Philosophy of Science -

Theories and Methodologies of

Research
02. Problems of Inductivism
Dr. Bambang Kismono Hadi
FTMD - ITB
 The basic idea of inductivism (4)
Example: Predict how far a mass falls within one
second.
Law of free fall: d = (1/2) g t2 ; g = 9,8. Situation S0: t0 = 1
Therefore: d0 = 4,9 .
The conclusion follows “deductively” (or “by logical
deduction”) from the premises.
By means of this pattern, a K0 that has not yet
happened can be predicted if S0 and the general
hypotheses are known.
If K0 has happened, it can be explained by recourse
to S0 and the general hypotheses.
 The basic idea of inductivism (5)
b) Technical application
Technical action is doing one thing in order to realize another
thing
You want to generate an event of the type K
General statement: Whenever an event of type S, then an
event of type K (general hypothesis)
Thus: realize S0 and you will get K0.
Example: You want to regulate the level L of the lake.
Find the general relation among L and the relevant variables:
outflow, inflow, evaporation, etc. ( a model of the lake ).
Manipulate outflow such that the desired L results
 The basic idea of inductivism (6)
Thus according to inductivism, scientific research
consists of an inductive procedure by which
scientific hypotheses are gained, and logical
deductions from these hypotheses by which
predictions, explanations and the possibility of
technical applications are given.
Scientific knowledge is different from and more
reliable than other forms of knowledge because
the two steps that generate it are much more
rigorously controlled that the steps that lead to
other forms of knowledge.
 2.2 Historical Remarks
From about the beginning of modern science in
the 17th century and until the 20th century,
inductivism was so wide-spread that the
natural sciences were even called “inductive
sciences”.
 2.3 Normative versus descriptive
philosophy of science
There seem to be two principle ways of answering
the questions posed in 1: What is science ?
• One can make an empirical investigation into the
peculiarities of science by observing what
scientists really do ?
This would be a descriptive procedure.
• One may consider how science should proceed
in order to produce reliable knowledge.
This is a normative procedure.
 Normative versus descriptive
philosophy of science (2)
In section 2.1, we obviously followed a
normative procedure.
The resulting philosophy of science is therefore
called normative.
 2.1 The basic idea of inductivism
The problem of how to correctly generalize from singular
statements and the justification of this step is called “the
problem of induction”.

In dealing with this problem, inductivism states that

scientific knowledge is gained in a two step process:
Step one: carefully observe singular facts without any
theoretical prejudice (“theory free facts”) and articulate
them in singular observation sentences.
This singular observation statements can deliver an
objective, and therefore also inter-subjective, description
of facts.
 The basic idea of inductivism (2)
Step two: generalize singular observation
statements to general hypotheses (or ‘laws’,
‘theories’, ‘models’)
This step, the ‘inductive generalization’, is allowed if
the following three conditions are met:
C1: The number of observations must be large
C2: The observations must be made under very
different conditions.
C3: None of the observation statements must
contradict the general hypotheses.
 2.4 Problems of inductivism
There are six main problems that inductivism faces:
1. Condition C2, which constrains the possibility of
inductive generalizations, is vague and if taken
literally, can never be fulfilled: it is not clear which
conditions have to be varied and which do not.
If no directives are given, infinitely many conditions can
be varied such that one is never allowed to proceed to
the inductive generalization.
Example: Influence of garlic on the function of compasses
– was a real question in the 16th century!
 Problems of inductivism (2)
2. The observation of facts must be somehow
directed: only relevant facts should be observed.
But the evaluation of facts as relevant presupposes
theoretical elements.
Thus, it is impossible to really gather theory-free
facts that are relevant to the hypothesis in question.
Example: Without the difference between (physical)
solutions and (chemical) compounds, the inductive
generalization to the law of constant proportions is
impossible.
 Problems of inductivism (3)
3. Even a singular observation statement is not
theory-free.
For instance, a statement like “This is a plant of
species X” uses the concepts of “plant” and “species”.
These concepts are highly theory-laden: for
instance, plants are assumed to be distinct from
animals (among other things), and the concept of
species assumes that biological entities can be ordered
into fairly well-defined classes.
 Problems of inductivism (4)
4. The justification of the inductive
generalization is probably impossible.
Most attempts to justify it end up in circularities.
Example: Inductive generalizations are justified
because Nature is ordered by regularities (laws). But
how do you know that these regularities will hold in the
future ?
 Problems of inductivism (5)
5. According to inductivism, disagreement
between scientists can only be the result of
mistakes: a “rational disagreement” is
impossible.
This is highly implausible.
 Problems of inductivism (6)
6. Inductivism is certainly not generally valid.
For instance, it is impossible to gain knowledge
of the structure of DNA (or any other highly theoretical
scientific conception) by inductive generalization from
phenomena.
 Problems of inductivism (7)
Note that difficulties 2 and 3 are not deadly to
inductivism.
They show, however, that a build-up of scientific
knowledge from a theory-free basis is an illusion.
Thus, inductivism looses much of its attractiveness
because theoretical elements enter already at the level of
observation.
The position dealt with next, deductivism, tries to
draw consequences by allowing theoretical elements to
enter science at all levels, and by avoiding the inductive
generalization because it seems unjustifiable.