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Rem Notes 2 by Laguilles
Rem Notes 2 by Laguilles
REMEDIAL LAW
by
Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has
been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the
execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of
execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the
resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction
is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera, the Court penalized two judges for
issuing a TRO against the execution of a demolition order issued by another co-
equal court. The Court stressed that ―when the respondents-judges acted on
the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were
acting on matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu
City RTC, which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in
Civil Case No. 435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judges still opted to interfere
with the order of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in
blatant disregard of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom
in adjective law (Cabili v. Judge Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September
6, 2011).
While the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership
or possession de jure solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession de facto, it has no jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of
ownership and any pronouncement made by it on the question of ownership is
provisional in nature. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes
of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of
possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of
who has the right or title of ownership. We have held that although it was
proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of
ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate
with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by
ordering the cancellation of the TCT (Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manzo, G.R.
No. 163602, September 7, 2011).
Payment of docket and other fees within the period for taking an appeal
is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is
lost. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of
the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellate docket
fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes
final and executory as if no appeal was filed (D. M. Wenceslao and Associates,
Inc. v. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011).
The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment
of the prescribed docket fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction
over the claim. In an action where the reliefs sought are purely for sums of
money and damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate
amount being claimed. Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar pleading
must specify the sums of money to be recovered and the damages being sought
in order that the clerk of court may be put in a position to compute the correct
amount of docket fees.
is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of
the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is
criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts,
but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private
parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to
enforce such rights (Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155849, August 31,
2011)
EVIDENCE
PEOPLE V. HUBERT WEBB, G.R. NO. 176864, DECEMBER 14, 2010
DNA Evidence
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and,
consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela‘s rapist and killer but serious
questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken
from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise
of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint,
with the exception of identical twins. If, on examination, the DNA of the subject
specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that
simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro
committed perjury in saying that he did.
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Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to
produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in
Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in
Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process
does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of
the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who
testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the
same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb‘s application for DNA
testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two
occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge
alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused. They raised
the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by
the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a
motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication
of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime
passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused‘s lack of interest
in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice
that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over
the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and
foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it
would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the
U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel
between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about
twelve to fourteen hours.
Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive
evidence, refers to proof of collateral facts and circumstances whence the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
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As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC
admit the CA‘s Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the
same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is
rejected, the party producing it should ask the court‘s permission to have the exhibit
attached to the record.
As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case,
thus it has no probative weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded
and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of
procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to
evidence which was not formally offered (Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 175991,
August 31, 2011).
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Property Rights Not Protected by the Writ of Amparo
At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge
erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack‘s favor. Had he read Section
1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would
have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to ―extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.‖ The present case
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To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived
as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds (Salcedo v. Bollozos,
A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010).
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were
no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The
exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision
must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason—“to prevent
the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which
may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.”
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the
petition for habeas corpus on Merino‘s behalf. No objection was raised therein
for, in a habeas corpusproceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf
of the aggrieved party.
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of
Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino‘s behalf
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as they are not authorized parties under the Rule (Boac v. Cadapan, G.R. Nos.
184461-62 , May 31, 2011).
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, which was the first to examine command
responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the
doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:
assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse
to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is,
therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo (Canlas v.
NAPICO Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008).
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does
not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate
court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
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A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the
claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping (Sheker v. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December
13, 2007)
Change of Name
The ―change of name‖ contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103
must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one‘s name
under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to
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justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling
reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced
by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds
invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
This rule in ―names,‖ however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108
to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for
allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and
paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary
proceeding. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the
truths about the facts recorded therein (Republic of the Philippines v.
Mercadera, G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010).
Amp/2011