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Stakeholder/Governance What went wrong? How to re-design?

mechanism
Audit Committee Wirecard did not establish an Audit When going public
Committee until 2019. Without this immediately create a
independent committee the independent Audit
management board is not held Committee with suitably
accountable for their action qualified individuals to
financially. There is no one to check check and monitor the
the financials, transactions of the financial actions of the
company. management board and
company. The name of the
financial expert should be
disclosed. The Audit
Committee should
communicate regularly with
the auditor, without the
presence of the
Management Board,
whereby this exclusion
should be set forth in the
Audit Committee’s
procedural rules.
Auditor EY was negligent when performing This could have been
the audit of Wirecard. EY allegedly prevented if the auditor was
failed to request critical account not so negligent. Even if you
information from a bank in 100% trust a company
Singapore for at least three years, always double check leads,
where, according to Wirecard, up to suspicious transactions.
$1 billion in the company's cash was Perform a thorough and
managed. EY trusted on documents good audit.
and screenshots of a third party and
from Wirecard itself. This type of
negligence brings about the
suspicion that auditors at EY were in
on the fraud.
BaFin Bafin is held accountable for This is due to negligence of
inadequate oversight and the regulator. It should have
negligence. Many hedge funds have worked more diligently and
criticized Germany’s financial should have followed up
regulator, BaFin, for temporarily lead and red flags pointed
banning short-selling in Wirecard out many times. More
stock and for filing a criminal stringent controls and
complaint against two FT journalists putting up more restrictions
who reported the whistleblower aren’t necessarily good
allegations about the company. In since trying to control and
2016 Bafin already got a dossier of monitor too much is
allegations related to money bringing about negative
laundering related to Wirecard. effects, but doing you job
Furthermore the FT already more thoroughly.
investigated Wirecard and the
situation was not right.
Supervisory board Until 2016 the Supervisory Board This should have been 12 at
consisted of only three persons, five the minimum for such a
until 2018 and only six from 2019. large company. The
This is very small for a company supervisory board is in place
that big and neglected to scrutinize to prevent such action made
the conduct. The name of the so- by the management board.
called financial expert member the The oversight should have
Supervisory Board was not been better. Transparency is
disclosed. important.

Multi-stakeholder approach From the looks of it Wirecard, from Implement a multi-


the start, was focused on growth stakeholder approach to
and creating shareholder value. This weigh in all factors making
too does not necessarily has to be a business decisions. Growth
bad thing but when you are will probably be slower but
overdoing it, it can become a bad you build a more steady
thing. You loose sight of other company and factoring in all
important aspects of the business. stakeholders fraudulent
Furthermore, like what happened behavior will be less.
can become fraudulent.
Markus Braun/management Markus Braun, took over the reign Stronger monitor by e.g.
of Wirecard in 2002. And already supervisory board would
started shady by taking over the mitigate this. An
listing of a defunct call center independent Audit
group, a route that avoids the Committee would mitigate
scrutiny of an initial public offering. this as well. Furthermore, a
This shady behavior continued. If transparent culture in the
the management team was company.
monitored better and was
accountable for their action this
would have a lower probability to
happen. They had too much
freedom and focus on growth and
misconduct.

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