IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

TRAVIS CLOSE and TINA CLOSE et al., )

)
Plaintiffs, ) No. 1:18-cv-110
)
v. ) JURY DEMAND
)
COOL RUNNINGS EXPRESS, INC., ) Judge Reeves
and BENJAMIN SCOTT BREWER, ) Magistrate Lee
)
Defendants. )
______________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

______________________________________________________________________________

Defendant Cool Runnings Express, Inc. hereby moves the Court for sanctions against

Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel, as set forth below.

I. Background

The jury trial of this matter was set to take place immediately after Memorial Day weekend,

beginning on June 1, 2021. On the eve of trial, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel disseminated a

press release containing their prepared statements.1 At least one news outlet published these

prepared statements, explaining, “A press release sent to the Channel 3 newsroom on Monday says

the Honorable Travis McDonough and a jury will hear claims of how Hamilton County residents

Travis and Tina Close, along with their two minor children, were injured and forever changed after

1
Plaintiffs’ counsel has not disclosed the full content of this press release to undersigned counsel
or this Court (only the prepared statements that appeared within the press release). It is not clear
to what extent the news story at issue quotes from or relies upon other content provided by
Plaintiffs in the press release. Defendant believes the content of the “press release” Plaintiffs sent
to the Channel 3 newsroom on the eve of trial is highly relevant. If the Court deems appropriate,
Defendants respectfully request that the Court order Plaintiffs’ counsel to produce the press release
and all correspondence between the press and Plaintiffs’ counsel and/or their agents (including
Holly House Marketing) in furtherance of this Motion.

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 being involved in the crash.” First trial begins against trucking company in deadly 2015 I-75

crash, WRCBtv.com, https://www.wrcbtv.com/story/44003847/first-trial-begins-against-

trucking-company-in-deadly-i75-crash-in-june-of-2015 (last visited July 5, 2021), attached hereto

as Exhibit 1. This story was published on May 31, 2021, at 9:41 PM EDT, less than twelve hours

before the trial was set to begin. (Id.) In this story, Plaintiffs and their counsel made the following

statements:

"The tragic wreck that our family had the misfortune to experience on June 25,
2015, has forever changed our entire family, including our two children. Our hope
is that our legal case against Cool Runnings Express will make other trucking
companies take a closer look at the drivers they hire and prevent other families from
going through this nightmare," Travis and Tina Close said in a statement.

* * * *

"After many delays, we are eager to share the Close Family’s incident from the
deadly I-75 crash with a jury. We are confident that the facts regarding Cool
Runnings Express’ negligent hiring and operating practices speak for themselves.
Safety regulations are integral to almost every aspect of the trucking industry, but
they only protect the lives of the drivers and our communities when trucking
companies actually adhere to them," said Danny Ellis, the attorney representing the
Close Family, Truck Wreck Justice, PLLC.

(Id.)

When confronted by the Court the next morning, Plaintiffs’ counsel thrice denied sending

the press release, stating:

• “Your Honor, the media contacted the Close family and our office, and we --
we issued a response.” (Tr. at 3:23-24, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.)

• “Your Honor, we were contacted.” (Id. at 5:2.)

• “Your Honor, I can't control what the press puts in. When they reached out to
us, I gave a prepared statement that follows and tracks the rule.” (Id. at 6:22-
24.)

All three statements were false, as this Court would later learn.

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 During a recess, undersigned counsel spoke with two reporters in the courthouse hallway,

who disclosed that they had not contacted anyone, but rather a company called “Holly House

Marketing” sent them a press release containing the prepared statements, among other information.

(See Exhibit 1 (“A press release sent to the Channel 3 newsroom on Monday says . . . .”).)

At this point, undersigned counsel requested a discussion in chambers. In this Court’s

chambers, the following discussion took place:

MR. GRIFFIN: That, and I think it -- I think we need to know, what is Holly House
Marketing? Are they your marketing firm?

MR. ELLIS: They're not our marketing firm.

(Tr. at 13:6-9.) This was a second false representation to the Court. In fact, Mr. Ellis admitted as

much when he recanted just moments later:

MR. ELLIS: So I knew that this could potentially be a media storm. So I reached
out to somebody so I would not have to deal with them, with the press, and said, "I
need you to handle these people. Here you go."

MR. GRIFFIN: And who is that?

MR. ELLIS: That's -- that's the Holly Mar- -- that's the Holly -- Ms. Holly Gribbs,
or -- I think that's her name.

MR. GRIFFIN: So you did -- you did hire Holly House Marketing.

MR. ELLIS: To handle the -- to handle the press. did not want to handle the press.
I said, "Hey, if the press contacts you, you handle it."

MR. GRIFFIN: So you contact Holly House Marketing to handle the press, and
then when the press contacts you, you issued a statement?

MR. ELLIS: I had a prepared statement, based on my conversation with her, saying,
"This is what I think we can do. If the press contacts you, this is -- this is our -- you
know, this is our statement."

(Tr. at 13:16-14:9.) In addition to the fact that Mr. Ellis initially denied having hired Holly House

Marketing and then admitted he did, his subsequent explanation defies logic—it simply must be

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 false. Why would a marketing company hired to simply “field” press inquiries issue a prepared

press release on the eve of trial without their client’s knowledge and consent? They would not.

Following this incredible disclosure, Defendants were presented with an impossible

choice—either ask jurors whether they had seen the inflammatory statements or ignore the

statements and run the risk that one of the jurors had read and been influenced by the statements.

As a result of this unfair prejudice, the Court sua sponte continued the trial and directed Defendants

to file a motion for costs, if desired. The media subsequently reported on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

violation of this Court’s rules. See, e.g., Federal judge halts trial against trucking company

involved in deadly 2015 crash citing violation by attorney, wbir.com,

https://www.wbir.com/article/news/crime/federal-judge-halts-trial-against-trucking-company/51-

ba689137-c188-41ca-b938-77281734e00d (last visited June 14, 2021).

In the three-day period between Sunday, May 30, 2021 and Tuesday, June 1, 2021,

Defendant incurred $8,685.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,761.64 in expenses, for a total of

$10,446.64. (See Decl. of John J. Griffin, Jr., attached hereto as Exhibit 3; Decl. of Michael A.

Johnson, attached hereto as Exhibit 4; Decl. of Billy Sizemore, Jr., attached hereto as Exhibit 5.)

II. Legal Standard

“[C]ounsel has a clear obligation to familiarize himself with a district court's local

rules and to follow them . . . .” Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 710 (6th Cir. 2013). Even

pro se parties are “expected to be familiar with and follow” the Local Rules. E.D. Tenn. L.R.

83.13. E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 83.2(a) prohibits public statements by attorneys, as follows:

No lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall, during its investigation
or litigation, make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than a
quotation from or reference to public records, which a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if there is a
reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial and if
such dissemination relates to:

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 (1) evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved;

(2) the character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or

prospective witness;

(3) the performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or

failure of a party to submit to such;

(4) the attorney's opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a

party, except as required by law or administrative rule; and

(5) any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the
action.

(emphasis added).

This Local Rule is similar to Rule 3.6 of Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct,2

which states as follows:

A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation

of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication
and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.6(a).3 Comment 5 to Rule 3.6 provides there are “certain subjects that

are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when

they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury,” including “the character, credibility . . . of a party” or

2
See also E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.6 (“The minimum standards of professional conduct before this
Court include the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee
insofar as they relate to matters within the jurisdiction of this Court. Such rules are not exhaustive
of the ethical standards the Court expects attorneys to meet. The Court has the obligation and
responsibility to interpret and apply the RPC and other rules and standards of conduct without
being bound by the decisions of Tennessee courts, other courts, or agencies.”).
3
Notably, this Court’s Local Rule is broader than Rule 3.6 because the standard under Local Rule
83.2(a) is a “reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial” rather
than the more exacting “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” standard in Rule 3.6 of
Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct.

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 “information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as

evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial

trial.”

III. Analysis

A. Monetary Sanctions and Grounds for the Same.

As a result of the conduct of Plaintiffs and their counsel, Defendant requests $10,446.64 in

attorneys’ fees and costs (plus the fees and costs associated with the instant Motion), that the Court

tax the costs of the June 2021 trial setting to Plaintiffs regardless of the ultimate jury verdict in this

matter, an order governing publicity in this matter going forward, and any other sanctions this

Court deems appropriate.

There are multiple bases for the relief sought. First, the Court has inherent discretion.

“There is no doubt that a federal district court, in the sound exercise of its discretion, may assess

attorney's fees against losing counsel, as well as against a losing party.” Jones v. Cont'l Corp., 789

F.2d 1225, 1229 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447

U.S. 752 (1980)) (“the Supreme Court, while finding no statutory authority for such an award,

determined that it could be upheld under the court's ‘inherent powers,’ upon a finding that an

attorney ‘willfully abused judicial processes’ by conduct ‘tantamount to bad faith.’”).

Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, as follows:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.

The Sixth Circuit explained that this statute applies when an attorney knows or reasonably should

know that the litigation tactic will needlessly obstruct the litigation:

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 28 U.S.C. § 1927 authorizes a court to assess fees against an attorney for
"unreasonable and vexatious" multiplication of litigation despite the absence of any
conscious impropriety. An attorney's ethical obligation of zealous advocacy on
behalf of his or her client does not amount to carte blanche to burden the federal
courts by pursuing claims that are frivolous on the merits, or by pursuing
nonfrivolous claims through the use of multiplicative litigation tactics that are
harassing, dilatory, or otherwise "unreasonable and vexatious." Accordingly, at
least when an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is
frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation
of nonfrivolous claims, a trial court does not err by assessing fees attributable to
such actions against the attorney.

Jones v. Cont'l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986).4 Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit

clarified that the standard under Section 1927 is objective, not subjective, as follows:

"Section 1927 sanctions are warranted when an attorney objectively 'falls short of
the obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court and which, as a result,
causes additional expense to the opposing party.'" Red Carpet Studios Div. of
Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re
Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added). "Section
1927 sanctions may be imposed without a finding that the lawyer subjectively knew
that his conduct was inappropriate." Hogan v. Jacobson, 823 F.3d 872, 886 (6th
Cir. 2016). Thus, sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 "require a showing of
something less than subjective bad faith, but something more than negligence or
incompetence."

Knopf v. Elite Moving Sys., 677 F. App'x 252, 257 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming sanctions); see also

Oakstone Cmty. Sch. v. Williams, 615 F. App'x 284, 289 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Their purpose is to deter

dilatory litigation practices. Thus, an attorney's conduct becomes sanctionable when she

intentionally abuses the judicial process or knowingly disregards the risk that her actions will

needlessly multiply proceedings. We review § 1927 sanctions, like those under Rule 11, for an

abuse of discretion.” (citations omitted)). For this reason, ignorance of the rules is no excuse—

sanctions may be imposed without a finding that the lawyer subjectively knew that his conduct

was inappropriate.

4
Thus, this statute contains a standard nearly identical to Local Rule 83.2(a)’s “reasonable
likelihood” of interference standard.

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 Third, E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 83.7(a) provides as follows:

The Court may impose discipline on any member of its bar who has violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, or
has engaged in unethical conduct tending to bring the Court or the bar into
disrepute. . . . Discipline which may be imposed includes disbarment, suspension,
reprimand, or such other further disciplinary action as the Court may deem
appropriate and just. Nothing in this rule shall be construed as limiting in any way
the exercise by the Court of its inherent contempt power or its authority to impose
other sanctions provided under federal law and the Federal Rules of Civil or
Criminal Procedure.

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Tennessee Rules of Professional

Conduct as well as the Local Rules of this Court. E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 83.2(a) prohibits public

statements by attorneys where (1) “there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will

interfere with a fair trial”; and (2) if such dissemination relates to, among other things, evidence,

character or credibility of a party, the attorney's opinion as to the merits of the claims, or any other

matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action. Similarly, Rule 3.6 of

Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits extrajudicial statements where the lawyer

knows or reasonably should know that the statements will have a substantial likelihood of

materially prejudicing the proceeding. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.6(a).

Here, Plaintiffs and their counsel caused to be published prepared statements, on the literal

eve of trial, saying: (1) Plaintiffs had been “forever changed” (the presence or absence of

permanent injury is a central issue for trial); (2) Plaintiffs went through a “nightmare”; (3) the

crash was “deadly” even though none of the Plaintiffs died; and (4) Cool Runnings was guilty of

“negligent hiring and operating practices” that “speak for themselves.” (Exhibit 1.) Despite this

Court’s ruling on Plaintiffs’ opening argument just days prior, the prepared statements also invoke

the “reptile theory” in a transparent effort to influence the jury pool, claiming: (1) “Our hope is

that our legal case against Cool Runnings Express will make other trucking companies take a closer

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 look at the drivers they hire and prevent other families from going through this nightmare”; and

(2) “Safety regulations are integral to almost every aspect of the trucking industry, but they only

protect the lives of the drivers and our communities when trucking companies actually adhere to

them.” Any reasonable attorney would know that these statements are reasonably likely to interfere

with and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the trial. This was a clear

violation of E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 83.2 and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.6(a). This conduct also

constitutes a violation of the objective standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which applies anytime an

attorney “so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously . . . .”

Finally, although a finding of violations of E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 83.2, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.

8, RPC 3.6(a), and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are objectively appropriate, there is clearly additional

intentional conduct justifying such a finding and that shows Mr. Ellis was subjectively aware of

his inappropriate conduct. Again, when this Court asked Plaintiffs’ counsel about the news story,

he made no less than four (perhaps five) false statements: (1) claiming three times that the press

contacted him and his clients directly and that they innocently responded with prepared statements

and nothing more, (2) denying he had hired Holly House Marketing, and (3) denying he had any

knowledge of the press release Holly House Marketing distributed on the eve of trial.

B. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Violated His Duty of Candor to the Court.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.3(a) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly “make a false

statement of fact” to the Court. “There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the

equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.” Id. at cmt. 3. Further, “an assertion purporting to

be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court,

may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on

the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry.” Id.

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 As discussed above, Mr. Ellis initially claimed that he had been contacted by the press.

This was false. The only reason the Court or undersigned counsel knew it was false is because

undersigned counsel spoke with reporters, who disclosed that they were contacted by Holly House

Marketing. When confronted in chambers, Mr. Ellis initially represented that he had not hired

Holly House Marketing and then immediately backtracked. In short, Mr. Ellis violated his duty of

candor to the Court, both by knowingly making false statements of fact and by failing to disclose

pertinent information regarding the genesis of the news article at issue. In fact, had it not been for

Defendants’ independent investigation and further questioning of Mr. Ellis in chambers, Mr. Ellis’

representations and half-truths would have gone undiscovered.

IV. Conclusion

The actions of Plaintiffs and their counsel cannot go unanswered. Not only did Plaintiffs’

counsel violate Local Rules and the Rules of Professional Conduct, causing inconvenience and

expense for counsel, the jury, witnesses, and the Court, when confronted with these violations, he

made multiple false statements to the Court in further violation of the Rules of Professional

Conduct. The Court must not countenance such conduct from a member of the bar, particularly

given the public attention now being paid to this case, Mr. Ellis, and his actions.5

Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests sanctions, as follows: (1) $10,446.64 in

attorneys’ fees and costs spent in preparation for trial in the 48 hours immediately prior, (2)

5
In addition to media coverage on the continuation of the trial as a result of Mr. Ellis’ conduct,
Mr. Ellis was recently awarded the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association’s “Trial Lawyer of the
Year Award.” “The award is for a trial lawyer who is an advocate of a noble cause, and who
demonstrated superior skills and achieved an outstanding result for a client against great
obstacles.” See Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association Facebook Post,
https://www.facebook.com/accesstocourts/photos/a.1429622853738909/4438485612852603/
(last visited July 5, 2021), attached hereto as Exhibit 6. Mr. Ellis holds or has been held out as a
paragon of an ethical trial lawyer.

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2267
 attorneys’ fees and costs spent on the instant Motion to be shown by subsequent declaration

following the close of briefing, and (3) that the Court tax the costs of the June 2021 trial setting to

Plaintiffs regardless of the ultimate jury verdict in this matter. Defendant also requests an order

pursuant to Local Rule 83.2(c) governing extrajudicial statements by parties likely to interfere with

the rights of the parties to a fair trial by an impartial jury; the seating and conduct in the courtroom

of spectators and news media representatives; the management and sequestration of jurors and

witnesses; and any other matters which the Court may deem appropriate for inclusion in such

order. Defendant further requests any other remedy deemed appropriate by this Court, including,

without limitation, suspension from practice in the Eastern District of Tennessee. See, e.g., In re

Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d 768, 772 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (suspending lawyer for disobeying court

instructions, among other violations). Defendant further requests that the monetary sums be paid

before this case is reset for trial or within thirty days, whichever is later.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ John J. Griffin, Jr.

John J. Griffin, Jr. (#15446)
Michael A. Johnson (#30210)
Kay Griffin, PLLC
222 Second Avenue North, Suite 340-M
Nashville, Tennessee 37201
615-742-4800
john.griffin@kaygriffin.com
michael.johnson@kaygriffin.com
Attorneys for Cool Runnings Express, Inc.

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2268
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served via CM/ECF
upon the following:

Danny R. Ellis
Truck Wreck Justice, PLLC
1419 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402

Rebecca C. Blair
Claire G. Sawyer
The Blair Law Firm
1608 Westgate Circle Suite 100
Brentwood, TN 37027

Thomas M. Horne, Esq.

Luther-Anderson, PLLP
100 W. Martin Luther King Blvd.
One Union Square, Suite 700
Chattanooga, TN 37402

on this 7th day of July, 2021.

s/ John J. Griffin. Jr.

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Case 1:18-cv-00110-TRM-CHS Document 159-1 Filed 07/07/21 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:
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Case 1:18-cv-00110-TRM-CHS Document 159-1 Filed 07/07/21 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:

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 1

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

3 CHATTANOOGA DIVISION

4 ------------------------------------------------------------
:
5 TRAVIS CLOSE, et al., :
:
6 Plaintiffs, :
:
7 v. : 1:18-CV-110
:
8 COOL RUNNINGS EXPRESS, INC., et al., :
:
9 Defendants. :
------------------------------------------------------------
10 Chattanooga, Tennessee
June 1, 2021
11

12 BEFORE: THE HONORABLE TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13
APPEARANCES:
14
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
15
DANNY R. ELLIS
16 Truck Wreck Justice, PLLC
1419 Market Street
17 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

18 FOR THE DEFENDANT COOL RUNNINGS:

19 JOHN J. GRIFFIN, JR.

Kay, Griffin, Enkema & Colbert, PLLC
20 222 2nd Avenue N
Suite 340-M
21 Nashville, Tennessee 37201

22 MICHAEL A. JOHNSON
Kay Griffin, PLLC
23 900 S. Gay Street, Suite 802
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902
24

25 DOCKET CALL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EXHIBIT 2

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 3

1 THE COURT: Who was the last one? I'm sorry.

2 MR. GRIFFIN: Tom Horne.

3 THE COURT: All right. But on behalf of? What did

4 you say? I just couldn't understand you.

5 MR. GRIFFIN: I'm sorry. On behalf of the uninsured

6 motorist carrier.

7 THE COURT: All right. We'll bring the panel in in

8 just a second. First I want to address something that was

9 brought to my attention last night.

10 So -- and by the way, Mr. Ellis, my clerk shared

11 with me the news. So I am very sorry to have heard that. I

12 hope -- I hope everything is going as well as it can be.

13 MR. ELLIS: Thank you, Your Honor. And the only

14 reason I bring this to your attention, I believe she's stable,

15 but the neurologist is supposed to be there this morning, and

16 if something takes a turn for the worse I may need to take a

17 quick break, and I know Your Honor will work with us on that.

18 THE COURT: We will. We will. Thanks for letting me

19 know.

20 I am a little concerned here. There's-- Apparently

21 there was a press release issued yesterday. Is that right,

22 Mr. Ellis?

23 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, the media contacted the Close

24 family and our office, and we -- we issued a response.

25 THE COURT: Okay. So is -- is everybody familiar

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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 5

1 THE COURT: -- tell me what's going on.

2 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, we were contacted. Looking

3 at the rule, we did not make any type of statement that is

4 not -- outside the public records that we filed. If you look

5 at the statement, it tracks our complaint and is exactly what

6 we have alleged in our complaint --

7 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

8 MR. ELLIS: -- and so therefore we believe that we

9 have followed the rule of the court.

10 THE COURT: Mr. Griffin, what -- let me give the

11 defendants an opportunity to react.

12 (Off-the-record discussion between defense counsel.)

13 MR. GRIFFIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I was being

14 spoken to. Did you ask me a question?

15 THE COURT: Well, I was just -- what would you like

16 to say about this?

17 MR. GRIFFIN: I mean, this -- this is -- we're

18 concerned about the press from six years ago, since this was

19 such a traumatic event in Chattanooga, and we're going to ask

20 about it. The timing of it is -- is horrible. We just found

21 out about it this morning. It's a prepared statement, clearly,

22 that they gave the -- the press, apparently yesterday. We're

23 trying to pull up to see if there are any comments. But

24 anybody who reads the news in this community may have seen

25 this, and it's -- it's highly prejudicial to my clients and --

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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 6

1 I don't want to speak for Ms. Blair, but for Mr. Brewer as

2 well.

3 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

4 Ms. Blair?

5 MR. GRIFFIN: These aren't off-the-cuff comments.

6 THE COURT: What's that?

7 MR. GRIFFIN: These aren't off-the-cuff comments.

8 These aren't, "We have no comment. The trial starts tomorrow.

9 We're looking forward to having our day in court."

10 I mean, this is a prepared statement.

11 THE COURT: All right.

12 Ms. Blair, what do you -- what do you want to say?

13 MS. BLAIR: I share Mr. Griffin's concerns, Your

14 Honor. I'm trying to look now. I mean, I see, you know, a

15 photograph with the story, with my client in an orange

16 jumpsuit, handcuffs, with police officers on either side. I'm

17 just -- you know, I'm a little flabbergasted, frankly, by this.

18 I think, if anything, we need some time to process it and

19 whether we think the damage is too great to start this trial

20 today.

21 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ellis, anything else?

22 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, I can't control what the

23 press puts in. When they reached out to us, I gave a prepared

24 statement that follows and tracks the rule.

25 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of your statement?

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1 and undo the harm that has occurred here other than, you know,

2 moving this trial and taking a step back so that things can die

3 down before we -- before we go to picking a jury and trying

4 this case.

5 THE COURT: Yep.

6 MR. GRIFFIN: That, and I think it -- I think we need

7 to know, what is Holly House Marketing?

8 Are they your marketing firm?

9 MR. ELLIS: They're not our marketing firm.

10 MR. GRIFFIN: So you think Holly House Marketing --

11 MR. ELLIS: No, I --

12 MR. GRIFFIN: -- just randomly contacted the media?

13 MR. ELLIS: I'm -- I'm more than happy to put this on

14 the record.

15 MR. GRIFFIN: Okay.

16 MR. ELLIS: So I knew that this could potentially be

17 a media storm. So I reached out to somebody so I would not

18 have to deal with them, with the press, and said, "I need you

19 to handle these people. Here you go."

20 MR. GRIFFIN: And who is that?

21 MR. ELLIS: That's -- that's the Holly Mar- -- that's

22 the Holly -- Ms. Holly Gribbs, or -- I think that's her name.

23 MR. GRIFFIN: So you did -- you did hire Holly House

24 Marketing.

25 MR. ELLIS: To handle the -- to handle the press. I

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1 did not want to handle the press. I said, "Hey, if the press

2 contacts you, you handle it."

3 MR. GRIFFIN: So you contact Holly House Marketing to

4 handle the press, and then when the press contacts you, you

5 issued a statement?

6 MR. ELLIS: I had a prepared statement, based on my

7 conversation with her, saying, "This is what I think we can do.

8 If the press contacts you, this is -- this is our -- you know,

9 this is our statement."

10 MR. GRIFFIN: I mean, Your Honor, I just think this

11 is outrageous.

12 THE COURT: So how does that -- how does that square

13 with -- with what the reporters said about them actually being

14 reached out to?

15 MR. ELLIS: I -- that part of it, Your Honor, that

16 was not -- I asked her to help us handle the press. So --

17 THE COURT: Okay.

18 MR. ELLIS: -- if she reached out to the press,

19 that's going to be on her.

20 MS. BLAIR: Can you clarify -- so did you hire the

21 marketing firm before you were ever contacted by the press in

22 the first instance?

23 MR. ELLIS: Yes, because I was preparing for the

24 press being here.

25 MS. BLAIR: Okay.

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1 that we can't begin today. I know that when you're a party to

2 litigation it's stressful and it's something you were probably

3 looking forward to getting over or getting past over the next

4 few days.

5 Same to you, Mr. and Ms. Sizemore.

6 This is something that I did not want to see happen.

7 So now I'm going to go apologize to the 42 or 43 potential

8 jurors that we called in and inconvenienced today.

9 We are adjourned. I will hear from you on the

10 issues that I raised. Thank you very much.

11 END OF PROCEEDINGS

12

13

14 I, Elizabeth B. Coffey, do hereby certify that I

15 reported in machine shorthand the proceedings in the

16 above-styled cause, and that this transcript is an accurate

17 record of said proceedings.

18 s/Elizabeth B. Coffey
Elizabeth B. Coffey,
19 Official Court Reporter

20

21

22

23

24

25

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

TRAVIS CLOSE and TINA CLOSE et al., )

)
Plaintiffs, ) No. 1:18-cv-110
)
v. ) JURY DEMAND
)
COOL RUNNINGS EXPRESS, INC., ) Judge Reeves
and BENJAMIN SCOTT BREWER, ) Magistrate Lee
)
Defendants. )

DECLARATION OF JOHN J. GRIFFIN, JR.

The undersigned, John J. Griffin, Jr., hereby declares as follows:

1. I am an adult resident of the State of Tennessee and have personal knowledge of

the matters set forth below.

2. I represent Cool Runnings Express, Inc. in this matter and submit this declaration

in connection with Defendants’ Motion for Costs.

3. My rate for this matter is $225.00 per hour. I performed 18.4 hours of service in

preparation for the trial of this matter for the time period from Sunday, May 30, 2021, through

Tuesday, June 1, 2021, including travel time to and from Chattanooga. The total attorney fee for

these dates of service is $4,140.00.

4. I incurred hotel charges (including parking) of $1,284.26, which included lodging

for Michael Johnson and Mr. and Mrs. Sizemore.

5. All of the fees and costs referenced herein were reasonable and necessary in

representing Cool Runnings Express, Inc. with regard to this matter.

1
EXHIBIT 3
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 I, John J. Griffin, Jr., declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

John J. Griffin, Jr.

07 / 06 / 2021
Date:

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 EXHIBIT 4
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Case 1:18-cv-00110-TRM-CHS Document 159-4 Filed 07/07/21 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

TRAVIS CLOSE and TINA CLOSE et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. 1:18-cv-110

v . JURY DEMAND

COOL RUNNINGS EXPRESS, INC., Judge Reeves

and BENJAMIN SCOTT BREWER, Magistrate Lee

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF BILLY SIZEMORE

The undersigned, Billy Sizemore, hereby declares as follows:

1. I am an adult resident of the State of Kentucky and have personal knowledge of

the matters set forth below.

2. I am the former president of Cool Runnings Express, Inc., which is no longer in

business, and submit this declaration in connection with Defendants' Motion for Costs.

4. I incurred mileage charges of $229.60 (calculated at the IRS rate) for travel to and

from Chattanooga on Sunday, May 31, 2021, and June 1, 2021. I also incurred meal expenses in

the amount of $94.66. My total expenses, therefore, were $324.26.

5. All of the fees and costs referenced herein were reasonable and necessary in

representing Cool Runnings Express, Inc. with regard to this matter.

I, Billy Sizemore, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXHIBIT 5
1

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 9+ 7 1 9+ 58
Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association - We are proud to announce that Chatta…

Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association

We are proud to announce that Chattanooga attorney Danny Ellis of Seattle Truck Law, PLLC is
this year's recipient of the TTLA Trial Lawyer of the Year Award!
The award is for a trial lawyer who is an advocate of a noble cause, and who demonstrated
superior skills and achieved an outstanding result for a client against great obstacles.

At law school, Mr. Ellis served as an editor for the law review and graduated near the top of his
class. He then began practicing law in Jackson, Tennessee. He quickly gained a reputation as
a fearsome courtroom advocate for his clients.
Soon after he began handling cases across West Tennessee. He achieved several notable
recoveries for his clients, including $500,000 in a tractor-trailer case and $350,000 in a rear-
end case where the victim suffered a cervical herniation. While living in Jackson, Mr. Ellis also
served on the city council and eventually rose to the position of vice mayor.

Mr. Ellis learned the value of compassion and sacrifice from his parents, two devoted
Christians who spent their prime years of life operating orphanages and children’s homes and
fostering children who had no family to care for them. As a result, he has a special passion for
helping children who have been deprived of the protection and guidance of their parents.
Away from the office, Mr. Ellis’ dedication to his community and helping children in need still
shines through. He and his wife Jennifer lead a children’s ministry at the Mountain Creek
Church of Christ in Chattanooga. The couple regularly bring their two children to attend
services at Mountain Creek, where Mr. Ellis also serves as a Bible class teacher and song
leader.

We featured Danny at the beginning of 2019 in our series #TTLAspotlight: https://

www.facebook.com/accesstocourts/posts/2389229734444878
Timeline Photos · Jun 30 ·

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