ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN

Abstract
Afghanistan domestic geo-politics
`Through the lens of geopolitics, a study with a mere emphasis on a given territory’s
demography-geography-economy as the main factors shaping its fate, Afghanistan is
described as “the land bridge,” a country with untouched natural resources, and a military
strategic point for “empires.” However, Afghanistan’s demography is not discussed, beyond
misguiding statistics on tribal population census, to understand geopolitical grievances of its
diverse ethnicities, representatives of different civilizations.

Ethnic groups have geopolitical representation rights of their places of origin, from
where they display their distinct cultures, civilizations’ evolution, traditional rituals and
lifestyle in the form of independent “nation-states,” autonomous or semi-autonomous regions.
Almost every ethnicity in Afghanistan has larger geopolitical representation beyond the
country in the neighboring kin-states  (for example, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, Hazaras, and
Tajiks in Iran and Tajikistan). But Pashtuns are the only ethnic minority group with a semi-
autonomous region, Waziristan, which is also on the verge of full inclusion into the “nation”
of Pakistan.

Uzbekistan, Iran, and others have been engaged in kin-state activism. While this is
legal under international law, as it allows to promote their descendent tribal representation in
Afghanistan by offering socio-economic and political support, Pakistan has sporadically
supported some radical elements (like the Taliban and Hezbe-i-Islami of Hekmatyar) to
escalate violence in Afghanistan. Is the Taliban’s entrenched connection to the Pakistani deep
state actors (ISI) and their use as an instrument of pressure against Afghanistan and the
region not a living example here?

Pakistan has been pursuing an undeclared anti-Pashtun policy by systemically

radicalizing Pashtun youths through Madrasas (religious schools). Pashtun leaders should
stand up against this cycle of radicalization – instead of promoting ethno-nationalism that
further radicalizes the Pashtun youths – by weaning themselves off their love-hate marriage
with Pakistan.

The Tapestry of Ethnic Division and Unity since 2001

In the absence of accurate census data, determining the true percentages of various ethnic groups is
problematic and can be contentious. Furthermore, simply defining various ethnic identities is not
always easy. the idea that “ethnic groups are solid cultural units, which are divided by obvious
boundaries” and have engaged in conflict for centuries is not applicable to afghanistan. For example,
2

a sizeable number of Dari speakers consider themselves Pashtuns because of ethnic heritage. Some
native-Pashto speakers consider Dari their second language. While the nooristanis, Balochis, Pashai
and Brahuis are distinct groups in the south and east of the country, they are identified more closely
with the Pashtuns in Kabul because many of their members are bilingual.
Bilingualism, intermarriages, religious and political ideologies transcend ethnic boundaries.
At the same time, identities and group interests are very local, often associated with a
political or regional unit—a village, clan or part of the country—rather than ethnic groups.
Afghanistan is a patchwork of ethnicities much like colorful afghan carpets, which makes it
difficult to see its politics purely through an ethnic prism. It also makes territorial ethno-
nationalism impractical. “Afghan ethnic groups have never viewed themselves as fixed
nationalities with an overriding commonality and history that would require political unity or
a nation-state,” writes american anthropologist thomas Barfield. “Instead, ethnicity in
Afghanistan is essentially prenationalist, with ethnic groups holding similar economic and
political interests but no common ideology or separatist aspirations.”

Afghanistan's national anthem recognizes 14 ethnic groups among the country’s 27 million
people: Pashtuns, tajiks, hazaras, Uzbeks, Balochis, turkmens, nooristanis, Pamiris, arabs,
gujars, Brahuis, Qizilbash, aimaq and Pashai. Few groups are indigenous to afghanistan; most
of the larger ones have significantly greater populations in neighboring countries. Governing
a viable state with on alliance building by factions and powerbrokers. For example, the 1929
rebellion against the reformer King amanullah Khan failed to deliver a stable replacement
because of a split between the Pashtun and tajik powerbrokers that instigated it. 6

During the next half century, Afghanistan witnessed a stable, centralized, mostly Pashtun-dominated
government, which relied on foreign assistance to bring about gradual modernization. “Pashtunistan”
— defined by some as an independent Pashtun state or autonomous region within Pakistan, but seen
by others as potentially unified state of all Pashtuns—became a key foreign policy issue for
Afghanistan. This period saw concerted government efforts to grant rights to all citizens to establish
more equality among them. The relative political freedoms granted under the 1964 Constitution
allowed the formation of leftist and Islamist groups. At the same time, ethnicity played a more
prominent role in political alignments. setam-e Milli (national Oppression) emerged as decidedly
anti-Pashtun organization whose focus was the overthrow what they described as the Pashtun
dominance of Afghanistan. On the other hand, afghan Millat, a Pashtun nationalist political party,
advocated greater Pashtunization of Afghanistan and even aspired to unite all Pashtuns. Many leaders
of the two major factions of the People's Democratic Party of the Taliban raison d’être was to end
the anarchy. But when they took on powerful non-Pashtun warlords and militias, some afghan and
international observers tended to describe them as “Pashtun nationalists” who wanted to revive a
centralized Pashtun-dominated state in Afghanistan. In fact, one of the first Taliban acts after
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capturing Kabul in September 1996 was to kill najibullah and hang his corpse on public display.
Their rigid policies never won them overwhelming public support among the Pashtuns. The Taliban
were opposed to all Pashtun political elites in the regimes preceding them. They opposed the
nationalist mainstream of the old royalist regime and, unlike the communists, had no worldly focus
on material development as a means of radical progress. Many Pashtun mujahedin commanders
fought against the Taliban for years. In fact, many Kandahari mujahedin joined herati Tajik
(sometime he is also identified as Farsiwan) warlord, Ismail down to the masses. Most, if not all,
Afghans simply wanted security, good governance, basic services and transitional justice. However,
the provision of these fundamental demands was relegated to secondary significance.

Thus, the new political system propped up by Washington and its allies aimed to balance ethnic
relations and prevent a renewed conflict by ostensibly attempting to make the new political system
more representative, open and a level playing field for all afghans. Some of the past discrimination
against certain minorities was abandoned. However, the centralized system failed to deliver
governance at sub-national level. Some of these critical shortcomings were papered over by more
informal means, such as elite alliances and patronage politics, which serviced those in power but
delivered little in the way of political stability and development. A big part comprised of deal-
making, in extremists, composed mainly of southern afghan Pashtuns primarily loyal to, or beneficial
to, Pakistan’s geo-strategic interests. they were viewed both as Pakistani proxies opposing the
influence of Pakistan’s near and further off neighbors; and as an Islamist bulwark against afghan
nationalism and secular Pashtun ethno-nationalism within Pakistan. In addition to fighting against the
pro-India, pro-Russia and pro-Iran northern alliance, the Taliban also opposed all moderate and
progressive Pashtun groups and political leaders in Afghanistan. Extremist groups in Pakistan later
emulated their intolerance for dissent among Pashtuns.

The aftermath of 9/11 did not change the Pakistani security calculus. Despite being allies of the West,
Pakistani leaders openly advocated a return of the Taliban and equated them with the real
representatives of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders, particularly former military dictator
general Pervez Musharraf, championed Pashtun rights in Afghanistan while remaining seemingly
oblivious to an expanding Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgency in its western Pashtun regions. Islamabad
gained little from what its critics dubbed as a double game. Its interference in domestic afghan affairs
made it extremely unpopular among many segments of the afghan society. Particularly damaging was
the loss of Pashtun and non-Pashtun powerbrokers who viewed Islamabad as an unreliable patron.

Legitimate grievances and illegitimate approaches

Pashtuns have geopolitical rights to representation in Afghanistan and the region, as

do other tribes. A legitimate way to address such grievances would be to decentralize
Afghanistan in a similar way that has taken Switzerland to socio-economic and political
heights. Afghanistan could have cantons instead of provinces to allow its diverse
demographic groups flourish with their culture, lifestyle and belief systems.

Pashtuns have legitimate concerns that their kleptocrats and demagogic leaders have hijacked
“stock-in-trade” for personal political gains on the basis of racial ideologies. They have
constantly promoted a false belief that the Pashtun race is superior to every other in
Afghanistan.

Ghani’s unilateral move to include “Afghan” as an overarching national identity in the new
national electronic ID cards, which have printed camels in the background to resemble
Pashtun nomads, as well as his decision to wear traditional Pashtun clothes and Peshawari
footwear during his recent visit to Balkh province – the land of Rumi: Persia – constitute
illegitimate behavior of an illegitimate head of an ethnically-diverse “state-nation.”

Such “revisionist” conduct may appease dogmatic ethno-nationalists, but they insult non-
Pashtuns and severely harm the spirit of “unity in diversity” in Afghanistan. A real president
of a “state-nation” not only represents all ethnic groups but also avoids undermining them.
“Undoubtedly many Geopolitical ideas of the kind that was en vogue in Nazi-Germany …
belonged to the intellectual stock-in-trade of a small circle of people”, Gertjan Dijkink wrote
in Geopolitical codes and popular representations in 1998. Ghani and his “small circle of
people” do not echo the general sentiment of the well-regarded Pashtun community in
Afghanistan, the real leaders of which have already opposed and rejected Ghani’s racial
ideologies.

Nonetheless, ethno-nationalism has created dogmatic ethno-nationalists in various

shapes and forms in Afghanistan. Some of them, like the Taliban, have embraced violence by
corrupting jihad to fight an endless war, and some are in power tirelessly working to
demoralize non-Pashtun communities. Altogether, they are threatening the region as a whole
with violence and hate speech hoping for a fallout that will not only devastate tribal dynamics
in Afghanistan but also reshape the region, as did Nazi-Germany in Europe in the
20th century.

Power sharing and political reconstruction Since Ghani government

Recommendation:

Afghanistan is a home of diversified ethnic groups composed of multi-cultures. The

linguistic disparities further divides its geography, fueling the ethnographic division in the
country. In order to get a ride off current's anarchic malady of political injustice in the
country, I would suggest the accurate and precise census based on consensual agreement
among leadership of all ethnic groups engaged in politics of Afghanistan. The reason why I
suggest this, is because till date, the exact figure of population in Afghanistan is not clear,
Pashtuns claims to be the majority of Afghanistan that makes 70-75% of whole population,
whilst non-Pashtuns, especially Tajik ethnic groups counter the claim of Pashtuns and
consider Pashtuns ethnic group equally as Tajiks in terms of population. Though, conducting
this task is quite difficult in current situation due to worsening security, but not impossible.

Secondly, I would suggest a consociation model of democracy in Afghanistan based

on meritocracy. The citied model was pretty successful in Kosovo and can be helpful in
Afghanistan as well. In practicalizing this model, all the ethnic groups' model shall consider
meritocracy instead of nepotism while introducing their candidates to key positions in the
government and shall prioritize national interests rather than personal, region, linguistic or
political party's interests.

Conclusion
 In the conclusion I can say that, though, Afghanistan is home of multi-ethnic groups,
indulged in a protracted civil war, triggered by our neighbors for their own national interests,
and though, in the current context of internal politics among all leaders of ethnic groups in
country, a sense of unity among ordinary masses is still at the peak and its main reason is
intermarriages, blood relations, amalgamation of various ethnic groups living in different
parts of Afghanistan, for example, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbek and Turkmen live together in
same village in the district of Char Bolak, Balkh province. This delivers a strong message and
a slap on the face of enemies of Afghanistan, that Afghanistan will remain strong and unified
and will not be disintegrated. .