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Obstacles to Empowerment: Local Politics and Civil Society in Metropolitan

Manila, the Philippines

Article  in  Urban Studies · November 2000

DOI: 10.1080/00420980020002841

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Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No. 12, 2357 – 2375, 2000

Obstacles to Empowerment: Local Politics and

Civil Society in Metropolitan Manila, the
Philippines

Gavin Shatkin
[Paper Ž rst received, September 1999; in Ž nal form, March 2000]

Summary. In recent years, the Philippine government has undertaken a number of reforms for
decentralising urban governance and increasing the role of community-based organisations
(CBOs) and non-governmental organisations in urban policy and programme development and
implementation. Popular interpretations see these changes as an outcome of the ‘people’s power’
movement against centralisation and authoritarianism and stress the potential for increased civil
society participation in government in the future. This paper critically examines these interpre-
tations with reference to the situation of CBOs in informal settlements in Metropolitan Manila.
SpeciŽ cally, it argues that decentralisation re ects the interests of a variety of politically powerful
social groups, including not only organisations of civil society, but also local political families and
international and domestic business interests. In addition, a number of factors continue to inhibit
meaningful civil society participation. These include the lack of local government capacity in
many cities and municipalities and the existence of powerful economic interests at the local level
that compete with civil society organisations for in uence.

In recent years, many developing countries
have adopted reforms for decentralisation
and increased citizen participation in urban
development programmes and policies. In
the area of tenure regularisation and infra-
structure delivery in informal settlements,
central governments have in many cases de-
volved responsibility to local governments
and have enhanced the role of non-
governmental and community-based organi-
sations (NGOs and CBOs) in organising
residents for improvement projects. Two
justiŽ cations are generally given for imple-
menting reforms for decentralisation and par-
ticipation. First, participation by community
residents supposedly enhances community
improvement programmes and projects by
Gavin Shatkin is in the College of Design, Art, Architecture and Planning, University of Cincinnati, PO Box 210016, Cincinnati, OH
45221-0016, USA. Fax: 513 556 1274. E-mail: gmshatkin@yahoo.com.
reducing their cost and increasing their
efŽ ciency. Secondly, local governments are
supposedly more responsive to CBOs be-
cause of their proximity and greater account-
ability to communities. In practice, however,
studies have shown that CBOs and NGOs
continue to face obstacles to participation in
local governments and that these reforms
have had a limited impact on access to shel-
ter among low-income urban residents
(Burgess et al., 1997).
This paper will examine some of the rea-
sons for the limited success of reforms for
decentralisation and participation in shelter
delivery, with reference to the case of
Metro(politan) Manila, the Philippines.
SpeciŽ cally, it will argue that these reforms

0042-0980 Print/1360-063X On-line/00/122357-19 Ó 2000 The Editors of Urban Studies

DOI: 10.1080/00420980020002841
2358 GAVIN SHATKIN
have a limited impact largely because they
do not address one of the main causes of the
lack of legal access to housing among low-
income groups—the high cost of urban land
due to speculation and development pres-
sures caused by urbanisation (Strassmann
and Blunt, 1994). The lack of legal afford-
able housing for low-income people is a
serious problem in Metro Manila. Approxi-
mately 37 per cent of the city’s population of
10 million live in informal housing that often
lacks basic services and is severely over-
crowded (PCUP, 1998). Since the overthrow
of the authoritarian government of Ferdinand
Marcos, the Philippines has undertaken a
particularly dramatic experiment in decentra-
lisation of government and recent reforms
have institutionalised a role for CBOs and
NGOs in urban development. Yet many of
the reforms have not been fully implemented
and local governments have often been un-
willing to undertake politically sensitive ini-
tiatives, such as raising property taxes or
large-scale government acquisition of land,
that would make land available for low-
income housing. Intense developmental pres-
sures due to rapid urbanisation and an in ux
of foreign investment have forced land prices
up, thereby exacerbating the problem. CBOs
have experienced limited successes in some
parts of the Metropolitan area, particularly
where there are large amounts of vacant land
and where informal settlers constitute a large
potential constituency that somewhat offsets
the political in uence of land-owners. In
other cases, however, they have had very
little in uence.
The paper will begin with a brief review of
recent literature on the role of civil society in
urban development in developing countries.
Next, it will examine the historical an-
tecedents to the recent decentralisation of
urban government in the Philippines and the
impact of the recent reforms on urban poli-
tics. The paper will then examine the chang-
ing nature of Metro Manila’s relation to the
global economy and how these changes are
impacting on local political economies in the
Metropolitan area. Finally, it will examine
current relations between government and
civil society in Metro Manila’s cities with
respect to the issue of urban poverty and
informal settlements, highlighting case stud-
ies of three localities.
Cities, States and Citizens in a Globalising
World
The increased appeal of reforms for decen-
tralisation and community participation in
urban development in recent years is largely
attributable to cynicism regarding the ca-
pacity of government to deliver effectively
goods and services. Such reforms are often
depicted as a means to overcome the per-
ceived shortcomings of government, namely
their inefŽ ciency and lack of accountability
(Pugh, 1994; Schubeler, 1996). This view is
succinctly summarised by Tendler (1997)
According to these accounts, public
ofŽ cials and their workers pursue their
own private interests rather than those of
the public good. Governments overextend
themselves in hiring and spending. Clien-
telism runs rampant, with workers being
hired and Ž red on the basis of kinship and
political loyalty rather than merit. …
Badly conceived programs and policies
create myriad opportunities for bribery,
in uence peddling and other forms of
malfeasance. All this adds up to the disap-
pointing inability on many governments to
deliver good public services and to cope
with the persistent problems of corruption,
poverty, and macroeconomic mismanage-
ment (Tendler, 1997, p. 1).
Decentralisation and the formation of part-
nerships between government and corpora-
tions and organisations of civil society are
therefore seen as a means to take goods and
service provision out of the hands of central
governments and provide a role for more
efŽ cient, accountable entities.
There are two main perspectives on the
recent spate of reforms for decentralisation
and participation, which differ in their politi-
cal perspective and in their interpretation of
why the reforms have taken place. One view,
put forth by the World Bank (1993) and
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT
other international aid and lending organisa-
tions since the early 1990s, holds that reduc-
ing central government intervention will
result in the more efŽ cient and cost-effective
provision of social services. This view is
premised on a neo-liberal economic perspec-
tive that holds that markets are inherently
more capable of delivering goods and ser-
vices than government. In this view, govern-
ments have begun to undertake such reforms
out of enlightened self-interest. A second
view is premised on political economy the-
ory, which stresses the capacity of com-
munity groups to produce development
outcomes that are more sustainable and more
appropriate to local socioeconomic and cul-
tural needs (Friedmann, 1992). Political
economists tend to emphasise the resistance
of economic, political and bureaucratic inter-
ests in the state to community participation in
planning and see reforms for decentralization
and participation as a victory of social move-
ments for local autonomy.
This paper will argue that neither of these
explanations of the genesis of the recent
reforms is sufŽ cient. Rather, reforms for de-
centralisation and participation are largely
the result of changes in the nature of urban
politics in developing countries resulting
from globalisation and rapid urbanisation.
SpeciŽ cally, these reforms re ect the impact
of two trends that are common to many
developing countries—increased pressures
on governments for Ž scal austerity in the era
of globalisation, which has caused many cen-
tral governments to retreat from a role in
social welfare and the increased political
in uence of social groups who have a vested
interest in political decentralisation and liber-
alisation. In order to understand these
changes, it is necessary to discuss brie y the
impacts of globalisation on developing coun-
tries.
Since the 1960s and 1970s, advances in
transport and telecommunications technolo-
gies have resulted in rapid industrial growth
in many developing countries, as multina-
tional corporations have taken advantage of
their increased mobility to seek out lower
production costs and new markets. Between
2359
1980 and 1993, developing countries in-
creased their share of world industrial output
from 10 per cent to 22 per cent (Burgess et
al., 1997). At the same time, many countries
that had adopted economic development
strategies based on import-oriented industri-
alisation or basic commodity production
were experiencing economic difŽ culties, as
falling commodities prices and borrowing to
Ž nance industrialisation had led to debt
crises. Pressured by international aid and
lending institutions to repay their loans,
many countries agreed to undergo structural
adjustment programmes which involved the
freeing of markets, the reduction or elimin-
ation of subsidies and price controls and
decreased government expenditures on social
services (Walton and Seddon, 1990). Such
reforms were part of an overall effort to
restructure developing economies to re ect
the neo-liberal economic ideals of decreased
government intervention in economic mat-
ters, Ž scal austerity and liberalised markets.
These measures were for the most part
backed by export-oriented industrial interests
in developing countries, who were becoming
increasingly in uential due to their increased
importance in national economies.
During the 1980s, however, declines in
standards of living caused by the retreat of
national governments from redistributive and
social welfare roles led to increased poverty
and civil strife (Walton and Seddon, 1990).
Wary of the economic and political impacts
of these developments, international organi-
sations such as the World Bank began to
formulate a framework for the role of the
state in urban planning and management and
social service delivery, that was consistent
with neo-liberalism and the need for Ž scal
austerity. The result was ‘enablement’ theory
(World Bank, 1993). In the enablement
framework, cities are seen as important gen-
erators of economic development and
government attempts to control urban devel-
opment through regulations, land-use con-
trols or government provision of housing are
generally seen as misguided and counter-
productive. Rather, the primary roles for
government are in providing trunk infra-
2360 GAVIN SHATKIN
structure, ensuring economic stability and
formulating policies and programmes that
will ‘enable’ the for-proŽ t private sector and
civil society to deliver social services.
SpeciŽ c measures include the deregulation of
land markets, the privatisation of certain ser-
vices and improved governance (Pugh,
1994). In enablement theory, NGOs and
CBOs represent the interests of urban resi-
dents in relations with other actors and foster
popular participation in order to pool re-
sources to reduce costs and to ensure the
sustainability of improvement projects
(Schubeler, 1996).
The imperative for countries to participate
in the global economy and the incentives
provided by international organisations, have
led many governments to implement enable-
ment reforms. These reforms have led to a
limited convergence of interests among vari-
ous actors in urban development. As a result
of such reforms, national governments are
able to cut expenditures while also accessing
the resources of international organisations,
local governments gain increased autonomy,
the for-proŽ t private sector gains freedom
from much central state regulation and civil
society organisations are provided with op-
portunities to in uence decision-making. Yet
there is a contradiction in enablement theory
with respect to the situation of informal set-
tlements. While the enablement model en-
courages governments to co-operate with
organisations of civil society, it also stresses
that governments should refrain from inter-
vening in land markets. Yet these objectives
may be in con ict. SpeciŽ cally, efforts by
CBOs to access urban land at prices afford-
able to low-income residents are often in
con ict with the objective of land-owners to
increase the value of that land. Governments
must therefore choose between conceding to
the interests of informal settlers and main-
taining the primacy of market forces in land
allocation. In practice, governments often
align with land-owning interests, thereby
limiting the space for participation by CBOs.
Two questions emerge from the above
analysis. First, given the contradiction stated
above, to what extent can local governments
be expected to provide channels for mean-
ingful political participation by organisations
of civil society? Secondly, what capacity
does civil society have to take advantage of
this political space? I would argue that two
main factors in uence local governments’
inclination and capacity to incorporate popu-
lar participation in decision-making. The Ž rst
of these is simply the relative capacity of
local governments to address the demands of
civil society. Economic development is in-
herently uneven in cities and high-value land
uses tend to be concentrated in certain parts
of the city. There is consequently a disparity
in the revenue-generating capacity of local
governments. Likewise, cities differ in the
availability of other resources, most notably
vacant land. Thus, in a decentralised system,
even where there is the political will to co-
operate with civil society, local governments
may lack basic resources, such as personnel,
funding or land, to do so.
The second factor is the nature of relations
between the state, the for-proŽ t private sector
and communities in localities. SpeciŽ cally,
the degree to which CBOs can in uence
decision-making is likely to be strongly af-
fected by the interests of politicians and po-
litically in uential private-sector actors in
local land markets. In many localities, the
bond between the state and capital is es-
pecially strong and governments may have
strong economic incentives to discourage
CBO and NGO participation in government.
This is particularly true in highly urbanised
areas, where land is scarce and valuable.
Governments have been reluctant to em-
power grass-roots organizations in inner
city areas, because they create obstacles to
the exercise of politically and economi-
cally sensitive planning powers …
required to facilitate not the poor, but the
commercial property interests linked to ur-
ban renewal, gentriŽ cation and the conver-
sion of residential to commercial and
public land uses (Burgess et al., 1997,
p. 157).
In addition, government ofŽ cials themselves
often have a direct interest in the local econ-
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT
omy, or in local real estate markets. Thus the
assumption that there is greater space for
civil society participation at the local level is
questionable—local governments may be
more accountable to land-owning interests
than to civil society.
The remainder of this paper will focus on
the case of Metro Manila. First, the recent
reforms will be placed in the historical con-
text of local– national government relations in
the Philippines. Next, the paper will discuss
how global economic forces are impacting
on the politics of space in Metro Manila and
on the role of civil society in government.
The paper concludes with a discussion of
some speciŽ c cases of local government –
civil society interaction around the issue of
informal settlements.
Case Study of Metro Manila
The proliferation of informal settlements in
Metro Manila is largely a consequence of the
relatively high cost of land in the city. Stud-
ies have shown that the ratio of land costs to
incomes is high in Metro Manila as com-
pared to most large cities in developing
countries (Strassmann and Blunt, 1994). Two
factors are largely responsible for the high
land prices. The Ž rst is rapid urbanisation—
the metropolitan area’s population grew from
approximately 4 million in 1970 to close to
10 million currently—an average annual
growth of 200 000 (NSO, 1998). The second
is speculation in urban land. Much privately
owned land is vacant, held for speculative
purposes. A study conducted in the early
1980s found that 44 per cent of land-owners
in Metro Manila held 300 square metres or
more and some held plots large enough for
5000 home lots (Mendiola, 1983). Due to the
high cost of land, residents must cut their
housing costs by reducing  oor space and
cutting back on services. A study conducted
in 1991 found that over 80 per cent of famil-
ies in Metro Manila occupied dwellings of 2
rooms or less and that approximately one-
third of dwellings lacked indoor piped water,
with a similar number lacking a water sealed
toilet (Strassmann and Blunt, 1994). The
2361
high cost of land also leads to the growth of
informal settlements, as many low-income
urban residents are shut out of the legal
housing markets.
Political reforms have signiŽ cantly
changed the Philippines’ urban development
framework in recent years, with signiŽ cant
implications for housing markets. The 1987
Constitution ensures the autonomy of city
and municipal governments and calls for par-
ticipation in government by the country’s
exceptionally mobilised civil society (Busto,
n.d.; Siliman and Noble, 1998a). The Local
Government Code of 1991 devolves import-
ant planning powers, including zoning and
land-use planning, to city and municipal gov-
ernments. It also dictates that NGO and CBO
representatives constitute 25 per cent of local
development councils (LDCs), the entities
responsible for the formulation of develop-
ment plans. Governance in Metro Manila has
also changed signiŽ cantly. The powerful
Metro Manila Commission, which had been
headed by a strong governor appointed by
the President during the Marcos period, has
been replaced by a weakened Metro Manila
Development Authority governed by a board
of mayors whose chair rotates every six
months (Berner, 1997). According to the
Constitution, the national government has no
authority to merge existing cities and munic-
ipalities into metropolitan political sub-
divisions without the consent of the populace
through a plebiscite (Busto n.d.).
Recent programmes and policies in hous-
ing have also emphasised the role of local
government, CBOs and NGOs. Under the
government’s current housing framework,
established by the Urban Development and
Housing Act (UDHA) of 1995, national
government agencies generally focus on
Ž nancing housing programmes, while im-
plementation is largely left to partnerships
between local governments, organisations of
civil society and the private sector. Under
UDHA, local governments are also required
to set aside land for relocation of informal
settlers and to compile lists of informal set-
tlers who are eligible for relocation. The law
also stipulates that sub-division developers
2362 GAVIN SHATKIN
must set aside 20 per cent of project costs for
socialised housing. The Community Mort-
gage Programme (CMP), the main govern-
ment initiative for low-income housing,
entails community organisations in informal
settlements taking loans from government to
purchase land, usually from private owners,
at market prices.
While organisations of civil society are
granted an enhanced role in recent pro-
grammes and policies, in practice CBOs and
NGOs have often encountered signiŽ cant
difŽ culties in in uencing local governments
and the reforms have had a limited impact on
access to legal housing for residents of infor-
mal settlements. Local governments have
been slow to comply with certain politically
sensitive provisions of UDHA, such as the
identiŽ cation of vacant land for socialised
housing and developers have largely ignored
the provision for setting aside part of project
costs for socialised housing (Racelis, 1998).
In addition, provisions for the rights of infor-
mal settlers in cases of eviction are often not
observed. The Urban Poor Associates, an
NGO that works with urban poor communi-
ties, recorded 105 demolitions affecting
20 110 families between July 1992 and De-
cember 1995. Only 43 per cent of affected
families were provided with relocation
(Karaos, 1996). Civil society participation on
local development councils has sometimes
been dominated groups like the Rotarians or
the Lion’s Club, which do not represent the
interests of marginal groups. Finally, CMP
projects have only reached a small minority
of communities and some projects have re-
sulted in the displacement of poorer resi-
dents, as they are unable to afford to make
payments on their loans (Berner, 1996).
In sum, while reforms have theoretically
provided the potential for the political em-
powerment of CBOs, in practice their role
continues to be limited. I would argue that
two factors have limited the role of CBOs.
The Ž rst is the persistent in uence of local
economic élites in political processes in
Philippine political culture, a phenomenon
related to Philippine history. The second is
the increased development pressure on urban
land in the Philippines in recent years, which
is largely a consequence of the integration of
Metro Manila into the global economy. The
next two sections will explore how these
factors have shaped government – community
relations in the Philippines.
Historical Foundations of Contemporary
Local Politics in the Philippines
Family plays a critical role in the Philip-
pines’ economic and political organisation.
Family-owned enterprises constitute a large
part of the economy—as indicated by the fact
that over 90 per cent of the top 1000 corpora-
tions in the Philippines are not publicly listed
(McCoy, 1993). In the political realm,
in uential families have passed political
power down through the generations. One
study indicated that 169 of the 200 House
Representatives elected in the Ž rst post-
Marcos elections, held in 1987, were either
from pre-martial-law political families or
related to these families by marriage
(Anderson, 1988).
An extensive literature has documented
the historical development of these élite fam-
ilies (Anderson, 1988; McCoy, 1993; Sidel,
1997). These accounts usually trace the
origins of this phenomenon to early Spanish
colonial times, when religious orders consol-
idated large tracts of rural land into agricul-
tural estates. Later, the Philippines turned to
the production of tropical agricultural prod-
ucts, such as sugar, tobacco, abaca and cof-
fee, to meet increasing demand in the
industrialising countries (Anderson, 1988;
McAndrew, 1994). Export-oriented agricul-
ture led to rising land values and en-
trepreneurial families, often of mestizo
Chinese heritage, began to acquire rural land
either by leasing from the religious orders
or by engaging in money-lending to small
cultivators.
When the Americans took over colonial
rule of the Philippines, these families domi-
nated agricultural production and trade. Hop-
ing to diminish the in uence of the Spanish
religious orders, the Americans soon under-
took a land reform programme that allowed
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT
Filipino farmers to purchase the land they
tilled. This resulted in the further consolida-
tion of land in the hands of rural land-owning
élites, as they used their superior Ž nancial
resources to accumulate lands. The Ameri-
cans also undertook the development of a
parliamentary democracy in the country,
holding elections for municipal ofŽ ce in
1901, for provincial governors in 1902, for
the Philippine Assembly in 1907 and for
Commonwealth president in 1935 (Sidel,
1997). Elected city and provincial ofŽ cials
gained power over local law enforcement,
taxation and public works, while national-
level ofŽ cials gained in uence over the ap-
portionment of national government funds
and loans by the national bank, the appoint-
ment of ofŽ cials, the awarding of contracts
and other powers. Political ofŽ ce therefore
held considerable potential for personal
economic advancement and many land-
owning families took advantage of their
economic position to achieve political power.
Thus the stage was set for ‘cacique democ-
racy’, in which family-based political dynas-
ties in localities perpetuated their power in a
democratic system through a combination of
patronage and violence (McCoy, 1993).
Many contemporary political Ž gures are
from large land-owning families that
amassed wealth from agricultural land hold-
ings and trading during the 19th century and
later gained electoral ofŽ ce. One example is
Corazon Aquino, the icon of the ‘people’s
power’ movement, who is from the Co-
juangco family, owners of large plantations
in Luzon.
The dominance of land-owning families at
the local level translated into in uence at the
national level as well. During the colonial
and immediate post-colonial period, their
main political concerns at the national level
were with the continuation of preferential
treatment of Philippine agricultural products
in the US market (a legacy of the colonial
era) and obtaining ‘pork-barrel’ funds from
the national government. Their concern with
maintaining hegemony in their areas made
them a powerful coalition against attempts to
centralise rule in the Philippines.
2363
The dominance of traditional landed, ru-
ral-based elite in the Congress resulted in
more attention being paid to local, particu-
laristic legislation compared with national
programs such as, for example, the issue
of balanced agricultural and industrial de-
velopment, or income and property tax
legislation. Congress enacted local auton-
omy laws, created new towns and cities,
subdivided provinces and increased pork
barrel appropriations in order to satisfy
local supporters (Caoili, 1988, p. 61).
The political in uence of the rural élite
gradually waned in the post-colonial era,
however, as industrialisation created new
bases of power and an increasingly urban and
educated population sought alternatives to
what they saw as the backwardness of the
rural élite. Their era of dominance ended
abruptly with Marcos’ declaration of martial
law in 1972. Marcos strengthened and co-
opted the military and police forces and used
them to seize control forcibly of the assets of
the rural élite and pass them on to his loyal-
ists (Anderson, 1988). Once his authority
was assured, Marcos declared his intention to
adopt an economic development policy based
on export-oriented industrialisation, which
was experiencing success in other countries
in the region. This earned him praise from
the middle class and local industrial interests,
as well as foreign investors and the World
Bank. The improved security situation, the
introduction of tax and duty concessions and
the suppression of labour unions brought in a
surge of foreign aid and investment, which
helped to solidify Marcos’ rule (Thompson,
1995).
The Marcos government also used the
governance of Metro Manila to consolidate
its rule. In 1975, Marcos issued a presidential
decree forming the Metro Manila Com-
mission which consolidated 17 municipali-
ties under a uniŽ ed authority responsible for
planning and policy-making. Marcos’ wife
Imelda was appointed Governor of the new
entity. The Marcos government undertook a
spate of monumental building projects em-
ploying the latest in modernist architecture
2364 GAVIN SHATKIN
and building techniques (often employing
crony companies), designed to project the
image of a modern, world-class metropolis.
These included the Cultural Centre of the
Philippines, the Folk Arts Theatre and the
Philippine International Convention Centre
(Pinches, 1994). These buildings were the
venue for a number of prestigious inter-
national events, including the 1974 Miss
Universe Pageant and the 1976 International
Monetary Fund and World Bank Conference.
These projects and the events they hosted,
often came at a direct cost to low-income
communities. During the preparations for the
Miss Universe Pageant, an estimated 100 000
people were evicted, while during the IMF
and World Bank Conference, an estimated
60 000 people were evicted. In all, it has
been estimated that 400 000 families were
evicted between 1973 and 1980 (Pinches,
1994).
Opposition to Marcos’ rule gradually
mounted during the late 1970s and 1980s.
The communist New People’s Army (NPA)
had gained control of large parts of the
countryside by the late 1970s (Thompson,
1995). The mainstream opposition to Mar-
cos, led by members of prominent pre-
Marcos political families such as former Sen-
ators Benigno Aquino and Lorenzo Tanada
and the son of former Senate President Gil
Puyat, advocated increasingly radical and
sometimes violent forms of protest. Some
formed alliances with the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP), the political wing
of the communist movement. Support for
Marcos in the business community also
slipped, as extreme corruption and lack of
transparency had led to a soaring budget
deŽ cit and economic stagnation. Labour un-
rest and a worsening security situation due to
the growing communist insurgency had fur-
ther limited economic opportunities. By the
early 1980s, some in the business community
began providing Ž nancial support to the Mar-
cos opposition (Thompson, 1995). The 1983
assassination of political opposition leader
Benigno Aquino Ž nally drove these disparate
elements—the left, the middle class, landed
élites and business interests—into a coalition
that openly opposed Marcos’ rule. Thus the
stage was set for the ‘people’s power’ revolt
of 1986.
Politics in the post-Marcos era has
re ected this coalition of interests opposed to
authoritarianism and centralisation. Foreign
and local industrial interests fear the return of
the cronyism and national-level corruption
that had driven the economy to the brink of
ruin. NGOs, many of which were formed by
middle-class activists and former communist
organisers, have demanded an increased role
for civil society in decision-making. The old
land-owning families have partially returned
to power and continue to resist efforts of
central government to usurp their authority.
These interests have in uenced the radical
experiment in decentralisation that the
Philippines has undertaken.
However, the recent political change does
not represent a complete return to the pre-
Marcos political order. The current political
climate is also in uenced by the fact that the
population has become more urban and edu-
cated and politicised by the experience of the
anti-authoritarian movement. As a result,
political candidates from rural land-owning
families have often not fared well in national
elections. The presidential elections of 1992
and 1998 resulted in the elections of Fidel
Ramos, a former general who had Aquino’s
backing and Joseph Estrada, a former Ž lm
star and populist politician. Metro Manila
politics has manifest elements of both the
in uence of wealthy families that is the
legacy of colonial history and the civil so-
ciety mobilisation that is the legacy of the
anti-authoritarian struggle. Family-based
politics has made a comeback in some ar-
eas—prominent old political families have
returned to power in some cities and munici-
palities and new families have gained power
in others. In the 1998 elections, in which
several mayors reached their term limit,
many candidates were the sons or wives of
the outgoing mayors. While some of these
candidates fared well, others did not. In
Makati, for example, the wife of outgoing
mayor Jejomar Binay prevailed over the son
of the Marcos-era mayor, Nestorio Yabut. In
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT
Pasay, several relatives of Pablo Cuneta, who
had been the country’s longest-serving
mayor, ran for a variety of posts at the local
and national levels and all lost. In addition,
the strength of NGOs and increased network-
ing among CBOs, have made low-income
communities a more potent political force in
many contexts and many politicians have
courted the votes of the poor by advocating
issues of concern to them. Thus local politics
has evinced a combination of clientèlism,
populism and grassroots political mobilis-
ation. Organisations of civil society have
acquired a degree of political legitimacy, but
face entrenched interests in efforts to
improve housing in poor communities.
State– civil society relations with regard to
the issue of housing for the poor have also
been affected by the impacts of economic
globalisation. SpeciŽ cally, the Philippines’
accelerated integration into the global econ-
omy as an exporter of manufactured goods
has intensiŽ ed competition over urban land,
often pitting low-value uses such as housing
for the poor against higher-value commercial
and industrial uses. Thus, organisations of
the urban poor have often found themselves
in competition with corporate and land-
owning interests for political in uence. The
impact of globalisation on civil society par-
ticipation in government is the subject of the
next section.
Globalisation and the Changing Politics of
Space in Metro Manila
Eager to make up ground lost to the rapidly
growing economies of neighbouring south-
east Asian countries during the Marcos years,
the Philippine government has worked assid-
uously to project an image of the Philippines
as the next in line in the region to achieve
‘tiger’ status. The government has taken
measures further to open the country to glo-
bal commerce, liberalise the banking indus-
try and deregulate key industries in order to
encourage investment. As the security situ-
ation in the country has improved, these
changes have paid off—Philippine exports
grew from $5.72 billion to $25.23 billion
2365
between 1987 and 1997 (NSO, 1998). The
country’s transformation from a primarily
agricultural economy to an industrial econ-
omy continued during this period, as the
share of manufacturing exports rose from
63.6 per cent of total exports in 1987 to 86
per cent in 1997. Of particular note has been
the growth in exports of electrical com-
ponents, from $1.1 billion in 1987 to $13.0
billion in 1997, indicating that the country is
moving towards more high-tech manufactur-
ing.
A signiŽ cant impact of the growing im-
portance of manufacturing exports in the
Philippine economy is the rapid industrialis-
ation and urbanisation that have occurred in
areas other than Metro Manila. ‘Growth
zones’ have included the provinces immedi-
ately surrounding Metro Manila, southern
Luzon, Cebu and economic zones created at
the former US military bases at Olongapo
and Subic Bay, to name some (PADCO,
1992). Nevertheless, Metro Manila’s econ-
omic primacy remains unchallenged. While
employment in industry in the Philippines
grew from 3.08 million in 1987 to 4.45 mil-
lion in 1998, Metro Manila’s share of this
employment remained fairly steady at around
21 per cent and its share of manufacturing
value-added remained at around 43 per cent
(NSO, 1998). Meanwhile, the city’s share of
gross national product rose from 28.7 per
cent in 1984 to 34.5 per cent in 1997. Econ-
omic growth has enhanced the city’s role as
a centre for producer services—the command
and control centre of the Philippines. The
city has also remained the country’s premier
port—67.4 per cent of exports and 60.6 per
cent of imports passed through Metro Manila
ports in 1997.
Economic growth has brought with it
changing development pressures on urban
land. One study found that the share of in-
dustrial land uses in Metro Manila increased
from 4.9 per cent in 1985 to 8.5 per cent in
1994 (Urban Research Consortium, 1998).
Much of this development has taken place in
cities and municipalities on the urban fringe,
most notably in Valenzuela, Quezon City,
Taguig and Paranaque (Figure 1). There has
2366 GAVIN SHATKIN

Figure 1. Development of industrial space by city and municipality in Metro Manila, 1990 – 97.
Source: NSO (1998).

also been a signiŽ cant increase in the share
of commercial land uses in Metro Manila—
from 3.8 per cent in 1985 to 6.1 per cent in
1994 (Urban Research Consortium, 1998).
Commercial space development has mainly
taken the form of malls and high-rise ofŽ ce
facilities. Particularly noteworthy in the
Metro Manila context is the existence of
large-scale developments carried out by a
single developer and containing a complex of
both commercial and business establish-
ments. The largest of these is the Makati
central business district, developed by the
Ayala conglomerate, which has been devel-
oped since 1945. A largely undeveloped
marsh on the urban periphery until the end of
World War Two, Makati is now one of the
premier business centres in Asia. It is the
home of 84 per cent of private commercial
banks in the Philippines, as well as 9 of the
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT 2367

country’s 10 largest insurance Ž rms and 48
of its 56 embassies (Gloria, 1995). More
recently, the Ortigas district in Mandaluyong
has emerged as a potential challenger to
Makati’s supremacy, having attracted the
ofŽ ces of the Asian Development Bank and
other prestigious institutions. As in some
other Asian mega-cities, malls have become
a ubiquitous feature in Metro Manila life.
The demand for mall development seems
endless, as the lack of public space in the city
and congestion on roads leaving the city
render these establishments one of the few
forms of recreation available to most people.
Commercial space development has occurred
mostly in central city areas, most notably in
Makati, but has also been prominent in Man-
daluyong, southern Quezon City and Manila
(Figure 2).
The rapid pace of real estate development

Figure 2. Development of commercial space by city and municipality in Metro Manila, 1990 – 97. Source:
NSO (1998).
2368 GAVIN SHATKIN
in Metro Manila presents an opportunity for
city and municipal governments. Saddled
with responsibility for a variety of services as
a result of decentralisation, local govern-
ments are under pressure to generate revenue
through property and business taxes. Each of
these sources of revenue now represents a
larger proportion of local government bud-
gets in Metro Manila than the Internal Rev-
enue Allotment (IRA), the sum provided by
the national government to all cities and
municipalities. Local government ofŽ cials
also often have a vested interest in encourag-
ing local economic development, both be-
cause in uential businesspeople make
powerful political allies and because ofŽ cials
themselves often come from families with
real estate interests. Thus city and municipal
governments have increasingly competed to
attract investment in the form of commercial
development, industrial development, high-
value residential development and develop-
ment of institutions such as colleges,
hospitals or government ofŽ ces.
The imperative of local economic develop-
ment for local government—and the conse-
quent competition among them to attract
investment—has two major consequences for
relations between local governments and
CBOs in informal settlements. First, local
governments may be inclined to discourage
participation by CBOs, as they may see the
interests of informal settlements as
con icting with the objective of local econ-
omic development. Informal settlements of-
ten occupy developable land, or land that
would be required for infrastructure improve-
ments such as road improvements or the
development of mass transit systems. The
second consequence is that, because of varia-
tions in the ability of localities to attract
investment, there is a disparity in their ability
to generate revenues. Inner-city areas and
large population centres are prime targets for
investment in retail and business ofŽ ce de-
velopment, which generate a great deal of
revenue. Areas on the urban fringe and those
that do not have adequate transport links
have greater difŽ culty in attracting such in-
vestment. In 1997, revenue collection of
Metro Manila local governments ranged
from 486 pesos per capita in Malabon, to
7656 pesos per capita in Makati (Figure 3).
Cities with especially low revenue are likely
to lack basic capacities in planning and pro-
gramme development and implementation,
thereby reducing their responsiveness to their
constituents.
Thus economic changes associated with
globalisation have weakened the ability of
CBOs to in uence government. Rapid urban-
isation has intensiŽ ed development pres-
sures, while uneven access to resources
among cities has weakened the capacity of
some city and municipal governments. Yet
both of these factors vary between cities and
municipalities in different parts of Metro
Manila and speciŽ cally between central areas
and the urban fringe, suggesting that local
governments in some areas may be more
open to civil society participation than oth-
ers. The next section will provide a compara-
tive examination of three case studies of
state– community relations in Metro Manila,
emphasising the differences in civil society
participation among them.
Local Politics and Informal Settlements:
Three Case Studies
Large-scale urban community organising in
the Philippines can be dated to the early
1970s, when the Philippine Ecumenical
Council for Community Organising
(PECCO) began training community organis-
ers in confrontational Alinsky-style organis-
ing tactics. CBOs experienced a number of
signiŽ cant successes in the 1970s in resisting
eviction, legalising tenure and improving in-
frastructure and services in communities.
During the martial law period, CBOs and
NGOs faced oppression and many organisa-
tions formed alliances with the National
Democratic Front (NDF), a political front
organisation for the Communist Party of the
Philippines. In recent years, government re-
pression has eased and the national govern-
ment has moved from a project to a
programme focus in its housing activities. In
addition, funding to NGOs for community
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT 2369

Figure 3. Revenue per capita for cities and municipalities of Metro Manila, 1997. Source: Department
of Finance, Makati (unpublished data).

improvement projects has increased. In this
context, many CBOs and NGOs have moved
from protest activities to service delivery and
have increasingly attempted to engage
government in improvement projects.
It is difŽ cult to determine the extent of
community organising in Metro Manila. Ap-
proximately 2000 CBOs in informal settle-
ments are currently registered with the Home
Insurance Guarantee Corporation, a national
government agency that administers housing
Ž nance programmes and 906 are registered
with the Presidential Commission on the Ur-
ban Poor (PCUP, 1998; Housing Insurance
Guarantee Corporation, unpublished data).
However, these likely represent only a frac-
2370 GAVIN SHATKIN
tion of the actual number of organisations. A
large number of NGOs have formed to pro-
vide technical assistance to CBOs in areas
such as organisational development, legal
training and assistance and the establishment
of livelihood and infrastructure improvement
projects. Many CBOs also belong to CBO
federations that have organised at the city,
metro and national levels to lobby for local
government compliance with UDHA, for the
formation of urban poor affairs ofŽ ces in city
and municipal governments and for the pre-
vention of evictions. Some federations have
also backed political candidates from infor-
mal settlements.
Experiences of NGOs and CBOs in work-
ing with local governments have been mixed.
In some cities, these organisations have
gained representation in local development
councils and other consultative bodies, but
they have failed to do so in others. Urban
poor affairs ofŽ ces have become important
channels for demand-making by urban poor
communities in some local governments,
while in others they have not been estab-
lished at all. UDHA regulations regarding the
provision of adequate relocation in the case
of eviction have often not been implemented
and some local governments have been slow
to comply with the UDHA mandate that they
conduct an inventory of vacant lands for
relocation of informal settlers.
Thus the question emerges as to why
CBOs and NGOs have succeeded in
in uencing local governments in some areas,
while they have failed to do so in others. it is
argued here that four contextual factors
strongly in uence the degree to which CBOs
and NGOs are able to in uence local govern-
ments. The Ž rst is the intensity of land devel-
opment pressures in the locality. A major
constraint on the availability of land for
housing low-income people in Metro Manila
is the fact that land-owners hold large
amounts of developable land for speculative
purposes. This problem is exacerbated by a
property tax system that provides incentives
for such speculation. Thus, in heavily ur-
banised or rapidly developing areas where
extensive tracts of land are held by private
owners, the political and economic costs to
local governments of enhancing access to
land for the poor will be great. Local govern-
ments may therefore be inclined to discour-
age participation by urban poor groups in
decision-making. CBOs are likely to be more
able to in uence government to legalise
housing where large amounts of vacant land
are available, where land ownership is in
con ict or where much of the vacant land is
publicly owned (unless this land is needed
for important public projects).
The second factor is the local govern-
ment’s access to sources of revenue. Two of
the major sources of revenue for local gov-
ernments in Metro Manila are business and
property taxes and the level of local govern-
ment revenue is therefore largely a function
of the amount of business investment coming
into localities and property values. Local
government revenues from property taxes
may be limited by the speculative holding of
undeveloped land. Where local governments
lack Ž nancial resources due to limitations in
revenue-generating capacity, they will be
less able to establish programmes to legalise
and improve informal settlements.
The third factor is the nature of the local
economic base and the relationship between
powerful economic actors and local govern-
ment. Where local ofŽ cials have a strong
vested interest in local economic develop-
ment, either because of their direct involve-
ment in the local economy or their ties to
local economic interests, they will be less
likely to be responsive to the interests of
residents of informal settlements. This is par-
ticularly true of smaller cities and municipal-
ities, where a few families may dominate
local economic and political power. The Ž nal
factor is the strength of community organis-
ing in the locality. This is dependent on a
number of factors, including the presence of
NGOs in the locality, the historical develop-
ment of community organising and relations
between communities and local govern-
ments.
The remainder of this section will illus-
trate the impact of the factors mentioned
above on CBO and NGO participation in
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT
government with reference to two cities
(Quezon City and Makati) and one munici-
pality (Navotas) in Metro Manila. The three
areas differ considerably in terms of their
population density, socioeconomic compo-
sition, economic base, historical develop-
ment and other factors. They also differ in
the degree of civil society participation in
government. A brief description will be
given of how these differences have impac-
ted on the capacity of CBOs to in uence
local governments.
Navotas. Navotas is a municipality of
229 039 people located on a narrow strip of
land on Manila Bay north of Manila. The
municipality is ideally located near waters
that are well-suited for deep-sea Ž shing and
Ž shing has been its major industry since the
19th century. Today, the Navotas economy
remains largely based on Ž shing and related
industries, such as canning, shipping and the
production of Ž sh sauce. It is estimated that
70 per cent of Navotas residents are depen-
dent on these industries (TWSC, 1988). The
job opportunities offered by the Ž shing in-
dustry have acted as a magnet for a steady
stream of migrants from rural areas, mostly
from the Visayan Islands in the central part
of the country. As most of the limited
amount of land in the municipality has long
since been developed, most of these migrants
have settled in informal settlements built on
stilts along Manila Bay. The presence of
these densely populated settlements gives the
city an astounding population density of
more than 88 000 people per square kilome-
tre, or about 6 times the Metro Manila aver-
age (NSO, 1998).
The Navotas economy is dominated by a
handful of families that own large Ž shing
vessels, shipyards and food processing
plants. This élite group also dominates the
political scene (TWSC, 1988). The continued
importance of Ž shing in the local economy
has meant that the composition of the local
élite has been fairly stable and, as a result,
there has been some intergenerational politi-
cal competition between these élite families.
In the mayoral elections of 1988, the Ž rst
2371
after Marcos’ rule, all three candidates were
sons of former mayors of Navotas. The even-
tual victor in the contest, Felipe del Rosario
Jr, came from a prominent family that grew
wealthy from the Ž shing industry and that
has been in uential in local politics since the
early part of the century. He was also the
director of the Inter-island Deep Sea Fishing
Association of the Philippines, a group repre-
senting major Ž shing magnates in the mu-
nicipality who were allegedly instrumental in
Ž nancing his campaign. In the 1998 elec-
tions, del Rosario had reached his term limit
and his wife ran for mayor and was initially
declared the winner. However, allegations of
fraud in the elections eventually resulted in
her losing her position to Efren Bautista, a
local entrepreneur who had made a fortune in
dry docking, shipping and the restaurant
business.
Relations between the local government
and communities have been shaped by a
combination of clientèlism and populism.
Formal channels for representation by infor-
mal settlements in the political process have
been quite limited. There is no urban poor
affairs ofŽ ce in the municipality and civil
society representation on the local develop-
ment council is dominated by élite organisa-
tions. Navotas also has the second-lowest
revenue collection for a local government in
Metro Manila, thereby restricting its ability
to plan for alternative housing solutions for
the urban poor. The lack of land for econ-
omic development has led the municipal
government to pursue the development of a
48 billion peso (US$1.26 billion) business
and commercial space development project
to be located on land to be reclaimed along
the Navotas shoreline. The project is de-
signed to capitalise on Navotas’ proximity to
the densely populated cities of Manila and
Caloocan. While a recent environmental im-
pact assessment found that the project would
not have any major social impact, a local
alliance of organisations representing the ur-
ban poor, Alyansa at Pagkakaisa ng mga
Samahan ng Navotas (ALPASAN), believes
the project is likely to displace many of the
26 000 families that it estimates reside along
2372 GAVIN SHATKIN
the Bay (Gaia South Inc., 1996). Yet the
municipality’s consultation with the informal
settlers along Manila Bay regarding this proj-
ect has been minimal.
In sum, CBOs exercise very little political
in uence in Navotas local government. Re-
source constraints on local government have
limited their interaction with informal com-
munities and the limited availability of land
in the municipality has created an obstacle to
possibilities for in-city relocation. In ad-
dition, demand for centrally located ofŽ ce
and commercial space from heavily popu-
lated and densely built-up areas adjoining
Navotas, such as Manila to the south and
Caloocan to the east, have created pressures
for the proposed reclamation project. Finally,
the existence of a political élite with econ-
omic interests in the locality has created a
climate of clientèlism that has hindered dia-
logue between the municipal government and
communities.
Quezon City. Quezon City occupies one-
quarter of Metro Manila’s land area to the
north-east of Manila city. With a population
of over 2 million, it is the most populous city
in the metro area (NSO, 1998). The city was
created in 1939 during the presidency of
Manuel Quezon and in 1948 was ofŽ cially
proclaimed the capital of the Philippines.
Since that time, the city has grown rapidly.
Many government facilities have relocated to
Quezon City and substantial residential and
commercial development has occurred as
well. In addition, the existence of large tracts
of vacant land in the city has attracted low-
income families in recent years and currently
over one-half of the city’s population lives in
informal settlements.
In contrast to Navotas, Quezon City has
proved relatively responsive to co-operation
with CBOs. The city has an active urban
poor affairs ofŽ ce that has acted as an origin-
ator for 82 Community Mortgage Pro-
gramme loans, although these projects have
beneŽ ted less than 4000 households, or less
than 2 per cent of the city’s informal settlers.
Channels for NGO and CBO consultation
with government exist in the local develop-
ment councils, as well as in a number of
other committees that provide civil society
input into housing policy and speciŽ c hous-
ing projects. In addition, Quezon City con-
tains a large number of NGOs, many of
which have ties to the many prominent uni-
versities in the city. Thus informal settle-
ments are relatively well organised. One of
the most well-organised areas is the National
Government Centre (NGC), a large piece of
land in northern Quezon City. In the 1950s,
the NGC was set aside by the national
government as the future site of the Philip-
pine capital, but due to slow implementation
of the project informal settlers gradually oc-
cupied the area. Since the end of the Marcos
era, several large CBO federations have per-
suaded the national government to grant a
large part of the NGC for settlement by the
more than 50 000 families that now occupy
the area. One reason for their success has
been the active role of NGOs together with
the presence of local government ofŽ cials
who have generally supported the CBOs.
Several factors have contributed to the
relatively benign response of Quezon City
government to the situation of informal set-
tlers. The availability of large tracts of vacant
land, much of which is government-owned,
has provided the local government with the
means to accommodate at least some infor-
mal settlers. The existence of a large popu-
lation of informal settlements, often in large
agglomerations such as that in the NGC, has
made housing for the urban poor a populist
political issue. Consequently, the mayor and
several of the city councillors have taken
visibly pro-poor stands on many issues.
Finally, NGOs have played a key role as
advocates and technical-assistance providers
for CBOs. Nevertheless, the efforts of Que-
zon City government have had a limited
impact, largely due to the fact that the
government has been unwilling to allocate
large sums of money to housing pro-
grammes.
Makati. As noted earlier, Makati has grown
in the past several decades to be the econ-
omic centre of the Philippines. However,
 OBSTACLES TO EMPOWERMENT
while the city’s name elicits ofŽ ce buildings,
malls and gated sub-divisions, Makati is in
fact composed of three distinct parts. The
Ž rst is the central business district. This area
is largely privately managed and handles its
own security, garbage collection and plan-
ning. The second area consists of the 17
barangay that surround the business district,
which are generally composed of lower- and
middle-income residential areas. Finally,
there is Fort Bonifacio, an expanse of land to
the north-west of the central business district
that was formerly a military barracks. In
1995, part of Fort Bonifacio was purchased
by the Metro PaciŽ c Group, a consortium of
business interests, for approximately $1.4
billion, to develop an ofŽ ce and commercial
complex (Gloria, 1995).
Overall, the population of Makati was
484 176 in 1995 and the PCUP estimated
that 44 per cent of that number were residing
in low-income families. The presence of a
large low-income population in the city has
contributed to the populist nature of local
politics. Local politicians have undertaken a
number of initiatives to foster a political base
in low-income communities, utilising the city
government’s considerable revenue-
generating capacity to populist political ends.
For example, under a plan developed by
Marcos-era mayor Nestorio Yabut and ex-
panded under recent administrations, low-
income Makati residents are given free ac-
cess to medical treatment at the Makati
Medical Centre, one of the most advanced
hospitals in the country (Gloria, 1995). The
city also has an exceptionally well-Ž nanced
school system. However, due to the high
value of land in the city and the consequent
opportunities for graft from land transactions
and development, local government has
maintained a strong grip on decision-making
in local development.
Since the end of the Marcos era, Makati
politics have been dominated by Jejomar Bi-
nay, a man of humble origins who became a
prominent human rights lawyer and anti-
authoritarian activist during the Marcos era.
Binay was chosen by President Corazon
Aquino in 1986 to replace Yabut. He was
2373
subsequently re-elected twice, largely on the
power of a political machine built upon
Makati’s economic resources. Binay has un-
dertaken a spate of politically popular
projects, such as the building of schools and
basketball courts, and road paving. He has
also developed direct links to low-income
communities. For example, he makes it a
point to visit personally funerals in such
areas and provides cash gifts to relatives of
the deceased. Binay was ineligible to run for
re-election in 1998 due to term limits. He
subsequently sponsored his wife’s successful
bid to replace him.
While Makati mayors have courted the
political support of the poor, they have also
been wary of the potential threat CBOs could
pose to development initiatives in the city.
Thus, city government has discouraged com-
munity organising and has attempted to as-
sert in uence in communities through the
barangay-level government. There is mini-
mal consultation between the city govern-
ment and the urban poor and there is no
urban poor affairs ofŽ ce. There are few
NGOs that work with informal settlers or
CBO federations in the city and the city
government usually only directly interacts
with informal settlements when it is planning
an eviction.
Conclusions
The brief case studies outlined above high-
light some of the constraints faced by NGOs
and CBO federations in attempting to expand
legal access to housing for the poor. In
Makati and Navotas, CBOs have generally
been denied in uence in decision-making
due to obstacles posed by political and econ-
omic structures in the two localities, as well
as the lack of available land that the govern-
ment is willing to allocate for socialised
housing. Quezon City has shown greater
openness to civil society participation, but it
has as yet not allocated signiŽ cant budgetary
resources to urban poor housing.
In much of the literature on urban develop-
ment, reforms for decentralisation and civil
society participation in urban governance are
2374 GAVIN SHATKIN
represented rather simplistically as a trans-
formation from a top-down to a bottom-up
model of planning. Democratisation is often
represented as an evolutionary phenomenon
resulting from popular movements against
authoritarian and centralised decision-
making systems. In this paper, it has been
argued that the reality of these reforms is
somewhat more complex—a variety of actors
have an interest in decentralisation and have
attempted to shape the outcome of reforms to
their agendas. It has further been argued that
recent trends in the reform of urban govern-
ment and the actual potential for civil society
participation created by these changes, must
be understood in the context of economic
globalisation and of the particularities of his-
torical and social factors in localities. This
Ž nding is consistent with a study by Warner
and Molotch (1995). In a study of move-
ments for growth control in three jurisdic-
tions in southern California, they found that
certain contextual factors, most notably the
historical base for organising within the lo-
cality, enabled these movements partially to
achieve their objectives despite the in uence
of developers on local growth coalitions.
In the case of the Philippines, decentralis-
ation has been implemented in the context of
a political culture in which powerful land-
owning families have traditionally dominated
local politics. As a result, CBOs and NGOs
have often had to confront entrenched local
interests that have attempted to thwart civil
society participation in government. In ad-
dition, the Philippines’ growing role in the
global economy as an exporter of industrial
products—and the consequent increase in in-
vestment in Metro Manila—has led to devel-
opmental pressure on urban land. This has
exacerbated the con ict of interests between
local governments and organisations repre-
senting the interests of the urban poor. Local
governments have often excluded institutions
of civil society from participation and such
organisations have themselves often exhib-
ited limited capacity to in uence govern-
ment. Thus, while the current situation of
state– civil society relations in the Philippines
is certainly an improvement on the Marcos
era, institutions of civil society that represent
the urban poor groups continue to face
signiŽ cant obstacles in their efforts to
in uence government.
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