WEEK 4 Overcoming Stigma and Fostering Participation Mechanisms For Community Reintegration in Colombia

Conflict, Security & Development
ISSN: 1467-8802 (Print) 1478-1174 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccsd20
Overcoming stigma and fostering participation:

mechanisms for community reintegration in
Colombia
Larissa Rhyn
To cite this article: Larissa Rhyn (2019) Overcoming stigma and fostering participation:
mechanisms for community reintegration in Colombia, Conflict, Security & Development, 19:2,
195-222, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2019.1586157
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1586157
Published online: 25 Mar 2019.
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CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT
2019, VOL. 19, NO. 2, 195–222
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1586157
ARTICLE
Overcoming stigma and fostering participation: mechanisms

for community reintegration in Colombia
Larissa Rhyn
Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Mechanisms for community reintegration are under-researched. In Disarmament;
Colombia and elsewhere, scholars outline the importance of effec- demobilisation and
tively reintegrating ex-combatants into local communities, but reintegration (DDR);
they hardly consider the practicalities of it. A major hindering community participation;
ex-combatants; Colombia;
factor to community reintegration is stigma. It leads to a fear of ex- stigma
combatants, causing people to refrain from participating in com-
munity reintegration projects. This article identifies and analyses
four principal mechanisms that help to overcome stigma and
foster participation: information provision, inclusion of target
groups in design and implementation, provision of incentives for
participation and a change in the narrative surrounding ex-
combatants. The analysis is based on a series of interviews with
project staff and ex-combatants, taking into account state-run and
local projects in Colombia’s capital Bogotá. This article identifies
potential for increased co-operation between state and local
actors. Furthermore, it argues that projects should increasingly
work with interest instead of geographic communities. Working
with interest communities creates incentives for participation and
facilitates community reintegration in urban environments.
Accordingly, this article counters the argument that community
reintegration in cities is difficult to achieve.
Introduction
The willingness of community members to interact with and accept ex-combatants is an
imperative condition for community reintegration. Many authors make strong argu-
ments supporting this stance;1 however, they often neglect the practical aspects of it:
namely how community reintegration can be achieved. Community reintegration pro-
grammes have the potential to raise levels of acceptance for demobilised combatants,2
e.g. by broadening the circle of beneficiaries. This contributes to undermining the
argument that perpetrators receive benefits through reintegration programmes, while
the victims and community members remain empty-handed. Community reintegration
programmes must also address another major hindering factor to reintegration: stigma.
For the purposes of this article, stigma is defined as a social construction, based on
a ‘recognition of difference’ due to a ‘distinguishing characteristic’ and a ‘consequent
CONTACT Larissa Rhyn larissa.rhyn@graduateinstitute.ch

© 2019 King’s College London
196 L. RHYN
devaluation’ of the individual.3 When it comes to ex-combatants, their past belonging

to an armed group is used for the construction of an image of persistent threat to
others, causing fear among community members while leading to a collective rejection
of ex-combatants. As a consequence, stigma is likely to keep both community members
and ex-combatants from participating in projects, erecting an important obstacle to
reintegration.4 When designing a community reintegration project, it is therefore
crucial to consider how both target groups can be incentivised to participate and how
stigma can be overcome or at least reduced.
While community reintegration can be applied in conflict or post-conflict contexts
worldwide, Colombia is a particularly interesting case, due to the country’s more
than two decades of experience with reintegration programmes. The projects offered
by the Colombian state’s reintegration agency, the Agencia para la Reincorporación
y la Normalización (ARN) and its predecessors,5 have repeatedly been adapted to
address their shortcomings. While early DDR approaches were purely based on
economic benefits, the reintegration programme for individually demobilised com-
batants from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del
Pueblo (FARC) and the Ejérctio de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which this article
focuses on, covers not only economic but also social and psychological aspects. What
had hardly changed over the years was the focus on targeted approaches. Only
recently did Colombian Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)
actors become interested in community approaches. Consequently, programmes
often failed to include communities in programme design or implementation. This
is one of the reasons why knowledge about the programmes is not widespread
among the Colombian population.
The peace process with the FARC has reached its reintegration stage, referred to as
‘long-term reincorporation’, overlapping with further demobilisation elements such as
continuing reinsertion benefits.6 Community approaches are thus becoming all more
relevant for Colombia. The FARC’s goal is to establish new bonds with community
members during their ‘reincorporation’,7 which is tied to the establishment of the newly
founded political party, Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común. Accordingly, the
group favours community reintegration. Meanwhile, the Colombian state has a strong
interest in effectively reintegrating ex-combatants into the communities due to the risk
of former FARC fighters joining other armed groups or criminal networks.8 Thus,
community programmes are likely to gain further importance in Colombia’s reintegra-
tion sphere in the next years. For new projects to become successful, it is crucial to
closely analyse the existing community reintegration programmes.
Scholars have tackled the advantages of community reintegration in many different
studies. Kaplan and Nussio show that ‘community counts’ by analysing the influence of
a community’s social participation on the opportunities for ex-combatant participation.
While their research points to the importance of community-contextual variables,
institutional mechanisms are left out from the analysis.9 Other authors, such as
Carranza-Franco or Özderdem, demonstrate that there is a co-responsibility implied
by community reintegration projects, meaning that the community must also show
interest in participating; otherwise the project will be unlikely to succeed.10 Both
scholars unfortunately stop short of explaining how the community can be incentivised
to participate.
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 197
Existing research usually focuses on the ARN as an implementing actor of reintegra-

tion projects, neglecting its co-operation with local actors. This article thus distin-
guishes projects run by the ARN and by local actors. Mixed forms exist, because state
and local actors often co-operate. However, projects that are mainly led by local actors
bear potential for learning among state actors, which is why it is important to analyse
projects not only with regard to mechanisms applied but also with regard to the actors
involved.
This study takes a qualitative approach, triangulating information from the relevant
literature, ACR’s strategic documents and the insights gained from a series of interviews
conducted in Bogotá in 2017. It offers an overview of local and state reintegration
projects, mapping their mechanisms for community and ex-combatant participation.
Interviews were conducted with members of the following stakeholder groups: ex-
combatants, reintegration project staff, members of foundations, think tanks, interna-
tional organisations, academia and the public sector, with the tightest focus on the first
two groups.11 Because many ex-combatants live in anonymity, the interviewees were
granted confidentiality. Snowball sampling was used due to the highly sensitive nature
of the topic.12 The ex-combatants interviewed13 demobilised between 2003 and 2016,
because the year 2003 marked the beginning of a new reintegration programme and the
start of the demobilisation of the paramilitary forces Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(AUC). This article focuses on reintegration projects in urban areas, namely in Bogotá.
The capital city has received particularly high numbers of demobilised people in
Colombia in the last 14 years, because ex-combatants were looking for an environment
that grants anonymity and offers economic opportunities.14 Additionally, the ARN
relied on sending demobilised fighters to cities with larger density of reintegration
projects, particularly during the DDR process with the AUC.15
The main question this article aims to answer is the following: what mechanisms are
being used to foster community involvement and ex-combatant participation in com-
munity reintegration projects? The study’s focus is on how the different projects tackle
the challenge of connecting ex-combatants with communities. An analysis of co-
ordination between state and local actors permits the identification of existing linkages
as well as potential for increased co-operation.
Finally, this article also aims to show the benefits of projects designed for
interest-based communities, as opposed to geographic communities. An interest
community is constituted on the basis of a common interest or passion, whereas
a geographic community is a group of people who feel first and foremost connected
through the area they live in. Working with interest communities permits organisers
to involve ex-combatants and community members in activities that are of interest
to all of them, and thus foster bonds between participants. This approach is
especially relevant to urban contexts, where broad arrays of interest communities
exist. In a city, it is not only much easier to identify interest groups to work with,
but also to build new ones through a reintegration project. This article hence
counters the argument that community reintegration is easier in rural contexts,
where the communities are smaller and their needs more clearly defined.16
Starting with a short overview of Colombia’s DDR experiences, this article then
outlines the importance of community reintegration before presenting the most
important actors and concepts, particularly the four mechanisms identified, which
198 L. RHYN
foster ex-combatant and community participation. In a third and principal section,

this article analyses two state-run and four local community reintegration projects,
before providing some concluding arguments.
Outlining the context: Colombia’s DDR experiences and the role of

community reintegration
A short history of DDR in Colombia
When analysing DDR processes in Colombia, one can distinguish the two major
collective DDR processes with the guerrilla group M-19 and the AUC paramilitary
forces on the one hand, and the individual demobilisation of thousands of members
of the FARC and other guerrilla groups on the other. Individual demobilisations
were legally recognised through Law 104, introduced in 1993. The respective autho-
rities, such as the Comité Operativo para la Dejación de las Armas (CODA),17 were
introduced one year later.18 Between August 2002 and July 2015, 25,279 ex-
combatants demobilised individually.19 They joined the same reintegration pro-
grammes as the collectively demobilised fighters of the AUC, which caused many
problems but was equally an opportunity for reconciliation between former members
of opposed groups.20 Ex-combatants from all three armed groups were interviewed
for this article.
Community reintegration: definition and short overview

Definition of community reintegration
Social reintegration as defined by Kaplan and Nussio is the ‘process by which ex-
combatants become involved in their communities’.21 Community reintegration can be
seen as a sub-category of social reintegration: it also aims at involving ex-combatants in
their communities, but the means to reach that goal are more tightly defined than for
social reintegration in general. Projects that aim at fostering community reintegration
must involve both the ex-combatants and the community members. Hence, community
reintegration can be defined as the opposite of a targeted approach; while the latter is
focused on the ex-combatant only, benefits of community reintegration projects are
extended to community members. For a project to qualify as ‘community reintegration
project’, community members should be involved at different stages. Ideally, they
already take part in project design; however, in practice, degrees of involvement can
vary.
The relevance of community reintegration projects

Social contacts are hard to establish in a foreign environment and with no connections
to build upon.22 As many combatants stem from rural areas but join a programme in
one of Colombia’s major cities, they do not have a pre-existing civilian social network
that they can fall back on. Often, the only contacts they establish are to other demo-
bilised people. Networks among ex-combatants can have advantages, since their mem-
bers understand and support each other, but they also increase the risk of falling back
into old patterns and remobilising.23 A community approach to reintegration helps the
ex-combatant to get in contact with community members and can thereby avoid the
building of ex-combatant silos.
Growing importance of community reintegration in Colombia

On the national and institutional level, conditions for community reintegration seem to
be a given in Colombia. The ARN formally shows willingness to adapt its programmes
to community needs. It claims that a community approach to reintegration can create
social stability, and is therefore also beneficial to economic stability.24 Furthermore, it
supports the idea of establishing community reintegration programmes, which ‘include
the development of an entire community including ex-combatants, rather than sup-
porting the ex-combatants exclusively’.25 However, the main state-run DDR pro-
grammes used to be based on targeted approaches only.26 This gap between theory
and practice is puzzling, and it is therefore crucial to analyse how the ARN involves
communities today, and whether it co-operates with local reintegration actors in order
to expand its community approaches.
Community reintegration approaches have been gaining importance as compared
to targeted approaches in a variety of national contexts.27 In Colombia, they
remained a marginal strategy for the state actors before 2011, when the creation
of the new agency for reintegration (ACR, now ARN) offered the perfect opportu-
nity to include more elements to foster social reintegration.28 The ARN has con-
stantly been introducing new community reintegration projects over the past years;
however, many are still in their early phase and mechanisms are in the process of
being tested. Community reintegration is included in the ARN’s strategic goals
2015–2018, where the state agency claims that it aims for the ‘creation of spaces
where the receiving community and the demobilised persons can interact and
conduct activities in the receiving contexts, according to their characteristics’.29
Furthermore, the ARN foresees the fostering of ‘mechanisms of community reinte-
gration and prevention for the construction of peace’.30 Finally, the ARN’s commu-
nity work unit is tasked with creating and helping to implement projects based on
the Modelo de Reintegración Comunitaria (MRC, Community Reintegration
Model).31 A standard programme based on the MRC takes 13 months and is
made up of six stages: preliminary stage, participatory diagnostic, citizenship educa-
tion, community project, symbolic action and evaluation.32
This section gave a short background on DDR in Colombia, outlining the
importance of community reintegration. It focused on the state projects because
there is hardly any literature available on community reintegration projects initiated
by local actors. The next section outlines the most important concepts, as a basis for
the analysis.
Conceptual framework and relevant actors

Dimensions of reintegration
Traditionally, reintegration is separated into three dimensions: economic, social and
political.33 In many contexts, the social dimension was long neglected, Colombia being
no exception.34 Due to this article’s focus on community reintegration, the discussion is
200 L. RHYN
anchored in the social dimension; however, economic and social aspects tend to be
interdependent, and thus the economic dimension also comes into play.35 Economic
reintegration is ‘[. . .] seen as a way in which to equip former fighters with productive
skills and employment so that they can return to civilian life’.36 Social reintegration is
both influenced by the community’s attitude towards the peace process as a whole and
ex-combatants individually, as well as by ex-combatants’ willingness to become part of
the community.37
Geographic versus interest communities

This article distinguishes two types of communities that ex-combatants may be
reintegrated into: interest and geographic communities. Geographic communities
are groups of people who feel first and foremost connected through the area they
live in, whereas an interest community defines itself on the basis of a common
interest or passion. Interest communities can take a large array of forms, ranging
from a reading circle to a self-defence group. Accordingly, their members may
exchange information, discuss personal problems or indulge in a leisure activity,
depending on the common interest that unites them. In the existing literature on
community reintegration, it is frequently implicitly assumed that recipient com-
munities are defined by geography rather than by interest. This is because tradi-
tional community reintegration projects tend to target a village or a town, and
not a sports club or a theatre company. However, the findings of an ARN report
indirectly suggest that it is easier to start a reintegration project within an
interest-based community, even if the report does not draw that conclusion.38
This article argues that a community with a common interest, which is able to
adapt a reintegration programme to fit that interest, is more likely to accept ex-
combatants. Geographic communities may have very different opinions and inter-
ests with regard to activities conducted in reintegration programmes. While
geography is often the constituting factor for communities in rural areas, this
need not be the case for urban communities; in the latter, anonymity is often
high and people are less connected to their neighbours. Therefore, the social
fabric of geographic communities is argued to be weaker and reintegration is
assumed to be harder to achieve in urban areas. However, people in cities are
likely to constitute their social contacts through personal interests, leading to
a large number of different interest communities.39
Reconciliation
Aside from reintegration, the concept of reconciliation should be taken into account for
an analysis of the relationship between ex-combatants and communities. If reconcilia-
tion cannot be reached, the social reintegration of ex-combatants is unlikely to be
sustainable, and the risk of a relapse into conflict may be higher. Reconciliation is
gaining importance in discussions on DDR, in particular with regard to community
reintegration.40 Prieto refers to the concept as ‘changes in the nature of adversarial
relations between the adversaries and each of the parties’ conflict-related needs, emo-
tions and cognitions’.41 Jenkins and his co-authors say that ‘reconciliation involves
processes through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future by
fostering co-operation between former enemies’.42 Lederach points out that reconcilia-
tion is important at every stage of peace-building and reconstruction processes,43 but its
role in the reintegration phase is even more vital. Figueroa Garzón argues that coex-
istence is only an intermediate step on the way to reconciliation.44 Accordingly, ex-
combatants and communities have to establish social relations in order to reach
reconciliation.
The centrality of stigma

Stigma is a crucial topic when discussing social reintegration. Nussio highlighted this in
his study focusing on demobilised combatants from the AUC.45 The AUC’s reintegra-
tion process took place in the early 2000s, but the problem of stigma remains important
from the perspective of ex-combatants today.46 Its presence can lead to the rejection of
a reintegration project, which is expressed through protests, the communities’ refusal to
participate in activities or even through threats against ex-combatants and adminis-
trators. Hence, community reintegration projects should also be analysed for their
ability to combat stigma.
The rhetoric of counter-insurgency used by the Colombian government and the
media in the early 2000s continues to have an influence on public opinion.47 This
factor, in combination with individual considerations, such as personal grievance in
the case of victims, may cause the persistence of stigma. Examples of stigma include
the idea that all demobilised people are terrorists or inherently bad and thus unable
to change and participate in society. Two specialists from the ARN refer to these
ideas as ‘social imaginaries’ and claim that they are usually linked with fear. The
social imaginaries, which are common beyond the case of Colombia, tend to be
instrumentalised by politicians who use ex-combatants as scapegoats, portraying
them as a danger to society.48 This leads to fear, thus severely hindering community
reintegration. And the fear is widespread: in a survey conducted by the Centro
Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), 41 per cent of the members of receiving commu-
nities said they fear ex-combatants and many associated them with being violent.49
Nussio found that ex-combatants are often framed as the major threat to security by
a variety of actors, including authorities and members of NGOs, even though
recidivism rates are generally low.50
Aside from the stigma faced in local communities, ex-combatants also report a high
level of discrimination from ARN employees working in headquarters.51 This is not
only worrying because it might impact the agency’s services, but also because it has
a negative influence when perceived by third parties. If even those who work for the
demobilised population fear interaction with ex-combatants, businesses will lack incen-
tives to become more inclusive for the demobilised population, and economic reinte-
gration will remain difficult. And if the ARN employees contribute to perpetuating the
stereotypes about ex-combatants, this severely hinders social reintegration. Often, the
problem arises from the fact that staff in the administrative section hardly interact with
ex-combatants or only do so on a superficial basis.
202 L. RHYN
Mechanisms to increase participation in community reintegration projects

There is a co-responsibility implied by community reintegration projects: they can only
be successful if not only the demobilised combatants but also the community members
show willingness to participate.52 But as long as stigma remains a major hindering
factor to reintegration, community members are unlikely to take part in projects – and
so are ex-combatants, because they fear their identities being exposed. To overcome this
problem, projects need to rely on mechanisms to overcome stigma and to incentivise
individuals to participate.
Providing information
Important parts of Colombian society still lack knowledge about the reintegration route
and the rules that ex-combatants need to follow. Additionally, authorities often start
reintegration programmes in communities without providing sufficient information,
which fosters narratives that portray ex-combatants as undeserving recipients of state
aid.53 This is not only common in Colombia but also in other countries.
Providing information through various channels (in schools, through the media or in
community centres, for example) was identified as crucial for reintegration processes.54
Kilroy finds that it is essential for the participation of ex-combatants in reintegration
projects that enough information on the programme is provided.55 According to
Morgenstein, the community is more likely to react with fear to a project if it lacks
information on it.56 If authorities install programmes without consulting the receiving
community, ‘moral issues of guilt, remorse, accountability and reconciliation cannot be
adequately addressed’.57
Inclusion in design and implementation

Kilroy found that if reintegration projects are using a participatory approach, meaning
if they involve ex-combatants in the development of reintegration programmes or give
them a say in decision-making, ex-combatants are likely to develop better relations to
the community.58 In a community reintegration process, the participatory approach
should be extended to the community. If the community members do not see any
benefits of reintegrating demobilised people in their midst, ‘the projects are quasi-
doomed to fail’.59 Furthermore, community members who are not being given a role in
the development and implementation of a reintegration project may feel that it is being
imposed on them.60 According to Thorsell, the inclusion of community members and
ex-combatants in the design of the project can create ownership and contribute
positively to reconciliation.61 The community’s involvement at different stages, espe-
cially in design and implementation, is thus of the utmost importance, especially if
reconciliation is the goal. A reintegration project may be built in collaboration with
existing community organisations, allowing its members to identify with the project
and influence it.62 Involving both ex-combatants and communities at early stages also
avoids having to adapt the predesigned programme in the process after a failure.
Therefore, community reintegration programmes must assess the needs of both the
community and the ex-combatants before the start of the project, while consulting the
groups throughout the process to make necessary adaptions.
Creating incentives
Community reintegration projects always need to consider the following question: how
can communities be incentivised to participate? And – in the case that the project does
not form part of the mandatory reintegration route – what makes participation attrac-
tive to ex-combatants? Incentives are often neglected by literature on reintegration, but
are crucial when stigma and fear hinder participation. Methods include a projects’
production of a long-needed facility for the community, which is generally the case with
the MRC. Alternatively, a project may be set up around prevention measures, e.g.
fighting recruitment of minors into the armed groups, with insights from ex-
combatants’ experience. Another means to incentivise community members and ex-
combatants to participate is to build the project around a common interest, for example
by offering football or theatre classes. Lastly, incentives for community members also
include the idea of a compensation for the wrong done in the past. By offering their
work for the benefit of the community, the ex-combatants show that they are trying to
make up for what they did. This can create the basis for friendly interaction: because the
community members see that the individual is dedicated to contributing to the com-
munity and to changing her or his lifestyle.
Changing narratives
Ugarriza and Nussio argue that discussions between ex-combatants and community
members revolving around a common future can lead to reconciliation.63 The framing
of such discussions is relevant, but for community reintegration projects it is even more
important to contribute to a change in the narratives about ex-combatants. To do so,
information is again a crucial element, but more importantly projects should create
opportunities for positive interactions between ex-combatants and community mem-
bers, which fight stigma. The much-needed change in narrative could for example be
reached through group discussions, where ex-combatants show how they have changed
since they left the armed group. Furthermore, addressing the problem of stigma actively
in schools, by teaching the youngest generation a narrative based on acceptance and
forgiveness instead of rejection, can lead to a better basis for community reintegration
in the medium to long term.
Reintegration actors and their interaction: going beyond the concept of local
ownership
National actors dominate the planning and implementation of DDR measures in
Colombia, while international actors remain in the background, taking a mainly
supportive role. This stands in contrast to many other DDR contexts, where inter-
national actors are taking the lead (often due to the fact that the national govern-
ment is busy tackling other post-conflict challenges and lacks the means to invest in
reintegration). Internationally led DDR programmes are widely criticised, by
Humphrey and Weinstein, among others. They identify a ‘lack of evidence that
international programs are returning the benefits attributed to them’.64 Accordingly,
authors often argue for more ‘local ownership’, a much-debated concept in DDR
research.
204 L. RHYN
Scholars usually refer to the connection between the international and the local
sphere when using the concept of local ownership, while traditionally ascribing the term
‘local’ to national authorities only. Recent debates have given more attention to the local
community and have started to analyse the role of civil society organisations, political
leaders at the sub-national levels and other local power groups.65 Despite this opening
of the concept, the international sphere guards its prerogative in the international
discussion of local ownership, because most authors refer to power- and responsibility-
sharing of agents at the international and the state level. In Colombia’s nationally led
DDR process, the debate should be centred around the connection between the national
authority implementing reintegration programmes, namely the ARN, and community-
level actors, which may include community associations, local reintegration actors or
individual citizen.
The active role of the state in a DDR process must not diminish the community’s
role: a programme could, for example, be state-designed, while being constituted and
influenced by the community. This is in line with Edomwonyi’s approach, which allows
for a rejection of the binary between the national and the community sphere.66 As
Donais suggests, ownership of peace-building must not be built on an either/or under-
standing of the power of different stakeholders, but can be a dynamic co-operation.67
This has additional benefits: if a community is disillusioned with a peace process,
greater inclusion of local actors can change the dynamic.
The role of geography

Regional characteristics can have an important influence on community reintegration
programmes. In the Colombian context, where different regions have experienced
varied levels of conflict activity, are geographically distinct, rely on separate economic
sectors and have a range of sub-national cultures, it seems unrealistic to find a one-size-
fits-all approach. Hence, a national strategy to community reintegration should be
adapted to the needs of the local communities.
Urban versus rural environments offer different preconditions for community
reintegration, and may thus require different approaches: in urban geographic
communities, members may be less familiar with each other and the social fabric
thus weaker. Several authors have argued that reintegration in urban areas is more
difficult and takes more time.68 This article focuses on the context of Bogotá,
developing an argument for community reintegration in urban environments.69 It
argues that by targeting interest instead of geographic communities, the problem of
a lack of social fabric within cities can be overcome, and community reintegration
in urban environments is facilitated.
Community reintegration projects in Colombia: an analysis

The following analysis is based on two state-run and four local community reintegra-
tion projects. The first part is focussed on the mechanisms applied to foster community
and ex-combatant participation. The second part outlines ex-combatants’ individual
strategies for reintegration, identifies opportunities for broadening the reach of com-
munity reintegration and analyses the co-operation among state and local actors.
Overview of state-run and local projects

For most ex-combatants, participation in local or state-run projects is not an either/or
decision, since they are dependent upon the financial assistance that only the ARN can
grant them. State-run and local projects may thus be understood as complements
instead of competitors. In the following, the projects that are included in the analysis
will be presented briefly. Table 1 shows the ARN’s community reintegration projects,70
while Table 2 gives an overview of different local projects aimed at community
reintegration.
Analysis of the mechanisms used to foster participation

This section refers to the central mechanisms outlined in the conceptual framework and
shows how they are being applied in the above-mentioned state-based and local projects
in Bogotá.
Information provision
A staff member of the ARN’s community reintegration division said that one of the
greatest difficulties they have to overcome when setting up an MRC project is convin-
cing the demobilised people to participate.71 Therefore, the ARN invites possible
candidates to workshops and info sessions before starting a project. The reasons why
many are hesitant to get involved include perceptions of insecurity and stigma, espe-
cially paired with the fear that one’s identity will be exposed in the process. Based on
that insight, an ARN community reintegration officer said, ‘I think we are responsible
for sensitising the communities before starting a project to reduce stigma and facilitate
participation for demobilised people’.72
Despite the efforts outlined above, ex-combatants share the concern that many
communities still lack knowledge about the reintegration process, especially the
Table 1. ARN’s community reintegration projects.

Community reintegration project (based on
Project name Servicio social MRC)
Location Conducted in all ARN points of attention Jamundí, Popayán, Pasto, Puerto Asís, Neiva,
nation-wide, ex-combatant participates in Chaparral, San Vicente del Caguán, El
a city close to his domicile or the domicile Bagre and Santa Rosa del Sur and others
itself, but often in a different (focus on rural contexts)
neighbourhood
Project design 80 h of work for the benefit of the Six-stage model, consultation of the
community; (e.g. cleaning parks, community at all stages: preliminary stage,
renovating public infrastructure). An participatory diagnostic, citizenship
element of the ARN reintegration route, education, realisation of a community
and hence of the individual and targeted project, symbolic action and evaluation.
approach of the ARN
Specification/type of Obligatory for all participants of the ARN Participation voluntary for ex-combatants
participation by standard reintegration route, designed as and community members, communities
ex-combatants and act of compensation should have some experience with
communities reintegration, sometimes combined with
a prevention strategy
Co-operation Local authorities (define necessities of Community members, sometimes local
partners communities), organisations and local authorities and any organisations familiar
reintegration projects with the local context (especially in stages
1 and 2)
206 L. RHYN
Table 2. Local community reintegration projects.

Centro para la Manos para la
Project name Reconciliación Reconciliación Surcando Caminos Victus
Location Countrywide, Bogotá (Engativá) Bogotá (Ciudad Bogotá as principal
changing locations Bolívar) location, reaching
circa every 4 years, out to conflict-
in Bogotá currently affected
in Suba communities
countrywide
Project design Community centres, Free day care on Distribution of Theatre aiming to
offering workshops weekends for kids clothes and goods foster
and courses for the of female ex- to ex-combatants reconciliation
community combatants, sex and marginalised among actors and
(involving ex- workers and single community audience, actors
combatants), mothers, teaching members, different are ex-combatants,
promoting values of community actions victims and former
a democratic acceptance, (e.g. sports events)soldiers,
culture of fighting stigma reconciliation
forgiveness and through common activities during
reconciliation activities practice
Specification/type of Conducting social Female ex- Many organisers are Group of actors
participation by service in contact combatants and ex-combatants, chosen from
ex-combatants and with the their kids establish they grant material different
communities community, contacts with support and communities and
participation in the other community organise activities groups,
Escuela de Perdón members, receive for former ex- participating in
y Reconciliación assistance with combatants and reconciliation
and other childcare, communities exercises before
workshops, often punctually also starting to prepare
interaction with administrative the play
victims support
Co-operation Fundación para la Independent project, Independent project, Co-operation with
partners Reconciliación funded by private funded by private ARN and victim
organises projects, contributions contributions organisations to
co-operation with establish contacts
ARN and IOM for with target groups
social service
responsibilities it accords to the demobilised people. Project components specifically

designed to diffuse information of reintegration in and outside of the MRC thus do not
seem to work well.73 Why this is the case and how it could be improved should be the
subject of further research.
Where the spreading of information prior to the start of the project comes with
potential backlash, former combatants’ identities can be protected by leaving it up to
them whether they would like to share information about their past. Projects that allow
for this option are typically masked as ‘normal’ community projects, and participants
do not know that ex-combatants are involved. Only during the process do some
individuals make the decision to share their past with fellow participants. This approach
is built on ex-combatants’ individual reintegration strategies, which will be discussed
later on. It could help overcome a problem outlined by McFee, namely the discursive
difference between the reintegrados (the ex-combatants who joined a community) and
the ciudadanos (the other community members).74 To avoid perpetuating this con-
structed difference, it helps to design programmes where all participants start as equals
and where ex-combatants may choose when to reveal their past, as practised by the
Centros para la Reconciliación.75
Inclusion in design and implementation

The ARN chose a pre-designed MRC, which is adapted to local circumstances with the
help of the community. While its standard organisation is fixed, the model demands
that communities be consulted at several stages.76 This may already start during the
preliminary stage, but it is especially significant for the diagnostic, which aims to
identify the characteristics of the community and its existing relationship with former
combatants. For the community project itself, the participants all make a suggestion –
be it the construction of a playground or the renovation of a school – and later they
commonly choose one project for realisation. With a symbolic action, which follows the
community project, the ARN tries to create visibility within the community and
beyond. The symbolic action usually takes place at an event that is open to the public.
It could for example consist of an ex-combatant and a community member inaugurat-
ing a playground built during the community project. This action is designed to show
the reconciliation between the former combatants and the community to those who
have not participated in the project. Finally, during the evaluation stage, community
members and ex-combatants are asked for feedback, which ideally produces lessons
learned for future project design.
Creating incentives
One common characteristic of all analysed local reintegration projects is that they
are designed to benefit either the entire community, or several social or interest
groups within it, instead of targeting the former combatants exclusively. This is
important because programmes that benefit only ex-combatants can be perceived as
a reward to perpetrators.77 Hence, the circle of beneficiaries should be broadened to
avoid the creation of additional incentives for joining armed groups to receive
reintegration benefits later on.78 Additionally, authors have found that acceptance
for reintegration projects in communities is higher if the beneficiaries of a project
include victims of the conflict or marginalised members of the community, instead
of exclusively former perpetrators.79 The project Surcando Caminos uses this
mechanism by distributing clothing and other items not only to ex-combatants
but also to vulnerable community members.
Both target groups have to be incentivised to participate in a community reintegra-
tion project. A successful strategy for local project administrators is to try to identify
a common interest or goal. The local project Victus (Table 2) works with theatre,
a medium that can bring communities and former combatants together in a fixed
framework, and has the potential to unite them through a common passion, while
providing a platform for exercises promoting reconciliation. Surcando Caminos also
works on the basis of a common passion and organises sports events for ex-combatants
and community members.
ARN projects, on the other hand, try to identify common necessities of both target
groups. In the MRC (Table 1), members of the recipient community as well as ex-
combatants can propose projects that they perceive to be beneficial for the community.
They then democratically choose their favourite project. This seems to be a promising
concept that could arguably be extended to other reintegration initiatives. The MRC
also provides incentives for participation, namely education. In the citizen education
stage of the project, around 150 beneficiaries receive schooling on subjects defined
208 L. RHYN
during the diagnostic period for a total of 80 h. The class ‘Citizen Education for
Community Reintegration’80 focuses on teaching competences such as leading
a dialogue and sharing with others.81 The reintegration route is explained and the
programme gives inputs on issues such as human rights, common living and ethics of
care. Finally, the participants learn to design a community project.
Meanwhile, the Centros para la Reconciliación conduct their workshops in conjunc-
tion with a course. Participants can, for example, learn to bake or to give manicures,
while the workshop leader familiarises them with the concepts of forgiveness and
reconciliation. Participation is free or the fees are affordable, offering people from
marginalised contexts the opportunity to participate in a course that has always inter-
ested them. Meanwhile, the workshops function as a window of opportunity to start
processes of community construction and create a more inclusive society.82 The
Centros para la Reconciliación teach concepts of tolerance and non-violence, as do
many other local projects. They do so not only to reduce problems faced by ex-
combatants, but also by community members, hence fostering peaceful coexistence.
In marginalised communities where domestic and street violence are widespread and
institutions that should prevent them are weak, these workshops are likely to have
a broad appeal for community members who aim to change their personal situation or
who would like to lead their community to a more peaceful existence.
Administrators from local reintegration projects agreed, based on their experiences,
that projects based on common interests and goals tend to attract a larger number of
participants.83 A common interest can thus be a great incentive to participate in
a community reintegration project. One example therefore is Victus. Its members all
have a passion for theatre, which helped the survivors, former army members and ex-
combatants among the participants to overcome the negative perceptions of one
another. But there are different types of interest communities, and they may not all
equally favour the purpose of a reintegration project. The environment of a theatre
group facilitates the sharing of experiences, since feelings can be more openly expressed.
The atmosphere in a football team may be characterised by more reluctance when it
comes to showing feelings and exposing personal stories. On the other hand, all its
members strive to a common goal when competing against another team, creating a
feeling of belonging that could be the basis for reconciliation. The number of projects
examined for this study does not permit determining which types of interest commu-
nities are most beneficial for the purpose of community reintegration, bearing potential
for further research.
The ARN’s reintegration route includes one mandatory element that is designed
to benefit the community: the social service. It obliges each individual ex-combatant
to work 80 h in a community project. This includes activities such as restoring and
cleaning public space, building or renovating community centres and other public
infrastructure, or helping out at events. The social service ‘seeks to generate spaces
for reconciliation between demobilised people and the community, with the goal of
improving the quality of life for those who take in the ex-combatants’.84 As opposed
to many other projects for reconciliation, the social service does not primarily aim
for contact between former combatants and the community.85 It is designed to be
a service provided by the former combatants to make up for their actions in the
armed group and to show willingness to reintegrate. An ARN officer explains the
intention behind this isolation: ‘It is an individual action, it is not designed to create
an interaction with the community – for the latter, we have the community reinte-
gration programmes’.86 The idea seems to be that a compensatory action from the
ex-combatants could in and of itself lead or contribute to reconciliation, which
contrasts the definition of reconciliation used by most local projects. The intervie-
wees reported that at times communities are not even informed that ex-combatants
are doing work in their neighbourhood as part of the social service.87 They see the
work being done, but do not recognise it as an act of compensation.88 Some
authorities make the involvement of demobilised people public upon termination
of the work, others never do. Therefore, many ex-combatants criticise the design of
the social service, even though they appreciate the idea of contributing to the
community. They believe that if the communities knew about the positive actions
of ex-combatants, their members would be more willing to accept them.
The ARN started to organise some of its social services in collaboration with local
reintegration projects, such as the Centro para la Reconciliación. In a past project of
the local centre in Suba, ex-combatants registered and assisted street vendors in the
neighbourhood. Street vendors were usually unaware of the workers’ identity but the
project fostered interaction between ex-combatants and community members. This
can lead to reconciliation, because communities feel that the ex-combatants are
making up for the wrong done in the past and consult them about their needs.
Conducting the social service, which is part of a state-run initiative, at local centres
thus allows for a combination of compensation to the community and
reconciliation.
Changing narratives
While ex-combatants accomplish their mandatory social service, the Centro para la
Reconciliación encourages them to take part in the Escuela de Perdón y Reconciliación
(the School for Forgiveness and Reconciliation). With the help of a workshop leader,
negative memories can be transformed into positive narratives that are centred on the
future. This reaffirms Ugarriza and Nussio’s findings that discussions between ex-
combatants and community members revolving around a common future might lead
to reconciliation.89 The workshops are open to the entire community since the admin-
istrators believe that everyone is hoping to forgive someone. During the process, each
individual shares a personal story in a small group of three participants, which gives ex-
combatants the opportunity to reveal their identity in front of two members of the
recipient community who have committed to handle the information confidentially. If
the experience that they have while giving up their anonymity in the safe space is
positive, they may later find it easier to open up to the entire community. This can
cascade into reconciliation processes on a broader level and may lead to a decrease in
stigma, since people get to know ex-combatants personally and can contrast their social
imaginaries with reality.
As discussed earlier, ex-combatants are under the impression that stigma is even
present among employees of the ARN. To address this problem, interviewees suggested
better training for ARN staff, involving ex-combatants who share their personal stories.
By confronting staff members with individual destinies of ex-combatants, who share
210 L. RHYN
their learning processes after leaving an armed group, common narratives of ex-
combatants at the ARN and ultimately also in parts of society, can be changed.
The local project Manos para la Reconciliación (Table 2) aims to fight stigma by
weaving ex-combatants into the social fabric of the neighbourhood. To reach this goal,
the project administrator starts with the youngest generation: she teaches the children
during day care that there is no difference between them, no matter what their parents’
profession is, what social status they have or whether someone in their family used to
belong to an armed group. She thus changes the narratives that the children are used to
from early on. Furthermore, she believes that it is pivotal to fight stigma with transpar-
ency. Accordingly, the children know whose mother is a demobilised person or a sex
worker, but are taught that it is ‘wrong to point fingers at someone’90 and that everyone
deserves to be treated with the same respect.91 Changing the narrative among kids is
important because even the youngest family members of an ex-combatant are often
concerned by stigma, as the administrator of Manos para la Reconciliación observed:
‘Many people refuse to see a kid simply as a kid, instead marking it as the kid of an ex-
combatant. They don’t stop stigmatising it, but how is it the kid’s fault?’92
In projects based on common interests, it is easier for ex-combatants and commu-
nity members to bond, because they share the same passion. Experiencing this similar-
ity can help them to overcome their perceived differences and lead to a change in
narrative. Working with interest communities allows co-ordinators to start on
a common base between ex-combatants and community members – be it their talent
in football, their interest in the same studies or their passion for cooking. The work-
shops offered by the Centro para la Reconciliación use the common interests of their
participants to change existing narratives: an individual is first and foremost charac-
terised by their passion and not by their past. Ex-combatants are identified based on
their new civilian identity, which might lead to a decrease in the social construction of
a different category of ‘demobilised people’ as opposed to ‘normal citizen’. This strategy
is also being used by ex-combatants who do not form part of a reintegration project, as
will be shown in the following.
Leaving institutional mechanisms aside: ex-combatants’ individual strategies for

dealing with stigma
Interviews showed that most ex-combatants do not reveal their identity to the com-
munity if they are not part of a project that demands them to do so. The reasoning
varies but is most often linked to stigma or prejudice. The latter term also includes
seemingly positive but insensitive reactions, which are mostly experienced by well-
reintegrated individuals who share information about their past with their networks. An
ex-combatant now working for the ARN was asked repeatedly: ‘Oh wow, is it really
possible that someone like you does not become criminal again, but is actually pursuing
a career?’93 Interestingly, such reactions motivated this ex-combatant to become more
visible – not only to prove society wrong in its stereotypes, but also to show other
former combatants that they can achieve more than people believe them to be capable
of. However, most other ex-combatants prefer to live in complete anonymity, some-
times not even telling their family any details about their past: ‘The fewer people know,
the better it is’.94 Another interviewee said: ‘We leave the underground just to find
ourselves in a new form of secrecy’.95 Hiding their pasts thus becomes a strategy for
fitting in, since ex-combatants believe that they are not accepted in the community if
they reveal their identity. This hinders reconciliation and condemns the ex-combatants
to secrecy. Community reintegration projects should try to overcome the anonymity,
while respecting ex-combatants’ wishes and not giving away their identity without
permission.
A strategy to overcome negative predispositions, which ex-combatants report using
with increasing frequency, is to introduce themselves with their new identity first – be it
that of a teacher, a parent or a passionate footballer. Only once they get to know
a person better will they reveal their past as a guerrillero or a paramilitary. Interviewees
reported predominantly positive reactions when employing this strategy. Even if their
counterparts are surprised or shocked at first, they may later realise that their new
friend has withheld information about the past, but did not lie about who he or she is
today. Some community members appreciate the honesty and the trust that the ex-
combatant granted them. Ideally, they then change their image of ex-combatants,
realising that demobilised people can be ‘like you and I’.96
Opportunities for broadening the reach of community reintegration

Using mechanisms adapted to urban environments
Projects designed for interest communities not only offer a strong incentive for parti-
cipation and allow for a change in narratives surrounding ex-combatants, they also
influence the discussion on the urban–rural divide. Several interviewed project admin-
istrators argued that the anonymity of a city hinders social reintegration, and may make
community projects nearly impossible.97 The counterargument suggested here is that
once the projects are designed for and conducted with interest communities, cities offer
a beneficial environment. Due to the larger population numbers, projects can target
many different interest communities. Finally, one may argue that the reach of projects
based on common interests is smaller; however, this does not have to be the case. First
of all, projects working with geographic communities also have a limited number of
participants and rarely include the entire community. Second, multiplier effects can also
come into play in interest communities: if a project works with a local football team and
teaches them acceptance for ex-combatants, the players may later replicate the meth-
odology used in the reintegration project within their families or friend groups, thereby
broadening its reach. The Centros para la Reconciliación, who build their projects on
common interests, actively ask their participants to talk to their families about the
lessons learned in their workshops.
Achieving reconciliation for all: involving higher social classes

The ARN has recently started to put more emphasis on reconciliation. It now
defines one of its goals as ‘[. . .] favouring spaces of coexistence and actions of
reconciliation in the recipient contexts, adapted to their relative characteristics’.98
Reconciliation should include all social classes; however, social stratification leads to
lower income classes having more exposure to ex-combatants. In Bogotá, ex-
combatants tend to live in marginalised areas – a dynamic that has been observed
all over Colombia by Kaplan and Nussio as well as Prieto.99 This is not only because
212 L. RHYN
rent is more affordable and housing is easier to find in these areas, but also because
mobility is high, and newcomers thus do not attract much attention. Reintegration
projects generally take place in the neighbourhoods to which ex-combatants relo-
cate, in order to maximise accessibility. Consequentially, affluent communities are
hardly ever involved in the community projects, and are also likely to learn less
about the reintegration route. Arguably, the ARN needs to target the regions with
the greatest needs, but it is nevertheless imperative for reconciliation processes to
involve the entire population. One way to do so is by working with interest instead
of geographic communities, since interest communities are more likely to involve
individuals from different social classes than geographic communities. One example
is the theatre project Victus that includes individuals from different social and
economic strata. But targeting interest communities will hardly be sufficient, because
it needs to be acknowledged that they are often shaped by the area in which they are
located: a football team in Ciudad Bolivar in the south of Bogotá is very unlikely to
have players from the northern, more affluent communities. The size of the city thus
leads to geographic as well as economic stratification.
Another way to address the lack of involvement of higher social classes in reintegra-
tion programmes is to design projects for private universities, since social stratification
in Colombia’s education system is high. The ARN and local projects are both working
with private universities, using them as catalysts for more dispersed community reinte-
gration. Developing projects that target the more privileged parts of society has become
more common in the last years. Some universities invite ex-combatants to give specific
courses in political science or psychology classes, thereby offering a different and
personal perspective on the issue of reintegration. Additionally, there are some
stipends available to ex-combatants to study at private elite universities, such as
Universidad de los Andes, which slowly contributes to reducing the social stratification
and fostering contact between ex-combatants and higher social classes.
Co-operation between state and local reintegration actors

State reintegration actors, such as the ARN in Colombia, develop models for
community reintegration projects that are general and applicable to a variety of
contexts. When it comes to implementation in different regions, the ARN relies on
the local communities for adaptations to the model, but also increasingly on local
partners such as small foundations and community leaders. The degree to which
local actors are involved varies. Sometimes, they may only be consulted for the
adaptation of a single programme component. But even then their involvement is
crucial because they have developed in-depth knowledge of the local conditions and
the challenges faced by ex-combatants and community members. Not only do state
actors collaborate with local actors to adapt their projects: local actors, such as
foundations and community members, tend to rely on the state’s infrastructure for
the implementation of their own projects. While they design their projects indepen-
dently from the state, having access to the state agency’s networks or its financial
means can be crucial for the success of a private project. With the high anonymity
surrounding ex-combatants, it is crucial for local projects to collaborate with the
state in order to get broader exposure among the demobilised people.
One example for collaboration between state and local actors is the social service.
Ex-combatants are given important agency in choosing their social service: they can
either join a local initiative that is recognised by the ARN or make an enquiry for
other local projects to be approved. To help ex-combatants pursue a social service
that they consider relevant, administrators of local reintegration and reconciliation
projects get in contact with the ARN. Examples for local projects recognised as
social service providers are the Centros para la Reconciliación. At the local centre in
Suba, the social service includes interaction with the community and possibly even
participation in reconciliation workshops, and hence goes beyond what is offered by
the ARN. The feedback provided by demobilised people regarding interactive social
services was positive.100
Beyond the co-operation with local reintegration actors, the ARN claims that it
consults communities about their needs before establishing a social service project. In
practice, this seems to involve a discussion with the mayor or other local authorities,
while the majority of community members is excluded. Verkoren and his co-authors
make a similar observation with regard to DDR processes internationally: exchanges
with local mayors are understood as sufficient bottom-up input for the process.101
Project administrators explained this by arguing that the community should not
know about ex-combatants’ involvement in order to avoid security risks. However, if
this was really the main concern, the population could be consulted with regard to their
needs without mentioning who will conduct the work before its completion. If a broad
consultation is too complex, the ARN should get in contact with the staff of local
reintegration projects, who can help assess the needs of the population. While colla-
boration between state and local actors is crucial, it should not come at the expense of
community consultation. Local reintegration actors or local institutions cannot always
speak for all the interests represented in a community. Therefore, community involve-
ment remains crucial even if local leaders are being consulted.
There remains potential in the collaboration between the state and local actors.
Currently, some ARN community reintegration officers do not have a wide overview
of existing local projects in Bogotá.102 Hence, local actors should more actively step
forward and contact the state agency to identify potential for co-operation.
Conclusion
This article aimed to contribute to the under-researched field of community reintegra-
tion, focussing on the case of Colombia. Not only does Colombia have decades of
experience with reintegration programmes, but community reintegration will continue
to gain importance. The reincorporation of the FARC offers a window of opportunity
for a more widespread use of community projects. Existing research shows the impor-
tance of community reintegration; however, it neglects the practical aspects of it,
namely how projects can foster ex-combatant and community participation in environ-
ments characterised by stigma. Stigma hinders participation of both target groups: on
the one hand, community members are afraid of ex-combatants and want to stay away
from them. On the other hand, ex-combatants fear revealing their identities and thus
refuse to take part in reintegration projects. Accordingly, community reintegration
projects must apply mechanisms that help to overcome stigma and foster participation
214 L. RHYN
from both target groups. This article identified the following four mechanisms: provid-
ing information; including community members and ex-combatants in project design
and implementation; creating incentives for participation; and changing narratives. It
then analysed how these mechanisms are being used in existing community reintegra-
tion projects.
The analysis was not only focussed on the ARNs community reintegration projects
but also took several local projects into account. The ARN only recently started to apply
community reintegration projects, and it uses national models that are then adapted to
the local context. For this adaption, the state relies on local actors, including existing
local reintegration projects. Accordingly, the co-operation between state and local
actors was analysed. One example for this co-operation is the social service, for
which the ARN collaborates with the Centros para la Reconciliación. Additionally,
many local projects depend on the state agency for identifying participants or for
funding. Bogotá’s local reintegration projects show great potential. Enhanced co-
operation with the ARN could lead to a more widespread application of the promising
methods for community reintegration developed on the local level. While collaboration
with local reintegration actors is an important factor, the ARN should not cease
consulting recipient communities directly. The community members should receive
a more active role as contributors to reintegration projects, and be given an opportunity
to participate in project design. Where standardised reintegration programmes are
applied, communities should at least have a say during the implementation phase.
Interest communities offer a promising environment for community reintegration
programmes. Due to the persistent stigma, it is crucial to incentivise community
members and ex-combatants to participate in reintegration projects; one way to do so
is by setting up a project around a common interest. If the individuals from both
groups realise that they share the same passion, they may be able to overcome their
perceived differences. Community members can realise that ex-combatants are ‘like you
and I’, despite the wrong done in the past – potentially leading to a change in narratives
surrounding ex-combatants and opening the way for reconciliation. Working with
interest communities is especially attractive in urban contexts, where a large array of
interests is represented. The findings of this research thus counter the common idea
that larger cities hinder community reintegration. In Colombia, where the majority of
ex-combatants have moved to the largest cities, it is crucial to employ social reintegra-
tion methods that fit the special contexts of urban areas, as it allows broadening the
reach of community reintegration.
While this article focused on the Colombian case only, several of the findings are
transferable to other national contexts. The four identified mechanisms for community
reintegration are universally applicable and can easily be adapted to the local context.
They offer a means to increase participation of both ex-combatants and community
members, especially where stigma hinders reintegration. In contexts where stigma
remains important, it can also be beneficial to leave it to the individual ex-
combatants to decide whether and when they would like to reveal their identity. This
not only helps to increase participation in community programmes, but also allows ex-
combatants and community members to get to know each other without the restrictions
brought about by stigma. It needs to be recognised that this strategy is only relevant
where anonymity can be granted, e.g. mostly in cities, and for contexts where the
individuals do not return to their pre-war communities. Finally, targeting interest

rather than geographical communities is beneficial for contexts where ex-combatants
predominantly move to urban areas, which tends to be the case in many internal armed
conflicts.
Notes
1. Leff, ‘The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration’; Kaplan and Nussio,
‘Community Counts’; and Özerdem, ‘Social Reintegration Approach’.
2. The terms ‘ex-combatant’ and ‘demobilised combatant’ will be used synonymously. For
the purpose of this article, the term ex-combatant will be defined as ‘informal combatants
no longer actively serving’ in guerilla or paramilitary activities, according to Muggah’s
definition, but excluding soldiers no longer serving in formal military structures (Muggah,
‘Anatomy of Disarmament’, 32).
3. Dovidio et al., ‘Stigma: Introduction and Overview’, 1–2.
4. Kaplan and Nussio, ‘Community Counts’.
5. The ARN was formerly called ‘Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración’, short ACR.
Under this name, it significantly developed the reintegration programmes for the indivi-
dually demobilised combatants (and its predecessor established the reintegration route for
collectively demobilised combatants of the AUC), which are the main object of analysis in
this article. The agency was renamed in the course of the process with the FARC – the
terms ‘reincorporation’ and ‘normalisation’ thus refer specifically to the FARC process. For
the sake of consistency, this article will refer to the current name ARN throughout, but it is
important to acknowledge that many of the current programmes were developed by the
ACR originally – hence the literature section mostly refers to ACR publications.
6. ARN, ‘Early Reincorporation’.
7. The FARC demanded their DDR process to include ‘reincorporation’ instead of reintegra-
tion, most importantly because they demanded for political participation, which had not
been granted in earlier reintegration processes.
8. ARN, ‘Early Reincorporation’; and ‘La Reincorporación en los Acuerdos’.
9. Kaplan and Nussio, ‘Community Counts’.
10. Özerdem, ‘Social Reintegration Approach’; Carranza-Franco, ‘Sub-national Approach to
State-building and Security’.
11. The sample size is N = 42. Community members are indirectly included in the set of
interviewees since many of the project staff in community projects also belong to the local
communities. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that community members could not
be involved as a separate group of interviewees, thus leaving potential for further research.
For this article, the gap is neglectable, since the focus is on an identification of the
mechanisms applied by community reintegration programmes, which can be identified
without considering statements of community members external to the programme.
12. Biernacki and Waldorf, ‘Snowball Sampling’, 141.
13. All ex-combatants interviewed are over 18 years of age, since this article focuses on
reintegration programmes for adults, and does not analyse the separate process for minors
at the ICBF. The gender of interviewed ex-combatants was evenly distributed between
female and male (with a slight over-representation of female ex-combatants in the sample
as compared to the numbers of female ex-combatants in the relevant armed groups). The
ex-combatants belonged to three different armed groups: the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC), the Ejército de Liberación
Nacional (ELN) and the Autodefensas Armadas de Colombia (AUC). Hence, not all of
them demobilised individually, but some formed part of the collective process with the
AUC. Since the reintegration programmes do not have separate designs for individually or
collectively demobilised combatants, it was important to consider both for the sample.
216 L. RHYN
Another characteristic that varied throughout the sample was the time of demobilisation.
Only ex-combatants that demobilised after 2003 were considered for the sample, but some
had demobilised years ago, while others were still in the formal reintegration process.
Interviewees’ age was not actively taken into account. Only one ex-combatant referenced
his age group actively and considered it relevant with regard to his assessment of the
reintegration process. Most participants of the ACR’s programme are between 26- and 40-
years old (see ARN, ‘Servicio Social’), and the majority of the interviewees also seemed to
fit into that age group.
14. Theidon, ‘Pasts Imperfect’, 83.
15. ARN (ACR), Histórico de Personas Desmovilizadas.
16. Personal interviews, various project administrators (Centro para la Reconciliación, ARN)
Bogotá, January and February 2017.
17. In English: Operative Committee for Disarmament.
18. Observatorio de Paz y Conflicto, ‘Salida de Integrantes’, 48.
19. Ibid., 50.
20. Interviewees who had joined the reintegration programmes in the early 2000s (after having
demobilised from the AUC or the ELN) said that living in so-called ‘peace homes’, namely
housing projects for ex-combatants including ex-combatants from different armed groups,
was difficult. This was mainly due to high levels of violence and hostilities between former
opponents. Another interviewee (FARC ex-combatant) reported situations in mixed rein-
tegration programmes where she met individuals who used to ‘belong to the enemy’ and
soon realised that she had a lot in common with their person opposite. This gave both
sides the opportunity to revise their stereotypes and ideally reconcile themselves, e.g.
during exercises organised by the ACR.
21. Kaplan and Nussio, ‘Community Counts’, 133.
22. Johnson and Jonsson, ‘Ending the Forever War’, 71.
23. Kaplan and Nussio, ‘Community Counts’, 2; and Nussio and Howe, ‘What if the FARC
Demobilizes’.
24. ARN (ACR), ‘First Global DDR Summit’, 53.
25. Ibid., 44.
26. Ibid.
27. Leff, ‘The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration’.
28. Alta Consejería para la Reintegración Económica y Social de las Personas y Grupos
Alzados en Armas, Módulo de Formación Ciudadana; and Nussio, ‘What if the FARC
Demobilizes’.
29. ARN (ACR), ‘Plan Estratégico 2015–2018’, 6. Extract loosely translated into English by the
author, original version: ‘Propiciar espacios para la convivencia y acciones de
reconciliación en los contextos receptores, según sus características’.
30. Ibid., 19. Translated into English by the author, original version: ‘Promover mecanismos
de reintegración comunitaria y prevención para la construcción de la paz’.
31. Ibid., 42.
32. Personal interview, ARN (ACR) community reintegration officer, Bogotá, February 2017.
33. Ugarriza, ‘La Dimensión Política del Postconflicto’.
34. Bowd and Özerdem, ‘How to Assess Social Reintegration’; and McMullin, ‘Integration or
Separation’.
35. UN 2006 in: ARN (ACR), ‘First Global DDR Summit’, 53.
36. Bowd and Özerdem, ‘How to Assess Social Reintegration’, 456.
37. Özerdem, ‘Social Reintegration Approach’, 62.
38. ARN (ACR), ‘First Global DDR Summit’, 53.
39. Specker, ‘The R-Phase of DDR Processes’.
40. Ugarriza and Nussio, ‘The Effect of Perspective-Giving’.
41. Prieto, ‘Together After the War’, 531.
42. Jenkins et al., Reconciliation in Conflict-affected Communities, 2.
43. Lederach, Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 1997.
44. Figueroa Garzón, ‘Aprendizajes para la Reconciliación’, 21.

45. Nussio, ‘La Vida Después de la Desmovilización’, 193–195.
46. Personal interviews, ex-combatants of the FARC, ELN and the AUC, Bogotá, January and
February 2017.
47. López de Roche, ‘El Gobierno de Juan Manuel Santos’.
48. Nussio, ‘Ex-Combatants and Violence in Colombia’, 2.
49. CNC, ‘Informe Final Evaluación de Impacto’.
50. Nussio argues in ‘Ex-Combatants and Violence in Colombia’ that there is evidence that
follower organisations to the paramilitary groups, often referred to as BACRIM or criminal
gangs, recruited demobilised combatants, who thus continued to engage in violent acts.
This re-recruitment fuelled the stigma, even though studies show that recidivism rates
among ex-combatants are generally low.
51. This was especially reported by those ex-combatants who demobilised before the start of
the new programme in 2011 (ACR), who felt that project staff had insignificant knowledge
about the background and histories of ex-combatants. But there were also a number of
interviewees who demobilised more recently (namely in the last seven years), who had
experienced stigma by employees of the stage agency. One ex-combatant reported that staff
made them feel inferior. Even a former combatant of the FARC who now works at the
ARN reported that many of her colleagues working at the stage agency made generalising
and stigmatising comments about ex-combatants.
52. Carranza-Franco, ‘Sub-national Approach to State-building and Security’; and Özerdem
‘Social Reintegration Approach’, 62.
53. McMullin, ‘Integration or Separation’.
55. Kilroy, ‘Participatory Approach to Reintegrating Ex-Combatants’, 287.
56. Morgenstein, ‘Consolidating Disarmament’, 2.
57. Theidon, ‘Pasts Imperfect’, 15.
58. Kilroy, ‘Participatory Approach to Reintegrating Ex-Combatants’.
59. Bowd and Özerdem, ‘How to Assess Social Reintegration’, 459.
60. Figueroa Garzón, ‘Aprendizajes para la Reconciliación’.
61. Thorsell, ‘Towards People-Centred Economic Reintegration’.
64. Humphrey and Weinstein, ‘Demobilization and Reintegration’, 549.
65. e.g. Lee and Özerdem, Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding, 4.
66. Edomwonyi, ‘Rwanda’.
67. Donais ‘Operationalizing Local Ownership’, 43.
68. Specker, ‘The R-Phase of DDR-Processes’.
69. It must also be acknowledged that Bogotá’s different neighbourhoods are far from
homogenous, mostly due to the sheer size of the city and the different socio-
economic conditions in the neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, a comparison of mechan-
isms used in different neighbourhoods of the same city allows for better comparison
then when opposing a small number of rural and urban projects, where the context is
likely to differ completely.
70. The MRC is a community reintegration project offered by the ARN, which is often
established independently from the standard reintegration route. Meanwhile, the social
service is a part of the reintegration route that is designed to foster reintegration into the
community; however, it is organised independently from other components and often in
collaboration with local actors, which is why it will be considered as an individual project
in the following analysis.
71. Other project staff also confirmed that ex-combatants were reluctant to participate.
A reason named repetitively was that ex-combatants want to maintain their anonymity
and fear that their identity would be exposed by the project.
218 L. RHYN
72. Personal interview, Bogotá, February 2017. Freely translated into English. Original version:
‘Yo pienso que somos responsables de sensibilizar la gente antes del inicio del proyecto,
para que podamos reducir el estigma y facilitar la participación de personas en ruta de
reintegración’.
73. Interviews with various ex-combatants from the FARC and the ELN and project staff from
local reintegration projects, 2017. The interviewees commented that their experience with
the community members shows that many do not know about the state-led reintegration
programmes, and specifically not about the contributions demanded by former
combatants.
74. McFee, ‘The Double Bind of Playing Double’, 56.
75. In English: Reconciliation Centres. These community centres are among the local projects
analysed for this article.
76. It needs to be pointed out, however, that only the community project of stage 3 of the
MRC is designed based on a bottom-up approach, and the model in itself is a top-down
intervention. But since the community project, the heart piece of the programme is
developed by community members, the bottom-up influence is still considerable.
78. Importantly, programmes must not be built on an either/or approach, meaning that either
the community or the ex-combatants benefit, but they can be designed to be attractive to
both target groups, based on Jaramillo’s argument (Jaramillo, ‘Transitional Justice and
DDR’).
79. McMullin, ‘Integration or Separation’.
80. Official name: Diplomado Formación Ciudadana para la Reintegración Comunitaria.
81. ARN (ACR), ‘Diplomado Formación Ciudadana’, 9.
82. Vargas et al., Centros de Reconciliación.
83. Ibid. and personal interview with an ex-combatant who now works for the ARN, Bogotá.
84. ARN (ACR), Servicio Social.
85. Due to the missing contact with the community, it could be argued that the social service
does not qualify as community reintegration project. However, by the ARN definition, it is
designed with and for the community. The discussion will show that only some of the
social services can be counted as community reintegration projects (for example, the ones
conducted in collaboration with the Centro para la Reconciliación).
86. Personal interview, Bogotá, February 2017.
87. Personal interview, administrator of Manos para la Reconciliación, Bogotá, February 2017
and personal interview, ex-combatant from the FARC, Bogotá (among others),
February 2017.
88. Personal interviews, ex-combatant of the AUC, Bogotá and ex-combatant of the FARC,
Bogotá, January and February 2017.
90. Translated by the author. Original version: ‘Señalar con el dedo a alguien’.
91. Personal interview, administrator of Manos para la Reconciliación, Bogotá, February 2017.
92. Ibid. Original version: ‘Muchos no están de acuerdo de ver un niño como un niño y no
como el hijo de una excombatiente. No van a dejar de estigmatizarlo, pero qué culpa tiene
el niño?’
93. Personal interview, ex-combatant of the ELN, Bogotá, January 2017. Original version:
‘Vaya, de verdad sea posible que un ex-combatiente no vuelva a delinquir pero que consiga
una carrera?’
94. Personal interview, ex-combatant of the FARC, Bogotá, February 2017. Original version:
‘Entre menos sepa la gente es mejor’.
95. Personal interview, ex-combatant of the ELN, Bogotá, January 2017. Original version:
‘Dejamos la clandestinidad, sólo para encontrarnos en otra forma de clandestinidad’.
96. For the sake of transparency, it must also be mentioned that stigma is not the only reason
why ex-combatants do not talk about their past in certain circles. Another reason is that
they feel no necessity to share it with their neighbours since the neighbourhood they live
in is very impersonal and they never have close contact with anyone – but if they hide their
past from their family and close friends, as one ex-combatant revealed he was doing,
stigma must play a role.
97. Personal interviews, ARN project administators, Bogotá, 2017.
98. ARN (ACR), ‘Plan Estratégico 2015–2018’, 6. Freely translated by the author. Original
version: ‘[. . .] propiciar espacios para la convivencia y acciones de reconciliación en los
contextos receptores según características’.
99. Kaplan and Nussio, ‘Community Counts’, 7; and Prieto, ‘Together After the War’, 528.
100. One ex-combatant from the FARC said that she felt happy to be able to contribute
something that the community truly needs and to get in contact with community
members. Others appreciated the workshops that they were allowed to participate in
aside from the social service.
101. Verkoren et al., ‘From DDR to Security Promotion’, 23.
102. Personal interviews with two community reintegration officers of the ARN in 2017 showed
that they were hardly aware of any local projects in Bogotá.
Acknowledgements
This article could not have been realised without the participation of my interview partners
who kindly shared their opinions and other valuable information and dedicated their time to
my study. A special thanks goes to all interviewees who have gone through or are now in the
process of reintegration. Not only is the analysis largely based on their voices and assess-
ments, but their personal stories also enabled me to better understand a crucial part of
Colombian history. Furthermore, my thanks go to the Centre on Conflict, Development and
Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute Geneva, particularly to Dr Oliver Jütersonke,
for sharing advice and providing support from the planning of the field research up to the
analysis and review.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Larissa Rhyn is Research Associate at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding of
the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. Her research interests
span internal armed conflict and post-conflict issues, in particular the disarmament, demobilisa-
tion and reintegration of former combatants.
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WEEK 4 Overcoming Stigma and Fostering Participation Mechanisms For Community Reintegration in Colombia

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Overcoming stigma and fostering participation:

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Overcoming stigma and fostering participation: mechanisms

CONTACT Larissa Rhyn larissa.rhyn@graduateinstitute.ch

devaluation’ of the individual.3 When it comes to ex-combatants, their past belonging

Existing research usually focuses on the ARN as an implementing actor of reintegra-

foster ex-combatant and community participation. In a third and principal section,

Outlining the context: Colombia’s DDR experiences and the role of

Community reintegration: deﬁnition and short overview

The relevance of community reintegration projects

Growing importance of community reintegration in Colombia

Conceptual framework and relevant actors

Geographic versus interest communities

The centrality of stigma

Mechanisms to increase participation in community reintegration projects

Inclusion in design and implementation

The role of geography

Community reintegration projects in Colombia: an analysis

Overview of state-run and local projects

Analysis of the mechanisms used to foster participation

Table 1. ARN’s community reintegration projects.

Table 2. Local community reintegration projects.

responsibilities it accords to the demobilised people. Project components speciﬁcally

Inclusion in design and implementation

Leaving institutional mechanisms aside: ex-combatants’ individual strategies for

Opportunities for broadening the reach of community reintegration

Achieving reconciliation for all: involving higher social classes

Co-operation between state and local reintegration actors

individuals do not return to their pre-war communities. Finally, targeting interest

44. Figueroa Garzón, ‘Aprendizajes para la Reconciliación’, 21.

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