People v. Tulin GR No.

111709 Aug 30, 2001

“M/T Tabangao,” a cargo vessel loaded fuel was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island
when it was suddenly boarded, by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates were armed with M-16
rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of
the vessel. “M/T Tabangao” then sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore’s shoreline where another vessel called “Navi Pride” received the cargo under the
supervision of accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong.
Accused-appellants were arrested and charged with qualified piracy for violating Presidential Decree
No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) and were convicted as principals of the crime charged, except
for accused-appellant Hiong who was convicted as an accomplice. On appeal, Hiong ratiocinates that
he cannot be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and
3[a], respectively of PD 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 has impliedly superseded PD 532. He
reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered “superfluous or duplicitous” because
both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish
piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word
“any person” mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to
passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither
member of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of
the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant Hiong was guilty of piracy?
RULING:
Yes, Hiong was guilty of piracy.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof.
Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened
to include offenses committed “in Philippine waters.” On the other hand, under Presidential Decree
No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including “a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters.” Hence, passenger or
not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and
hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen
the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring
states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the “whereas” clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is “among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries.” For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
People v. Flores GR No. 116488 May 31, 2001
Facts:
· The victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at the store when the defendants were at
the same store drinking beer.
· Sayam joined the four accused at their table. Then, all the accused and the victim left the
store and walked towards the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused
left the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing coming
from the direction of the detachment headquarters. That was the last time Samson Sayam was seen,
and despite diligent efforts of Sayam's mother and relatives, he has not been found.
· The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence that Samson Sayam was seen
being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters by the accused.
· Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the trial court held that
the three accused were responsible for the former's disappearance.
· They should be acquitted of the offense charged against them because they were not
private individuals at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.
· The Solicitor General recognizes the error and submits that, under the facts alleged,
accused-appellants can only be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

Issue:
WoN the accused-appellants are guilty of Arbitrary Detention.

Held:
No, a careful review of the records of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove
that Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants.
Based on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, there is no shred of evidence that he was
actually confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard
from since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he was detained and
deprived of his liberty.
Even the circumstantial evidences when presented were not sufficiently proven by material or
relevant testimony, and do not support a judgment or conviction.
In fact, the disappearance of the victim has no bearing in this case because it is not one of the
elements of the crime of arbitrary detention.
 Thus, the Court reverses the decision of the trial court and acquits the accused.

Milo v. Salanga GR No. L-37007 July 20, 1987

FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent (accused Barrio
Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him
with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with
deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two
members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking
petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an
opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can
be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an
order. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary
Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or
order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable
with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act
with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function
vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case
of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and
order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact
that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a
barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

People v. Mamantak GR No. 174659 July 28, 2008

Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with her son XXX and her elder sister
Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and son
looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her
seat, XXX, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had XXX gone from his
mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for
him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for
the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.

The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of
Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call
from a woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of XXX and asked
for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.

On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent
photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough,
when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of XXX. She then contacted the
mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the
woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not
raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7,
2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.

Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was
formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together
with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in
Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.

At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women
came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached
Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting
for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant
in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told
Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned
to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed
them that she had XXX. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused.
Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.

Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that
Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their
agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after
several minutes with XXX.

Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no
longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked
who he was, the boy gave a Muslim name with “Taurak” as surname.

Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her
niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney
which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the
ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the
PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.

XXX relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand,
Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her
third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were
charged with kidnapping for ransom.

Issue:

Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article
267 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?

Held:

After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on
November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD
SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly
and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa
Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs against the accused.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with
the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not
limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject
only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate
the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in
exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a
decision dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering
the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the
death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with
modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule
124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to
this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.

Umil v. Ramos GR No. 81567 October 3, 1991

Pestillos v. Generoso and People of the philippines GR No. 182601 November 10, 2014
Macaga-an v. People GR No. L-77317 July 29,1987
Ladlad v. velasco GR No. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
Facts:
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006, he was subjected
to a second inquest, with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion.

On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to
indict Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information
with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and other... individuals
"conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng
Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan
(KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms
against the duly constituted government, x x x."

Issues:
(a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is
probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and

Ruling:
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
[14] Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when
such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.
The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers[15] states that the officers arrested Beltran, without
a warrant,[16] for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only
have conducted as he did... conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently,
when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion,
they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran's arresting
officers saw
Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause
to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers... alleged in their affidavit
is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."[20]

To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this
Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause for
otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor's... findings in such
investigations.[21] However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion
by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the
accused his right to substantive and... procedural due process, we have not hesitated to intervene and
exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor's findings.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end.[24]
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
consisted of the affidavits and other documents[25] attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over
these documents and find merit in Beltran's contention that... the same are insufficient to show
probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of
which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians.
Except for two affidavits, executed by a... certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,[26]
and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,[27] none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.
[28] In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the... afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran,
Ocampo, Casiño, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a
chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met
by another individual who looked... like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former
member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran;
(2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used... were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list
groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an
armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran
was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years... earlier, he was present
during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of
promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006.
None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of... a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence
during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.

Juan Ponce Enrile v Salaraz GR No. 92163 June 5, 1990

Facts:Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested on the strength of a warrant. Charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990. February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, filed the petition for
writ of habeas corpus. The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the
plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
return for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164. Said return urged that the petitioners'
case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged
murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion,
whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed
on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.The court granted Senator Enrile and the
Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash
or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
respectively.Issue:a) Whether SC should abandon Hernandez and adopt the view that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion
may properly be complexed with common offenses, b) Whether SC hold Hernandez applicable only
to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but
not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or
less grave character;c) Whether SC should maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb
all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
Held:
WHEREFORE, The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simplerebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to
bail, before final conviction, as amatter of right. Ratio Decidenti:a.NO.In the view of the majority,
the ruling remains good law, its substantiveand logical bases have withstood all subsequent
challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
completereversal.b.NO.Under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution,would be unfavorable to the movant. Article 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penaltymore severe than that which would
be proper if the several acts performed toy Mm were punished separately.c.NO.Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.

People v Lovedioro GR No. 112235 November 29, 1995

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay
Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist,
aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground.
After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.

The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old
welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the
fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his
nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that
the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the
chest, and other parts of the body. On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of
death as hypovolemic shock.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant committed Rebellion under Art. 134 and 135 or Murder under
Article 248 of the RPC?

Held:

The court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal,
acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the
deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the
sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the
said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos,
representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the
part of the said accused.

In his appeal, appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as
supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his
Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New
People's Army.

However, the appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime
being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Finally,
treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden,
and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime
committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with all the accessories provided by law. The trial court's decision dated September 14,
1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

Rivera v People GR No. 138553 June 30, 2005

People v. Recto GR No. 129069 October 17, 2001
Facts:
On April 18, 1994, early afternoon, while SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the premises, the
group of appellant Julio Recto arrived. Barangay Captain Orbe advised them not to create trouble,
but Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them. Thereafter, appellant Recto, while
holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain Orbe. The latter responded by telling
the former to surrender the balisong. Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a
gun. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while Barangay Kagawad Antonio
Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: 'Do not do it. We'll just
settle this.' Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the trigger, hitting Barangay Kagawad
Macalipay, causing him to fall down on the ground. Then Cornelio Regis, Jr. approached the fallen
Macalipay and flipped his bolo at the latter who rolled and fell into the rice paddy. Melchor Recto
saw the shooting from his hiding place behind a concrete pillar. He then ran inside the old dilapidated
bathroom of the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe also followed. Inside the bathroom, Melchor Recto
peeped through the window and saw appellant Recto fire his gun at Emilio Santos. Santos also fired
his revolver at appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While crawling, Santos fired another
shot towards Regis, Jr., but the latter was able to reach and hack the former with a bolo. When
Melchor could no longer see Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroom window and ran. While
running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter's thigh. Barangay Captain Orbe also got out of the
bathroom through the top and landed onto the ricefield. Before he could take a step, he was also shot
by appellant Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running and cross the
southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounded Melchor Recto and both went their
separate ways. On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano
'Renato' Santos died due to multiple wounds inflicted on them by herein appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of direct assault in
Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1972 which accordingly resulted in his being convicted of complex
crimes in those cases

Held:
Yes. First, in Criminal Case No. 1970. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be
committed in two ways. One of which is by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
"shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.”
One way to aggravate this mode is when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. In this
case, Melchor Recto was clearly an agent of a person in authority. Unquestionably, he was a
barangay chief tanod; however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not
acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the
attack on him did not amount to direct assault. Thus, appellant's liability amounted only to attempted,
not frustrated, homicide. Appellant shall be convicted of attempted homicide. Second, in Criminal
Case No. 1972. The court erred in finding the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Evidently, the victim had all the opportunity to escape or defend himself from the aggression that
was to ensue, yet chose not to grab the opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more
open to attack. Equally important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately sought by
appellant. It was thrust on the latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately
choose the mode of attack to kill the victim with impunity and without risk to himself. Absent
treachery, the killing is homicide, not murder. Appellant shall be convicted of qualified direct assault
with homicide aggravated by the use of a weapon.

People v Abalos GR No. 88189 July 9, 1996

PP vs ABALOSGR No. 88189July 9, 1996Facts:On that night, while accused Tiburcio Abalos and
his father, Major Cecilio Abalos werehaving a heated argument, a women shouted for help. Pfc.
Sofronio Labine appeared in the sceneto appease them. The victim saluted Abalos when the latter
turned around to face him. AsMajor Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, Tuburcio Abalos hurriedly
left and procured a pieceof wood, about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from
a nearby Ford Fieravehicle. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden
piece at Labinefrom behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine
collapsedunconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from
thatblow. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar pronounced the appelantguilty
of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.Issue: Whether or not the court erred in
convicting the crime of direct assault with murder.Ruling: No. On the offense committed by
appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that heshould be held accountable for the complex crime
of direct assault with murder. Under Art. 148of the Revised Penal Code, there are two ways of
committing direct assaults. First, withoutpublic uprising, by employing force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposesenumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition.
Second, without public uprising, byattacking, by employing force, or by seriously intimidating or
seriously resisting any person inauthority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on theoccasion of such performance.The appellant committed the second form of
assault, the elements of which are that theremust be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or
resistance upon a person in authority orhis agent; the assault was made when the said person was
performing his duties or on theoccasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is
a person in authority orhis agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
assault theoffended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.In the case,
Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samarand, thus, was an agent of
a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised PenalCode, as amended. There is also no
dispute that he was in the actual performance of his dutieswhen assaulted by appellant, that is, he was
maintaining peace and order during the fiesta inBarangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that
he personally knew Labine to be apolicemanand, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform.
These facts should havesufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct
clearly demonstratesthat he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the
law.When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for thatmatter,
there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. When the
assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arisesthe
complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. The killing constituted the felonyof murder
qualified byalevosiathrough treacherous means since Pfc. Labine was struck frombehind while he
was being confronted at the same time by appellant's father. The evidence showsthat appellant
deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood whichhe deliberately got
for that purpose.

Conquilla v Bernardo AM.No MTJ 09-1737 February 9, 2011