-2 test is particularly oner-
ous in that the test temperature increases to 950 °C and 8.8.6 Power supplies
the water spray time increases to 60 minutes.
In general, the fire alarm control panel and associated
Cables must be provided with appropriate fixings or devices operate at extra low voltage (elv), typically 24 V
support in order that they remain in place and operating dc, and receive this supply either from a built-in charger/
correctly if subjected to changing conditions during a fire. rectifier circuit (powered from the local mains ac supply)
This is particularly important when ‘soft skin’ cables are or from a dedicated elv dc power supply. In the event of
specified, and the practice of using plastic cable ties as failure of the mains supply, a standby elv dc supply is
fixings should be avoided. automatically provided by batteries, or in some cases a
generator. The power supply to fire alarm equipment
should be used for the fire alarm only.
8.8.5 Radio-based systems
Connection to the mains supply should be from a dedi-
Fire alarm systems are available in which communication cated circuit that derives its supply from a point as close as
between the detectors and the control panel is made by possible to the origin of the supply within a building. This
means of radio signals. The advantages and disadvantages will typically be a spare fuse-way in a main switch panel
that need to be considered before designing a radio-based rather than a downstream distribution board. The advan-
system are listed below. tage of this is a reduction in the risk of loss of supply due
to circuit failure. The protective device, be it fuse, minia-
The advantages of radio-based systems are as follows: ture circuit breaker (mcb) or moulded case circuit breaker
(mccb), should be clearly marked in red, carry some means
—— In general, the absence of wiring between system of preventing accidental operation and bear a notice stating
components, e.g. detectors and control panel, means ‘FIRE ALARM – DO NOT SWITCH OFF’.
that radio-based systems are generally cheaper and
quicker to install than hard-wired systems. Disrup- Care should be taken in the design of the power supply to
tion is kept to a minimum, since installation can ensure that the transition from mains to standby batteries
normally take place while the building is occupied. does not cause momentary interruptions in the supply to
Systems can extend beyond a single building with- the equipment. Operation of a single protective device
out the need for inter-building wiring. should not interrupt supplies or cause the system to fail.
The construction of the power supply should comply with 8.9.1 Flameproof equipment
the recommendations of BS 5839-1, NFPA 70: National
Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017) or local standards as Detection equipment is housed within a flameproof enclo-
appropriate. sure. If a fault should occur that produces an electrical
spark, the spark is contained within the housing and not
released into the potentially explosive environment.
The duration and power required for the standby power
supply will depend on the purpose of the system. For cate-
gory L systems, a standby duration of 24 hours is required, 8.9.2 Intrinsically safe equipment
with sufficient capacity to maintain the evacuate signal in
all zones for 30 minutes. If the premises are likely to be Detection equipment installed in the potentially explosive
unoccupied and not supervised for a period exceeding area is fed through suitable barriers or isolators that limit
24 hours, then consideration should be given to engaging the amount of electrical energy entering into the hazard-
a remote monitoring centre for monitoring of power ous area (see Figure 8.5). If a fault occurs on electrical
supply faults or to increasing the standby duration. equipment installed within the hazardous area, causing a
spark to be produced, the amount of energy released will
be insufficient to cause an explosion.
In buildings with a category P system, and if the building
may be unattended and has no power supply monitoring The Zener barrier is an electronic device that limits the
link, then the required duration is 24 hours longer than current that may enter the hazardous area. The end-of-
the period for which the building may remain unoccupied line resistor is used to monitor the supply from the control
(or 72 hours, whichever is less), after which there should panel to the detection devices.
be sufficient capacity to operate all fire alarm devices for
30 minutes. Again, where the building could be unat-
tended for longer periods, remote monitoring of the power
supply should be considered.
8.10 Construction sites
Methodologies for determining standby battery capacity The reader should also refer to chapter 15: Fire safety on
are provided in BS 5839-1. Nevertheless, fire alarm equip- construction sites in this Guide.
ment manufacturers will ensure that batteries supplied
with their equipment are adequate for the standby period
required by the design. Once again, early consultation is 8.10.1 Temporary fire alarm systems
essential to ensure that the requirements of the system are
fully understood by all parties. Construction sites need to be provided with a suitable
warning system to alert all persons on the site in the
event of a fire. On small sites, this can be a simple
management procedure. However, more complex sites
8.9 Hazardous areas will need a different approach. Issues to consider include
complexity of the escape routes, the need to keep escape
routes clear and protected, the changing personnel who
There are potentially explosive areas in which fire detec- may not be familiar with the site and, in some instances,
tion equipment needs to be installed. Such premises may the value of the site, particularly as it approaches
be protected in one of the following ways. completion.
Safe area Hazardous area Figure 8.5 Wiring of detectors

Fire alarm within a hazardous area
control panel
Zener
barrier
+ + +
Detection End of line
In Out
zone resistor
– – –
Detectors/call
points etc
Note 1: the control panel and Zener barrier are wired in the safe area.
Note 2: current entering the hazardous (e.g. potentially explosive) area is limited by the use of a Zener barrier.
Because of the changing nature of buildings during floors of the same building may contain office accommoda-
construction, temporary fire alarm systems have to be tion that has a category L1 (or total coverage) system. Such
dynamic. It may be appropriate to review the installation system design and its intended operation would benefit
daily as construction progresses, as escape routes may get from the early completion of a cause and effect table.
longer, change direction or simply cease to exist. Signage
and education of persons on site need to reflect this. Care should also be taken with regard to cabling types and
Attention will also need to be paid to sound levels and control panel positions within tall buildings.
visual warning devices, as these can quickly become inef-
fective by the introduction of only a few additional
building elements. Regular maintenance needs to be References
carried out to ensure detectors are not contaminated by
construction-generated dust. BSI (1997) BS EN 54-2: 1997+A1:2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems.
Control and indicating equipment (London: British Standards Institution)
Construction continues to be a multi-nationality industry BSI (1998) BS EN 54-4: 1998 Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Power
and it is common to have 20-plus nationalities on a site at supply equipment (London: British Standards Institution)
any one time. The need for clear, unambiguous signage
and warning signals is of utmost importance to ensure BSI (2001) BS EN 54-7: 2001 Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Smoke
safety is maintained. detectors. Point detectors using scattered light, transmitted light or ionization
BSI (2003) BS 8434-2: 2003 + A2: 2009 Methods of test for assessment of the
8.10.2 Fire alarm systems in buildings fire integrity of electric cables. Test for unprotected small cables for use in
with phased handover emergency circuits. BS EN 50200 with a 930° flame and with water spray
Where buildings are designed and constructed for mixed BSI (2006) BS EN 54-20: 2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems.
use, such as retail complexes and high-rise office/residen- Aspirating smoke detectors (London: British Standards Institution)
tial accommodation, construction works may still be under
way while parts of the complex are occupied. The fire BSI (2013a) BS 5839-1: 2013 Fire detection and fire alarm systems for
alarm system may well be completed in the occupied part buildings. Code of practice for design, installation, commissioning and
of the building or complex. However, the system cannot maintenance of systems in non-domestic premises (London: British Standards
Institution)
give full protection and will need to be supplemented by
a temporary system in the construction area. BSI (2013b) BS 5839-6: 2013 Fire detection and fire alarm systems for
buildings. Code of practice for the design, installation, commissioning and
This arrangement brings added complexity over a contin- maintenance of fire detection and fire alarm systems in domestic premises
ually changing temporary system installed on a straight- (London: British Standards Institution)
forward construction site. Evacuation procedures will need BSI (2013c) BS 5839-8: 2013 Fire detection and fire alarm systems for
to be agreed between parties who would normally be buildings. Code of practice for the design, installation, commissioning and
unconnected. The risks involved in false alarm should be maintenance of voice alarm systems (London: British Standards Institution)
assessed, as this may have increased commercial or nuisance BSI (2015a) BS 9991: 2015 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
implications over a straightforward construction site. residential buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
Escape routes will have to be carefully planned to ensure BSI (2015b) BS EN 54-12: 2015 Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Smoke
sufficient segregation is in place to avoid overcrowding of detectors. Line detectors using an optical beam (London: British Standards
Institution)
escape routes.
BSI (2015c) BS EN 54-26: 2015 Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Carbon
Access for fire brigade vehicles and firefighters will have monoxide detectors. Point detectors (London: British Standards Institution)
to be considered on a frequent basis and may involve the BSI (2015d) BS EN 60702-2: 2002+A1:2015 Mineral insulated cables and
cooperation of a number of different bodies. their terminations with a rated voltage not exceeding 750 V. Terminations
BSI (2015e) BS 7629-1: 2015 Electric cables. Specification for 300/500 V fire
8.11 Tall buildings resistant, screened, fixed installation cables having low emission of smoke and
corrosive gases when affected by fire. Multicore cables (London: British
Standards Institution)
Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the
number of tall buildings being erected around the world. BSI (2015f) BS EN 50400: 2015 Method of test for resistance to fire of
This type of construction brings with it particular prob- unprotected small cables for use in emergency circuits (London: British
lems for fire alarm design, as traditional alarm systems do Standards Institution)
not lend themselves to this type of building. Considering BSI (2017a) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
the advances in construction methods and the desire to buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
reduce the size of access cores, the fire alarm design will
generally become part of the overall fire engineering strat- BSI (2017b) BS EN 54-5: 2017 Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Heat
detectors. Point heat detectors (London: British Standards Institution)
egy for the protection for the building. It may therefore be
necessary to provide widely varying levels of detection in DFPNI (2012) Technical Booklet E: Fire Safety. Building Regulations
different parts of the building, as well as different types of (Northern Ireland) (Belfast: Department of Finance and Personnel)
audible warning, depending on the building’s use. HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006 edition
As an example, a predominantly residential building may incorporating the 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon
have smoke detection and sounders individual to each Tyne: NBS) (Note: further amendments published as a separate document,
apartment that do not generate a general alarm, while other April 2019)
HM Government (2015) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document NFPA (2017) NFPA 70 National Electric Code (Quincy, MA: National
M: Access to and use of buildings (Newcastle upon Tyne: NBS) Fire Protection Association)
NFPA (2015) NFPA 90A Standard for the installation of air-conditioning Scottish Government (2017) Technical Handbook – Non-Domestic
and ventilating systems (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection (Livingston: Building Standards Division)
Association)
Welsh Government (2015) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved
NFPA (2016) NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code (Quincy, Document B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006
MA: National Fire Protection Association) edition incorporating 2010, 2013 and 2016 amendments) (Cardiff)
9-1
9 Emergency lighting
9.1 Introduction activation of the fire alarm system, the emergency lighting
is also activated. This may be the case in premises such as
This chapter provides guidance on emergency lighting theatres and cinemas, where lighting may be dimmed.
with regard to fire engineering. More detailed guidance on Where a fire causes the failure of mains power, the emer-
the general principles of emergency lighting is given in gency lighting should operate on detecting that loss,
the Society of Light and Lighting (SLL) Code for Lighting independently of the fire alarm system. If the emergency
(SLL, 2012) and SLL Lighting Guide 12: Emergency lighting comes on during a fire alarm test or if an error
Lighting (SLL, 2015). occurs, then by the time the staff are able to return to the
building the battery capacity may have fallen too low to
To be effective in facilitating the safe evacuation of a build- provide the required period of coverage: time will be
ing in the event of a fire, all escape routes must be adequately needed to recharge the batteries before staff would be
illuminated. Any routes that are part of the normal circu- allowed to reoccupy the building.
lation routes within the building necessarily need, in any
case, to be properly illuminated at all material times. In a situation where the fire and rescue service choose to
isolate power within a building, the emergency lighting
Emergency lighting (also referred to as escape lighting, should respond to that action by detecting the loss of
safety lighting and standby lighting, depending on its mains power.
purpose) is provided to ensure that, in the event of failure
of a building’s main lighting system, there remains a level This chapter should also be read in conjunction with
of artificial illumination which will either allow safe egress chapter 7: Means of escape and human factors, which looks
from the building or allow people to stay in place until the at the use of wayfinding signage.
main lighting returns.
Emergency lighting should be viewed in a different way to

fire alarm systems. While both are important in maintain-
ing people’s safety, the differing approach is taken for a
9.2 Siting of essential
very good reason. While a fire alarm system provides early escape lighting
notification of a potentially catastrophic event, the build-
ing owner/occupier will be happy if the system is never
called into action. 9.2.1 Initial design
In contrast, loss of power to the workplace is not uncom- It is important to identify specific escape routes before
mon. It is, in fact, common enough for building occupants commencing on the design of an emergency lighting
to often view it with bemusement rather than panic. But system. This should be done in consultation with the
the sudden loss of lighting can put people in grave danger architect (if appointed), building owner, fire officer and
if they happen to be working on moving equipment or building control officer. At this stage it would also be
attempting to move about. Therefore, the need for emer- advisable to identify any specific requirements that the
gency lighting is very important as it is more likely to be building’s insurers may wish to impose.
put to use during its lifetime than is a fire alarm system.
Loss of power, and hence loss of lighting, may occur Following consultation with these parties, the initial
during a fire as a result of the fire, but can occur at other design commences with the siting of luminaires to cover
times for a variety of reasons. specific hazards and to highlight safety equipment and
safety signs (see Figure 9.1). Typical locations where such
Where the loss of lighting could result in a life threatening lighting should be sited include the following:
or unexpected situation arising, then an assessment should
be made of the overall risk and appropriate action to be —— on or in designated stairs, corridors, aisles, ramps,
taken. This could include a behavioural assessment of the escalators and passageways
building occupiers, which considers how they are likely to
respond naturally to a lighting failure as well as to any —— at each exit door
management procedure imposed on them.
—— near intersections of corridors
Early discussion with the building owner and other —— near each stairway so that each flight of stairs
designers is important to understand how occupants will receives direct light
be managed during a lighting failure and if any unusual
hazards are present. —— near each change in direction
—— near any change in floor level
It is often assumed that the emergency lighting system
and fire alarm system should be interconnected so that on —— near firefighting equipment
(a) At each door exit (b) Near intersections of corridors (c) Near each staircase
Fire
extinguisher
(d) Near each change in direction (e) Near any changes in floor level (f) Near firefighting equipment
Break-glass unit
(g) Near each fire alarm break-glass unit (h) To illuminate exit and safety signs
Figure 9.1 Locations where emergency luminaires must be sited
—— near each fire alarm call point —— Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
B: Fire Safety (Wales) (Welsh Government, 2015)
—— near first-aid equipment
—— Technical Handbooks (Scotland) Section 2: Fire
—— at non-illuminated exit and safety signs, as required (Scottish Government, 2017a, 2017b)
by the enforcing authority.
—— Building Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2012,
Part E: Fire safety.
There may be instances where other measures, behaviours
or management policies either increase or reduce the need
for emergency lighting. An early meeting with the inter- In addition to the recommendations applicable to the UK,
ested parties should be used to identify such instances and this guide also considers fire alarm and detection installa-
allow the design to reflect them. A policy such as allowing tions across the world and the recommendations of NFPA
the occupants to stay in place during a lighting failure 101: Life Safety Code are also considered (NFPA, 2018a).
may increase the need for emergency lighting, whereas the
use of, for example, vision panels in doors opening onto
escape routes may provide the recommended levels of 9.2.2 Additional escape lighting
emergency illumination within the adjacent room and
reduce the need in that particular room. After siting luminaires at the locations listed in section
9.2.1, consideration should be given to installing lumi-
The principal documents covering the need for emergency naires at other locations, including the following:
lighting in various types of premises within the UK are as
follows: —— lift cars; although not considered as part of the
escape route, emergency lighting is required since
—— Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (SI failure of the normal lighting could result in
2005/1541) (England and Wales) persons being confined in a small dark space for
an indefinite period
—— Fire (Scotland) Act 2005
—— moving stairs and walkways
—— BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management
and use of buildings. Code of practice (BSI, 2017) —— toilets with areas exceeding 8 m2 and any toilet for
disabled people or with baby-changing facilities
—— BS 5266-1: 2016 Emergency lighting. Code of practice
for the emergency lighting of premises (BSI, 2016) —— external areas in the immediate vicinity of exits; if
the identified place of safety is distant from the
—— Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document building, the route to it should be treated as part of
B: Fire Safety (England) (HM Government, 2013) the escape route for emergency lighting purposes.
Emergency lighting 9-3
9.2.3 High-risk task areas relevant door to ensure that its association is unambigu-
ous. Signs should be sited to ensure that a clear contrast
In addition to the above, emergency lighting should also is apparent between the sign and its surroundings.
be provided for areas in which high-risk tasks are under-
taken. These include areas such as plant rooms, lift motor Signs which only show text should no longer be installed.
rooms, electrical switch rooms and any area where a safety
hazard is present, which may become a danger to people Signs complying with BS 5499-1: 2002 (BSI, 2002) may
moving about in darkness. still be used in the UK if they are to be installed in a
building which currently has this type of sign. This is
only due to the citing of BS 5499-1 in the Building Regu-
9.2.4 Open-plan and undefined areas lations 2010 Approved Document B: Fire Safety (HM
Government, 2013) as BS 5499-1 has now been withdrawn
Open and undefined spaces, referred to in BS EN 1838: and replaced by BS ISO 3864-1: 2011 (BSI, 2011).
2013 (BSI, 2013) as ‘anti panic’ areas, are spaces where no
defined escape route exists. In this situation, the office Self-luminous signs may also be used as exit signs. If used,
furniture may hinder the safe escape of occupants if the however, these must also comply with the appropriate
lighting system fails. BS 5266-1 (BSI, 2016) gives examples legislation or code.
of open-plan areas that may need emergency lighting
following a risk assessment.
9.2.6 Lighting levels for escape
In England, the Building Regulations 2010 recommend routes
that areas over 60 m2 be provided with emergency lighting.
Due to the size and nature of such large spaces, they will Escape routes have specific recommendations in terms of
also include areas previously referred to as undefined minimum levels of illumination. It is essential that a
escape routes. In such situations, occupants of a space may minimum level of illumination is maintained along escape
take several different routes to the nearest exit. routes, including during a main lighting failure. BS 5266-1
recommends a minimum illumination of 1 lux at floor
The minimum illumination level for such situations level along the centre line of an escape corridor up to 2 m
recommended by BS 5266-1 is 0.5 lux in the core area. This wide (BSI, 2016).
recommendation is a minimum level, and designers are
asked to consult with building owners to assess the way in NFPA 101 (NFPA, 2018a) and the International Building
which the building will be used and how that might affect Code (ICC, 2015) both recommend that a much higher
the level of illumination to be provided. average of 1 foot candle (11 lux) is achieved, with a mini-
mum of 0.1 foot candle (1.1 lux) at any point along the
The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) and path of egress.
International Building Code (IBC) take a different approach
to open-plan areas. There is no requirement for open-plan
areas to have illumination throughout; however, parts of 9.2.7 Emergency safety (stay-in-
open-plan areas should be classified as escape routes and place) lighting
illuminated in accordance with the recommendations in
section 9.2.6 below. Some judgment is required to assess In 2016, BS 5266-1 introduced the concept of safety light-
which parts of open-plan areas should be treated as ‘escape ing (BSI, 2016). Where building owners or tenant
routes’, but they are generally dictated by the furniture organisations prefer or expect occupants to stay in place
layout and are the areas likely to be used as egress routes during a lighting failure, then provision should be made
by a number of people. to ensure the safety of those occupants until the normal
lighting returns. Decisions regarding emergency safety
9.2.5 Illumination of exit signs lighting should be subject to a risk assessment and may
include, for example, the introduction of emergency light-
Exit signs can be either illuminated internally or exter- ing into areas where it would otherwise not be required.
nally from a remote source. The specific requirements for
exit signs under UK legislation are given in the Health
and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996 (SI
1996/341). For countries applying other codes, the require-
References
ments can be found in NFPA 5000 (NFPA, 2018b), the
International Building Code (IBC) 2015 (ICC, 2015) or BSI (2002) BS 5499-1: 2002 Graphical symbols and signs. Safety signs,
including fire safety signs. Specification for geometric shapes, colours and layout
NFPA 170 (NFPA, 2018c).
If applying international codes, it should be noted that BSI (2011) BS ISO 3864-1: 2011 Graphical symbols. Safety colours and safety
NFPA 101 and the International Building Code 2015 signs. Design principles for safety signs and safety markings (London: British
require exits signs, whether located internally or exter- Standards Institution)
nally, to be illuminated at all times. However, NFPA 101 BSI (2013) BS EN 1838: 2013 Lighting applications. Emergency lighting
does qualify this by stating that this condition applies (London: British Standards Institution)
when the building has normal power and is occupied.
BSI (2016) BS 5266-1: 2016 Emergency lighting. Code of practice for the
emergency lighting of premises (London: British Standards Institution)
All emergency exit signs within a particular building
should be uniform in colour and format as well as being BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
located within a sufficiently close proximity to the buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution)
HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document Scottish Government (2017a) Technical Handbook – Domestic (Livingston:
B: Fire Safety. Volumes 1 and 2 (2006 edition incorporating the 2007, 2010 Building Standards Division)
and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon Tyne: NBS) (Note: further
amendments published as a separate document, April 2019) Scottish Government (2017b) Technical Handbook – Non-Domestic
(Livingston: Building Standards Division)
ICC (2015) International Building Code 2015 (Washington, DC:
International Code Council) SLL (2012) SLL Code for Lighting (London: Chartered Institution of
Building Services Engineers)
NFPA (2018a) NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (Quincy, MA: National Fire
Protection Association) SLL (2015) SLL Lighting Guide 12 Emergency Lighting (London:
NFPA (2018b) NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code (Quincy, Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers)
MA: National Fire Protection Association)
Welsh Government (2015) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved
NFPA (2018c) NFPA 170 Standard for fire safety and emergency symbols Document B: Fire Safety. Volumes 1 and 2 (2006 edition incorporating the
(Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association) 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Cardiff)
10-1
10 Smoke ventilation
10.1 Introduction These objectives may have different timelines and identi-
fication of the timeline required for the design is a critical
part of system design.
10.1.1 General
10.1.3 Principles of smoke ventilation
The spread of smoke and other products of combustion
throughout enclosed spaces can present a significant
systems
hazard to the safe evacuation of occupants and the ability
of firefighters to operate and can cause substantial damage Smoke ventilation systems tend to operate on one (or a
to properties and business. combination) of the following principles and can be
mechanical and/or natural:
Smoke can spread a significant distance from the source of
the fire unless controlled. To prevent or minimise the (a) Smoke management or control systems: These systems
risks, there is a wide range of means by which the move- are based on ensuring sufficient ventilation and
ment of smoke can be minimised and controlled. These containment of smoke to maintain a smoke-free,
generally form part of a package of fire protection meas- clear layer above finished floor level. The purpose
ures, which may include the provision of smoke barriers, of the clear layer can be to minimise smoke dam-
fire-resisting construction and smoke ventilation systems, age to property (e.g. stored goods) or to provide
often in combination with other active systems, such as suitable conditions for occupants to escape.
sprinklers and smoke detection. (b) Diluting the smoke within the space with fresh air or
smoke clearance: These systems are based on provid-
However, it is essential that the design of the smoke ing sufficient ventilation to dilute the smoke to an
control systems is consistent with both the planning of the extent where tenable conditions are achieved. This
spaces within the building and the objectives of the fire approach is particularly useful in circumstances
strategy. At the outset of the design, it should be clear why where the normal internal conditions or wind pres-
a smoke control system is required. sures adversely affect the formation of a stable
smoke layer. A form of these systems can be used to
The system should be as simple and reliable as possible, remove heat and smoke to assist fire service opera-
since the provision of an overly complex design can lead tions in spaces such as basements and some atria
to a lower level of reliability. (commonly referred to as ‘air change’ systems).
(c) Opposed air flow: The flow of air prevents the flow
It is likely that the smoke control system design will
of smoke into adjoining spaces. These systems
involve several parties (for example, the architect, fire
tend to be used in small enclosed areas (e.g. stairs,
engineer, building services engineer and the contractor).
corridors etc.)
Therefore, particular care should be taken to agree and
define the respective responsibilities at an early stage in (d) Pressure differential systems: These systems typically
the design process. One framework option, to assist in the work on either pressurisation or depressurisation
definition and documentation of responsibility, is provided of a space or an adjoining space.
in BS 7346-8: 2013 (BSI, 2013a).
10.1.2 Objectives of a smoke control 10.2 System considerations

system
The objectives of the smoke control systems should be set 10.2.1 General
by the designers. Typically, systems have several objec-
tives, which may have identical or different priorities. Designers of smoke control systems should consider the
Typical objectives can include: following aspects as part of the design.
(a) maintaining tenable conditions in the area of fire

origin or areas adjoining the fire 10.2.2 Key considerations
(b) minimising smoke spread to adjoining parts of the 10.2.2.1 Maintaining a smoke-free layer
building
(c) removing smoke from the building during or post Where the aim of the system is to maintain a smoke-free
firefighting operations. layer, consideration must be given to the layer height
required. It should be noted that clear layer heights are 10.2.2.4 Replacement air
difficult to achieve where there are low ceiling heights, such
as in residential corridors, and instead smoke dilution or For any smoke removal system to work effectively, it
smoke clearance systems may be more appropriate. requires a source of replacement air. The replacement air
can be supplied either by natural means or mechanically.
To determine the required clear layer height for means of
escape or the protection of property, the temperature of It is important that the sources of inlet air are located such
the smoke and the depth of the smoke layer are important that the inlet air does not allow the hot smoke layer to
to limit radiation received beneath (see section 10.3 below become excessively turbulent or cool to the detriment of
on tenability criteria). the smoke ventilation system. It may be necessary to
consider locating the inlet air at low level or remote from
To ensure that smoke is maintained a safe distance above the smoke layer base.
head height, and also to ensure that radiation from the
smoke layer is not excessive (assuming a maximum smoke Designers should consider the velocity of incoming air.
layer temperature of 200 °C as described in section 10.3), Excessive velocities through openings used for means of
recommended minimum values for the clear layer height escape can impede the evacuation of occupants, while
in BS 7346-4: 2003 (BSI, 2003a) are 3 m for public build- excessive velocity close to the base of the smoke layer can
ings (e.g. malls and exhibition halls) and 2.5 m for increase the turbulence of the layer (and therefore the
non-public buildings (e.g. offices). quantity of the smoke).
BS 7346-4 also recommends that, where the predicted In the UK, a maximum velocity of 5 m · s–1 across door-
layer temperature is less than 50 °C above ambient, 0.5 m ways or other openings used for escape is commonly used
should be added to any recommended minimum value to (BSI, 2003a). BS 7346-4 also recommends that, to avoid
take into account smoke cooling. the incoming air disturbing the smoke layer or pulling
down smoke from the layer (Venturi effect), the upper
Where smoke control is provided for property protection edge of an inlet opening should be 1 m or more below the
reasons, BS 7346-4 also recommends that a similar value smoke layer base or the inlet air speed beneath the layer
of 0.5 m be applied above the top of any stacked goods. should be less than 1 m · s–1.
10.2.2.2 Area of reservoir NFPA 92 makes a similar recommendation in stating that

the make-up air velocity should not exceed 1.02 m · s–1
Historically, an area of 2000 to 3000 m2 has been adopted where the make-up air could come into contact with the
as the maximum reservoir size to prevent excessive cool- plume unless a higher air velocity is supported by engi-
ing and downward mixing of smoke (Morgan et al., 1999). neering analysis (NFPA, 2015a).
However, this is an arbitrary limit and larger reservoirs
may be acceptable, provided appropriate consideration has In practice, replacement air will come via the flow paths
been given to heat loss to the surrounding structure. This of least resistance, which may include leakage from the
may necessitate a more complex numerical fire engineer- facade and other openings. However, care needs to be
ing analysis or the use of computational fluid dynamics taken when using these paths as a source of replacement
modelling. air as the air-tightness of buildings increases under the
environmental requirements of national building regula-
tions. NFPA 92 also recommends that make-up air be
10.2.2.3 Reservoir screens and curtains designed at 85%–95% of the exhaust (not including leak-
age through small leakage paths).
The screens or curtains enclosing the edges of a reservoir
must be constructed from materials that can withstand the When designing mechanical smoke removal systems, the
calculated smoke temperature for the required period. replacement air requirement should be based on volume
These screens should be impermeable, but some leakage, balance, not mass balance. When designing natural smoke
e.g. at the junction of screens, is not likely to be critical removal systems, replacement air should be based on mass
for most applications. balance.
Where these are fixed screens, the depth or drop of the Where a powered inlet is used in combination with a
screens or curtains should be at least to the level of the powered exhaust, consideration should be given to the
base of the smoke layer. However, consideration should be impact of changing pressures generated by the fire as it
given to increasing this depth to add a margin of safety. develops and the potential impact on the forces acting on
For example, BS 7346-4 suggests an additional 0.1 m. the fire escape doors etc.
Retracting screens or curtains may, in certain circum-

stances, deflect from the normal vertically hanging position 10.2.2.5 Number of extract points
due to the pressure of gases acting on the smoke curtain.
That horizontal deflection of the curtain causes the bottom When the smoke layer is relatively shallow, a high extract
of the curtain to rise, which could lead to leakage of smoke velocity at any single point may lead to plug-holing,
underneath the curtain if the rise takes the bottom of the whereby air is extracted from below the smoke layer, as
curtain above the base of the smoke layer. This should be opposed to the smoke itself. This leads to a significant loss
considered when calculating the depth of the curtains and in the ability of the system to remove smoke efficiently
some margin of safety may be required. Further guidance and, accordingly, several extract points may be needed at
can be found in BR 368 (Morgan et al., 1999). a lower velocity.
Smoke ventilation 10-3
The maximum volumetric flow rate that can be exhausted into account when considering smoke movement (BSI,
by a single exhaust vent can be calculated (NFPA, 2015a) 2003a). Channelling screens and smoke barriers should be
as continued above the suspended ceilings (to structural
soffit) where necessary.
Vmax = 4.16cd 5/2 T Y (10.1)
Ts - T0 1/2
The space above a partially open suspended ceiling which
T0
has less than 25% of its geometrical free area open should
where Vmax is the maximum volumetric flow rate without be treated as a plenum chamber.
plug-holing at Ts (m3 · s–1), c is the exhaust location factor
(dimensionless), d is the depth of smoke layer below the 10.2.2.8 Pressure differentials
lowest point of exhaust (m), Ts is the absolute temperature
of the smoke layer (K) and T0 is the absolute ambient
It is important that excessive pressure differentials are not
temperature (K).
created by the design of the system. Pressure differences
between the pressurised/depressurised space and adjoining
Note: c = 1 (for exhaust vents centred no closer than
accommodation should be designed so that the force
twice the diameter from the nearest wall) or 0.5 (for vents
required to open the door, typically measured at the door
centred closer than this or located on a wall).
handle, shall not exceed regulatory or manufacturer’s
requirements. This is typically 100 N in Europe (BSI,
Where multiple exhaust vents are needed to prevent 2005) or 67 N under the guidance of NFPA 101 (NFPA,
plug-holing, the minimum separation distance can be 2015b).
determined (NFPA, 2015a) by
Where it is not possible to calculate door opening forces,
Smin = 0.9Ve1/2 (10.2) such as during the early design stages, the pressure differ-
ence across a closed door between the pressurised area and
where Smin is the minimum edge-to-edge separation adjoining space should be not greater than 60  Pa in Europe
between vents (m) and Ve is the volumetric flow rate of (BSI, 2005).
one exhaust vent (m3 · s–1).
Additional considerations relating to the impact of the
The volumetric flow rate of a smoke exhaust can be deter- pressure difference between the area of fire origin and the
mined (BSI, 2003a) using adjoining accommodation include the risk of closed doors
being pushed/pulled open, or adverse or undesired move-
mTs ment of smoke into adjoining spaces.
V= (10.3)
t0 T0
For example, unlatched doors may be pulled open due to
where V is the volumetric flow rate of smoke exhaust the pressure difference between two adjoining spaces.
(m3 · s–1), m is the mass flow rate of smoke exhaust (kg · s–1), This can occur where the pressure difference is between
Ts is the absolute temperature of the smoke layer (K), T0 25 and 30 Pa. However, these circumstances are depend-
is the absolute ambient temperature (K) and t0 is the ent on the doorset and ironmongery, including self-closing
density of air at ambient temperature (kg · m–3). mechanisms.
10.2.2.6 Smoke layer depths
It is not recommended that a smoke extract system be 10.3 Tenability criteria for
designed with a height from base of fire (usually floor) to smoke ventilation
base of smoke layer of less than 10% of the height from
fire to ceiling (BSI, 2003a). system design
Likewise, no smoke extract system should be designed
with a height from base of fire to the base of the smoke 10.3.1 Hazards of smoke
layer of more than 90% of the height from base of fire to
ceiling (BSI, 2003a). However, guidance given in NFPA 92 The toxic products of fire include irritant and narcotic
suggests that smoke layer depth should be a minimum of components, which can cause disorientation, incapacita-
20% of the floor-to-ceiling height, unless based on an tion or death, with effects dependent on the concentration
engineering analysis (NFPA, 2015a). and length of exposure.
The predominant irritant components are organic smoke

10.2.2.7 Suspended ceilings products and acid gases, such as hydrogen chloride (HCl).
The immediate effects of irritants are related to the
Imperforate suspended ceilings should be treated as the concentration, but may include pain in the eyes and lungs,
top of the smoke layer. Provided the suspended ceiling is accompanied by difficulty in breathing.
designed in such a way that it would not prematurely fail
on being exposed to the predicted design temperatures of The predominant narcotic component is carbon monox-
the smoke layer, channelling screens and smoke barriers ide, with hydrogen cyanide also being important in
need not be continued above a closed suspended ceiling. pre-flashover fires. Narcotic effects, disorientation and
collapse occur only when a certain dose (i.e. the product
Partially open suspended ceilings with more than 25% of of exposure concentration and exposure time) has been
evenly distributed geometrical free area need not be taken inhaled over a period.
The temperature of smoke is significant, since it can cause 10.3.4 Visibility in smoke
burns both by convection (to exposed skin and lungs) and
by radiation. With long exposure times there is also the Familiarity with your surroundings has a major impact
risk of hyperthermia. on visibility distances, as a person in a familiar environ-
ment only needs to see enough of their surroundings to
Smoke particles and irritant products can, in sufficient be able to maintain their orientation, while a person in
concentrations, reduce visibility. While loss of visibility is unfamiliar surroundings needs to be able to see exits or
not directly life threatening, it can prevent or delay escape escape signage. A person’s level of familiarity with their
and thus expose people to the risk of being overcome by environment may also decrease significantly when that
smoke. environment is filled with smoke.
Typically, a tenability limit for visibility for escape

10.3.2 Temperature purposes is a visibility distance of 8–10 m (BSI, 2017).
For most fire types, it is likely that smoke at this concen-
The human body cannot tolerate elevated temperatures tration will cause some eye irritation but it is unlikely to
for any extended period of time, as pain and skin damage contain irritants at concentrations high enough to
will begin to occur when the temperature at the basal layer seriously inhibit escape or cause collapse.
of the skin exceeds 44 °C. The amount of damage is a
function of both the skin temperature and the duration of It is expected that a person in their own dwelling would
time for which the temperature is elevated above the 44 °C be familiar with their surroundings even if they could
threshold. Chapter 68 of the SFPE Handbook allows an only see for 3–4 m (Klote et al., 2012).
interested reader to predict skin burns (SFPE, 2016).
For a static, homogenous smoke layer, optical smoke
Heat exposure occurs when a person comes into contact density per m (D) can be calculated (BSI, 2002):
with hot gases. A recommended value for demarcation
between skin burns and hyperthermia (heat stroke) is Dm fb
120 °C (Klote et al., 2012). D= (10.5)
Vt
Exposure of naked skin to temperatures above 120 °C can where Vt is the total volume of smoke (m3), fb is the total
result in incapacitation due to skin pain and burns, so this mass of fuel burnt (kg) and Dm is the mass optical density
temperature can be used as the upper tenability limit for for the fuel concerned (m2 · kg–1). Vt can be calculated from
direct exposure to (or immersion in) hot combustion the volume of the smoke layer, and mass optical densities
gases. for generic products are shown in Table 10.1.
Humidity does not have a great impact at this intensity, Total mass of fuel burnt (fb) is calculated by multiplying
but permitted exposure temperatures can drop to approx- the mass burning rate of the fuel (mfuel) by the time (s).
imately 55 °C (wet smoke) and 75 °C (dry smoke) for This can be found from the heat release rate at steady state
increased exposure times of up to 30 minutes (Klote et al., (BSI, 2003b):
2012).
Qsteady = mfuel HC (10.6)
Other sources note that thermal burns to the respiratory
tract can occur upon inhalation of air above 60 °C that is where Qsteady is the rate of heat release at steady state
saturated with water vapour (NFPA, 2017). NFPA 130 (kW), mfuel is the mass burning rate of fuel (kg · s–1) and
suggests that this is the tenable limit applied, at head HC is the effective calorific value of fire load (kJ · kg–1).
height, where high levels of water vapour may be present
(e.g. where sprinklers have activated or during firefighting Calorific values for different materials can be researched
operations). in PD 7974-1: 2003 (BSI, 2003b) or the SFPE Handbook
(SFPE, 2016) but wood is typically 18 MJ · kg–1 and poly-
urethane 23  MJ · kg–1.
10.3.3 Radiation
Visibility in smoke is defined in terms of the furthest
The level of radiant heat received from the smoke plume distance at which an object can be perceived, S (m), the
or layer can affect the ability of the occupants to evacuate optical density per unit length (m–1), D, and a visibility
by causing pain at far lower levels than those required for
piloted ignition.
Table 10.1 Mass optical density for given materials (BSI, 2002)
For prolonged exposure, the tenability limit for exposure
of skin to radiant heat is approximately 1.7 kW m–2
· Material Mass optical density, Dm / m2 · kg–1
(NFPA, 2017). Below this value, exposure can be tolerated Cellulosics 400
almost indefinitely without significantly affecting escape. Plywood 290
Above this threshold value, the time to burning of skin Douglas fir 280
due to radiant heat decreases rapidly according to the
Plastics 240–1000
equation
PMMS 150
PVC 640
tirad = 1.33 q-1.35 (10.4) Polyurethane 220–330
Polystyrene 790–1400
where tirad is the time (min) and q is the radiant heat flux
Generic building contents 300
(kW · m–2).
coefficient, K (m–1). This can be determined from (Klote Table 10.2 Design tenability limit exposure concentrations for
et al., 2012) asphyxiant gases expressed as carbon monoxide for 5-minute and
30-minute exposures (BSI, 2004)
K
S= (10.7) Fuel type Maximum asphyxiate concentration
2.303D as CO / ppm
Light-emitting objects, such as electric lights, are more 5-minute exposure 30-minute exposure
easily perceived than objects which receive ambient illu- Retail/residential (>2% 800 125
mination. These differences are reflected in the typical nitrogen by mass of fuel)
visibility coefficients given below for wood- and plastic- Offices (<2% nitrogen by 1200 275
based fires: mass of fuel)
—— for light-emitting signs: K = 8

—— for light-reflecting signs: K = 3 Table 10.3 Approximate lethal exposure dose lc50 for common
—— for building components in reflected light: K = 3. materials (Reprinted from Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering by
Klote et al. © 2012. ASHRAE.)
10.3.5 Toxicity Material Approximate lc50 dose / g · m–3 · min–1
Non-flaming Fuel-controlled Fully developed

Carbon monoxide (CO) exposure accounts for the majority fire fire
fire
of fire fatalities, although smoke often includes other toxic
gases and factors such as hyperventilation due to high Cellulosic (e.g. wood) 730 3120 750
levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) or hypoxia caused by C, H, O plastics 500 1200 530
oxygen (O2) deprivation will also have an impact. As such,
toxicity is often expressed as a fractional effective dose PVC 500 300 200
(fed). Wool/nylon 500 920 70
Flexible polyurethane 680 1390 200
A simple approach is to provide a tenability limit for
5-minute and 30-minute exposure durations based on the Rigid polyurethane 63 100 54
concentrations of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
oxygen and hydrogen cyanide in the fire effluent. Table
10.2 shows some proposed limiting exposure times for
asphyxiants based on a 0.3 fed tenability limit for condi-
tions considered typical for fires in buildings (BSI, 2004).
a few seconds of exposure and 92 dBa for the remainder
Fires likely to involve fuels containing significant quanti- of the exposure time (NFPA, 2009). Consideration should
ties of nitrogen-containing materials (>2% nitrogen by also be given to the impact of excessive extraction system
mass of fuel) are those involving furniture or clothing, noise levels on the ability of occupants to hear and under-
such as fires in residences or retail premises, while fires stand any fire alarm systems, particularly those including
involving mainly cellulosic or other materials low in voice alarms.
nitrogen (<2% by mass of fuel) are more likely in offices.
An alternative method is to compare the concentrations

against the concentration that is lethal to 50% of animal 10.4 Design of systems
subjects (lc50) for a given period of time (usually 30 minutes)
(see Table 10.3).
10.4.1 Smoke dilution systems
For an exposure at a constant concentration, the fed
(Klote et al., 2012) is A smoke dilution system or purging system is based on
diluting the smoke within a space such that the design
mf t criteria within that space, e.g. tenability or containment
FED = (10.8)
LC50 temperature limits, are not exceeded.
where fed is the fractional effective dose, mf is the mass While smoke dilution could be based on simple dilution
concentration of fuel burned (g · m–3), t is the exposure using only the volume of the space, this approach is
time (min) and lc50 is the lethal exposure dose from the unlikely to be effective in any but the largest spaces with
test subject (g · m–3 · min–1). relatively small fires. It is unlikely that sufficient dilution
can be achieved to maintain tenable conditions for a
An fed of 1 (unity) is considered to be fatal and various substantial period without ventilation of the smoke.
values from 0.5 (Klote et al., 2012) to 0.3 (NFPA, 2009) Therefore, the majority of smoke dilution systems work
may represent levels reflective of incapacitation. on the basis of smoke extract and air inlet points being
provided.
10.3.6 Noise levels: design values Prior to the design of a smoke dilution system, the designer
should consult all appropriate local codes and regulations
High noise levels created by the extraction system should to ensure that such systems are acceptable to the authority
be avoided. Noise levels should be limited to 115 dBa for having jurisdiction.
10.4.1.1 Smoke clearance or purging systems area of the building, at least half of the total of which
should be equally distributed on two opposing sides of a
Dilution as a means of smoke clearance is often used for space. No theoretical justification has been offered for the
removal of cold smoke from a large space after the fire has percentages given in the various codes of practice used in
been extinguished. Smoke clearance ventilation is typi- the UK, although it is reasonable to suppose that the vent
cally undertaken using natural ventilation but a lack of areas that can result for large floor plates are such that, in
buoyancy at high levels means that at heights in excess of most instances, they would provide an effective means of
18 m the use of mechanical ventilation should be removal of heat and smoke.
considered.
As the required ventilation areas are prescriptive, the
Since there is no need to maintain a clear layer, replace- designer should make reference to the required codes of
ment air for dilution systems may be from both high and practice and standards for the appropriate jurisdiction.
low levels. Caution should be exercised in the location of
the supply and exhaust points to prevent the supply air For UK car parks, for example, it is recommended that
from being extracted by the exhaust and thus short- sufficient smoke ventilation equal to an aggregate of 2.5%
circuiting the system. of the floor area is provided at each level (BSI, 2013b). The
distribution should be such that a minimum aggregate
Dilution systems are often based on nominally prescribed area of 1.25% of the total floor area is provided equally
air change rates, but can be calculated based on times to between two opposing walls (e.g. a minimum of 0.625%
improve visibility or temperatures within the space, using per opposing wall). As long as the minimum ventilation
calculations or computational modelling. area is equal to 1.25% of the floor area provided on two
opposing walls, the remaining vents can be provided in
An extract rate of six (or 10) air changes per hour has been any location. It should be noted that requirements for car
widely adopted as a prescriptive standard for the purpose fume ventilation may exceed those for smoke.
of smoke clearance, although in atria a decrease to four air
changes per hour where sprinklers are provided is used in Smoke vents in the wall or ceiling can be used to form any
England and Wales, where fire loading at the base of the part of the ventilation strategy, provided a through draft
atrium is controlled (BSI, 2017). is created.
The time to improve the visibility within a space to a Where openings have louvres etc., the effective free area
predetermined level can be calculated from the following provided should take into account the restriction.
equation (SFPE, 2002):
Mechanical cross-ventilation
c
= e-at (10.9)
c0 Mechanical cross-ventilation systems can comprise either
entirely mechanical systems, with mechanical extract and
where c is the concentration at time t, c0 is the initial mechanically provided inlet, or, more commonly, natural
concentration, a is the air changes per minute (or purging inlet and mechanical extract to provide cross flow.
rate) and t is the dilution time (min).
Mechanical cross-ventilation systems are typically found
The concentrations c0 and c must both be in the same in car parks and designed, in the UK, to operate at 10 air
units, and they can be any units appropriate for the changes per hour.
particular contaminant (e.g. mass of smoke) being consid-
ered. Further reference should be made to chapter 6 of For a typical UK car park provided with a ducted smoke
this Guide. ventilation system, it is recommended that the extract
system should be designed to run in at least two parts,
An area can be considered to be ‘reasonably safe’ with such that the total exhaust capacity of each part does not
respect to smoke obscuration if the concentration is not fall below 50% of the total extract rate (BSI, 2013b). As an
greater than 1% of the concentration at the fire (SFPE, example, if 10 m3 · s–1 is required to provide 10 air changes
2002). per hour in a car park, then the system should be designed
such that it is provided in at least two parts, each part
10.4.1.2 Cross-ventilation systems capable of ventilating at 5 m3 · s–1.
Cross-ventilation has historically been widely used as a For all other system types, the system should be designed
means of smoke dilution and/or dispersal, particularly for such that the extract system takes into account fan or
firefighting operations, and is based on the flow of air component failure in the design without reduction in
between (typically) opposing vents on the same floor level performance.
to provide dilution.
In addition, for car parks, extract points should be arranged
Cross-ventilation can be provided naturally or using so that 50% of the exhaust capacity is at high level and
mechanical systems. 50% is at low level and the extract points are evenly
distributed. For all other purpose groups, the extract
Natural cross-ventilation should typically be at high level and does not require
high/low level extraction.
In the case of natural cross-ventilation, in the UK, this
has traditionally been based on providing nominally The system should be designed such that failure of one
prescribed vent areas based on a percentage of the floor part of the system will not jeopardise the other; this
includes the provision of power supplies. The designer intended to exhaust hot gases should be appropriately
should check the appropriate local codes of practice and tested to verify their suitability for operating at a mini-
regulations with regard to the need to provide sprinklers mum of 300 °C for a period of not less than 60 minutes.
or other automatic water fire suppression systems to
ensure that smoke temperatures are kept low in order to
reduce the risks of fan failure. 10.4.2 Opposed air flow systems
The discharge points for the smoke exhaust system should Air flow can be used to stop smoke movement through
be located such that they do not cause smoke to be recir- any space. Opposed air flow systems are based on inducing
culated into the building or spread to adjoining buildings, an air flow towards the area of the building containing the
or adversely affect the means of escape. fire, such that the air velocity is sufficient to prevent the
outflow of smoke (see Figure 10.1).
The design of such systems should also ensure that there
are no stagnant areas. Where opposed air flow is used to prevent smoke spread
from the room of fire origin propagating into an adjoining
While subject to local code requirements, in the absence large volume space (e.g. an atrium or shopping mall), the
of any detailed guidance it is recommended that all fans room of fire origin shall be ventilated at a sufficient rate
intended to exhaust hot gases should be appropriately to cause the ‘average air velocity’ (m · s–1) at the opening
tested to verify their suitability for operating at a mini- to exceed the ‘limiting average air velocity’ calculated as
mum of 300 °C for a period of not less than 60 minutes. detailed below (NFPA, 2015a).
Impulse jet ventilation The ‘average air velocity’ is found by dividing the extract
rate by the area of all the openings, including those which
Impulse jet ventilation works by controlling the move- do not open into the communicating space. An allowance
ment of air around the car park using locally mounted should be made for any unknown leakage paths and a
impulse jet fans. typical allowance of 15% is usually sufficient where these
are not known.
The permitted use and required performance of impulse
fan systems is subject to local code requirements. Typi- The ‘limiting average air velocity’ (m · s–1) can be found
cally, the system should be designed such that the air using
change rate within the car park is a minimum of 10 air
ve = 0.64 T gH Y (10.10)
changes per hour. Impulse jet ventilation can also be Tf - T0 0.5
designed to control the smoke to enhance means of escape
Tf
or firefighting access provisions to the car park.
where ve is the limiting average air velocity (m · s–1), g is
Care should be taken to ensure that the number of impulse the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m · s–2), H is the
fans activated does not induce the movement of a volume height of the opening as measured from the bottom of the
of air greater than that which the extract fans are capable opening (m), Tf is the temperature of the heated smoke
of extracting. (K) and T0 is the temperature of the ambient air (K).
No stagnant areas within the car park are permitted. The temperature of the heated smoke Tf can be calculated
Impulse fans should be carefully located to avoid exposing using chapter 6.
the doors to dynamic pressure effects, which might cause
smoke to enter lobbies, staircases etc. used as means of Smoke can be prevented from flowing from a large space
escape. to a small communicating space, where the small commu-
nicating space is located within the smoke layer, by
While subject to local code requirements, in the absence supplying air to the small space. This can also be deter-
of any detailed guidance, it is recommended that all fans mined using equation 10.10 above.
Figure 10.1 Opposed
Mechanical air flow
extract required
Non-fire spaces may be pressurised
to ensure that
if desired to enhance performance
smoke is
removed at a Shaft, stair
rate sufficient to or linking
create opposed space
airflow
Opposed
air flow
Where opposed air flow is used to prevent smoke spread This system can also be referred to as a zoned smoke
from a large space (e.g. atrium) to an adjoining small control system in the USA.
communicating space below the smoke layer interface, this
can be achieved by providing air into the space the This approach can be assisted by pressurising the adjoin-
designer wishes to remain smoke free. The air shall be ing spaces not affected by fire, for example the staircases
supplied into the space at the ‘limiting average velocity’ or the zones immediately adjacent to the fire, such as the
(NFPA, 2015a) calculated as follows: floor above and below the floor of fire origin.
ve = 0.057 T Y (10.11)
Q 1/3
The minimum design pressure differences are dependent
z on local codes of practice, but a design pressure difference
of 25 Pa between the depressurised and pressurised space
where ve is the limiting average air velocity (m · s–1), Q is may be sufficient for an unsprinklered room with a maxi-
the heat release rate of the fire (kW) and z is the distance mum ceiling height of 2.7 m (NFPA, 2015b). This could
above the base of the fire to the bottom of the opening (m). be halved to 12.5 Pa for a sprinklered room of any ceiling
height. It is noted that BS EN 12101-6 recommends a
This equation is only valid where the limiting average air minimum pressure difference of 50 Pa, irrespective of
velocity is not greater than 1.02 m · s–1, or where z is less sprinkler provision or room height, when all the doors and
than 3 m. openings are closed, a 0.75 m · s–1 velocity between pressur-
ised and depressurised spaces when doors etc. are opened
The above equation does not apply to corridor fires or for means of escape and 2 m · s–1 for firefighting (BSI,
where smoke enters a corridor via an open door from an 2005).
adjoining room etc., where it is proposed to prevent
further spread into the corridor by providing inlet air into The required extract rate can be calculated from the
the corridor. Instead, the following equation (SFPE, 2002) required pressure difference and the assumed leakage area
should be used, although it is noted that this equation is using the following equation (BSI, 2005):
not applicable for sprinkler-controlled fires as the mini-
mum velocity calculated would be too small.
Q = 0.83 # Al # P 1/R (10.14)
vk = KT Y (10.12)
g Q 1/3
where Q is the air flow into or out of a pressurised space
wt cT
(m3 · s–1), Al is the inherent leakage area from openings
where vk is the limiting average air velocity to prevent and building construction (m2), R = 2 (constant) and P is
smoke flowing upstream (m · s–1), Q is the heat release rate the pressure (Pa).
of the fire (kW), w is the corridor width (m), t is the
density of upstream air (kg · m–3), c is the specific heat of So, the required air flow between a depressurised space
downstream gases, T is the temperature of the downstream and an adjoining one (at 0 Pa) with leakage area being
mixture of air and smoke (K), K = 1 (constant) and g is only a single 2 m2 door, would be 8.3 m3 · s–1 to maintain
the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m · s–2). a pressure difference of –25 Pa in the room of fire origin.
Temperature (T) can be calculated from chapter 6 and is Note: To ensure that the adjoining space is maintained at
considered to be the temperature of the smoke layer within 0 Pa, inlet vents are needed from the adjoining room. This
the room. ventilation could be provided naturally or mechanically
but must be sufficient to ensure that the pressure in the
Where the adjoining space is located with openings above adjoining room does not decrease such that the pressure
the smoke layer, air should be supplied from the adjoining difference is below that required by the appropriate codes.
space into the room of fire origin at the limiting average
velocity, calculated as follows: For mechanical systems, this can be achieved by using the
Q (m3 · s–1) value to calculate the ‘make-up’ air needed to
ve = 0.64 T gH Y (10.13)
Tf - T0 0.5 be admitted into the space which is not depressurised.

Tf
where ve is the limiting average air velocity (m · s–1), g is Temperature of extraction fans
the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m · s–2), H is the
height of the opening, as measured from the bottom of the The exhaust fan temperature can be calculated, based on
opening, Tf is the temperature of the heated smoke (K) the gas temperatures calculated using zone models or
and T0 is the temperature of the ambient air (K). hand calculations using the following equation (Klote et
al., 2012):
10.4.3 Pressure differential systems

! nj = 1 tj Vj Tj
Tfan = (10.15)
10.4.3.1 Depressurisation systems ! nj = 1 tj Vj
This method of smoke control is based on the extraction where Tfan is the temperature of the gases in the exhaust
of air and/or smoke from the fire-affected part of the fan (°C), tj is the density of gases in space j (kg · m–3), Vj
building to reduce the pressure in the space to less than is the volumetric flow rate of exhaust from space j (m3 · s–1),
that in the adjacent parts of the building. The induced Tj is the temperature of gases in space j (°C) and n is the
pressure differential then inhibits the spread of smoke. number of spaces.
Alternatively, the extraction fan from the depressurisation a pressurisation system which compensates itself when
zone shall be specified to be capable of handling smoke at doors are opened and closed. A compensated system is,
a temperature of 1000 °C for unsprinklered buildings, or therefore, one that adjusts for changing conditions by
300 °C for sprinklered buildings (BSI, 2005). either modulating supply air flow or by relieving excess
pressure.
Use of the HVAC system
Compensated systems may have two or more different
It is possible to use the building’s hvac system, depend- scenarios that require assessment and which will have
ing on the type of system, the kind of depressurisation different air flow requirements subject to the amount of
system and the arrangement of the hvac zones. The use leakage created by opening additional doors. An example
of hvac is subject to local codes of practice and regula- may be a closed door scenario with minimal leakage and
tions as well as the availability of a fully coordinated an open final exit scenario with substantial air flow to the
system to ensure that both smoke control and day-to-day outside via the open door. The air flow may need to be
functions can be achieved. calculated as a leakage, using equation 10.14 above, or
calculated as that required to maintain a given air speed
The provision of further information on this subject is (m · s–1) through the opening.
outside of the remit of this Guide but further guidance can
be found in ASHRAE’s Handbook of Smoke Control Engi- Modulating the supply air flow is usually undertaken by
neering (Klote et al., 2012). providing a pressure sensor within the space linked to an
inverter controlling the fan. Where this is provided, the
Use of computer modelling engineer should be careful to ensure that the highest and
lowest air flow requirements do not go outside the manu-
For complex designs, computer software can be used to facturer’s recommended ranges for inverter-controlled
undertake the calculations. While many different software fans. Typically, the lowest air flow rate is limited to 40%
packages are available, one of the more common is contam of the total air flow provided (e.g. a 10 m3 · s–1 fan could
(Dols and Polidoro, 2015). This is a multizone indoor air only be inverted down to 4 m3 · s–1).
quality and ventilation analysis computer program
produced by the National Institute of Science and Tech- If natural overpressure relief is provided, then the calcu-
nology (NIST) and available as a free download. lation given in equation 10.16 can be used to calculate the
area. The value of Q used in this case should be calculated
based on (BSI, 2005)
10.4.3.2 Pressurisation systems
Qc = Qfr - Qp (10.16)
An alternative to depressurisation the fire-affected area by
extraction is to pressurise the surrounding areas, thus where Qc is the air supply used to calculate overpressure
preventing the leakage of smoke from the fire-affected area relief vent (m3 · s–1), Qfr is the air supply needed to provide
into the adjoining spaces. the required air flow through the open door into the fire
room (m3 · s–1) and Qp is the air supply to the stair or lobby
Full reference should be made to local codes and regula- needed to satisfy the pressure differential requirement
tions regarding system performance criteria, especially (m3 · s–1).
with regard to pressure differences. However, typically,
US-based codes require a pressure difference of 12.5 Pa Where overpressure relief is provided by natural ventila-
(sprinklered) and 25 Pa (unsprinklered and 2.7 m ceiling tion, equation 10.17 should be used (BSI, 2005):
height) as per a depressurisation system (NFPA, 2015b).
Conversely, European systems are typically based on a Qc
50 Pa pressure difference (BSI, 2005). Apv = (10.17)
0.83 # P 0.5
Due to the requirements for high air flows, pressurisation
is usually reserved for critical parts of the escape and fire Supply air Supply air Air relief
service access routes, such as staircases and lift lobbies.
A typical example of a pressurised staircase and lobby is 50 Pa 45 Pa 0 Pa

shown in Figure 10.2. The pressure differences provided
are from BS EN 12101-6 (BSI, 2005).
Supply air requirements can be determined using

equation 10.14 above.
As well as providing supply air, it is also necessary to Lift

ensure that the adjoining spaces do not pressurise by
providing an air release path as well as ensuring that the
pressurised space itself does not overpressurise where such
systems are provided as ‘compensated’ systems.
Supply air
Compensated systems
It may be necessary, either to comply with the fire engi-

neering strategy or to comply with local codes, to provide Figure 10.2 Pressurisation of protected area
where Qc is the air flow into a pressurised space (m3 · s–1), Table 10.4 Air leakage data from doors (BSI, 2005)
P is the pressure (Pa) and Apv is the area of air/pressure
Type of door Leakage Pressure Air leakage /
relief (m2). area / m2 differential / Pa m3 · s–1
Air release path Single-leaf opening 0.01 8 0.02
into a pressurised 15 0.03
space 20 0.04
If an insufficient air release path is provided to the adjoin- 25 0.04
ing space, adjacent to a pressurised one, then over time the 50 0.06
adjoining space will reach the same pressure. Smoke and
other combustion gases could flow from the adjoining Single-leaf opening 0.02 8 0.05
outwards from a 15 0.06
space into the pressurised one as a result.
pressurised space 20 0.07
25 0.08
Where the adjoining space is the room of fire origin, it is 50 0.12
likely that ventilation will be formed due to window
breakage; however, this cannot be relied upon. It is also Double-leaf 0.03 8 0.07
15 0.10
possible that the adjoining space may be a corridor etc.
20 0.11
without ventilation but which is otherwise smoke logged. 25 0.12
50 0.18
Where air relief is provided by mechanical extraction, the
Lift landing door 0.06 8 0.14
calculated Q value for the pressurised space can be used to
15 0.19
calculate the required extract rate. 20 0.22
25 0.25
Where an air release path is provided by natural ventila- 50 0.35
tion, equation 10.18 should be used (BSI, 2005):
Q AVA = 2.5 (10.18)

Table 10.5 Air leakage data for walls (BSI, 2005)
where Q is the air flow into a pressurised space (m3 · s–1) Construction element Wall Leakage area ratio,
and AVA is the area of air/smoke relief vent (m2). tightness ALW/AWall*
Exterior building walls (including Tight 0.7 × 10–4
Note: The value of Q will be the higher of the values calcu- construction cracks, cracks Average 0.21 × 10–3
lated when the doors are closed or when the doors are around windows and doors) Loose 0.42 × 10–3
open depending on the design of the system and code Very loose 0.13 × 10–2
requirements for the adjoining space.
Internal and stair walls (includ- Tight 0.14 × 10–4
ing construction cracks, but not Average 0.11 × 10–3
Leakage cracks around windows and Loose 0.35 × 10–3
doors)
Aside from any open doors or windows, leakage may also Lift well walls (including Tight 0.18 × 10–3
occur from the building structure itself. Such leakage construction cracks, but not Average 0.84 × 10–3
should be added to any leakage assumed for open doors cracks around windows and Loose 0.18 × 10–2
etc. especially when assessing the ‘door closed’ scenarios. doors)
*ALW is total leakage area through the walls, AWall is the area of the walls
Tables 10.4 and 10.5 provide air leakage data for doors and
wall construction. It is recommended that any calculated
leakages are increased by 50% to reflect any potential
increases in leakage found during the commissioning (a) Smoke clearance systems: these are generally either
process. dilution or cross-flow systems and are detailed in
section 10.4.1.
Number of injection points (b) Smoke control systems: these consist of high-level
vents with low-level inlet and are provided to
Pressurisation systems can consist of single or multiple maintain conditions as determined by the designer,
injection points. The provision of injection points is e.g. to keep a smoke layer at a predetermined
usually determined by compliance with local codes. For height or maintain a tenable condition.
example, NFPA 92 recommends that single injection
(c) Smoke shafts: these systems are provided to protect
point systems are not provided for staircases in excess of
adjoining spaces, such as firefighting lobbies and
30 m in height (NFPA, 2015a), while BS EN 12101-6
residential corridors.
recommends that single injection is limited to buildings
of less than 11 m in height and that, above this height,
injection points should be provided with no more than 10.4.4.1 Smoke control systems
three storeys between points (BSI, 2005).
Designers should use chapter 6 of this Guide to determine
the relevant fire size and factors such as mass flow rate,
10.4.4 Natural ventilation systems volume flow rate and temperature of smoke.
There are a number of forms of natural ventilation Section 6.8.3.3 in chapter 6 details the calculation meth-
provided within buildings, which can be broadly split into odology for estimating the mass flow rate of smoke through
the following: horizontal natural vents.
Where the size of the vents is unknown, these can be The shaft should terminate at roof level, at least 0.5 m
calculated (BSI, 2002) based on above any surrounding structures within a horizontal
distance of 2.0 m.
msmoke T
Av =
Cv T 2 g dt20 iT0 - # &Y
T T0 m2smoke 1/2 (10.19) The shaft should extend at least 2.5 m above the ceiling
A2i C2i of the highest storey served by the shaft. This generally
means that it is not always appropriate to vent the top
This can also be arranged to allow vent area to be deter- floor level of the building via a smoke shaft, which should
mined in terms of Q, although this is recommended only be vented in a different manner.
for very large inlet areas:
The adjoining stair should be ventilated directly to the
outside via a 1 m2 vent at the top storey level, which
#1 + & (10.20)
3/2 1/2 1/2
m T C 1 Qp
t0 Cv Q2 g dV0.5 Qp1/2
smoke 0 p
Av = # should open at the same time as the lobby vent.
msmoke Cp T0
Additional guidance on the design of smoke ventilation
where Av is the throat area of the ventilator (m2), msmoke systems for residential buildings using natural ventilation
is the mass flow rate of smoke (kg · s–1), T is the smoke can be found in the SCA’s Guidance on Smoke Control to
temperature (K), Cv is the coefficient of discharge (dimen- Common Escape Routes in Apartment Buildings (SCA, 2015).
sionless), g = 9.81 (m · s–2), d is the smoke layer depth (m), This guide is available from the SCA as a free download.
t0 is the ambient air density (kg · m–3), i is the excess
temperature (°C), T0 is the ambient air temperature (K), Firefighting shafts
Ai is the total area of all inlets (m2) and Ci is the entry
coefficient for inlets (dimensionless). Guidance on the use of natural smoke shafts in firefighting
shafts in the UK is given in BS 9999 (BSI, 2017). Typically,
The coefficient of discharge (Cv) is provided by the manu- the cross-sectional area (geometric free area) of the smoke
facturer but typically taken as 0.6. If inlet air is provided shaft should be at least 3 m2. Historically, these smoke
by smoke ventilators in adjacent smoke reservoirs, then Ci shafts have been provided with openings at the top and
would be the same as Cv. Ambient air density is typically bottom; however, this design has now largely been super-
taken as 1.2  kg · m–3. Excess temperature (i) is simply the seded by the ‘closed-base’ smoke shaft approach, as described
smoke layer temperature (°C) minus the ambient temper- in the BRE project report 79204 (Harrison and Miles, 2002).
ature (°C). The lobby ventilator should have a geometric free area of
at least 1.5 m2. Both the width and the height of the lobby
ventilator should be not less than 1 m. This ventilator
10.4.4.2 Natural smoke shafts should open on detection of smoke within the lobby.
The adjoining stair should be ventilated via a 1 m2 vent

Natural smoke shafts are commonly used to ventilate
at the head of the stair direct to the outside, which should
staircases and lobbies, either for firefighting shafts or resi-
open at the same time as the lobby vent.
dential common corridors. The main objective of these
systems is to protect the adjoining staircase by ventilating
the corridor or lobby giving access to the stair. The systems 10.4.4.3 Consideration of wind overpressures
work by the provision of a natural ventilator from the
lobby/corridor into a vertical smoke shaft, which is natu- Where natural ventilators are used for smoke extraction,
rally ventilated directly to the outside at the head of the it is important that they be positioned where they will not
shaft. Replacement air for the system comes from a vent be adversely affected by external wind conditions. A posi-
at the head of the adjoining staircase. The provision of a tive wind pressure can be much greater than the pressures
door between the stair and the lobby/corridor means that developed by a smoke layer. If this occurs at a smoke
the system is only fully effective when the stair door is exhaust opening, the ventilator may act as an inlet rather
open. than an extract. However, if the ventilator is sited in an
area of negative wind pressure, the resulting suction force
These systems work because of a net flow of air between may assist smoke extraction.
the stair and lobby, and so generally ensure that the stair-
case is kept clear of smoke, but they may not only have The effects of wind pressures on a ventilation system are
limited success in maintaining tenable conditions in the not isolated to localised wind pressure effects. The wind
lobby when the stair door is closed (when no inlet air is pressures around the entire building envelope (i.e. global
available), but also when the stair door is open. pressures) will dictate the smoke flow patterns within the
building and the effectiveness of the ventilation system
The design requirements for smoke shafts tend to be design. Tall buildings, or taller areas of the same building
prescriptive and therefore the designer should make full (such as rooftop plant rooms), can create a positive wind
reference to local codes prior to designing smoke shaft pressure on the upstream section of the lower roof area.
systems.
The designer should consider the need to undertake a
Residential buildings wind analysis and determine the external pressures at
high-level vents and low-level openings, and also to esti-
In England, smoke shafts for residential buildings should mate the internal pressure.
be a minimum of 1.5 m2 in area and have a minimum
dimension of 0.85 m in any direction (e.g. width) (HM In some instances, adverse effects may be overcome by
Government, 2013). positioning the ventilators in regions of the roof that are
sheltered from wind action or that will always produce systems can be provided as an alternative to natural or
suction. In other cases, the positioning of suitably designed pressurisation systems.
wind baffles can overcome wind interference or even
convert a positive pressure into suction. Locating the Prior to design of these systems, designers should take
low-level openings in regions of a positive pressure can into account any local code requirements and
also help to improve venting. recommendations.
10.4.5 Mechanical ventilation Comprehensive guidance on the design of mechanical

smoke ventilation systems for residential buildings can be
Mechanical smoke ventilation consists of fan systems to found in the SCA Guide on smoke control to common
extract smoke. These systems may or may not be ducted, escape routes (SCA, 2015).
depending on the proposed design of the system.
10.4.6 Interaction between sprinklers
Designers should use the equations given in chapter 6 of
this Guide to calculate the relevant fire size, type of smoke and smoke vents
plume or flow and resulting mass flow rate for the proposed
fire, in relation to the geometry under assessment. There has been much debate over whether sprinklers affect
smoke ventilation, or vice versa. Experiments have demon-
This information can then be used in conjunction with strated that there are no issues raised where both systems
section 6.7.5 to calculate average plume temperature and are used in the same building (McGrattan et al., 1998).
section 6.7.6 to calculate the volume flow rate of the smoke.
The provision of smoke vents reduces the spread of fire
The volume flow rate of the smoke (m3 · s–1) calculated products through the building due to the release of hot
should be less than or equal to the rate of extract proposed. gases and fire material from the building. This improves
the visibility and conditions in the building to enable
The risk of plug-holing can be minimised using the guid- occupants to escape and firefighters to undertake firefight-
ance provided in section 10.2.2.5. ing operations.
10.4.5.1 Slot or slit extract Experimental studies have shown that early vent opera-
tion does not have a negative effect on sprinkler
performance (Beyler and Cooper, 2001).
Slot extract systems can be employed to prevent the flow of
smoke across the openings in a room and into adjoining
spaces. They can also be used to supplement an exhaust Where sprinklers successfully contain a fire, vents may
system and remove the need for a downstand or channelling not be needed, except for post-fire smoke clearance.
screen where employed over the length of the flow path. However, sufficient smoke may still be produced, even
when the fire is suppressed, that there may be a benefit
While a slot extract system is designed to prevent smoke from smoke ventilation and the impact of this should be
entering an adjoining space, it will not necessarily main- considered by the system designer.
tain a clear layer within the room itself. It may be necessary
to supplement the slot extract with additional mechanical
ventilation from the room of fire origin.
References
The extraction should be provided very close to the open-
ing from a continuous slot, which may be situated in the Beyler CL and Cooper LY (2001) ‘Interaction of sprinklers with smoke
plane of the ceiling or at very high level. and heat vents’ Fire Technology 37 (1) 9–35
BSI (2002) PD 7974-2: 2002 Application of fire safety engineering principles to

It is considered that powered exhaust from a slot at right the design of buildings. Spread of smoke and toxic gases within and beyond the
angles to a layer flow can completely prevent smoke pass- enclosure of origin (Sub-system 2) (London: British Standards Institution)
ing that slot, provided that the extraction rate at the slot (Note: PD 7974-2: 2002 has been replaced by PD 7974-2: 2019)
is at least 5/3 times the flow in the horizontal layer flowing
towards the slit (Morgan et al., 1999). This allows a useful BSI (2003a) BS 7346-4: 2003 Components for smoke control systems.
general method for sizing such extracts: Functional recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat
exhaust ventilation systems, employing steady-state design fires. Code of practice
(1) Calculate the flow rate of gases approaching the
opening or gap. BSI (2003b) PD 7974-1: 2003 Application of fire safety engineering principles
to the design of buildings. Initiation and development of fire within the enclosure
(2) Multiply the mass flow by 1.667 (i.e. 5/3).
of origin (Sub-system 1) (London: British Standards Institution) (Note: PD
(3) Use the convective heat flux of the smoke layer 7974-1: 2003 has been replaced by PD 7974-1: 2019)
(allowing for sprinkler cooling if applicable) to cal- BSI (2004) PD 7974-6: 2004 The application of fire safety engineering
culate the volume extract rate required. principles to fire safety design of buildings. Human factors. Life safety strategies.
Occupant evacuation, behaviour and condition (Sub-system 6). (London:
10.4.5.2 Residential smoke ventilation British Standards Institution) (Note: PD 7974-6: 2004 has been replaced
by PD 7974-6: 2019)
Mechanical smoke ventilation systems can be used to BSI (2005) BS EN 12101-6: 2005 Smoke and heat control systems.
prevent smoke entering the staircases and to maintain Specification for pressure differential systems. Kits (London: British
tenable conditions within the common areas. These Standards Institution)
BSI (2013a) BS 7346-8: 2013 Components for smoke control systems. Code of McGrattan KB, Hamins A and Stroup DW (1998) Sprinkler, Smoke and
practice for planning, design, installation, commissioning and maintenance Heat Vent. Draft Curtain Interaction: Large scale experiments and model
(London: British Standards Institution) development. International fire sprinkler smoke and heat vent draft curtain fire
test project NISTIR 6196-1 (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of
BSI (2013b) BS 7346-7: 2013 Components for smoke and heat control systems. Standards and Technology)
Code of practice on functional recommendations and calculation methods for
smoke and heat control systems for covered car parks (London: British Morgan HP et al. (1999) Design Methodologies for Smoke and Heat Exhaust
Standards Institution) Ventilation BRE Report BRE 368 (Garston: Building Research
Establishment)
BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of
buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution) NFPA (2015a) NFPA 92 Standard for smoke control systems (2015 edition)
(Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association)
Dols WS and Polidoro BJ (2015) NIST Technical Note 1887: CONTAM
NFPA (2015b) NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (2015 edition) (Quincy, MA:
User Guide and Program Documentation Version 3.2. (Gaithersburg, MD:
National Fire Protection Association)
National Institute of Science and Technology)
NFPA (2017) NFPA 130 Standard for fixed guideway transit and passenger
Harrison R and Miles S (2002) Smoke Shafts Protecting Firefighting Shafts: rail systems (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association)
Their performance and design BRE Project Report 79204 (Garston: Building
Research Establishment FRS) SCA (2015) Guidance on Smoke Control to Common Escape Routes in
Apartment Buildings (Flats and Maisonettes) Revision 2 (London: Smoke
HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document Control Association)
B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006 edition
incorporating the 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon SFPE (2002) SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (3rd edition)
Tyne: NBS) (Note: further amendments published as a separate document, (Boston, MA: Society of Fire Protection Engineers; Quincy, MA:
April 2019) National Fire Protection Association)
Klote JH, Milke JA, Turnbull, PG, Kashef, A and Ferreira, MJ (2012) SFPE (2016) SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (5th edition)
Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering (Atlanta, GA: American Society (Boston, MA: Society of Fire Protection Engineers; Quincy, MA:
of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers) National Fire Protection Association)
11-1
11 Fire suppression
11.1 Introduction made to try to deal with any fire incident at the earliest
possible stage but to recognise that any of the measures
could be subject to potential failure. The following is a
This chapter covers the wide range of active firefighting summary of the measures adopted.
systems and devices which are available to specifiers.
(a) Enhanced awareness of the potential for fire and
When calling for the use of any particular system it is the consequent risk to the business and manage-
most important to understand the purpose that the system ment of the risk:
is to serve. Even the term ‘suppression’ can lead to confu-
sion, since this may imply that fire extinction may be the —— strict security control of access by person-
expectation whereas, in some instances, this is not the nel, and escorting of all visitors
case. It is vital that, in calling for the use of a specific —— detailed induction to include fire risk
system, the anticipated outcome and potential reliability management, with regular refresher induc-
are understood. For example, a gaseous fire protection tions
system would normally be designed to ‘extinguish’ a fire
but its ability may be severely compromised if the room —— strict control of all works in the area, to
integrity is breached by something like an open door. On include risk assessments and method
the other hand, a sprinkler system would normally only be statements
expected to ‘control’ a class A fire, so as to limit the release —— limitation of any storage and limited local
of heat and combustion products, and external interven- combustible consumables.
tion by the fire brigade may be necessary to complete the
extinguishment process. (b) Installation of an aspirating smoke detection sys-
tem to give the earliest possible warning of fire.
The objectives of the end user may be simply to meet the This system was intended to initiate investigation
obligations imposed on them by the authority having and action by security staff and not evacuation or
jurisdiction (ahj), which may be the local authority, the activation of any suppression systems.
building fire insurers or the fire and rescue service. In this (c) Installation of a ‘standalone’ point fire detection
case, ‘compliance’ would be the objective and the exact and alarm system (the ‘house’ system) to initiate
nature of the suppression systems is likely to be clearly evacuation of the area, provide warning to adjacent
spelled out by the ahj. It is probable that any requirement areas and summon the fire and rescue services.
imposed under the Building Regulations 2010, as amended,
will be aimed at ‘life safety’ whereas the fire insurers are (d) Installation of an automatic inert gaseous firefight-
more likely to be aiming for ‘property protection’. In prac- ing system armed by a coincident smoke detection
tice, a system designed to protect life will have a beneficial system in which two smoke detectors are required
effect on the protection of property and vice versa. The to initiate release of the gaseous agent.
two are very much entwined and often an identical system (e) Automatic sprinkler protection of the ‘wet’ type,
will fulfil both objectives. with sprinkler heads protected from mechanical
damage.
In cases when ‘compliance’ is not the only objective, it
may be necessary to carry out a thorough review of the (f) Compartmentation of the risk areas from adjacent
client’s objectives to establish which active systems may areas on the same floor and from adjacent floors by
be necessary. In these cases, a clear understanding of the construction which offers at least two hours’ fire
expectations in terms of acceptable levels of property and resistance.
contents damage will be necessary. In some circumstances, By providing these multiple methods of potential control,
where the building or contents are particularly valuable or the building owner was able to put in place the maximum
business critical, a comprehensive scheme of protection number of opportunities to stop the progress of the fire
may be appropriate. This could include passive protection incident. The owner acknowledged that every stage has
(compartmentation), alarm and detection systems, active the potential for failure to control the fire and was willing
systems and even smoke ventilation and firefighting access to invest in many ‘layers’ of protection in the attempt to
to give the required resilience that is necessary to meet the offset any weaknesses in the earlier stages.
needs of the project.
This is an exceptional project and it is not intended that
An example of how this might work in practice is demon- this should be considered as a ‘model’ but it does serve to
strated in a recent, prestigious project in the UK where, demonstrate that the ‘suppression’ tools in the box can be
in a particular area of the site, the risk was considered to used in combination as well as in isolation to provide the
be of such significance to the business that it was decided potential to engineer for almost any objective. It is always
that ‘zero damage’ was the real objective. The decision was important to consider the end needs of the building
occupier and/or owner in engineering the systems. damage. Automatic sprinklers have a good performance
Although the life safety risks will almost certainly be miti- record, and it is reasonable to expect that the majority of
gated by meeting the obligations of the building codes or fires in sprinkler-protected premises are controlled by the
even the fire insurers, it may not always be the case that operation of four sprinklers or fewer.
these systems will offer the levels of protection that the
business needs. The early involvement of a qualified profes- Real fire data collected by the National Fire Protection
sional in any project is always recommended, see chapter 5: Association (NFPA) for the period 2007–2011 showed that,
Application of risk assessment to fire engineering designs. across all types of premises protected by a sprinkler system:
—— for wet-pipe sprinkler systems, 88% of reported fires

were controlled by only one or two sprinklers
11.2 Sprinkler protection
—— for dry-pipe sprinkler systems, 73% were con-
trolled by only one or two sprinklers.
11.2.1 General
A report published in 2005 by the NFPA (Rohr and Hall,
The use of a fixed system of water sprayers to fight fires 2005) concluded that when sprinklers are present, the
in buildings can be traced back to the nineteenth century. chances of an occupant dying in a fire are reduced by 50%
The earliest systems consisted of simple, manually to 75%, and the average property loss per fire is cut by 50%
controlled arrangements of sparge pipes in vital areas, but to 67%, compared to fires where sprinklers are not present.
these soon led to individually operated devices attached to These figures are considered to understate the potential
a pressurised pipework system. The earliest fixed system value of sprinklers as they exclude unreported fires but do
in the UK is believed to have been installed in the Drury include all types of sprinkler system, regardless of age or
Lane Theatre, London in 1812. operational status. As even more emphasis is placed on
proper operation of sprinkler systems, the need for
Other than the refinements in terms of aesthetics and increased reliability and availability is being met by estab-
thermal response brought about by improvements in engi- lished independent third-party certification of components,
neering techniques and materials, little has changed in the systems and companies.
design principles of sprinkler heads. The original idea of
sealing a waterway in a fixture with an element that The merit of such schemes is referenced within current
responds to local thermal conditions is both simple and UK fire safety guidance, such as Approved Document B
reliable. Unnecessary complexity should be avoided and (HM Government, 2013), BS 9999: 2017 (BSI, 2017), BS
the introduction of any additional steps between fire EN 12845: 2015 (BSI, 2015a) and the Technical Bulletins
detection and the discharge of water must be carefully of the Loss Prevention Council (LPC), which also directly
considered to ensure that real benefits are not outweighed address the issue of availability and reliability.
by reduced reliability. A sprinkler system is a very simple
solution and it is that simplicity and well-documented Although sprinkler systems are reliable, there are occa-
reliability that makes the use of sprinklers an effective fire sions where sprinklers fail to control a fire. Recent data
protection measure. from the NFPA for fires in the USA in 2007–2011
concluded that sprinklers failed to operate in only 9% of
Water is a very good firefighting medium for class A mater- building fires (Hall, 2013). However, the majority of these
ials and most sprinkler systems are therefore most effective failures were due to human intervention (64% of the cases
on a risk of this nature. The use of sprinklers on class B, C, where sprinklers failed were because the system had been
D and E risks would need to be carefully considered. shut off before the fire started). For this reason, sprinklers
cannot claim to be 100% effective and so it is occasionally
In simple terms, a conventional automatic sprinkler suggested that they should not be used in trade-offs with
system consists of pipes and heat-sensitive valves (sprin- other fire protection measures. This argument, however, is
kler heads) connected to a water supply. Fire is detected considered to be flawed in that it assumes that all other
by individual sprinkler heads, which open to release water, fire protection measures are 100% effective, which is
in the form of spray, to the seat of the fire. The idea that clearly not the case. For example, fire doors may fail to
the operation of a single sprinkler head results in all sprin- prevent fire spread either due to being left open or because
kler heads discharging water is not true; this is a they are poorly fitting. In the design of buildings, a balance
misconception generated by the film and television should be found between passive and active fire safety
industry. measures that address the needs of the building in the
most rational and economical way.
The alarm is raised at the same time and the fire is kept
under control until the arrival of the fire brigade. The prin- A comparison of the reliability of sprinklers compared to
ciple objective is to control the fire for subsequent passive fire protection can be found in PD 7974-7: 2003
extinguishment by the fire brigade, but often the sprinklers Application of fire engineering principles to the design of buildings
will have accomplished extinguishment prior to their (BSI, 2003a). The document gives probability figures for
arrival. successful sprinkler activation between 0.75 and 0.95 (the
latest US data suggest a probability of 0.93). These figures
Common factors in large fires are delays in the discovery compare favourably with passive fire system figures from
of the outbreak and a subsequent delay in the commence- the British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association’s Sprinklers
ment of firefighting operations. Automatic sprinkler for Safety (BAFSA, 1995), which include the following:
systems first detect and then immediately attack the fire,
thereby restricting the growth of the fire and confining —— probability of fire doors being wedged open = 0.3
Fire suppression 11-3
—— probability of self-closing doors failing to close protected from the effects of extremely hot smoke
correctly on demand = 0.2 by the action of the sprinklers on the fire. This is
particularly useful in basement conditions when
—— probability that fire-resisting structures will access to outside air is not possible.
achieve at least 75% of the designated fire resis-
tance standard = 0.25 for suspended ceilings (e) As the sprinklers will effectively be combating the
fire, the number of firefighting shafts can poten-
—— probability that fire-resisting structures will
tially be reduced.
achieve at least 75% of the designated fire resis-
tance standard = 0.65 for partition walls. (f) As the sprinklers will be controlling the fire size,
the level of radiated heat flux will also be con-
This section of Guide E considers the principles of sprin- trolled. The result of this is that the separating
kler system design and identifies the relevant design distance between buildings may be reduced. Under
codes. It is not intended to act as a design manual and the Building Regulations 2010, as amended, the
specialist advice should always be sought when a system distance is reduced by one-half.
needs to be designed.
There are further ways in which sprinklers can be used in
buildings with atria, in healthcare buildings, shopping
11.2.2 Benefits of sprinklers complexes and other places of assembly. Reference to the
BAFSA document is recommended if further guidance is
In its document Use and Benefits of Incorporating Sprinklers required.
in Buildings and Structures, the British Automatic Fire
Sprinkler Association (BAFSA) has listed the potential for Other uses that sprinklers offer are covered in the sections
using sprinklers to work in conjunction with other fire that follow.
safety systems to attain coherent fire safety designs
(BASFA, 2006). This approach permits reductions in some
levels of fire resistance to support structure or the increase 11.2.3 Fire engineering using
in fire compartment sizes. The document was prepared sprinklers
with the UK Building Regulations as the guide document
but the data are applicable on an international scale. The The use of a sprinkler system to automatically detect and
following list details some of the potential concessions fight a fire may be exploited as part of an engineered solu-
that may be considered due to the presence of sprinklers. tion. The size of fire and the rate of release of combustion
products may be reasonably predicted where a specific
(a) Means of escape: As the action of the sprinklers is standard is used. The prescriptive guidance of compart-
likely to reduce the rate of burning of a fire and, ment size, fire resistance values etc. where sprinklers are
in consequence, the mass smoke flow, the time used will depend on the control of the release of heat from
available for people to escape may be increased. the fire given by sprinkler activation.
The result of this is that the distance required to
travel to an exit can potentially be increased with- This is discussed in some detail in chapter 6: Fire
out reducing the level of people’s safety. It is, of dynamics.
course, true that if smoke detection is present,
evacuation would be well advanced prior to sprin- It is generally accepted that a fire will stop growing at the
kler activation. The argument would be valid only time of sprinkler activation or shortly thereafter. The time
if sprinklers were being used as the means of that a sprinkler takes to operate in a fire can be predicted
detection. but is dependent on a wide range of variables, namely:
(b) Compartmentation: As the action of the sprinklers
will be reducing the intensity of a fire, the chance —— fire growth rate
of it becoming large is reduced. This reduces the —— ambient temperature
number of people being immediately threatened
by a fire and offers a level of protection to people —— temperature rating of the sprinkler
expected to remain in or enter the building during
the fire. As the fire is likely to be controlled, the —— response time index (rti) of the sprinkler
risk of fire spread to adjacent buildings is reduced. —— conduction factor of the sprinkler components
The result of this is that building compartment
areas/volumes may be increased over those for a —— radial distance of the sprinkler from the fire
similar non-sprinklered building. —— height of the sprinkler above the fire
(c) Fire-resistance levels: The severity of a fire and its —— distance of the sprinkler below the ceiling.
duration are likely to be reduced by the action of
the sprinklers. The results of this are that a struc-
tural element is liable to maintain its load-bearing Factors such as the type of risk, type of fuel and expected
capacity and that a separating element will main- heat release rate are also very important as they will
tain both its integrity and its ability to resist the directly influence the speed of sprinkler activation. These
transfer of heat. The fire-resistance levels may factors are fundamental to the way in which a sprinkler
therefore be reduced if sprinklers are fitted. system needs to work. Understanding the fuel load (or
‘hazard’, as it is termed in the design codes or ‘rules’) is
(d) Mechanical smoke extract: As a replacement for nat- vital. A system designed to control a fire of 8.5 MW total
ural smoke exhaust, the presence of sprinklers per- heat output is unlikely to contain a fire expected to rapidly
mits the use of mechanical fans. The fans are grow to 15 MW. The expected fire size or design size fire
needs to be determined to ensure that the sprinkler following testing by Kim and Lougheed (1997). Their work
system water discharge rates are suitable. This is prescrip- resulted in the development of a specific window sprinkler.
tively done in the design codes, where a large range of This sprinkler, if used in accordance with the manufactur-
hazard areas are listed along with the required water er’s recommendations, can provide a fire resistance level of
discharge rates and expected areas of operation. It can 60 to 120 minutes. There are aspects to be aware of when
also be done by determining the fuel load and rate of heat proposing this type of active system to provide fire separa-
release of the contents and the construction material of tion. A fire immediately next to the glazing is likely to
the building. This should be undertaken by experienced cause the glass to fail. To mitigate this, it is recommended
fire engineers. that a 900 mm high spandrel panel is adopted. This
provides a level of protection during the fire’s initial growth
The use of a more performance-based approach will not be phase, allowing the sprinkler to react prior to the glazing
suitable for many building designs. For simple buildings, failure temperature being reached. The glass needs to be
where a large level of flexibility in either its current or its heat strengthened or tempered. The glazing should be
future use is envisaged, the prescriptive guidance of system vertically unobstructed as the presence of a horizontal
engineering given in the various rules and codes should be mullion negates the sprinkler’s ability to cover the glass
used wherever possible and practicable. If bespoke or effectively. If a joint in the glass is required, it would need
non-standard sprinkler designs are used, or some of the to be butt jointed for the sprinkler to be effective. It should
system features do not meet the objectives laid down in the also be noted that this sprinkler is for use on fixed glazing,
adopted design code, their full impact on the performance and it is not suitable for operable windows.
of the system’s speed of reaction to fire and its ability to
restrain fire growth will need to be taken into account.
11.2.4 Extinguishing mechanism
This section of Guide E attempts to strike a balance
between the recommendations of the current standards One of the key mechanisms of sprinkler effectiveness is
and the principles upon which they are based and the fire the pre-wetting of unburnt combustible materials. This is
engineered approach relying on first principles. Where the of great importance at the design/installation stage, as the
nature of the risk falls outside the scope of the guidance layout/arrangement needs to consider avoiding obstruc-
in the rules, or novel designs or techniques are employed, tion to the sprinkler spray pattern and discharge.
the objectives of the standard system in terms of response
time and water spray performance should be replicated if There are two other main mechanisms involved in the
similar levels of control are to be expected. way that water suppresses fire: cooling and ‘inerting’.
There are further uses for sprinklers not adequately Cooling of the item on fire will reduce the rate of heat
covered by a number of international design codes. One of release. Cooling also occurs in the flame, which reduces
these would be the use of water to provide protection the concentration of free radicals. A proportion of the
against fire spread or by enhancing the fire-resisting prop- fire’s energy is dissipated in heating the water droplets.
erties of materials such as glass.
The inerting aspect, while fairly minor with the large
Sprinkler protection has the potential to increase the water droplets formed by standard sprinklers, does play a
performance of glazing in fire situations and external part. The production of steam helps to displace oxygen
drencher systems have been used to protect buildings from the flame zone.
from the effects of fire in adjacent buildings.
Water has a theoretical cooling capability of 2.6 MW· litre–1
Although not covered by many codes, there is no reason per second (Grimwood, 2005) and this could be used,
why this practice should not be extended to provide adopting a safety factor, to determine appropriate discharge
protection for internal elements of buildings as part of a densities when the heat release rate of the design fire to be
fire engineered design. The location and spacing of the addressed has been assessed.
sprinklers would need to be determined for the particular
situation, but locating sprinklers within 600 mm of glaz- Babrauskas and Grayson (1992) compiled various fire load
ing should provide a good spray distribution over the surveys from 1966 to 1975 and estimated an 80 percentile
glazing. The use of sprinklers to protect glazing and exter- range for fire load for offices in the following countries,
nal walls, although not common in the UK, is adopted in demonstrating a wide variation in the fire load:
Australasia and Hong Kong. A sprinkler designed specif-
ically to discharge water onto glazed assemblies and also —— USA: 835  MJ · m–2
for outside protection against exposure fires is available in —— Germany: 1002  MJ · m–2
the USA and is covered by NFPA guidance (NFPA,
2016a). —— Sweden: 635  MJ · m–2
—— Holland: 401  MJ · m–2
Australian Standard AS2118.2: 1995 Wall wetting sprinklers
(drenchers) covers the requirements of providing protection —— England: 535  MJ · m–2.
to external walls, windows and doors from exposure to fire
(SA, 1995). The system is required to be automatic in oper- The 20th edition of the NFPA’s Fire Protection Handbook
ation and therefore uses either sealed sprinklers or open (NFPA, 2008) has values for offices which are quoted as
sprinklers with water being released via a detection system. 590 and 1075 MJ · m–2 for general offices and file storage.
The use of a film of water providing glazing with a recog- A comprehensive collection of surveys was presented by
nised period of fire resistance is an accepted method Yii (2000), whose report builds on work carried out by the
University of Canterbury, New Zealand, since 1994, with The majority of design codes advise that protection should
11 surveys collated to produce a range of fire loads of be provided throughout the building under consideration,
between 224 and 800 MJ · m–2. any building which communicates with it, and any neigh-
bouring building that represents an exposure hazard to
It is obvious from the data presented above that a great the protected building. If a communicating building or
deal of consideration needs to be given to the density of other exposure risk is not to be protected, then the
water discharge required to control a fire outbreak if an protected building must be separated from the risk posed
engineered solution is to be adopted. The simplistic but by the unprotected building. This is usually accomplished
safe approach would be to design to the highest figures. by the nature of the structure between the risk areas, but
This offers a high level of protection and permits flexibil- this may be supplemented by, for instance, an external
ity in the use of the protected facility. A more considered drencher system. An engineered approach would involve
approach could be more restrictive, but might represent a an assessment of fire load, level of fire-resisting construc-
better use of capital funds. It should also be noted that an tion and the associated risks of fire spread potential. On
engineered solution may attract increased insurance this basis, it is possible to sprinkler-protect the risk areas
premiums, as the insurer could regard the system as a only. The provision of a suitable level of fire compartmen-
departure from the codes. tation between sprinklered and non-sprinklered areas
would be recommended, or virtual compartmentation util-
ising non-fire load areas, for example railway platforms,
11.2.5 Rules and standards airport terminal buildings etc.
There are many sets of internationally recognised design Within any protected building there are sometimes areas
codes against which a sprinkler system can be designed. where sprinkler protection would be hazardous, such as
The principal rules applicable to sprinkler installations in metal melt pans or frying ranges, and sprinklers should not
the UK and other parts of the world are contained in the be fitted in these situations. The impact of the absence of
European Standard BS EN 12845: 2015, which is a harmo- sprinklers should be fully considered and steps taken to
nised document covering the European nations (BSI, mitigate the risk. Measures could take the form of alternative
2015a). British Standard BS 5306-2: 1990 is now super- active fire protection systems, such as gaseous or water mist,
seded by this standard. To include the UK’s specific or separation by means of a fire-resisting construction.
requirements, a number of detailed bulletins (Technical
Bulletins) are incorporated into the standard, forming the There will be areas where sprinklers may not be essential
Loss Prevention Council’s Rules for Automatic Sprinkler due to the absence of an appreciable fire load, such as
Installations (LPC, 2016). stairs, lifts, toilets etc. These can be considered as ‘permit-
ted exceptions’, and usually a grade of fire-resisting
There are a number of other internationally accepted construction is stipulated between the protected and
design codes, chief among them being the National Fire non-protected areas. It should be noted that these permit-
Protection Association’s (NFPA) suite of codes. The ted exceptions may not be applicable to sprinkler systems
NFPA codes tend to be the most widely adopted code designed to NFPA 13.
throughout the world. Other popular standards include:
Cut-off sprinklers (sprinklers fitted on the non-protected
—— NFPA 13: Standard for the installation of sprinkler side immediately above a window, doorway or other pene-
systems (USA) (NFPA, 2016a) tration of the compartment wall) can sometimes be used
to improve the efficiency of the separation. Their use
—— FM Data Sheet 2-0: Installation guidelines for auto- should be carefully considered as the benefit accrued by
matic sprinklers (USA) (FM Global, 2014) their installation may not be warranted if, for instance,
—— CEA 4001: Sprinkler systems planning and installa- there is no fire load on the non-sprinklered side.
tion (Europe) (CEA, 2006).
There are circumstances in both the LPC and NFPA rules
Although this section of the Guide concentrates on the whereby water curtains may be used for the protection of
provisions of the UK codes, applicable comparisons have floor openings for escalators and open stairways.
been made with NFPA 13. 
11.2.7 Hazard classification
11.2.6 Extent of sprinkler protection
In order to match the capability of the sprinkler system
Where a building is to be fitted with a sprinkler system with the type of risk with which it will have to cope, risks
that is compliant with the rules and standards noted are grouped into hazard classifications. There are three
above, the intent is that it will serve the entire building, main divisions, each based on the expected fuel load of the
although most codes do have exceptions. occupancy and the rate of fire growth expected from the
contents or processes:
This is on the basis that sprinkler systems are designed to
control a fire in the very early stage of its development and —— light hazard (low combustible loading with a slow
not necessarily to halt the advance of an already estab- rate of fire growth)
lished fire. Where it is appropriate to leave an area —— ordinary hazard (low to moderate combustible
unprotected by sprinklers, it is important to make other loading with moderate to fast rate of fire growth)
provisions, such as fire-resisting construction, automatic
fire detection and, if necessary, other automatic firefight- —— high hazard (high combustible content with fast to
ing systems. ultra-fast rate of fire growth).
Table 11.1 Minimum design densities and assumed maximum areas of sprinkler operation
Hazard classification Minimum design Assumed maximum Equivalent number of operating

density / litre · m–2 · min–1 area of operation / m² sprinklers
Light 2.25 84 4
Ordinary, group 1 5 72 6
High 7.5–30 260–375 29–42
Notes: Care is required when adopting the equivalent number of operating heads, especially in high hazard areas.
The equivalent number of operating sprinklers is the maximum number of sprinkler heads expected to operate before control of a fire is achieved.
Table 11.2 Typical fire load densities NFPA 13 takes a different approach and provides a selec-
Occupancies Fire load density / Hazard class tion of values from curves for the design density and area
MJ · m–2 of operation (Figure 11.1), as listed below:
Hospital 350 Light
—— for light hazard occupancy, the design density and
Hotel 400 Ordinary 1 area of operation may be selected from
Industrial (non-flammables) 470 Ordinary 1 4.1  litre · min–1 · m–2 over 139  m2 to 2.8  litre · min–1 · m–2
over 279 m2
Office 570 Ordinary 2
Residential (institutional) 750 Ordinary 3
—— for ordinary hazard, group 1, occupancy, the design
density and design area of operation may be
Place of assembly 750 Ordinary 3 selected from 6.1  litre · min–1 · m–2 over 139 m2 to
Residential (flats) 870 Ordinary 3 4.1  litre · min–1 · m–2 over 372 m2
Retail 900 Ordinary 3 —— for ordinary hazard, group 2, occupancy, the design
Industrial (high risk) 1800 High density and design area of operation may be
selected from 8.1 litre· min–1 · m–2 over 139 m2 to
6.1  litre · min–1 · m–2 over 372 m2
—— for extra hazard, group 1, occupancy, the design
The ordinary and high hazard classes are sub-divided to
density and design area of operation may be
further qualify the type of risk. The classifications princi-
selected from 12.2  litre · min–1 · m–2 over 232 m2 to
pally depend on the quantity and type of combustible
8.1  litre · min–1 · m–2 over 465 m2
materials contained in the risk, the speed at which a fire
is likely to develop and any processes which will produce —— for extra hazard, group 2, occupancy, the design
particularly severe circumstances for fire propagation. density and design area of operation may be
selected from 16.3 litre· min–1 · m–2 over 232 m2 to
Premises may often contain a combination of different 12.2  litre · min–1 · m–2 over 465 m2.
risk classifications. The allocation of the appropriate clas-
sifications can be complex and will almost certainly The equivalent number of operating sprinklers will natu-
require qualified judgment. The final decision will often rally vary with the selected design area of operation.
rest with the fire insurer or other ahj.
The hazard classes detailed in Table 11.2 are typical occu-
There are certain risks, such as oil and flammable liquids pancies and these can be equated to a typical fuel loading
and gas hazards, for which standard sprinklers may not be for these types of premises, taken from this Guide or PD
suitable. Special requirements apply in these circum- 7974-4: 2003 (BSI, 2003b).
stances and special water spray systems are used, often
with the firefighting performance enhanced by foam solu- Many of these occupancies would be classified as different
tion. The NFPA codes offer sound and detailed guidance hazard classes in NFPA 13.
for these types of risks.
11.2.7.1 Light hazard
The hazard classification will dictate the minimum
amount of water which must be provided at the fire in the
Light hazard risks will be non-industrial, where the amount
form of spray and this is normally expressed as the ‘design
and combustibility of contents are low. This includes risks
density’ (in mm per minute or litre · m–² per minute). The
such as hospitals, hostels, schools etc. A maximum fire
expected maximum area of the sprinkler system which
loading for this type of risk would be 400 MJ · m–².
will be activated by the fire is also dictated and this
‘assumed maximum area of operation’ (amao) is expressed
in square metres. It must be noted that there are substan- 11.2.7.2 Ordinary hazard
tial differences in the design approach between UK codes
and NFPA 13. Ordinary hazard risks will be commercial and industrial
occupancies involving the handling, processing and stor-
Typical UK code design densities and areas of operation age of mainly ordinary combustible materials, which are
are indicated in Table 11.1 unlikely to develop intensely burning fires in the initial
Density / mm∙min–1 Figure 11.1 NFPA 13 area/

density curves. (Reprinted
2.0 4.1 6.1 8.1 10.2 12.2 14.3 16.3
with permission from NFPA
5000 465
13-2016 Standard for the
installation of fire sprinkler
Area of sprinkler operation / ft2
Ex
systems, Copyright © 2015,
Area of sprinkler operation / m2

t
Ex
ra
National Fire Protection,
t
ra
ha
4000 372
Quincy, MA. This reprinted
z
ha
ar
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material is not the complete
d
ar
Gr
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and official position of the
ou
Gr
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NFPA on the referenced
2
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Ord
3000 279 subject, which is represented
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only by the standard in its

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entirety.)
ry 2
Ligh
2500 232
ry 1
t
2000 186
1500 139
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Density / gpm∙ft–2
stages. A maximum fire loading for this type of risk would The risks are further subdivided as follows:
be 1000  MJ · m–².
—— high hazard process risks
The ordinary hazard classification tends to be further
—— high hazard storage risks
subdivided, so a broad band of fuel loading can be expected,
ranging from 400  MJ · m–² through 600, 800 and up to the —— other special hazards, as defined in LPC Rules
1000  MJ · m–² figure. These are not firm figures, but they Technical Bulletin 217: Categorization of goods in
can be used to determine the likely hazard rating required. storage (LPC, 2016: Part 20).
Again, care is required, as storage risks can produce fires Due to the factors mentioned above, a fire is likely to
with a strong upward fire plume velocity. If the sprinkler follow a fast to ultra-fast fire growth curve. Unchecked it
system design does not take this into consideration, the is likely to grow to an extremely high output fire. The fuel
sprinklers may underperform. Storage of goods is permitted load is likely to be above 1000 MJ · m–². The fire size would,
under this classification but for the reason stated it is likely in consequence, be such that the fire brigade is unlikely to
to be restricted in height and quantity. achieve control easily. Even with sprinkler intervention,
achieving fire control is likely to be difficult. For this
Included in the ordinary hazard classification are restau- reason, sprinkler spacing is reduced, discharge densities
rants and cafes as well as hotels and industrial buildings. are increased and water supply duration periods increased.
These are likely to incorporate large commercial kitchens.
Most kitchen risks can be handled with standard sprin- For storage risks, there are a number of variables to be
klers, but positioning the proposed fire extinguishing considered, ranging from the method of storage (free
system over deep fat fryers presents a potential danger. standing, palletised racks etc.), the goods being stored, the
Water entering hot oil at low velocity is likely to sink packing materials and the height to which goods are stored.
below the oil and quickly turn to steam. The volumetric
expansion rate of water to steam is approximately 1 to Sprinkler protection needs to be tailor-made to suit the
1620. This rate of expansion is equivalent to a small explo- risk, with sprinklers located at roof level only or a combi-
sion and hot, burning oil is likely to be spread far from nation of roof sprinklers and sprinklers located within the
the source of fire origin. Special sprinklers are available racks.
for this type of risk, which operate at higher pressures,
ensuring that the water droplets are not encapsulated by Other, more recent, methods of protecting high piled stor-
the hot oil and thus preventing the risk detailed above. age risks are early suppression fast response (esfr) and
More common for this type of risk, however, are dry control mode specific application (cmsa) sprinkler systems.
powders, foam, CO2 or water mist (refer to sections 11.3, See sections 11.2.8.5 and 11.2.8.6 below.
11.4 and 11.5).
Special hazards, as defined in the LPC Rules Technical
11.2.7.3 High hazard Bulletin 217, consist of:
—— aerosols with flammable content

High hazard risks will be commercial and industrial occu-
pancies which have abnormal fire loads due to: —— clothes in multiple garment hanging stores
—— flammable liquid storage
—— the process taking place
—— idle pallets
—— the presence of stored goods
—— non-woven synthetic fabric
—— the method of storage and the height to which
goods are stored. —— polypropylene or polyethylene storage bins.
11.2.8 Sprinkler heads The operating temperature of sprinkler heads will normally
be not less than 30 °C above the highest expected ambient
temperature. In most conditions this will result in a sprin-
11.2.8.1 General
kler head rating of 68 °C, indicated by the familiar red
bulb. See Tables 11.3 and 11.4 for the range of sprinkler
Sprinkler heads are a crucial element in any sprinkler bulb colours and temperature ratings.
system. In most cases, they will act to both detect a fire
and release water, in the form of spray, in the appropriate Three sizes of sprinkler are generally available to suit the
quantities and spray characteristics to fight the fire effec- various applications, i.e. nominal orifice sizes of 10, 15 and
tively. Normally, the sprinkler has a heat-sensitive 20 mm. Generally, 10 mm sprinklers would be expected
element – a glass bulb or a fusible metallic link or a on light hazard installations, 15 mm on ordinary hazard
combination of both – which, in combination with other installations and 20 mm on high hazard installations.
elements of the sprinkler, seals the head until activated esfr sprinklers can have sizes of 20 mm or more; however,
by the fire. However, sometimes it is desirable for fire the key is the K-factor (coefficient of discharge) and, for
detection and the consequent release of water to be storage protection, larger is better/more effective. In fact,
activated by other means. In these circumstances, the research has concluded that there are five key attributes of
heat-sensitive element and sealing mechanism are a sprinkler head that are important in sprinkler design,
removed from the sprinkler and such units are termed particularly for storage protection, to ensure that the
‘open’ sprinklers. The control of the water supply is by correct amount of water is delivered to the fire area (the
other means, such as a ‘deluge’ valve, which can be acti- concept of actual delivered density):
vated electrically or pneumatically.
—— rti
Table 11.3 Colour code for sprinklers (BS EN 12845: BSI, 2015a) —— K-factor
Glass bulb sprinklers Fusible link sprinklers
—— temperature rating
Nominal Liquid colour Nominal Yoke arms
operating code operating colour code
—— orientation
temperature / temperature —— spacing.
°C within range /
°C
For these reasons there has been a move away from the
57 Orange 57–77 Uncoloured traditional area/density design specification for storage
68 Red 80–107 White sprinklers towards design criteria based on number of
operating sprinkler heads at a given minimum operating
79 Yellow 121–149 Blue
pressure.
93 Green 163–191 Red
100 Green 204–246 Green The relationship between sprinkler orifice and droplet
size is proportional, with larger droplets being formed
121 Blue 260–302 Orange from the larger orifices. This supports the use of the
141 Blue 320–343 Black 10 mm sprinkler on low-output fire risks and the use of
163 Mauve
the 20 mm orifice on the high challenge fires.
182 Mauve There are a number of different sprinkler types, ranging
204 Black from the more functional conventional and spray pattern
sprinklers to the more decorative recessed or concealed
227 Black
pattern sprinkler.
260 Black
286 Black The more decorative types of sprinkler are suitable for use
on suspended ceilings and are either colour-matched to
343 Black
the ceiling or have the body of the sprinkler concealed
Table 11.4 Temperature ratings, classifications and colour codes. (Reprinted with permission from NFPA 13-2016 Standard for the installation of fire
sprinkler systems, Copyright © 2015, National Fire Protection, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete and official position of the
NFPA on the referenced subject, which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.)
Maximum ceiling Temperature rating Temperature Colour code Glass bulb colours
temperature classification
°F °C °F °C
100 38 135–170 57–77 Ordinary Uncoloured or black Orange or red
150 66 175–225 79–107 Intermediate White Yellow or green
225 107 250–300 121–149 High Blue Blue
300 149 325–375 163–191 Extra high Red Purple
375 191 400–475 204–246 Very extra high Green Black
475 246 500–575 260–302 Ultra high Orange Black
625 329 650 343 Ultra high Orange Black
within the ceiling, with the heat-sensitive element protrud- 11.2.8.5 Early suppression fast response
ing below the ceiling. (ESFR) sprinkler
Recessed pattern sprinklers have the sprinkler body and These use specially developed large capacity sprinkler heads
all or part of the heat-sensitive element above the plane of fitted with quick response elements, which are designed to
the ceiling. operate very early in the development of the fire. They
deliver very large quantities of water over relatively small
Sprinkler heads and their components must not be areas of operation to effect extinguishment of the fire.
painted.
The objective of extinguishing, rather than controlling, the
11.2.8.2 Conventional and spray types fire is one of the major features of this type of system and,
although the water volumes are large, the designed duration
These are the most common types of modern sprinklers tends to be shorter, so they can be a very effective alterna-
and are designed for use in most situations, either mounted tive to systems involving roof plus in-rack sprinklers. 
directly onto the pipes or below a suspended ceiling. They
are usually of the miniature type, designed to be as neat 11.2.8.6 Control mode specific application
as possible to minimise the aesthetic impact. The only (CMSA) sprinkler
difference between a conventional and a spray type sprin-
kler is the type of spray produced and the direction in The cmsa approach to sprinkler protection employs
which it travels. A conventional sprinkler is designed to special designs of sprinkler heads which have been success-
direct the spray both upwards and downwards from the fully tested to protect risks in very specific
deflector in roughly equal proportions. This will produce configurations.
a significant degree of ceiling wetting, as well as direct
distribution below. The spray sprinkler is designed to The approach provides potential sprinkler solutions to
direct the majority of its spray downwards. These sprin- scenarios which are challenging to design, in terms of the
klers are designed for either pendent or upright orientation, specific fire hazard and the guidance within the LPC rules.
although some are designed so that they can be fitted in
either way. These are called universal type. cmsa sprinklers are mainly used to control fires within
storage risks.
11.2.8.3 Quick response sprinkler
There is little room for error in the design and installation
Quick response sprinklers are defined as having an rti of of these systems and the successful outcome of this system
50 (metre-seconds)1/2 or less. The term ‘quick response’ type is highly dependent on the correct application. It is
refers to the listing of the entire sprinkler (including spac- essential that the requirements of Annex N and Technical
ing, density and location) not just the fast-responding Bulletin 235: Control mode specific application (CMSA)
releasing element. sprinklers of BS EN 12845 (LPC, 2016) are met.
The most common difference between a quick response 11.2.8.7 Concealed pattern sprinkler
sprinkler head and a standard response sprinkler head is
known as thermal sensitivity. Quick response sprinkler
Concealed pattern sprinklers are fully recessed into the
heads activate slightly faster in a fire than a standard
ceiling with an additional cover plate at ceiling level. The
response head. Physically, the only difference between a
cover plate is attached to the sprinkler body with fusible
standard response fire sprinkler and a quick response fire
elements so that the cover plate reacts to the fire first and
sprinkler is the size of the bulb. Standard response sprin-
drops away to allow the sprinkler itself to react to the ther-
klers have a 5 mm glass bulb, while quick response fire
mal conditions. All ceiling-style sprinklers are likely to
sprinklers have a 3 mm glass bulb.
react more slowly to fire conditions than more traditional
designs, principally because the heat-sensitive element is
11.2.8.4 Sidewall sprinkler not located in the zone where the gases are hottest. The
hottest gas layer is considered to be located 75–100 mm
These are primarily used to keep ceilings clear of pipe- below a flat ceiling and the location of the sprinkler relative
work for aesthetic reasons or to avoid having to disturb to this layer will have a bearing on the likely response time.
existing ceilings when installing pipework. Each sprinkler
protects up to 17 m² in light hazard occupancies and 9 m² There is a level of debate in the UK regarding the use of
in ordinary hazard occupancies. the concealed pattern sprinkler on risks that could be
defined as having a ‘life safety’ implication. The term ‘life
There is a ‘quick response’ extended coverage model avail- safety’ in relation to a sprinkler system is somewhat vague.
able, which is commonly used for the protection of hotel The way that a building is designed in terms of people’s
bedrooms to overcome the need for sprinklers and exposed safety in case of fire is driven by the Building Regulations.
pipework in the centre of the room. They are specifically The Building Regulations cover aspects of building design
designed to give an extended coverage of water of up to relating to fire safety ranging from means of warning, fire
21 m² and are designed to inhibit fire growth by extensive spread and access and facilities for the fire service. The
wall wetting. aim of the Building Regulations is to ensure that a reason-
able standard of life safety is achieved.
These sprinklers must be used in accordance with the instal-
lation standards and manufacturer’s guidelines; however, The use of concealed pattern sprinklers on designated life
they are often specified in inappropriate locations. safety risks is seen by some as not permissible. This is due
to the slower reaction time and the possibility that a —— Dry pendent sprinklers: These take the form of
component could fail due to either incorrect installation special pipes with a valve at one end and a sprin-
or post-installation interference. However, this is an issue kler head at the other. Operation of the sprinkler
that is not confined to life safety systems and is just as head at the bottom of the drop pipe opens the
pertinent to systems installed to provide protection to valve at the top end and allows water to pass down
property. the pipe to the sprinkler outlet. They are used in
situations where a pendent sprinkler is required on
Concerns that have been expressed relating to the concealed a system that is not normally charged with water,
pattern sprinkler are its slower reaction time to a fire e.g. dry, alternate wet and dry or pre-action systems,
condition and the fact that it requires the twin actions and where the water that would normally be
involving the cover plate and then the sprinkler, which trapped in the drop pipe to the sprinkler head
could potentially lead to non-sequential operation. Other cannot be tolerated, e.g. where the water might
concerns raised are that: freeze.
—— Dry upright sprinklers: These operate on similar
—— obstruction of the sprinkler casing vents will be principles to dry pendent sprinklers but are less
detrimental to sprinkler operation, making moni- commonly encountered.
toring of the ceiling void space usage important
—— Window drenchers: These drenchers spray water
—— the air gap between the cover plate and the ceiling onto glazing (windows or fixed glazed sections)
is crucial in sprinkler operation terms, but a achieving a level of fire resistance.
shadow effect results that often leads to these being
sealed with paint or plaster
11.2.8.9 Thermal sensitivity of sprinkler heads
—— the installation of the sprinkler needs to be care-
fully undertaken to avoid misalignment, which
The speed at which the heat-sensitive element of a sprin-
makes the shadow effect more pronounced
kler head will react to the local thermal conditions will
—— the position of the sprinkler deflector in relation to depend on many factors, including the size and structure
the ceiling is important, i.e. if not carefully installed of the bulb or link, the material, shape and size of the
the casing can be too high, resulting in the deflec- sprinkler body and the type of fitting into which the
tor being above the bottom of the ceiling sprinkler is inserted.
—— the use of the ceiling void needs to be considered, The speed at which they react can be measured and
as use as a supply plenum may result in air move- compared using standard apparatus and this is normally
ment away from the sprinklers carried out during the approval procedure for any partic-
—— when redecoration occurs, the cover plate is liable ular sprinkler head. The rti is a measure of sprinkler
to be painted along with the ceiling, or papered thermal sensitivity and sprinklers are graded according to
over, which will further delay sprinkler actuation the sensitivity range into which they fall. Three response
or cause the sprinkler element to react first to the classes are recognised:
fire condition
—— standard response A: corresponding to rti values
—— the sprinklers were initially restricted to cover between 80 and 200 (m1/2 · s1/2)
risks in the UK up to ordinary hazard group 2, as
it was felt that they would not be able to deal effec- —— special response: corresponding to rti values
tively with a faster growing fire. between 50 and 80 (m1/2 · s1/2)
—— quick response: corresponding to rti values of 50
The majority of the above concerns are covered in the (m1/2 · s1/2) or less.
installation instructions issued by the sprinkler manufac-
turers or listed in the sprinklers’ conditions of approval. The following can be used to determine sprinkler reaction
time:
11.2.8.8 Other devices
(a) Ceiling jet velocity and temperature:
Other devices which may be encountered include the 5.38 (Q / r) 2/3
following: i= for r / h > 0.18 (11.1)
h
—— Multiple controls: These consist of valves held in 16.9 (Q) 2/3
the closed position with a heat-sensitive device i= for r / h ≤ 0.18 (11.2)
h5/3
and are used to feed one or more open sprinkler
heads or sprayers. 0.195Q1/3 h1/2
U= for r / h > 0.15 (11.3)
—— Medium-velocity sprayers: These produce a direc- r5/6
tional spray of fine droplets for controlling fires
involving combustible liquids and gases with low 0.96Q
U= for r / h ≤ 0.15 (11.4)
flashpoints and to cool the surfaces of vessels. h1/3
—— High-velocity sprayers: Such sprayers have open where i is the maximum temperature of gases above
nozzles that produce a directional spray of larger ambient temperature (°C), Q is the rate of heat
droplets for extinguishing fires in combustible release from the fire (kW), r is the radial distance
liquids with higher flashpoints. from the centre of the fire plume impingement (m),
h is the vertical distance between the fire source and considered. A maximum pipe volume of 2.5 m³ may be
the ceiling (m) and U is the gas velocity (m · s–1). considered appropriate, or delivery of water to the most
remote single sprinkler within 60 seconds. In the case of
(b) Temperature rise: an engineered solution, the delay in delivery of water from
dTd U QTg - TdV
1/2
a sprinkler once it has operated must be fully taken into
= (11.5) account. The limitation of fire size will not begin until
dT RTI
water is delivered and the effectiveness of the sprinkler
where Td is the detector temperature, U is the operation could be prejudiced if this delay is excessive.
instantaneous velocity of fire gases (m · s–1), Tg is
the temperature of fire gases (K) and rti is the 11.2.9.1 Wet installations
response time index (m1/2 · s1/2).
This is the simplest and, consequently, the most reliable
Recessed, concealed and horizontal sidewall sprinklers are
system, by far. It is also the most common. The entire
not classified and are referred to as ‘unrated’.
system pipework is charged with water under its opera-
tional pressure. In the event of sprinkler head operation,
It should be borne in mind that if sprinklers are to be used
the water is discharged immediately.
in a fire engineered solution and their speed of operation
must be predicted, then the rti of the head must be used
Installations of this type are suitable for most risks but not
in the calculation. Use of these sprinklers therefore requires
where there is a danger that the water in the pipework
more information to be obtained from the sprinkler manu-
may freeze or where the temperature may exceed 70 °C.
facturers. It does not necessarily mean that they cannot be
used. Ad hoc testing of concealed pattern sprinklers fitted
with a sprinkler with a ‘fast response’ element have indi- 11.2.9.2 Alternate wet and dry installations
cated that the reaction times of these units are similar to
that of a sprinkler classified as a standard response unit. These systems are designed for areas which are subject to
winter frosts. During the warmer months, the system is
As quick response sprinklers are likely to operate earlier operated as a wet installation but, prior to the onset of
in the development of a fire than would standard response frosts, the system is thoroughly drained and the control
sprinklers, it follows that the control effect of the sprin- valves set to ‘winter’ operation. In this mode, the system
klers is likely to take place when the fire size is smaller. pipework is charged with air under modest pressure.
A smaller fire size places less demand on the water supply When a sprinkler head operates, the air pressure is
and the hydraulic demand on the system should also be reduced, which actuates the control valve, allowing water
reduced. Similarly, the smoke management system may into the system to the operating sprinkler head(s). As soon
be subject to a reduced demand if the fire size is restricted, as there is no longer any danger of freezing, the system
see chapter 10: Smoke ventilation. These factors can should be returned to wet operation.
reduce the impact made by a fire incident on the build-
ing and, consequently, on the resulting costs. Although The disadvantage of this type of system, when in the dry
the design codes have not been changed to date to take mode, is the potential delay between sprinkler operation
account of these effects, the benefits of quick response and the arrival of water at the fire area. Therefore, the
sprinklers may be exploited in fire engineered solutions number of sprinkler heads which may be fed from this
for appropriate projects. type of installation is restricted to a smaller number than
for wet systems. A slight relaxation in this restriction is
allowed when an ‘exhauster’ or ‘accelerator’ is fitted to the
11.2.9 Types of sprinkler system valve set. Such devices detect the drop in air pressure
resulting from sprinkler operation and operate to charge
The method of feeding the water supply to the sprinkler the system with water more rapidly than would otherwise
heads, the control of that supply and the method of raising be possible.
the alarm must be suitable for the type of risk, its location
and its environment. Various types of system have been Alternate wet and dry installations are not suitable for
devised to meet the differing requirements and these are high hazard storage risks nor are they to be used where
described below. the temperature may exceed 70 °C.
A common element for all system types is a means to These systems are no longer permitted under the LPC
isolate the system from the water supply. One or more Rules.
valves are placed in the supply line such that the supply of
water may be isolated by the fire brigade following a fire,
once they are satisfied that the fire is under control or 11.2.9.3 Dry installations
extinguished. The same control valve is used to shut the
system down for maintenance, alteration or extension. These should only be considered for areas where a wet or
alternate wet and dry installation cannot be used. Instal-
The size of an installation should be limited so that the lations of this type are permanently charged with air
area isolated during shutdown is not too extensive. This under pressure and the action of the system is identical to
can be engineered to reduce the number of installations that described for winter operation of alternate wet and
by adopting zone or sectional valves. dry systems.
In the case of systems which are in a ‘dry’ mode, the speed As well as being suitable for areas subject to permanent
of delivery of water in the event of fire should be carefully frost conditions, such as cold stores, they are appropriate
for areas where the temperature is likely to exceed 70 °C, predetermined delay, can close down the water supply when
such as drying ovens. the sprinklers have controlled the fire. The supply may be
re-opened in the event of re-establishment of the fire.
11.2.9.4 Tail-end alternate or tail-end dry
systems Such systems offer the obvious attraction of reduced water
damage, but there are also drawbacks and installations of
this type should only be considered after full consultation
If limited areas of a wet installation are subject to frost, with the ahj.
either periodically or permanently, then it is possible to
install a small alternate or dry system as an extension to
the wet system. These are termed tail-end alternate or tail- 11.2.9.7 Deluge installations
end dry systems. The provisions and restrictions noted
above for the appropriate full systems apply equally to these These are systems in which it is desired to operate all of
extensions. the sprinklers heads, or spray nozzles, simultaneously.
The sprinklers, sprayers or nozzles are of the unsealed, or
‘open’, type and are attached to a system of pipework
11.2.9.5 Pre-action installations connected to a deluge valve or, for smaller systems, a
multiple control. Sensing of the fire can be by electronic
This is a special type of dry installation that incorporates fire detection or by a ‘dry pilot’ system in the risk area in
additional measures to pre-arm the system in the event of which sprinkler heads are fitted to pneumatic pipework.
detection of the fire by another system. There are two Normally it is possible to release the system manually at
different types of system, but in both cases an electronic fire the control valve station or some other location. Installa-
detection system must be installed in the same area as the tions of this type are normally used for oil or flammable
sprinkler system. The detection system and its integration liquid risks, gaseous risks, cooling from exposure risks
with the control system should comply with an appropriate and high hazard group 4 process risks, as detailed in
standard to ensure that it will operate when required. Annex A of BS EN 12845.
Type A systems A UK standard for the design of deluge systems is not

available. Most deluge systems are designed to NFPA 15
The pipework is fed through a special ‘pre-action’ valve (NFPA, 2017a).
and water is only released into the system pipework on the
actuation of the fire detection system, usually on the
coincident operation of two fire detectors. When the 11.2.10 System components
system is in its normal operating mode, the system pipe-
work is charged with low-pressure compressed air, which Many of the components necessary in a sprinkler system
will escape in the event of damage to a sprinkler head or are tested and approved by a recognised third-party test-
to the system pipework. This will raise the alarm but not ing facility. These components include items such as:
allow water into the system. Simultaneous operation of the
fire detection system and a sprinkler head is required —— alarm valves
before water can discharge from the system.
—— accelerators and exhausters
Such systems are particularly suited to situations where —— deluge valves
the inadvertent operation of a sprinkler head, or a damaged
pipe, would have exceptionally expensive or disruptive —— adjustable drop pipes
consequences. However, the added complication, in —— direct-reading flow meters
conjunction with reliance on a fire detection system,
reduces reliability. Consequently, these systems should be —— multiple controls
considered only where there is no alternative. They should —— pipe couplings and fittings
not be considered for high hazard risks.
—— pre-action systems
Type B systems —— electrical alarm pressure switches
These are alternate wet and dry or dry installations in —— sprinkler heads
which the detection system is used to charge the system —— suction tanks
with water at an early stage during fire development and
prior to operation of the sprinkler heads. This is appropri- —— vortex inhibitors
ate on large systems with a high volume and also where
—— water flow alarm switches
high hazards are involved and rapidly growing fires are
likely to occur. In the event of failure of the detection —— water sprayers and systems
system, the installation will operate as a conventional
alternate or dry installation. —— fire pumps.
Standard items, such as pipes, fittings, stop valves and the

11.2.9.6 Recycling installations like, are usually referred to in the codes and rules by a
recognised national or international standard.
The flow of water into the installation is controlled by a
system of heat detectors installed in the same area as Components should be fit for purpose and of a quality that
the sprinklers. The flow control valve is designed to open will not be detrimental to the longevity of the system or
and close in response to the heat detectors and, after a its potential to operate correctly in fire conditions.
Sprinkler head Design point
Range pipes Arm pipe
(horizontal)
Riser
Drop
Distribution
pipe
Riser
Main
distribution
pipe
Installation control
valves and riser
Figure 11.2 Principal components of a typical sprinkler system
The principal components of a typical sprinkler system of material cost and availability, ease of installation, flexi-
are shown in Figure 11.2. The various components of a bility to take up site variances, experience and tradition,
sprinkler system listed above and shown in Figure 11.2 and avoidance of future problems with maintenance. This
are detailed in BS EN 12845. Reference to the Standard tends to lead to a common approach within the industry
will assist in detailing aspects of design relating to pipe and, for example, a typical wet installation in the UK
grades, pipe supports, pipe fittings etc. would include:
The anticipated use and life expectancy of the building —— an underground feed main in high-performance
may influence the choice of materials. If the environment polyethylene (hppe) pipework with fusion-welded
is corrosive, then clearly the wet system components must joints and fittings
be adequately protected. Alternate wet and dry systems are
prone to more rapid internal corrosion than systems which —— installation pipework downstream of the alarm
are perpetually charged with water, and the use of unpro- valve in black medium-grade steel tube to BS EN
tected steel pipe may limit the life of the pipework to 10255: 2004 (BSI, 2004a), shop prefabricated as far
20 years or less. The use of galvanised pipe may be consid- as practicable
ered as a means of extending the life of the pipework. —— mains over 50 mm diameter with welded branches
and sockets, joined to adjacent pipework with
A more recent development has been the use of plastic mechanical grooved joints and to plant items with
(chlorinated polyvinyl chloride, cpvc) pipes and fittings flanges
in above-ground (i.e. fire-exposed) situations. There are
usually specific qualifications regarding their use. This —— pipework of diameter 50 mm or less fabricated
material has proven to be particularly good for domestic with screwed joints to BS EN 10226-1: 2004 (BSI,
and residential applications and retro-fitting in premises 2004b) and joined with screwed fittings to BS EN
such as hotels, where the light weight and ease of instal- 10242: 1995 (BSI, 1995).
lation are particularly important. It is likely that this
material will be used more extensively in the future. Flexible pipe connectors have become very popular and
commonplace over the past 10 years. Although the intro-
The use of welding is another area where consideration duction of flexible connections to sprinkler heads has
should be given to authority preferences. The practice of offered a number of benefits to assist in the installation of
in situ welding should be restricted and should be avoided sprinkler systems at the second fix stage of a project, their
if possible. These restrictions are due to the difficulties of use is also accompanied by a number of shortfalls that can
quality control and the increased risk of fire on site (see prove detrimental to the operation of a sprinkler system
chapter 14: Fire safety management). A strict quality control in a fire condition.
system for welded prefabrication is essential and tech-
niques such as set-in sockets and ‘cut and shut’ direction The flexible connection typically used by sprinkler
changes should not be permitted, as these impair the flow contractors is often poorly fitted and will require adjust-
of water through the piping network. ment. They cannot be installed over large plasterboard
areas without a suitable number of access hatches for
Many options for pipe materials and jointing methods are maintenance and visual inspection. Some insurers do not
available, but usually the choice will be based on a balance permit their use, and this opinion may increase with time.
11.2.11 Installation planning access in fire conditions and the need for disposal
of test and system drain water
It is essential that the provision of sprinkler protection is —— potential locations of any main risers through the
properly planned in order that: building and subsidiary control valve locations,
where planned
(a) the system fully meets the needs of the risk and is
capable of controlling an outbreak of fire —— potential locations of storage tanks and pump
house, where these are proposed
(b) as many of the potential future uses of the building
as possible are taken into account within the orig- —— details of the planned electrical supply to the proj-
inal design ect, where an electric pump is necessary, to estab-
lish if this is of sufficient capacity and reliability
(c) the specific requirements of the owner/occupier,
local authority, fire insurers and other ahjs are —— an outline of the principal routes of main distribu-
met tion pipes such that any structural or architectural
impacts may be taken into account early in the
(d) the local and national water byelaws are observed design process.
(e) the sprinkler system forms an integrated part of
The effects of water run-off, resulting from the operation
the overall construction, fire detection and fight-
of the sprinkler system and any other firefighting opera-
ing and means of escape strategies for the
tions, should be fully considered in the emergency
premises
planning. This will be especially crucial where soluble
(f) the system is coordinated with the fabric of the materials or chemicals are at risk or where synthetic foams
building and other building services so as to min- are used in the firefighting system, due to the pollution
imise the aesthetic impact on the project. risk.
Consultation with all interested parties should take place Fires on construction sites often happen when the sprin-
at the earliest possible time and the fire protection engi- kler system, although partially installed, has not been put
neer should be involved as soon as possible when aspects on line. It is important during the planning process that
such as building construction, space planning and services consideration is given to bringing the system on line as
spaces may be influenced. The consequences of the system the building works progress. If early sprinkler protection
operation in fire and non-fire conditions should also be is desired, a water supply ready for use is essential and this
considered, and such matters as drainage of water result- may mean having a temporary connection made to the
ing from sprinkler operation should be taken into account. town main or a temporary power supply available (diesel
The possibility of damage or interference to the system, generator) if electric pumps are being used. The use of
both accidental and deliberate, should be ‘designed out’ diesel rather than electric fire pumps may be a better
wherever possible and contingency plans drawn up to deal option.
with all eventualities should such damage arise.
If neither solution is possible or practicable then, as a
In terms of the building itself, as many aspects as possible minimum, a fire brigade breeching inlet should be in
should be taken into account at the earliest possible stage place to permit the fire brigade to utilise the system. This
in the building design process. These include, but are not will require ensuring that sectional completion is imple-
limited to, the following: mented to avoid open pipe ends or blanked-off sections of
piping.
—— the occupancy and any processes that are to take
place in the premises (information that will be
used to determine the hazard classifications that 11.2.12 Installation design
will apply to the risk. It is not unusual for several
different classifications to apply to various parts of 11.2.12.1 Sprinkler spacing and location
the premises)
—— the details of any goods on the premises and the The spacing and location of sprinklers is a vital element
heights and storage methods planned, each type of of the design of the system. It dictates the speed of response
goods being given a category and the combination and the effectiveness of the sprinkler protection, and ulti-
of category of goods, storage method and height of mately will have a major influence on the severity of a fire
storage further determining the type and classifi- incident and its impact on the building. The two key
cation of protection factors affecting sprinkler system performance are prompt
sprinkler operation and sufficient, unobstructed water
—— details of town or local main water sources, includ- discharge into the fire area. Therefore, the building’s
ing full flow testing of the mains to establish their construction features, height, layout and mechanical and
suitability to supply water for the installation, electrical (m&e) services all have a significant impact on
either directly or as infill to a water storage tank these two factors. Avoiding obstructions is of paramount
—— details of any existing water storage tanks, reser- importance for the sprinkler design and installation,
voirs, lakes, rivers etc. which may have potential to which requires considerable coordination with all aspects
serve as feeds to the sprinkler system of building design, infrastructure and services.
—— potential locations of the installation control The principles of design are relatively simple and are
valves, including consideration of fire brigade based on common sense, but the most important factor
concerning sprinkler performance is having a thorough Table 11.5 Sprinkler head spacing by risk
understanding of the fundamentals of fire dynamics (see BS EN 12845: area per NFPA 13: area per
chapter 6: Fire dynamics). sprinker / m2 sprinker / m2
Light hazard 21 11.1–20.9
A series of maximum values is given in Table 11.5 as a
guide to the designer but these should not be taken as Ordinary hazard 12 12.1
target values. High hazard 9 8.4–12.1
For instance, in a high hazard risk, the spacing of sprin-

kler heads may be reduced to a value significantly below
the maximum to reduce the hydraulic demands on the Table 11.6 Maximum allowable distance between sprinkler heads
system. Similarly, the spacing in certain areas may be
BS EN 12845 / m NFPA 13 / m
reduced to enhance performance in that area of the risk.
The approach must be balanced and based on sound engi- Light hazard 4.6 4.6
neering skills and experience. Ordinary hazard 4.0 4.6
High hazard 3.7 3.7
Where sprinklers are being used as part of an integrated
fire engineering strategy, the speed of sprinkler operation
may be crucial to the strategy objectives. The spacing and
location of sprinkler heads relative to the ceiling or roof
must be carefully considered. protection by sprinklers at ceiling level and the location
of sprinklers at the edges of adjacent floors may require
Spacing of sprinklers special consideration to enhance their ability to ‘cut-off ’
the atrium from the protected floor.
The maximum values given in Table 11.5 for sprinkler head
spacing of normal (i.e. non-sidewall) sprinklers according It has been recognised for many years that sprinkler
to classification of risk are common to most codes. protection increases the life of glazing in fire situations
and external drencher systems have been used to protect
The area per sprinkler is calculated as the area located buildings from the effects of fire in adjacent buildings.
between four adjacent sprinkler heads, regardless of the
spacing method used for the sprinklers (i.e. standard or Although not covered by existing UK codes, there is no
staggered) for ordinary hazard risks. reason why this practice should not be extended to provide
protection for internal elements of buildings as part of a
The maximum allowable distance between sprinkler heads fire engineered design. The location and spacing of the
for ‘standard’ sprinkler spacing in most countries is shown sprinklers would need to be determined for the particular
in Table 11.6. situation, but locating sprinklers within 600 mm of glaz-
ing should provide a good spray distribution over the
glazing. The use of sprinklers to protect glazing and exter-
Using the maximum spacing for sprinklers (under BS EN
nal walls, although not common in the UK, is adopted in
12845) in each hazard category would be:
NFPA 13.
—— light hazard 4.6 m × 4.6 m (approximate)
Systems for protecting atria have been designed that
—— ordinary hazard 4 m × 3 m combine electronic flame detectors with open sprinklers
or sprayers, fed on a zoned deluge system. Such systems
—— high hazard 3.7 m × 2.4 m (approximate). are not covered by present codes. Therefore, each system
must be tailored to suit the particular objectives and
The NFPA code does allow some latitude when protecting circumstances of the project, with the agreement of the
small rooms. As the heat will build up more rapidly and appropriate authorities. The objectives would be to repli-
the sprinkler activate more quickly than in a larger room, cate the speed of sprinkler response and design density
wider spacing can be adopted. The NFPA and Australian given by a ‘standard’ system for the risk involved. This
codes also permit special sprinklers to be used if the has been achieved in some systems by using analogue
manufacturer’s guidance on their use is followed. infrared flame detection linked to a microprocessor
programmed to activate various stages of alarm from first
Location of sprinklers detection of any fire through to activation of the deluge
system when a fire of, say, 0.75 MW heat release rate has
Sprinkler location is again a matter of common sense. been detected.
They should be close to the ceiling and not obstructed by
ceiling features or other services. Where sloping soffits or roofs are encountered, the hot
gases produced from a fire will tend to collect first at the
They need to be at a height above the risk where the highest point of the roof. Therefore, in general, sprinklers
sprinkler discharge will be effective. The British Standard should be located within a reasonable distance from the
covering the design of atria within buildings recommends ridge when the roof slope is steep (exceeds 1 in 3, i.e. 18.5°).
heights of 7.5 m and 10 m depending on the response
time of the sprinkler if control of a design size fire of The positioning of sprinklers in relation to the ceiling or
2.5 MW is to be achieved. soffit is also important since this will affect the operating
speed of individual sprinklers. The gas strata immediately
The provision of atria in buildings therefore presents adjacent to the soffit will be cooled by the fabric of the
special problems. Often these are too lofty for effective ceiling and therefore the sprinklers should be located
between 75 mm and 150 mm below the soffit in order to water flowing through them simultaneously, even
place the sprinkler within the zone of the hottest gases. though the fire may only involve the sprinklers on
one tie pipe.
11.2.12.2 Suspended ceilings —— ‘Looped’ systems: A loop, or multiple loop, configu-
ration consists of a pipe immediately downstream
Where suspended ceilings are fitted, the void formed of the sprinkler installation control valves con-
between floors and the ceiling below should be protected necting into a single or multiple loop pipe config-
if it is in excess of 0.8 m deep. This depth is considered uration. Range pipes that feed the sprinkler heads
by many in the insurance industry as usable space and are fed from the loop pipes.
could be used for ad hoc storage of materials (files, Christ-
mas decorations and similar items). A void of less than The rules for the design of sprinkler systems do not
this depth may require protection if combustible construc- provide a basis for pipe diameter sizing for loop or grid
tion or contents are present. An assessment should be systems other than by full hydraulic calculations. Loop,
undertaken to verify the level of fire risk involved and this multiple loop and grid pipe configurations must not be
will include the construction materials’ combustibility, used for dry and alternate wet and dry pipe sprinkler
the fire loading expected within the void (fan coil units, installations.
duct insulation, cables etc.) and the relationship between
combustible items and ignition sources.
Gridded systems can prove to be an economical method of
sprinkler feed in certain circumstances, since the hydrau-
11.2.12.3 Pipework system arrangements lic load may be spread over a greater number of pipes,
which can then be smaller in diameter than those in a tree
There are three principal styles of pipework design: system. Certain types of buildings, such as large, high
hazard risks with large bays and flat or slightly sloping
—— ‘Tree’ or ‘terminal’ systems: The traditional method roofs, are more suited to this system.
of feeding sprinkler systems involves the sprinkler
heads being fed, singly or in groups, from dead- 11.2.12.4 Pre-calculated pipe arrays
end range pipes linked to distribution pipes, which
are fed, in turn, from the water supply through
main distribution pipes. This system is hydrauli- The use of pre-calculated pipe sizes is common in light
cally very simple in that, in the event of system and ordinary hazard class systems. Pipe tables are provided
operation, only those range pipes that feed the and pipe diameters are influenced by pipe configuration.
operating sprinklers, and the distribution and System design using full hydraulic calculations is required
main distribution pipes which feed those ranges, for some forms of sprinkler system design but may be
will contain flowing water. used on all system designs.
—— ‘Gridded’ systems: The sprinkler heads are fed from

‘tie’ pipes which are fed from more than one distri- 11.2.12.5 Fully hydraulically calculated pipe
bution main (often termed a ‘track’), which may or arrays
may not be directly linked to the water supply (see
Figure 11.3). This type of system is hydraulically Fully hydraulically calculated pipe arrays are arrays in
more complex than the tree system since generally which a detailed hydraulic analysis of the system is carried
each sprinkler is fed from more than one direction. out to determine the precise hydraulic characteristics of
Therefore, all of the pipes in a system may have the system and to balance the capacity of the water supply.
Sprinkler heads Back track
Front track
Tie pipes
Installation control
valves and riser
Figure 11.3 Component parts of a gridded system

The basis of the calculation is to establish the demand of where P is pressure loss (millibars), Q is flow rate (l · min–1),
the hydraulically most unfavourable situation for the C is the roughness coefficient for the type of pipe
installation. The demand of the hydraulically most favour- (contained within design guides or codes) and d is the
able situation must also be established where the water mean internal pipe diameter (contained within design
supply is limited and an overload on demand may be guides or codes).
detrimental or could shorten the time during which the
supply will be available (e.g. a storage tank and automatic Although the calculations may be performed manually,
pumped supply). This may involve multiple calculations, software is now available, which is the preferred option,
since the most and least demanding situations may not be particularly for gridded systems, where the flow/pressure
obvious. logic through the matrix of pipes is very complex. Where
software is employed, the input data must be checked,
The demand for favourable areas is not considered for preferably by performing an independent calculation
systems designed to NFPA 13. using quality-tested and calibrated software or by carrying
out extensive manual cross-checks.
The process involves establishing the individual sprin-
klers that are in the amao, which will be as close as The results of full hydraulic calculations must be plotted
possible to rectangular in the case of the most unfavour- onto a water supply graph to ensure that the hydraulic
able location, and square for the most favourable location. demand of the system can be met fully by the water supply.
The number of sprinklers contained in the amao is calcu-
lated from the areas covered by individual sprinklers
added together until the design area of operation is 11.2.13 Water supplies
covered. The minimum rate of flow through each sprin-
kler is obtained by multiplying the design density Adequate water supplies are one of the most important
(l · m–² · min–1) by the area covered by each sprinkler. Also, issues in connection with sprinklers, and a full treatment
each sprinkler must operate at a minimum running pres- is beyond the scope of this Guide. However, the following
sure to ensure that the correct spray characteristic is section identifies some of the salient points.
established. These vary according to hazard and location,
as follows: The concept of automatic fire protection collapses if water
is not available in sufficient quantities and for an adequate
(a) light hazard, all types: 0.7 bar duration when required. Consequently, great attention
(b) ordinary hazard, all types: 0.35 bar must be given to the three aspects of water supply:
(c) high hazard, intermediate rack systems: —— reliability

—— 2.0 bar for K80 sprinkler head —— flow rate
—— 1.0 bar for K115 sprinkler head —— capacity (i.e. duration).
(d) high hazard, other types: 0.5 bar
In simple terms, the higher the hazard, the higher the
(e) esfr and cmsa: varies according to the risk and required flow rate and capacity, and the greater the need
type of sprinkler chosen. for reliability.
The minimum running pressure of standard sprinklers in Water supplies are designated as follows, in order of
NFPA 13 is 0.5 bar. increasing reliability:
The calculations may have to include sprinklers below —— single supply
ducts or other obstructions. Where intermediate rack
sprinklers are involved, the final calculations must include —— superior supply
both roof and rack systems operating simultaneously, even —— duplicate supply.
if the most unfavourable rack location is not in the same
area as the most unfavourable roof location. This allows
Any of the above may be suitable for light and ordinary
the building owner flexibility in the layout of the racks.
hazard risks, but only superior or duplicate supplies would
normally be considered for high hazard risks.
The principal formula for the establishment of friction
loss within the calculation process is the Hazen–Williams
formula (an empirical relationship which relates the flow Acceptable sources for sprinkler water supplies include
of water in a pipe to the physical properties of the pipe the following:
and the pressure drop caused by friction). Losses or gains
as a result of differences in elevation are accounted for —— town main
using a simplified method in which 1.0 m head is taken as —— automatic booster pumps, drawing from town main
0.1 bar. The balance tolerances to be achieved in the (where permitted)
calculations are stipulated in the codes, which also sched-
ule the information which must be provided to any —— automatic suction pumps drawing from a suitable
approving authority for checking purposes. The Hazen– source
Williams formula may be expressed as follows: —— elevated private reservoirs
6.05 Q1.85 # 107 —— gravity tanks
P= (11.6)
C 1.85 d 4.87 —— pressure tanks.
A single supply would normally be one of the following: Where the difference between the highest and lowest
sprinklers exceeds 45 m, the system is classified as ‘high-
—— a town main fed from a single source rise’ in the UK and the system must be subdivided into
sections, each having a highest to lowest differential not
—— a single automatic suction pump drawing from a
exceeding 45 m.
suitable source
—— a single automatic booster pump drawing from a Each section must be fed from a separate set of pumps or
town main fed from a single source. from separate stages of a multi-stage pump, but these may
draw from a common water storage facility sized to suit
Superior supplies include the following: the highest demand.
—— a town main fed from more than one source and Where pipes have been sized by full hydraulic calculation,
from both ends and not dependent on a common then the flow/pressure characteristics of the pumps and
trunk main the size of the storage tanks are based on these
calculations.
—— two automatic suction pumps drawing from a suit-
able source The calculations for the hydraulically most favourable and
—— two automatic booster pumps drawing from a town unfavourable locations should be accurately plotted on a
main fed from more than one source and from graph using a linear scale for pressure and a square-law
both ends and not dependent on a common trunk scale for flow. The resulting system demand curves should
main appear as virtually straight lines on the graph. The design
site performance curve for the pump under two separate
—— an elevated private reservoir conditions, with the tank full and with the tank at its
—— a gravity tank lowest operational level, should be plotted onto the same
graph. The installation demand points must be covered by
—— a pressure tank (light and ordinary hazard risks the pump curve when the tank water is at its lowest level
only). so that the design flow rate is available through to the end
of the operational period.
Duplicate supplies comprise a combination of the above
but tend in the UK to comprise a full holding capacity The circumstances of a full design size fire operating the
water storage tank and duplicate fire pumps. sprinkler system in the most hydraulically favourable
location must also be considered and the increased flow
Where duplicate pumps are required, each pump must be rate resulting from such circumstances must be catered for
capable of satisfying the requirements on its own. If two in terms of both pump driver power and tank capacity.
electric pumps are provided, independent electric supplies
are required for each pump. For duplicate pumps, it is The demand curves for this installation should be extended
common practice to provide one electric and one diesel on the graph (Figure 11.4). The point at which the most
unit. If the capacity is too large to be provided by a single favourable curve intercepts the pump curve at its highest
pump, three pumps may be used, each of which is capable point is known as Qmax and this value is used to calculate
of providing one-half of the required capacity. the tank size and pump duty.
70 Figure 11.4 Pump duty graph for a

1 typical installation
60
2
50
Height / m
40
7
0.5 bar
30
3
20
4
6
10
5
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Q / l·min
–1
1 Hydraulically most unfavourable area curve 5 Pump site performance − low water level ‘X’
2 Hydraulically most favourable area curve (at pump outlet)
3 Hydraulically most unfavourable area demand 6 Pump site performance − tank full (at pump outlet)
4 Hydraulically most favourable area demand 7 Maximum demand flow, Qmax
The tank capacity is determined by allowing for the flow When pumps are considered as suction lift, then full prim-
of Qmax for the design duration of demand, which is ing facilities, including priming tank and pipework, must
directly related to the hazard classification, as follows: be provided. Separate suction pipes must be provided for
each pump and the size of these pipes may be larger as a
—— light hazard: 30 min result of the imposition of a decreased velocity limit.
—— ordinary hazard: 60 min
The provision of suction lift fire pumps with priming
—— high hazard: 90 min. arrangements is not an acceptable option in NFPA Stan-
dards. Vertical turbine pumps would be used.
The tank capacities that the above procedure generates
can be adjusted if a reliable infill source is available. The In addition to the main sprinkler pumps, it is usual to
majority of the design codes will permit a reduction in provide a smaller capacity ‘jockey’ pump to make up small
tank capacity as long as the shortfall in stored capacity is losses in the trunk main to prevent the operation of the
made up by the rate of infill into the tank during the main pumps in such circumstances. Unlike the main
discharge period. pumps, the jockey pump is automatically switched off
when the predetermined cut-out pressure is reached.
Sprinkler pumps must be arranged to start automatically
in response to a drop in trunk main pressure and, once A typical arrangement of a single pump water supply is
started, must run until switched off manually. shown in Figure 11.5.
The conditions under which the pump is operating will
be defined as either flooded suction or suction lift, depend- Common water supplies are of particular importance
ing on the relationship of the pump centre line and low where water is a valued commodity. If a site has a number
water level. Flooded suction conditions apply when not of buildings, consideration should be given to providing a
more than 2.0 m depth or one-third of the effective capac- water supply common to all buildings. The supply should
ity, whichever encompasses the smaller volume of water, be capable of furnishing the flows and pressures required
is below the centre line of the pump. With natural unlim- by the building with the highest risk. There may be issues
ited supplies, such as rivers, canals, lakes etc., the pump regarding the responsibilities of ownership, service and
centre line must be at least 0.85 m below the lowest known maintenance.
or expected water level.
A more simplistic method is used for sprinkler system 11.2.14 Commissioning and testing
design to NFPA 13. The minimum required tank capacity
is based on the density/area calculation multiplied by the In common with all piped services, the control of instal-
duration. Often, an allowance for hose streams is added to lation standards and proper commissioning and testing of
this requirement. The duration of the water supply is 30 the completed installations are very important. However,
minutes for light hazard systems, 60 or 90 minutes for unlike other piped services, the completed installation
ordinary hazard systems and 90 or 120 minutes for extra will not normally be tested in full operational mode,
hazard systems. The lower duration values may be used therefore even greater care should be exercised to ensure
when the system is supervised and adequately monitored. that the design objectives are met.
10 Key
1 Water storage tank 6 Float valves
9 2 Vortex inhibitor 7 Jockey pump
3 Stop valve 8 Pipe union
4 Duty pump 9 Pump start pressure switch From town main
To installation 5 Check valve 10 Pressure gauge connection
control valves
8
7
1
4
5 3
To drain
Figure 11.5 Typical arrangement of a single pump water supply

Notwithstanding the need to monitor the installation —— full documentation for the entire system, its compo-
work during its progress, the commissioning and testing nents and all associated plant, alarms, utility
normally carried out is likely to consist of the following supplies etc., including record drawings
elements.
—— instructions for the day-to-day operation of the
system and procedures to be adopted in fire
11.2.14.1 Pneumatic and hydrostatic testing of conditions
installation pipework
—— a full schedule of all maintenance and testing pro-
cedures required to keep the system in full working
Dry pipework should be tested pneumatically to a pres- order.
sure of 2.5 bar for not less than 24 hours. Wet pipework
should be tested hydrostatically to a pressure of 15 bar or
1.5 times the working pressure, whichever is the greater, Requirements for the maintenance of sprinkler systems are
for a period of at least 1 hour. detailed in Technical Bulletin 203: Care and maintenance of
automatic sprinkler systems for BS EN 12845 (LPC, 2016).
With wet pipework it is common practice to carry out a
For sprinkler systems designed to NFPA 13, a comprehen-
preliminary pneumatic test prior to the hydrostatic test to
sive schedule is provided in NFPA 25: Standard for the
establish that there are no major leaks or open ends.
inspection, testing and maintenance of water-based fire protec-
tion systems (NFPA, 2017b).
The manufacturers of cpvc pipe and fittings recommend
against pneumatic testing of their products and this should
It is often wise for the user to have the testing, mainte-
be borne in mind when choosing the most appropriate
nance and servicing carried out under a service agreement
material, and specifying the testing regime, for a particu-
with the installer or an accredited servicing company. The
lar system. The manufacturer of the pipe and fitting
LPS 1048 scheme lists contractors considered to be suit-
should be consulted if there is any doubt in respect of the
able for undertaking the maintenance of sprinkler systems
safety of pneumatic testing.
and choosing a contractor from this list should justify an
expectation of reliability and capability (LPCB/BRE
With systems that are normally dry, it may be appropriate Global Limited, 2015).
to prove the capability of the system to deliver water to
the remote ends of an installation within a reasonable Care should be taken to ensure that all appropriate person-
time in response to the operation of a sprinkler head. nel are aware of the actions which are necessary in the
event of fire and in the event of mechanical damage to a
11.2.14.2 Water supply testing part of the system. When a system is shut down following
either of these incidents, the necessary repairs and replace-
The capability of the water supply should be tested, ment of sprinklers should be carried out and the system
through the complete range of its design requirements, to returned to an operational condition as quickly as possi-
prove that it will perform as required. Flow measuring ble. All interested authorities should be advised and the
devices must be provided at the installation control valves stock of replacement sprinkler heads held on site should
and also adjacent to pumps such that water flow and pres- be replenished as quickly as possible if any sprinklers have
sure can be accurately measured. been used. Care should also be taken to ensure that follow-
ing a fire incident all damaged components are replaced.
A thorough inspection by suitably qualified personnel
In the case of diesel pump sets, additional tests should be
may be necessary to establish the extent of the damage to
carried out to prove the automatic starting sequence of the
the system.
unit.
11.2.14.3 Alarms and monitoring facilities 11.2.16 Property protection
Sprinkler and deluge systems are most often connected to References are often made to sprinkler systems being for
some form of fire alarm system, which monitors the vari- ‘property protection’ or ‘life safety’. It is true to say that,
ous system appurtenances. All alarms and alarm whatever the ultimate purpose of a system, the bulk of the
connections associated with the installation should be design will be identical. A property protection sprinkler
tested and links to any remote locations proven. All valve system will almost certainly give some life safety benefits
monitoring functions should be proven. and a life safety system will also protect the property. The
spacing of sprinklers, sizing of pipes and general arrange-
When all tests have been carried out to the satisfaction of ment of the systems is likely to be identical. The
all authorities, then a completion certificate should be enhancements which are required to be included in a ‘life
issued by the installing contractor. safety’ system are geared mainly towards improvements to
potential reliability, to ensure that water is available at the
sprinkler heads when it is required, as discussed below.
11.2.15 Maintenance of sprinkler
systems 11.2.17 Life safety systems
When the system is handed over to the user, a comprehen- Although the origins of a sprinkler installation relate to
sive operation and maintenance manual should be provided, the protection of property, the consequent control of fire
which should contain: means that any sprinkler system may be regarded, in part,
as a life safety system in that the safety of the building 11.2.18 Domestic and residential
occupants, those of adjacent properties and the firefighters
may be improved if a sprinkler system is fitted. There are sprinklers
also circumstances in which a sprinkler system is installed
specifically for life safety purposes and may form part of There is an increasing move towards the more widespread
an integrated life safety strategy, providing concessions use of domestic and residential sprinkler protection, as
with regard to other fire safety measures. UK fire statistics show that the majority of fire deaths and
injuries occur in dwellings (ODPM, 2004). The potential
The term ‘life safety’ was introduced into the sprinkler to save lives in fires is greater in this field than any other
standards in 1990, with the change from the Rules of the area of sprinkler protection.
Fire Offices’ Committee, 29th edition (FOC, 1973) to
BS 5306-2: 1990 (BSI, 1990). However, this term is also Automatic fire sprinkler systems are a well-established
widely used in the world of fire safety engineering, and technology and have demonstrated their effectiveness in
beyond, with a different meaning. As such, Annex F protecting life and property for industrial and commercial
‘Special requirements for life safety systems’ has been reti- premises over many years. These systems also offer a
tled in the 2015 edition of BS EN 12845 as ‘Additional potential means of saving lives, reducing injuries and
measures to improve system reliability and availability’. reducing property damage in domestic and residential
occupancies.
An example of an installation for life safety is an enclosed
shopping centre, where sprinklers may be required within With materials such as cpvc pipework and fittings becom-
shop units to prevent the spread of fire and to limit the prod- ing more readily available and a greater awareness of
ucts of combustion, thereby assisting the safe escape of the the potential benefits of sprinkler protection, the use of
occupants and making the fire brigade’s task less onerous. sprinklers is gradually increasing, especially in high-rise
buildings.
In such cases, the reliability and availability of the system
becomes even more important than in situations where
The principles of sprinkler location, pipe feed and water
only commercial risks need to be considered.
supply resilience for these systems is similar to those for
commercial and industrial risks discussed earlier, but
Additional measures considered necessary by the UK expected flow rates are fairly low, comparable with those
design codes to improve system reliability and availability in light hazard systems.
are that:
—— they must be ‘wet’ pipe installations Residential sprinklers are installed in a wide range of
properties – new, existing, refurbished, historic, residen-
—— they must be arranged into zones of not more than tial, domestic, single properties and whole estates. They
2400 m2 which cover only one ownership and one are installed for a variety of reasons, some of which
floor level include:
—— water flow into each installation control valve and
each zone must be monitored and the device —— life safety
connected to a fire alarm panel —— property protection
—— the installation control valves must be arranged —— Building Regulations requirements
with either a valved bypass or with a parallel dupli-
cate valve set such that the valves may be main- —— fire service recommendation
tained without interrupting the supply of water to
—— decision of owner or developer
the sprinkler system
—— all stop valves that are located in the path between —— following a fire incident
water source and sprinkler head must be electri- —— protection of people who are vulnerable or at high
cally monitored and tamper-proof risk
—— permanent test and drain facilities are required for —— as a compensatory feature to meet Building Regu-
each zone lations requirements.
—— flushing valves are required in each zone
A typical system will consist of a water supply, a control
—— quick response sprinklers are required – there are valve, a backflow prevention check valve, a priority
restrictions on the type of sprinklers suitable for demand valve, an alarm system and an array of pipework
such systems fitted with sprinkler heads (see Figure 11.6). The system
—— the water supply must be reliable and consist of is permanently charged with water.
two single water supplies or two stored water
supplies Further requirements for fire sprinkler systems for domes-
tic and residential occupancies can be found in BS 9251:
—— additional information is required on the block 2014 (BSI, 2014).
plan to indicate zone valve locations
—— there are restrictions on the extent of areas which The greatest resistance to the use of domestic and residen-
may be shut down for maintenance, repair or alter- tial sprinklers is caused by perceptions of high cost and
ation at any one time; and strict notification pro- the risk of unwanted operation, although these are unsub-
cedures prior to shutdown may be required. stantiated myths.
2 the use of ‘concealed’ type sprinklers, discussed above, is

permitted in certain circumstances so that the presence of
sprinklers can be less obvious.
4
9
11.2.20 Third-party certification and
3 1 approved contractors
5 10
6 A voluntary scheme exists within the UK for the registra-
tion of sprinkler systems that are constructed to a recognised
standard. This is administered by the Loss Prevention
11 Certification Board (LPCB) and the scheme is termed LPS
8 1048 (LPCB/BRE Global Limited, 2015). Companies listed
7
under this scheme will also have been assessed to ISO
9001: Quality management systems (BSI, 2015b).
1 Pressure gauge 7 Incoming cold water main

Contractors who work within the scheme are listed under
2 To domestic drop off points 8 Lever operated fullway four different approval levels, indicating the level of LPCB
3 Priority demand valve stop valve supervision required and the ability of the contractor to
(optional) 9 Alarm device issue certificates. The scheme also identifies five different
4 Drain valve 10 To sprinklers categories of work type. The contractor will have proved
5 Back flow prevention device 11 Combined drain and alarm its competency to undertake the design, installation and
6 Stop valve test valve maintenance of sprinkler/suppression systems.
Figure 11.6 Typical sprinkler installation control valve and water
supply arrangement Other third-party certification schemes also exist, such as
Exova Warrington and International Fire Consultants.
These are illustrated in the comparison chart in Figure
11.7 for sprinkler systems designed and installed to both
11.2.19 Sprinkler protection in schools BS EN 12845 and BS 9251 (BASFA, 2017).
Recognition of the ability of sprinkler systems to provide The facility to recognise and schedule areas of a project
a reliable and resilient method of property protection for which do not fully conform to the letter of the rules is an
schools has led to the development of specialist guidance integral part of the service. A schedule of ‘non-
alongside the main guidance provided within the LPC conformities’ may be provided within the certification
rules. Technical Bulletins in both the BS and BS EN paperwork.
versions of the rules have been added and these focus on
the classification of hazard, selection of sprinklers and The absence of a certificate of conformity should not
provision of water supplies, the requirements for which necessarily be construed as condemnation of the sprinkler
have been adjusted in line with the specific needs of this protection. The ahj should be in agreement with all of the
specialist area. The guidance recognises the obvious features of the sprinkler protection.
concerns in respect of vandalism to sprinklers and,
although it is never possible to have an effective automatic The use of third-party accreditation is not currently
firefighting system which is not vulnerable to some degree, adopted throughout the world but is a desirable system.
LPC Rules Incorporating BS EN 12845 Figure 11.7 Third-party

Commercial and industrial sprinkler systems certification comparison chart for
sprinkler contractors designing and
BRE/LPCB Exova Warrington International Fire installing systems to BS EN 12845
Certification Ltd Consultants
LPS 1048 FIRAS C&I IFCC C&I BS EN 12845 and BS 9251 (Courtesy of the
SYSTEM TYPE British Automatic Fire Sprinkler
Level-1 Approved PC Approved PC
Association, Information File BIF
Certificated Certificated PRE-CALCULATED
No. 20.)
Level-2 Approved PCW Approved PCW FULL
Certificated Certificated HYDRAULICALLY
CALCULATED
Level-3 Approved FHC Approved FHC
Level-4 Certificated FHC Certificated FHC
BS 9251 BS 9251
Residential and domestic sprinkler systems SYSTEM TYPE
BRE/LPCB Exova Warrington International Fire FULL
Certification Ltd Consultants HYDRAULICALLY
LPS 1301 FIRAS R&D IFCC R&D CALCULATED
PC – pre-calculated, PCW – pre-calculated with water supplies, FHC – fully hydraulically calculated
11.3 Foam systems Foam is not suitable for:
—— live electrical hazards

11.3.1 Introduction —— three-dimensional running fuel fires.
This section is intended to provide the user with outline
design criteria and descriptions for the main types of foam 11.3.3 Types of foam concentrate
system. It has been produced with reference to BS EN
13565-2: 2009 (BSI, 2009). Foam concentrates are grouped and defined as follows.
The performance characteristics of some of these foam
European standards also exist for foam concentrates (EN concentrates are shown in Table 11.7.
1568 series; see e.g. BSI, 2008), and these are also referred
to. There are also the internationally used National Fire
Protection Association (USA) codes: 11.3.3.1 Fluoroprotein foam (FP)
—— NFPA 11: Standard for low-, medium-, and high- This protein-based foam with fluorochemical additives is
expansion foam (NFPA, 2016b) generally best used aspirated, is stable but flows freely and
has good firefighting properties with relatively low fuel
—— NFPA 16: Standard for the installation of foam-water pick-up as long as it is applied gently. Standard fluoropro-
sprinkler and foam-water spray systems (NFPA, tein foam is not suitable for use on water-soluble risks. It
2015a). generally produces a thick, stable foam with excellent
burn-back resistance.
Foam systems are most commonly used to protect flam-
mable liquid pool fire hazards, or defined flammable liquid
hazards, including those associated with flammable liquid 11.3.3.2 Aqueous film-forming foams (AFFFs)
storage tanks and containers. The choice of foam concen-
trate and foam proportioning system will vary according afffs were developed specifically for crash fire situations
to the type of system, the water supply pressure and where fast fire knockdown is vital to maximise chances of
whether a central supply is used to serve a number of personnel rescue. They are a combination of fluorocarbon
hazard areas. Foam systems may also be used as ‘wetting surfactants and synthetic foaming agents, which gives the
agents’ for class A materials (ordinary combustibles) in foam solution surface tension characteristics capable of
some applications. producing a thin vapour-sealing film on a hydrocarbon
liquid surface. This film spreads rapidly over the surface
of a fuel, resulting in fast flame knockdown. afffs are
11.3.2 General formulated to drain foam solution quickly from the foam
bubble to produce optimum film formation for rapid fire
In a foam system, foam concentrate is ‘proportioned’ at a knockdown. To achieve this, long-term sealability and
carefully controlled ratio – usually 3% concentrate to 97% burn-back resistance are sacrificed to some degree. Due to
water, or 1% to 99% to produce foam solution. This solu- their film-forming ability and their low energy require-
tion is then ‘aspirated’ with air to form foam bubbles, and ment to produce good quality foam, afffs can be used
applied to the surface of the flammable liquid. through non-aspirating equipment, such as conventional
sprinkler heads. Thus, for example, existing water deluge
Foam extinguishes fires by: systems can be easily converted to foam systems by merely
adding the appropriate proportioning equipment.
—— smothering the fire by preventing air mixing with
the flammable vapour 11.3.3.3 Synthetic detergent (SD)
—— suppressing the release of flammable vapour from
the fuel surface sd foam concentrates are based on a mixture of synthetic
foaming agents with additional stabilisers. They are very
—— separating the flames and heat from the fuel surface versatile in that they can be used to produce low-, medium-
—— cooling the fuel surface and the sources of or high-expansion foams. For this reason, they are often
ignition. referred to as ‘high-expansion foam concentrates’. In addi-
tion, they can provide a certain amount of ‘wetting action’
To be effective foams must: for class A solid combustible material fires.
—— flow freely The foams produced from sd concentrates have good

fluidity, will flow around obstructions and achieve rapid
—— form a tough cohesive blanket knockdown. However, they have low stability and rela-
—— suppress flammable vapours tively rapid drainage times and so provide little radiant
heat resistance and tend to dissipate fairly quickly. There-
—— seal against hot surfaces fore, sd foams exhibit very little burn-back resistance and
—— resist heat their fuel surface-sealing capabilities are limited.
—— resist fuel pick-up High-expansion foam can be used for various hazards,
—— retain water such as paper stores and vapour suppression of liquefied
natural gas (lng). Standard ‘syndet’ foams are not suitable
—— offer good ‘burn-back resistance’. for use on water-soluble fuels. Not all types available
Table 11.7 Performance characteristics of some foam concentrates
Property fp afff sd fffp mp
Cohesion *** ** ** *** ***
Vapour suppression **** ** ** *** ****
Stability/water retention *** ** ** *** ***
Flowability/flame knockdown ** **** *** *** ***
Heat resistance **** ** * *** ***
Sealing capability **** ** * *** ****
Burn-back resistance **** ** * *** ****
Fuel tolerance hydrocarbons *** *** * *** ***
Fuel tolerance polar solvents 0 0 0 0 ***
**** = excellent, **** = good, ** = reasonable, * = poor, 0 = inadequate
Note: This table is an attempt to show the properties attainable from each generic type of foam concentrate for firefighting of flammable liquids
from a good quality foam of that type. It is important that a recognised high-quality standard relevant to the risk is applied. There can be consider-
able performance differences between foams of the same generic type across the commercial marketplace. Other factors, such as cost effectiveness,
standardisation on site, storage conditions and corrosion, must be considered prior to final choice of agent.
exhibit good dry chemical compatibility. sd foams are foam behaves as a conventional afff or fffp, with addi-
available for use at various concentrations. The most tional stability and burn-back resistance caused by the
common are used at 1.5–2%. Low-temperature grades are polymer additives. Hence, modern multi-purpose (mp)
available. foams can provide an effective agent for both types of
flammable liquid.
11.3.3.4 Film-forming fluoroprotein (FFFP)
Earlier types of mp foams were designed for 3% use on
hydrocarbons and 6% on polar solvents (i.e. they differed
In order to combine the good stability and heat resistance from most conventional foams in that they were used at
of a protein-based foam and the fast knockdown of a different concentrations according to the fuel type). There
film-forming one, some manufacturers have developed an are now grades available for use at 3% on both hydrocar-
fffp type. The result is usually foam that exhibits good
bons and polar solvents.
all-round properties but may not achieve quite the same
knockdown as an afff or quite the same burn-back resist- One very important aspect of mp foams, which can have a
ance as an fp foam. This is understandable because, for significant influence on system design, is that of concen-
fast knockdown, a rapidly draining fluid foam is better, trate viscosity. mp foam concentrates tend to be more
whereas for burn-back resistance a slow draining stable viscous than other types of concentrate and therefore may
foam is better. Thus, the two features being sought tend require different proportioner characteristics, especially in
to require conflicting properties. systems where concentrate pumps are used.
Standard fffps are not suitable for use on water-soluble
fuels. They are available in 3% and 6% grades with low 11.3.3.6 Class A foam
temperature capability. fffps can be used through medium-
expansion foam-making equipment to achieve expansions Class A foams are primarily wetting agents, which reduce
up to approximately 50 : 1, but are generally used at low the surface tension of the water, giving greater penetration
expansions up to 10 : 1. and effectiveness on ordinary combustibles. They can also
be aspirated to enable them to be used as a surface fire
11.3.3.5 Alcohol resistant barrier.
Polar solvents and water miscible fuels, such as alcohols 11.3.3.7 Fluorine-free foams
and ketones, are destructive to standard hydrocarbon-type
foams because they extract the water contained in them Due to increasing concerns about fluorinated compounds
and rapidly destroy the foam blanket. These fuels require within the majority of foam concentrates that are available
a special type of ‘multi-purpose’ concentrate, often known on the market, a number of manufacturers have produced
as ‘alcohol resistant’ (ar). Some of these have a synthetic ‘fluorine-free’ versions. They have been in development
afff base and some an fffp base. Both types can be used, for several years and some end users have adopted them
with the right application techniques, on hydrocarbon and for environmental reasons. The performance of fluorine-
polar solvent fires. They contain special polymeric addi- free concentrates is usually reviewed and, if a large amount
tives that remain in the foam until it comes into contact is to be purchased, a recognised fire test is conducted to
with the water-soluble fuel. As the fuel extracts the water ensure that it is suitable for the intended application and
in the foam bubbles, a tough polymeric membrane is gives acceptable extinguishing, vapour suppression and
formed on the fuel surface, preventing the further destruc- burn-back performance. Such tests include those identi-
tion of the foam blanket on top of it. This effect does not fied in EN 1568 and by LASTFIRE (Large Atmospheric
occur on a standard hydrocarbon liquid but instead the Storage Tank Fires) — a consortium of international oil
and storage companies which reviews the risks associated and discharge outlet. High back pressure will stop the
with fires in storage tanks and develops best industry device picking up foam concentrate.
practice, based on research, academic studies and experi-
ence, to mitigate those risks. A line proportioner is essentially a fixed flow device and
it is very important to precisely match the flow/pressure
characteristics of the proportioner with those of the foam
11.3.3.8 C6 foams
discharge device. Failing to do so is probably the most
common reason for system failure.
Recently, many manufacturers have started to produce so
called ‘C6’ versions of fluorinated foams that have shorter
fluorocarbon chain lengths than foams available in the 11.3.4.2 Bladder tank
past, which usually contained fluorinated chain lengths
with at least eight carbons (‘C8’). Based on groundwater A bladder tank proportioning system comprises a pressure
and soil monitoring studies, it is currently thought that vessel with a rubber bladder of foam concentrate inside it.
potential breakdown products of C6 versions might be Water is fed from the foam system inlet water supply,
persistent in the environment but not necessarily bioaccu- under pressure, into the shell of the vessel to pressurise the
mulative or toxic. In terms of performance, C6 foams are space between the vessel wall and the bladder. The water
rapidly approaching the levels obtainable by ‘legacy’ pressure thus squeezes the foam concentrate out of the
C8-based foams but end users should perform fire testing bladder through a delivery pipe to a foam proportioner.
to determine suitability.
The proportioner mounted in the pipework to the foam
system mixes the water flowing through the proportioner
11.3.4 Foam proportioning and foam concentrate at the required ratio.
The purpose of the proportioner is to introduce foam Bladder tanks are used extensively in fixed systems where
concentrate into the water supply to form foam solution. variable flow is required, water pressure is limited and no
As finished foam properties are highly dependent on using power supplies are available to drive pumps. However,
the foam concentrate at the correct percentage, the accu- extreme caution is required when refilling the system in
racy of foam proportioning equipment plays an important order not to break the diaphragm inside the foam tank. In
part in ensuring that good quality foam is produced by the addition, the routine maintenance and inspection proce-
overall system. dure to ensure that they are ready for use can be more
complicated than with other systems.
If the foam concentrate is proportioned at too low a
percentage, the foam solution will be weak and may fail to Wide-range proportioners are available that typically
form stable bubbles. If the concentration is too high, the operate from 80  l · min–1 of solution flow up to over
foam will be too stiff and may fail to flow across the fuel 5000  l · min–1. These were specially developed for use in
surface to extinguish the fire completely. foam enhancement of sprinkler systems.
Foam concentrate is mixed with water at the required 11.3.4.3 Balanced pressure proportioning
ratio (usually 3% or 1%, and although some foams can be
proportioned at 6%, these are becoming less popular). A balanced pressure proportioning system comprises a
foam concentrate pump drawing from an atmospheric
There are many different types of proportioner available storage tank and pumping foam concentrate through a
to the firefighter for mobile use and to the fire protection pressure balancing valve into a proportioner. The pressure
engineer for fixed systems. balancing valve senses both the foam and water pressures
entering the proportioner and regulates the foam pressure
11.3.4.1 Inductors (line proportioners) down to match the water pressure. Like a bladder tank
system, it will operate over a wide range of flows and pres-
sures depending upon the proportioner and the foam
The line proportioner induces foam concentrate into the concentrate.
water line by means of Venturi action. Water, at high pres-
sure, is fed into the inductor inlet and passes through a
nozzle into a small chamber built into the device. Water 11.3.4.4 Water-driven foam metering pumps
entering the device contains a certain amount of ‘energy’
as velocity and pressure. As it enters the nozzle, the veloc- These units have a water motor, within the water line to
ity increases dramatically and, consequently, the pressure the foam system, which drives a foam pump drawing from
has to drop. A foam concentrate container is connected, an atmospheric foam storage tank. The flow of the foam
via a pipe or tube, to the induction chamber and so the pump is matched to the speed of, and thus flow through,
foam liquid is ‘driven’ into the device by atmospheric the water motor to deliver the correct amount of foam
pressure. concentrate into the water downstream of the water motor.
These units will proportion accurately over a limited
A pressure drop of approximately 35% has to occur over range of flows and pressures, and are available in various
the unit for it to function properly. This may present a sizes and capacities, up to many thousands of litres per
problem if water pressure is low, resulting in insufficient minute. They have become increasingly popular over the
pressure at the final discharge outlet. Following on from past few years because they can be used in either fixed or
this, the maximum allowable back pressure on the unit is mobile foam systems and the proportioners are usually
approximately 65%. Back pressure is affected by elevation skid mounted or supplied so that they can be easily put
difference and friction losses between the proportioner onto vehicles.
11.3.4.5 Premix foam units 11.3.6 Foam system discharge devices

One way of proportioning is, of course, simply to mix the 11.3.6.1 Foam chambers for fixed roof oil
foam concentrate with water in a large container to form storage tanks
‘premix’. This can then be stored ready for pumping to
the foam discharge devices when required. Premix is used
in foam extinguishers and in some relatively small systems Fixed foam pourers are often used as the primary protec-
where the storage tank is pressurised with nitrogen or air tion method for cone roof tanks. There are three
so that the automatic opening of a valve by a detection components to a foam pourer assembly used for storage
system gives immediate discharge to the foam application tank protection, including the foam generator, vapour seal
equipment. As these systems have limited capacity, they box and discharge device (pourer). Normally, the pourer
are used for protection of small hazard areas, such as itself is of a type that forces foam back against the tank
remote boiler rooms or oil storage rooms in buildings. wall, so that it flows down relatively gently onto the fuel
surface. The pourers are located immediately below the
weak seam joining the roof to the tank shell.
11.3.5 Types of foam system
11.3.6.2 Rimseal foam pourers for oil tanks
11.3.5.1 Low-expansion foam systems with open top floating roofs
Expansion is defined as the ratio between the volume of The main fire risk for open top floating roof tanks is the
‘finished’ foam produced and the foam solution required to seal area between the tank shell and the floating roof, so
make that foam. Methods for measuring foam expansion rim seal foam pourers are often provided. The pourer
can be found in NFPA 11 (NFPA, 2016b) and EN 13565-2 system comprises a number of pourers positioned strategi-
(BSI, 2009). cally around the top of the tank discharging foam into the
seal area. In most cases, a foam dam is fixed on the tank
Low-expansion foam typically has an expansion of up to roof to contain the foam in the seal area. With foam pour-
20 : 1. Low-expansion foam systems are used for the protec- ers, it is only possible to apply foam over any secondary
tion of cone roof and floating roof flammable liquid storage seal or water shield in the rim seal area. Other types of
tanks, tanker loading and off-loading bays, process areas, system are available (catenary and coflexip) with which it
oil-fuelled machinery spaces and aircraft landing and is possible to inject foam directly into the space under-
servicing areas. They are also used for protection of dykes neath, but these are not so common and introduce an
and bunds (secondary containment) around storage tanks. additional maintenance burden.
Compressed air foam systems (cafs) are available that 11.3.6.3 Subsurface foam units for fixed roof
aspirate the foam water solution within the foam delivery oil storage tanks
system so that pre-aspirated foam is discharged at the
nozzles. Compressed air foam is usually very stable but its With sub-surface application or ‘base injection’, the foam
suitability for a given application should be checked. is forced directly into the fuel either via a product line or
at a point near the bottom of the tank (but above any
11.3.5.2 Medium-expansion foam systems water base that may be present). The foam then travels
through the fuel to form a vapour-tight blanket over the
Medium-expansion foam typically has an expansion of entire surface.
between 20 : 1 and 200 : 1, although most operate at around
50 : 1. These systems are often used for dyke/bund protec- 11.3.6.4 Foam water sprinklers
tion and for manual firefighting on minor spills where a
thick, stable blanket of foam is required. Medium- These are open nozzles mounted above process or fuel
expansion foam is sometimes used as a means of suppres- handling areas. They consist of an air induction body into
sion of flammable and/or toxic vapours from spills to protect which the foam solution discharges. The air is drawn in
personnel and prevent ignition of flammable vapours, and mixes with and aspirates the foam, which is then
although it will never be 100% effective at suppressing spread evenly over a circular area by a deflector plate.
vapours – especially with high-vapour-pressure fuels and
liquefied gases, so caution is always recommended.
11.3.6.5 Water sprinkler and sprayers
11.3.5.3 High-expansion foam systems
Conventional sprinkler and water spray systems can
deliver fluorosurfactant-based foams, which are effective
High-expansion foam usually has an expansion of between with little or no aspiration, as afff, ar-afff and also
200 : 1 and 1000 : 1. It is used for limited vapour suppres- fffp in some instances.
sion and fire control of outdoor spills of lng at expansions
up to 500 : 1. It is also used for protection of warehouses,
tunnels, aircraft hangers and sometimes cable voids, where 11.3.6.6 Foam branch pipes and monitors
water damage and/or water availability could be a prob- (foam ‘cannons’)
lem. To be effective, high-expansion foam must fill the
hazard to above the height of the highest hazard. As a Foam branch pipes and monitor nozzles can project foam
result, it poses problems of breathing, hearing and disori- horizontally and vertically over long range, but the plung-
entation for anyone within it, and can make it difficult for ing of the foam into the fuel can reduce their effectiveness.
firefighters to find the seat of the fire. Their use is discouraged for polar solvent fuels, including
alcohols, where much gentler application is required. The basic process to be followed when designing a foam
Smaller capacity units are generally hand-held, while system is summarised below.
larger units, up to 60 000 l · min–1 and higher, are some-
times mounted on turrets or trailers that can rotate and (1) Identify the flammable or combustible liquid.
elevate. They are used for storage tank and area protec-
(2) Define a potential fire area.
tion, including bunds, process and handling areas, aircraft
hangers and helicopter decks. (3) Identify a suitable foam type (e.g. fp, afff,
ar-afff) and proportioning rate.
11.3.6.7 Foam inlet (‘semi-fixed’) systems (4) Select and specify the foam solution application
method/devices to be used.
These consist of a fire brigade pumping-in connection on
the outside of a building or hazard area, with ‘dry’ piping (5) Determine a foam solution application rate and
routed to foam discharge devices within a small hazard required run time from published standards.
area, such as a basement fuel oil storage room. The fire (6) Establish the required number of foam application
service personnel pump foam solution into the system devices.
from outside and the foam is applied directly to the hazard
area, without the need to enter the hazard area. (7) Determine foam concentrate requirement (using the
calculation methods in EN 13565-2 or NFPA 11).
11.3.6.8 Medium-expansion foam generators (8) Determine the water delivery rate required.
(9) Identify the available water supply and its quantity,
Medium-expansion foam generators consist of a body with rate and pressure.
a mesh screen on the outlet and a foam solution nozzle
mounted axially in the (air) inlet. The solution is sprayed (10) Assess the best methods of providing the foam and
onto the mesh and the induced air flow blows the solution water supplies (i.e. fixed or mobile foam supplies,
into bubbles. They are mounted above and beside the proportioning system type etc.).
hazards they protect. The generators produce thick, stable
foam but it cannot be ‘thrown’ as far as low-expansion Foam-enhanced sprinkler systems use the assumed maxi-
foam from a standard branch pipe. Generators are available mum area of operation (amao) (see section 11.2) as the
in a number of capacities to suit the total foam application design basis. The duration of foam discharge varies accord-
rate required. They are often used in bund protection ing to the type of system and the hazard. Sprinkler, deluge
applications where foam is required to cover a large area and other spill fire hazards generally require a minimum
quickly and maintain post-fire security – but they can be 10 minute supply of foam. Fuel in depth hazards, such as
used for vehicle fires and in small equipment rooms where tanks, have longer discharge times of between 30 and 90
there is a possibility of a flammable liquid pool fire. minutes depending on the volatility of the fuels.
11.3.6.9 High-expansion foam generators 11.3.8 Components and materials

High-expansion foam generators consist of a body with a Foam concentrates and foam solutions may attack galva-
mesh screen on the outlet and one or more spray nozzles nised pipe, so piping is usually black steel, although some
in the (air) inlet. It is not possible to achieve expansions foam concentrates require stainless steel or copper alloy.
up to 1000 : 1 with straightforward drawing in of air to the Foam systems have operating pressures similar to those of
foam solution by Venturi action; it is necessary to actually sprinkler systems, so the same pipe, fitting and valve
drive air in. This is normally done by use of a fan, which standards apply. All pipework must be adequately
can be water driven or electric motor driven. Combustion supported and be pressure tested to 1.5 times the maxi-
products present in the air used to generate the foam can mum working pressure after installation. It is usually a
severely affect the expansion ratio achieved. It is always good idea to ensure that pipework is designed to avoid
preferable to draw air from a clean, outside source. If this foam concentrate being static in a line for extended peri-
is not possible, a large factor to compensate for foam loss ods, where it can deteriorate; viscosity of the concentrate
must be applied to the application rate of foam. For this and ease of pumping should also be taken into account
reason, high-expansion generators should be mounted when designing systems.
above the level that the foam is required to reach in order
to draw fresh air in to produce the foam.
11.3.9 Testing
11.3.7 Foam system design To verify that the foam system is functioning correctly,
each system should be tested as part of the commissioning
Foam systems are required to deliver foam at or above a process and annually thereafter. Ideally, each system
minimum application rate or density for a minimum should be allowed to discharge foam to check the correct
length of time. These vary according to the type of hazard, functioning and coverage of the discharge devices (cone
the discharge device and the foam concentrate used. Both roof tank foam chambers are available that can be turned
NFPA 11 and EN 13565-2 give these basic design criteria to discharge away from the tank so as not to contaminate
for most situations that the designer will encounter, but the product within). During the test, a sample of the foam
where information is not available it is prudent to check should be taken to check expansion ratio, 25% drainage
with the foam manufacturer (e.g. in the case of application time and also that the foam proportioning system is
of foam to polar solvent and alcohol hazards where recom- mixing at the correct ratio. Such tests are specified in EN
mended application rates can differ from the standards). 13565-2 and NFPA 11.
Any foam solution discharged should be contained, —— description of discharge devices used, including
collected and disposed of by environmentally safe means. orifice size/code (where applicable)
—— description of pipes, fittings and valves used,
In addition, a sample of foam concentrate should be
including material specification.
analysed yearly to check that its physical properties (e.g.
pH, specific gravity, sediment content, refractive index,
viscosity etc.) are still within the manufacturer’s toler-
ances. While these properties do not directly affect fire
performance, any major change throughout the lifetime of 11.4 Water mist systems
the foam might indicate deterioration, degradation or
contamination that might ultimately affect fire perfor-
mance if the foam solution made from the concentrate is 11.4.1 Introduction
applied to a fire.
It is useful to detail the applicable standards covering
Modern foam concentrates can be expected to have a shelf water mist systems prior to covering the technology.
life of 10 to 20 years depending on the type of foam and
the storage conditions. However, premix foams have a —— NFPA 750 (2015) Standard on water mist fire protec-
limited life and should be replaced every one to three tion systems
years, depending on thorough testing of a sample. It is
good practice for the end user and manufacturer to keep —— BS 8458: 2015 Fixed fire protection systems. Residen-
retained samples of concentrate as a ‘guarantee’ for foam tial and domestic watermist systems. Code of practice for
systems containing large quantities of concentrate, or if design and installation
bulk supplies are purchased, so that physical properties —— BS 8489-1: 2016 Fixed fire protection systems. Indus-
can be checked to establish the reason for any deteriora- trial and commercial watermist systems. Code of prac-
tion in foam concentrate if a dispute arises. tice for design and installation
—— BS 8489-4: 2016 Fixed fire protection systems. Indus-
11.3.10 Documentation trial and commercial watermist systems. Tests and
requirements for watermist systems for local applications
Part of any contract involving the supply of foam equip- involving flammable liquid fires
ment should include a requirement for descriptions of the —— BS 8489-5: 2016 Fixed fire protection systems. Indus-
system, and detailed testing and inspection methods and trial and commercial watermist systems. Tests and
schedules. At the very minimum, the documentation requirements for watermist systems for the protection of
should include step-by-step instructions of how to meas- combustion turbines and machinery spaces with volumes
ure the system parameters described in standards such as up to and including 80 m3
EN 13565-2 (e.g. application rate, time to achieve effective
discharge, proportioning rate, expansion and drainage —— BS 8489-6: 2016 Fixed fire protection systems. Indus-
time). trial and commercial watermist systems. Tests and
requirements for watermist systems for the protection of
Each system should be provided with the following industrial oil cookers
documentation: —— BS 8489-7: 2016 Fixed fire protection systems. Indus-
trial and commercial watermist systems. Tests and
—— scaled plan and section drawing of the hazard and requirements for watermist systems for the protection of
the foam system, including foam supply propor- low hazard occupancies.
tioners and their location, piping and discharge
devices, valves and pipe hanger spacings etc. Note: The British Standards BS 8458 and BS 8489 differ
—— isometric view of the agent distribution piping significantly from the Draft for Development documents
system, showing the lengths, sizes and node refer- that have been in circulation since 2011 and are now
ences relating to the flow calculations withdrawn.
—— flow calculations, giving pipe and nozzle sizes Note: There is a European Technical Specification, TS
—— name of owner and occupant 14972, which is in committee stage to become a European
Standard prEN 14972 Fixed firefighting systems. Watermist
—— location of area in which the hazard is located systems. Part 1: Design and installation. This standard also
has a number of test requirement standards as part of the
—— location and construction of the protected hazards series. No date has been set for publication although the
—— foam concentrate information, including agent latest version (2017) is now at committee stage after public
used, proportioning concentration and quantity consultation.
provided
In addition to these standards are specific standards writ-
—— foam concentrate physical property data, including ten by insurance-governed approvals bodies. The most
acceptable tolerances (minimum pH, specific grav- important and globally recognised are detailed below.
ity, sediment content, refractive index)
—— specification of the water and foam supplies used, —— Factory Mutual Global FM 5560 (2016) Approval
including capacity, pressure and quantity standard for water mist systems (this standard covers
fire testing for specific applications and component
—— description of occupancy and hazards protected and system approval)
—— FM 4-2 (2013) Water mist systems of water mist on each fire type differs and it is important
to understand the effective mechanisms before applying to
—— Underwriters Laboratory UL 2167 (2011) Water provide the necessary protection. A detailed risk assess-
mist nozzles for fire protection service (this standard ment is therefore essential. The RISCAuthority
covers fire testing for specific applications and
questionnaires are a useful tool for this process.
nozzle approval)
—— VdS 3188 (2015) VdS Guidelines for water mist sprin- The small water droplet size increases the amount of
kler systems and water mist extinguishing systems (high surface area available to make contact and absorb heat
pressure systems). Planning and installation (this doc- from a fire. Heat is then extracted from the burning
ument differentiates between technologies and is combustibles in one of two ways: through the energy loss
based on VdS fire testing for specific applications in increasing the droplet temperature from ambient
and component approval). temperature to 100 °C (specific heat capacity); or through
the energy required to change the phase into vapour (latent
The UK Loss Prevention Council (LPC) adopts the use of heat of vaporisation). The former mechanism contributes
the fire tests detailed in BS 8458 and BS 8489 Parts 4, 5, to 13% of the cooling effect and the latter, 87%.
6 and 7 but does not cover component approval. The
BS 8489 parts are taken directly from the sections If the water droplets are vaporised then two additional
published in FM 5560. mechanisms come into play. The first is the displacement
of oxygen around the flame front, which results in the
The above standards focus principally on land-based amount of oxygen available for combustion decreasing. The
applications. Marine systems have different standards, second is to provide a physical screen that attenuates the
coverage of which is outside of the scope of this Guide. In radiation, preventing radiative heat spread to adjacent areas.
general, a water mist system that has been proven for
marine use should not be assumed to be suitable to meet Smaller water droplets are effective in being carried into
the test requirements of land applications. the base of the fire through thermal movement (entrain-
ment), but are also subject to the influence of ventilation
These standards cover the requirements to meet the intent and thermal barriers from the fire itself, particularly when
of the application design, the installation, commissioning discharging from height.
and maintenance of water mist systems. They do not allow
the user to design the system. This will be dependent on The performance of the system is critically dependent on
the particular manufacturer of the system, the applicable fire type. Class B and class F fires are characterised by
design based on fire testing appropriate to the risk and the high heat release rates. This maximises the evaporation of
necessity for third-party approval of system components. the water mist droplets and full extinguishing of the fire
can be achieved. It is interesting to note that the larger the
fire in the smaller the volume, the more effective the
The Fire Protection Association (FPA) has published
system can become; and that, also, it requires a minimum
questionnaires developed through the RISCAuthority in
fire size before extinguishment can take place.
relation to providing assessment on the suitability of water
mist and to ensure that all salient design and operational
Conversely, for class A fires, in which we can include cable
points are detailed and documented:
fires, the heat release rate is low, and only a small amount
of water mist is vaporised, thus negating up to 87% of the
—— Water Mist Questionnaire: Building compartment
cooling capacity and the corresponding effects of oxygen
protection – ‘Deluge’ open-head systems – IQ1 (Version
dilution/radiative attenuation. Water mist systems
2, November 2015)
designed to protect class A hazards are designed for
—— Water Mist Questionnaire: Building compartment suppression/control not extinguishing and use a higher
protection – Local application protection – IQ2 water density than for class B applications. For class A
(Version 2, November 2015) fires, systems using slightly larger droplet sizes use less
water as the additional droplet mass helps with surface
—— Water Mist Questionnaire: Building compartment pro- wetting and penetration in cooling deep-seated fires.
tection – Systems incorporating ‘thermally-actuated’
closed heads – IQ3 (Version 2, November 2015). The advantages of water mist systems include the
consumption of less water than an equivalent sprinkler
system, with consequent benefits in reduced water capac-
11.4.2 Properties of water mist ity, pipework size and collateral damage.
Water mist is defined in British and European Standards For purposes of comparison, typical values for water usage
as a water spray in which 90% of the droplet diameters are are shown in Table 11.8, based on approved listings from
less than 1 mm measured in a plane 1 m from the nozzle. a range of manufacturers.
(Note that this value is 99% in the NFPA 750 standard.)
Table 11.8 Comparison of typical water use values for water mist and
Water mist is used as a firefighting method for the protec- sprinkler systems
tion of class A, class B and class F fires. Class A fires
include wood, paper and plastics and are deep-seated fires. Fire class Water mist / Sprinkler /
Class B fires are liquid or solid hydrocarbons, such as l itre· min –1 · m–2 litre · min–1 · m–2
paraffin, petrol, diesel, kerosene, and alcohols including Light/ordinary hazard 1.7–2.2 5
paints and solvents. Class F fires are cooking fats and oils (class A)
— essentially an extension of class B fires but with much
Class B 0.16–0.5 5–7.5
higher ignition temperatures. The purpose and operation
11.4.3 Fire test protocols A suitable risk assessment should be carried out and a
detailed review undertaken of relevance to any proposed
All standards for water mist state that it is imperative for water mist system, supported by third-party fire test and
the water mist system to be tested in accordance with component approval.
third-party fire test protocols applicable to the hazard to
be protected. The published fire test protocols include
those detailed in FM 5560, UL 2167 and the VdS approv- 11.4.4 Types of water mist systems
als programme, along with Parts 4, 5, 6 and 7 of BS 8489.
Examples of fire test protocols are as follows:
11.4.4.1 Pressure and water supply
—— Class A fires: light hazard occupancies (roughly
equivalent to BS EN 12845 ordinary hazard group The type of water mist system is normally characterised
1): FM 5560 Appendix G; BS 8489-7: 2016. by the amount of pressure used and the type of water
supply.
—— Class B fires: machinery spaces (various volume
limits): FM 5560 Appendices A, B, C, D, E, F; NFPA 750 introduced the categorisation of pressure, prin-
BS 8489-5: 2016; local application: FM 5560 cipally to differentiate between the various materials and
Appendix I. engineering pertinent to each. However, the use of pres-
—— Class F fires: industrial oil cookers: FM 5560 sure terms, such as ‘high’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘low’, has led
Appendix J. to confusion, and largely been driven by the marketing
efforts of companies with a single technological offering.
Note: The local application for a land-based fire test differs Indeed, many of the myths surrounding water mist,
significantly from those for marine fires. Marine fire tests including the ‘black box’ design approach, have been
only cover exposed spray fires, whereas land tests cover driven by such companies.
concealed spray fires and both exposed and concealed pool
fires. Marine approved systems have not been proven to The important point is that, as long as the water droplet
work for land-based fire tests. Furthermore, there is a size meets the criteria of the definition of water mist, and
marine requirement for a secondary protection system to the water mist system has been fire tested and approved,
be provided in the event of the water mist system failing the pressure is irrelevant.
to extinguish a fire. As a minimum, this has to be adhered
to, along with the limitations of fire scenarios, should a For completeness, at a simple level there are two types of
marine approved system be considered for land use. pressure system: one operating below 16 bar and one oper-
ating above 16 bar. In reality, most systems that are
Other fire test protocols published in FM 5560 include the approved and listed operate at 12 bar or below, or at 70 bar
protection of wet benches, data processing equipment or above. There are systems in between, but the key differ-
rooms/halls etc. UL 2167 includes similar tests as under- entiators are the means of generating pressure and the
taken for marine applications (such as cabin spaces) and pipework systems utilised. To complicate matters further,
for higher hazards, including storage with limited heights systems exist that are single fluid (using only water) and
(as defined in NFPA 13). VdS also has fire test protocols twin fluid (using water and a gas propellant, normally
for ordinary hazards, concealed spaces (floor/ceiling voids), nitrogen). Additionally, the actual water supply can be
car parking, storage and cable tunnels. from stored water tanks and pumps (similar configuration
to sprinkler systems) or cylinder-based water supplies and
It is important to note that all fire test protocols have limi- a separate supply of propellant gas. The key difference
tations. These limitations include ceiling height, volume, between the two is that any system containing water or
ventilation, openings, fire load etc. Thus, a system approval propellant gas cylinders has a finite supply of either water
for light hazard to 5 m height is not valid for a room of or propellant gas or both, thus limiting total available
greater height. Where a water mist solution is applied discharge time.
outside the boundaries of testing, either by virtue of limi-
tations above, or an application not covered by, one of the Single fluid systems operating at 16 bar or below, based on
published protocols, then the following approaches can be pumps, typically use similar hardware to sprinkler systems.
considered. Pumps are normally centrifugal. Often the basis for
component approval is identical to that for sprinklers,
In the case of an established fire test at, say, an increased alongside the required fire tests undertaken to provide
height, then the fire test could be repeated in exactly the system approval. Such ‘low’ pressure systems can also be
same configuration at the required height. A pass within used with water tanks and propellant cylinders, with the
the criteria of the original certification, subject to third- outlet pressure of the gas being regulated during discharge.
party witness and review, could provide justification for Generation of the water mist is through engineered nozzle
use. orifice and deflectors.
Where an application has no equivalent published fire test Single fluid systems operating at 70 bar or above, based on
protocol, then full-scale fire testing is normally required. pumps, use positive displacement type pumps, stainless
Details of specific requirements are given in NFPA 750 steel hydraulic pipe and specially fabricated valves. Water
Annex C. The development of the fire test protocol and storage cylinders have a high pressure rating (normally
‘pass/fail’ criteria, actual tests and report should be vali- 200 bar working pressure) with a special plastic lining to
dated by a third party, ideally including the ahj, insurer prevent corrosion. The water mist is created as high pres-
and a third-party approval body, such as FM, LPCB, VdS, sure loses its energy as it passes through finely drilled
UL etc. orifices.
Twin fluid systems (or hybrid systems) are third-party within range, with a rapid drop-off as it approaches maxi-
approved under a different scheme: FM 5580 Approval mum flow. This type of pump uses a relief or unloader
standard for hybrid (water and inert gas) fire extinguishing valve to allow the flow of water not used for system
systems (2012). The water mist is formed as the two fluids discharge to return back to the water supply tank. Positive
mix at the nozzle. This type of technology can generate displacement pumps operating at pressures above 50 bar
extremely small water mist droplets (~10 microns) at require considerably more power at a given flow rate than
around 8 bar. This is interesting engineering proof that the other type – centrifugal pumps. Centrifugal pumps, as
droplet size is independent of pressure used. These types often found in sprinkler systems, use a series of impellers
of systems are only used for the protection of class B flam- of a given flow rate to increase the pressure. The pressure
mable liquid fires and must not be used for risks containing drops with increased flow. Selection of the pump is
class A combustibles. dependent on system flow and pressure requirements.
11.4.4.2 System configuration 11.4.5.2 Nozzles
There are two types of system configuration: deluge (using There are many different nozzle types, depending on the
open nozzles) and automatic (using closed nozzles with technology used and manufacturer approval. The most
alcohol-filled bulbs, as per sprinklers). common types are:
Deluge systems are used for the protection of class B and —— nozzles used for pressures of 50 bar and above,
class F risks. Deluge systems are applied in ‘total flood’ with small orifice outlets (available as automatic
applications, in which the entire room is flooded, or local and deluge types)
applications, in which the discharge is confined to a —— nozzle design similar to sprinklers, with a smaller
specific hazard area or object. The system is discharged orifice and specially designed deflector plates, for
after receiving a signal from a detection system. Sufficient pressures of 12 bar and below (available as auto-
water (and, in the case of a gas propellant system, gas as matic and deluge types)
well) is required to maintain the water supply for the
complete duration of discharge specified in the approval —— twin fluid nozzles that mix propellant gas and water
documentation. In the case of class F fires, the water mist at the outlet orifice (available as deluge nozzles only).
often extinguishes the fire extremely rapidly but extended
discharge is required to ensure that the fuel is cooled 11.4.5.3 Valves
below its auto-ignition temperature/fire point. Protection
of class A risks using deluge systems, e.g. cable tunnels, is Any valve installed in the system needs to be approved for
normally addressed by configuring the risk in zones with use at the desired working pressures. The most common
design overlap to ensure that fire cannot spread between valves are detailed below.
zones.
—— Isolation valves: These are installed upstream (near-
Automatic water mist systems are more normally used in est the water supply) of zone (alarm) valves and
the protection of class A risks. The systems can be config- deluge valves, to provide isolation in the event of
ured as wet or pre-action (as per sprinkler systems). Heat maintenance. The valve should be monitored open
from a fire causes the alcohol to expand, which breaks the and closed. Valves used for pressures above 70 bar
frangible bulb, and water discharges local to the risk. The tend to be of the ‘ball’ type; for pressures of 16 bar
design area is based on third-party approval and the rele- and below, butterfly, gate or ball valves can be
vant applicable standard. Typically, for light/ordinary used.
hazard risks with water mist approval, the design area is
between 72 m2 and 140 m2. The system must have suffi- —— Zone (alarm) valves: These are incorporated into
cient flow and water supplies to meet the most hydraulically ‘wet systems’, i.e. automatic systems, and are used
favourable and unfavourable demands. Design discharge to section areas of a protected building. The valve
times should be never less than 30 minutes and are more is an assembly that should come complete with
usually for 60 minutes. non-return valve, flow switch, drain/test valve and
pressure gauges.
The British Standard BS 8489 has detailed appendices —— Deluge valves: These are used for deluge systems
covering the calculation of design area, hydraulic gradi- (ball-valve type for pressures of 50 bar and above;
ents and water tank sizes. This is particularly relevant to diaphragm or ball valve type for pressures below
ensure that the supplying installation company of the 16 bar). These valves can be activated electrically
water mist system has the design knowledge to calculate (via a solenoid) or pneumatically (via a separate air
these parameters correctly. supply). Some types of valve have the functionality
of remote resetting. Valves should be configured
‘latched’ (so that they remain open until closed).
11.4.5 Water mist components They can also be configured as a pre-action valve,
with the necessary additional trim (including
11.4.5.1 Pumps components associated with zone valves).
—— Pre-action valves: These are used on automatic
Pumps may be pneumatic, electric or diesel and either systems where critical risks are being protected
centrifugal or positive displacement. Positive displace- and unwanted water discharge needs to be mini-
ment pumps work on ‘back pressure’ and have a ‘flat’ mised. Upstream is wet, but downstream is dry.
pump curve, with the flow constant at a given pressure The pipework downstream is filled with air, which
is monitored for any pressure loss to ensure integ- Certain insurance companies insist on the system meeting
rity of the system. On detection of a fire by the fire FM approval, and third-party approval is a requirement to
detection system, a signal is sent to the valve to comply with BS 8489. Third-party installation schemes
open. Water then enters the pipework but will are in preparation by Warrington Fire Research (FIRAS)
remain there until there is sufficient heat to oper- and the LPCB.
ate the thermal bulb(s) of the automatic system.
Configuration of valves should comply with the British 11.4.7 Maintenance

Standard series BS 7273, in particular:
Maintenance requirements are given in the relevant
—— BS 7273-3: 2008 Code of practice for the operation of standards — BS 8489 and NFPA 750. In general, pump-
fire protection measures. Electrical actuation of pre- based systems with a water supply tank have similar
action watermist and sprinkler systems maintenance requirements to sprinkler systems. Cylinder-
based systems are subject to the requirements of hydro-
—— BS 7273-5: 2008 Code of practice for the operation of static testing every 10 years, as is the case for gas
fire protection measures. Electrical actuation of extinguishing systems.
watermist systems (except pre-action systems).
11.4.5.4 Pipe
11.5 Gaseous fixed fire
All pipe used in water mist systems must meet the require- extinguishing systems
ments of the operating pressure of the system, be smooth
walled to ensure efficient flow and be of a material such
that no deposit of debris or clogging of nozzles can take 11.5.1 Introduction
place (particularly important where the nozzle outlets are
very small). National standards also place restrictions on This section details the function and design of gaseous
the use of certain types of pipe (e.g. upvc), with regard to fixed fire extinguishing systems. These systems contain a
strength and fire resistance, and where the pipe can be fixed amount of extinguishing agent, in a gaseous or lique-
used. fied state, in containers installed in a fixed location. The
containers or cylinders are connected to a pipe network
For all systems, stainless steel pipework is most often and nozzles. They are deluge systems requiring electric
used, with minimum grade of 304, and more usually 316. activation from a fire extinguishing alarm panel, or a
Thin-walled crimp/press systems are suitable for operating manual release. They are designed to extinguish class A
pressures of 16 bar and below, while thicker walled tube and class B fires. The discharge agents used vary in appli-
is suitable for higher pressures. Ferrule connection meth- cability and characteristics but all are non-conducting,
ods for systems operating above 50  bar are not ‘clean’ agents that leave no residue upon discharge. This
recommended due to the potential for pipework failure, makes them ideal for the protection of electrical risks.
particularly in cases of hammer effect (rapid increase in
pressure or flow in a short period of time). For higher
pressures, special fittings or deforming pipe at the fitting, 11.5.2 Type of application
so that no failure can occur, are preferred.
There are two main types of application of fixed extin-
Approvals bodies, such as FM, will not accept galvanised guishing systems. The first, and by far the most common,
pipe, although a combination of approved galvanised pipe is a ‘total flood’ system, whereby the entire enclosure is
and nozzles with orifice size >4 mm in low-pressure filled with agent. The second is a ‘local application’ system,
systems may be deemed acceptable, subject to meeting whereby only an object within a much larger volume (e.g.
certain minimum documentation requirements. However, transformer, cabinet, printing press) is protected. Discharge
care needs to be taken concerning the quality of galva- of the agent is local to that object. This method is preferred
nised pipe and acidity of the water, which could potentially in cases where multiple hazards are located together (e.g.
cause a reaction that would corrode the pipe with the generators), so that only the hazard on fire receives
production of hydrogen gas as a by-product. discharged agent, leaving the remainder operational.
11.4.6 Approvals 11.5.3 Extinguishing agents
The approval of water mist systems is vital to meet the fire The extinguishing agents most frequently used are one of
protection requirements of the specification. This should three types:
include, as a minimum, certification of fire test and
components pertinent to the risk being protected, third- —— synthetic (halocarbon)
party certification of the installing contractor and full —— inert
document submittal, including the necessary hydraulic
flow calculations. Unfortunately, due to the historical lack —— carbon dioxide.
of standards, particularly in the UK, many systems have
been installed that are either unsuitable for the protected Each agent has an extinguishing concentration which will
risk and/or have no third-party approval for fire test or vary depending on the type of fire. These can be catego-
components, or correct design for discharge duration and rised as class A (wood, paper etc.), higher class A
coverage. (deep-seated fires, such as plastics and electrical cables)
and class B (liquid or solid hydrocarbons, such as paraffin, Table 11.9 Properties of halocarbon agents
petrol, diesel, kerosene, and alcohols, including paints and Property alc /% Design noael / % loael / %
solvents). All systems have a safety factor, depending on concentration
the design standard applied, of between 20% and 30% range / %
design concentration above the extinguishing concentra-
FK-5-1-12 >10 5.3–5.9 10 >10
tion. Note that the US standard NFPA 2001 (NFPA,
2015b) has recommended design concentrations in general HFC-125 >70 11.2–11.5 7.5 10
below those of the ISO and BS EN standards. HFC-227ea >80 7.9–9 9 10.5
HFC-23 >65 16.3–16.4 50 >50
The Fire Industry Association (FIA) has produced a useful
publication: Guidance document on the use of high and regu-
lar hazard concentrations for enclosures protected by gaseous fire
fighting systems (2010) to advise on which category of class It is recommended that all systems are approved to either
A is required. LPCB, FM, UL or VdS certification and that the installa-
tion is undertaken by an approved installer. In the UK,
the certification scheme is the LPS 1204 (LPCB/BRE
There are other technologies available, such as aerosols
Global Limited, 2014).
and permanent ‘hypoxic’ inerting systems that are covered
in section 11.5.4.
The safety levels for synthetic agents are normally limited
by the toxicity level limits (see Table 11.9):
11.5.3.1 Halocarbon and fluoroketone
extinguishing agents —— no observable adverse effect level (noael)
—— lowest observable adverse effect level (loael)
Halocarbon extinguishing agents are referred to as
synthetic agents as they are chemically formulated specif- —— approximate lethal concentration (alc).
ically for their fire extinguishing characteristics. The main
extinguishing agents in use and covered in this document Maximum exposure limit is five minutes.
are HFC-227ea, HFC-125, HFC-23 and the fluoroketone
FK-5-1-12. HCFC Blend A, which was designed as an HFC-227ea and HFC-125
alternative to halon, is not covered as its use is now banned
due to its ozone depletion potential. HFC-227ea (heptofluoropropane) is a hydrofluorocarbon,
sometimes known under the trade name FM-200. HFC-125
The agents are stored under pressure in liquid form and (pentofluoroethane) is a hydrofluorocarbon, sometimes
discharge as a gas. Other than HFC-23, the agents them- known under the trade name Ecaro-25. The present
selves have very low vapour pressures. In order to discharge understanding of the functioning of these hydrofluorocar-
the agents, a nitrogen pressurising medium is used. The bons is that 80% of their firefighting effectiveness is
most common fill pressure is 25 bar; however, 42 bar and achieved through heat absorption and 20% through direct
even 70 bar systems are becoming more prevalent. chemical means (action of the fluorine radical on the
chain reaction of a flame).
Cylinder sizes vary between 5 litres and 343 litres and,
dependent on fill ratio (which depends on agent type, stor- HFC-227ea and HFC-125 are classified as fluorinated
age temperature and factors which influence discharge gases (F-gases), which are controlled substances due to
time), allow a range of flexibility in cylinder selection. their high global warming potential. Discharge testing is
not permitted and contents have to be monitored for leak-
Discharge time has to be within 10 seconds and with age. Spain, as an example, applies an environmental levy
25 bar systems this often restricts the location of the cylin- tax which has effectively limited the sale of new systems.
ders to within or immediately adjacent to the risk. The
higher pressure systems can extend the pipe distance and HFC-23
mitigate this restriction.
HFC-23 (trifluoromethane) is a hydrofluorocarbon, some-
Functional storage temperatures are between –20 °C and times known under the trade name FE-13. The present
50 °C. The lower the temperature, the more difficult it is understanding of the functioning of HFC-23 is that 80%
to pressurise the pipework and achieve the required of its firefighting effectiveness is achieved through heat
discharge time. Only HFC-23 will work below 0 °C and absorption and 20% through direct chemical means (action
minimum temperatures for other gases are higher. of the fluorine radical on the chain reaction of a flame).
Halocarbons and fluoroketones decompose at tempera- HFC-23 has the highest vapour pressure of all the halo-
tures in excess of 500 °C and it is therefore important to carbons and is normally stored under its own vapour
avoid applications involving hazards where continuously pressure of 42 bar. Some systems are super-pressurised
hot surfaces are involved. Upon exposure to the flame, the with nitrogen to enhance their flow characteristics or
agents will decompose to form halogen acids (HF). Their allow pressure monitoring without the need for weighing
presence will be readily detected by a sharp, pungent devices.
odour before maximum hazardous exposure levels are
reached. It has been concluded from fire toxicity studies Because HFC-23 is classified as an F-gas, discharge testing
that decomposition products from the fire itself, especially is not permitted and contents have to be monitored for
carbon monoxide, smoke, oxygen depletion and heat may leakage. Furthermore, since HFC-23 has the highest
create a hazard. global warming potential of halocarbons commonly used
in fire protection, first fill and refill after discharge will Table 11.10 Properties of inert agents
not now be permitted in Europe. As a result, no new Agent Composition / % Density Relative
systems of HFC-23 are being installed. @15 °C and density /
Nitrogen Argon CO2 1013 mbar / air = 1
FK-5-1-12 kg · m–3
IG-01 (argon) — 100 — 1.689 1.37
FK-5-1-12, more commonly known under its trade name
Novec 1230, is a fluoroketone. Under normal conditions IG-55 50 50 — 1.437 1.17
Novec 1230 is a colourless and low odour fluid with a IG-100 (nitrogen) 100 — — 1.185 0.97
density around 11 times greater than air. The present IG-541 52 40 8 1.441 1.17
understanding of Novec 1230 is that its firefighting effec-
tiveness is through heat absorption and chemical means.
Table 11.11 Exposure duration at a given oxygen limit with the
FK-5-1-12 has almost zero global warming potential and a corresponding concentration of inert gas agent
very short lifetime and therefore is not subject to the
controls imposed by F-gas regulations. Toxicity Agent Oxygen Exposure limit
level concentration / % concentration / %
noael 43 12 ≤5 minutes
11.5.3.2 Inert extinguishing agents
loael 52 10 ≤3 minutes
All inert extinguishing agents are naturally occurring Below loael <10 Unoccupied
gases or blends of naturally occurring gases that do not areas only
chemically react with combustibles. All agents have zero
ozone depletion potential (odp = 0). The global warming
potential (gwp) is not applicable since the agents consist
of only naturally occurring gases. All agents are stored as very large systems with long pipework runs, and restric-
a gas in steel containers with a storage pressure of 200 bar tions on the pressure ratings of pipes, this is not always
or 300 bar at 15 °C. achievable. An update is included in the current ISO
14520 standards (ISO, 2015/2016) that permits an increase
The systems are designed and approved to operate in the of the discharge time to 120 seconds. This extension has
temperature range of –20 °C to +50 °C, or as otherwise been adopted in the revisions of the BS EN 15004 stand-
stated in separate component listings. Handling and ards published at the start of 2018 (see section 11.5.5).
installation of the system equipment should only be
carried out by persons experienced in dealing with this There are two main types of inert system. The first, found
type of equipment. mainly in older systems, is known as orifice technology.
Here, the agent is discharged at storage pressure (normally
All agents are colourless and odourless. The types and 200 bar or 300 bar), and the pressure reduced through an
properties are detailed in Table 11.10. orifice plate to around 60 bar. The second, used in more
modern systems, uses constant flow technology, where the
The agents extinguish fires by reducing the oxygen concen- flow is regulated at the valve, normally 40–60 bar. This
tration below the combustion value of approximately 15%. removes the ‘peak’ flow upon initial release of agent and
A typical inert extinguishing system with 40% design normally permits the use of pipe diameters one size down.
concentration will reduce the oxygen concentration in the Within both of these technologies, the specifics vary
hazard to approximately 12.5%. The agents are effective depending on the manufacturer.
and approved for class A and B fires. The carbon dioxide
in IG-541 stimulates increased respiration. It is recommended that all systems are approved to either
LPCB, FM, UL or VdS certification and that the installa-
The safety levels for inert agents are limited by the accept- tion is undertaken by an approved installer. In the UK,
able minimum oxygen level reached. The two limits, the certification scheme is the LPS 1204 (LPCB/BRE
noael and loael, with recommended maximum human Global Limited, 2014).
exposure to each level in minutes are shown in Table 11.11.
Liquid inert systems
The footprint for inert gas systems is larger than that for
equivalent designed halocarbon systems since the gas cannot Technology has been developed using either argon or
be liquefied and higher design concentrations are required. nitrogen to the exact design standards as above, but stored
Inert gas systems rely on the oxygen level being reduced, in a cryogenic state in low-pressure vacuum vessels, rather
which is achieved by the addition of the inert gas, with the than high-pressure cylinders. These systems require evap-
air being displaced to ensure no over-pressurisation occurs. orators to rapidly heat the liquid to the gas phase and
This method requires more gas than the chemical cooling usually rely on the longer (120 second) discharge times.
provided by halocarbon gas systems. However, their main
advantages lie in the ability to install cylinders remotely The pipework must be stainless steel, but operating pres-
from the risks (even at distances of hundreds of metres), sures are around 20 bar. Since it is possible that liquid at
their environmentally green credentials, the lower agent low temperature could enter the pipe, expansion (contrac-
refilling costs post-discharge and the ability to configure tion) bellows need to be installed at regular intervals to
multi-zone directional valve systems (see section 11.5.11). prevent damage upon contraction. These systems have
cost viability only for the larger installations but do have
Discharge times are typically 60 seconds to deliver 95% of advantages due to ease of refilling, and no requirement for
design concentration. However, it is recognised that for hydrostatic testing.
11.5.3.3 Carbon dioxide extinguishing agent consist of a tank containing the wet chemical solution
connected to a pressurising medium. Actuation of the
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is stored either as a liquefied gas in system is by way of thermal links. The protected areas
high-pressure cylinders or in refrigerated low-pressure include the range, hood and ducts, which are installed
tanks. When the liquid discharges, it rapidly turns into its with nozzles approved to the specific hazard or configura-
gas phase. When released directly into the atmosphere, tion. The system is automatic with manual override,
liquid carbon dioxide forms solid dry ice (‘snow’). Carbon standalone without the need for a separate fire detection
dioxide gas is 1.5 times heavier than air. It extinguishes system, and normally connected to a gas shut-off valve.
fire by reducing the concentrations of oxygen to the point
where combustion stops. 11.5.4.3 Aerosols
The discharge of carbon dioxide in fire-extinguishing
concentration creates serious hazards to personnel, such as Aerosols are small particles of dry powder used as an alter-
suffocation and reduced visibility during and after the native to gas extinguishing systems. They are contained in
discharge period. Consideration should be given to the small containers or cartridges of various sizes and can be
possibility of carbon dioxide drifting and settling in adja- used for local or total flood applications.
cent areas outside the protected volume. Consideration
should also be given to where the carbon dioxide can The canisters are modular and one or more are located,
migrate or collect in the event of a discharge from a safety evenly spaced, throughout the protected hazard. Actuation
relief device of a storage container. Adequate safety meas- is electric via a signal from the releasing panel.
ures will include physical isolation of discharge pipework
and door interlock that cannot be opened prior to the The generation of the aerosol upon discharge is via an
network being isolated. explosive charge and the aerosol is filtered through a cool-
ant so that the temperatures are reduced. Care is required
The use of carbon dioxide has diminished over the years to ensure that the agent does not react with any compound
but it is still one of the best agents for local application in within the protected hazard. Due to the reduction in visi-
printing presses, and for total flooding of rotating machin- bility, their use is not permitted in areas that are normally
ery, for example. occupied.
The design of carbon dioxide systems differs from halo- 11.5.4.4 Oxygen-reduction systems
carbon and inert gas agents, principally in the coverage of
deep-seated class A fires where often an additional quan-
tity of agent is discharged along a separate pipe network Oxygen-reduction systems are those that permanently
after the initial discharge. This extended discharge inject either nitrogen or a nitrogen-enriched air mix into
compensates for the lack of cooling provided by the agent the protected enclosure to create a hypoxic atmosphere. At
and also any leakage within the enclosure. oxygen levels below 16%, most materials cannot combust
and a fire cannot start. There are various methods used to
Discharge times varying between 30 seconds (local appli- create the mix, the most common being a membrane that
cation class B fires) to 7 minutes (deep-seated class A fires), filters out smaller oxygen molecules, allowing only the
to 20 minutes or beyond for rotating machinery, such as larger nitrogen molecules to pass. The air is supplied from
turbines, so that discharge is maintained during the period a compressor and filtered before entering the membrane.
of rotation shutdown. Its use in the protection of industrial
deep fat fryers has been superseded by water mist technol- Physiologically, the atmosphere created is similar to that
ogy since carbon dioxide lacks the cooling capacity required found at altitude and, to most fit people, does not prevent a
after extinguishment, and often re-ignition occurs once the hazard to health. However, its use in permanently occupied
blanket carbon dioxide has been dispersed. areas is restricted by the Confined Spaces Regulations 1997,
which refer to the reduced oxygen level presenting a danger
due to the displacement of oxygen by toxic gases, rather
11.5.4 Alternative fire extinguishing than the reduction of actual oxygen concentration in itself.
technologies These systems are good at preserving materials that age

through oxidation, such as paper and paintings, and are
11.5.4.1 Dry powder therefore a proactive method of protecting against fire and
degradation in, for example, archives. The biggest drawback
Dry powder systems are the best protection method for is that the building integrity has to be extremely high other-
class D reactive metal fires. The systems can be designed as wise large systems are required, with high power consumption
total flood or local application. Dry powder is available in levels, necessary to maintain the air leakage rate with incom-
several forms, and careful selection is required, dependent ing hypoxic air. In many cases where positive pressurisation
on the fire class. The primary extinguishing mechanisms is present there can be significant challenges in achieving
are chemical, inhibiting the flame reaction, and through functionality in an economic manner.
inerting. Dry powder discharges obscure all visibility and
their use is restricted to normally unoccupied areas. Properly designed systems normally take around 36 hours
to reduce the ambient oxygen levels from 21% to 15%, and
then have a duty on–off cycle of around 60%. The big
11.5.4.2 Wet chemical advantage is that there is a large volume of hypoxic air
and, even if a component fails, there is a long period of
Wet chemical systems are used for the suppression of time before oxygen levels increase to the point where
kitchen fires. They are designed for local application and combustion can take place.
Degradation of polymers that occurs through overheating design of gas extinguishing systems for IG-541 (ISO
(e.g. cables) does not form flaming combustion but damage 14520-15: 2015 modified)
will occur. To detect this effect, high-sensitivity air-aspi-
rating systems are often used alongside oxygen-reduction —— NFPA 2001 (2015): Standard on clean agent fire
extinguishing systems
systems.
—— ISO 14520-1: 2015 Gaseous fire-extinguishing systems.
11.5.4.5 Tube-operated systems Physical properties and system design. General
requirements
Modular cylinders or small canisters filled with an extin- —— ISO 14520-2: 2016 Gaseous fire-extinguishing systems.
guishing agent with their own tube detection are available Physical properties and system design. CF3I
for the protection of objects (e.g. bus engines) and inside extinguishant
cabinets. The tube is pressurised and ruptures at a certain
temperature. Depending on the configuration, the agent —— ISO 14520-5: 2016 Gaseous fire-extinguishing systems.
discharges either through the tube or through a separate Physical properties and system design. FK-5-1-12
outlet to a discharge nozzle(s). These systems are not covered extinguishant
by a specific design standard but the extinguishing agent —— ISO 14520-8: 2016 Gaseous fire-extinguishing systems.
design concentration and hold times (where applicable) Physical properties and system design. HFC 125
should be the same as those for fixed systems. extinguishant
—— ISO 14520-9: 2016 Gaseous fire-extinguishing systems.
11.5.4.6 Cool gas generators Physical properties and system design. HFC 227ea
extinguishant
These are small canisters containing sodium azide, a cool-
ant and a booster at zero pressure. Activation is via a small —— ISO 14520-10: 2016 Gaseous fire-extinguishing
charge that starts the decomposition of the chemicals. The systems. Physical properties and system design. HFC 23
chemical decomposition generates nitrogen to discharge at extinguishant
around 10 bar, diluting the oxygen to a level below 15%. —— ISO 14520-12: 2015 Gaseous fire-extinguishing
The residue remains within the generator and is not systems. Physical properties and system design. IG-01
discharged. Applications are similar to aerosols and extinguishant
tube-operated systems and the applicability of standards is
the same as per tube-operated systems. —— ISO 14520-13: 2015 Gaseous fire-extinguishing
systems. Physical properties and system design. IG-100
extinguishant
11.5.5 International standards —— ISO 14520-14: 2015 Gaseous fire-extinguishing
Gaseous fixed fire extinguishing systems are detailed extinguishant
under several series within British Standards. The follow-
—— ISO 14520-15:2015 Gaseous fire-extinguishing
ing provides an introduction to all types of systems and
offers a general overview:
extinguishant.
—— BS 5306-0: 2011 Fire protection installations and
equipment on premises. Guide for selection of installed Standards covering carbon dioxide systems include:
systems and other fire equipment.
—— BS 5306-4: 2001 + A1: 2012 Fire extinguishing
Specific to halocarbons, fluoroketones and inert gases, the installations and equipment on premises. Specification
following BS EN, ISO and NFPA standards are available: for carbon dioxide systems
—— NFPA 12 (2015) Standard on carbon dioxide extin-
—— BS EN 15004-1: 2008 Fixed firefighting systems. Gas guishing systems
extinguishing systems. Design, installation and
maintenance —— VdS 2093: 2017-08 VdS Guidelines for fire
extinguishing systems. CO2 fire extinguishing systems.
—— BS EN 15004-7: 2008 Fixed firefighting systems. Gas Planning and installation
extinguishing systems. Physical properties and system
design of gas extinguishing systems for IG-01 —— ISO 6183: 2009 Fire protection equipment. Carbon
extinguishant dioxide extinguishing systems for use on premises.
Design and installation
—— BS EN 15004-8: 2017 Fixed firefighting systems. Gas
extinguishing systems. Physical properties and system —— Comité Européen des Assurances CEA-4007 (2007)
design of gas extinguishing systems for IG-100 extin- CO2 systems. Planning and installation.
guishant (ISO 14520-13: 2015 modified)
—— BS EN 15004-9: 2017 Fixed firefighting systems. Gas The standards relating to dry powder systems are:
extinguishing systems. Physical properties and system
design of gas extinguishing systems for IG-55 extinguis- —— NFPA 17 (2017) Standard for dry chemical extin-
hant (ISO 14520-14: 2015 modified) guishing systems
—— BS EN 15004-10: 2017 Fixed firefighting systems. Gas —— BS EN 12416-2: 2001 Fixed firefighting systems.
extinguishing systems. Physical properties and system Powder systems. Design, construction and maintenance.
Standards relating to wet chemical kitchen protection The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
systems: (DEFRA) has a website offering guidance (www.defra.gov.
uk/fgas), and F-Gas Support, a government-funded team,
—— UL 300 (2005) Standard for fire testing of fire extin- provides advice to organisations (PO Box 481, Salford,
guishing systems for protection of commercial cooking M50 3UD, fgas-support@enviros.com).
equipment
—— BS EN 16282-7: 2017 Equipment for commercial 11.5.7 Safety considerations
kitchens. Components for ventilation in commercial
kitchens. Installation and use of fixed fire suppression The use of pressurised systems can be dangerous and
systems. requires adherence to a number of precautions. These
relate to transportation, installation, maintenance and use.
Standards relating to aerosol fire extinguishing systems: There have been serious accidents with both synthetic and
inert gas cylinders that have discharged, either when not
—— NFPA 2010 (2015) Standard for fixed aerosol fire- racked in or when in poorly installed systems, which have
extinguishing systems resulted in considerable damage to buildings and equip-
ment, and even death.
—— ISO 15779: 2011 Condensed aerosol fire extinguishing
systems. Requirements and test methods for components
The FIA has published a useful guide: GN Safe handling of
and system design, installation and maintenance.
pressurised container assemblies used in fire extinguishing systems
General requirements
(2015).
—— UL 2775 (2014) Standard for fixed condensed aerosol
extinguishing system units When discharged into an enclosed volume, the agent can
create safety hazards to personnel in several ways:
—— PD CEN/TR 15276-1: 2009 Fixed firefighting systems.
Condensed aerosol extinguishing systems. Requirements —— reduction of available oxygen
and test methods for components
—— products of combustion of the fire
—— PD CEN/TR 15276-2: 2009 Fixed firefighting
systems. Condensed aerosol extinguishing systems. —— products of decomposition of the agent itself
Design, installation and maintenance. (generally only halocarbons and fluoroketones)
—— toxicity of the agent
Standards relating to oxygen-reduction systems:
—— noise as the agent discharges through nozzles
—— BS EN 16750: 2017 Fixed firefighting systems. Oxygen —— dislodging of objects through turbulence
reduction systems. Design, installation, planning and
maintenance —— low temperature upon discharge in the vicinity of
the nozzle that can cause frostbite and, in the case
—— PAS 95: 2011 Hypoxic air fire prevention systems. of humid atmospheres, water vapour.
Specification.
Regarding the chemical effect, this is measured using the
physiologically based pharmacokinetic (pbpk) model,
11.5.6 Environmental considerations which is used to determine maximum exposure time to
halocarbons and fluoroketones. Specific limits are given in
The use of environmentally damaging chemical agents in the sections relating to the agents above.
fire extinguishing systems has come under scrutiny ever
since the discovery that halon, one of the best fire extin- Dry powder and aerosol systems should not be used in
guishing agents, damages the ozone layer. Bans and normally occupied areas due to the resulting reduction of
restrictions of its use in the Montreal Protocol led to the visibility and the danger of inhaling the agent.
development of alternative chemical agents. Some of these,
although having no ozone depleting compounds, have Carbon dioxide should never be used in normally occu-
significant global warming potential, and legislation has pied areas due to its high toxicity at design concentrations
followed to regulate their use. which will result in death.
The two terms currently in use are global warming poten-
tial (gwp) and ozone depleting potential (odp). odp for all 11.5.8 Pressure relief venting
agents is now zero, and any agent with a gwp above 1 is
subject to restrictions under the F-Gas Regulation (Regu- When the extinguishing agent discharges into the protected
lation (EU) No. 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases). volume, the displacement of residual air and the ingress of
This imposes bans on the supply of perfluorocarbons and additional gas creates either an over-pressurisation or, in the
HFC-23 for fire protection, strict monitoring of contents, case of certain agents, under- and over-pressurisation of the
leakage, emissions and transport across borders. Inert gas enclosure. The enclosure strength is measured according to
agents and fluoroketones are unaffected. Quotas were the maximum differential pressure that can be withstood.
introduced in 2018, which may affect the supply and costs This measurement is in pascals and can vary greatly, e.g.
of these agents used in fire protection systems. from plasterboard at ~250 Pa to blockwork at ~500 Pa.
The FIA provides training and certification for engineers In most applications, to prevent structural damage, pres-
and companies that are authorised to undertake installa- sure relief devices are required. Types of pressure vent
tion, commissioning and maintenance of F-gas systems. include counter-weight, pneumatic and electric.
Work by the US-based Fire Suppression Systems Associa- operation of fire protection measures. Mechanical actuation of
tion (FSSA) (Pressure relief vent area for applications using gaseous total flooding and local application extinguishing
clean agent fire extinguishing systems, 3rd edition) looked systems.
specifically at the discharge pressures created when
synthetic and inert agents are released. The FIA has writ- The actuation of multi-zone systems follows the same
ten a guidance document on how to calculate the vent standards detailed above. However, the cause and effect
sizes based on agent amount, discharge rate and wall configurations differ according to the system needs and
strength. It also covers specific arrangements to ensure are often quite complicated. Clear documentation, piping
that the egress path is determined correctly, including and instrumentation diagrams and thorough testing at
when the gas passes through more than one volume. commissioning and during maintenance are critical to
Reference should be made to FIA’s Guidance on the pressure avoid errors or dangers in operation (e.g. discharge into
relief and post discharge venting of enclosures protected by gase- closed sections of pipe).
ous fire-fighting systems (8th March 2012).
ISO/NP TS 21805 standard for vent guidance, based on 11.5.11 System configuration
the FIA document, was published in 2018 (ISO, 2018).
The most common method of configuration for synthetic
gas systems is for the extinguishing agent to be supplied
11.5.9 Hold time in individual cylinders. Each cylinder will be of a suitable
size with the appropriate fill density. If another risk has to
The hold time, or retention time, is the period during which be protected, e.g. a floor void within a room, then a sepa-
design concentration has to be maintained post-discharge, at rate cylinder can be added. Or, alternatively, if more than
a height relative to the risk or object being protected, as one cylinder is required for the room then further cylin-
detailed in the standards. This time is calculated to take into ders can be added. This configuration is known as a
account any additional cooling that may be required to modular system, as the individual pipe runs from the
ensure that the source of the fire has cooled below its igni- cylinders are separate from each other.
tion temperature and that no re-ignition will occur.
Where many cylinders are required, most typically seen in
The hold time can be measured by way of a door fan test. inert gas systems, the size and fill must be identical and
The ability of an enclosure to ‘hold’ an agent will be deter- the cylinders are connected by a pipe known as a manifold
mined by the density of the agent, the integrity of the (see Figure 11.8). In high-pressure inert gas systems with
enclosure and actual configuration of ventilation. orifice, this manifold is normally made of a higher grade
of pipe, typically Sch 160. (Note: Sch = schedule number,
Often works are required to seal an enclosure in order to with higher numbers referring to thicker walled pipe.
meet the required hold times (e.g. sealing cable holes etc). Refer to the FIA Guidance Document: Pipework for gase-
Note that hold times for synthetic and inert gases are ous fixed fire fighting systems, Version 1, May 2017.)
10 minutes and for carbon dioxide 20 minutes.
The FIA has published a guide: Application of hold time

heights in enclosures protected by gaseous fire fighting systems
(2010), which is useful in clarifying some of the require-
ments detailed in the standards.
Note that there are changes in the later ISO 14520 stand-
ard and the upcoming BS EN 15004 standard that make
the determination of acceptable hold times more realistic
for actual risks.
Manifold system
11.5.10 System operation (all cylinders hydraulically
connected)
All containers must be the
Systems can be operated electrically, by manual means or same size and the same fill
pneumatically. density
An electrical signal is given by an automatic detection

system that is configured in accordance with the require-
ments of BS 7273-1: 2006 Code of practice for the operation
of fire protection measures. Electrical actuation of gaseous total
flooding extinguishing systems. This should be consulted
along with the BS EN 12094 series — Fixed firefighting
systems. Components for gas extinguishing systems. Part 1
details the requirements and test methods for electrical Modular systems
automatic control and delay devices (such as extinguish- (cylinders hydraulically
ing release panels). separate)
Different container sizes
Mechanical operation that includes actuation via thermal and different fill densities
are acceptable
links, pneumatic heat devices and manual release devices
is covered in BS 7273-2: 1992 Code of practice for the Figure 11.8 Manifold and modular pipe system configuration
Downstream pipe in both types of system is between Sch sound has a cumulative effect); discharge time (which
40 and Sch 80, dependent on diameter and required work- affects mass flow rate); the type of discharge system used
ing pressure. (i.e. constant flow or orifice-type – which affects peak flow
rate); and the construction of walls, floors and ceilings
Simple systems with predetermined characteristics are (which affects the reflection of the sound).
known as pre-engineered systems, which permit design
and installation within the bounds of testing documented Thorough evaluation should be undertaken using a proven
in the supplier’s manual. modelled calculation method, based on the sound power
output of the nozzle at a given flow rate, to estimate the
More complicated systems with multiple or uneven flow maximum sound pressure level generated across a range of
splits require hydraulic flow calculations to ensure that frequencies.
the correct amount of gas is discharged evenly and within
the specified requirement (e.g. BS EN 15004 stipulates The discharge noise for halocarbon and fluoroketone
95% of the extinguishing agent within the discharge time). extinguishing agents is a result of the nitrogen propellant,
not the extinguishing agent itself. There have not, to date,
Fixed extinguishing systems can be designed in a multi- been reports of any damage occurring from the use of
tude of ways. In buildings where multiple risks are to be these types of systems, probably due to the fact that the
protected, there are two possible options. The first would sound pressure levels generated are generally much lower.
be to put an extinguishing system in each risk. This can
be costly and occupy a large amount of footprint that
could otherwise be used for other equipment. The advan- 11.5.13 Maintenance requirements
tage is that a discharge in a single area will not affect other
areas. The second approach would be to install a multi- Regulation (EU) No. 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse
zone system using directional valves. The cylinders are gases (which replaces Regulation (EC) No. 842/2006)
selected so that there is sufficient agent to protect the larg- requires that all systems containing halocarbon F-gases
est risk. The pipework is then configured with a valve per must be installed and maintained by competent individu-
risk, known as a directional (or selector) valve, which is als. Anyone who services F-gas systems must demonstrate
normally closed. In a fire event, a signal is sent to the their competence by having an independently awarded
correct valve and the correct number of cylinders required competence certificate. The UK statutory instrument is
for that risk are discharged. This has the advantage that, the Fluorinated Greenhouses Gases Regulations 2009
with a large number of protected risks, the system install (SI 2009/261) and these regulations will be updated to
cost is cheaper than installing separate systems. The accommodate the new EU Regulation.
disadvantage is that once there has been a discharge, the
amount of agent available is compromised for other risks All hoses and operating valves should be inspected at
(there would not be sufficient for the largest risks). Also, regular intervals (detailed in the general standards in that
system configuration and actuation of valves can be section). Additionally, cylinder contents should be checked
complicated and thorough commissioning is crucial to and refilled:
ensure that system failure does not occur at a time of need.
Often, a separate connected or unconnected reserve bank —— for liquefied agents (halocarbons and fluoro-
of cylinders is provided to keep downtime, while the ketones), if below 5% weight or 10% pressure
discharge cylinders are being refilled, to a minimum. (when adjusted for temperature)
—— for inert agents, if below 5% pressure (when adjust-
ed for temperature).
11.5.12 Noise during discharge
For agents that are stored under their own vapour pres-
As the extinguishing agent is released from the nozzles, it sure, a gauge is not an accurate indicator of contents and
generates noise at a decibel level over a range of frequen- these cylinders must be weighed, or be equipped with
cies that has, in some instances, caused damage to hard dynamic weight-monitoring devices.
disk drives.
Enclosures should be tested for integrity and checks
This is a relatively recent phenomenon that has been carried out to ensure that the hold time can be achieved
attributed to the increase in data density of hard disk at installation and thereafter every 12 months or immedi-
drives, which results in them becoming much more sensi- ately after any works that could affect the integrity have
tive to pressure and vibration. Other sound actions, such been carried out.
as clapping, can similarly cause read/write devices to
malfunction. Reported incidences concern only inert gas Under the Pressure Equipment Directive (2014/38/EU),
systems, whether orifice or constant discharge type. the Transportable Pressure Equipment Directive (2010/35/
EU) and the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Regulations
There are several purported solutions on the market, (SI 2009/1348) hydrostatic testing is required every 10
based on ‘silent’ or ‘acoustic’ nozzles. However, the matter years (applies in Europe but the requirement is lower in
is more complicated than simply replacing an old (‘noisy’) certain other countries). This will require physical removal
nozzle with an acoustic one. Depending on the manufac- of cylinders, decanting, testing and refilling. Normally, a
turer, the nozzle coverage may be limited (resulting in service replacement cylinder is installed to minimise
larger numbers of nozzles being installed). In addition, system downtime. The FIA has published a useful docu-
sound power modelling is required, since other parame- ment Guidance on the periodic testing of transportable gas
ters can affect the output, such as the distance of the containers used in fire extinguishing systems (Version 2,
nozzle from the hard disk drive; the number of nozzles (as November 2015).
The standards relating to the requirements for testing are CEA (2006) CEA 4001 Sprinkler systems planning and installation (Paris:
contained in BS EN 1968: 2002 Transportable gas cylinders. CEA Property Insurance Committee)
Periodic inspection and testing of seamless steel gas cylinders, FM Global (2014) FM Data Sheet 2-0 Installation guidelines for automatic
applicable to seamless steel gas containers (inert and sprinklers (West Glocester, RI)
carbon dioxide cylinders and any halocarbon cylinder
operating at 42 bar or above), and BS EN 1803: 2002 FOC (1973) Rules of the Fire Offices’ Committee for Automatic Sprinkler
Installations (29th edition) (revised) (London: Fire Offices’ Committee)
Transportable gas cylinders. Periodic inspection and testing of
welded carbon steel gas cylinders, applicable to welded carbon Grimwood P (2005) Firefighting flow rate: Barnett (NZ) – Grimwood (UK)
steel gas (halocarbon cylinders at 25 bar and below). The formulae (available at https://firenotes.ca/download/Flow_Rates_for_
manufacturers generally recommend that, at the time of Firefighting.pdf)
testing, the valve be fully refurbished (for synthetic gases)
Hall, JR Jr. (2013) US Experience with Sprinklers (Quincy, MA: National
or replaced at the time of testing. Recommendations are Fire Protection Association)
given in the 2015 FIA guidance document detailed above.
It is also recommended that gas purity is checked to HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
ensure that the decanted gases are properly filtered and B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006 edition
cleaned before refilling. Certification by the original incorporating the 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon
equipment manufacturer supplier of the gas is highly Tyne: NBS) (Note: further amendments published as a separate document,
April 2019)
recommended.
ISO (2015/2016) ISO 14520 Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems (Geneva:
International Organization for Standardization)
References
ISO (2018) ISO/NP TS 21805 Guidance on design, selection and installation
of vents to safeguard the structural integrity of enclosures protected by fixed
Babrauskas V and Grayson SJ (eds) (1992) Heat Release in Fires (London:
gaseous fire fighting systems (Geneva: International Organization for
Interscience Communications Ltd)
Standardization)
BAFSA (1995) Sprinklers for Safety (Ely: British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Kim AK and Lougheed GD (1997) Fire Protection of Windows Using
Association) Sprinklers (Ottawa: National Research Council of Canada)
BAFSA (2006) Use and Benefits of Incorporating Sprinklers in Buildings and LPC (Loss Prevention Council) (2016) LPC Rules for Automatic Sprinkler
Structures (Ely, Cambs: British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association) Installations – incorporating BS EN 12845 (Moreton in Marsh: Fire
BAFSA (2017) Third party certification Information File BIF No. 20: March, Protection Association)
Issue 2 (Aberfeldy, Scotland: British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association) LPCB/BRE Global Limited (2014) LPS 1204 Requirements for firms
BSI (1990) BS 5306-2: 1990: Fire extinguishing installations and equipment engaged in the design, installation, commissioning and servicing of gas
on premises. Specification for sprinkler systems (London: British Standards extinguishing systems (Watford: BRE Global Ltd)
Institution) LPCB/BRE Global Limited (2015) LPS 1048 Requirements for the approval
of sprinkler system contractors in the UK and Ireland (Watford: BRE Global
BSI (1995) BS EN 10242: 1995 Threaded pipe fittings in malleable cast iron
Ltd)
NFPA (2008) Fire Protection Handbook (20th edition) (Quincy, MA:
BSI (2003a) PD 7974-7: 2003 Application of fire safety engineering principles
National Fire Protection Association)
to the design of buildings. Probabilistic risk assessment (London: British
Standards Institution) (Note: PB 7974-7: 2003 has been replaced by PD NFPA (2015a) NFPA 16 Standard for the installation of foam-water sprinkler
7974-7: 2019) and foam-water spray systems (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection
Association)
BSI (2003b) PD 7974-4: 2003 Application of fire safety engineering principles
to the design of buildings. Detection of fire and activation of fire protection NFPA (2015b) NFPA 2001 Standard on clean agent fire extinguishing
systems. (Sub-system 4) (London: British Standards Institution) systems (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association)
BSI (2004a) BS EN 10255: 2004 Non-alloy steel tubes suitable for welding NFPA (2016a) NFPA 13 Standard for the installation of sprinkler systems
and threading. Technical delivery conditions (London: British Standards (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association)
Institution)
NFPA (2016b) NFPA 11 Standard for low-, medium-, and high-expansion
BSI (2004b) BS EN 10226-1: 2004 Pipe threads where pressure tight joints foam systems (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association)
are made on the threads. Taper external threads and parallel internal thread.
Dimensions, tolerances and designation (London: British Standards NFPA (2017a) NFPA 15 Standard for water spray fixed systems for fire
Institution) protection (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association)
BSI (2008) BS EN 1568: 2008 Fire extinguishing media. Foam concentrates NFPA (2017b) NFPA 25 Standard for the inspection, testing, and maintenance
(London: British Standards Institute) of water-based fire protection systems (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection
Association)
BSI (2009) BS EN 13565-2: 2009 Fixed firefighting systems. Foam systems.
Design, construction and maintenance (London: British Standards Institute) ODPM (2004) Fire Statistics – United Kingdom, 2002 (London: Office of
the Deputy Prime Minister)
BSI (2014) BS 9251: 2014 Sprinkler systems for domestic and residential
occupancies. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution) Rohr KD and Hall, JR Jr. (2005) U.S. Experience with Sprinklers and Other
Fire Extinguishing Equipment (Quincy, MA: Fire Analysis and Research
BSI (2015a) BS EN 12845: 2015 Fixed firefighting systems. Automatic Division, National Fire Protection Association)
sprinkler systems. Design, installation and maintenance (London: British
Standards Institution) SA (1995) Australian Standard AS2118.2: 1995 Automatic fire sprinkler
systems. Part 2: Wall wetting sprinklers (drenchers) (Sydney, NSW: Standards
BSI (2015b) BS EN ISO 9001: 2015 Quality management systems. Australia)
Requirements (London: British Standards Institution)
Yii HW (2000) Effects of surface area and thickness on fire loads Fire
BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of Engineering Report 00/13 (Canterbury, New Zealand: University of
buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution) Canterbury)
12-1
12 Fire resistance, structural robustness

in fire and fire spread
12.1 Introduction 1200
Gas temperature / ºC
1000
Fire resistance is an integral component in the delivery of
successful fire engineering input and design. The specifi- 800
cation and integration of fire-resisting construction into
design has benefits that extend beyond life safety. This 600
chapter outlines some principles so the reader can ensure 400
that fire-resistance design is:
200
(a) fully integrated into the conceptual and early stages
of the building design process 0
0 20
60 40
80 100 120 140
(b) implemented appropriately during specification Time / minutes
and construction Figure 12.1 The standard (ISO 834) fire curve (ISO, 1999)
(c) manageable as the building moves into service.

1999), ASTM E119-15 (ASTM, 2015) etc.) and, where
appropriate, loading conditions (Hopkin et al., 2014).
12.2 Fire resistance
Performance (i.e. fire resistance) is typically measured in
terms of time taken (in minutes) to breach any one or all of
12.2.1 What is fire resistance? the given performance criteria (Table 12.1), depending on the
nature of the construction element tested, when subject to
Within the construction community, ‘fire resistance’ is the particular furnace time temperature curve (Figure 12.1).
conventionally referenced in the context of the perfor-
mance (in a furnace test) of an isolated construction The specific heating curve and performance criteria vary
element, relative to specific performance criteria (integrity, subtly between different countries and are defined in a vari-
insulation and load-bearing), under defined furnace heat- ety of standards permitted for use in differing jurisdictions.
ing (e.g. BS 476-20: 1987 (BSI, 1987), ISO 834-1 (ISO, A summary of prominent standards is given in Table 12.2.
Table 12.1 Standard fire test performance criteria according to BS 476-20
Performance criteria Performance expectation
(a) (b)
Integrity Construction suffers collapse or sustained Construction is no longer considered impermeable, i.e.
flaming on the unexposed face (side) openings lead to either the ignition of a cotton pad on
the unexposed side or gaps are sufficiently large for a
gap gauge to penetrate
Insulation The mean of temperatures recorded on the The temperature recorded at any single location on the
(Note: if an integrity failure has unexposed face increases by more than 140 °C unexposed face increases by more than 180 °C above
been deemed to occur, this also above its initial value the initial value
constitutes an insulation failure)
Load-bearing Test specimen deflects by more than span / 20 The rate of increase of deflection, once deformation
exceeds span / 30, is more than span2 / 9000d (where d is
the depth of the structural specimen)
Table 12.2 Summary of primary international fire-resistance standards
Primary nation/continent Standard Title Year
UK BS 476-20 (BSI, 1987) Fire tests on building materials and structures. Method for determination of the 1987
fire resistance of construction (general principles)
USA ASTM E119-15 (ASTM, 2015) Standard test methods for fire tests of building construction and materials 2015
Europe EN 1363-1 (BSI, 2012a) Fire resistance tests. General requirements 2012
Canada CAN/ULC-S101-14 (SCC, 2014) Standard methods of fire endurance tests of building construction and materials 2014
Australasia AS 1530 Part 4 (SA, 2014) Fire-resistance tests for elements of construction 2014
12.2.2 Context —— The performance criteria are generalised and not

typically representative of circumstances which
At the start of the twentieth century, the provision of ‘fire reflect the failure of a building or component
safe’ buildings became a social expectation when review- therein. Specifically, in the case of the load-bearing
ing the impact of significant conflagrations (the great fires criteria, the deflection limit (span / 20) is adopted
of Baltimore (1904) and San Francisco (1906) being two of principally for the purpose of preventing damage
the most prominent). to the furnaces used in the testing regime.
The primary purpose of fire-resistance testing (and thus
The fire-resistive principle developed momentum as ratings) remains consistent with the time of the concept’s
proclaimed ‘fire proof ’ (largely inert) materials flooded the inception, i.e. a means of comparatively assessing the
construction market-place in the wake of ‘great fires’ with- performance of elements, materials and products when
out any significant accompanying evidence regarding their subject to a standardised (fairly severe) heating condition.
actual performance in fire. The standard fire test emerged
during this period as a means of assessing comparative
performance of such materials and products in (what were
considered to be) the most severe fires possible. 12.3 Fire resistance in design:
The severity of the thermal scenario (time–temperature the fire-resistance period
curve) during the early iterations of the standard fire test is
understood to stem from New York fire codes, developed It is typical of most jurisdictions that buildings are
towards the end of the nineteenth century (specifically, required to achieve certain levels of fire-resistance perfor-
tests intended to appraise the fire performance of floors). mance in meeting minimum life safety obligations. The
These codes, informed by qualitative firefighter experience aim of providing fire-resisting construction is normally to:
from that time, were predicated on a thermal scenario of
peak temperature 1700  °F. At the time, this thermal scenario (a) ensure that the structure has an adequate likeli-
was intended to be more severe than any foreseen ‘real’ fire. hood of surviving burnout of a real fire, and/or
Following criticism of the New York building structure (b) mitigate the spread of fire (within and beyond a
fire testing concept, various construction material agencies building) and, by extension, manage the size of fire
sought change, with efforts led by the American Society that the fire and rescue service may encounter.
for Testing Materials (ASTM). As a result, a new fire test The concept of the fire-resistance period, i.e. the depend-
standard was proposed in 1916, which is largely reflective ence on time, was introduced by Simon Ingberg (Ingberg,
of the standards adopted today. Most importantly, the 1928). Ingberg acknowledged that the standard time–
thermal scenario adopted in today’s standards has signifi- temperature curve was not realistic and sought to make
cant synergy with that proposed at the turn of the correlations between the severity of real fires and the
nineteenth century (i.e. the peak gas temperature after 60 equivalent durations in furnace conditions. These correla-
minutes of ISO 834 exposure (945 °C) broadly coincides tions were predicated crudely on energy consumption
with that of the nineteenth-century New York fire codes). (Figure 12.2), where the fire load consumed from ignition
to burnout in real fire experiments was observed, and
Since the inception of the standard fire test in the early related to corresponding periods of the standard time–
1900s, the concept has been extended beyond testing inert temperature heating regime. Depending on the fire load
materials to combustible materials, such as timber density (or, in today’s terms, the purpose group), differing
construction. fire-resistance periods were proposed. These fire-resistance
periods are, therefore, a crude proxy for the fire design
For a fuller description of the development of structural requirements of isolated structural elements, to the extent
fire testing see Gales et al. (2012).
Average occupancy curve

12.2.3 Limitations 1200 determined on the basis of
fire load and ventilation
In the context of the thermal scenario, the element Area 1
arrangements tested in the fire-resistance procedure and 1000
Standard time–
the performance criteria against which ‘acceptable’ perfor- temperature curve
mance is quantified, fire resistance cannot represent the
Temperature / °C
time to ‘failure’ of an element of construction in a real fire 800

Area 2
for a number of reasons (O’Loughlin and Hopkin, 2016):
600
—— The thermal condition, i.e. the standard fire curve, Critical temperature
is not representative of real fire exposure as real
fires can take many forms. It is also non-physical, 400
as it neither cools nor acknowledges variability in
peak temperature (or the time taken to achieve it). Equivalent
200 Area 1 = area 2 standard fire
—— The structure boundary conditions (i.e. typically endurance time
simply supported isolated elements) are not repre-
sentative of whole structural frames, where 0 1 2 3 4
structural elements interact (both positively and Time / hours
negatively). Figure 12.2 Time equivalence – equal energy concept (Ingberg, 1928)
Fire resistance, structural robustness in fire and fire spread 12-3
Table 12.3 Fire-resistance rating requirements for building elements (hours) (Derived from the International Building Code (ICC, 2015).)
Building element Type I Type II Type III Type IV Type V
A B A B A B HT A B
Structural frame 3 2 1 0 1 0 HT 1 0
Building walls
Exterior 3 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 0
Interior 3 2 1 0 1 0 1/HT 1 0
Non-(load)bearing walls and partitions
Exterior See Table 602 of the IBC
Non-(load)bearing walls and partitions See Section 602.4
Interior 0 0 0 0 0 0 of the IBC 0 0
Floor construction
Including supporting beams and joists 2 2 1 0 1 0 HT 1 0
Roof construction
Including supporting beams and joists 1½ 1 1 0 1 0 HT 1 0
HT = heavy timber.
Further reference is made to dispensations within the IBC.
that they have an adequate likelihood of withstanding the (a) the primary fire-resistance goal is the delivery of a
burnout of an appropriately severe fire. building that satisfies the obligatory minimum level
of performance necessary to achieve an adequate
The performance specification of materials, elements etc. level of safety, and
that require fire resistance is most commonly informed by
(b) the building to which the guidance is applied is
tabulated fire-resistance design guidance (typically in incre-
simple/straightforward (or, specifically, in the case
ments of 15 minutes) documented in prescriptive life safety
of Approved Document B, a ‘more common build-
guidance, e.g. Approved Document B (HM Government,
ing situation’).
2013), NFPA 101 (NFPA, 2018a), NFPA 5000 (NFPA,
2018b), International Building Code (IBC) (ICC, 2015) etc.
In the above mentioned guidance, the fire-resistance expec- With regards to the first prerequisite, clients and develop-
tations for the more straightforward building situations are ers may have a limited understanding of what strict
defined as a function of construction form, height, use and adherence to life safety guidance delivers, which can often
compartment size, depending on the guidance document be detached from their goals and aspirations. For instance,
referenced. An indicative extract from the IBC is provided such an approach may prove to be a barrier to the adop-
in Table 12.3. tion of sustainable (and potentially combustible) materials,
or it might not capture resilience ambitions, where a client
wishes to protect assets or achieve a higher level of oper-
The origins of fire-resistance periods, such as those shown
ational continuity.
in Table 12.3, should be a significant consideration in
their adoption as:
Regarding the second prerequisite, the prescriptive recom-
mendations of life safety guidance inherently rely on the
(a) designing on the premise of fire-resistance periods following precepts:
would ensure an adequate likelihood of survival of
a burnout of a structure and (non-combustible)
(a) The fire dynamics being adequately and conserva-
enclosure similar to those observed by Ingberg,
tively represented by the standard fire curve (as
but would not necessarily be adequate for modern
introduced in section 12.2.2). The standard fire
structures or, conversely, might be too onerous
curve was developed to cater for post-flashover fire
(b) different types of structure designed to achieve a dynamics, which are typical of smaller enclosures
defined fire-resistance standard would achieve and not necessarily applicable to large open-plan
very different performances in reality. floor plates.
(b) Limited, if any, structure and fire interaction. That
is, the standard fire test was conceived to compare
the ‘fire-proof ’ credentials of non-combustible
12.4 Selecting the right materials. It was not intended, therefore, to assess
solutions: prescriptive the performance of combustible structural materi-
als, such as timber. If there is the potential for the
vs. performance-based structure to form part of the fire’s fuel, e.g. due to
design exposed combustible elements, it would be pru-
dent to consider the implications of this approach.
The conventional means of specifying the required fire (c) The response of the element of construction in fire
resistance of construction elements (i.e. tabulated prescrip- being adequately and conservatively represented
tive guidance) relies on two fundamental prerequisites, by the furnace conditions. In the case of structural
namely: fire resistance, this means that the structural
response of a building subject to fire is adequately The factor of safety applied typically aims to
represented by the behaviour of isolated elements broadly align performance-based assessments with
and that all failure modes of the system are cap- the principles of prescriptive recommendations
tured within the limitations of the standard test. (i.e. it is quasi-comparative).
For more complex structural arrangements and/or
unconventional materials, this may not be the (b) Demonstration of performance relative to an
case. explicit goal, typically expressed in terms of the
frequency of return of the event that should be
Ultimately, all projects seek to deliver a successful outcome, resisted or the design confidence limit (reliability)
which means the delivery of solutions that are cognisant that should be achieved, e.g. the fire-resisting
of the project obligations, goals and constraints. Achieve- enclosure is designed to resist the full burnout of
ment of this goal relies on the selection of the right a fire corresponding with the 95th percentile con-
engineering processes and tools necessary to yield the fidence limit.
most appropriate solution for the given circumstances.
This can only be achieved where there is an understand- Form (a) is the basis of the process advocated when adopt-
ing of the scope and limitations of all structural fire design ing the time equivalence methodology presented in
tools, whether that be the straightforward adoption of a BS EN 1991-1-2: 2002 (BSI, 2002a) and PD 6688-1-2: 2007
prescriptive fire-resistance period or the implementation (BSI, 2007). In that guidance, design fires are assigned a
of a complex model. factor of safety to ensure that the fire dynamics and sever-
ity are not considered without wider context, i.e. that the
At the outset of a project, it is incumbent on the engineer enclosure is part of a bigger building within which struc-
to consider the project goals and determine whether a tural elements exist that are integral to the stability of the
prescriptive solution is in keeping with these, or even rele- building.
vant, given its origins and implicit limitations.
Form (b) is representative of the process utilised in the
In today’s environment, where buildings are increasingly development of the ventilation-dependent fire-resistance
complex and architecture ever more ambitious, performance- period tables (tables 24 and 25) in BS 9999: 2017 (BSI,
based fire-resistance assessments will be critical to the deliv- 2017). The development of these tables (Kirby et al., 2004)
ery of buildings that meet the functional requirements of life provides a useful example framework, relative to which
safety regulations. other countries could develop similar concepts. The means
of deriving the percentage of ‘severe’ fires (i.e. those that
might lead to structural damage) that must be resisted by
the building’s active and passive systems (termed ‘overall
12.5 Performance-based reliability’) is beyond the scope of this Guide; further
guidance is available in the literature (Kirby et al., 2004;
design Hopkin, 2016; Hopkin et al., 2016a; Block and Kho, 2018).
12.5.1 Performance-based design in 12.5.2 Performance-based design in

the context of fire resistance the context of fire resistance
(design goals) (fire conditions and bench-
marking)
In offering an alternative performance-based design for
elements that require fire resistance, it is first essential to
consider the project goals and how they might be explic- The key aspect of adequately quantifying the fire resist-
itly quantified in the form of tangible performance metrics. ance required of elements of construction in a
performance-based assessment (other than having a clear
goal) is the definition of credible design fires on which
These goals will vary from project to project, and may
product specification can be based. In the selection of the
constitute explicit employer requirements (likely in the
fire dynamics model(s) which will underpin the assess-
context of resilience) or functional (life safety) expectations.
ment, the designer must be cognisant of the limitations
and inherent assumptions of the different options, as
What constitutes an acceptable level of risk (and, thus, outlined below:
performance) varies from one jurisdiction to the next, as
attitudes to the tolerable level of societal risk vary from
country to country. —— A post-flashover model, such as the parametric fire
method outlined in EN 1991-1-2, is predicated on
With explicit consideration of fire resistance (specifically, the assumption that:
the level of fire-resistance performance required of (a) ventilation conditions exist, which are able
elements of construction), a performance-based assess- to support the near simultaneous combus-
ment would typically take two forms: tion of all fuel within the fire enclosure,
and
(a) A deterministic quantification of the fire severity
for a ‘reasonable worst case’ scenario (in terms of (b) a uniform/homogenous temperature can be
fire-resistance response), which is subsequently expected throughout the full volume of the
afforded a ‘safety margin’ commensurate with the fire enclosure (this assumption, in particu-
consequence of failure, e.g. of magnitude governed lar, is unlikely to hold true in large modern
by height, extent and occupancy characteristics. open-plan buildings).
—— Localised fire models, such as that proposed by Standards and Technology (NIST) expert panels and
Hasemi et al. (1995), are valid within certain heat Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) standards commit-
release rate ranges. The inherent assumption is tees, is now available to designers via ASCE/SEI 7 (ASCE,
that the fire will not spread beyond the items first 2017a). The ASCE approach seeks to bifurcate fire resis-
ignited. Therefore, this must be verified as part of tance and structural fire engineering as two discrete
the design process. entities, allowing the designer to use two options:
—— A travelling fire method (tfm), such as those —— Option 1 is a standard fire-resistance design based
proposed by Stern-Gottfried and Rein (2012), on the building code; this is the traditional index-
Hopkin (2013) and Rackauskaite et al. (2015), ing system that refers to a single structural element
relies on the quantification of key metrics in a furnace test and periods of fire resistance of
regarding: between 1 hour and 4 hours.
(a) the rate at which fires spread —— Option 2 is a structural fire engineering approach
(b) the direction in which they travel that follows ASCE/SEI 7 Appendix E. It addresses
performance objectives, thermal response and
(c) the time taken for fuel packages to be structural response. It proposes risk categories
consumed ranging from ‘global collapse permissible’ to ‘local
(d) the temperature of the burning region or global collapse not permissible’, also referred to
(near field) relative to the far field. as ‘complete burnout’.
Regardless of the fire dynamics model adopted, it must be The ASCE/SEI Fire Protection Committee is currently
accepted that all inputs will invariably feature a degree of developing a companion design guideline entitled ASCE/
uncertainty and this must be addressed by some means. SEI Guideline: Structural Fire Engineering (ASCE, 2017b).
One approach would be by way of a sensitivity study or a This guideline will provide recommendations and design
broader sampling-based methodology, such as Monte examples. A summary article has been published by La
Carlo analysis. The Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) Malva (2018).
provides guidance on the application of modelling-based
tools, via a process flowchart (Jowsey et al., 2013), which
outlines the different types of sensitivity study that should
be considered in different circumstances. 12.7 Structural design for fire
safety
The interaction of active suppression with enclosure fire
dynamics is another important, albeit complex, consider- A key element of successful fire engineering input is the
ation. Different approaches are advocated around the development of solutions that ensure structures have an
world, such as: adequate likelihood of withstanding the burnout of a real
fire. This typically means ensuring that principal
—— altering the design goal to reflect the probability of load-bearing elements of structures are afforded fire resist-
a severe fire developing being significantly reduced ance (or protection). In deriving what level of fire
where sprinklers are installed (Law et al., 2015) performance is acceptable, how it should be achieved and
—— reducing the fire load density by a statistical factor, how protection/resistance provisions are apportioned, a
as is advocated in BS EN 1991-1-2 and logical process must be followed.
PD 6688-1-2.
Numerous design guides and textbooks focus on the topic
The fire resistance of products, systems and elements is of material behaviour in fire and structural fire engineer-
defined according to the standard testing process. This has ing (or structural design for fire safety). It is not the
been the case for over a century and is likely to remain intention of this chapter to reproduce this content.
unchanged for many years to come. Therefore, it is often However, a logical structure is set out in Table 12.4, which
necessary to provide a direct link between performance- may inform the design process and provides references
based (natural fire) assessments and fire-resistance ratings where further guidance can be sought.
for the purpose of defining what materials or products are
appropriate for achieving a given design solution.
Commonly, the time equivalence concept is applied for this
purpose, with specific guidance available in BS EN 1991- 12.8 Compartmentation
1-2 and PD 6688-1-2. This concept stems from the early
principles proposed by Simon Ingberg, discussed previ- Compartmentation is the division of a building into fire-
ously (see Figure 12.2). resisting compartments, comprising one or more rooms,
spaces or storeys, by elements of construction designed to
contain a fire for a predetermined duration (FPA, 2008).
It is a fire safety measure that can be used to gain time –
12.6 US approach to structural the fire being contained while occupants have a chance to
escape or take refuge until it can be extinguished (Stollard
fire engineering and Abrahams, 1999). Compartmentation also offers the
chance of containing the fire to protect, at least, the rest
A new US approach to structural fire engineering, based of the property while the fire is extinguished. It can
on collaboration with the Society of Fire Protection Engi- contribute to business continuity by limiting the extent of
neers (SFPE) standards committees, National Institute of damage and benefiting post-fire recovery.
Table 12.4 Domain-based guidance – structural design for fire safety
Domain Component Guidance / references
Goal-setting Prescriptive It is implicit that the building is simple and that the project goals pertain only
to life safety. In such a case, the fire resistance recommendations of the
prescriptive guidance are appropriate.
Performance based The building is unusual or complex, or prescriptive design is sub-optimal. The
level of appropriate life safety performance may be informed by PD 6688-1-2
(BSI, 2007), Kirby et al. (2004) or similar sources (Hopkin, 2016).
The functional goals should be informed by the qualitative design review (qdr)
process, following protocols set out in documents such as PD 7974-0: 2002 (BSI,
2002b) and PD 7974-8: 2012 (BSI, 2012b).
Design fires/fire dynamics Localised fires The fire may not spread beyond the items first ignited.
Design fire guidance can be found in Mayfield and Hopkin (2011), PD 7974-1:
2003 (BSI, 2003), the SFPE Handbook (SFPE, 2016) or the wider literature.
Post-flashover fires The enclosure is relatively small (<500 m2) and therefore flashover can be
assumed to be possible.
Hand calculation methods may be adopted, such as the Eurocode parametric fire
(BSI, 2002a). Alternatively, single-zone models may be appropriate where
ventilation conditions warrant further consideration. Commonly adopted tools
include cfast (Peacock et al., 2016) and b-risk (Wade et al., 2013).
Travelling fires Travelling fires are often considered appropriate where enclosures are of a scale
such that a fully developed fire is likely, although flashover is unlikely. A typical
application might be an open-plan office exceeding 500 m2 in floor area.
Calculation methods are available in the literature, such as those proposed by
Stern-Gottfried and Rein (2012), Hopkin (2013) and Rackauskaite et al. (2015).
Heat transfer to structural General Classical heat transfer, i.e. radiation, convection and conduction, is covered in
elements many textbooks, including those that specifically target structural fire engineer-
ing (Drysdale, 2011; Buchanan, 2017; Quintiere, 2006).
Finite element analysis (fea) is commonly adopted for complex heat transfer
problems. Commercial tools are available that have been validated for structural
fire engineering applications (Franssen and Gernay, 2016; Manie, 2016; Dassault
Systèmes Simulia Corp., 2014; ANSYS Inc., 2013).
Steel Steel has a very high conductivity. Therefore, lumped capacitance methods are
often appropriate, whereby the structural element can be assumed to have a
uniform temperature. Calculation methods can be found in BS EN 1993-1-2:
2005 (BSI, 2005) for unprotected and protected steel structures.
Specialised guidance has been published by the Steel Construction Institute

(SCI) (Law and O’Brien, 1981) for the purpose of appraising structures outside
the compartment of fire origin.
BS EN 1993-1-2 provides thermo-physical properties for application in finite

element models (or other similar numerical models).
Concrete Temperature profiles within standard-sized sections subject to ISO 834 (ISO,
1999) exposure are published in BS EN 1992-1-2: 2004 (BSI, 2004a). These are
appropriate for simple element-based assessments.

element models (or other similar numerical models).
Timber Under ISO 834 heating conditions, charring rates are utilised as a proxy for
explicit heat transfer calculations. Typical one-dimensional values noted in
BS EN 1995-1-2: 2004 (BSI, 2004b) are 0.5 and 0.65 mm/min for high-density
hardwood and typical density softwood, respectively.

element models (or other similar numerical models). However, these are limited
to ISO 834 exposure.
Many challenges exist where wooden structures are either exposed by design or
have the potential to become exposed during a real fire condition. A discussion
is provided in Hopkin et al. (2016b).
Structural response and Structural analysis and Basic hand calculations are appropriate for verification purposes and the
solutions performance criteria assessment of single elements or sub-frames. Guidance is available in textbooks
(Buchanan, 2017; Cobb, 2014).
The BRE/Bailey method (Newman et al., 2000) is a commonly adopted process for
optimising passive fire protection to steel elements within composite assemblies.
Continued
Table 12.4 continued
Domain Component Guidance / references

Alternatively (and commonly) partial frame or full-frame finite element analyses
are undertaken (Frassen and Gernay, 2016; Manie, 2016; Dassault Systèmes
Simulia Corp., 2014; ANSYS Inc., 2013).
Concrete structures Concrete structures typically achieve fire resistance inherently, through a
combination of element sizing and cover to reinforcement. Tabulated solutions
for ISO 834 exposure are offered in BS EN 1992-1-2 for beams, columns, floors
and walls. In addition, layers of calculation methods exist for quantification of
performance under different heating conditions (Buchanan, 2017; Wickström,
1986, 2016). The methods culminate in numerical modelling, where temperature-
dependent material properties are provided.
Steel structures Steel structures typically achieve fire resistance by way of applied fire protection.
Commonly applied systems are referenced in the Association for Specialist Fire
Protection (ASFP) ‘Yellow Book’ (ASFP, 2014). Depending on the element
utilisation (i.e. how hard it is working relative to its capacity) different element
temperatures are tolerable, with protection specified to ensure that these are not
exceeded within the design fire-resistance period (or, where relevant, design fire).
Calculation methods for beams and columns are provided in BS EN 1993-1-2.

Temperature-dependent material properties are also provided for more advanced
numerical simulations.
Timber structures Commonly, timber structures are designed on an elemental basis. Charring rates
are adopted to assess the residual cross-section at the end of the fire-resistance
period. Where encapsulation is provided (e.g. plasterboard), its contribution can
also be considered. The residual cross-section must be sufficient to support the
applied loads in the fire condition.
Calculation methods are provided in BS EN 1995-1-2. Since the publication of

Eurocode 5 in 2004, a number of technological advances have emerged, such as
cross-laminated timber. Therefore, more contemporary guidance exists, in the
form of Fire Safety in Timber Buildings (SP Trätek, 2010).
Often, facilities are required within buildings to assist the —— the stability of the structure supporting the fire-
fire and rescue service in carrying out their firefighting or resisting boundary must be maintained for the
rescue operations as efficiently as possible. In complex required period.
buildings, or high-rise buildings, fire service personnel
should not only be provided with good access and water Figure 12.3 details examples of penetrations (for services,
supplies, but also safe bridgeheads from which to work. etc.) through fire-separating elements, and example
Such bridgeheads might be linked to specially protected fire-stopping and sealing measures are described in the
lifts and wet or dry rising water mains. This will enable following section.
fire and rescue service personnel to attack the fire earlier
without the need to lay out hose. Such ‘vertical compart-
ments’ provide many benefits to firefighting operations
and these facilities should be considered as part of the fire 12.9 Concealed spaces and
compartmentation strategy. Refer to chapter 13 for more
details regarding firefighting operations. fire stopping
For compartmentation to be effective, the enclosing Guidance on fire stopping, fire-resisting walls and floors,
boundaries, such as walls and floors, must be able to resist and the protection of services passing through compart-
the spread of fire. This requires that: ment boundaries is contained in national codes, such as
Approved Document B (HM Government, 2013) in
—— all enclosing surfaces must have an appropriate England. The alternative standards commonly used
level of fire resistance throughout the world are the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) standards: NFPA 101 and 5000
—— all junctions of constructional elements are effec- (NFPA, 2018a and 2018b, respectively).
tively sealed to maintain the fire resistance at the
junction Fire dampers and fire-resisting shutters are usually actuated
by fusible links. It should be noted that this method of actu-
—— all holes are fire stopped ation is effective at controlling fire spread only and not the
—— ducts penetrating fire-resisting boundary elements spread of smoke. Large quantities of smoke can pass through
are provided with fire dampers or are also fire an opening protected by a fire damper or shutter during the
resisting, and other penetrations through which early stages of a fire before a fusible link-actuated mecha-
fire might spread (e.g. cables) are suitably nism will operate. To control such smoke transfer, smoke
protected detector-operated smoke/fire dampers are used.
—— openings are protected by self-closing fire doors or Generic types of fire stopping and fire sealing systems
fire-resisting shutters/curtains include the following:
Horizontal duct
Horizontal multiple
penetration
penetration
Horizontal pipe
penetration
Horizontal cable Sealing of
tray penetration blank opening
Cable
penetration
Multiple penetration
Vertical duct (vertical and horizontal)
penetration
Temporary multiple
horizontal penetration
Movement
Vertical pipe joint
penetration
Figure 12.3 Typical applications for fire-
stopping systems (adapted from ASFP, 2004)
—— Coated stone wool batts or boards: These can be used usually supplied in strip form and generally used to
to fire stop penetrations through compartment seal the gap at a movement joint between two build-
walls and floors and allow additional services to be ing elements, such as between a floor and a wall.
readily installed as required. In certain circum-
stances, a structural support for the seal will be —— Bags/pillows: Available in various sizes and shapes,
required. these are specified for use in temporary or perma-
nent fire stopping situations where services, such
—— Sealant/mastic coatings: Available as single or multi- as cables, pass through walls and floors. Since they
pack systems comprising organic, inorganic or are easily removed, they are particularly suited to
intumescent fillers, pre-dispersed in a suitable areas where services are frequently rerouted. They
binder (i.e. acrylic, polysulphide, silicone etc.). can also provide temporary protection during
The materials have a high viscosity and are construction work. Bags or pillows are made from
dispensed by gun or trowelled into the opening special fabrics and enclose a filling material which
and between penetrating services. They are suit- often incorporates an intumescent material.
able for penetration seals (coated batts/boards) in
all forms of fire-resistant construction, particularly —— Pipe closures: These are designed to preserve the
where openings are small, where penetrations are integrity of a fire-rated compartment where vari-
complex and where there is an imperfect fit ous plastic pipes or plastic trunking pass through
between building elements or linear joints. floors or walls. Unlike metal or cable service pene-
—— Mortars: Generally a gypsum- or cementitious-based trations, plastic pipes and plastic trunking soften
powder blended with inorganic lightweight fillers, and collapse under raised temperature, therefore
composite reinforcement and chemical modifiers. some means of preventing the passage of hot gases
The compounds are designed to be mixed with and smoke is required. This is achieved by stran-
water and placed around and between penetrat- gling the cross-section of the pipe or trunking.
ing services, forming a rigid seal. The systems can There are variations in the design of pipe closures
be used to fire stop penetrations through concrete but the two principal methods are pipe collars and
and masonry compartment wall and floor pipe wraps. Both systems confine an intumescent
constructions. compound, which expands on exposure to fire,
rapidly exerting pressure on the pipe. The plastic
—— Preformed elastomeric seals: These are made from walls of the pipe, which will have softened due to
elastomeric foam, sometimes with reinforcing the heat, collapse under this pressure, creating a
sheets on either side. The foam and/or the reinforc- constriction. Some pipe closures incorporate a
ing sheets may be intumescent. These products are mechanical device, which may or may not include
an intumescent compound. Pipe collars incorpo- contacted for specific advice and installation instructions
rate a rigid outer casing, which acts as a restraint for details of the permitted field of application of that
for the intumescent material, enabling the collar to fire-resisting system.
be either surface fixed to the separating element or
incorporated within it. Pipe collars may be incor-
porated into appropriately designed fire-resisting
drainage gullies. Pipe wraps have no casing and 12.10 Dampers
must therefore be located within the separating
element, which acts as a restraint for the intumes-
Despite many years of use, there is little recognised guid-
cent material.
ance for installing fire and smoke damper units when used
—— Plugs/blocks: These are available in a variety of for providing fire-resisting compartments and separation.
shapes and sizes. They are generally supplied as The Association for Specialist Fire Protection publishes a
rectangular blocks for rectangular penetrations or guide to assist those involved in the manufacture, specifi-
as cylindrical or conical blocks for circular pene- cation, installation, inspection and verification of fire-
trations. Pre-formed trapezoidal plugs/blocks are resisting dampers installed in heating, ventilation and air
available for sealing openings below profiled metal conditioning (hvac) ductwork systems, known as the
decking. Plugs and blocks are formed from mater- ‘Grey Book’ (ASFP, 2011).
ials such as bonded vermiculite, mineral wool,
gypsum or cementitious materials, polyurethane, Types of fire dampers include the following:
modified rubber etc. They can be either rigid or
flexible. Some fire-stopping plugs/blocks are inher- —— Curtain fire dampers: These are constructed of a
ently fire resistant, some rely on an intumescent series of interlocking blades, which fold to the top
coating and some are manufactured using intumes- of the assembly permitting the maximum free area
cent materials. in the airway. The blades are held open by means
of a thermal release mechanism, normally rated at
—— Cavity barriers: These are provided to close a
72 °C ± 4 °C. The blades fall or are sprung to fill
concealed space against penetration of smoke or
the airway to prevent the passage of the fire.
flame. In most applications they would be expected
to have fire resistance of 30 minutes’ integrity and —— Intumescent fire dampers: These expand by intumes-
15 minutes’ insulation. Small cavity barriers are cent activity under the action of heat to close the
used in small, narrow cavities between layers of airway in order to prevent the passage of fire. The
construction. Products used in larger spaces above intumescent materials form the main component for
ceilings will require particular fixing systems and/ fire integrity. In some instances this may be supported
or support systems and are used to divide a large by a mechanical device to prevent cold smoke leak-
space into maximum dimensions, as specified by age. The type of intumescent material selected will
national regulations. influence activation temperatures and these tempera-
tures typically range from 120 °C to 270 °C.
In order to ensure that the correct type of fire stopping is
specified and/or installed, there are a number of key ques- —— Multi-blade fire dampers: These are constructed
tions that still need to be answered before the final selection with a number of linked pivoting blades contained
can be made. These key questions are listed below: within a frame. The blades are released from their
open position by means of a thermal release mech-
(a) Is the fire stopping to be used in a wall or a floor, anism, normally rated at 72 °C ± 4 °C. When the
or a junction between fire-separating elements, release mechanism is activated, the blades pivot
and what type of materials are used to form each and move to close the airway to prevent the passage
element? of fire.
(b) What fire resistance is required? —— Single-blade fire dampers: These are constructed
with a single pivoting blade within a frame. The
(c) How big is the gap or opening? blade is released from its open position by means
of a thermal release mechanism, normally rated at
(d) Does the fire stopping have to cater for movement 72 °C ± 4 °C. When the release mechanism is acti-
in the fire-separating element? vated the blade pivots and moves to close the
(e) What type of services, if any, are penetrating the airway to prevent the passage of fire.
construction at the opening? —— Multi-section dampers: Where the duct exceeds the
(f) How many services are there? maximum tested size of an individual damper (or
single section), manufacturers may provide
(g) What size is each service? multi-section units. These will generally be
(h) How close are the services to each other? supplied with some type of joining strip or mullion
to allow the unit to be assembled on site.
(i) How close are the services to the edge of the
opening? —— Smoke control damper: These are single or multi-
blade dampers that generally have two positions:
(j) Is the fire-stopping system suitable for use with ‘open’ to allow smoke extraction or ‘closed’ to
the intended elements of construction? maintain the fire compartment. They do not have
a thermal release mechanism, relying instead on a
In all cases, when a particular system is selected, the ‘powered’ control system to ensure that they
manufacturer of the fire-resisting system should be achieve the correct position.
Regardless of the type of fire-separating element in which an example, in order to meet market demands for certifi-
the damper is to be mounted, there are only three main cation schemes on the fire performance of compartmenta-
design criteria to be met, namely: tion products, BRE Global provides schemes such as LPS
1208: Fire resistance requirements for elements of construction
(a) that the damper should be fixed either within or used to provide compartmentation (LPCB, 2014). This scheme
directly adjacent to the fire barrier and be support- tests the performance requirements for walls, cavity barri-
ed independently of the connecting ductwork, i.e. ers, floors and roofs, and defines the methods of test (based
if the ductwork were to be removed from both on the standard fire-resistance tests discussed above)
sides of the damper it would continue to be an necessary to satisfy the fire-resistance requirements for
integral member of the barrier it protects compartmentation given in loss prevention guidance, such
as the Fire Protection Association’s publication, The LPC
(b) that the damper is installed in accordance with the Design Guide for the Fire Protection of Buildings (FPA, 1999).
manufacturer’s recommended tested method
(c) that the installation meets or exceeds its design spec- It is important when a compartment wall or floor and
ification, especially with regard to its fire rating. separating wall are made up of a number of different
elements (for example, partition-door glazing, penetration
It is common for the UK industry to refer to ‘E’ classified seals etc.) that a check is made to ensure that the fire resis-
products as ‘fire dampers’ and ‘ES’ classified products as tance will be maintained. This may mean more testing, or
‘fire and smoke dampers’. ES classified dampers are fire that a detailed assessment needs to be carried out by a
dampers tested to BS EN 1366-2: 2015 (BSI, 2015) that competent person.
meet the ‘ES’ classification requirements of BS EN 13501-3
(BSI, 2009), and achieve the same fire resistance in rela- It is a common failing that the fire-separating elements
tion to integrity as the fire-separating element through are not properly installed or maintained, or even consid-
which the duct/damper passes. Traditionally, ductwork ered. Frequently encountered problems include large
passing through protected escape routes needed to be holes through fire-separating elements which are not fire
enclosed with imperforate fire-resisting construction to stopped, the use of inappropriate materials for fire-
prevent the spread of smoke to the escape routes. Devel- stopping purposes, incorrectly installed fire-stopping
opments in damper technology and testing methods have systems such as collars or dampers, missing sections of
enabled the use of ES leakage classified dampers, which wall between false ceilings and the structural soffit, and
are capable of reducing smoke leakage to a minimum. poorly maintained fire-resisting door sets. The problems
Typically, when protecting means of escape, there are two broadly fall into four groups (Wilkinson, 2008):
options in relation to damper provision:
(a) removal of substrate to allow passage of services,
(a) the ventilation ducting located within the protected leaving excessive penetrations
escape routes is enclosed in 30-minute fire-resisting
(b) fire stopping that is incorrectly installed
construction in terms of integrity and insulation, or
(c) a lack of thought given to fire compartmentation
(b) ES classified fire dampers are provided to ventila-
at the time of construction
tion ducts where these penetrate the fire-resisting
enclosure to the escape route, and, where fire (d) wear and tear rendering fire compartmentation
dampers are used instead of a fire-resisting enclo- provision ineffective.
sure to ductwork, the fire damper should achieve
an ES classification of 60 minutes, as described in It is critical that all elements of fire compartmentation, fire
BS EN 13501-3 and be successfully tested to protection and fire separation are considered in the design,
BS EN 1366-2. construction and in-use management of a building.
Fire dampers fitted only with fusible links are not suitable
for protecting escape routes and the fire damper must
close under the control of a smoke alarm. References
ANSYS Inc. (2013) ANSYS Mechanical Users Guide Release 15.0
(Canonsburg, PA: ANSYS Inc.)
12.11 Quality of specification,
ASCE (2017a) ASCE/SEI 7-16 Minimum design loads for buildings and other
installation and structures. Appendix E Performance-based design procedures for fire effects on
maintenance structures (Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers)
ASCE (2017b) ASCE/SEI Guideline: Structural Fire Engineering (Reston,

VA: American Society of Civil Engineers)
There is a very large range of products available for the
provision of fire protection. Unless the chosen product is ASFP (2004) ‘Red Book’ – Fire Stopping and Penetration Seals for the
also third-party certified by a test body, it cannot necessar- Construction Industry (Bordon, Hants: Association for Specialist Fire
ily be assumed that no changes to the basic product have Protection)
occurred. Any changes in specification can affect the prod- ASFP (2011) ‘Grey Book’ – Fire and Smoke Resisting Dampers (Bordon,
uct’s performance under fire conditions. The certification Hants: Association for Specialist Fire Protection)
process for a product involves rigorous testing, assessment
and review of the design and specification of the product, ASFP (2014) ‘Yellow Book’ – Fire Protection for Structural Steel in Buildings
(Bordon, Hants: Association for Specialist Fire Protection)
coupled with regular audits of the quality procedures
governing the factory production process and repeat test- ASTM (2015) ASTM E119-15 Standard test methods for fire tests of building
ing, to ensure that they meet quality standards. By way of construction and materials (West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International)
Block F and Kho TS (2018) ‘Determining the fire resistance rating of Hasemi S, Yokobayashi T, Wakamatsu and Ptchelintsev A. (1995) ‘Fire
buildings using the probabilistic method – a state-of-the-art approach’ safety of building components exposed to a localized fire’ AsiaFlam ’95
The Structural Engineer 96 (1) Proceedings of the First Asia-Flam Conference, Hong Kong (London:
Interscience)
BSI (1987) BS 476-20: 1987 Fire tests on building materials and structures.
Method for determination of the fire resistance of elements of construction HM Government (2013) The Building Regulations 2010 Approved Document
(general principles) (London: British Standards Institution) B: Fire Safety. Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006 edition
incorporating the 2007, 2010 and 2013 amendments) (Newcastle upon
BSI (2002a) BS EN 1991-1-2: 2002 Eurocode 1. Actions on structures. Tyne: NBS) (Note: further amendments published as a separate document,
General actions. Actions on structures exposed to fire (London: British April 2019)
Hopkin DJ (2013) ‘Testing the single zone structural fire design
BSI (2002b) PD 7974-0: 2002 Application of fire safety engineering principles hypothesis’ Interflam 2013 Proceedings of the 13th International
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13-1
13 Firefighting
13.1 Introduction 13.2 The fire and rescue
While the risk and consequences of fire in the built envi-
service as a stakeholder
ronment can be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable
through good design and management, it is nearly always As detailed in chapter 4 of this Guide, and in other recog-
impossible to fully remove the potential for a fire incident nised codes of practice, such as PD 7974-0: 2002 (BSI,
to occur. Therefore, regardless of whether a building has 2002) or the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (NRC
been designed to prescriptive codes or has adopted a et al., 2005), the development of successful fire engineered
performance-based fire engineering approach, it is always design schemes often relies upon accounting for the needs
important to ensure that adequate measures for firefight- of the various stakeholders involved (perhaps as part of a
ing and to facilitate fire and rescue service access around formal qualitative design review (qdr) process). With
and within a building are provided, appropriate to the use, regard to incorporating firefighting provisions into a
size and occupancy of the building in question, to fulfil scheme, the local fire and rescue service are therefore a
life safety objectives. Depending upon the project, fire- crucial stakeholder, both in terms of advising on their
fighting facilities and access may also form a critical part requirements during the design (and possibly construc-
of the property protection and/or environmental protection) phases, as well as ongoing liaison with the
tion strategies. management of the building or site once in use, to ensure
that operational preplanning information is collected and
Although prescriptive design codes often provide a good that any fire safety legislative matters are addressed. The
benchmark for the design and implementation of firefight- fire and rescue service are one of the only stakeholders
ing measures, the origins and relevance of some of the present that potentially could be involved in a project
criteria contained in such guidance can appear vague, and across its lifetime, from inception all the way through to
sometimes outdated in the context of modern building occupation and beyond.
design and current fire and rescue service operational
practices and technologies. Therefore, there is potential Although different fire and rescue services will often adopt
scope for fire engineering to be applied, where appropri- similar approaches to firefighting, they can have different
ate, to develop project-specific firefighting access strategies operational procedures, resources, equipment and require-
that take into account the bespoke nature of a scheme yet ments depending upon geographical location, both in the
still deliver robust and safe access facilities for the fire and national and international contexts. If a building fire strat-
rescue service. However, it is important to remain aware egy refers to the design guidance contained in prescriptive
that any application of fire engineering to fire and rescue codes of practice relevant to the geographical location in
service access must remain cognisant of the needs, require- question, then in broad terms most local fire and rescue
ments and potential limitations of the local fire and rescue service requirements will be met. However, where fire
service, both in terms of their equipment and their engineering is being applied and has an impact on fire and
personnel. rescue service access and operational firefighting, then
more specific attention will need to be given by the fire
This chapter primarily aims to provide an overview of the engineer and wider design team to the needs of the local
relevant factors that fire and building services engineers fire and rescue service; this will usually require early
(along with other relevant stakeholders) may need to consultation with the fire and rescue service (i.e. as a
consider when developing and implementing a firefight- stakeholder), potentially at different times during the
ing access strategy. It will focus mainly on the operational design process, to make sure that adequate facilities and
firefighting tactics, procedures and equipment needs of the provisions can be included in the design scheme as soon
fire and rescue service, identifying key areas that may need as possible. It should be noted that such consultations may
to be considered when determining the level of provision need to involve people at different organisational levels
for a particular design scheme. within the local fire and rescue service; usually initial
discussions are had with personnel who are specialists in
Additional commentary is also provided in relation to fire safety or fire engineering, but this could go on to
equipment provided for firefighting for use by occupiers include others who advise on water supplies, communica-
of a building, such as fire extinguishers, but in reality the tions or operational fire crews.
scope to use such measures to justify a fire engineered
design is very limited. While this chapter identifies areas where there may be
potential flexibility in approaches to firefighting and fire
While this chapter has attempted to capture relevant and rescue service access in certain scenarios, what is
themes and requirements for potential international important for the fire engineer and project team to remem-
application, references to firefighting procedures and ber is that the fire strategy should not dictate to the local
expectations from the UK have been used to provide fire and rescue service assumed procedures or arrange-
context. ments that are impractical for the local fire and rescue
service. The purpose for consulting the fire and rescue —— the nature of the fire and the operational tasks that
service at an early stage is hopefully to establish an under- need to be performed
standing of and ‘buy in’ to the principles proposed by the
fire strategy, thus de-risking the design approach to fire- —— working and environmental conditions.
fighting and fire and rescue service access. It needs to be
demonstrated that the fire and rescue service access solu- While there can might many variables linked to the above
tion is equivalent to, if not better than, that which would that can impact upon the nature of fire and rescue service
be expected under prescriptive guidance; to achieve this activities and intervention at the time of an incident, these
(and where time and resources permit), it is encouraged four areas provide a good foundation from which fire and
that the fire and rescue service and the design team enter rescue service access strategies can be developed, and from
into active dialogue. which discussions with the local fire and rescue service
can be had as part of this process. Detailed guidance relat-
ing to potential considerations and inputs that could be
used to assess these four areas further can be found in PD
7974-5: 2014 (BSI, 2014a: clause 4.1 to 4.3).
13.3 Firefighting by the fire
and rescue service: Although the fire and rescue service’s objectives may vary
depending on the situation encountered on arrival at an
general principles incident and the available resources, for structure fires the
general objectives of firefighting can be summarised as
follows:
13.3.1 Key considerations
—— Assess the situation on arrival, including locating
Firefighters face a huge range of potential hazards and the fire, securing water supplies and identifying
risks as part of the work they do, and the modern built access and egress routes.
environment (and the pace at which it is evolving) poses
many challenges. Fire and rescue services may be called —— Perform rescues and ensure adequate medical
upon to respond to a wide variety of operational incidents, support is summoned for casualties.
which could include fire, explosions, flooding, road traffic —— Prevent the fire from spreading (internally and
collisions, structural collapse and chemical, radiation and externally to the structure, including stopping
biological hazards. spread to exposure risks).
This chapter focuses on the provision of measures that can —— Surround and extinguish the fire.
be incorporated into a building’s design to assist with the —— Commence damage control operations (including
emergency response to fire incidents, under typical fire salvage and environmental considerations), and
safety-related legislation. There may be a need for some commence post-fire ventilation and cutting away
higher risk sites, buildings and facilities to consider other and, when possible, investigations.
types of emergency incident and/or the provision of
enhanced fire and rescue service access and firefighting It is the successful fulfilment of these general objectives
provisions where additional legislative requirements exist that most prescriptive fire and rescue service access design
(for example, additional measures may be required for a guidance seeks to achieve through the provision of reason-
UK site where the Control of Major Accident Hazards able and practical measures. Therefore, any fire engineered
Regulations 2015 (comah) are applicable). strategy should also ensure that it can similarly deliver an
adequate package of measures to do the same.
The activity of firefighting by fire and rescue service
personnel is covered by legislative requirements, includ-
ing those to ensure the health and safety of those 13.3.2 Tactical firefighting
undertaking the activity. This is a fundamental principle
that needs to be acknowledged; firefighters and their The understanding of fire behaviour in the built environ-
equipment have limitations (see section 13.4). This has, in ment is essential to the development and evolution of
modern times, increased the need for firefighters to firefighting techniques and tactics. Continued industrial
complete dynamic risk assessments when attending an and academic research work – such as current studies being
incident to ensure that safe systems of work can be imple- completed by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
mented. Those designing for fire and rescue service access nology (NIST) and Underwriters Laboratories (UL) in
and provisions outside prescriptive guidance need to North America (IAFC and NFPA, 2016) – along with the
remain cognisant of this to avoid proposing arrangements collection of evidence from the observations and experi-
for a building that are impractical for use and/or place ences of firefighters is essential to improving the effectiveness
unreasonable and unrealistic demands on firefighters. and safety of firefighting procedures and equipment.
When dealing with fires in buildings, there are four broad Due to this, many fire and rescue services have now
areas that can heavily influence the response and actions adopted the use of different tactical modes as part of their
of firefighters based on hazard and risk assessment (DCLG response to and management of fire incidents; the initia-
and CFRA, 2011): tion of these different modes is dependent on the hazard
and risk assessment (see section 13.3.1) completed by the
—— the construction and design of the building Incident Commander, and may change at any time as an
incident develops. For example, in the UK the following
—— the contents and use of the building (including tactical modes could be declared during a fire incident
occupancy type) (DCLG, 2008: section 4.4):
Firefighting 13-3
—— Offensive mode: where firefighting operations are The standard vehicle of fire and rescue services is a pump-
being conducted within the hazard zone (e.g. ing appliance. These may have a variety of titles, such as
committing firefighters to undertake firefighting pump, water-tender, pump-ladder, engine company,
and/or rescues within the fire compartment), where pumper truck etc. But, whatever its title, for the purposes
the potential benefits outweigh the identified risks of planning for fire and rescue service attendance at a
present and there are adequate resources present. building, it is sufficient to refer to any such vehicle as a
‘pump’. A pumping appliance carries a large amount of
—— Defensive mode: where firefighting operations are equipment for firefighting use, including: built-in high-
being conducted outside the hazard zone (e.g. fire- and low-pressure pumps, a portable pump, high-pressure
fighting using hose jets from outside the fire hose reels (booster hose), suction hose, a variety of
compartment, and not committing firefighters into branches and nozzles (nozzles and tips), breaking-in gear,
the compartment), where the identified risks ladders and breathing apparatus. Pumps usually also carry
outweigh the benefits and there may be inadequate a quantity of water (typically between 1000 and 2000
resources present. litres) and foam compound (to produce firefighting foam).
—— Transitional mode: where both offensive and defen-
sive tactics are being implemented at the same High-reach (or aerial) appliances are the second most
time; or where there is a shift from offensive to common form of fire and rescue service vehicle. These are
defensive. utilised at incidents where extended vertical reach is
required. Appliances of this type can take several forms,
By using these modes, firefighters can direct their resources such as aerial ladder platforms or turntable ladders, and
most efficiently and safely, while at the same time moni- typically have a capability to reach vertical heights of
toring (and, to a certain degree, predicting) the behaviour about 30 m. High-reach appliances are larger vehicles
of the fire as an incident progresses. than pumping appliances (see section 13.6.1), being fitted
with either a fixed telescopic ladder or essentially a crane
Although the fire and rescue service will aim to keep the with a caged platform that can be used to effect rescues
management of an incident as simple as possible, it may from taller structures or to deliver high volumes of water
be necessary for the Incident Commander to sectorise the from an elevated height.
building or incident area to ensure that appropriate
command, control and safety can be maintained (DCLG, Fire and rescue services use many other types of specialist
2008: section 2.7). This involves breaking the building or appliances (such as fire rescue units, command support
area down into horizontal or vertical sectors, in which units, hose layers, bulk foam units, foam tenders, and so
different tactical modes could be being implemented, with on). For most typical built environment situations, no
different firefighting or search and rescue activities being specific design requirements are imposed regarding facili-
undertaken. This is important for fire engineers to note, tating access for these specialist appliances. However, there
as there is often a broad perception that firefighting by the may be circumstances and specific site or building require-
fire and rescue service simply involves getting firefighters ments where additional consideration needs to be given to
with charged hose lines to the fire compartment. In real- planning for the attendance of specialist fire appliances
ity, fire incidents can be much more complicated than that would be likely to attend in the event of an emergency
this, with different fire and rescue service personnel with (e.g. at an airport, access would potentially need to be
different levels of equipment being tasked to undertake planned for the use of foam tenders as well as pump and,
different activities in different sectors of an incident (note possibly, high-reach appliances around the site).
that this could potentially include firefighters undertaking
activities and tasks above the floor of fire origin in multi-
storey buildings). It is therefore important where fire and 13.4.2 Firefighting hose
rescue service access arrangements are proposed which
deviate from prescriptive guidance that the fire engineer Hose and associated branch and nozzle equipment is an
accounts for the potential working practices that may be essential tool for firefighting in that it ensures that fire-
implemented by the fire and rescue service for a reasona- fighters can appropriately deliver water onto a fire to
ble set of worst case fire scenarios for the structure in control and extinguish it. Fire and rescue services typi-
question. This will need to be agreed with the local fire cally carry a variety of hose equipment on their appliances;
and rescue service. this can include high-pressure hose reels, low-suction
hose (layflat delivery hose), hard suction hose, and
branches and nozzles that can deliver water at different
flow rates and spray patterns.
13.4 Fire and rescue service
Hose is carried on fire appliances in individual pieces,
equipment known as lengths, which can be joined using couplings to
create a hose line. In the UK, individual hose lengths are
typically 20–25 m long, although for planning purposes it
13.4.1 Vehicles is reasonable to assume that each length of hose is 20 m
in length. Therefore, if four lengths of hose were joined,
Fire and rescue services often have a diverse fleet of vehi- these would form a single hose line of around 80 m in
cles on which to call for different emergency situations. length. In other geographical areas, shorter hose lengths
The two most common types of frontline appliance used may need to be assumed, such as in the USA, where 15 m
to respond to incidents are pumping appliances and high- lengths are considered under NFPA guidance.
reach appliances. Prescriptive design guidance typically
requires access to buildings to be based on accommodat- Fire and rescue service planning and procedures assume
ing these two types of vehicle. that a single pumping appliance and crew can deploy and
operate a single hose line when attending an incident ppe will provide protection to its user in line with approved
(note that for a fire in a high-rise building it would typi- national and international standards, it is crucial to
cally be expected that two hose lines, a primary and a acknowledge that ppe has a performance limitation and
secondary safety, would be required to commence fire- that individual firefighters have different physiological
fighting). This, coupled with the fact that a single fire limitations. It should not be assumed that firefighters are
appliance will only carry a certain amount of hose, means immune to the effects of working in a fire-impacted envi-
that engineers and designers need to carefully assess the ronment. Indeed, it is the fact the firefighters and
knock-on resource implications for the fire and rescue firefighting equipment have limitations that has helped to
service of any proposal to extend: inform the content of typical prescriptive fire and rescue
service access guidance (e.g. limitations on hose distance
—— distances from the perceived fire appliance arrival coverage, and thus travel distances and related retreat
position to hydrants and dry fire main inlets paths, to the furthest points of a building).
—— general hose coverage to the furthest point of the
building (where required), and This can therefore be an important factor when designing
performance-based solutions for buildings that move away
—— other hose-related criteria that may be set out in from prescriptive guidance. What needs to be avoided as
prescriptive design guidance. much as possible is creating a scenario that has the poten-
tial to be impractical and/or onerous on firefighters and
For example, under Approved Document B (HM Govern- their ppe. Although recent research into this specific area
ment, 2013) and BS 9999: 2017 (BSI, 2017a) guidance, is currently limited (in relative terms), information relat-
pumping appliances should be afforded access to dry rising ing to the potential limitations of ppe, firefighter physiology
main inlets within 18 m, measured along a route suitable and firefighter tenability is available to provide engineers
for laying hose; this distance enables the fire and rescue with a good understanding of the background issues and
service to connect two separate lengths of hose (twinned) a benchmark for design purposes. Fire Research Technical
from the pumping appliance to the fire main inlet, with Reports 1/2005 (ODPM, 2004a) and 2/2005 (ODPM,
enough resilience in the design to account for differences 2004b) in particular provide in-depth commentary on the
in pumping appliance parking position or a shortened potential physiological demands that can be placed on
hose length. If a design proposes to increase the distance firefighters undertaking different firefighting and search
between the appliance and dry fire main inlet beyond and rescue activities and the different influences that can
18 m, then the potential resulting implication is that the limit performance. As part of this, the relationship between
fire and rescue service may then have to use four lengths an individual firefighter’s exertion, physical response and
of hose to reach the fire main (along with the hose already ppe is acknowledged; for example, when undertaking
required to connect to the hydrant) and charge it with demanding work, a firefighter’s body temperature may
water, which will increase both time and resource demand. increase along with breathing demand from their breath-
ing apparatus (which has a limited duration of operation,
When hose lines are charged (pressurised) with water for depending upon the user), with their overall effective safe
firefighting, the hose itself becomes relatively inflexible. A (tenable) working time being relatively short.
common misconception is that charged hose will be able
to bend sharply around obstructions, when in fact it has Where fire engineered design solutions propose to consider
to bend in a smooth curve. This is important to note when an assessment of firefighter tenability as part of the justi-
designing and installing fire main inlets and outlets. Fire- fications being put forward, it is imperative that discussions
fighters should be able to connect hose to these face-on, are had with the local fire and rescue service in order to
with the inlet or outlet positioned so that there is enough agree reasonable and conservative assessment criteria as
clearance and working area for the hose to run out to or part of the approach being adopted. This again would
from it without obstruction or the need to bend around ideally be incorporated into a qdr process; PD 7974-5
sharp angles. Similarly, when engineers and designers (BSI, 2014a) provides a useful reference in regard to this
need to measure potential hose coverage distances (see issue.
section 13.9.1) from pumping appliances or fire mains,
these should be measured conservatively, with the hose One example from the UK where the limitations of fire-
assumed to run through the mid-point of doorways or up fighter ppe and physiology have been expanded upon
or down the mid-point of stair flights and landings, rather further in a specific design context is found in the best
than using unrealistic hose runs, such as tight up against practice design guidance contained in the Smoke Control
walls or bending at right angles around door openings. Association’s (SCA) guide to smoke control in residential
Specific hose-bend radius data (e.g. sourced from the local common escape routes (SCA, 2015: section 5.3). Within
fire and rescue service) may be used to inform the assess- this document, where performance-based fire engineered
ment of hose coverage distances in some circumstances. solutions are being developed to justify extended travel
distance within the common corridors of residential apart-
13.4.3 Firefighter personal protective ment buildings, designers need to specifically (and
quantitatively) assess conditions within the corridors
equipment (PPE), limitations during fire scenarios to ensure that they remain appropri-
and tenability ately tenable for both escaping occupants and attending
firefighters. In the case of the latter, maximum air temper-
In order for firefighters to engage in firefighting, and ature (°C), maximum radiated heat flux (kW · m–2) and
search and rescue activities, they need to wear appropriate exposure time that firefighters are subjected to in the
ppe, primarily to protect them from heat, smoke and toxic corridor space need to be assessed against defined accept-
gases. Typical ppe includes helmet, tunic, leggings, gloves, ance criteria to demonstrate that reasonable measures are
flash hood, boots and breathing apparatus. Although this being provided to facilitate fire and rescue service access.
Firefighting 13-5
Table 13.1 Exposure limits for firefighters under various conditions 13.4.5 Advances in technology
(Reproduced with permission from Society of Fire Safety, 2014.)
Routine Hazardous Extreme Critical Like many industries, technology associated with firefight-
condition condition condition condition ing is always evolving and progressing, with standards
Maximum time 25 10 1 < 1 improving, more efficient and safer equipment being devel-
(minutes) oped and new equipment being introduced to react to
Maximum air 100 120 160 235
emerging challenges posed by the modern built
temperature (°C) environment.
Maximum 1 3 4–4.5 > 10
radiation (kW·m–2)
While some technological advances can be adopted rela-
tively quickly, caution must be exercised by fire engineers
and any other stakeholders so as not to presume that the
local fire and rescue service for a particular area will have
access to (or the budget or demand to acquire) all forms
Temperature: 120 ºC Radiation: 3.0 kW·m–2 of cutting-edge firefighting equipment. The adoption of
new equipment and techniques may also not be univer-
sally accepted between different fire and rescue services.
In some cases, advancements in technology are adopted
Exposure limit relatively slowly by fire and rescue services. An example
1.5 m
<10 mins of this could be the availability and use of positive pres-
sure ventilation (ppv) equipment and tactics by different
fire and rescue services in the UK.
At the extreme end, some technologies may be so special-

ised or unique that they are only adopted in certain areas
or where they are absolutely warranted. An example of this
Figure 13.1 Example exposure limits in hazardous conditions up to could be the development of the Martin ‘First Responder’
10 minutes, with conditions measured at 1.5 m relative to the floor level Jetpack product (Martin Aircraft Company, no date),
(After Society of Fire Safety, 2014, with permission.)
which may soon enter use to assist firefighters responding
to incidents in Dubai. Similarly, the development of higher
The acceptance criteria in this case have been derived reach fire appliances, such as the Bronto Skylift High
from exposure limits used by the Australasian Fire Author- Level Articulated (HLA) aerial platform (Bronto Skylift,
ities Council, as outlined by the Society of Fire Safety no date), which can vertically extend to 81–112 m, can
(2014) (Table 13.1). The suggested firefighter tenability offer enhanced high-rise firefighting capabilities. However,
criteria can be summarised as shown in Figure 13.1 such appliances may only be appropriate (or be able to be
practically put into service) for a relatively small number
Although the SCA guidance document is specific to resi- of fire and rescue services. Cutting extinguishing tech-
dential applications, the broad fire engineering themes niques, utilising equipment such as the coldcut Cobra
and concepts outlined within it relating to the demonstra- (originating from Sweden) or Pyrolance (USA), enables
tion of firefighter tenability could potentially be applied to firefighters to attack a fire from outside the fire compart-
other building uses. There may also be cases where visi- ment by using high-pressure water to cut through walls
bility through smoke needs to be considered in relation to and building fabric and apply water spray through the
firefighter tenability; for example, BS 7346-7: 2013 (BSI, resulting holes.
2013a: clause 10) requires a 10 m visibility criterion to be
applied when demonstrating the performance of impulse Overall, what needs to be remembered is that while fire
jet fan smoke ventilation systems being used in car parks and rescue services will always use a similar base level of
to assist firefighting access. equipment (pumping appliances, hose lines and so on),
engineers and designers may need to be aware of and
account for emerging technologies and new practices or
tactics being implemented by the local fire and rescue
13.4.4 Other equipment service as part of their building or site design.
considerations
In addition to their own ppe and hose equipment, firefight-

ers may need to transport and use other equipment (e.g. 13.5 Fire and rescue service
ladders or breaking-in gear) for use during an incident. notification and response
This can be a key consideration in some cases when
designing firefighter access routes from perceived fire
appliance arrival positions to and around buildings. It 13.5.1 Local fire and rescue service
needs to be remembered that firefighters will in most cases
have to physically carry all necessary equipment, thus it is resource variations
important to ensure that such access routes are reasonably
limited in distance, intuitive in terms of wayfinding and It is important to understand the level of local fire and
reasonably dimensioned to permit relatively easy transpor- rescue service coverage to a building as this can vary signif-
tation of resources and equipment. Assumed fire and icantly depending upon geographical area. In addition, due
rescue service vehicle parking locations also need to be to increasing economic and resource pressures on fire and
practical. rescue services in many areas, the current level of coverage
may be under review and subject to change. Therefore, resources on their pda record for a building, with this
understanding where local fire stations are situated and often being limited (e.g. a single pump appliance). Upon
what resources they have could be relevant to the develop- arrival at an incident, the officer in charge of the initial
ment of the building fire strategy in terms of what initial fire and rescue service attendance will then call for addi-
resources will be available and the time it will take for the tional resources should they be required.
fire and rescue service to attend an incident (and factoring
in a suitable margin of safety, should the building fire strat-
egy rely upon this). 13.5.2 Improving fire and rescue
service notification
The local fire and rescue service may provide full-time
and/or retained fire coverage to an area. Retained fire To increase the potential for early attendance by the fire
stations (which are common in some countries, including and rescue service, in support of a building’s life safety
the UK and Ireland) are staffed by professional firefighters, and/or property protection strategy, the fire engineer
who may have other employment elsewhere but respond to should consider the use of automatic transmission of
emergency incidents within their local area when neces- signals from the building fire detection and alarm system
sary. Although not as common, volunteer-staffed fire to a suitable alarm receiving centre.
stations may also be present (such as in parts of Germany,
France and the USA), or a private fire and rescue service By considering the factors outlined in section 13.5.1, along
(part or fully private) may serve the site in question. with the hours during which the building in question is
occupied and the reliability of manual means of notifica-
It is usual for all forms of fire station to have attendance tion (e.g. use of telephones by onsite staff), the building
time targets. There will, however, be differences in the level fire strategy may determine that the provision of a more
of coverage that different geographical areas receive, in resilient arrangement for the early summoning of the fire
terms of how quickly the fire and rescue service could and rescue service is required due to the risks posed by
potentially arrive to deal with an incident and what the building’s use and occupancy. Often this is most easily
resources and equipment they would have available to achieved through the automatic transmission (via a moni-
them. For example, a fire and rescue service in an urban tored link) of fire detection and alarm system signals to an
metropolitan area could be expected to provide a quicker alarm receiving centre, from where a quick response to a
response and more immediate resources than one located in potential fire incident and the summoning of the fire and
a remote rural area. rescue service can be efficiently completed. An alarm
receiving centre could be located in, for example, a contin-
While the distance to the nearest fire station will be a uously staffed fire and security room on the same site as
consideration for fire engineers, in most cases the fire the building requiring protection (as found in some shop-
engineer should not rely solely upon a response from this ping complexes and hospital sites) or in a third party
fire station as a means to justify a proposed scheme. It will commercially operated centre.
always be possible that the resources located at the fire
station are responding to another incident elsewhere. The use of an alarm receiving centre will provide a more
Therefore, where required and possible, it would be more reliable and resilient means to react to a fire detection and
resilient to consider assessing the following information alarm signal from a building, and can therefore help to
in relation to the relevant local fire and rescue service: compress the timeline involved in getting adequate fire
and rescue service resources to an incident. Example
—— average time for emergency calls to be responded to design and procedural guidance relating to automatic
transmissions from a fire detection and alarm system to an
—— average time for firefighters to be mobilised and alarm receiving centre can be found in BS 5839-1: 2017
leave the fire station (BSI, 2017b: clause 15), and requirements for alarm moni-
—— average time for the first and second fire appli- toring and receiving centres are covered in BS EN 50518:
ances to arrive at an incident 2013 Parts 1 to 3 (BSI, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d) and BS 8591:
2014 (BSI, 2014b).
—— what the expected predetermined attendance (pda)
could be, and what implications this may have for
the scheme in question
—— what the potential, reasonable worst-case scenarios 13.6 Fire service vehicle access
for all the above could be, and how these might and water supplies
need to be considered as part of a sensitivity analysis.
Information relating to the above can often be requested 13.6.1 Roadway access
from the local fire and rescue service, and in some cases is
publicly available (via the internet) as part of fire and It is important to ensure that fire and rescue service vehi-
rescue service performance target and response time statis- cles can access a site and get close enough to a building
tics reports. via appropriately sized and constructed roadways in order
to commence fire and rescue operations. This should
In regard to the pda mentioned above, another common include consideration of associated landscaping, building
perception is that the fire and rescue service will immedi- overhangs, the need to drive over or under features such
ately mobilise a multitude of fire appliances and resources, as bridges, and so on. The extent to which fire and rescue
sufficient to deal with the worst-case fire incident in a service vehicle access is required depends on whether
building. For most incidents, this is not the case; the fire external (see section 13.8) or internal (see section 13.9)
and rescue service will usually only mobilise those firefighting measures are appropriate and what type of fire
Firefighting 13-7
Table 13.2 Fire and rescue service vehicle route specification (UK) (BSI, 2017a)
Appliance type Min. width of Min. width of Min. turning Min. turning Min. clearance Min. carrying
road between gateways / m circle between circle between height / m capacity / t
kerbs / m kerbs / m walls / m
Pump 3.7 3.1 16.8 19.2 3.7 12.5
High-reach 3.7 3.1 26.0 29.0 4.0 17.0
Note: Because the weight of high-reach appliances is distributed over a number of axles, it is considered that their infrequent use of
a carriageway or route designed to 12.5 tonnes is not likely to cause damage. It would therefore be reasonable to design the road
base to 12.5 tonnes, although structures such as bridges should have the full 17 tonnes capacity.
and rescue service vehicle response needs to be planned space needs to be provided to allow these vehicles
for. Ultimately, this will be driven by the size, height, loca- to negotiate corners. This is often assessed for new
tion, geometry and occupancy of the building in question. routes and roadways by completing a swept path
Ensuring the provision of adequate fire and rescue service analysis.
vehicular access should be considered by all relevant
designers and stakeholders at a very early stage in the —— Dead-end access roads: Limits are often placed in
design process for a building, to ensure that the necessary national and international design guidance on the
external and internal fire and rescue service access arrange- distance along which the fire and rescue service
ments can be supported. In particular, design schemes drivers are expected to reverse their vehicles before
involving podium access need to be very carefully consid- being able to drive forward away from a building
ered to avoid imposing onerous expectations on firefighters, or site. For example, in the UK-specific context, a
in terms of having to conduct firefighting operations in dead-end access road distance of 20 m is typically
areas remote (physically, visually and communication considered the limit under BS 9999 (BSI, 2017a:
wise) from the locations accessible to fire and rescue clause 21.3), while under International Fire Code
service vehicles. guidance the limit is 150 feet (ca. 45 m) (ICC,
2017: Appendix D). When such limits are exceeded,
The design guidance applicable in a particular geographi- suitably sized turning circle or hammerhead facil-
cal area will often specify, in broad terms, what dimensions ities should be provided to allow fire and rescue
and carrying capacity fire and rescue service vehicle access service vehicles to turn around and drive forward
routes should have. For example, BS 9999 (BSI, 2017a: from the dead-end road. While some of these dead-
clause 21.3) provides guidance on how these routes should end distance limits have historic origins (e.g. the
be designed for the two most common fire appliance types UK limit of 20 m originates from the time when
used in the UK, as shown in Table 13.2. fire and rescue services used horses to pull their
engines), they do have a practical relevance in the
Checks should be made to ensure that inspection covers modern era. Managing fire and rescue service
(such as those used by public utilities) and other similar resources during an incident can be complicated;
features that may be incorporated into the roadway design thus, as fire appliances carry all relevant personnel
are capable of carrying the expected carrying capacity and equipment, reasonable measures need to be
weights. provided to ensure that resources can be moved
relatively easily if required. In some scenarios, it
For those designing roadways and vehicle access for a site may be possible for the fire engineer to justify
or building, it should be remembered that fire appliances dead-end access road distances that exceed rele-
are not standardised; the size and weight and equipment vant local limits based on the provision of other
carried may differ between appliance types within a fire building-specific compensatory measures. Such
and rescue service, and may differ further regionally, measures could include the voluntary provision of
nationally and internationally. Some fire and rescue a robust suppression system in a building where
services use more specialised vehicles than others; a suppression is not required for other reasons, or
consideration which may also need to be factored into the wider access roads to permit easier vehicle revers-
design of roadways. Relevant vehicle dimensions and ing. In some cases, measures such as these could
details should therefore be confirmed with the local fire assist in obtaining agreement by the local fire and
and rescue service where appropriate. rescue service to an extension to the road distance.
Other design considerations that may need to be checked
as part of ensuring that adequate fire and rescue service —— Working area: While providing the roadways to
vehicle access can be facilitated include the following: minimum dimensions, such as those shown in
Table 13.2, will get the fire and rescue service vehi-
—— Roadway gradients: There may be local roadway cles close to a building, it must be remembered
gradient design limits that must be observed. For that firefighters will require a working area in
example, in the UK, hardstanding areas for high- order to unload personnel and stowed equipment
reach appliances should not exceed a 1 in 12 from the appliance for use. Therefore, it may be
gradient, and gradients of 1 in 4 should be avoided best practice to provide some additional room
for fire and rescue service vehicle access in general. around perceived fire appliance parking positions
(e.g. in zones designated for perimeter access or
—— Vehicle turning and sweep circles: When designing where fire appliances will be parking near to desig-
access routes, allowances should be made for fire nated building entry points or fire mains inlets) to
appliance turning and sweep circles as additional allow for this to be done easily. This may be of
particular relevance if it is proposed that only a 2.5 bar nozzle pressure, the rate of delivery will be approx-
single-lane access road is to be provided. imately 160 litres of water per minute (this figure should
be taken as a guide only; e.g. some modern multi-flow
—— Roadway markings: For some sites it may be neces- nozzles for use with layflat hose can deliver 360–750 litres
sary to consider the use of roadway markings to
per minute). Therefore, with a 1000 litre tank and a deliv-
impose traffic restrictions (such as no parking ery flow of 160 litres per minute, the water would be
areas or hatched zones for emergency vehicle use exhausted within 6 minutes. The significance of these
only) or, in some extreme cases, such as found in figures for preplanning is that if a fire cannot be extin-
North America, the use of fire lanes on roadways. guished within that time period, additional water supplies
Similarly, if a fire and rescue service roadway is need to be established to maintain an unbroken attack on
proposed to pass through a pedestrianised area, a the fire. The building type also has an influence on the
clear fire path should be planned and identifiable requirements for a water supply; for example, for a high-
(perhaps using different surface materials or mark- rise building, a water supply must be secured to charge fire
ings) to ensure that it is not obstructed. mains before firefighters can be committed to the fire
—— Posts and bollards: Any posts or bollards installed compartment, thus additional water supplies will be
across roadways used for fire and rescue service needed.
access (to restrict use by other vehicles) should
usually be of the removable or collapsible (fixed The most common and effective means of providing
hinged) type, with standard ‘fire brigade’ padlocks supplementary and resilient water supplies is via a hydrant
used to secure them in the up position. Any connected to a water main. These often take the form of
proposed use of flexible or electronically retract- underground hydrants (e.g. to BS 750: 2012 (BSI, 2012a)
able posts or bollards needs to be carefully or BS EN 14339: 2005 (BSI, 2005a)), but could also be
considered, and design details discussed with the presented as pillar hydrants (e.g. to BS EN 14384: 2005
local fire and rescue service. (BSI, 2005b), with these provided by the relevant local
water authority from street water mains or by the building
—— Use of security gates across a roadway or vehicle access or site developer or owner as a private hydrant. Alterna-
point: Gates are often used to restrict access to tively, where no piped water supply can be provided, a
larger sites, but to prevent any delay being caused charged static tank or natural water source (river, pond or
to fire appliances, ideally only one gate barrier similar) could be considered acceptable provided that it
should be used. This should be secured by a means provides adequate capacity for the building, site or risk in
that can be easily and quickly opened by the fire question and is agreed with the local fire and rescue
and rescue service (e.g. use of a single ‘fire brigade’ service. Guidance in Approved Document B Volume 2
padlock or, where electronic gate locks are used, a (HM Government, 2013) recommends a capacity of at
drop-key mechanism). For some buildings or sites, least 45 000 litres, but it is suggested that the adequacy of
there may be a 24-hour security presence, where this would need to be assessed on a project-specific basis
gates are opened via a central control system; the (particularly as some alternative sources of water may
relevant details and protocols associated with this increase time delays to effective firefighting due to the
may need to be agreed with the local fire and need for additional specialist equipment or the need for
rescue service. water relay).
—— Traffic calming measures: Features such as speed
humps can significantly increase fire and rescue Figure 13.2 illustrates how the fire and rescue service will
service attendance times, depending on the length typically connect a pumping appliance to a hydrant.
of roadway over which the traffic calming measures
are proposed, and on their design, number and To connect a standpipe to an underground hydrant (for
spacing. example), the firefighter has to collect a standpipe, key and
bar from a locker on the pumping appliance, run to the
If there is any doubt as to what local regulatory and fire hydrant, lift the pit lid, take the blank cap off the outlet,
and rescue service requirements are in place in relation to screw the standpipe onto the outlet, fit the key onto the
the above items (or similar roadway features), the local fire
and rescue service, and possibly the local traffic authority,
should be consulted. As outlined in section 13.5.1, while
pumping and high-reach appliances are often the most Collecting head
common forms of vehicles used by fire and rescue services,
there may be a need to plan for the attendance of other
specialised appliances for some buildings or sites. This
should also be discussed with the local fire and rescue
service in the event of any doubt.
13.6.2 External water supplies and

hydrants
Carrying water to an incident enables the fire and rescue Figure 13.2 Water from a hydrant via a standpipe and a line of hose of
service to apply the first jet or spray to the fire with least one length to the collecting head of a pump and then from a delivery
delay. However, the water supply carried in the tanks of valve via a line of hose of two lengths to a branch or nozzle (Note: the
pumping appliances is limited; capacity is typically hose connection between the hydrant and fire appliance may be
between 1000 and 2000 litres. Using a 12.5 mm nozzle at twinned depending upon local fire and rescue service procedures.)
Firefighting 13-9
false spindle, fit the bar into the key, turn on the water to would be a hydrant located within 90 m of an entry point
flush the hydrant and then turn off the water. For plan- to the building and not more than 90 m apart or, for a
ning purposes, may be reasonable to assume a time of building fitted with a dry rising main, within 90 m of the
30 seconds to collect the equipment off the pumping fire main inlet connection (assumed for a building with a
appliance and 30 seconds of work at the hydrant (1 minute). compartment of more than 280 m2 that is more than
If the hydrant is 20 m from the pump (equivalent to a 100 m away from an existing hydrant) (HM Government,
single length of hose; in some cases, two lengths of hose 2013: section 15.7). BS 9990: 2015 guidance (BSI, 2015a:
twinned between the fire appliance and hydrant will be clause 5), which covers the provision of private hydrants,
required), it will take the firefighter a total of 20 seconds adds to this by stating that hydrants should be positioned
to run to the hydrant and back. On return to the pump, no less than 6 m away from the building or risk in order
the firefighter will collect a length of hose, run back to the to offer some protection from falling debris and other
hydrant, connect the hose to the standpipe and run back possible occurrences during a fire. For comparison, NFPA
to the pump, paying out the hose (a further 20 seconds). 24 (NFPA, 2013: chapter 7) gives the general recommen-
The firefighter will then run back to the standpipe dation that hydrants ‘shall be spaced in accordance with
(10 seconds) and turn on the water (10 seconds). It is the authority having jurisdiction’ and ‘for average condi-
appreciated that hydrant pits sometimes contain debris tions hydrants shall be placed at least 40 feet (12.2 m)
that must be removed before the hydrant can be used, and from the building protected’.
this would extend the time considerably. However, as with
all planning assumptions, the above figures have assumed In terms of flow rate for hydrants, typical building design
a hydrant pit in good order. Using these figures, the total guidance is relatively silent on specific requirements; for
time available for one firefighter to obtain a feed from an example, BS 9999 (BSI, 2017a: clause 22.2) limits recom-
underground fire hydrant to a pump where the hydrant is mendations to ensuring that hydrants are capable of
20 m from the pump could reasonably be considered as delivering a ‘sufficient flow of water to enable effective
being 2 minutes. firefighting to be undertaken’. In terms of assessing
whether a hydrant flow is sufficient for firefighting, exam-
Securing an uninterrupted water supply is one of the crit- ple data produced in the National Guidance Document on
ical actions that the fire and rescue service will complete the Provision of Water for Fire Fighting (LGA and Water UK,
upon arrival at an incident. Ensuring that an appropriate 2007: Appendix 5) show that there can be quite diverse
supply is available should therefore be identified as part of requirements, depending upon the type of building and
a building’s or site’s fire strategy. For new developments, risk in question; this is summarised in Table 13.3.
formal consultation may be needed with the local water
authority and the local fire and rescue service (which are This variation in potential flow rate demand between
likely to have a specialist water department) to ascertain different uses demonstrates the importance of liaising
the adequacy of existing supplies and to identify where with the local water authority and fire and rescue service
new hydrants may be required. when providing new or assessing existing hydrant
installations.
The legislative requirement to provide hydrants can be a
complex issue. For example, in England and Wales, while For more complex schemes, where water supplies are
there is guidance contained in design documents support- deemed to require more in-depth analysis to support a
ing the Building Regulations, it is actually the Fire and specific fire engineered design solution, PD 7974-5 (BSI,
Rescue Services Act 2004 that is explicit in stating that the 2014a: clause 8 and Annex A) provides a detailed commen-
fire and rescue authority must secure an adequate supply tary and suggested methodology for the assessment of
of water in the event of fire. The Act states that if securing water demand and efficient flow rates.
a supply requires making an agreement with a water
undertaker to provide hydrants, it is the responsibility of Table 13.3 Recommended ideal hydrant flow rates (LGA and Water
the fire and rescue authority to pay the water undertaker. UK, 2007)
There is no qualification in this that differentiates between
Type of structure Flow rate / Distance
whether the hydrants are on public or private land,
litre · s–1 from risk / m
although it is usual for hydrants on private property to be
paid for by the developer or owner. However, it is standard Housing: not more than two floors 8 Not stated
policy within all fire and rescue services in the UK that it Multi-occupied housing: not more 20–35 Not stated
should be made clear to developers and owners that the than two floors
fire authority cannot be expected to meet the expense of Lorry/coach parks, multistorey car 25 90
providing water supplies for special premises where this parks, service stations
would be out of all proportion to the remainder of the risk Industrial estates:
in an area. Further information relating to the legislative up to 1 hectare 20 Not stated
background and general requirements for hydrants is 1–2 hectares 35 Not stated
provided in the National Guidance Document on the Provi- 2–3 hectares 50 Not stated
sion of Water for Fire Fighting (LGA and Water UK, 2007). over 3 hectares 75 Not stated
Shopping, offices, recreation and 20–75 Not stated
The location of hydrants should be such that they are near tourism
to fire and rescue service appliance parking positions, near Village halls 15 100
to building entry points and readily accessible. Hydrants
Primary schools and single-storey 20 70
should be located in a prominent position and clearly health centres
signed, and not camouflaged in surrounding landscaping.
Approved Document B guidance suggests that a reasona- Secondary schools, colleges, large 35 70
health and community facilities
ble provision for a building not provided with fire mains
13.7 Internal water supplies: of fire main, which can be referred to using a number of
different terms.
fire mains
It can be seen in Table 13.5 that different guides recom-
mend the installation of a dry fire main at varying floor
heights; in the UK this is where (depending upon the
13.7.1 General guidance being applied and building use) the top occupied
floor height above fire and rescue service vehicle access
Fire mains are fixed installations provided within a build- level is more than 7.5 m, 11 m or 18 m, where hose
ing to assist with the supply of water for firefighting, helping distances from the perceived fire appliance parking posi-
to reduce hose lengths and fire and rescue service intervention to the furthest point of the furthest dwelling exceed
tion times. As shown in Table 13.4, there are various types 45 m (for residential flats), or where there are large or deep
Table 13.4 General terminology used for fire mains in buildings (examples)
Type of installation Terms used in UK Terms used in USA

Internal firefighting water main Fire main, rising/falling main or Standpipe system
internal main
Pipework that is normally empty of water Dry riser/faller Manual dry
Pipework that is filled with pressurised air No equivalent in UK Hybrid mains; automatic dry and
semi-automatic dry
Pipework that is filled with water but has no Charged dry main or damp main Manual wet
other supply
Pipework that is filled with water and has additional Wet fire main, wet riser/faller Automatic wet
water supplies to sustain a firefighting attack
Table 13.5 Typical criteria for internal fire mains (summary examples UK)
Design guide Building use Floor Top floor height or Type of fire main Typical location of fire main
area lowest floor depth* outlets or landing valves
ADB / BS 9991 Residential flats (where the N/A < 18 m in height Refers to BS 9990; Protected staircase landings
hose distance from the typically dry
pumping appliance to the
furthest point of the furthest
dwelling exceeds 45 m)
BS 9991 Residential flats N/A 18–50 m in height Dry Firefighting staircase
and/or –10 m deep landings
BS 9991 Residential flats N/A ≥ 50 m in height Wet Firefighting staircase
landings
ADB Shop, commercial, assembly, ≥ 900 m2 storey ≥ 7.5 m in height Refers to BS 9990; Firefighting lobbies
recreational or industrial use over 7.5 m in typically dry
height
ADB All buildings ≥ 900 m2 (each Two or more Refers to BS 9990; Firefighting staircase
basement storey) basement storeys typically dry landings for residential flats,
firefighting lobbies for all
other uses
ADB All buildings N/A 18–50 m in height Dry Firefighting staircase
and/or –10 m deep landings for residential flats,
other uses
ADB All buildings N/A ≥ 50 m in height Wet Firefighting staircase
landings for residential flats,
other uses
NFPA 1 All buildings N/A 3 floors high or Floor landings
15 m in height
NFPA 5000 All buildings N/A 4 floors high/deep
BS 9999 All buildings within the N/A 11–18m in height Dry Firefighting lobbies
scope of the document
BS 9999 All buildings within the N/A 18–50 m in height Dry Firefighting lobbies
BS 9999 All buildings within the N/A ≥ 50 m in height Wet Firefighting lobbies
* Floor heights and depths are measured above and below fire and rescue service access level.
Note: ADB refers to Approved Document B Volume 2 design guidance (HM Government, 2013).
Firefighting 13-11
multiple basement levels present. Where the top occupied risers, a four-way inlet should be provided. The door of
floor height exceeds 50 m, a wet fire main is required in the inlet box should be secured and should be clearly indi-
order to ensure that water can be adequately pumped verti- cated with appropriate signage (e.g. ‘DRY RISER INLET’).
cally up the building. Fire mains can also be a useful tool A drain valve should be incorporated into the breeching
for fire engineers wishing to enhance (as part of a wider inlet unless the main also feeds landing valves below the
fire strategy) the firefighting provisions in a building that inlet level. An automatic air release valve should be fitted
would not otherwise be required under typical design guid- at the highest point on dry risers to permit the riser to be
ance to have a fire main. charged with water without the need to open any landing
valves. NFPA 14: Standard for the installation of standpipes
and hose systems (NFPA, 2016) contains similar design
13.7.2 Dry fire mains guidance, although there are three classes of ‘standpipe
systems’ that can be applied when using this document,
Dry fire mains consist of a pipe installed vertically through dependent upon the building or scenario in question.
a building with an inlet breeching provided at fire and
rescue service vehicle access level and outlets, with A dry fire main can also be ‘charged’, i.e. permanently
hand-controlled valves (known as landing valves), on each filled with water, which is sometimes known as a ‘damp
floor (Figure 13.3). On arrival, the firefighters connect fire main’ or ‘manual wet fire main’. The primary benefit
hoses from a hydrant to a pump appliance and from the of providing such an arrangement is that the fire and
pump appliance to the fire main inlet, then charge the rescue service do not need to fill the fire main with water,
main with water. Other firefighters go to a floor (in an thereby ensuring there is no delay in deploying firefight-
above-ground context, one or two floors below the fire ing jets to tackle the fire. However, this arrangement tends
floor initially, to establish a bridgehead, which is usually only to be applied where extensive fire main installations
a protected area, from which firefighting crews can then are proposed for a building or site. The permanent charg-
be committed to tackle the fire), connect their hoses to the ing of the fire main should be discussed with the local fire
outlet and run out the hose to the fire. Fire mains that and rescue service.
serve above-ground floor levels are known as dry rising
mains, while those that serve below-ground floor levels are Horizontal dry fire mains (involving a horizontal length,
known as dry falling mains. In the UK, BS 9990 (BSI, with no vertical rise or fall to other floors) have also been
2015a) (with supplementary references to BS 5041) applied on design schemes. However, they have limited
provides guidance on the design, installation and mainte- application, related to: their potential to cause confusion
nance of fire mains. among attending fire crews; the fact that, while they may
be able to deliver water across a significant horizontal
Dry fire mains typically have pipework diameters of distance, firefighters with all their required equipment
100 mm or 150 mm. Breeching inlets for dry risers are still need to travel across the same distance; and issues
located on an external wall as close as possible to the relating to practical drainage and maintenance.
installation and relevant fire and rescue service access
point into the building, and there should be access for a The landing valves (also known as outlets) for fire mains
pumping appliance within 18 m of each fire main inlet. are typically located in close association with the protected
The breeching inlet box should be positioned with its firefighter access routes provided in a building. For exam-
lower edge between 400 mm and 600 mm above ground ple, it is common in the UK for the landing valves to be
level. Where a 100 mm dry fire main is provided, a provided within the firefighting lobbies provided to the
two-way breeching inlet should be fitted, and for 150 mm firefighting access stair in commercial buildings, and
within the firefighting access stair enclosure for residen-
tial buildings. The landing valves themselves should be
positioned in a manner that enables ease of access and the
Automatic running out of what will become a charged hose line, and
air release ensures they do not obstruct or become obstructed by
door openings. Additionally, landing valve height, protec-
tion and security should also be considered; for example,
BS 9990 (BSI, 2015a) recommends that the lowest part of
Landing
valve
the valve is positioned no lower than 750 mm above floor
level, that the valve is preferably protected by an appro-
priate box to BS 5041-2: 1987 (BSI, 1987), and that
precautions should be taken against vandalism and theft
of the landing valves. Any alternative landing valve loca-
tions (that deviate from the expectations of local or
national fire safety design guidance) should be discussed
and agreed with the local fire and rescue service.
13.7.3 Hybrid fire mains
Breeching
In addition to the dry and charged dry mains common in
inlet at the UK, NFPA 1 (NFPA, 2018a) also describes two hybrid
Drain ground dry and wet systems, known as an automatic dry standpipe
valve level system and semi-automatic dry standpipe system. Both
systems consist of a dry main that is filled with pressurised
Figure 13.3 Schematic of a dry rising fire main air. When a landing valve is opened, water flows into the
system piping automatically. The water supply for these than 100 mm diameter that enters the wet fire main tank(s)
systems must be capable of supplying the system demand. above the maximum water level. Any such inlet provided
should be clearly indicated with appropriate signage that
ensures it is identifiable as the wet fire main infill.
13.7.4 Wet fire mains
Wet fire mains in the UK are known as ‘automatic wet’ 13.7.5 Additional considerations
standpipe systems in NFPA codes. A wet fire main is simi- relating to fire main landing
lar in construction and layout to a dry fire main except
that the system is connected to a permanent water supply valves
that is capable of supplying the system demand automati-
cally. This may be a direct connection to a water company There are clear differences within and between national
main, where this is permitted and is of sufficient capacity, guidance relating to the positioning of fire main landing
but more commonly consists of a water tank and either a valves. For example, the recommendations in Approved
pumping facility or gravity feed or both. In the UK, Document B (HM Government, 2013) and BS 9999 (BSI,
BS 9990 (BSI, 2015a) guidance calls for wet fire mains to 2017a) vary depending on whether or not the landing
be fed by two interconnected tanks of equal capacity, valve is located in a firefighting shaft or protected stair-
having a total minimum capacity of 45 000 litres, with the way and whether or not a building is sprinklered. The
tanks automatically supplied from a mains water supply. recommendations are also significantly different to the
The tanks and water mains feed should be capable of NFPA 1 (NFPA, 2018a) recommendation that landing
maintaining a flow of water to supply two firefighting hose valves should be located at each intermediate landing
lines for 45 minutes when water is being used at a total between floor levels in every required exit stairway. NFPA
rate of 1500 l · min–1, with two pumps (duty and standby) 1 also recommends considerably more landing valves
provided to feed the system with a running pressure of than Approved Document B.
8 (±0.5) bar per landing valve when the landing valve is
fully open. For many building and fire main systems, designs achiev-
ing compliance with the minimum standards outlined in
Wet fire mains are suitable for buildings of all heights but local and national standards will suffice. However,
are essential when the highest floor is more than 50 m for some fire engineered buildings it may be appropriate
above fire and rescue service access level. This is due to to further consider where fire main landing valves are
the excessive pressure at which the fire and rescue service located and/or whether the provision of additional
would need to pump and the delay in delivering water to landing valves would bring clear benefits to a scheme
the highest point in the riser. The benefit of wet fire mains (through the subsequent enhancing of firefighter access
is that a supplementary water supply via fire service pumps arrangements).
may not be necessary. If a supplementary water supply is
necessary, the time available to obtain the supply is Research in England in 2004 (ODPM, 2004b) assessed the
extended. physiological limits of firefighters in a series of controlled
experiments. Essentially, these experiments tested the
Because of the need to provide sufficient pressure in the maximum distance it was considered possible to penetrate
upper sections of wet risers, the pressures in the lower into a fire compartment for the purposes of fighting a fire
parts of the riser may be excessive. If this is the case, it and searching for a casualty. The research determined
may be necessary to limit the delivery pressures so as to that heat strain among the firefighters was the greatest
avoid dangerously high pressures in firefighting hoses. single source of performance limitation. It was further
Pressure control can be achieved by the provision of a determined that the most significant effect on heat strain
pressure relief connection built into the delivery side of was the number of stairs that had to be climbed while
the landing valve that is permanently connected to a waste wearing standard ppe, standard-duration breathing appa-
pipe. Valves can be calibrated to give different inlet–outlet ratus or extended-duration breathing apparatus and
pressure differentials, as appropriate for specific locations carrying firefighting and rescue equipment.
within the riser. An alternative type of landing valve for
wet risers incorporates a ‘dead shut-off ’ pressure-reducing As a result of the trials, the research suggested that fire-
valve and requires no drain connection. For example, fighters should be able to penetrate into a fire compartment
BS 9990 recommends pressure-reducing valves be provided to rescue a casualty, where no stair climbing is required
to regulate the flow and pressure to 750 (±75) l · min–1 at to access the point of entry, for a maximum distance of
8 (±0.5) bar per landing valve, with the system designed 34 m. This distance was reduced if firefighters had to
so that the static pressure in any hose line connected to a climb stairs beforehand. For example, climbing two floors
landing valve does not exceed 12 bar when the nozzle is reduced the penetration distance to 32 m, and climbing
shut off. 10, 20 and 30 floors reduced the penetration distance to
approximately 25 m, 20 m and 12 m, respectively. It
The landing valve/outlet location for a wet fire main should be noted that this research dealt with simulated
system should meet the same standards as for dry fire incidents, and there are no data on actual fire incidents
main systems, as outlined in section 13.7.2. that suggest that travel distances up to 45 m into a
fire compartment are excessive. Therefore, it was deemed
An emergency tank filling connection for fire and rescue that the distances firefighters are able to travel are primar-
service use may be necessary to take account of circum- ily dependent upon the number of floors climbed, and
stances when the automatic infill is out of action. BS 9990 that travel distances within fire compartments should be
recommends that this should typically take the form of a based on a standard that considers both the (non-
breeching inlet (positioned in a prominent location on the operational) research and the practical experiences of
face of the building) connected to a delivery pipe of not less actual firefighting.
Firefighting 13-13
It is standard operating practice within the UK for fire- rescue service to ensure there is confidence in operational
fighters to travel up a high-rise building in a firefighting procedures expected to be applied, hose line distances and
lift and to exit that lift two floors below the fire floor. resourcing, and travel distances.
Although the research referred to above suggested that if
firefighters climbed two floors they should not travel
more that 32 m into a fire compartment, this is not 13.7.6 Foam inlets
supported by assumptions made in typical design guid-
ance, where hose coverage distances of 45 m and 60 m can A foam inlet system consists of an inlet box housing a
be acceptable, depending upon the circumstances. In fact, foam inlet adaptor that is connected to a length of distri-
if the two floors and 32 m recommendation were accepted bution pipework, which then terminates in one or more
as a standard, it would mean that fire mains should be fixed foam pourers or discharge outlets. In the UK, design
installed in the majority of buildings above two floors in guidance relating to the design of these systems can be
height. found in BS 5306-1 (BSI, 2006). These systems are
provided to assist the fire and rescue service in fighting
When firefighters exit a firefighting lift two floors below fires involving oil storage tanks or oil-fired boilers that are
the fire floor, they undertake two key tasks: either situated below ground level or are inaccessible from
outside. Where a fire strategy deems that such an installa-
(a) establishing a bridgehead on that floor, and tion is required, the foam inlet breeching connection at
the fire and rescue service access level should be posi-
(b) the officer in charge considers where it is safe to tioned in a prominent and practical location (e.g. within
connect the primary and secondary hose lines to 18 m of a practical fire appliance parking position), with
the fire main landing valves; ideally, the primary this being clearly indicated with appropriate signage.
hose line would be connected to a fire main land-
ing valve on the floor below the fire floor, with the
secondary (safety) hose line connected to the fire
main landing valve on the fire floor.
13.8 External firefighting
It is clear from the above that, if only one landing valve access (perimeter
is to be installed for each staircase, the optimum location
for that landing valve is within the staircase enclosure. access)
This will ensure that only the fire-resisting doors to the
fire floor are held open by the hose line passing through Design standards attempt to ensure that the fire and
them and will shorten hose lines. Arguably, locating land- rescue service can reasonably reach the exterior of a build-
ing valves within stair enclosures also increases the ing in order to efficiently commence firefighting operations.
possibility that firefighters can use the landing valve The ideal scenario is to afford access to all sides of a build-
located on the fire floor. ing. The reasons why external access is required are best
summarised in clause 16.1 of Approved Document B
There is also merit in the NFPA 1 recommendation that Volume 2 (HM Government, 2013), which states that it is
landing valves should be located at each intermediate needed to enable high-reach appliances to be used and to
landing between floor levels rather than at floor levels. enable pumping appliances to supply water and equip-
This would remove the need for landing valves at the full ment for firefighting and search and rescue activities. The
floor levels, and would mean that hose lines could be extent to which external access is required is, however,
connected half a floor below the fire floor rather than one driven by the size and height of a building.
or two full floors below, thereby reducing the lengths of
hose lines and reducing congestion on staircases (includ- In the UK context, buildings less than 11 m in height, as
ing potentially not disrupting wheelchair refuges). measured to the highest occupied storey, need to facilitate
access for pumping appliances, while those over 11 m in
If it is proposed to provide more than one fire main land- height need to be designed to facilitate access for high-
ing valve per level for each staircase (to enhance firefighter reach appliances. This acknowledges that the portable
water supply and access arrangements by helping to reduce ladders typically carried on pumping appliances have a
potential hose and travel distances), this could be presented limited reach. Depending upon the size of the building (in
in several different arrangements, such as: terms of total area, m2), a percentage of the building
perimeter must then be made available for fire and rescue
—— a twin landing valve connection within the stair- service access, with this ranging from 15% to 100%. The
case enclosure at each level fire and rescue service should then be able to access the
building from adjacent to the designated perimeter eleva-
—— a single landing valve each within the staircase
tion. Where access for high-reach appliances is required,
enclosure and within the associated protected
designated hard-standing areas need to be provided and
lobby at each level
must be free from overhead obstructions (such as cables,
—— a single landing valve within the staircase enclosure trees etc.).
and a single landing valve installed adjacent to the
door to the fire compartment, for those occasions Key to providing the adequate perimeter access percentage
when it is safe to enter the fire compartment is ensuring that there are entry points into the building on
without a charged hose line. any elevations that have a designated perimeter access
zone (within 18 m of a practical fire appliance parking
Where it is proposed to provide more than one fire main position). BS 9999 (BSI, 2017a: clause 21.1) calls for suit-
landing valve per staircase per level, the arrangements able entry door(s) not less than 750 mm in width to be
should be discussed and agreed with the local fire and provided so that there is no more than 60 m between each
door and/or the end of the elevation. It is then assumed —— buildings more than 11 m but less than 18 m
that the provision of this perimeter access along with the in height; firefighting shaft to include an escape
access offered by the normal means of escape for a building stair and unvented firefighting lobby with a fire
will provide reasonable access for firefighting. Note that main
there is no requirement to consider the nature and quan-
tity of facade openings (e.g. windows) on the upper floors —— buildings intended to be used as shops, factories or
of a building; however, in some cases (e.g. for a building for assembly and recreation where the height of
with no windows, or with double- or triple-glazed fixed the topmost storey exceeds 7.5 m, with the floor
shut windows) where an engineered approach is being area of any storey above the ground storey not less
taken in relation to firefighting access, it would be advisa- than 900 m2; firefighting shaft to include a fire-
ble to consider the practicalities of firefighting externally. fighting stair and firefighting lobbies with a fire
main
In some geographical areas, alternative methods of facili- —— buildings or parts of buildings where the height of
tating perimeter access for the fire and rescue service can the surface of the floor of the topmost storey
be required. For example, access ‘holes’ can be provided (excluding any storey consisting entirely of plant
at regular intervals in the building facade (as mentioned rooms) exceeds 18 m; firefighting shaft to include
in the Spanish Technical Building Code), which are seen a firefighting stair, firefighting lobbies with a fire
to offer benefits. main, and a firefighting lift
As part of developing an external access strategy, appropri- —— buildings where the depth of the surface of the
ate access should also be afforded to any fire system inlet floor of the lowermost storey exceeds 10 m; fire-
connections positioned on the building perimeter which fighting shaft to include a firefighting stair,
the fire and rescue service personnel may need to use. firefighting lobbies with a fire main, and a fire-
Common inlet connections that may need to be consid- fighting lift
ered include dry rising main inlets, wet rising main inlets —— buildings where there are two or more basement
and suppression system inlets. Hose distances from the levels, each with a floor area exceeding 900 m2;
perceived fire appliance parking position to such inlet firefighting shaft to include a firefighting stair and
connections need to be minimised. In the UK, for exam- firefighting lobbies with a fire main.
ple, the distance between the pumping appliance parking
position and a dry rising main inlet should be limited to
18 m, which equates to one hose length (see section 13.4.2). The recommendations in BS 9999 (clauses 20.1.2 and 20.1.3)
for the number of firefighting shafts include the following:
—— At least two firefighting shafts should be provided

13.9 Internal firefighting in buildings with a storey of 900 m2 or more in
area and should be located to meet the maximum
access hose distances set out in (a) and (b) below:
(a) If the building is fitted throughout with an
13.9.1 Provision of firefighting shafts automatic sprinkler system in accordance
with BS EN 12845, then sufficient fire-
Reasonable access into and within a building must be fighting shafts should be provided such
provided for firefighters to enable them to undertake effi- that every part of every qualifying storey is
cient firefighting activities. The main factor determining no more than 60 m from a fire main outlet
the level of access and dedicated facilities required to in a firefighting shaft, measured on a route
assist the fire and rescue service is the size and height of suitable for laying hose.
the building in question. For some buildings, the provi- (b) If the building is not fitted with sprinklers,
sion of adequate external (perimeter) access along with the then every part of every qualifying storey
access offered by the normal means of escape routes will should be no more than 45 m from a fire
be acceptable. For other buildings, such as those with main outlet contained in a protected stair-
deep or multiple basement levels or those that are tall and way and 60 m from a fire main in a fire-
beyond the reach of fire service ladders, more onus is fighting shaft, measured on a route suitable
placed on firefighting occurring inside the building, thus for laying hose.
special access facilities and, often, enhanced fire compart-
mentation need to be provided. Note: qualifying storey means a floor with a height
of more than 18 m, or basements more than 10 m
The most common facility provided within a building to in depth.
improve firefighting capability is a firefighting shaft. Note: in order to meet the 45 m hose criterion in (b),
Depending upon the specifics of the building involved, a it might be necessary to provide additional fire
firefighting shaft will provide a package of fire protection mains in escape stairs. This does not imply that
measures and installations to help facilitate internal these stairs need to be designed as firefighting shafts.
firefighting.
Note: it is not necessary for lobbies to be provided
Local and national fire safety design guidance sets out to escape stairs solely to accommodate dry riser
criteria for where firefighting shafts (or equivalent) need outlets. The riser outlets may be sited on landings
to be provided. For example, in the UK, BS 9999 (BSI, or half-landings to the stair, provided that suffi-
2017a) recommends the provision of at least one firefight- cient space is available for their use by firefighters
ing shaft in each of the following types of buildings: without obstructing the opening of doors.
Firefighting 13-15
Note: where exact hose distances are not known, (b) by way of a protected corridor not exceed-
direct distances should be taken as two thirds of ing 18 m in length. The corridor is deemed
the hose distance. to be part of the firefighting shaft, and any
access to it from the accommodation should
Note: where the firefighting shaft or firefighting
be by way of protected lobbies, with the cor-
stair is not adjacent to a perimeter wall, an assess- ridor being 500 mm wider than is required
ment should be made as to whether more than one for means of escape purposes to permit fire-
inlet needs to be provided. If two or more inlets fighters to move towards the firefighting
are provided, they should be sufficiently remote shaft while occupants are escaping.
from one another to provide viable alternative
locations from which to charge the fire main. —— A firefighting lift installation includes the lift car
itself, the lift well and the lift machinery space,
NFPA 5000 (NFPA, 2018b) does not differentiate between together with the lift control system and the fire
escape staircases and firefighting shafts (called ‘smoke- and rescue service communications system. The
proof enclosures’ in NFPA 5000), i.e. every escape staircase installation should conform to BS EN 81-72: 2015
is considered to be suitable as a firefighting staircase. (BSI, 2015b) or BS 9999 (BSI, 2017a). Water
protection measures (e.g. raised threshold, drain-
age grid, sloping floor) to prevent the ingress of
13.9.2 Design considerations for water into the lift shaft entrances along with water
firefighting shafts protection measures within the lift shaft itself will
need to be provided as part of the installation.
To provide context, BS 9999 (BSI, 2017a) broadly recom-
—— Passenger lifts should not be located within a fire-
mends that the following key provisions are incorporated
fighting shaft unless the lift cars are constructed in
into the design of a firefighting shaft:
accordance with BS EN 81-72, are clearly and
conspicuously marked with a notice stating ‘FIRE-
—— A firefighting shaft may consist of lobbies and a stair-
FIGHTING LIFT: Do not use for goods or refuse’,
case within a protected enclosure (120 minutes fire-
and have access only from a firefighting lobby.
resisting) and may also include a firefighting lift.
—— Goods lifts and service lifts should not be located
—— Firefighting shafts should serve every storey
within firefighting shafts.
through which they pass and be located such that
every part of every storey, other than the fire and —— If a firefighting shaft contains a firefighting lift,
rescue service access level, is no more than 60 m the firefighting stair in that shaft should serve
from the fire main outlet. every storey served by the firefighting lift.
—— Only services associated with the firefighting shaft —— Dedicated fire and rescue service communications
should pass through or be contained within the (e.g. a fire telephone system to BS 5839-9: 2011
firefighting shaft. A firefighting shaft should not (BSI, 2011)) may be required.
contain any cupboards or provide access to service
shafts serving the remainder of the building. NFPA 5000 (NFPA, 2018b) describes a firefighting shaft
—— Firefighting lobbies and stairs should be provided as a ‘smokeproof enclosure’. The source documents should
with facilities for smoke control (natural smoke be read for the detail of design and construction, but the
ventilation, mechanical smoke ventilation or pres- following general standards are recommended in the
surisation, depending upon application). documents:
—— Fire mains to BS 9990 to be provided. —— A stair enclosure designed to limit the movement
of products of combustion produced by a fire. The
—— Firefighting lobbies and stairs should be provided
smokeproof enclosure can be ventilated naturally,
with emergency lighting.
by mechanical ventilation incorporating a vesti-
—— Firefighting lobbies should have a clear floor area bule, or by pressurising the enclosure.
of not less than 5 m2. The clear floor area should
not exceed 20 m2 for lobbies serving up to four —— A smokeproof enclosure shall be enclosed from the
lifts, or 5 m2 per lift for lobbies serving more than highest point to the lowest point by barriers having
four lifts. All principal dimensions should be not 2-hour fire-resistance ratings.
less than 1.5 m and should not exceed 8 m in —— Access to the smokeproof enclosure shall be by
lobbies serving up to four lifts, or 2 m per lift in way of a vestibule or by way of an exterior balcony
lobbies serving more than four lifts. unless the smokeproof enclosure consists of a pres-
—— In buildings containing flats, protected smoke- surised enclosure. Every vestibule shall have a net
ventilated common corridors or lobbies are area of not less than 16 ft2 (1.5 m2) of opening in
expected to protect the firefighting stairs without an exterior wall facing an exterior court, yard or
the need to provide additional dedicated ventilated public space not less than 20 ft (6.1 m) in width.
lobbies. However, where a firefighting shaft is Every vestibule shall have a minimum dimension
pressurised, a lobby should be provided. of not less than the required width of the corridor
leading to it and a dimension of not less than
—— Entry to a firefighting shaft at fire and rescue 72 inches (183 cm) in the direction of travel.
service access level should be available either:
—— Where a vestibule is used, it shall be within the
(a) directly from the open air whenever possi- 2-hour fire-rated enclosure and shall be considered
ble, i.e. be sited against an exterior wall, or part of the smokeproof enclosure.
—— Every smokeproof enclosure shall discharge into a

public way, into a yard or court having direct
13.10 Smoke control measures
access to a public way, or into an exit passageway. for firefighting
Such exit passageways shall be without openings
other than the entrance from the smokeproof Heat and smoke build-up from a fire within a structure
enclosure and the door to the outside yard, court can adversely impact the ability of the fire and rescue
or public way. The exit passageway shall be service to carry out firefighting and search and rescue
separated from the remainder of the building by a activities. Therefore, smoke control measures (see chapter
2-hour fire-resistance rating. 10) can be employed in certain areas of a building to help
protect, or improve tenability in, firefighter access routes
to support life safety and property protection strategies.
13.9.3 Assessing the provision and Such systems can, therefore, prove to be critical where fire
design of firefighting shafts: engineering is being applied to a building.
alternative approaches
In the UK, areas that are typically afforded dedicated
It may be possible to develop a firefighting access strategy smoke control measures that can benefit firefighter access
where the provision and design of the firefighting shafts are as follows:
deviates from standard fire safety design guidance by
considering the specifics of the building in question and —— Firefighting shafts: Natural smoke ventilation shafts,
risks present. Common examples of design deviations mechanical smoke ventilation shafts (lobby extract)
include the following: and pressurisation (to BS EN 12101-6: 2005 (BSI,
2005c)) are all typically used to protect firefighting
—— Rationalising or reducing the number of firefight- stairs, firefighting lifts and firefighting lobbies in
ing shafts by ensuring there is good hose coverage buildings, depending upon the individual circum-
from the firefighting shafts that are being provided stances. Firefighting shafts are fundamental
(often linked to the shape of the building in ques- infrastructure required for tall and/or deep build-
tion). For tall buildings, the impact of this approach ings; therefore, ensuring that there is a robust and
on the potential for conflict between occupant egress resilient means of smoke ventilation to protect
and firefighter access needs to be considered. these vital fire and rescue service access routes and
facilities is a key aim.
—— Variations to protected corridors that lead from
external to an inboard firefighting shaft (e.g. in —— Basement floors: Fires in basements can present
terms of level of fire resistance applied, require- exceedingly onerous conditions for firefighters as
ments for lobby protection to the protected the products of combustion will often want to
corridor, length and firefighter travel distance leave the fire compartment by the same access
within the protected corridor). routes that firefighters need to use to get to the
seat of the fire. Except for basements that are less
—— Proposed provision of firefighting lobbies larger than 200 m2 in area and less than 3 m below ground
than 20 m2 in area. level, it is expected that a means of smoke ventila-
—— Proposed use of firefighting lifts for other function is provided to help alleviate conditions should
tions, and proposal for firefighting lifts not to a fire occur. As outlined in section 18 of Approved
serve all floors. Firefighting tactics and the poten- Document B Volume 2 (HM Government, 2013),
tial locations of bridgeheads need to be considered this could take the form of natural smoke outlets
for the latter. (e.g. vents providing a minimum combined area of
1/40th of the floor area or storey they serve, covered
—— Introduction of a new firefighting shaft or refur- by a stallboard, breakable panel or pavement
bishment of a current firefighting shaft within an lights) or a mechanical smoke extract system
existing building, where not all aspects of the current (provided an adequate suppression system is pres-
firefighting shaft can practically achieve compliance ent, such as sprinklers, with the smoke extract
with BS 9999 guidance. This could include the system providing a minimum of 10 air changes per
application of supplementary guidance, such as BS hour using equipment rated to 300 °C).
8899: 2016 (BSI, 2016), in relation to proposed
upgrading of existing lifts for firefighter use. —— Car parks: There are three broad approaches to
providing smoke ventilation to car parks (which
—— Deviation from the BS EN 81-72 (BSI, 2015b) are structures that can contain a relatively high
suggestion that the vertical speed of firefighting potential fuel load), as outlined in section 11 of
lifts should be such that floors in a building can be Approved Document B Volume 2:
accessed within 60 seconds; for some high-rise
buildings, this may not be physically possible due (a) design the car park as an open-sided car
to the limits of lift equipment and the sheer height park, with each storey being naturally vent-
of the building in question. ed via permanent openings to external with
an area not less than 1/20th of the floor area
Where such deviations are proposed, it would be expected at that level (with at least half of the vents
that a specific project assessment is completed in relation split equally on two opposing walls), or
to the potential impact that the deviations could have on
firefighter safety, and the safety of other relevant persons, (b) where not designed as an open-sided car
with the proposals then being discussed and agreed with park, each car parking level should be vent-
the local fire and rescue service. ed by permanent openings at high level
with an aggregate free vent area of not less
Firefighting 13-17
than 1/40th of the floor area at that level 2017a), smoke control measures are often required
(with at least half of the vents split equally in atrium spaces to protect occupant means of
on two opposing walls), or escape. These measures can also be used to assist
with firefighter access. Even where dedicated
(c) where not designed as an open-sided car
smoke control for means of escape is not required,
park and where opportunities to provide
smoke clearance provisions may still be provided
permanent openings for natural ventilation
(e.g. for atria 18 m or less in height: natural exhaust
are limited, the car park should be mechan-
vents with an area of not less than 10% of the
ically ventilated. Methods of providing
maximum plan area of the atrium; and for atria
mechanical ventilation in car parks, as cov-
more than 18 m in height: mechanical smoke
ered in BS 7346-7 (BSI, 2013a), include duct-
ventilation providing a minimum of four air
ed mechanical systems for smoke clearance,
changes per hour in a sprinklered building with a
impulse fan systems for smoke clearance,
controlled fire load at the atrium base or six air
impulse fan systems for protecting means of
changes per hour in an unsprinklered building).
escape, impulse fan systems for assisting
with firefighter access, and smoke and heat
exhaust ventilation systems. There are other, less obvious buildings where smoke
control measures may be present and which can be used
In all the above cases, the smoke ventilation provi- to assist firefighting activities. For example, natural or
sions will provide benefits for firefighting, albeit to mechanical smoke ventilation measures can be found in
different degrees of effectiveness. theatres and in some warehouse types (e.g. some self-
storage or high-bay storage warehouses).
—— Residential apartment common corridors and staircases:
As outlined in BS 9991 (BSI, 2015c), Approved
When developing a fire strategy that is required to propose
Document B Volume 2 (HM Government, 2013)
smoke control measures for a building under local or
and guidance published by the Smoke Control
national design criteria and/or where smoke control is
Association (SCA, 2015), common staircases, corri-
desired to fulfil a property protection or business continu-
dors and lobbies in residential apartment buildings
ity aspiration, it is important to clearly define the objective
require a means of smoke control. Depending upon
of the smoke control system. As part of this the method
the size and configuration of the building in ques-
of smoke control should also be defined, with the perfor-
tion, this could range from a simple, automatic
mance goals and design criteria or specification clearly
opening natural smoke vent to external, all the way
established.
through to a mechanical smoke ventilation system
utilising multiple smoke shafts. For standard appli-
Where smoke control measures are present to support fire
cations for apartment buildings 18 m or less in
and rescue service access, three key items should be
height, the provision of smoke control is primarily
considered as part of designing, installing and handing
for the protection of the stairs, for means of escape
over the relevant system(s):
and firefighting purposes. However, once buildings
exceed 18 m in height (at which point firefighting
—— Automatic operation of the smoke control system(s)
shafts are required) and/or where extended common
is preferable, where possible and practical. Fire-
corridor travel distances are involved, the smoke
fighters attending a fire incident may have neither
control provisions become more extensive. This is
the time nor the knowledge or experience to engage
to provide increased protection to the common
with the manual operation or adjustment of a
areas and to offer increased resilience to the occu-
smoke control system. Configuring the smoke
pant escape and firefighter access routes.
control system to operate automatically will there-
—— Shopping malls: In covered shopping complexes, fore help to reduce the potential for confusion and
there is the potential for smoke from a fire in one for delay to firefighting intervention.
unit to compromise adjacent units and the wider
mall, posing a significant hazard to both occupant —— Where manual override controls for firefighter use
means of escape and firefighter access. Therefore, are provided for a smoke control system, these
having automatic means of smoke control in should be intuitive in function or use, and posi-
covered shopping complexes is crucial to prevent tioned in an appropriate location that is easily
smoke logging the building. Depending on the size accessible and in a place of relative safety.
of the shopping mall, smoke measures may be —— Clear and concise system operation information
required in the public common mall areas, indi- should be kept on site in an appropriate manner
vidual shopping units, other occupancies and for firefighter reference, to enable interaction with
non-public areas. The form of smoke control may the system.
be natural, mechanical (powered) or pressurisa-
tion. BRE Report BR 368 (Morgan et al., 1999)
provides useful background and design informa-
tion relating to smoke control systems appropriate 13.11 Communications
for shopping malls, including considerations rele-
vant to fire and rescue service access.
For large and complex buildings, the provision of addi-
—— Atrium spaces: Where there are open spaces or voids tional, reliable communication equipment for the fire and
passing through floors within a building, there is rescue service should be considered. Radio equipment is
an obvious higher potential for smoke spread in carried and used by firefighters, but this equipment has its
the event of a fire. Under guidance such as that limitations, and it can be significantly affected by the built
contained in Annexes B and C of BS 9999 (BSI, environment, particularly in tall and deep structures.
The most common means of providing supplementary strategy. For example, in an ultra-high-rise building, fire-
communication equipment is a fire telephone system (e.g. fighters may utilise high-speed lifts to go from the access
to BS 5839-9 (BSI, 2011)). Telephones, as part of a dedi- level to the refuge floor below the fire floor, and then
cated linked network, can be positioned in protected utilise the firefighting lift(s) from this refuge floor to work
firefighter access routes, such as the firefighting lobbies on their way further up the building.
each floor.
Where the provision of refuge floors is being considered
In some certain circumstances (e.g. underground transport for a building, there should be a coordinated approach
infrastructure and high-rise buildings, where construction between the fire engineer and the building services engi-
materials may limit the broadcasting of radio communica- neer in relation to the additional provisions that may be
tions), fire and rescue service radio communications may required (in terms of active and passive fire safety meas-
need to be supported through the use of a ‘leaky feeder’ ures, additional welfare facilities, emergency power,
installation. In its simplest form, this involves the provi- communications etc.). Discussions should also be had
sion of an appropriate cable and amplifiers: the cable is with the local fire and rescue service in relation to the
able to receive and emit radio waves, thus acting as an different potential evacuation scenarios and the fire and
extended antenna and allowing two-way communication. rescue service access strategy.
The need to provide additional communication equipment

in a building for fire and rescue service use should be
discussed with the local fire and rescue service, particu- 13.13 Firefighting timelines
larly when the provision of leaky feeder technology is
being considered.
and an engineered
approach
13.12 Refuge floors and 13.13.1 Background

firefighter access For some fire engineering design solutions, it may be
desirable to interrogate in detail the assumptions relating
With buildings tending to increase in height on a global to the predicted timings for attendance to and firefighting
scale, and the emergence of ultra-high-rise buildings, activities within a building by the fire and rescue service
designers and engineers need to consider the impact that (or other trained personnel expected to engage in fire-
vertical travel within such buildings has on both occupant fighting). The aim of this is to gain a more accurate
evacuation and firefighter access. appreciation of how long it could reasonably take for fire-
fighting to commence for a specific type of fire incident
While some ultra-high-rise buildings, such as the Petronas or scenario.
Twin Towers, rely on high-speed lifts for occupant evacu-
ation, others have protected ‘refuge floors’ or ‘refuge Where such an analysis is required, it will be necessary to
rooms’ at strategic levels within a building, for the occu- consider what level of detail is appropriate. In some cases,
pants to evacuate to in the event of a fire. These refuge a relatively simple analysis may be suitable, where only
floors are places of temporary refuge. They are highly fire broad events and actions are considered. In other cases, a
protected (with passive and active measures) and have very detailed analysis could be needed, where the antici-
their own independent air supplies. For example, in Taipei pated activities of specific groups of (or individual)
101 there are two pressurised fire safety corridors on each firefighters need to be accounted for. In all cases, it is
floor, which connect to separate pressurised emergency important to consider and demonstrate a reasonable
staircases that provide access to two refuge rooms on every margin of safety, keeping in mind that there could be
eighth floor. In the Shanghai World Financial Centre, potential future changes to local fire and rescue service
every 25th floor is constructed as a refuge floor, with suffi- resourcing and response, which may have an impact on
cient space to hold every occupant from 24 other floors at the validity of an analysis completed at a particular point
a density of 0.3 m2 per person. Lift installations known as in time.
‘occupant egress elevators’ stop at every refuge floor. The
Shard in London also adopts a refuge floor approach, As can be seen in the preceding sections of this chapter,
along with the use of evacuation lifts. the objectives and process of successful tactical firefight-
ing involve a complex interrelationship of many different
The use of refuge floors potentially means that the evacu- variables. For a building fire, considerations that might
ation of a building can be completed in a more controlled influence the firefighting timeline could include, among
and efficient manner, and avoids placing onerous physical others:
demands on the occupants (in terms of being expected to
evacuate tens of storeys down to final exit level). In turn, —— What is the potential fire scenario that needs to be
this can have a benefit in that there will potentially be less considered?
conflict between occupant egress and fire and rescue
service access (e.g. within the stair enclosures and lobby —— How is the fire incident potentially detected, and
areas), and it can help to minimise any adverse impacts on how is the local fire and rescue service notified or
staircase pressurisation systems (which are often used in summoned?
taller buildings, but performance can be reduced with the —— Where is the building or area in question located?
opening of multiple stair enclosure doors during occupant
escape). The fire and rescue service may also be able to —— What is the expected local fire and rescue service
utilise the protected refuge floors as part of their access attendance in terms of type of predetermined
Firefighting 13-19
attendance, resources (type of fire cover, personnel, give access to a compartment from a staircase in which
equipment) and response time? How might this there are fire main landing valves.
escalate?
—— How do the local fire and rescue service gain access The speed and ‘weight’ of fire service attendance
to the site or building? Who might meet them on
arrival? What level of premises information is The location of the nearest fire stations and the system of
available to firefighters? staffing will enable pump appliance fire crews to arrive
outside the building within 10 minutes of the time of call.
—— What is the size, height, shape, occupancy, content, Additional fire pumps could take up to 30 minutes to arrive.
layout, etc. of the building?
—— What external water supply arrangements (e.g. Fire scenario
hydrants) are available?
—— Are any specific facilities for firefighting (e.g. fire- Because of the occupancy and fire compartmentation, any
fighting shafts, fire mains) provided for the fire that occurs should be (worst credible case) contained
building? What other relevant passive and active within a compartment or sub-compartment so that it will
fire safety systems are present? be limited to a size that can be controlled by two firefight-
ing jets for a period of 120 minutes.
—— How will firefighting equipment and personnel be
able to be transported in and around the building?
Arrival protocol and entry preparation time
What are the travel distances within the building,
both horizontally and vertically? How long could
the transportation of equipment and personnel take? The fire alarm system and indicator board together with
the fire safety management system within the building
—— How will the factors listed above potentially should mean that the fire crews will know which access
influence the decision-making of attending fire- door(s) to use and the firefighting lift should be waiting at
fighting crews, in terms of committing resources ground floor access level.
and commencing fighting the fire with appropriate
extinguishing media? Interrogating the fire alarm panel (and/or receiving infor-
mation from a representative of the building management)
The number of variables that will need to be considered by the fire officer in charge should take no more than
when developing the perceived firefighting timeline will 3 minutes, by which time the fire crew should have
be highly case specific. It is recommended that the time- collected all necessary equipment from the fire pump.
line is developed through a qdr process, with the fire
engineer liaising with the local fire and rescue service and Positions for hose lines/stopping jets
other relevant authorities having jurisdiction.
The aim and objective of compiling a firefighting timeline The configuration of the floors means that it would be
as part of a fire engineered solution should be clearly necessary to commence firefighting operations from two
declared, and the events and activities that form part of directions utilising two firefighting shafts.
the timeline should be collated and assessed in a logical
and chronological order. ‘Fire safe’ access routes
PD 7974-5 (BSI, 2014a) provides useful background infor- ‘Fire safe’ access routes within floor areas have been estab-
mation on different variables that could influence a lished by utilising protected corridors.
firefighting timeline, as well as suggested firefighter task
analysis and intervention modelling. Related to this, and
as discussed by Halstead (2016), there may in some Firefighting lift and staircase
circumstances be scope to utilise computer modelling soft-
ware to help assess potential firefighting intervention and The firefighting lifts within the building can access all
timelines, albeit that this approach is currently in its floors within 60 seconds. If ascending via a staircase, a
infancy. base of 30 seconds per floor, increasing by 15 seconds for
each floor, could be used for the calculations.
13.13.2 Worked example for a In this example, it is assumed that firefighters would
high-rise building initially use the firefighting lift to ascend from access level
to the firefighting bridgehead located two floors below the
The following presents an example firefighting timeline fire floor. They will then use the staircase to work their
for a theoretical high-rise building. It should be treated as way from the bridgehead up to the fire floor.
an indication of what a simple assessment of the relevant
firefighting events and activities could entail. This exam- Therefore, for this example:
ple is provided for illustrative purposes only.
—— time for firefighters ascending in firefighting lift
to bridgehead = 60 seconds
The building
—— time for firefighters to walk up firefighting staircase
A high-rise building with floors of a size and layout that to fire floor from bridgehead = 60 + 15 seconds.
require four firefighting shafts to ensure every part of
every storey is within 50 m of the fire-resisting doors that Calculation of fire attack timeline
Table 13.6 Example fire attack timeline environmental protection. For example, this can arise for
Event Time / seconds some buildings used in the processing of waste materials
or chemical production, where ensuring adequate environ-
Initiation to fire detection 120
mental protection for many reasons, including fire, is a
Actuation of fire detector to transmission of alarm 10 key objective for stakeholders. In recent years, societal
Processing by central monitoring station 60 understanding and expectations for the protection of the
environment and what constitutes sustainable develop-
Receipt of call by fire service mobilising control 10
ment have increased. This has led to the implementation
Transmission to fire station and response 60 of specific environmental protection legislation, which has
Travelling time of fire service 600 had an influence on fire safety.
Arrival protocol and entry preparation time 180
Firefighter travel in firefighting lift 60 Fire-related incidents can potentially have a significant
Firefighter travel walking up two flights of stairs 75 impact on the environment, with contaminated water
to fire floor run-off, hazardous substance leakage or release, and smoke
emission posing the most significant concerns. Fire and
Total: 1175
(approx. 20 min)
rescue services have had to adjust to these concerns and
implement new techniques to minimise potential environ-
mental damage resulting from firefighting operations. In
the UK, this is reflected in the detailed guidance contained
in the Environmental Protection Handbook for the Fire and
The calculation of the fire attack timeline for this simple Rescue Service (DCLG, 2016).
worked example is shown in Table 13.6.
Similarly, operators of buildings or sites of certain types

Discussion of timeline results for worked example or uses may also need to consider specific environmental
protection measures on site in the form of provisions that
If the worst credible case, adjusted by a factor of 2, minimise the outbreak and spread of fire to begin with,
suggested that the fire and rescue service must commence and then to assist the fire and rescue service in accessing
applying water to the fire within 40 minutes of discovery the building or site and then controlling and extinguish-
of the fire, the above figures would mean that the horizon- ing a fire with as little damage as possible. Such measures
tal distance from the fire pump to the firefighting lift and could include, for example, the strategic use of fire
from the staircase landing to the point at which the fire- suppression systems, the use of bunds and/or contain-
fighting jet is applied must be traversed within 20 minutes. ment tanks, the provision of enhanced fire and rescue
service access roadways and water supplies, and protec-
Clearly, the travelling time from the staircase landing to tion measures for drainage systems or watercourses found
the point at which the firefighting jet is turned on is the on site.
more onerous, as firefighters will have to run out hose and
enter a hazardous environment dragging the hose with
them. The travelling time from the fire pump to the lift Where enhancements to building or site fire protection
will be in clear air and carrying equipment rather than measures for environmental protection are required by
running out hose, and a greater distance can therefore be national legislation, these often need to be incorporated
covered in a shorter time. It is obviously beneficial for all into the overall fire strategy to ensure that a consistent
travel times to be as short as possible. However, if the and complementary design solution can be delivered, and
limitations of the site or the designed use of the building that it still satisfies the minimum accepted standards for
calls for extended travel times, it is considered reasonable life safety. Fire engineers should therefore be cognisant of
to allocate times, and thereby distances, on a 3 : 1 basis, i.e. this, and they may need to liaise with additional authori-
if the available time is 20 minutes then 5 minutes could ties having jurisdiction (e.g. the Health and Safety
be allocated for travel from the fire pump to the lift and Executive and/or the Environment Agency), as well as the
15 minutes allocated for travel from the staircase landing local fire and rescue service where the need arises.
to the point at which the jet turned on.
Obviously, if any of the individual times are extended,

then the whole timeline is altered. This may result in a 13.15 Provision of information
need to provide further passive or active fire safety meas-
ures to help compensate for the extended timeline and for the fire and rescue
provide an increased margin of safety, such as installing service
an automatic sprinkler system.
For any building, the provision of appropriate and

adequate premises information for the local fire and rescue
13.14 Firefighting and service can help to facilitate efficient firefighter access and
response, and help responders to an incident understand
environmental protection a building’s layout and fire safety systems. This can be of
particular importance for buildings containing fire engi-
Although life safety and property protection are usually neered design solutions or systems, high fire risks or
the main focuses for building fire strategies, in some cases where bespoke arrangements within the building may
specific consideration needs to be given to the interaction present firefighters with scenarios that they may not be
between fire safety, potential firefighting activities and familiar with.
Firefighting 13-21
There are different methods of collating, formatting and the availability and competency of trained staff to take
providing information on site for firefighter reference. action based on:
The easiest forms are:
—— availability of appropriate firefighting equipment
—— the provision of concise premises plans and
supporting hazard/risk and firefighting facility —— appreciation of the size and risk of the task
information at a centralised location within the —— physical ability of staff
building (e.g. a 24-hour staffed reception) or in a
secure manner external to the building (e.g. a —— training assimilated
secured, recognisable information box system) —— skill level of the individuals involved.
—— the provision of information as part of a fire control
centre (see chapter 14). The type and quantity of first-aid firefighting equipment
provided for a site or building is often determined through
Whichever method is chosen, it is essential to keep the fire risk assessment, to ensure that the most appropriate
information provided on site up to date, and that it is in form of fire extinguishing media is provided for the type
a format that is recognised by the local fire and rescue of fire incident that might potentially occur. The ongoing
service. It is therefore recommended that the key person- testing and maintenance of firefighting equipment
nel liaise where possible with the local fire and rescue provided on site is obviously crucial, to ensure that the
service to ensure that the information is presented in an equipment is in good working order at all times.
appropriate manner for them, and to initiate any required
familiarisation visits to the building or site by local fire Where the provision of first-aid firefighting is deemed
crews to gather risk and pre-planning information. As necessary for different areas and risks, it should be
many local fire and rescue services use mobile data termi- provided in accordance with whatever code is appropriate
nals (mdts) on their appliances, there may also be for the country or region in which the site or building is
opportunities for building or site managers to provide situated. Adequate training must be given to designated
additional supplementary electronic information and personnel who may be expected to use such equipment
plans to the fire and rescue service that can be downloaded (e.g. BS 5306-8: 2012 (BSI, 2012b) calls for at least one
to the mdt devices. water-based fire extinguisher per 200 m2 suitable to the
risk, and people should not have to travel more than 30 m
For buildings where complex fire safety systems are to reach one). This training should not only deal with how
provided, it is also recommended that key personnel (such to operate the different types of fire extinguishing equip-
as the building services engineer or security staff), who ment present, but should also include:
may provide 24-hour on-site staff coverage or are available
for out-of-hours emergencies, are trained to be familiar —— an assessment of the physical capability of staff to
with the fire safety systems present, including any dedi- carry and operate the different equipment
cated facilities provided for fire and rescue service use.
Such trained personnel can provide invaluable assistance —— the maximum distance it is reasonable for individ-
to the fire and rescue service in the event of an emergency, uals to carry a fire extinguishers etc. in order to
in terms of ensuring the efficient transfer of fire safety use them
information and identifying where and how relevant fire —— the necessity of maintaining a route to safety so
safety systems operate. that the operator can turn away from the fire and
escape, and
—— an indication of the maximum size of fire the
13.16 First-aid firefighting trained personnel may try to extinguish (expressed
in common terms, such as a single waste paper
provisions on site basket).
All training should be repeated on an appropriate routine

13.16.1 Objectives of providing periodic basis depending on the risk (e.g. annually).
first-aid firefighting equipment
In certain circumstances, it could be argued and justified
Although there would be very limited opportunities to through risk assessment that a building may not be
base a fire engineered design solution upon firefighting required to be provided with first-aid firefighting equip-
intervention by the occupiers of a site or building, the ment. An example of such a circumstance could be in
provision of first-aid firefighting equipment is still impor- residential blocks of flats, where there are no trained
tant to the overall fire strategy. For example, when used members of staff present.
by correctly trained staff, fire extinguishers have proved to
be an effective method of controlling and extinguishing
fires of limited size, with their true success rate probably
13.16.2 Examples of common
being under-reported due to the reluctance of people to first-aid firefighting
report extinguished fires to the fire and rescue service. equipment
When firefighting is undertaken by the occupiers of a There are many types of first-aid firefighting equipment
building, there is usually a single immediate objective – to and technologies in use (rated for use on different fire
extinguish the fire in the shortest possible time. The sources), but in broad terms the most common types fall
outcome of an attack on a fire by occupiers will depend on into the following groups:
—— Portable fire extinguishers (e.g. to BS 5306-8): Types

of portable fire extinguisher include:
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(b) water spray (with additives to permit
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BSI (1999) BS 7944: 1999 Type 1 heavy duty fire blankets and type 2 heavy
(c) water mist – can be used on a broad spec- duty heat protective blankets (London: British Standards Institution)
trum of fire types depending upon class BSI (2002) PD 7974-0: 2002 Application of fire safety engineering principles
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grease, oil and petrol BSI (2005a) BS EN 14339: 2005 Underground fire hydrants (London:
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and fats. Standards Institution)
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2006)): Comprise a small-bore hose on a reel or buildings. Code of practice for the design, installation, commissioning and
drum, connected to a permanent water supply, and maintenance of emergency voice communication systems (London: British
can typically be used on solid materials such as Standards Institution)
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primarily for use by designated trained personnel surface box frames and covers (London: British Standards Institution)
within a building, but may also be used by the fire
BSI (2012b) BS 5306-8: 2012 Fire extinguishing installations and equipment
and rescue service.
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1999)): Use a fire-resisting material to smother Code of practice on functional recommendations and calculation methods for
flammable liquid fires of a relatively small size. smoke and heat control systems for covered car parks (London: British
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Technical requirements (London: British Standards Institution)
13.16.3 Special circumstances and BSI (2013d) BS EN 50518-3: 2013 Monitoring and alarm receiving centre.
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Institution)
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14-1
14 Fire safety management
14.1 Introduction The fire safety manager is the person who carries out the
job of fire safety management within the building. In a
small building, this task might only be a small part of the
The importance of fire safety management should not be manager’s job. In a large, complex building, this task may
underestimated. Even with the most comprehensive fire be a full-time job with a team of staff.
safety provisions that modern technology can provide, it
is essential that there is adequate management of fire Within the UK, the fire safety manager may be the
safety to ensure that the occupants of a building reach a ‘Responsible Person’ for the building or occupancy speci-
place of safety in the event of fire and to avert disaster. fied in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (in
In many multi-fatality disasters, poor fire safety manage- England and Wales, or the relevant Regulations in Scot-
ment has been found to be a significant contributing land and Northern Ireland). (Note that different terms for
factor. ‘Responsible Person’ are used outside England and Wales,
such as the ‘Duty Holder’.)
Different countries around the world have adopted and
apply different requirements, recommendations or stand- In other buildings, the fire safety manager will be a ‘Compe-
ards in their approach to fire safety. Most countries have tent Person’ appointed by the ‘Responsible Person’. In this
some regulations governing the design and construction latter case, the Responsible Person will be the entity that
of the building for fire safety; fewer have regulations that retains the legal responsibility to comply with the fire
relate to the management of the building. safety law. The legal responsibility cannot be delegated to
the Competent Person who has been appointed to assist the
Within Europe, the ‘Workplace Health and Safety’ Direc- Responsible Person in executing the requisite duties.
tive (89/391/EEC) includes fire safety and provides
functional high-level requirements to achieve fire safety The designer needs to ensure that the overall design of a
through the management of the premises. The individual building assists and enhances the job of the fire safety
countries that are subject to the Directive have each imple- manager. Also, the fire safety manager needs to be aware
mented the Directive in their own way. of the fire safety provisions designed into the building.
Note, however, that in response to the movement of people Detailed guidance on fire safety management is contained
within Europe, hotels have been given special status with in British Standard BS 9999: 2017 (BSI, 2017).
respect to fire safety (Council Recommendation 86/666/
EEC) and guidance on hotel fire safety management is This chapter covers the following aspects of fire safety
available (HOTREC, 2010). management:
Within the UK, effective fire safety management, and the —— legal obligations and statutory duties
key tasks that this entails, are specified as legal require-
ments (in England and Wales) under the Regulatory —— designing for a manageable building
Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (SI 2005/1541) (and in —— construction to handover
the Fire Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (SSI 2006/456)
or the Fire Safety Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2010 —— the fire safety manual
(SR 2010/325)).
—— authority and responsibilities of the fire safety
Fire safety management here encompasses the whole of manager
the management of fire safety. It comprises the manage- —— communication
ment activities that ensure that the incidence of fire in a
building is minimised, but that, when a fire does occur, all —— fire prevention
of the passive, active and procedural fire safety systems are
in place and operating properly. —— ensuring that systems respond properly in a fire
emergency
Fire safety management primarily concerns the life safety —— planning for a fire emergency
of building occupants and firefighters but can also concern
the protection of property, heritage and environment. It is —— management of a fire emergency
a process that covers the entire life cycle of the building,
i.e. from design to construction, handover, occupation, —— other planning issues
changes of use etc., through to demolition. It is essentially —— changes to a building
concerned with building occupation. It is not simply about
maintenance of fire safety systems. —— fire control centre.
14.2 Legal obligations and management responsibilities. The job of the fire safety
manager will be made more difficult if the fire safety
statutory duties design conflicts with the normal, everyday use of the
building (e.g. by placing fire doors across through routes)
The senior management of the building need to identify or fails to take account of real behaviour during an inci-
and meet legal requirements and statutory duties imposed dent, such as counter-flows in escape routes as parents
upon them by various regulations, orders and acts that search for their children.
impact on the management of fire safety. The relevant
regulations, orders or acts applying to the management of In practice, therefore, the fire safety engineer can assist the
fire safety will nearly always be those of the country or work of the fire safety manager by ensuring that:
jurisdiction in which the building is located.
—— active fire safety systems are able to be properly
Within the UK, these include the Building Regulations maintained and tested
2010 (SI 2010/2214), as amended, the Health and Safety at
—— passive fire safety systems are not likely to be made
Work etc. Act 1974, the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
ineffective
Order 2005, the Fire Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006,
the Fire Safety Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2010, the —— design assumptions regarding the use and manage-
Construction (Design and Management) (CDM) Regula- ment of the building are sound, e.g. that they
tions 2015 (SI 2015/51), the Equality Act 2010, local acts, correctly anticipate the type of occupancy or the
environmental acts and, in some premises, the Petroleum fire load, or provide for flexibility in the use of the
(Consolidation) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/1637). building.
Some older buildings will have been previously subject to Therefore, wherever possible, the key management issues
the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 relating to any new project should be identified at the
(SI 1997/1840) and the Fire Precautions Act 1971 (now earliest possible stage in the process, ideally at the concept
repealed). (Fire certificates issued under the Fire Precau- stage, and properly taken into account. It is important at
tions Act no longer have legal standing, and risk this early stage to initiate liaison with other agencies, such
assessments carried out under the Fire Precautions (Work- as building control officers, fire safety officers, health and
place) Regulations need to be carried out afresh as the safety inspectors and insurers.
detailed requirements have changed.)
The designer should become familiar with the responsibil-
In England and Wales, the Department for Communities ities and tasks of the fire safety manager so that these
and Local Government (DCLG) has published a series of issues can reasonably be taken into account in the design
guides in support of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) (see section 14.4). In England and Wales, the designer
Order 2005 (DCLG, 2012). Similar guides are available in needs to be aware of Regulation 38 of the Building Regu-
Scotland (Scottish Government, 2017). lations 2010, entitled ‘Fire safety information’ (see section
14.5.1).
Managers have to be aware of the statutory requirements
(for all buildings except private domestic premises but 14.3.2 Management input at the
including houses in multiple occupation and common areas
in apartment buildings) concerning the maintenance of the design stage
means of escape, fire warning systems, portable fire extin-
guishers, escape lighting, fire safety instructions to staff etc. It is a principle of good fire safety design that buildings
should be designed and equipped so that in an emergency
In many countries, there is a legal requirement to consult the occupants of the building can make their way easily to
the local building and fire authorities prior to the imple- a place of safety. This requires the designers to take
mentation of extensions or alterations within the building account of human behaviour, in particular in emergency
and for necessary approvals under planning acts that situations, and seek to use this behaviour to lead people to
control external elevations of buildings. safety, rather than design a complex system which requires
a rapid learning process by the occupants at a time of
For fire engineered buildings, in particular, where good stress. There is therefore a need for the fire safety systems
management is often a significant element of the safety to be appropriate for what people actually do, not what the
system, the ways in which the legal obligations and duties designer would like them to do.
are satisfied should be properly documented.
A clear statement of the design requirements for the
management of a building has to be developed and
conveyed to the design team (architect, designer and fire
14.3 Designing for a safety engineer), otherwise there is a danger that the new
building will need extensive modifications to cater for
manageable building conditions that were not anticipated by the designers.
A design that does not fulfil the management brief can

14.3.1 Pre-planning adversely affect running costs, staffing levels and the
general safety and efficiency of the building.
Although the formal responsibilities of the designer and
the fire safety engineer largely end once the building is Fire safety systems need to be considered as an inherent
completed and occupation and/or use has commenced, part of the basic design, and not as supplementary to other
many, if not all, of the systems included will impose aspects, such as services or finishes. Where there are
Fire safety management 14-3
conflicts of interest, compromises may be necessary. In 14.3.4 Designing for the management
any case, a flexible approach is essential if novel problems of fire protection
are to be solved. It should be recognised that there can be
conflicts between the fire safety requirements and the
By careful and considered design or planning, the designer
normal use of the building or with building services or
other safety systems. or fire engineer can provide the building with facilities
and equipment that can assist the fire safety manager. This
includes ensuring that the fire protection systems can be
An important aspect of design team management is the kept fully functional and designing provisions that will
coordination of the specialists who are designing systems allow effective evacuation.
that will have to interact. Wherever possible, checks
should be carried out to ensure that the systems are
compatible and that, when changes are made, any conse-
quential effects are accommodated so that the overall 14.3.5 The provision of safety systems
objectives will still be satisfied.
All safety equipment should be readily available, reliable,
Where the project is a speculative build, without a particu- testable, durable, resilient, repairable and maintainable.
lar occupier, or even a particular use, in mind, then it may Fire safety systems requiring inspection, maintenance,
be appropriate to design with minimal management testing or repair are detailed in section 14.9.1.
requirements.
Other aspects to consider will be the management of envi- 14.3.6 Designing for change of use
ronmental issues and the long-term implications of the
proposed design for management over the life of the The designer needs to consider whether the building is
building. being designed to accommodate a specific occupancy with
a defined management regime. The designer may wish to
provide a greater level of designed-in safety with the least
14.3.3 Designing for the management possible dependence on management so as to allow for
of fire prevention maximum flexibility in the future use of the building.
By careful and considered design or location, the designer

or fire engineer can provide the building with facilities
and equipment that can assist the fire safety manager in
carrying out their fire prevention duties (see section 14.8). 14.4 Construction to handover
In particular, the designer can assist the fire safety manager
with the housekeeping in the building (see section 14.8.1).
14.4.1 Construction
A significant way of preventing fire incidents is to correctly
maintain non-fire equipment that might start a fire and to Many fires occur during construction, often in the latter
control the storage and use of materials that might allow part of a project nearing completion, partly due to the
a fire to develop and spread. The designer should there- nature of the work being carried out, which often includes
fore consider the manager’s need to inspect and maintain hot work, partly due to the necessarily complex manage-
the following items (the list is not exclusive): ment regime and partly due to the level of fire protection
measures, which, although fitted, may not be operable.
—— potential sources of ignition, such as gas, oil and Fire safety on construction sites, including fire safety
electrical heating installations management, is covered in detail in chapter 15.
—— electrical and gas installations
—— other heat-dissipating equipment 14.4.2 Fitting-out and speculative
builds
—— equipment in voids and cavities, such as heating,
ventilation and air-conditioning (hvac) and cavity Management during fitting-out will need to consider most
barriers of the same issues as for the construction phase, although
—— furniture, furnishings, decor and equipment different processes may be employed, since fire safety
systems may still not be in place or operational. Again,
—— floor coverings, scenery, props, curtains and drapes particular care is needed during any hot work, and to
avoid blocking escape routes.
—— other equipment that has particular fire risks.
Some buildings will be speculative and the identity of the
The designer can assist the manager in a number of ways occupier will not be known at the time of construction.
to reduce the likelihood of arson and to mitigate the Such buildings must either be well-equipped with fire
effects if it does occur. One option is for the designer to safety provisions and require the minimum of fire safety
provide good security arrangements in the building to management from the eventual occupiers, or the manage-
reduce the risk of arson. However, the designer will have ment assumptions or implications must be stated in the
to bear in mind the possible conflict between security and fire safety manual as a limitation on the eventual use of
means of escape (see section 14.8.3). the building.
14.4.3 Approvals and certification of the management team present. Such tests have the
following purposes:
All documentation relating to approvals and certification
must be made available to the fire safety manager and —— to demonstrate that the safety system design objec-
included in the fire safety manual (see section 14.5). tives have been achieved
—— to identify any problems of detail which were not
14.4.4 Commissioning and handover considered in the original design
—— to demonstrate that the design has been properly
Before accepting the building for occupation, it is essential implemented
that the safety of the staff, public and construction person-
nel, if the building is being completed in phases, is assured. —— to identify any problems with interactions, or fail-
ures to interact
The design and construction of the building and the —— to provide management with the opportunity to
systems installed in it need to be recorded in the fire operate the systems
safety manual. In any case, fire safety systems, as with any
other components of a building, must, in England and —— to inspire confidence in the users of the building
Wales, satisfy Regulation 7 of the Building Regulations —— to offer reassurance, and training opportunities, to
2010 (Materials and workmanship) (HM Government, the fire service.
2013; Welsh Government, 2013), ), as amended by the
Building (Amendment) Regulations 2018 (HM Govern- The fire safety management team must be provided with
ment, 2018). information on all installed active and passive fire safety
systems incorporated into the building, compiled in the
Guidance on the commissioning and handover of fire fire safety manual, including:
safety systems is given in appropriate British Standards
and other guidance documents. On completion of the fire —— documentation from contractors and manufactur-
safety system, the complete installation must be checked ers (including any instructions, guarantees and test
for conformity with the approved drawings and system certificates) and spare parts
design. The handover procedure should include operation
of the system. —— as-built drawings and specifications and equipment-
operating parameters and record drawings
All the fire safety systems need to be individually tested —— instructions on the use, planned maintenance and
to establish that the final installation complies with the testing of the systems
specified design, is functioning properly and is ready for
acceptance testing. A written record must be kept confirm- —— the results of acceptance tests (which may involve
ing that the installation of each system component is the regulatory authorities and insurance company
complete and that the component is functional. representatives).
Acceptance testing has to demonstrate that the final inte- All components of any installed safety system for which
grated system as installed complies with the specified the tenant is responsible need to be operational and
design, has been properly installed or fitted, and is func- compatible with the systems common to the complex
tioning correctly. The details and findings of acceptance before the tenant occupies their unit.
tests should be recorded and verified. The extent and form
of any acceptance tests should be agreed with the enforc- The design and construction of the building and the
ing authority at the design stage. systems installed in it need to be fully documented for
handover to the management team on completion.
Arrangements for standby power supplies need to be
checked and tested. The fire safety manual needs to be prepared.
Wherever possible, the appropriate members of the

management team should be available during the hando-
ver period to ensure that a clear understanding of every 14.5 Fire safety manual
aspect of the building is passed on.
(Note that the fire safety engineer will not normally be 14.5.1 Purpose and contents of the
present at handover and responsibility for conveying an fire safety manual
understanding of the fire safety aspects will often fall to
the architect. However, wherever possible, the fire safety The designer of a large or complex building has a respon-
engineer should be involved in the handover.) All installed sibility to document and communicate the design for the
safety systems need to be operational before the building benefit of the management of those premises. All this rele-
(or part of the building) is accepted and any units are vant information needs to be included in the fire safety
handed over to tenants in mixed user developments and manual (which should be a ‘live’ file or folder of docu-
premises in different occupation. ments), which will provide a clearer understanding of the
responsibility for ensuring that a high standard of safety
All installed safety systems need to be commissioned and, is maintained. It should be available for inspection or tests
where appropriate, tested by full commissioning tests by auditors and regulators. The fire safety manual should
involving fire and/or smoke, with the appropriate members provide:
—— a permanent means of communication between the —— exterior and interior access for the fire ser-
designer and successive fire safety managers vice and planned procedures agreed with
the fire service
—— a full description of the assumptions and philoso-
phies that led to the fire safety design, including —— planned procedures for salvage
explicit assumptions regarding the management of
—— firefighting equipment
the building, housekeeping and other management
functions —— communication systems
—— a full description of the active and passive protec- —— fire prevention, and security and arson
tion systems in the building prevention
—— a complete account of all the other design aspects —— any IT system used to manage the manual
that have a direct bearing on the fire safety (e.g. maintenance schedules, record
management keeping)
—— an ‘operator’s manual’, containing inspection, —— information relevant to the Construction
maintenance and repair manuals for the fire safety (Design and Management) Regulations 2015
systems (in the UK, or their equivalent elsewhere)
—— interactions with security, building management, —— information relating to certification and/or

other safety systems etc. licensing, with copies of all certificates and
licences
—— information required under the Construction
(Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (in —— (within the UK) information relating to
the UK, or their equivalent elsewhere) for the the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order
safety plan 2005, the Fire Safety (Scotland) Regula-
tions 2006 or the Fire Safety Regulations
—— information relating to any fire certificates or (Northern Ireland) 2010
licensing
—— further information etc. relating to other rea-
—— continuing control and audit plans sons for protecting the building (property,
contents, fabric, heritage, environment)
—— a ‘log book’ of all events that occur over the life of
the building that relate to fire safety. —— proposed testing regime for the manual.
(b) Part 2: Operational records
The fire safety manual should contain details of the follow-
ing items: —— the safety management structure, and any
changes to the management structure
(a) Part 1: Design information —— access statements for people with disabili-
ties (in the UK, to meet obligations under
—— fire safety policy statement endorsed by the the Equality Act 2010)
highest level of management
—— the testing of fire safety systems, including
—— fire safety specification for the building, acceptance tests
supported by layout plans
—— the results of monitored fire drills
—— a description of the computer models that
have been used to derive the safety design —— training and education records
and the assumptions, inputs and outputs to
—— maintenance records (of all heat-dissipating
any computer models used
equipment, other equipment that presents a
—— any quantitative or qualitative risk assess- fire risk and fire safety equipment)
ments and sensitivity analyses —— a log of contractors’ and/or workers’ atten-
—— a description of the active and passive fire dance and the issuing of hot work permits
safety measures and details of their —— changes to the building structure
integration
—— changes to building systems
—— any identified fire risks, and particular haz-
ards for firefighters —— information relating to regulatory require-
ments (e.g. fire safety risk assessments,
—— planned inspection, maintenance and test- Building Regulations approvals)
ing schedules
—— feedback from staff, occupants or other
—— control systems utilised throughout the users of the building
building
—— any fire incidents
—— critical transportation routes for building
—— any ‘near-miss’ events
services
—— any false alarms and evacuations
—— the site plans, showing escape routes,
assembly points and/or muster stations —— records of any appeals or prosecutions
—— results and changes following reviews and are being properly carried out, and should be monitored
testing of the manual by senior management.
—— inventories of flammable materials Records of the reviews and of any changes made should
—— details of any operations that have a high be kept. If an it system is used to manage the manual,
fire hazard. then regular checks should be made to ensure that the
requirements are being met.
In England and Wales, the designer needs to comply with
Inspection routines should make provision for all fire
Regulation 38 of the Building Regulations 2010, ‘Fire
safety systems installed in the building, including systems
safety information’. This requirement stipulates that
installed in tenant units and other occupancies.
sufficient information must be recorded to assist the
eventual owner, occupier or employer to meet their stat-
utory duties under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) There should be a full monitored building evacuation drill
Order 2005. This is specified as ‘information relating to at least once a year to test all of the systems and proce-
the design and construction of the building or extension, dures in the manual. Such evacuations should always be
and the services, fittings and equipment provided in or in carried out shortly after the first full occupation of a new
connection with the building or extension which will building. If the interval between these drills is more than
assist the responsible person to operate and maintain the about 12 months, consideration should be given to
building or extension with reasonable safety’. Where this conducting a monitored evacuation in the interim period.
information is provided, it will underpin the fire safety The purpose of any test exercise or drill should be clearly
defined by management, and explained to the staff, so that
manual.
it can be assessed afterwards. The records of fire drills etc.
should be made available for scrutiny by the enforcing
14.5.2 Location, access and authority.
maintenance of the fire
safety manual
14.6 Authority and
The fire safety manual should be kept in a secure and fire-
proof container on the premises. It should be readily
responsibilities of the
accessible to fire officers attending an incident. At least fire safety manager
one duplicate, fully maintained identical copy should be
retained in a separate stated location away from the prem- The fire safety manager is the person in overall control of
ises (i.e. not at risk from a fire on the premises). the premises while people are present, or the person with
direct responsibility for fire safety. The fire safety manager
The manual should be available for inspection by the fire may exercise this responsibility in their own right, e.g. as
enforcement authority or other relevant enforcing author- the owner, or it may be delegated. Whatever the building
ity on request. However, it is not intended that the fire size, there should be no doubt as to the identity of the
safety manual should be in lieu of the fire safety risk person with whom the responsibility lies.
assessment required (in the UK) as a part of the Regula-
tory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, the Fire Safety The fire safety manager needs to have sufficient authority
(Scotland) Regulations 2006 or the Fire Safety Regulations and powers of sanction to ensure that standards of fire
(Northern Ireland) 2010, although the manual will contrib- safety in the complex are adequately maintained. These
ute to this. powers may extend to closing the building to the public,
restricting its use or shutting down normal operations.
The fire safety manual should be kept up to date by the The appointed manager must have access to sufficient
fire safety manager or a competent person nominated for resources to ensure that essential repairs or maintenance
the task, so that the information is included within one are carried out.
week of any event. It should be updated, as appropriate, to
record feedback from staff and other users of the The fire safety manager has responsibility for the
building. following:
Records of any reliability problems with particular equip- —— being aware of all of the fire safety features pro-
ment should be kept. vided and their purpose
—— being aware of any particular risks on the
14.5.3 Review and testing of the premises
fire safety manual —— being aware of their responsibilities towards people
with disabilities
The fire safety manual needs to be reviewed and its proce-
—— being conversant with the legal duties, codes or
dures tested annually, or whenever alterations are made to
regulations that apply and all terms, conditions
the building, in accordance with a documented procedure.
and restrictions imposed by any licence
If possible, this should be undertaken periodically by an
independent auditor. —— being in attendance on the premises, or ensuring
that some other competent person delegated in
Most of the testing should be a matter of routine activity writing is in attendance, whenever the public are
for the management, to ensure that prescribed activities present or when the building is occupied
—— liaising with, and where necessary seeking the The management teams of all individual units and other
advice of, the fire authority and the licensing occupancies need to understand that their own fire safety
authority responsibilities are in no way diminished by the existence
of a further tier of management with a wider span of
—— dealing with individuals who sabotage or tamper
control. In particular, it is necessary that a clear under-
with safety systems (for example, because they are standing exists on the subject of emergency procedures to
inconvenient), who ignore any non-smoking policy ensure that no element of these procedures is neglected,
or who block exits and no element is unreasonably duplicated where this
—— (in the UK) as a Competent Person, conducting could cause confusion in an emergency.
the fire risk assessment required under the Regu-
latory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, the Fire Where the fire safety management is outsourced, e.g. as
Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006 or the Fire part of the facilities management arrangements, then the
Safety Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2010. final responsibility will still reside with the person respon-
sible within the main organisation.
Other responsibilities of the fire safety manager include:
—— carrying out routine maintenance and testing of

fire safety equipment 14.7 Communication
—— maintaining documentation for the fire safety
manual, such as training records, drill records, Good communication is the key to successful management.
information on ‘near-miss’ events
Large, crowded, complex buildings represent a significant
—— developing a fire strategy appropriate for the par- potential for loss of life in fire, and therefore demand the
ticular risk highest standards of management to ensure that risks are
anticipated and covered by the best possible systems for
—— in the role of a Competent Person, seeking to
life safety and property protection.
ensure compliance with appropriate codes, regula-
tions, terms or conditions
It is the responsibility of the fire safety manager to ensure
—— responding to any rare or unexpected events that that all necessary and appropriate communication systems
could increase the risk of fire or affect the evacua- are in place to deal with any fire incident. This includes
tion procedures, e.g. by limiting the number of both equipment and chains of command, especially if it is
people permitted on the premises intended that first alarms be investigated before sounding
warnings, or if control room staff are taking decisions
—— notifying the authorities of any changes that will based on many channels of information. The communica-
affect the fire precautions in the building, e.g. tion strategy must include contingency planning, e.g. for
structural alterations, extensions, alterations to abnormal occupancy loads, or for absent staff or equip-
internal arrangements or a new practice of keeping ment failure. Such systems should be tested and audited
explosives or highly flammable materials on the as part of the testing of the overall fire safety procedures.
premises.
Other issues that need to be considered are:
In addition, for larger buildings and complexes, the fire
safety manager is responsible for: —— the communications structure, in particular where
there is a cascade decision-making process involv-
—— appointment of fire marshals/fire wardens ing a number of levels of management
—— appointment or delegated appointment of mem- —— maintenance and routine testing of systems
bers of any site fire team
—— testing of ‘emergency conditions’
—— development of the training policy for the
building —— the selection of languages to use in voice messages
—— ensuring that staff have the necessary compe- —— special provisions for people with sensory disabil-
tencies ities
—— arranging training and maintaining training rec- —— contingency planning (i.e. while fire safety facili-
ords ties, equipment or systems are faulty or otherwise
non-operational).
—— organising audits by an independent third party
—— organising periodic internal audits to review cur-
rent fire safety management procedures and the 14.8 Fire prevention
effect of changes in personnel or building use
—— ensuring the effectiveness of automatic fire safety The task of fire prevention involves attempting to avoid
systems, even after a change in building use fires occurring and working to create an environment in
which fires are prevented from starting. The fire preven-
—— consideration of and, if appropriate, preparation of tion tasks of the fire safety manager include:
disaster plans, where a fire incident could affect
the local community. —— monitoring the behaviour of occupants
—— monitoring any smoking policy 14.8.1 Housekeeping

—— housekeeping
Good housekeeping will reduce the chances of fire starting
—— routines for the disposal of waste or developing. It is vital that all employees are aware of
the particular risks associated with hazardous substances
—— minimising hazards of combustible contents, fur- and practices that may be encountered in the premises,
nishings and surface finishes especially in factories and warehouses.
—— minimising hazards of materials, components and
elements of construction Where additional risks are introduced anywhere in the
building, e.g. the introduction of car displays and Christ-
—— establishing purchasing standards for furniture, mas grottoes inside shops, advice on their specific protection
furnishings and fittings needs to be obtained from the appropriate authority.
—— seeking to avoid conditions which could lead to
Housekeeping measures include:
gas and dust explosion hazards
—— maintenance of furniture, furnishings, decor and —— keeping combustible materials separate from pos-
equipment sible ignition sources
—— reviewing and appraising the risks, i.e. how a fire —— storing flammable liquids, paints and polishes in
might start, spread and its consequences appropriate containers
—— routine checks, inspections, tests and monitoring —— recognition of potential hazards
the maintenance of equipment that could cause
fires (especially heat-generating equipment), chaff- —— monitoring proper waste control
ing of cables, self-heating and fuel supplies —— cleaning, including build-up of dust on machinery
—— maintaining integration of the fire safety system or extract ducts
with other systems (e.g. ventilation) —— checks on electrical machinery overload
—— assessing the risks from new equipment, new busi- —— clearing waste from the outside of the building
ness processes or changing and new technologies
—— checking ‘dark’ areas (e.g. cinemas, darkrooms)
—— issuing work permits
—— out-of-hours checks, or checks after closing time
—— training and education
—— other routine precautions.
—— establishing and maintaining out-of-hours inspec-
tion and security procedures Good housekeeping is essential to reduce the chances of
—— security. fire and smoke spreading and escape routes being blocked,
and measures must include:
The task requires vigilance and, in larger buildings and
complexes, may need separate teams to cover all of the —— ensuring that escape routes are kept clear and are
possible areas of hazard. Regular inspections should be available for use at all times when the building is
carried out and logged in the fire safety manual, and any occupied
problems found and remedial action taken stated. —— ensuring that fire doors which should be kept
closed are kept closed and are not obstructed
It is probable that surreptitious smoking presents the
greatest fire risk, especially by members of the public and —— ensuring that fire doors on hold-open devices are
staff in back rooms, store rooms and other areas not in operable, are not obstructed and are closed at night
continuous view of supervisory staff. The best recommen-
—— preventing warning signs or wayfinding guidance
dation that can be made is that, for those premises where
lighting from becoming obscured
smoking is still permitted by law, smoking be prohibited
other than in designated smoking areas and that fire-safe —— carrying out general inspections of all the fire
ashtrays and bins are provided. For those premises where safety equipment.
smoking is not permitted by law, then continuous vigi-
lance is needed. Management procedures should ensure that control is
exercised over the parking of commercial vehicles on
Outside contractors can pose a greater fire risk than a service roadways that are also used for fire service access,
firm’s own employees. They are not as familiar with the so that fire appliances are not obstructed in an emergency
premises as the people permanently employed by the firm. and are able to proceed to within the required distance of
Therefore, they cannot be expected to know the fire risks, any fire main, foam or other inlets. In the interest of secu-
necessary precautions and correct action to take in the rity, it may also be considered necessary to restrict
event of fire. Yet, these contractors may have to carry out unauthorised entry via such roadways, in consultation
operations which are much more hazardous than those with the fire authority.
normally occurring on the premises, e.g. hot work. Efforts
should be made to make contractors and subcontractors
aware of the risks involved in their work. All activities of 14.8.2 Training and education
outside contractors should be strictly supervised and
controlled, and management should ensure that all neces- An essential task of the fire safety manager is the training
sary precautions against fire are taken. of all staff, including part-time, security and cleaning staff,
in fire prevention. This training aims to ensure that each —— seeking to ensure compliance with relevant codes
member of staff takes the appropriate actions to minimise or regulations, as appropriate
the likelihood of a fire starting. In a complex, the training
should include the tenants of every unit and other occu- —— maintenance of structural and/or passive safety
systems
pancy in the complex.
—— routine inspection, maintenance and testing of
All staff need to be trained in basic fire prevention, risk active systems
awareness, smoking policy, process shutdown, good house-
keeping and reporting procedures. Fire safety training —— testing under simulated ‘emergency’ conditions
needs to commence on the first day of appointment of new —— safety audits and inspections
staff and continue in the form of regular refresher
training. —— recording and taking appropriate remedial action
following false alarms
—— learning from drills, false alarms and near-miss
14.8.3 Security events, i.e. using false alarms and near-miss events
as data
Arson fires can start with a rapid burning material, such
as petrol, and the arsonist can start fires in several places —— revising safety plans and updating the fire safety
simultaneously so that the alternative escape routes manual.
normally provided in a building are blocked. Building
management can reduce the risk of serious fires by arson In addition, for larger buildings and complexes, this task
by using a number of methods to reduce the likelihood of includes:
arson and to mitigate the effects if it does occur. These
include: —— ensuring that systems mesh properly with the
emergency procedures
—— management awareness of vulnerability to arson
—— integration of the fire safety systems
—— security against intruders
—— maintaining integration of the fire safety system
—— intruder detection with other systems (e.g. ventilation).
—— control of ignition sources and easily ignitable
materials 14.9.1 Fire safety maintenance and
—— fire detection throughout the building
testing
—— fire suppression systems throughout the building It is essential for the safety of the occupants of a building
that all fire safety equipment is checked frequently.
—— segregation of risks Planned inspection, maintenance and testing procedures
—— effective staff training need to be established and used to ensure that all fire
protection systems can operate effectively when required.
—— closed-curcuit television (cctv) to deter deliberate
fire-setting. Maintenance needs to be carried out in accordance with
the relevant British Standards or manufacturer’s instruc-
Good security arrangements will reduce the risk of arson. tions at the recommended time intervals. The testing and
inspection of these systems should be carried out by
However, the fire safety manager needs to be aware of the competent persons.
possible conflict between security and means of escape
and must ensure that the security arrangements do not Fire safety equipment that needs to be checked regularly
prevent occupants from exiting the building to reach a includes the following:
place of safety or hinder the entry of the fire service into
the building to fight the fire or effect the rescue of occu- —— fire detection and alarm systems (see chapter 8)
pants. In certain circumstances, the need to restrict the
—— fire suppression systems (see chapter 11)
occupants’ ability to leave the premises must be inte-
grated with the provision of adequate and manageable —— smoke control systems (see chapter 10)
emergency egress.
—— means of escape systems (see chapter 7)
—— structural and/or passive elements
14.9 Ensuring systems —— firefighters’ systems (see chapter 13)
respond properly in a —— control systems and power supplies, including

emergency power arrangements
fire emergency
—— access to the building and its surroundings (see
chapter 13)
Another task of the fire safety manager is to ensure that
all of the safety systems respond properly in a fire emer- —— communications systems.
gency. This task includes:
In addition to being responsible for daily checks on the
—— housekeeping (see section 14.8.1) premises prior to the admission of the public, it is also the
fire safety manager’s responsibility to ensure that all fire place of safety quickly, without injury or distress. This
safety equipment is adequately and routinely maintained requires that occupants react promptly to any alarm, and
and tested. Failure to maintain any one of the fire safety also that they exit the building by the most efficient route.
provisions in effective working order could negate the To facilitate this result, the fire manager is responsible for:
whole fire safety strategy.
—— staff training and fire drills, including full
All fire safety installations need to be tested individually, evacuations
but interdependent fire safety installations need to be
tested collectively to demonstrate satisfactory interfacing/ —— reviewing all plant and equipment interface con-
interlinking etc. trols, to ensure that they mesh correctly with the
procedures
Alterations or modifications to an existing installation —— continual inspections and testing of systems and
should not be carried out without consultation with the emergency procedures, including major incident
enforcing authority and, where possible, the original simulations
system designer or installer or other qualified persons.
This is particularly important where systems are combined —— testing under simulated emergency conditions
and depend on a sequence of control events. —— carrying out safety audits and inspections
The manager needs to be aware that safety equipment can —— responding to false alarms
itself be a hazard, e.g. poorly maintained fire doors can
—— learning from and recording drills, false alarms,
cause injury. Where necessary, equipment may need to be
near-miss events and minor incidents
replaced, but without reducing the safety of the building.
Similarly, equipment that is not reliable, or that is regu- —— reviewing all staff duties and training procedures
larly vandalised or abused due to poor or inappropriate
design, may need to be replaced. —— checking the records, as-built drawings and speci-
fications for all fire protection measures
When repairs or alterations are made to the building —— collating feedback from, and issuing it to, partici-
structure, it should be ensured that compartment walls or pants, staff, other occupants etc. after drills
other passive fire protection systems are reinstated if
damaged, especially those that are hidden in voids. —— managing the site fire team
—— monitoring and recording information in the fire
Any alterations, additions, repairs or modifications to safety manual and revising safety plans.
services and equipment need to be carried out only by
competent persons.
Specific tasks relating to plans include:
Contingency plans must be prepared to cope with equip-
ment failures or other problems, such as a failure in the —— developing and maintaining emergency plan(s),
water supplies for the sprinkler system. including evacuation plans, personal emergency
evacuation plans (peeps), victim support and emer-
The maintenance of furniture, furnishings, decor and gency accommodation plans
equipment is as important for the safety of occupants as is —— planning for bad weather, including evacuation
the maintenance of the fire safety equipment. Contents into hostile weather conditions
and equipment affect the likelihood of fire occurring, its
development and subsequent events. Diligent attention to —— planning for the mitigation of potential environ-
detail can minimise the risk of fire. Floor coverings, furni- mental impact of fire
ture, furnishings, scenery, props, curtains and drapes —— risk management, contingency planning, re-start
should be maintained to the appropriate standards of fire planning
retardancy and in a condition that does not reduce overall
fire safety. In addition, well-maintained floor coverings —— contingency planning for salvage and damage
reduce the risk of persons tripping during any emergency control.
evacuation.
Planning should include liaison with the external fire
A record of all tests and checks, and any defects remedied, brigade, and, if appropriate, provision of an ‘emergency
needs to be made in the fire safety manual. pack’, prepared in collaboration with the fire authority,
containing essential information for firefighting, and indi-
cating escape routes and special hazards, including a clear
set of plans, ideally laminated, indicating key hazards and
14.10 Planning for a fire shut-off switches in the building.
emergency
14.10.1 Training and education
Having a fully developed and effective emergency plan is
a key part of effective fire management. In the UK, such An essential sub-task of the fire safety manager is the
a plan is a requirement of the Regulatory Reform (Fire training and education of all staff to ensure that, in a fire
Safety) Order 2005 or the relevant regulations in Scotland emergency, they each take appropriate actions to safeguard
and Northern Ireland. It is the responsibility of the fire occupants and facilitate safe escape. This training is in
safety manager in planning for a fire emergency to seek to addition to training in fire prevention (see section 14.8.2)
ensure that in the event of a fire all occupants escape to a and should include:
—— the fire emergency plan special risk (such as people with disabilities, the elderly,
the infirm and children), and make suitable arrangements
—— the action to be taken on discovering a fire for their assistance.
—— exits and exit routes
All staff should be familiar with the fire emergency plan
—— raising the alarm, including the location of alarm and evacuation procedures and prominent ‘fire instruction’
indicator panels notices should be displayed in all staff areas. These should
—— the action to be taken on hearing the fire alarm state the essentials of the action to be taken on discovering
a fire and on hearing the fire alarm, and should be placed
—— the arrangements for calling the fire service in conspicuous positions in all parts of the building.
—— the location, selection and use of firefighting
equipment Key members of staff should have specific roles relevant
to the fire emergency plan. Designated staff who require
—— knowledge of the escape routes, refuges and exits, master keys to assist in an evacuation should carry them
especially those not in regular use at all times.
—— appreciation of the importance of fire doors and of
the need to close all doors at the time of a fire and In some cases, the fire authority or competent salvage
on hearing the fire alarm professional should be consulted regarding the fire emer-
gency plan.
—— procedure for process shutdown and shutting
down of non-essential equipment, stopping
A key issue for training and the fire emergency plan will
machines and processes and isolating power sup-
be how to decide whether the fire service should be called
plies, where appropriate
in from outside. Many minor fires will not appear to be
—— assisting other occupants who may be unfamiliar (and will not be) life-threatening and might be success-
with the building or fire safety systems fully extinguished with portable firefighting equipment.
However, nearly all large fires start off as small fires, and
—— evacuation procedures if this initial judgment is faulty, then disaster can follow.
—— evacuation of the building (this will include reas-
suring any members of the public, escorting them
to exits and encouraging them to get well clear of 14.10.2 Evacuation management
the building).
Fire alarms in most smaller buildings are best operated in
Details of all training and instruction given and received a ‘single stage’ mode, in which the actuation of a call point
should be recorded in the fire safety manual (e.g. the date or detector gives an instantaneous warning from all fire
of the instruction or exercise and its duration; the name alarm sounders for an immediate evacuation.
of the trainer or instructor, the name of the person receiv-
ing the training or instruction and the nature of the In large or complex buildings, a staged evacuation proce-
instruction, training or drill). dure may be adopted, in which the operation of a call
point or detector gives an evacuation signal on the storey
The basis of fire safety in any premises is the fire emer- or zone affected, and an ‘alert’ warning signal sounds in
gency plan. Staff need to know how to act on discovery of all other parts of the premises. The decision to evacuate
fire or on the raising of the alarm. It is essential that the the remainder of the occupants then rests with the manage-
management team draws up an effective routine which ment and/or the fire service. It is essential that adequate
covers all situations, from a false alarm to a major inci- means of communication between storeys or zones is
dent. The fire routine must take into account the types of provided. A public address system or voice alarm is the
activities that take place in the premises, the fire precau- most suitable way to control the evacuation process if fire
tions that are provided and, above all, the fire warning and alarm sounders are not used (but see chapter 8).
communications systems that are available and the emer-
gency actions that will be required. The evacuation process can be phased evacuation, in
which different parts of the building are evacuated in a
The core of the fire emergency plan will be the actions to controlled sequence of phases; first, the original fire-
be taken in the event of fire. A fire emergency plan should affected storey or zone, then the remainder of the building
be developed that keeps the procedures as simple as possi- in various phases. A phased evacuation will normally
ble and minimises the decisions that need to be made to require at least a two-stage alarm system to give ‘alert’ and
cope with a particular incident. ‘evacuate’ signals, or ‘staff alarm’ and ‘evacuate’ signals.
A fire emergency plan should be carefully devised for each The escape stairs in the building will have been designed
building, taking into account the uses to which the prem- specifically for phased evacuation and the evacuation will
ises are put and, in particular, the means of giving warning normally be coordinated from a fire control centre with
and the means of communication. This fire emergency directive public address announcements, aided, where
plan should take account of the relationship between the appropriate, by colour cctv.
trained staff and other occupants, the familiarity of occu-
pants with the building, and the availability of fire Where horizontal evacuation is planned, and/or the use of
marshals or a site fire team. temporary refuges, then appropriate evacuation proce-
dures will be needed. In general, evacuation procedures
The production of the fire emergency plan should take would not be intended to cope with extreme events which
account of the needs of all occupants, including those at may require simultaneous evacuation.
The sophistication of the fire alarm system and public (f) Ensure that people with peeps are able to put their
address arrangements are major factors when considering plan into action and that assistance is given to
evacuation procedures in large or complex buildings. those using temporary refuges.
Directive messages provide the occupants with the clear,
(g) Ensure that everyone assembles at a place of safety
prompt and accurate information they need to move safely
and is accounted for so that, if anyone is missing,
without delay. The use of public address systems should
the fire service can be informed on their arrival.
not be restricted to coded staff messages.
Ensure that people do not re-enter the building.
Members of the public may need to be guided to a suitable
exit as, otherwise, they tend to follow the same route that (h) Ensure that, on the arrival of the fire service, every
they used to enter the building, or they may be disorien- assistance is given to enable them to attack the fire
tated or unaware of the location of exits. If they arrived by effectively, and in particular inform the fire service
car, they are likely to try to return to it. Parents and chil- of the situation regarding the safety and where-
dren who have been separated will tend to seek each other abouts of the occupants of the building.
so as to leave together. People will often attempt to carry out
normal activities when faced with an unexpected situation.
(i) Implement any pre-planned procedures with
Careful attention must be given to the wording and deliv- respect to care of evacuees, salvage, environmental
ery of both live and pre-recorded messages, not only to protection etc.
provide reassurance and relevant information, but also to
convey the sense of urgency necessary to motivate people (j) Initiate the pre-planned recovery process.
to move promptly in the safest direction when required.
14.11 Management of a fire 14.12 Other planning issues

emergency
Actions in the event of fire for which fire emergency plan- Other planning issues may involve plans for limiting loss
ning is appropriate include: and damage to building structure, contents, the environ-
ment and business operations. Plans may involve actions
—— action on discovery of a fire to be taken both during and after the fire emergency. In
certain cases, these may include planning for the salvage
—— warning and evacuation signals of identified valuables during the incident.
—— calling the fire service, providing information and
advising them
The fire safety manager may wish to consider measures to
—— initiation of evacuation facilitate the post-fire operation of the business or func-
tioning of the building, including arrangements to keep
—— fighting the fire and other staff activities duplicates of business records off-site. This might be as
—— evacuation procedures simple as preparing a list of contacts, but could include
having arrangements in place for using alternative prem-
—— meeting the fire service, providing information ises. For other types of occupancy or businesses, more
and advising them detailed planning may be appropriate. Re-start planning
—— completion of evacuation. for the business may form part of the overall risk
management.
Other issues to consider include: environmental protec-
tion, security, salvage and damage control, protecting the
building contents, protecting the building fabric and The fire safety manager may also wish to consider plans
recording lessons learned. for the protection of the building structure, its contents
and the environment. Building fabric and property protec-
The following procedure provides the basis for any plans tion will be a particularly important issue for heritage
that are developed for a specific building: buildings. It must be recognised that, while it is often the
case that protecting occupants will also protect contents
(a) Operate the fire alarm system and alert employees, etc., there may be conflicts of interest and in such cases
or selected employees, and any control room, to life safety must take precedence.
the emergency.
(b) Call the fire service.
(c) Establish the location and apparent extent of the
fire and assess the situation. 14.13 Changes to a building
(d) Organise and effect the movement and/or evacuation
of the public and staff as determined by item (c).
Changes to a building include extensions, alterations,
(e) Take steps, consistent with the safety of individuals, refurbishment, change of use, disuse, or decommissioning
to fight the fire or contain it. and demolition, all or any of which can affect the fire risk.
14.13.1 Extensions, alterations and Issue of a permit for hot work should also be dependent on:
refurbishment
—— the contractor receiving training in the operation
Experience has demonstrated that fires are more likely to of available fire extinguishers
occur when general maintenance work or alterations are —— the availability of a safety officer (if appropriate)
being carried out to a building, most notably when work
is being carried out by external contractors. The activities —— particular precautions being put in place where
of all external contractors should be strictly supervised special risks are present in the premises.
and controlled, and management should ensure that all
necessary precautions against fire are taken. It is therefore A log of the contractors’ attendance should be maintained
particularly important that guidance is given to both so that, at any time, the number and location of all
general maintenance staff and external contractors on: personnel can be determined.
—— the fire safety arrangements within the building, to
ensure that they are not adversely affected by 14.13.2 Change of use
maintenance work or alterations (especially in
hidden spaces or voids), and Any occupiers of a building will be subject to the manage-
—— procedures to avoid fire occurring, particularly in ment requirements specified at the design stage and
relation to hot work, such as welding or cutting. recorded in the fire safety manual. Where there is a change
of use of the building, or where the scale of the operation
within the building changes, then the fire safety manage-
During maintenance work, and particularly when altera-
ment requirements specified will have to be carefully
tions are being carried out in buildings that remain
re-examined and assessed for the new use. Unless the
occupied, appropriate arrangements should be made to
management assumptions and the level of management
safeguard the integrity of escape routes and the operation
specified prove to be appropriate for the new use, changes
of all fire protection facilities.
will have to be implemented. These changes could either
be to the management structure or could involve the
Approval should be obtained from the local building and provision of additional facilities or equipment, retrofitted
fire authorities, where appropriate, before the implemen- to the building.
tation of extensions or alterations within the building
(DCLG, 2007).
Following a change of use, the building will be subject to
review by various regulatory bodies and they will need to
Management should ensure that arrangements are made
be assured that an appropriate level of fire safety has been
for the instruction and supervision of contractors and
reinstated within the building.
workers in maintaining fire safety; in particular, that they
implement good safety practices, that they understand the
actions to be taken in case of fire and that they are made For buildings in the UK subject to the Regulatory Reform
familiar with appropriate escape routes. In many situa- (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (England and Wales), the Fire
tions there will be a need for strict documentation and a Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006 or the Fire Safety
permit system for contractors carrying out any kind of (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2010, a review of the fire
structural work. Any form of hot work should be the safety risk assessment will be necessary.
subject of specific approval and insistence on appropriate
safeguards.
14.13.3 Units in disuse and
Before any hot work is carried out, a thorough safety decommissioned areas
check should be made in the area where the work is to be
undertaken, and adjacent areas, to see that flammable For units in disuse and decommissioned areas, routine
materials are either removed to safety or protected. inspection by staff should be intensified to prevent care-
less practice and to ensure that fire protection systems
Suitable portable fire extinguishers should be provided remain fully operative (where appropriate). In cases where
adjacent to the hot work area. A further check should be these units/areas are not physically separated from the rest
carried out immediately after work has finished for the of the building, they should either have an operational
day to ensure that the area is safe. sprinkler system or be partitioned off from the rest of the
building by appropriate fire-resisting construction.
No hot work should be allowed in or near the building
unless a hot work permit has been issued. The permit will
be issued only if the fire safety manager is satisfied that no
satisfactory alternative method is feasible and that the 14.13.4 Disused or decommissioned
contractor understands and can carry out their responsi- buildings
bilities with regard to the following issues:
Disused or decommissioned buildings do not present a
—— preparation of the place of work very great risk to life. Any fire safety management of such
a building should focus on the prevention of fire starting
—— care and attention during work and should include measures to:
—— leaving the workplace clean and safe
—— ensure that all power supplies are disabled
—— the need for a check of the area after the job is
completed and for a final check at a later time. —— remove any material that might self-ignite
—— remove any material that might be subject to an sequencing of phases of an evacuation procedure,
arson attack except for the initial phase, should be provided.
—— maintain security to prevent arson attacks. —— Control systems showing the location of the inci-
dent and the status of all automatic fire protection
installations and facilities.
14.13.5 Buildings being demolished
—— Override provision associated with all automatic
The management of fire safety in buildings that are being fire protection installations and facilities (other
demolished will be very similar to that required during than those that have to be located either adjacent
construction (see chapter 15). There will be significant to their equipment or elsewhere where local con-
risks of ignition in a building where many or most of the trol is needed, e.g. overrides for gaseous fire
fire protection systems are either disabled or missing. extinguishing systems or the sprinkler system
main, or floor-isolating valves).
—— Override provision for air conditioning systems or
ventilation systems involving recirculation of air.
14.14 Fire control centre —— A communication system, in the UK conforming
to BS 5839-9, providing a direct link between the
In all buildings designed for phased evacuation, and in control room and all firefighting lobbies, fire and
large or complex buildings, a fire control centre should be rescue service access points and refuges for people
provided to enable the fire and rescue service to assist the with disablilities.
premises management in controlling an incident immedi-
—— An exchange telephone with direct dialling for
ately on arrival. The fire control centre should be either:
external calls.
(a) a room dedicated solely as a fire control centre or —— Facilities to broadcast information via public
address system to occupiers of the building.
(b) combined with the management central control
room. —— Controls and monitor screens for cctv, if provided
for the control of evacuation (the use of cctv can
The fire control centre should be adjacent to a fire and greatly assist in the management of emergencies).
rescue service access point, or other location agreed with the
fire and rescue service, and it should be readily accessible, —— The fire emergency plan for the building.
preferably directly from the open air. If this is not practica- —— Keys or other devices required to facilitate access
ble, the route to the fire control centre should be protected. throughout the building and to operate any
mechanical and electrical systems.
Because of the potential need for the fire control centre to
be operational over an extended period of time, it should be —— Floor plans of the building.
separated from the remainder of the building by two-hour —— Means of contacting principal staff and/or building
fire-resisting construction and should incorporate facilities services engineers.
to enable it to function as normal during an emergency.
—— A means of sounding the alert signal throughout
The fire control centre should be provided with a three- the building.
hour non-maintained system of emergency lighting
—— A clock to time phases of evacuation.
supplied from a source independent of the normal light-
ing, to enable the control centre to operate satisfactorily —— A visual indication showing the status of evacua-
in the absence of the normal lighting supply. tion in those parts of the building where an
evacuation signal has been given.
Throughout the building, a reliable means of communica-
—— A wall-mounted writing board with suitable writing
tion with the fire control centre – either a fire telephone
implements for displaying important information.
system or a radio telecommunication system acceptable to
the fire authority – should be provided for use by the —— Refreshment facilities for personnel involved in
management of the building in conjunction with the fire the incident.
control system to control evacuation procedures and for
communication between fire and rescue service personnel. The control centre should be staffed by a competent
Fire telephone systems in the UK should conform to person, familiar with the use and operation of the installed
BS 5839‑9: 2011 (BSI, 2011). equipment, whenever the building is occupied. Particular
attention should be paid to the human factors involved in
The fire control centre should be equipped with the running a control centre in an emergency. The design
following: should support the interface with control centre operators
to enable them to take control of the emergency efficiently
—— All control and indicating equipment for the fire and effectively.
alarm and other fire safety systems for the building.
This should include a facility to sound the evacua- The control of building systems, such as fire, security and
tion signal in each evacuation zone throughout the general building services control, is increasingly being
building, with the option to signal a total evacua- integrated into single building management systems. In
tion. However, this would not be feasible where the view of the increasing use of these systems, it is important
stairs provided are designed to cope with phased that the integrity of the building management system is at
evacuation only. The option to cancel any automatic least as good as the integrity of the individual systems that
it incorporates. This is essential to ensure that the highest DCLG (2007) Building Regulations and Fire Safety Procedural Guidance
standards of security, safety and reliability are achieved (4th edition) (London: RIBA Publishing)
where systems have been integrated. Clear differentiation
should be provided, where possible, between fire, security DCLG (2012) HM Government. Fire safety law and guidance documents for
business [online] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fire-safety-
and building management systems within the control
law-and-guidance-documents-for-business (accessed November 2017)
centre.
HM Government (2013) The Buildings Regulations 2010: Approved
Document 7. Materials and Workmanship (Newcastle upon Tyne: NBS)
HOTREC (2010) Guidelines to fire safety in European hotels. Hotel fire safety
MBS (management, building and systems) methodology Version 1st February
References 2010 (Brussels: HOTREC)
Scottish Government (2017) Fire law. General guidance [online] http://

BSI (2011) BS 5839-9: 2011 Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings. www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/policies/police-fire-rescue/fire/FireLaw/
Code of practice for the design, installation, commissioning and maintenance of GeneralGuidance and http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/public-safety/
emergency voice communication systems (London: British Standards Fire-Rescue/FireLaw/FireLaw/SectorSpecificGuidance (accessed Novem-
Institution) ber 2017)
BSI (2017) BS 9999: 2017 Fire safety in the design, management and use of Welsh Government (2013) The Buildings Regulations 2010: Approved
buildings. Code of practice (London: British Standards Institution) Document 7. Materials and Workmanship (Cardiff)
15-1
15 Fire safety on construction sites
15.1 Introduction still a lack of belief that such events will happen (Fire
Prevention, 1992b). The conflict between the need for fire
It was reported that the fires at London’s Minster Court precautions generally and resistance to having to adopt
(1991) and Broadgate Phase 8 (1990) accounted for them due to their maintenance requirements not only
£138.5 million of the £143 million total for fire losses on exists in completed buildings but also during construc-
construction sites between 1984 and 1991 in the UK (Fire tion. An effective way of increasing awareness is to assign
Prevention, 1992a; SCI, 1991). In response, a code of prac- responsibility for the outcome of failure to provide
tice for fire prevention on construction sites was produced, adequate fire precaution. Where it is unrealistic for indi-
Fire Prevention on Construction Sites: The joint code of practice viduals to bear this responsibility, it should be borne by
on the protection from fire of construction sites and buildings their employers.
undergoing renovation (FPA, 2015). In addition, the Health
and Safety Executive (HSE), which has powers over fire
precautions on construction sites, has published guidance 15.2.2 General fire training and
on managing fire safety during construction and identify- security
ing the responsibilities for those concerned (HSE, 2010).
The application of either may be required by insurers, The building process is varied and complex and often
depending on the scale of the works and the risks involved. conflicts with the need to provide and maintain fire
precautions. An effective form of detection and control,
The increasing use of timber construction poses an ever proven in health-care premises particularly, is the pres-
greater fire risk in the construction industry. A report by ence of alert persons. Of the many fires which start in
the Greater London Authority (GLA) suggests that timber health-care premises, few get out of hand because they are
construction now makes up approximately 24% of all new detected by persons trained to respond and are therefore
housing projects in the UK and approximately 12% of all tackled at an early stage.
construction site fires in London (GLA, 2010). The high
fire loads inherent in timber-framed buildings and the One solution to the need for provision and maintenance
difficulties associated with providing fire compartmenta- of fire precautions on building sites may be to employ
tion prior to completion has led to a number of severe fire trained persons to monitor the site and take appropriate
incidents in recent years. action when fires are detected. This may be more cost
effective than stipulating temporary measures or over-
As with completed buildings, there is a conflict between
specifying permanent ones to serve during construction.
the building user and the regulatory controls designed to
limit the incidence of fire. The designer, contractor and
building user do not really believe that their building will Such persons could be provided by private security contrac-
ever be involved in a fire, whereas the regulating authori- tors or, alternatively, suitably trained persons could be
ties assume that a fire will occur at some stage during the sought as part of the professional responsibility of the devel-
life of the building and require that the building be oper or contractor. There may be a need for a team of on-site
designed accordingly. However, the extent and cost of fire professionals, who could respond to any fire incidents.
damage and the resulting disruption to the construction
process, as well as the commercial consequences of delayed General awareness of the risk of site fires would be
handover, can be significant. Therefore, it is important to increased by contractors offering improved levels of train-
clarify the issues surrounding site fires and to emphasise ing in firefighting. Contractors could then ensure that a
where attention should be focused. minimum number of suitably trained staff are present on
site during construction.
Furthermore, the transient and changing nature of
construction sites makes it harder to police them and to The provision of trained fire watchers can be justified in
ensure that an appropriate level of safety is provided. view of the potential losses arising from inadequate provi-
sion. This is not a new concept, it is employed in certain
hazardous industries and during national emergencies.
Aside from offering financial incentives for fire detection
15.2 Motivation for provision and control duties, the necessity for the role could be
and maintenance of fire backed by requirements from the HSE, the fire brigades
and the building control authorities.
precautions
15.2.1 Personal responsibility 15.2.3 Life safety
An increased awareness of the possibility of fire and its It is of primary importance to maintain the record of zero
consequences is required. Despite past incidents, there is lives lost in recent construction site fires in the UK. The
provision and maintenance of means of escape is vital, but While the risk to firefighters and construction workers is
may conflict with construction activities. The financial significant, particularly on high-risk sites, such as the
losses incurred from recent incidents are bad enough; the construction of timber-framed buildings, to date there has
loss of life of operatives or firefighters must be avoided. been little risk of loss of life from construction site fires
in the UK. Moreover, the emotive dimension present in
Many provisions and recommendations contribute to life dwelling fires is absent from construction site fires. There-
safety. It would not be helpful to distinguish any as unique fore, the incentive for improving construction site fire
or of more importance than others, but particular items safety lies mainly with insurers, who bear the cost of rein-
that should be addressed as part of a life safety strategy are: statement, and with the client, who has an interest in
seeing projects completed, ready for occupation. Substan-
—— escape routes tial losses are also incurred by delays to future business
activities.
—— detection and alarm
—— ventilation for smoke relief
—— emergency lighting and signage 15.5 UK legislation
—— compartmentation.
In England and Wales, the construction of new buildings
Obviously, the management and signage of escape routes and the alteration of existing buildings is controlled by
is essential, but emergency lighting on construction sites the Building Regulations 2010, as amended, and by some
often fails to meet satisfactory standards. remaining local acts. The principal legislation relevant to
existing buildings in England and Wales is the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, known as the Fire Safety
Order, which applies to both occupied buildings and
construction sites. Similar legislation applies in Scotland
15.3 Long-term objectives (Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 and Fire (Scotland)
Act 2005) and Northern Ireland (Building Regulations
(Northern Ireland) 2012) (see section 3.4). In the course of
15.3.1 Assimilation of fire precautions construction, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974,
into routine site practice the Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations
1996 (regulation 18), the Construction (Design and
The long-term objective of effective site fire precautions Management) Regulations 2015 and the Management of
should be to maintain the status quo of no fatalities Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, as amended,
resulting from construction site fires, a reduction in the apply, the enforcing authority generally being the HSE. In
number of site fires, and a reduction in losses and insur- non-segregated sites, both the HSE and the fire service
ance claims. In achieving this objective, it is important may have an enforcing role.
not to make the construction process more onerous –
indeed, the more onerous the fire prevention measures, Under the Fire Safety Order and these acts and regula-
the more likely they are to be ignored or overridden. The tions, the person who has control of the site has a duty to
objectives should include the assimilation of site fire keep the workplace, including any temporary buildings
precautions in the most unobtrusive manner possible, and temporary accommodation units, in a safe condition.
ensuring that their effectiveness is commensurate with the This duty includes the identification of risks, preservation
risk. They should be as effective during construction, of safe means of escape, maintenance of fire safety equip-
when the risk is high, as they will be in the completed ment, and the provision of training, supervision and
building. information to ensure health and safety (HSE, 1993).
Employees must be conversant with fire drills and fire
precautions. The Fire Safety Order identifies the appro-
15.3.2 Improved fire awareness priate enforcing authority.
Petrochemical and other hazardous industries have consid- Safety precautions for the special processes taking place
erable experience in assessing risks and ensuring that during construction and for the storage and use of danger-
their staff are aware of such risks. Similar principles need ous substances and materials are addressed in legislation,
to be applied to the construction industry to ensure that such as the Highly Flammable Liquids and Liquefied
an adequate level of safety is provided and that staff under- Petroleum Gases Regulations 1972 and the Petroleum
stand the risks and the safety features provided. (Consolidation) Regulations 2014.
15.4 Implications of site fires 15.6 Aspects to be considered

There are environmental issues associated with site fires There are several aspects that should be considered with
besides pollution, such as the wastage of materials and respect to fire safety on construction sites, including the
workmanship. However, in financial terms, there need be following:
little cause for concern, provided that insurers continue to
cover losses. Furthermore, the workforce may continue to —— Role of the designer: An appreciation of the fire
be employed on a site following a fire, and materials hazards during construction should be part of the
suppliers may also continue to benefit. designer’s brief (see also section 15.8).
Fire safety on construction sites 15-3
—— Fire precautions: Precautions required during separation distances that should be maintained between
construction should be incorporated into the adjoining buildings.
design in the most economic manner possible and
with the least disruption to the building process.
15.7.2 The case for action
—— Fire strategy report: The contractor should be
cognisant of the fire strategy for the completed
building, which provides guidance on the intended Clearly, there is a general level of awareness of the dangers
fire precautions and highlights particular prob- from fire on building sites; however, even given the
lems and provisions in the design. This knowledge unlikely assumption that existing building sites have been
will assist in the development of construction fire protected to the standards recommended by available
risk assessments and in the provision of appropri- guidance, fires within buildings undergoing works have
ate fire precautions. happened and the resulting financial losses have been
significant. Therefore, it is clear that existing guidance is
—— Performance requirements for site fire precautions: Fire either ignored, misunderstood, inadequate or does not
risks during construction should be identified and address the issues that have previously resulted in large
managed to avoid them being significantly losses. The need to focus on these issues in order to
increased. Contractors should undertake risk improve the situation is justified by the losses experi-
assessments and produce manuals and work proce- enced, both capital and consequential, particularly from
dure documents to record their solutions to these smoke damage, delays in completion and future business
issues, highlighting the use of temporary measures disruption.
and maximising the use of provisions intended for
the completed building.
—— Fire awareness: The workforce must be made aware
15.7.3 Temporary and permanent
of the risk of fire and be encouraged to undertake provision
fire safety training.
The completed building will ideally incorporate suitable
—— Revisions to conditions of contract: Contracts should fire precautions to limit damage effectively in the event of
address legislation and standards, such as the Fire a fire.
Safety Order, NFPA 241 (NFPA, 2013) or other
applicable standards and published guidance. They
should include performance requirements for fire However, it must be remembered that statutory fire
precautions and safety, method statements relating precautions are weighted towards life safety rather than
to the planning of fire precautions, and the property protection. Nonetheless, during building works,
necessity for appointing appropriately qualified it would be advantageous to be able to rely as much as
fire wardens. Tender submissions and interviews possible on the fire precautions for the completed building
should address these issues. rather than introducing temporary measures. Although
relying on the final provisions may add costs due to
out-of-sequence working, these are often likely to be less
than the cost of equivalent temporary provisions. The use
15.7 Objectives of fire of some temporary provisions will probably be inevitable,
but the aim should be to keep these to a minimum.
precautions during
construction The intention would be to install the fire precautions as
the work progresses, to preserve them during the works
and to leave them in good order upon completion. They
15.7.1 Background would then assume their intended role of protecting the
completed building. This approach offers advantages in
programme reduction and subsequent time savings.
It is understandable and commendable that most of the
guidance and legislation on fire precautions during
construction is aimed at providing a safe environment for The alternative option is to introduce extra fire precau-
construction staff. That there have been no actual casual- tions during the works and either leave them in the
ties in the UK in recent incidents suggests that existing completed building or remove them before handover.
life safety provisions have probably been adequate.
However, this situation will remain satisfactory only if the It must be appreciated that the hazards in a completed
present standard of vigilance is maintained, and increased building and one under construction or repair are not the
when the fire risk is greater, such as during the construc- same, and it is generally accepted that they are greater
tion of timber-framed and high-rise buildings. However, during construction. This will be apparent from the ongoing
in terms of overall fire damage, the situation is much less risk assessments and can be catered for by recognising the
satisfactory, and this aspect of construction fire safety increased danger and increasing vigilance accordingly. If
needs urgent attention. it is considered essential to provide additional temporary
fire precautions, the maintenance and effectiveness of such
The risk to neighbouring buildings and persons posed by measures are more likely to be ensured if they are active,
timber-framed buildings can be greater than would gener- such as detection and firefighting facilities, rather than
ally be encountered in standard construction practices and passive measures, such as temporary partitions. Passive
the spread of fire deserves additional consideration. provisions are prone to damage, although they can be
Organisations such as the Structural Timber Association easily inspected; active systems are less prone to damage
in the UK provide guidance on such matters as the safe but need to be maintained.
15.7.4 Criteria for fire precautions 15.8.3 Reducing ignition sources

Based on the premise of maximising dependence on Minimising the need for hot work is the most crucial area,
permanent, rather than temporary measures, fire precau- although control of on-site ignition sources is more in the
tions during construction may be considered using the domain of the contractors. The need for welding on-site
same criteria as those anticipated for the completed build- can be reduced by specifying bolted rather than welded
ing. These criteria include: steel sections and by the use of off-site fabrication. Another
area for risk reduction is the use of threaded or push-fit
—— that suitable measures should be taken to avoid plumbing rather than brazed jointing.
fires from starting
—— the need to detect fires at an early stage 15.8.4 General fire safety
precautions
—— provisions for raising an alarm and evacuating the
building Fire safety measures required in the completed building
—— control of fire size by active or passive measures can often be provided in the early stages of construction.
General fire safety precautions worthy of attention include
—— access and facilities for fire brigade intervention. the following:
These provisions, all of which will be required in the —— Operational fire mains and access for personnel
finished building, can be incorporated at an early stage in and vehicles to the inlets will greatly improve fire-
the construction programme and maintained as the build- fighting capabilities.
ing work develops. The fire precautions required during —— Compartmentation required in the finished build-
building works can then be established based on analysis ing should be implemented as early as possible.
of the various activities taking place and the availability of
the fire precaution measures intended for protection of the —— Early provision of escape and firefighting stairs
completed building. enhance both safety and firefighting capabilities.
—— Fire doors, if shut during a fire, are very effective
Additional protection during works may be necessary to in controlling fire and smoke spread; where they
reduce the risk to an acceptable level. In defining such a are provided to protect escape and firefighting
level, it would not be appropriate to attempt to quantify it stairs, their early installation is beneficial.
rigorously, by a statistical representation of time related to
hazard, for instance. However, this should be borne in —— Alarm systems will provide early warning of a fire
mind when evaluating proposals. For example, the storage situation, but should be suitable for installation in
of hazardous materials for a short period may be accept- dusty environments.
able with strict management in a non-fire-rated area.
However, if such storage were needed over an extended The early provision of these facilities, although conceptu-
period, then the use of a secure fire-resisting enclosure ally possible, may have an impact on other design features.
would be expected. An appreciation of their benefits may allow their incorpo-
ration early in the process, if raised at a suitable stage
during the design phase.
15.8 Designer’s responsibility 15.8.5 Emergency procedures

Provision and maintenance of first-aid firefighting equip-
15.8.1 HSE guide: Fire Safety in ment and training regimes may be outside the scope of the
Construction designer’s responsibility, but designers can address the
provision of suitable access to the site and within it. A
suitable route into and around the site would be beneficial
The HSE’s own guidance, Fire Safety in Construction, is a
for general construction purposes, and could be kept clear
very thorough document and could be applied to address
for firefighting access. With higher risk projects, e.g. those
the subject matter of this section (HSE, 2010). However,
below ground and tall structures, particular attention to
in considering the responsibilities of all entities associ-
this aspect is warranted.
ated with construction, it is appropriate in this Guide to
emphasise the designer’s role. Appendix 4 of the HSE
guide is entitled ‘Who does what?’ and is summarised in 15.8.6 Temporary accommodation
this section.
units
15.8.2 Fire performance of Space should be allowed for temporary units when
considering the general layout of the site. Locating them
construction materials outside the structure is optimal but, if this is not achiev-
able, the most suitable locations would include
Designers should be aware of the fire performance of their consideration for means of escape, fire spread and fire-
preferred materials during storage, construction and in fighting access.
the completed building. Following analysis, it may be
decided that the use of less hazardous materials or
processes would be more appropriate. 15.8.7 Sleeping accommodation
The advice of a fire safety specialist should be sought if 15.9.3 Firefighting

there is any doubt about the specification or location of
sleeping accommodation on a construction site, as higher 15.9.3.1 Construction
fire safety standards are justified.
Construction sites associated with timber structures can
present an unexpected risk to attending fire and rescue
service personnel, and fire authorities should be notified
15.9 Building construction of such projects before work begins on site. If fire stopping
and compartmentation is incomplete when a fire starts,
works fire spread and growth can be rapid.
The Colindale fire in London in 2006 highlighted the

Method statements and works sequencing should consider
severity of fires involving timber-framed buildings during
and take into account the following fire safety issues.
construction (GLA, 2010). Within nine minutes of the fire
being detected, all parts of the six-storey building were
alight and the building collapsed 14 minutes later. The fire
15.9.1 Compartmentation was so severe that 100 firefighters attended the incident
and, at times, were not able to get within 50 m of the build-
The need to provide and maintain fire compartmentation ing. This fire, and several others involving timber structures
at the early stages of construction should be emphasised. in the UK, resulted in an inquiry by the London Assembly
If self-closing fire doors protecting shafts and other verti- in 2010 and a number of recommendations regarding the
cal connections are vulnerable to damage, they should be construction of timber-framed buildings (GLA, 2010).
provided with hold-open devices operated by a fire detec-
tion system. Buildings with features such as fake chimneys and fake
masonry facades may give the attending fire service a false
The provision of compartmentation is likely to be a perception of the type and nature of construction involved.
major part of the fire strategy for a completed building.
During construction, it may be provided only partially, Where construction methods would present an abnormal
or not at all. During the fire at Minster Court, compart- risk to firefighters, the fire service should be notified of
mentation intended for the completed building was the nature of the site and the risks prior to the commence-
impaired, with the result that fire spread up a protected ment of construction activities on site.
shaft because doors were held or left open without clos-
ing devices (Fire Prevention, 1992c). Furthermore the 15.9.3.2 Firefighting facilities
atrium was not enclosed, as it would have been once the
building was complete, which resulted in further fire and Firefighting facilities in the completed building, includ-
smoke spread. ing risers, hydrants and firefighting shafts, should become
operable as early as possible during construction to
The need for the progressive installation of compartmen- maximise their usefulness. This issue is addressed in the
tation is even greater in timber-framed buildings, Joint code (FPA, 2015), in NFPA 241 (NFPA, 2013) and in
particularly those using cross-laminated timber products hydrant standards. The provision and maintenance of
where the risk to firefighters, construction workers and these facilities during construction is dependent on
adjoining properties is greater. The Colindale fire in management commitment but is nonetheless considered
London in 2006 revealed the speed at which a large fire possible and worthwhile.
can develop in a partially constructed timber-framed
building (GLA, 2010). 15.9.3.3 Sprinklers
Some sprinkler standards call for the installation of func-

Testing of timber-framed buildings has highlighted the
tioning sprinklers as construction progresses. Sprinklers
need to ensure that approved methods of fixing fire-rated
should be installed as early as possible and will be of
elements are used; organisations such as the Structural
economic benefit if such measures also form part of the
Timber Association in the UK provide further guidance
completed building. Damage to sprinklers during build-
on fire safety for these types of structures.
ing works is a matter for site management; however, if
needed, they could be guarded or provided with mechan-
ical protection, e.g. recessed. Special precautions may be
15.9.2 Ventilation required in exposed conditions during winter, such as
temporary alternative valve sets.
The control of smoke, to assist escape, as assistance to
the fire brigade in identifying the fire source or as a Decommissioning of sprinklers already installed must
means of clearing a building, would normally form part first be discussed with the building owners, responsible
of the fire strategy for a completed building. During the persons, where assigned, insurers and fire authorities.
Minster Court fire, smoke control systems were not oper-
ating (Fire Prevention, 1992c). Smoke spread up the It is appreciated that the provision of sprinklers to the
atrium, accumulating at the top, causing considerable relevant standard in a partially completed building poses
damage to the upper floors, until the atrium roof failed. considerable problems. However, if their contribution to
The need to provide and maintain smoke ventilation at the reduction of construction fire risks is acknowledged,
the early stages of construction should be considered the phasing of the building works could be structured to
where possible. incorporate them at the earliest opportunity.
15.9.3.4 First-aid firefighting This issue is even more critical with timber-framed build-
ings, due to the potential for a very large fire to occur
There is some evidence that first-aid firefighting facilities, within a short period.
including extinguishers, blankets and fire hose reels, are
abused by site staff, but their usefulness is generally
accepted. The fact that some fires are not extinguished by
first-aid firefighting equipment may be due less to the
15.10 Management and
availability of such equipment and more to a lack of skill communication
or training in their application, or to the nature of the fire
at the time of discovery.
15.10.1 Management
15.9.4 Detection Site management plays an important part in ensuring that
fire precaution measures are adopted and site managers
The early detection of fire in any circumstances is advan- may need to ensure that site staff are adequately trained to
tageous. On construction sites, detection will alert both fight fires. Keeping the fire brigade informed about the
those responsible for first-aid firefighting and the fire development, in terms of access and firefighting facilities as
brigade. Dust levels are likely to be high during building well as the site layout, should form part of the site manag-
works and the provision of fire detection will require care- er’s duties. The importance of patrolling construction sites,
ful consideration due to the potential for false alarms. particularly as work nears completion, should be empha-
This aspect must be considered to avoid early mistrust of sised. Site management will play a leading role in briefing
the installation arising, although the problem can be the attending fire brigade on the incident on their arrival.
largely overcome by the choice of detector.
15.10.2 Fire wardens
On large, complex sites, or where the risk is high, consid-
eration should be given to the use of an automated fire The role of a fire warden is to ensure that fire precautions
detection system rather than a manually operated system. are being observed, and they should be aware of the risks
based on an understanding of the behaviour of fire, rather
than merely as the application of a set of rules. There
15.9.5 Fire loads needs to be a greater appreciation of the importance of the
fire warden’s role. Implementation of this recommenda-
Past incidents emphasise the need to address the increased tion should not result in the employment of a poorly
fire load posed by temporary works and the need to main- qualified person to double as the fire safety officer. The
tain the integrity of protected shafts (Fire Prevention, better suited the person is to this role, the greater the
1992b). The use of less combustible materials for tempo- assurance that fire precautions will be observed. The
rary works would reduce the risk of fire spread over nature of the job and its responsibilities demand that
combustible protective cladding, scaffold boards and stag- appropriate safety measures be implemented. The fire
ing. Nonetheless, automatic fire detection and control warden must receive full support from management in any
would provide further assistance in reducing fire damage. negotiations that may be necessary, regardless of the
contractual implications.
15.9.6 Building separation
Depending on certain factors (see section 3.2.5), the fire 15.11 Built-in fire precautions
strategy will consider the possibility of fire spread between
buildings, and will include appropriate measures to miti- The concept of built-in, or ‘hidden’, fire precautions that
gate the risk. cause minimal conflict with the building’s use is not new.
However, the more heavily they rely on continuous
The fire strategy’s contribution to limiting fire spread will management, the more likely they are to be ineffective
take into account the building’s intended end use, when required. The dangers of having to use an escape
compartmentation and the provision of sprinklers. route with which one is not familiar are well known and,
However, during construction, neither sprinklers nor in an emergency, it is often considered better to leave a
compartmentation may be functional, and measures to building by the route through which it was entered.
control fire spread will be limited; fire loads may also be
higher than they will be on completion. The best fire precautions in completed buildings are those
that are in harmony with the building’s normal use.
Furthermore, designs may require external elevations Examples include hospitals in which department bounda-
themselves to include protected areas, but the fact that ries coincide with fire compartments, and hotel bedrooms
these are incomplete will mean that they can make no where fire-resisting doors provided for privacy and acous-
contribution to preventing fire spread to adjoining tic needs also ensure sufficient mass to resist fire. Such fire
properties. precautions are more likely to be effective when required.
Temporary measures in the form of fire-resisting parti- The same considerations apply on construction sites, and
tions, facades and enclosures for combustible materials, appropriate fire precautions, ‘hidden’ in the developing
and the control of combustible materials, may be required building, should be included where possible. The use of
on construction sites to avoid fire spread to adjoining reinforced concrete, for example, provides a level of fire
properties. resistance as soon as the formwork is removed.
15.12 Partial occupation References

For some construction projects, in particular where Fire Prevention (1992a) ‘New construction site code “must succeed”’ 252
extended timescales are involved, parts of the building (September) 9
may be completed and occupied while construction work Fire Prevention (1992b) ‘Getting through construction’ 248 (April) 20
continues elsewhere.
Fire Prevention (1992c) ‘FPA casebook of fires’ 248 (April) 33
Care is needed where it is intended that partial occupation FPA (2015) Fire Prevention on Construction Sites: The joint code of practice
is to take place, in particular where the occupied (or on the protection from fire of construction sites and buildings undergoing
renovation (London: Fire Protection Association)
partially occupied) part of the building is residential or
incorporates sleeping accommodation. The completed GLA (2010) Fire Safety in London: Fire risks in London’s tall and timber
parts of the building are likely to be subject to different frame buildings (London: Greater London Authority)
legislation from the construction site, and the require- HSE (1993) ID 404/23 General Fire Precautions at Temporary Accommodation
ments of such legislation will have to be reconciled with Units on Construction Sites (Sudbury: Health and Safety Executive)
the particular risks of construction.
HSE (2010) HSG168 Fire Safety in Construction (London: HSE Books)
It may be necessary to provide additional and, if appro- NFPA (2013) NFPA 241 Standard for safeguarding construction, alteration
priate, temporary fire safety measures to assure the safety and demolition operations (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection
Association)
of those in the occupied parts, especially if sleeping
accommodation is provided while construction works SCI (1991) Structural Fire Engineering: Investigation of the Broadgate Phase
continue elsewhere. 8 fire (Ascot: Steel Construction Institute)
16-1
16 Fire safety of building facades
This new chapter has been added as a result of the fire at The arrangements in England for full scale fire tests and
Grenfell Tower in Kensington, London, and other large- ‘assessments in lieu of testing’ have recently been the
scale international fires involving external facades. This subject of a consultation on severely restricting such
section does not contain speculation regarding the cause assessments, and on banning combustible materials from
and spread of such fires around the world, or the Grenfell external elements, which may render full scale testing
fire, which is being addressed by the public inquiry and redundant or significantly curtail its relevance. Such regu-
police investigation. latory measures are not limited to the UK. In Australia the
states of Victoria and New South Wales have recently
The design of facade systems is a highly specialised area introduced new measures to restrict the use of certain
of fire engineering expertise and should only be under- products in construction.
taken by someone who is competent to do so. The Society
of Façade Engineering (https://www.cibse.org/socie-
ty-of-facade-engineering-sfe) is the specialist group within As a result of this significant regulatory uncertainty, the
CIBSE that deals with the requirements of façade engi- decision has been taken to publish chapter 16 in online
neering. Corporate members of the Society have form only. This will allow it to be updated in line with
demonstrated their competence in the discipline of façade anticipated ongoing government announcements and
engineering and have the specialist knowledge to provide changes to legislation. It also removes the potential for
advice on cladding and façade engineering requirements. erroneous guidance on these matters to be available in a
more durable and persistent printed form.
There are hundreds of fire tests defined by UK, European,
ISO and US codes and standards. It is vital that reference
is made to the correct fire test for the particular use When substantive information is available, chapter 16 of
required. Care should be taken in respect of vague terms, this Guide may be accessed from the summary page for
such as fire proof, fire safe, fire retardant, fire resistant, CIBSE Guide E on the CIBSE website (https://www.cibse.
and instead a check should be made to determine if the org/knowledge). Given the high likelihood of significant
product or system satisfies the performance requirements regulatory changes, readers should consider whether it is
in the relevant fire test or classification documents refer- appropriate to download copies for subsequent use, or
enced in this chapter. access the guidance online to ensure that the latest version
is being consulted and applied. Downloaded copies may
Internal fire spread, including requirements for compart- need to be stored for audit and quality assurance purposes,
ment floors, compartment walls and protected shafts, is but it is important that such copies are clearly identified
addressed in chapter 12, smoke ventilation in chapter 10 as archive copies and not to be used in a live design or
and sprinklers in chapter 11 of this Guide. construction environment.
I-1
Index available safe egress time (ASET) 7-7 building extensions 14-12 to 14-13
building facades see facade systems
balanced pressure proportioning 11-25 building handover 2-5, 14-4
Note: page numbers in italics refer to figures; basement areas 3-4, 13-16 building height 3-1, 3-4
page numbers in bold refer to tables; headings beam detectors 8-9 to 8-10, 8-13 building information modelling (bim) 2-3
are arranged in letter-by-letter alphabetic order. bedrooms see sleeping accommodation building life cycle 2-5 to 2-6
behaviour in fires 7-9, 7-9 to 7-11 building maintenance 14-10, 14-13
bladder tanks 11-25 building management 14-8, 14-10
acceptance testing 14-4 BRE see Building Research Establishment building occupancy see occupancy types
access for the fire service 13-6 to 13-8, 13-13 to (BRE) Building Regulations 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, 3-5, 7-1,
13-16, 13-18 B-RISK 6-6 to 6-7 8-1
aerial appliances 13-3 British Standards Building Research Establishment (BRE)
aerosols (extinguishing agents) 11-35 BS 476-20: 2017 12-1 BRE 79204 10-11
afffs (aqueous film-forming foams) 11-23 BS 750: 2006 13-8 LPS 1208 12-10
ahj (authority having jurisdiction) 1-2, 2-3 to BS 5041-2: 1987 13-11 building separation 3-5
2-4, 2-5 BS 5266-1: 2016 9-3 construction sites 15-6
air change systems 10-1 BS 5306-1: 2006 13-13, 13-22 and sprinkler protection 11-3
air leakage from building 10-10 BS 5306-8: 2012 13-21, 13-22 building types see also occupancy types
air-tightness of building 10-2 BS 5499-1: 2002 9-3 characteristic fire growth times 6-4
alarm systems see automatic fire detection and BS 5588-7: 1997 3-10 escape travel times 7-11
alarm systems BS 5839: 2013 8-2 fire load densities 11-6
alarp (as low as is reasonably practicable) BS 5839-1: 2013 8-4 to 8-5, 8-7, 8-8, 8-11 floor space factors 7-2
5-3, 5-5, 5-6 to 8-12, 8-13 to 8-14 travel distances for escape 7-5
alcohol resistant (AL) foams 11-24 BS 5839-1: 2017 13-6 building volume 3-5
alterations BS 5839-6: 2013 3-8, 8-4, 8-5 to 8-6 ‘built-in’ fire precautions 15-6
buildings 14-12 to 14-13 BS 5839-8: 2013 8-14 business resilience 5-8 see also property
systems 14-10 BS 5839-9: 2011 13-18 protection
alternative exits 7-4 BS 7346-4: 2003 10-2
apartment buildings 3-8 to 3-9, 13-17 see also BS 7346-7: 2013 13-5 C6 foams 11-25
corridors BS 7346-8: 2013 10-1 carbon dioxide (extinguishing agent) 11-34,
approvals process 2-3 to 2-4, 14-4 BS 7944: 1999 13-22 11-35
approved codes of practice (acops) see codes BS 7974: 2001 1-1, 2-2, 4-3, 5-4 carbon monoxide detectors 8-11
of practice BS 8458: 2015 11-28, 11-29 car parks 3-11, 10-6 to 10-7, 13-16 to 13-17
approved contractors 11-22 BS 8489: 2016 11-28, 11-29 cavity barriers 12-9
Approved Document B 1-1, 2-2, 3-5, 3-7, 7-1, BS 9990: 2015 13-9, 13-11, 13-12 certification
8-2, 9-2 BS 9991: 2015 13-10 fire resisting products 12-10
approved inspectors 3-7 BS 9999: 2017 2-2 handover documents 14-4
aqueous film-forming foams (afffs) 11-23 building designation 3-1, 3-6 to 3-7, sprinkler systems 11-22
argon (extinguishing agent) 11-34 3-10 change of use 14-3, 14-13
arson fires 14-9 fire detection and alarm 8-2 characteristic growth time 6-4
aset (available safe egress time) 7-7 firefighting 13-4, 13-7, 13-9, 13-10, China 2-4
‘as low as is reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) 13-12, 13-13, 13-14, cladding systems 16-1
5-3, 5-5, 5-6 13-15, 13-17 Class A foams 11-24
assembly and recreational buildings 3-10 fire resistance 12-4 client responsibility 2-5
ASTM fire test standards 12-1 fire safety management 14-1 closed-circuit TV 7-6, 8-11
atria 3-10 means of escape 7-3, 7-6, 7-7 cmsa (control mode specific application)
smoke ventilation 13-17 risk assessment 5-4 sprinklers 11-9
sprinkler protection 11-15 smoke ventilation 10-11 codes of practice 1-1, 2-2
Australia 2-4, 16-1 BS EN 81-72: 2015 13-15, 13-16 construction sites 15-1
authority having jurisdiction (ahj) 1-2, 2-3 to BS EN 1869: 1997 13-22 emergency lighting 9-1
2-4, 2-5 BS EN 12101-6: 2005 10-8, 10-10 fire alarm and detection systems 8-2
automatic fire detection and alarm systems 8-1 BS EN 12845: 2015 11-5, 11-8, 11-15 combustible materials
to 8-18 BS EN 13565-2: 2009 11-23 fire load 3-5, 11-6 to 11-7
activating safety measures 8-14 BS EN 14339: 2005 13-8 flame heights 6-15
addressable systems 8-6, 8-8 BS EN 15004-1: 2008 11-36 hazard classification 11-5 to 11-7
alarm filtering 8-3 BS PD 7974-5: 2014 13-19 hazardous materials 3-3
audible and visual alarm 8-13 BS PD 7974-7: 2003 5-6, 11-2 heat flux for ignition 6-14 to 6-15
cables 8-14 to 8-15 building alterations 14-12 to 14-13 heat release rates 6-3
cause and effect tables 8-3 building area 3-4 to 3-5 oil and flammable liquids 11-7
classification 8-4 to 8-5 building classification 3-1, 3-2 to 3-3, 3-8 to combustion 6-1
construction sites 8-16 to 8-17, 15-6 3-11 combustion detectors 8-11
control equipment 8-13 to 8-16 building commissioning and handover 14-4 commissioning and handover 11-19 to 11-20,
detector siting and spacing 8-11 to 8-13 building contents 3-3, 4-2 14-4
detector types 8-8 to 8-11 building control authority 3-7 common areas 3-8, 8-4, 10-11, 10-12, 13-17
for dwellings 8-5 to 8-6 building depth below ground 3-4 communication systems see also staff training
fire service notification 13-6 building design 14-2 to 14-3 evacuation management 14-11 to 14-12
hazardous areas 8-16 ‘built-in’ fire precautions 15-6 firefighters 13-18 to 13-19
life protection 8-4 to 8-5 designer’s responsibility 15-4 to 15-5 fire safety management 14-7
power supplies 8-15 to 8-16 fire resistance rating requirements for lift lobbies 7-6 to 7-7
property protection 8-4 building elements 12-3 voice alarm systems 3-5, 7-10, 8-13, 8-14,
radio-based systems 8-15 sprinkler installations 11-14 14-11
sprinkler connected 6-6, 11-20 structural design for fire safety 12-5, 12-6 comparative criteria 4-4
system types 8-6 to 12-7 compartmentation 3-4, 12-5, 12-7
zoning 8-7 to 8-8 building designation 3-1 to 3-7, 3-8 to 3-11 construction sites 15-5
I-2 Fire safety engineering
compartmentation (continued) ‘Duty Holder’ 2-5 fire dynamics (continued)

protected openings 12-7 to 12-9 effect of sprinklers 6-5, 6-6 to 6-7
sprinkler protection 11-3, 11-5 early suppression fast response (esfr) fire and smoke modelling 6-7
compartment fires 6-1 to 6-2 systems 11-9 and fire resistance 12-4 to 12-5
fire resistance assessment 6-15 to 6-16 educational buildings 3-10 flame calculations 6-14 to 6-16
flame spread 6-14 to 6-16 emergency lighting 7-16, 9-1 to 9-4 smoke plumes 6-7 to 6-14
heat flux calculations 6-14 to 6-15 emergency planning and management 14-10 fire emergency management 14-12
smoke filling times 6-11 to 6-14 to 14-12, 15-4 fire emergency plans 14-11, 14-12
competency 2-2 emergency wayfinding systems 7-16 fire engineering 1-1 to 1-2
‘Competent Person’ 14-1 empty buildings 14-13 fire engineer responsibilities 2-3
compliance with regulations 11-1, 16-1 environmental impact 4-2 fire extinguishers 13-22
concrete construction 12-6, 12-7 environmental protection 13-20 firefighters
Construction (Design and Management) escalators 7-7 communication systems 13-18 to 13-19
Regulations 2015 2-3, 2-5 escape lighting see emergency lighting exposure limits 13-5
construction sites 3-6, 15-1 to 15-7 escape routes see also means of escape personal protective equipment (PPE)
building separation 15-6 alternative 7-4 13-4 to 13-5
compartmentation 15-5 basement areas 3-4 physiological limits 13-4
designer’s responsibility 15-4 to 15-5 compartmentation 12-10 risks to 5-7 to 5-8
fire detection and alarm systems 8-16 to individual dwellings 3-8 safety 12-7, 13-4 to 13-5, 13-12
8-17, 15-6 lighting 9-3 travel times 13-19 to 13-20
fire emergency procedures 15-4 protection 7-5 to 7-7, 8-5 firefighting 13-1 to 13-24 see also fire services
firefighting 15-5 to 15-6 separation 7-4 construction sites 15-5 to 15-6
fire precautions 15-1, 15-2 to 15-4, 15-6 smoke control 7-8, 10-5 to 10-11 environmental protection 13-20
fire safety incidents 15-1 escape stairs equipment 13-5, 13-21 to 13-22
fire safety management 14-3, 15-6 capacity 7-3 to 7-4, 7-13 to 7-14 high-rise buildings 13-13, 13-19 to 13-20
fire safety responsibility 2-5 smoke ventilation 10-11, 13-17 objectives 13-2
legal considerations 15-2 escape time 7-7, 7-8, 7-9 to 7-11 tactical 13-2 to 13-3
site management 15-6 pre-movement time 7-9 to 7-11, 7-11 timelines 13-18 to 13-20
smoke ventilation 15-5 travel time 7-11, 7-11 to 7-14 water supplies 13-8 to 13-11
sprinkler protection 11-14, 15-5 ESFR (early suppression fast response) firefighting lifts 13-15, 13-16, 13-19
CONTAM 10-9 systems 11-9 firefighting lobbies 13-13, 13-15
continuum net-value work diagram 5-5 to 5-6 European perspective 2-4 firefighting shafts 3-1, 3-4, 10-11
contractor responsibility 2-5 evacuation see also means of escape fire mains 13-12
contractors, fire precautions 14-8, 14-13, 15-1, disabled occupants 7-5 to 7-6, 7-9 provision 13-14 to 13-16
15-3 escape time 7-8, 7-9 to 7-12 smoke ventilation 10-11, 13-16
control centre 14-14 fire drills 14-6 and sprinkler protection 11-3
control equipment 8-13 to 8-16 lifts 7-6, 13-18 firefighting staircases 13-15, 13-19
control mode specific application (CMSA) models 5-8 fire growth, effect of sprinklers 6-6 to 6-7
sprinklers 11-9 procedures 14-11 to 14-12 fire growth curves 6-3, 6-4, 6-16
cool gas generators 11-36 simulation models 7-14, 7-15 fire growth rates 6-1, 6-2, 6-3 to 6-6
corridors strategies 7-1 to 7-2 fire hoses 3-4, 13-3 to 13-4, 13-22
firefighters’ safety 13-4 to 13-5 event tree analysis (eta) 5-5 to 5-6 fire hydrants 13-8 to 13-9
smoke ventilation 10-8, 10-11, 13-17 exits fire load 3-5
cost-benefit analysis (cba) 5-5 to 5-7, 5-8 to alternative 7-4 construction works 15-6
5-9 final 7-13 equivalent 6-6
cost and affordability 5-9 exit signs 7-16, 9-3 hazard classification 11-6 to 11-7
remedial works 5-8 to 5-9 exit widths 7-3, 7-13 occupancy types 11-6
cross-ventilation systems 10-6 to 10-7 exposure limits for firefighters 13-5 offices 11-4 to 11-5
extensions to building 14-12 to 14-13 fire mains 13-10 to 13-13
‘defend in place’ strategy 3-8 external fire spread 3-5, 15-6 fire management plans 14-10 to 14-12
demolition work 14-13 facade systems 3-5, 16-1 fire models 6-7
Department of Health, Firecodes 3-9 sprinkler protection 11-4 fire precautions 3-7 to 3-8
depressurisation systems 10-8 to 10-9 external walls see also facade systems construction sites 15-1, 15-2 to 15-4, 15-6
design, building see building design sprinkler protection 11-4 purpose groups 3-8 to 3-11
design codes see also codes of practice standards 3-7 to 3-8
means of escape 7-2 to 7-7 facade systems 3-5, 16-1 Fire Precautions Act 1971 2-1, 2-6
sprinkler systems 11-5 failure scenarios 4-2 to 4-3 fire prevention 14-3, 14-7 to 14-9
design fires 4-2, 6-2 to 6-6, 12-6 film-forming fluoroprotein (fffp) 11-24 fire protection engineering, definition 1-1
design information 14-5 final exit 7-13 fire resistance
design objectives 4-1 to 4-2 fire alarm and detection systems see automatic assessment 6-15 to 6-16
design responsibility 2-5 fire detection and alarm systems fire resistance period 12-2 to 12-3
design scenarios 4-2 to 4-3 Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 2-1 fire resistance rating requirements for
deterministic criteria 4-4 fire appliances 13-3, 13-5 building elements 12-3
disabled occupants 3-6, 4-2, 5-9 to 5-10 fire authority 3-7 fire tests 16-1
evacuation 7-5 to 7-6 fire buckets 13-20 measurement 12-1 to 12-2
discounted areas 7-2 fire control centre 14-14 performance-based design 12-4 to 12-5
discounted exits 7-3 fire dampers 12-9 to 12-10 performance criteria 12-1
documentation 2-3, 4-4, 14-4 to 14-6 fire detection and alarm systems see automatic prescriptive vs. performance-based design
domestic buildings see residential (dwellings) fire detection and alarm systems 12-3 to 12-4
buildings fire drills 14-6 and sprinkler protection 11-3
dry mains 13-11 fire dynamics 6-1 to 6-17 standards 12-1
dry powder systems 11-35 accumulated ceiling layer 6-11 to 6-14 fire resisting shutters 12-7
ductwork compartment fires 6-1 to 6-2 fire risk see risk assessment
fire dampers 12-10 design fires 6-2 to 6-6 fire risk assessment 2-5
Index I-3
Fire Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006 2-5 fluoroketone (extinguishing agent) 11-34 insulating materials/products see cladding
fire safety design fluoroprotein (FP) foam 11-23 systems; fire resistance
for a manageable building 14-2 to 14-3 foam systems 11-23 to 11-28 insurance 5-8
objectives 4-1 to 4-2 discharge devices 11-26 to 11-27 insurance standards 3-8
process 4-3 to 4-4 foam proportioning 11-25 international perspectives 2-3 to 2-4, 3-7 to 3-8
scenarios 4-2 to 4-3 inlets 13-13 intrinsically safe equipment 8-16
fire safety engineering system types 11-26
design approach 4-1 types of foam concentrate 11-23 to 11-25 kitchens 11-7
deterministic approach 1-1 fp (fluoroprotein) foam 11-23
equivalency 1-1 fuel bed-controlled fires 6-2, 6-6 landing valves 13-12 to 13-13
general approach 2-1, 2-2 to 2-3 legislation 2-1 to 2-6, 14-2
multiple methods of potential control gaseous fixed fire extinguishing systems 11-32 construction sites 15-2
11-1 to 11-35 equal regard for 5-9
probabilistic approach 1-2 environmental and safety considerations life safety protection 3-6, 4-1 to 4-2
fire safety goals 2-3 11-37 construction sites 15-1 to 15-2
fire safety information 2-6, 14-5 to 14-6 extinguishing agents 11-32 to 11-35 fire detection and alarm systems 8-4 to
fire safety maintenance 2-3, 11-20, 14-8 to international standards 11-36 to 11-37 8-5
14-9, 14-9 to 14-10 maintenance requirements 11-39 to 11-40 fire resistance 12-3 to 12-4
fire safety management 14-1 to 14-14 system configuration 11-38 to 11-39 risk assessment 5-3 to 5-4, 5-6
and building design 14-2 to 14-3 system design 11-37 to 11-38 sprinkler protection 11-9 to 11-10, 11-20
building handover 14-4 glazing protection 11-4, 11-15 to 11-21
changes to a building 14-12 to 14-13 ‘good industry practice’ 5-3 to 5-4, 5-6, 5-9 lifts
communication systems 14-7 Grenfell Tower 2-1 firefighting 13-15, 13-16, 13-19
construction sites 14-3, 15-6 guidance documents 2-2 means of escape 7-6, 13-18
documentation 2-3 liquid inert systems 11-34 to 11-35
emergency planning and management Hackitt Review 2-1, 2-6 lobbies see firefighting lobbies; protected
14-10 to 14-12, 15-4 halocarbon (extinguishing agent) 11-33 to lobbies
fire prevention 14-3, 14-7 to 14-9 11-34 localised fires 12-5, 12-6
legal considerations 14-2 handover phase 2-5, 14-4 loss prevention 4-2
fire safety manager 14-1, 14-6 to 14-7, 14-9 hazardous areas 8-16
fire safety manual 2-5, 14-4 to 14-6 maintenance
hazardous materials 3-3, 4-2
fire safety responsibilities 2-5 to 2-6 building 14-10, 14-13
hazards
fire safety review 14-6 fire safety systems 11-20, 14-8 to 14-9,
analysis 5-4
fire safety strategy 4-4, 11-1 14-9 to 14-10
classification 3-2 to 3-3, 11-5 to 11-7
fire scenarios 4-2 manual fire alarm systems 8-2, 8-3, 8-5, 8-8
definition 5-2
fire separation mass optical densities 10-4
Hazen–Williams formula 11-17
between buildings 11-3, 15-6 means of escape 7-1 to 7-16 see also escape
healthcare buildings 3-9, 4-1
multi-tenancy/multi-occupancy 3-6, 3-8 routes; evacuation
Health Technical Memorandum 05-02:
to 3-9 design codes 7-2 to 7-7
Firecode 4-1
fire services see also fire authority design objectives 7-1 to 7-2
heat detectors 8-9, 8-11 to 8-12
access within premises 13-14 to 13-16, evacuation strategies 7-1 to 7-2
heat exhaust ventilation 13-16
13-18 fire safety engineering approaches 7-7 to
heat exposure limits 13-5
consultation with 13-1 to 13-2 7-9
heat flux calculations 6-14 to 6-15
emergency pack 14-10 prescriptive approaches 7-1 to 7-16
heat release rates 6-3 to 6-5 sprinkler protection 11-3
external access to premises 13-6 to 13-8,
14-8 condition for flashover 6-5 to 6-6 mechanical smoke ventilation 10-12
notification and response 13-5 to 13-6 heat tolerance 7-8 mechanical ventilation and air-conditioning
perimeter access 13-13 to 13-14 heat transfer to structural elements 12-6 systems see HVAC systems
provision of information for 13-20 to high-reach appliances 13-3, 13-5 mechanised walkways 7-7
13-21 high-rise buildings see tall buildings Middle East (Gulf States) 2-4
vehicles and appliances 13-3, 13-7 ‘historical’ data 5-7 modifications to systems 14-10
fire size 6-2, 6-7 horizontal evacuation 14-11 mp (multi-purpose) foams 11-24
fire spread see fire growth rates hose reels 13-3 to 13-4 multiple fatalities 5-6
fire stopping 12-7 to 12-8 hotels 14-1 multiple safeguards 4-2
fire suppression 11-1 to 11-40 hot work 14-13, 15-4 multi-purpose (mp) foams 11-24
fire tanks 13-12 housekeeping measures 14-8, 14-10 multi-storey buildings see apartment
fire tests 12-1 to 12-2, 16-1 human factors, behaviour in fires 7-9, 7-9 to buildings; tall buildings
fire ventilation see also smoke ventilation 7-11 multi-tenancy/multi-occupancy 3-6, 3-8 to 3-9
fire wardens 15-6 hvac systems means of escape 7-9
fire watchers 15-1 use in smoke ventilation 10-9
fitting-out 14-3 hydrants 13-8 to 13-9 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
flame detectors 8-10 to 8-11, 8-13 hyperthermia 10-4 codes
flame height 6-15 NFPA 1 13-10, 13-11, 13-12, 13-13
flame projection from openings 6-15 ifw (informative fire warning) systems 7-14 NFPA 11 11-23
flameproof equipment 8-16 to 7-15 NFPA 13 11-5, 11-6, 11-7, 11-15
flame spread 6-14 to 6-16 ignition 6-1 NFPA 14 13-11
flammable liquid hazards 11-7 see also foam impulse jet ventilation 10-7 NFPA 16 11-23
systems incubation period 6-3 to 6-4 NFPA 24 13-9
flashover 6-1 to 6-2, 6-5 to 6-6, 6-13 to 6-14 inductors (line proportioners) 11-25 NFPA 25 11-20
flats and maisonettes 3-8 to 3-9, 13-17 see also industrial buildings 3-11, 11-7 NFPA 72 8-2, 8-4, 8-7, 8-12, 8-14
corridors inert extinguishing agents 11-34 NFPA 92 6-4, 6-5, 10-2
floor area 3-4 informative fire warning (ifw) systems 7-14 NFPA 101 4-1, 7-1, 7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 9-3,
floor space factors 7-2, 7-2 to 7-15 10-3, 12-3
fluorine-free foams 11-24 to 11-25 institutional (residential) buildings 3-9, 11-21 NFPA 130 10-4
I-4 Fire safety engineering
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) qualitative design review (qdr) 4-3 smoke (continued)
codes (continued) qualitative risk assessment 5-4 to 5-5 toxicity 10-5
NFPA 5000 13-10, 13-15 quantitative risk assessment (qra) 5-5 to 5-7 visibility in 7-8, 10-4 to 10-5
natural smoke shafts 10-11 smoke clearance 10-1, 10-10
nitrogen (extinguishing agent) 11-34 rack storage 11-7, 11-17 smoke control 10-1, 10-11 see also smoke
Northern Ireland 3-7 radiant heat ventilation
heat flux for ignition 6-1 dampers 12-9
occupancy characteristics 3-5 to 3-6, 4-2, 5-4 maximum exposure tolerance 7-8 dilution smoke management 10-5 to 10-7
occupancy types 3-1, 3-2 to 3-3, 3-8 to 3-11 ‘reasonably foreseeable risks’ 5-2 opposed air flow systems 10-7 to 10-8
escape pre-movement times 7-10 to 7-11, ‘reasonably practicable’ 5-6 pressure differential systems 10-8 to
7-11 recreational buildings see assembly and 10-10
escape travel times 7-11 to 7-12 recreational buildings slot/slit extract system 10-12
fire load 11-6 refuge areas 7-3, 7-5 to 7-6 smoke-free layer 6-13
occupant behaviour 7-9, 7-9 to 7-11 refuge floors 7-7, 13-18 system design 10-5 to 10-12
occupant capacity 7-2 to 7-3 refurbishment of buildings 14-12 to 14-13 system types 10-5 to 10-12
occupants regulatory approvals 2-3 to 2-4 see also smoke detection
firefighting by 13-21 to 13-22 Building Regulations detector as equivalent heat detector 6-6
fire prevention 14-8 Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 detector siting and spacing 8-11 to 8-12
training and education 13-21, 14-8 to 2-1, 2-5 detector types 8-9 to 8-10
14-9 remedial works 5-8 to 5-9 smoke dilution systems 10-5 to 10-7
office buildings 3-9 to 3-10, 11-4 to 11-5 required safe egress time (rset) 7-7 smoke extraction see smoke ventilation
oil and flammable liquid hazards 11-7 residential (dwellings) buildings 3-8 to 3-9 see smoke-free layer 6-13, 7-8, 10-1 to 10-2
openings also flats and maisonettes smoke hazards 10-3 to 10-5
flame projection from 6-15 fire detection and alarm systems 8-5 to smoke layer 6-8 to 6-9, 6-11 to 6-14
protected 12-7 to 12-9 8-6 depths 10-3
smoke plumes 6-8 to 6-10 smoke ventilation 10-2, 10-11, 10-12 temperature 10-4
open-plan layout 3-8 sprinkler systems 11-21 smoke plumes 6-7 to 6-11, 6-9
operational records 14-5 residential (institutional) 3-9 air entrainment 6-7 to 6-8
opposed air flow 10-1 response time index (rti) 6-6 axisymmetric 6-8
opposed air flow systems 10-7 to 10-8 ‘Responsible Person’ 2-5 to 2-6, 14-1 ceiling flow 6-11 to 6-12
outsourcing of fire safety management 14-7 ‘reverse alarp’ 5-8 convective heat release 6-7
overseas regulations 2-4 rising mains 13-10 to 13-13 flow from an opening 6-8 to 6-10
oxygen reduction systems 11-35 to 11-36 risk, definition 5-2 heat release rate 6-7
risk assessment 4-1, 5-1 to 5-10 heat transfer to building surfaces 6-14
partial occupation 15-7 acceptability criteria 5-3 radiant heat transfer 6-14
performance-based design 4-1 to 4-4 definition 5-2 stratification 6-14
personal protective equipment (ppe) 13-4 to England and Wales 2-6 temperature 6-10
13-5 hazard classification 11-5 to 11-7 volume flow rate 6-10
phased evacuation 3-1, 3-4, 14-11 pitfalls 5-8 to 5-10 smoke reservoirs
stair capacity 7-4 process 5-2 area of reservoir 10-2
pipe closures 12-8 to 12-9 techniques 5-3 to 5-8 screens and curtains 10-2
planning for emergencies 14-10 to 14-12, 15-4 risk matrices 5-4, 5-5 smoke shafts 10-11
post-completion 2-5 risk profiles 3-1, 3-6 to 3-7, 5-4 smoke ventilation 10-1 to 10-12
post-flashover fires 6-5 to 6-6, 12-4 to 12-5, risk reduction measures air inlets 10-2
12-6 cost-benefit analysis (cba) 5-6 calculations 6-7
power supplies fire prevention 14-3, 14-7 to 14-9 computer modelling 10-9
automatic fire detection and alarm ‘reasonably practicable’ 5-6 in construction sites 15-5
systems 8-15 to 8-16 RSET (required safe egress time) 7-7 cross-ventilation systems 10-6 to 10-7
smoke ventilation 10-7 RTI (response time index) 6-6 depressurisation systems 10-8
PPE (personal protective equipment) 13-4 to ductwork 12-9
13-5 safety lighting see emergency lighting exhaust fan temperature 10-8 to 10-9
pre-flashover fires 6-3 school buildings 11-22 extract vents
premix foam units 11-26 Scotland 3-7 location 6-13
pressure differential systems 10-1 sd (synthetic detergent) foams 11-23 to 11-24 number 10-2 to 10-3
pressurisation systems 10-9 to 10-10 security for firefighting 13-16 to 13-17
probabilistic criteria 4-4 construction sites 15-1 firefighting shafts 10-11, 13-16
professional competency 2-2 fire prevention 14-9 hvac system use in 10-9
property protection 3-6, 4-2 landing valves 13-11 impulse jet ventilation 10-7
cost-benefit analysis (cba) 5-6 separation distances 3-5, 11-3, 15-6 maximum volumetric flow rate 10-3
fire detection and alarm systems 8-4 sfairp (‘so far as is reasonably practicable’) mechanical ventilation 10-12
sprinkler protection 11-20 5-3 natural ventilation 10-10 to 10-11, 10-11
protected escape routes 7-5 to 7-7, 8-5 shopping malls 13-17 noise levels 10-5
compartmentation 12-10 shops and commercial premises 3-10 pressure differentials 10-3
individual dwellings 3-8 signage 7-16 replacement air velocity 10-2
smoke ventilation 10-11 simultaneous evacuation, stair capacity 7-3 to smoke clearance/purging 10-6
protected lobbies 7-5, 7-6, 10-11 7-4 smoke-free layer 6-13
protected shafts see firefighting shafts site boundary see building separation and sprinkler protection 11-3
protected stairways sleeping accommodation 3-6, 7-10, 7-11, 8-13, system types 10-1, 10-5 to 10-12
capacity 7-13 to 7-14 8-14 ventilation-controlled fires 6-6
smoke ventilation 10-11 slit extract system 10-12 wind overpressures 10-11 to 10-12
public evacuation 14-12 slot extract system 10-12 smoking 14-8
pumping appliances 13-3 smoke societal concern 5-7
purpose groups 3-1, 3-2 to 3-3, 3-8 to 3-11 in escape routes 7-8 ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ (sfairp)
pyrolysis 6-1 temperature 6-10, 10-3 to 10-4 5-3
Index I-5
speculative builds 14-3 sprinkler protection (continued) third-party certification 11-22

spontaneous ignition 6-1 speed of activation 11-3 timber construction 12-6, 12-7
sprinkler protection 11-2 to 11-22 sprinkler heads 11-8 to 11-11 training of staff 14-8 to 14-9, 14-10 to 14-11,
approved contractors 11-22 sprinkler pumps 11-18 15-1
assembly and recreational buildings 3-10 sprinkler sensitivity 6-6 to 6-7, 11-10 to transient fires 6-5
benefits 11-3 11-11 travel distances 7-4, 7-12
building design issues 11-14 sprinkler spacing and location 11-14 to firefighters 13-4, 13-12 to 13-13
colour coding 11-8 11-15, 11-15 travelling fires 12-5, 12-6
commissioning and testing 11-19 to system components 11-12 to 11-14 travel times
11-20 system maintenance 11-20 to an exit 7-11 to 7-14
compartmentation 11-5 system types 11-11 to 11-12 firefighters 13-19 to 13-20
concealed pattern sprinklers 11-9 to tail-end alternate and dry systems 11-12 tube-operated systems 11-36
11-10 thermal sensitivity of sprinkler heads
construction sites 11-14, 15-5 11-10 to 11-11 uncertainty in design data 4-3
control mode specific application (cmsa) water supplies 11-17 to 11-19, 11-20 underground structures 3-4, 3-11
sprinklers 11-9 staff training 14-8 to 14-9, 14-10 to 14-11, 15-1 United States (USA) 2-4 see also ASTM fire
deluge installations 11-12 staircases see escape stairs; firefighting test standards; National Fire
and design size fire 11-3 to 11-4 staircases Protection Association (NFPA)
domestic and residential 11-21 standard fire curve 12-1, 12-2 codes
dry installations 11-11 to 11-12 standards see ASTM fire test standards; British
early suppression fast response (esfr) Standards; National Fire Protection ‘value of preventing a fatality’ (vpf) 5-6
systems 11-9 Association (NFPA) codes
ventilation see hvac systems; smoke
effect on fire growth 6-6 to 6-7 standby lighting see emergency lighting
ventilation
effect on fire size 6-7 statutory requirements see legislation
ventilation-controlled fires 6-2, 6-6
extent of protection 11-5 ‘stay put’ strategy 3-8
video smoke detection (vsd) 8-11
extinguishing mechanism 11-4 to 11-5 steady-state fires 6-5
voice alarm systems 3-5, 7-10, 8-13, 8-14,
fire dynamics 6-5, 6-6 to 6-7 steel construction 12-6, 12-7
14-11
fire engineering approach 11-3 to 11-4 storage and other non-residential buildings
vpf (value of preventing a fatality) 5-6
firefighting shafts 11-3 3-11
vulnerable occupants 5-9 to 5-10 see also
and fire load 11-4 to 11-5 storage risks 11-7, 11-8
disabled occupants
foam systems 11-26 structural design for fire safety 12-5, 12-6 to
glazing protection 11-4 12-7
Wales 2-1, 2-2
industrial buildings 3-11 structural fire engineering 12-5
wall wetting sprinklers 11-4
installation design 11-14 to 11-17 supervising station fire alarms 8-5
installation planning 11-14 suspended ceilings water as extinguishent 11-4
institutional (residential) buildings 3-9 position of channelling screens and water-driven foam metering pumps 11-25
life safety protection 11-9 to 11-10, 11-20 smoke barriers 10-3 water mist systems 11-28 to 11-32
to 11-21 sprinkler protection 11-16 water supplies
location of sprinklers 6-6 synthetic detergent (sd) foams 11-23 to 11-24 firefighting 13-8 to 13-11
occupancy hazard classification 3-2 to 3-3 sprinkler protection 11-17 to 11-19, 11-20
operating temperatures 11-8 tall buildings 3-1, 3-4 water mist systems 11-30
pipework systems 11-13, 11-16, 11-20 cladding systems 16-1 water suppression see sprinkler protection
pre-action installations 11-12 fire detection and alarm systems 8-17 wayfinding systems 7-16
property protection 11-20 firefighting 13-13, 13-19 to 13-20 wet chemical systems 11-35
recycling installations 11-12 refuge floors 7-7, 13-18 wet risers 13-12
reliability 11-2 to 11-3 stair capacity for phased evacuation 7-4 ‘what if ’ assessments 4-2 to 4-3
response time 11-10 to 11-11 temperature, survivable 7-8 wind overpressures 10-11 to 10-12
response time index (rti) 6-6, 11-10 testing window sprinklers 11-4, 11-10
rules and standards 11-5 fire safety manual 14-6 Workplace Health and Safety Directive 14-1
school buildings 11-22 fire safety systems 14-4, 14-9 to 14-10
shops and commercial premises 3-10 materials/products 16-1 zoning 8-7 to 8-8
The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers
CIBSE Guide E

222 Balham High Road, London SW12 9BS
+44 (0)20 8675 5211
www.cibse.org
CIBSE Guide E
ISBN 978-1-912034-29-1
2019
9 781912 034291

CIBSE Guide E Fire Safety Engineering

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CIBSE Guide E Fire Safety Engineering

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Fire safety engineering

Fire safety engineering

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted

Registered charity number 278104

ISBN 978-1-912034-29-1 (book)

ISBN 978-1-912034-30-7 (PDF)

Layout and typesetting by Alasdair Deas for CIBSE Publications

Note from the publisher

Martin Shipp BSc (Physics) CEng FIFireE CPhys MInstP

Martin J. Kealy CEng BSc (Hons) FIFireE MSFPE MCIBSE

Guide E Steering Committee

Chapter 3: Building designation

Chapter 4: Performance-based design principles

Chapter 5: Application of risk assessment to fire engineering

Chapter 6: Fire dynamics

Chapter 7: Means of escape and human factors

Chapter 8: Fire detection and alarm

Chapter 9: Emergency lighting

Chapter 10: Smoke ventilation

Chapter 11: Fire suppression

Chapter 13: Firefighting

Chapter 14: Fire safety management

Chapter 15: Fire safety on construction sites

Chapter 16: Fire safety of building facades

Principal authors and contributors (first, second and third editions)

Project manager: Sanaz Agha

3 Building designation 3-1

4 Performance-based design principles 4-1

5 Application of risk assessment to fire engineering designs 5-1

6 Fire dynamics 6-1

7 Means of escape and human factors 7-1

8 Fire detection and alarm 8-1

9 Emergency lighting 9-1

10 Smoke ventilation 10-1

11 Fire suppression 11-1

12 Fire resistance, structural robustness in fire and fire spread 12-1

14 Fire safety management 14-1

15 Fire safety on construction sites 15-1

16 Fire safety of building facades 16-1

Important note: potential changes to fire safety legislation

Legislation and guidance relating to fire safety is currently undergoing significant

conservative approach should be adopted. This

The main benefits that fire safety engineering alternatives

Design objectives and design scenarios are covered and

1.6.6 Chapter 6: Fire dynamics 1.6.10 Chapter 10: Smoke ventilation

The chapter gives guidance on means of escape design,

The fire engineer may have specialist expertise in a

It is only after considering all of these elements or phases

2.2.2 Central Europe 2.2.6 USA

The operational legislation in the UK requires the Respon-

Table 3.1 Classification by purpose group (HM Government, 2013: 140)

(a) Light hazard occupancies

(b) Ordinary hazard occupancies

Occupancy Ordinary hazard group

OH1 OH2 OH3 OH4

Table 3.2 (b) continued

Occupancy OH1 OH2 OH3 OH4

(c) High hazard process occupancies

HHP1 HHP2 HHP3 HHP4

3.2.2 Depth below ground —— greater aggregate fire loads

other occupancy types). Unless alternative codes of practice 3.4.1.2 Scotland

3.4 Designing the fire 3.4.1.4 Alternative approaches

In all cases, the building control department of the local

There is scope for fire safety engineering in unconven-

0.195 QQV1/3 Z 5/3 + Q