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President Duterte’s bicephalous leadership: Populist at home –pragmatic

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DOI: 10.1177/2057891120912008

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DOI: 10.1177/2057891120912008
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Populist at home –
pragmatic abroad

Christine B Tenorio
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Patrik K Meyer
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Achmad Nurmandi
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Abstract
Rodrigo Duterte won the Philippines’ 2016 presidential elections thanks to a well-orchestrated
campaign and his populist appeal among Filipinos. Soon after he assumed the presidency, he sur-
prised and upset most of his domestic and western international audiences by pragmatically
rejecting the pro-Western approach followed by the previous Aquino administration and adopting
a China-friendly one. Adopting Critical Discourse Analysis, this research reveals President
Duterte’s bicephalous leadership: populist in domestic policies, and pragmatic but unpopular in
foreign relations. To qualitatively describe the dichotomy between the populist and pragmatic
nature of Duterte’s leadership, this article surveys the Philippines’ mainstream media from 2016 to
2019. Furthermore, this analysis shows that Duterte is using a defensive neorealist approach in
building Philippines-China relations and that Filipinos are willing to consider China as a constructive
partner for their country.

Keywords
CDA, defensive neorealism, Duterte, leadership styles, Philippines

Corresponding author:
Christine B Tenorio, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Kampus Terpadu UMY J1. Brawijaya, Kasihan Bantul,
Yogyakarta 55183, Indonesia.
Email: christine.bt.pasca18@mail.umy.ac.id
2 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

Introduction
With China becoming a global power and following the shift of global politics towards the Asia-
Pacific region, the Philippines have emerged as a key player in the supremacy struggle between the
Asian giant and the USA. Thus, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte plays a significant role in this
regional power struggle, and understanding his leadership style becomes both important and
timely.
This article analyzes President Duterte’s leadership style by adopting Critical Discourse Anal-
ysis (CDA). To do so, it surveys the Philippines’ mainstream media and government policies
between 2016 and 2019, as well as social media outlets and opinion polls, to evaluate the response
of Filipinos to Duterte’s controversial discourses and policies. The analysis exposes Duterte’s
bicephalous leadership, populist at home and pragmatic in the international arena. Moreover, to
illustrate Duterte’s pragmatic approach to international relations, this article examines his efforts in
building Philippine-China relations while deconstructing the Philippines’ longstanding partnership
with the USA. Duterte’s Philippines-first policy results in a defensive neorealist approach to
international relations.

Existing literature and theoretical framework

It has been customary to use Critical Discourse Analysis to explore how power is expressed in
discourse in general and leadership in particular. From a discursive perspective, leadership is the
result of a collection of verbal and non-verbal actions by leaders in their daily professional
interactions (Baxter, 2013; Svennevig, 2011). Also, Svennevig (2011: 18) proposes that leadership
is associated with actions that achieve predominance in mobilizing action and shaping the insti-
tutional reality. Hence, to analyze Duterte’s leadership style it is necessary to take into account
verbal and non-verbal information. According to Fairclough (2009), CDA proposes a systematic
exploration of the relationship between discursive texts, practices, and events, cultural structures,
and broader social relations and processes. Therefore, CDA is an effective framework in examin-
ing the discourse of leaders and how leadership character constructed.
A large body of research has applied CDA to investigate leadership styles in different contexts
(Fairclough, 2009). Baxter (2013) has used CDA extensively in feminist linguistic research to
describe how leadership styles vary along gender lines. CDA has also been used to analyze Tarigan
(2017) studies about local wisdoms of Karonese that covers some proverbs that refers to leadership
model. Based on local wisdom and proverbs, it reveal two distinct leadership style, namely advisor
or mentor and decision-maker. Additionally, Tarigan (2017) finds that leadership can be defined
by eight characteristics: diligence, wisdom, bravery, ambition, optimism, altruism, smartness, and
being tactical.
In the political arena, CDA is also used to explore how political leadership is constituted.
Zaimar and Wardhani (2019) use CDA to uncover how undemocratic local traditions and values
can strongly influence the leadership style of elites in democratic countries, resulting in author-
itarian decisions being welcomed by the majority. There are also numerous case studies that
explore the leadership styles of national leaders using CDA. Junaidi et al. (2018) used Fairclough’s
model to analyze Ahok’s leadership style based on his statements in the Jakarta Post between 2014
and 2015. The authors conclude that Ahok has a dominant autocratic leadership style. More
relevant and closer to this research is Salvaleon (2018), who used CDA to unpack the meanings
of “change is coming” in the Rodrigo Duterte State of the Nation Addresses of 2016–2017.
Tenorio et al. 3

There is, however, no research exploring Duterte’s dual leadership style that can be appreciated
in his different, sometimes conflicting approaches to domestic and foreign policy. This work uses
CDA to unpack Duterte’s bicephalous leadership style which results in domestic populist discourse
and policies, and pragmatic ones in the international arena.
With the objective of identifying the dichotomy in Duterte’s leadership style, this article uses
CDA to survey the Philippines’ mainstream media and social media, as well as Duterte’s dis-
courses and policies, between 2016 and 2019. A number of scholarly papers are used to provide
academic depth to the analysis. To explore the populist nature of Duterte’s leadership, this work
adopts Engesser et al.’s (2017) values that define a populist leader’s discourse, including sover-
eignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking
the “heartland.” As for the pragmatic component, this research uses the defining characteristics of a
pragmatic leader offered by Mumford and Van Doorn (2001), including the exercise of influence
through the use of elite social relationships, appeals to existing shared values, effective commu-
nication of the merits of a plan, persuasion and negotiation through demonstration projects, and
entrepreneurial ability to tap both technical and social opportunities for innovation.
To illustrate Duterte’s pragmatic approach to foreign policy, this work adopts defensive neorealism
to expose the thinking process behind his decision to shift the Philippines’ alliances from the West to
the East, and to China more specifically. This is particularly relevant because of China’s unpopular
territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) (Meyer et al., 2019). Neorealists believe that the
unbalance of power of international politics and the absence of a supreme authority over states causes
anarchy and a struggle for power between states (Taylor, 2010). Defensive neorealist states focus on
developing their defensive capabilities with means other than military ones (Waltz, 2000).

Analysis: Duterte’s leadership style

Before being elected as President in June 2016, Rodrigo Duterte had served as the mayor of Davao
City for over two decades. During the presidential election campaign, Duterte repeatedly declared
that if elected, he would manage the country in the same way he had been managing Davao as
mayor. After he was elected, he became the first president to maintain his post in the local
government after assuming the helm of the country (Cook, 2017: 268). Moreover, he kept his
promise and embraced a mayoral approach to governing the country.
Duterte’s mayoral approach extends to his worldview and foreign policy, which many saw as a
serious handicap for the Philippines. According to Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio of
Supreme Court, a case of this handicap having detrimental effects for the Philippines’ foreign policy
was when the EU and the US criticized Duterte’s “War on Drugs,” resulting in him becoming
emotional and overreacting (Gotinga, 2019). He often makes harsh remarks against political leaders
or institutions, which he describes as “tough-talking.” Filipino elites disagree and define him as a
“foul-mouthed” bully, who looks tough at home, but is weak abroad (Brinkløv, 2017). Despite the
criticism received for his harsh rhetoric, Duterte has remained extremely popular among Filipinos of
all walks of life. It is this duality in Duterte’s leadership that this work investigates and shows to be
populist at home and pragmatic abroad.

Domestic Duterte: Populist

Cass Mudde’s definition of populist ideology is one of the most influential: “Populism is a thin-
centred ideology that considers society ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic
4 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an
expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde and Mudde, 2018). This populism empha-
sizes the importance of popular identity and sovereignty (Ordoñez and Borja, 2018), and results in
a confrontation between the political interests of the “people” and those of the elite of a country
(Stavrakakis, 2014). Hence, a populist leader is one that claims to represent the unified “will of the
people.” To assess whether Duterte’s leadership style is populist, this study compares it to Enges-
ser et al.’s (2017) five key traits of a populist leader, namely: emphasizing the sovereignty of the
people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the
“heartland.”

Emphasizing the sovereignty of the people. Duterte has consistently presented himself as the leader
that would restore Filipinos’ sovereignty over the affairs of their country. During a ceremony
commemorating the heroism of Second World War veterans during the Fall of Bataan, President
Duterte urged Filipinos to uphold the country’s sovereignty and protect hard-won rights (Esguerra,
2019). Duterte expressed in a written message released by Malacañang that he hoped to see his
compatriots being inspired to become resolute like the country’s forefathers in advocating sover-
eignty and defending the freedoms and rights of the Filipinos. Moreover, Duterte emphasized that
the sacrifices of the Philippines’ forefathers who fought to protect the country should never be
forgotten and that they should be admired as Filipino heroes.
Duterte’s populist leadership style reflected in his discourse is reinforced by populist policies.
To show his gratitude and appreciation of Filipino heroism in upholding the country’s sovereignty,
Duterte’s administration proposed a P3000 monthly pension for war veterans and full healthcare
coverage for Filipino comfort women. Duterte’s strong call to honor those who contributed to the
Philippines’ sovereignty stands in stark contrast to his weak defense of his country’s sovereignty
over the WPS, where China has overlapping territorial claims (Umil, 2019).
The populist nature of Duterte’s leadership is also reflected in how he interacts with some of the
world leaders. During the ASEAN conference in Lao in 2016, Duterte reacted disrespectfully to
President Obama’s criticism of Duterte’s war on drugs and the thousands of extrajudicial killings
resulting from it. He aggressively rejected any criticism by stating that he is the president of a
sovereign country and that he has not to answer to anyone except the Filipino people. By aggres-
sively challenging the world’s current superpower and declaring that the Philippines is not an
American puppet anymore (McKenzie and Liptak, 2016), Duterte strongly emphasized the sover-
eignty of the country and its people.

Advocating for the people. Another key trait of a populist leader is that they present themselves as
being one with and advocating for the people. Duterte declared that by the people giving him their
vote, they had empowered him to make decisions in their name and that he had no obligations
toward the Philippines’ elite. This “us vs. them” populist rhetoric was already evident in the early
stages of his successful presidential electoral campaign. His campaign was driven under the slogan
“The People’s Call for Change,” explicitly presenting himself as the voice of the large majority of
Filipinos. Duterte successfully sent through the message that he was an “ordinary man” and that he
would run the country for the benefit of the poor (Paris, 2019).
Duterte’s message as the man that could save the Philippines from the previous administrations’
legacy of corruption and poverty proved to be successful in convincing the majority of Filipinos.
When asked about President Duterte’s leadership style, most people described it as brave, tough,
rude, and aggressive, and saw in him a leader that “keeps his promises” (Webb and Curato, 2019).
Tenorio et al. 5

Despite his at times harsh policies and the disapproval and criticism from the international
community over his semi-authoritarian leadership style, Duterte enjoys high approval ratings
among Filipinos. It is his “strong man” approach to society’s problems with poverty, drugs, crime,
and corruption that strengthens his popularity. In a country where the democratic processes have
repeatedly failed to improve the lives of ordinary people, Filipinos seem to be hooked to his tough,
at times undemocratic, populist approach to managing the country. Duterte presents himself as an
“anti-system man” with the experience necessary to bring social and economic change to the
Philippines (Dollanganger, 2018).

Attacking the elites. As a “anti-system man” that consistently attacks and blames the country’s elites,
Duterte fulfils another dominant trait of a populist leader. He has successfully built an image of
himself as a virtuous citizen fighting the domestic enemies of the country. These enemies include
greedy elites of “Imperial Manila,” dangerous drug pushers, and corrupt justices. In a country with
very high inequality rates (Punay, 2018), this attack on established elites is welcomed by the
general public.
Duterte is particularly aggressive toward elites that are embedded in the government and are
public figures. For example, he accused Ongpin Roberto, a well-known oligarch, of illegally
benefiting from his connections in the political arena (Quackenbush, 2016). He argued that Ong-
pin’s predatory interests not only massively enriched the already wealthy oligarch, but often
undermined public policies that were designed for the common good.
Another reason why Duterte attacks Filipino elites is because of their alleged manipulation of
the domestic mainstream media for their self-interest and in detriment of the public good. For
instance, Duterte claimed that online news sites such as Rappler fabricated fake news to undermine
his leadership, and therefore revoked their licenses to operate. For Duterte, to restrict the media
manipulated by the elites is a question not of press freedom, but rather of their abuse of power
(Holcombe, 2019). By being at war with the domestic elites in the economic, political, and social
environment, Duterte’s leadership style fulfils one of the fundamental traits of a populist leader.

Ostracizing others. Besides attacking the elites, Duterte’s populist appeal is further reinforced by
explicitly segregating the “virtuous people” from the “dangerous other” and strongly ostracizing
the latter. Of all the policies pursued by this populist president, his war on drugs is the most
controversial and, at the same time, the most popular. Duterte has been successful in convincing
Filipinos that the drugs trade is a grave threat to Philippine society and national security. More
importantly, he has convinced them that the drug plague has infected every nook and corner of the
country, and involves mayors, generals, governors, and police forces who protected the drug
syndicates. Having convinced Filipinos that drugs were the country’s biggest problem, he made
the war on drugs a fundamental element of his administration (Diola, 2016). This war has resulted
in the arrest of tens of thousands of suspects that have ended up in the already overpopulated
prisons of the country. Moreover, afraid of summary execution, over a million of drug pushers and
users have submitted to law enforcement forces (Ross, 2016).
Aggressively ostracizing the drug trade and drug use has been an effective strategy to improve
Duterte’s popularity. Duterte’s war on drugs has resulted in thousands of people being summarily
executed and their bodies dumped in the streets with a cardboard sign reading: “I am a pusher”
(Maitem, 2019). Despite widespread violence and international condemnation resulting from this,
over 85 percent of Filipinos surveyed were still “satisfied” with the war on drugs (Diola, 2016).
6 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

According to Quimpo (2017), Duterte’s choice to initiate a war on drugs was a clever choice
because it was a common concern among Filipinos. By ostracizing and aggressively acting against
drug pushers and users, his image of being tough on crime and a man of action was reinforced and
so too therefore his popular appeal.

Invoking the heartland. Finally, Duterte’s leadership style also fits the fifth trait that characterizes a
populist leader: invoking the heartland. In his political campaign, Duterte proposed to change a
deeply unequal and corrupt society into an idealized one popular with middle-class and poor voters
(Bowring, 2019). The middle class was attracted by Duterte’s program because it aimed to improve
the education system, introduce meritocracy in the government, and enforce the rule of law to fight
corruption and crime. Poor voters were motivated by Duterte’s pro-poor discourse and policies.
Besides invoking the heartland to promote a fundamental change in the dynamics of the Filipino
society, Duterte invoked it to reshape Philippines’ governance model. By effectively using mass
and social media, he framed his struggle as the fight between those who defend an administration
for the people, the “Dutertards,” and the “Yellowtards,” who want to preserve an administration at
the service of the elite. The majority of Duterte’s opposition come from the Liberal Party that
represents the previous administration, which he argues needs to be removed. This is because the
past administration, which was dominated by the country’s elites, committed a series of political
and economic blunders that have deeply harmed the Filipino’s heartland. The political debate
became oversimplified and polarized along Dutertard-Yellowtard virtual groups that Duterte suc-
cessfully created by invoking the heartland (Abellanosa, 2018).
In this section, it has been shown that Duterte’s leadership style contains all the traits that
characterize a populist leader. Hence, it can be said that Duterte has adopted a populist style when
it comes to domestic affairs. The next question to be answered is whether his leadership style
remains the same in the international arena.

International Duterte: Pragmatic

While a populist leader emphasizes the importance of popular identity and sovereignty, a prag-
matic one focuses on finding solutions to problems by adapting his words and actions to specific
relationships and roles in a changing environment. Hence, pragmatic leadership calls for a more
complex and deeper understanding of context in which words are expressed and actions taken (Hay
and Hodgkinson, 2006). Consequently, pragmatism rejects the populist idea that truth corresponds
to some pre-constituted or non-experienced reality.
Mumford and Van Doorn’s (2001) analysis of Benjamin Franklin’s leadership revealed that
pragmatic leaders exercise influence by identifying and communicating solutions to significant
social problems, the use of elite social relationship in solution generation, creating structures to
support solution implementation, and demonstrating the feasibility of these solutions. Hence, a
pragmatic leader designs solutions grounded on the opportunities and threats given by a particular
situation (Ruwhiu and Cone, 2013).
In the previous section it was shown that Duterte is a populist leader. Now, to assess whether he
is a pragmatic leader too, his leadership style is compared to Mumford and Van Doorn’s (2001)five
traits that characterize a pragmatic leader, which are: exercising influence through the use of elite
social relationships, appealing to existing shared values, communicating effectively the merits of a
plan, negotiating and persuading through tangible projects, and having the entrepreneurial ability
to tap into both technical and social opportunities for innovation (Mumford and Van Doorn, 2001).
Tenorio et al. 7

Exercise of influence through the use of elite social relationships. Despite President Duterte being
known for his blunt and harsh manners when interacting with most domestic social elites, he
still pragmatically nurtures his relationship with them when it comes to foreign policy. For
instance, when asked about the purpose of his Independent Foreign Policy approach, Duterte’s
explanations reflected a pragmatic use of the existing influence that a number of members of
Philippines’ social elite had on international actors (Wakefield, 2018). Duterte argued that the
country already had good allies in the international arena, but that it needed to make new ones to
ensure the Philippines’ economic and security future. At times, the old and new allies might not
get along well, and that is where domestic elites that have good relations with the allies can help
keep good relations between the Philippines and them. In this case, he most probably implied that
the country’s social elites could make a positive contribution to preserving the relations with the
old ally, the US (Chalk, 2018).
Duterte added that the main purpose of the Independent Foreign Policy approach was to win
new allies but also keep the old ones (Brinkløv, 2017: 21). This policy requires a rapprochement
with China and other non-traditional partners such as Russia, Japan, and India, with the objective
of finding a “geopolitical sweet spot” to maximize the Philippines’ national interest.

Takes a practical approach to problems. While Duterte’s use of the social elites is limited, his
practical approach to dealing with problems is clearly a sign of his pragmatic leadership style.
During the presidential election campaign, Duterte adopted a predominantly populist discourse
because he needed to get the people on his side. However, soon after assuming the presidency,
his discourse and decisions started to become more pragmatic about dealing with serious chal-
lenges that the country was facing. For example, Duterte raised legitimate concerns about the
real consequences of the increasingly unreliable alliance with the US, and adopted a practical
way to deal with this challenge (De Vera, 2019). Duterte’s concerns resulted from the fact that
US economic and military assistance to the Philippines declined between 2010 and 2015, and
that the US seemed to be questioning the long-standing Mutual Defense Treaty. In particular,
Duterte was concerned with the US not considering the Spratly Island and the Scarborough Shoal
as part of the territory of the Philippines and as a consequence not considering that it had to
defend them. Duterte and most Filipino policymakers were left with the realization that the US
had let the Philippines down. Given that the US could not be seen as a reliable ally anymore,
Duterte showed his pragmatism by compensating for the economic and security loss that this
represented in a practical way: shifting the Philippines’ alliance toward the East, i.e. China and
Russia (Browne, 2018).
A more striking example of Duterte’s practical approach to resolving problems was his decision
not to confront China militarily in the WPS, despite the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea’s (UNCLOS) favorable decision toward the Philippines. He decided to do so because he
knew that without the military support of the US, the Philippines had no chance to come out
victorious from a confrontation with China: “I will not go to war because we will not win it. It will
be a massacre. I will not waste the lives of Filipino soldiers and policemen” (Heydarian, 2016:
232). This was a radical change from the Aquino administration’s approach, which focused on the
implementation of international legal norms. More importantly, Duterte’s decision went clearly
against the desire of the large majority of Filipinos, who wanted to see him confront China
militarily to defend Philippines’ sovereignty (Gotinga, 2019). Duterte’s pragmatic decision on
this particular topic shows that despite being a populist president, he is still willing to sacrifice his
popularity for the sake of doing the right thing for the Philippines.
8 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

Effective communication of the merits of a plan. Compared to his powerful populist discourse,
Duterte’s discourse to promote his policies and plans is weak. However, he is still effective in
communicating their merits because he keeps his arguments simple and to the point. This trans-
parency results in a convincing discourse. This is how he has been able to convince the majority of
Filipinos that some of the radical changes in domestic and international politics are meaningful and
beneficial to the Philippines.
It required very effective communication skills from Duterte to convince Filipinos that it was in
their interest to shift their alliances from their long-standing American protector to China, which
most of them saw as their main enemy. Previous Filipino administrations had consistently demo-
nized the Asian giant, in particular because of its territorial claims in the South China Sea (Esma-
quel, 2018). It took an effective communicator to turn this view around.
In the international arena, Duterte also proved himself to be an effective communicator when it
came to supporting his controversial policies in front of his international colleagues. For example,
at the ASEAN Business and Investment Summit held in Manila in November 2017, he effectively
defended his pragmatic security and economic cooperation with China and Russia. A number of
ASEAN members would have preferred to see the Philippines confronting China, but accepted that
Duterte presented good arguments to support his controversial approach. He was effective in
showing that friendly relations with China would hold numerous benefits for the Filipino people
(Uy, 2019). By replacing the previous confrontational strategy by a cooperative one, the Philip-
pines could benefit from China’s large surplus capacity and investment in the country’s economy
and infrastructure.

Persuasion and negotiation through demonstration projects. With the collapse of the US-led Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and a weakening EU economy, Duterte needed to find new partners to
make real changes on the ground. The obvious new partner was China, but there was significant
domestic reluctance to get closer to them. This reluctance was further reinforced by the fact that, to
build confidence between the two countries, Duterte promised China he would exercise self-
restraint on the very sensitive issue of the WPS maritime dispute. Duterte feels that the Philippines
is in dire need of Chinese support and is confident that Chinese capital will usher in a golden age of
infrastructure building and economic development for the Philippines. Nothing is more effective
for persuading his domestic audiences that his controversial pro-China policies are in the interest of
the Philippines than the real positive changes that Chinese capital in the form of new infrastructure
and jobs is bringing to the lives of the people (Juego, 2017).
Duterte has been an effective negotiator to achieve a win-win cooperation deal with China. It is
a fact that he has had yield to China on some of the most controversial issues, such as the territorial
disputes in the WPS. Despite this, the country is experiencing unprecedented growth thanks to
China’s massive foreign direct investment. Thanks to China’s investments and Duterte’s devel-
opment programs, such as the 10 Point Economic Agenda and the Build, Build, Build Initiative
(Janssen, 2019), Filipinos are seeing how their living standards improve day by day. This positive
reality on the ground is persuading them that Duterte’s cooperative approach to China is the right
way after all.

Entrepreneurial ability to tap both technical and social opportunities. The preliminary success of
Duterte’s numerous development projects and policies seems to indicate that he also fulfils the
fifth trait of a pragmatic leader: entrepreneurial ability. However, to bring his projects and
policies to life he needs funding. Thanks to Duterte’s decision to cooperate with China, China
Tenorio et al. 9

has offered credit lines and soft loans worth US$24 billion, and another US$34 billion is
expected for building a new railroad, making China the Philippines’ top investor. An example
of China being beneficial for the Philippines are the Chinese firms Hebei Iron and Steel Group
that reached an agreement with local steelmakers to invest in an iron and steel plant in southern
Philippines (Uy, 2019).
Duterte has also shown entrepreneurial ability by leading the design of numerous development
projects financed through Chinese investments, such as the Build, Build, Build Initiative (Lucas,
2019), aimed at improving the Philippines’ infrastructure and Filipinos’ lives (Pitlo, 2019). With
the Build, Build, Build Initiative, the Philippines’ government intends to invest up to US$175
billion across nearly 5000 projects in the next four years, including in 75 flagship ventures.
However, three years on, many projects are still on the drawing board, resulting in Duterte having
little to show China (Remon, 2019).

Duterte’s populist-pragmatic bicephalous leadership

In the two previous sections, Duterte’s leadership has been compared to the traits defining
populist and pragmatic leadership styles. The analysis found that Duterte’s leadership can be
defined as “bicephalous” because it goes back and forth between populist and pragmatic styles
depending on the circumstances. More specifically, his leadership is dominated by a populist
style when he deals with domestic policies and a pragmatic one when it comes to foreign
policy.

Populist at home; pragmatic abroad

Duterte’s populist rhetoric and policies, a well-orchestrated campaign, and his strong man appeal
all lifted him to the Philippines’ presidency. His political baggage as an efficient manager of
Davao City and his aggressive socio-political programs to address widespread dissatisfaction
with poverty, drugs, corruption, and crime were the building blocks of his victory. Duterte
repeatedly said that he did not want to be addressed as “President” and declared that he would
continue with his people-first approach as the “mayor of the Philippines.” He intends to govern
the country using the same populist approach as he used in governing Davao City. As soon as he
assumed the helm of the country, he was confronted with a number of pressing foreign policy
issues for which a populist approach might not have been in the best interests of the Philippines
(Umil, 2019).
The most pressing and important of these was to decide whether to continue with the previous
administration’s US-friendly approach or to shift to a closer alliance and cooperation with US’s
rival China. A populist leader would have continued with the assertive stance against China’s
maritime expansion in the WPS. However, Duterte’s populist approach at home was overridden by
a pragmatic one when it came to most foreign policies, and Philippines-China relations in partic-
ular. From his first day in office, Duterte progressively distanced himself from the US while
gradually building closer economic and political ties with China. This drastic shift in allegiances
brought forward Duterte’s preference for a pragmatic and constructive approach to foreign policy,
rather than a popular but confrontational one (Viray, 2018).
Pursuing better relations with China might have already been quite unpopular, but his decision
in 2016 to set aside the ruling against China’s territorial claims in the WPS for the sake of
establishing closer political and economic relations with China (Baviera, 2013) was definitely
10 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

extremely unpopular. His decision to develop friendly relations with China in exchange for
economic benefits clearly illustrates his pragmatism when it comes to foreign policy.
Despite Filipinos resenting his decision to yield some of the country’s territorial sover-
eignty, and extensive criticism from the West, Duterte pushed forward with his pragmatic, but
unpopular, China-friendly approach. Duterte knows that the Philippines’ military capabilities
are no match for China’s, and he does not trust the effectiveness of Philippines-US treaties.
He defended his decision by arguing that if he forced the issue with the Chinese, the Phi-
lippines and China would have no other choice but to go to war, which he did not want to do.
And despite his very unpopular approach to the WPS, Duterte still enjoys significant approval
rates at home.
Duterte’s leadership style is widely criticized both at home and abroad. For example, he was
widely criticized for not enforcing the favorable UNCLOS arbitral ruling the country received
against China (Arugay and Magcamit, 2017) as part of his efforts to improve relations with China.
Also, Duterte is criticized for downgrading military relations with America to please Beijing
(Steinbock, 2016). Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana has often raised alarm bells over China’s
maritime assertiveness in both the Benham Rise and Scarborough Shoal and Duterte’s limited
understanding of the situation in the region. Domestically, Duterte was criticized by the Filipino
pro-American business community for downgrading the Philippines-American relations (Arugay,
2018). Despite this extensive criticism, Duterte has significantly yielded in his pragmatic approach
to foreign relations.

Duterte’s China relations: Pragmatic defensive neorealist leadership style

Duterte’s at times unpopular at home, but yet effective, foreign policy approach strongly reflects
the features of defensive neorealism that leads states to survive in a chaotic system. This survival is
based on “self-help” (Magcamit, 2018) and using non-military means to build up relative power
with respect to other states.
Since the presidential election period, Duterte has criticized the role of the US in keeping the
Philippines underdeveloped and its double standards in international affairs. From the very early
stages of his presidency, Duterte rejected the previous administrations’ predictable and conserva-
tive pro-US foreign policies (Heydarian, 2016) and gradually rolled out his Independent Foreign
Policy (Romero, 2017), becoming the first Filipino administration to abandon the geopolitical
route plotted by the colonial administration of the US. As a consequence of distancing the Phi-
lippines from its former ally and protector, Duterte had to develop new strategic partnerships.
His pragmatic, defensive neorealism is most obvious in his Independent Foreign Policy, which
strongly reduces the Philippines’ dependence on the US by strategically diversifying its alliances
and including China and Russia, geopolitical competitors of the US. Recognizing the US as a
declining power in the region and China as the new power, turning to the latter was an obvious
pragmatic shift in the Philippines’ foreign policy. Duterte can then be seen as an opportunist that
disengages from declining powers, the US and EU, and engages with the rising power and the
benefits it brings with it (Fonbuena, 2017).
Being aware that the Philippines is in no position to engage on its own in hard geopolitics with
the Asian giant, Duterte has chosen a pragmatic cooperative approach focused on mutual economic
interests. His cooperation and binding to temporarily set aside the 2016 Hague Tribunal Ruling on
the WPS stress his defensive neorealist approach to Philippines-China relations (Meyer et al.,
2019). This softer approach is a trait of a defensive neorealist approach that aims at safeguarding
Tenorio et al. 11

the Philippines’ national security through non-military might (Chalk, 2018). Rather than trying to
force China to accept the tribunal’s ruling, Duterte has selected to de-emphasize maritime and
territorial issues when negotiating with China.
By untangling economic relations from geopolitical disagreements, Duterte proved to be an
effective pragmatic leader. While building a friendship with China might not have been Duterte’s
original intention, as a defensive neorealist he quickly realized that a cooperative approach was the
most appropriate to safeguard the Philippines’ national security and promote its development.
Duterte has no problem, despite the Filipinos disliking China, in publicly confessing that China
is an essential ingredient for the realization of his project to develop the country (Venzon, 2019).
Duterte needs to negotiate strategically to obtain the necessary financing for the numerous eco-
nomic development projects necessary to alleviate the country’s acute poverty. Projects such as the
10 Point Economic Agenda and the Build, Build, Build Initiative are not feasible without China’s
investments. Hence, instead of asserting his sovereign rights over the disputed islands, the pres-
ident contends that Filipinos must remain humble and meek to receive the mercy of China’s
President Xi.
Hence, when it comes to foreign policy, Duterte clearly adopts a pragmatic defensive neorealist
approach that focuses on economic diplomacy through business and trade, rather than focusing on
confrontational geopolitics and security. And this cooperative approach has resulted in the Phi-
lippines becoming one of the largest recipients of China’s foreign investment. This has resulted in
numerous development projects being implemented in the Philippines with very tangible benefits
for Filipinos, at least in the short term. However, some would argue that the Philippines is walking
into a gigantic Chinese death trap (Lucas, 2019).
Finally, to reverse the negative perception that Filipinos have of China, Duterte has been selling
the idea that the Philippines needs China more than China needs the Philippines, as well as that
China’s President Xi is the only global leader that understands the Philippines’ needs and is willing
to engage in a constructive way with the country (Venzon, 2019). Following a pragmatic defensive
neorealist approach, Duterte promotes a positive image of China and justifies being soft on China
in the very sensitive geopolitical issue of the territorial disputes in the WPS.

Conclusions
Duterte’s populist discourse and polices and his strong man image elevated him into winning the
Philippines’ presidency. His determined socio-political programs to address widespread dissatis-
faction with issues related to corruption, poverty, drugs, and crime, as well as his political baggage
as an efficient manager of Davao City, were the building blocks of his victory. As mayor of Davao,
he had to deal only with domestic policies, which he did in a populist manner. As soon as he
became the Philippines’ president, he had to deal with a number of urgent foreign policy issues, for
which his domestic populist strategy was not in the best interests of the Philippines. The most
sensitive issue he had to address as a newly elected populist president was to decide whether to
continue with the previous administration’s US and West-friendly approach to foreign policy or to
abandon it and establish new alliances with US’ rival, China. In choosing China, he replaced his
populist approach at home with a blunt pragmatic one abroad. This switch from populist to
pragmatic leadership occurred despite the majority of Filipinos having antagonistic feelings
toward China.
Duterte’s popularity was challenged by his pragmatic defensive neorealist leadership style
adopted in establishing the Independent Foreign Policy program. The Independent Foreign Policy
12 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

strategically lessened the Philippines’ dependence on the US by developing strong alliances

mainly with China, but also with Russia, both geopolitical rivals of the US. More importantly,
Duterte’s decision to set aside the 2016 UNCLOS ruling against China’s territorial claims in the
WPS is testimony to his robust pragmatic leadership style in foreign policy. However, despite the
unpopularity among Filipinos of some of his foreign policies, his approval rates at home remained
very high, revealing his exceptional skill to adopt two different, at times competing, leadership
styles.
This article unpacks and illustrates Duterte’s bicephalous leadership style, which is dominated
by a populist approach in domestic affairs, predominately pragmatic, and at times unpopular, when
it comes to foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, when it comes to complex security and eco-
nomic foreign policies, Duterte adopts an explicit defensive neorealist approach that puts the
interests of the Philippines above his own self-interest and popularity.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Christine B Tenorio https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1151-3181

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